Court Reporting Data
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(1 week, 2 days ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the Courtsdesk court reporting data has been a great success in providing access to data from our courts. It has been reported that about 1,500 journalists have used the platform. It has proved particularly important in collating information about grooming gangs and in properly investigating that terrible issue. It would be extremely damaging to the transparency of our justice system if that service was to be extinguished.
Various excuses have been advanced by the Minister in the other place, despite her having announced in July of last year that the agreement with Courtsdesk would be continued. I highlight two of the excuses put forward. First, there is the allegation of a data breach. We now know that the Ministry of Justice data protection officer concluded, following investigation of that report, that there was no basis for a report to the Information Commissioner. Does the Minister agree with her department’s data protection officer? Secondly, there was an allegation of the sharing of data with a third-party AI company—I use the term “third party” advisedly. The data platform had contracted with an AI firm to carry out sub-processing in terms of an agreement. Does the Minister agree that, under Article 4(10) of the general data protection regulation, someone carrying out processing in terms of such an agreement is not to be regarded as a third party for the purposes of data protection?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt)
My Lords, I am in the happy position of being able to reassure your Lordships’ House that there is no cover-up or conspiracy. The facts are as follows. Courtsdesk, a commercial company, was given copies of the data held in magistrates’ courts’ registers for one purpose only: to share it with bona fide journalists. However, Courtsdesk then shared it with a third-party company without asking or even telling the Ministry of Justice. This data contained sensitive information about both defendants and victims.
When the Ministry of Justice found out that Courtsdesk had done this, it was less than transparent with us, at which point the Government did what any responsible Government would have done: we stopped sending copies of the data to Courtsdesk and required it to remove the copies it still had from its platform. I reassure your Lordships’ House that the original data has always been retained by the Ministry of Justice, and no records have been deleted or lost.
Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)
My Lords, this is a 10-minute Urgent Question, so questions must be brief. We will now move on to the Lib Dems.
Separation Centres Review
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(1 week, 3 days ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to respond to the Government’s Statement on separation centres and the independent review by Jonathan Hall KC. While the review itself contains important material, we must be frank about several critical issues that have been raised both in and out of Parliament.
First, on the fundamental question of what threat we are talking about when discussing the need for separation centres, the reality is clear. Islamist extremism remains the predominant form of extremist offending within our prison estate. As the shadow Justice Secretary pointed out in the other place, Security Service statistics show that Islamist-related threats form the majority of the counterterrorism focus, and most terrorist prisoners in custody are convicted on Islamist-related charges. This is not a matter of debate but an acknowledgement of the practical threat that separation centres are designed to contain, and it must inform both policy and parliamentary scrutiny.
Secondly, we have concerns about the Government’s stated intention to look at litigation based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While that may offer superficial reassurance, it is in fact Article 3 of the convention that is the real legal barrier. Article 3 is absolute. There are no exceptions, no public order or national security carve-outs and no limited derogations. It prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the strongest terms, as that may be interpreted.
We have already seen its damaging consequences in our own courts. In the case of Abu v Secretary of State for Justice, the High Court found that prolonged segregation of a convicted terrorist, who was already in a separation centre, amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3. It was found that Ministers had failed to account for his mental health needs adequately before imposing those conditions. This was a binding judicial judgment, applying the European convention directly to the operation of separation regimes in England and Wales.
Let us be clear: Article 3 cannot be overridden or restricted by statute or ministerial policy; it is absolute. No amount of legislative tweaking proposed by the Justice Secretary will permit separation conditions that our courts find contravene Article 3. If the Government’s strong desire is to insulate separation centre management from litigation, they will find that Article 3 presents the true legal limit, far beyond anything provided by Article 8, which is a qualified act. I therefore ask the Minister to confirm precisely what steps the Government intend to take in relation to Article 3. How, in practical and legal terms, do they plan to deal with the fact that the law, as it stands, prohibits what is interpreted to be inhuman or degrading treatment, even in the face of compelling public safety arguments?
In these circumstances, while we want to ensure that our prisons are safe, that our staff are protected and that dangerous offenders cannot radicalise others or cause greater mayhem, clearly there is a fundamental problem with the legal constraints imposed by the convention, and the Government need to address these.
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, when it comes to the basic question that has already been raised today—the European Convention on Human Rights—I am afraid that my Benches very much disagree with the noble and learned Lord who has just spoken. It was Churchill who said that it is the way you treat your prisoners that defines you as civilised. So are we going to make sure that we define their rights? If we look at this in practical terms, how are we going to balance this out?
If we are going to make sure that the prison officers in charge of this are safe—that is surely one of the most important parts here—when will the Minister be able to tell us whether we have gone through the improved training programmes that have been suggested and when they will have the equipment they need? These are two fundamental things.
The secure centres mean that we are not going to allow this highly dangerous section of prisoners into the main prison population, which is right; radicalisation has always been a problem in prisons, and we are doing something to stop it here. It is not only Islamic terrorists but far-right extremists—I think it was 60%, 30% and then 10% of other groups, if I understood the figures right. What are we doing to make sure these people are isolated and do not make the situation worse, and are we going to make sure that those who are containing it are properly equipped? That is the basic question here.
I appreciate that the Government have moved and have accepted Jonathan Hall’s recommendations. The timeframe is very important, as then we will know what we are going to expect from the Government and will be able to judge how it has succeeded. I hope that the Minister will be able to answer these basic questions in fairly short order.
Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsMonday 9th February 2026
(1 week, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 141-I(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (6 Feb 2026)
Lord Keen of Elie
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the rationale behind restricting the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing to only the Crown Courts.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments in my name relates to Clauses 1 and 2. I start by observing that we on these Benches are broadly supportive of most of the provisions in the Bill. Many of the amendments tabled in my name, save one or two exceptions, have the aim of strengthening the Bill’s existing provisions rather than removing them. The use of reasonable force to compel attendance at sentencing hearings was a measure first proposed by the previous Conservative Government in the Criminal Justice Bill, which fell at the Dissolution of Parliament. It is, therefore, a policy that we on these Benches strongly support.
As the Government have consistently said, victims and their families deserve to see justice done. They deserve to hear directly those remarks which explain the court’s reasons for the sentences that are being imposed, and they deserve the chance to face their offenders and have their own voices heard in open court. In that spirit, many of the amendments in my name probe details of Clauses 1 and 2, and question how they would operate in practice. These clauses set out the statutory powers for judges to order an offender to attend court for their sentencing hearing, by reasonable force if necessary. As we have heard previously, offenders who refuse to attend their sentencing hearing thereby insult their victims. Offenders should not be able to undermine the final moment of justice in such a way. The amendments in this group ask the important question of why the Government are not taking this opportunity to expand the applicability of Clauses 1 and 2, given their upcoming and substantial court reforms.
I understand that the application only to the Crown Court in these clauses is the same as the approach taken in our Criminal Justice Bill, but I point out a crucial difference between the positions of the last Government and this Government. When this clause was originally proposed, there were no plans to alter the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ courts. However, this Government are now proposing to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to three years, thereby shifting a large number of cases away from the Crown Court towards magistrates. As such, magistrates will hear a much greater proportion of increasingly serious cases, which surely throws into question the application and scope of Clauses 1 and 2.
In fact, this is a different contextual background from not only that of the previous Government but that of this Government. The Bill was introduced in the other place before the Government announced their court reforms. So, as published, Clauses 1 and 2 would have permitted the compulsory attendance of an offender for sentences between one year and three years. Now, however, if the Bill is unamended, and the Government’s court reforms go ahead, a person convicted in a magistrates’ court for an offence that would have previously been heard only before a Crown Court will not be required to attend their sentencing hearing.
If it was previously the Government’s view that offenders facing between one and three years’ imprisonment should be subject to compulsory attendance at their sentencing hearing, why have they not made the necessary amendments to the Bill? Perhaps that is because they have changed their mind, in which case the Minister should be clear about that. If it is the Government’s position that the scope of offenders who should be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing should remain the same as when the Bill was introduced, they must surely accept these amendments. The question that then arises is: why stop at the Crown Court, when extending these powers to other courts could make a meaningful and positive difference to the victims of other crimes?
We should not dismiss the experience of victims of, for example, burglary. Requiring an offender to attend their sentencing hearing may give those victims just as much closure. Conversely, an offender refusing to attend could cause just as much insult, if this series of amendments is not accepted. If anything, by reserving these powers for the Crown Court only, we risk playing down the significance of other crimes by signalling that offenders do not have to face their victims. Extending these powers to other courts would not only provide greater consistency but show that no crime is more permissible than another, or that one victim’s experience is not more or less important than another’s. If the rationale is one of practicality or resource, the Government should make that case. If, however, there is no compelling reason, whether it be legal, procedural or financial, the Bill presents an ideal opportunity to address a gap, rather than requiring further primary legislation later on down the line after court reform has been implemented.
If the Government’s intention is to strengthen victims’ confidence in the criminal justice system, surely consistency must be at the heart of that ambition. Victims do not experience crime through the lens of jurisdictional boundaries. They experience the indignity of being wronged and they rightly expect the justice system to deal with offenders in a manner that recognises that harm each time, regardless of which court is sentencing. It is for these reasons that I believe the Government should revisit the decision to confine these powers solely to the Crown Court; otherwise, the Bill risks creating a two-tier system, where the victims of some crimes are afforded the closure of seeing justice done in person, while others are denied it for reasons that are administrative rather than principled.
I would be grateful if the Minister could also clarify what consideration has been given to victims’ expectations and their confidence in the justice process when limiting these powers to the Crown Court. I hope that the Minister will reflect on these points and consider whether there is scope for a more ambitious and comprehensive approach. I look forward to her response and to working to strengthen this legislation for the benefit of all victims. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I will make a brief observation about the amendment. The exercise of this power by a judge is never going to be easy, and we should be very cautious about the way this is introduced. Let us first see how it works with people who have the experience of handling what, in the circumstances, will be a very difficult position before we move on to doing it in all courts. This power must be confined to those cases where it is really necessary, because I think that a number of us who have had experience of this would be very worried indeed if this power came to be routinely deployed.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, explores the reasons for limiting this power to the Crown Court.
Before I begin, I am sure that the whole Committee will wish to join me in paying tribute to the families of Jan Mustafa, Henriett Szucs, Sabina Nessa, Zara Aleena, and Olivia Pratt-Korbel—whose mother and aunt sit below the Bar today. Their tireless campaigning has brought about this change. They have persuaded the Government that when a cowardly offender refuses to attend court, it causes anger and upset, which can feel like a final insult to victims and their families, who have sat through the trial waiting for the moment when they can tell the world—and, importantly, the offender—about the impact their crimes have had. Many of them want the opportunity to look the offender in the eye as he or she hears about the effects of what they have done.
Offenders are expected to attend court for sentence, and the overwhelming majority do so. Because magistrates’ courts hear less serious cases, offenders are more likely to be on bail, and where an offender is on bail, the courts have powers to compel attendance by issuing a warrant. When a warrant is issued, the defendant is brought before the court in custody for the warrant to be executed, and the judge can add an additional sentence for the offence of failing to surrender to bail, which will appear on their record in future.
However, in the Crown Court, which deals only with the top level of serious crime, offenders are much more often remanded in custody, and so court powers to get them physically into court are more restricted. That is why the Government have acted by bringing forward this legislation which gives three powers that can be used in relation to recalcitrant—that is the right word, as used by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—offenders: first, authorising the use of reasonable force, except in the case of children, because we are a civilised country, and this Government do not believe in using force on children; secondly, for offenders who still refuse to attend, or for those who are disruptive once they are there, the power to add an additional sentence; and, thirdly, the power to impose the same kinds of prison sanctions as a prison governor can impose.
However, getting an unwilling and often disruptive offender to court is by no means straightforward, and it inevitably causes a delay to the sentencing hearing for the following reasons. At the outset, the judge will have to hear submissions from prosecution and defence counsel, as well as possibly from the prison and escort staff, as to whether the offender has a reasonable excuse for non-attendance and, if not, whether to exercise these new statutory powers. Then the judge will need to give a ruling, giving reasons as to why, in the circumstances of that particular case, it would be necessary, reasonable and proportionate to use reasonable force to get the offender to court.
Then the prison and transport staff will have to go and get the prisoner from the place, whether it is a prison or a court cell, which they are refusing to leave. The prison and transport staff will then have to use their judgment as to how best to execute the judge’s ruling, including what degree of force to use. Finally, if the offender is forced into court and is then disruptive, this is likely to cause more delay while the judge decides what to do next.
There is probably one thing we can all agree on: the criminal courts do not need any additional delays. Judges will need to weigh up carefully whether and when to use their new powers. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the question of the inherent powers that courts already have. Both the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts have inherent powers to deal with a non-attendance as a contempt of court, but these are used sparingly because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out very powerfully, it is far from straightforward.
For these reasons, the Government’s view is that this new legislation is appropriately restricted to Crown Court sentencing. It represents a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem, because it is the Crown Court where these powers are needed. Operational arrangements are already in place for producing the most serious and violent offenders at the Crown Court, managing the risks that that involves and, where necessary, using proportionate force. So, for these reasons, we consider that expanding the power to magistrates’ courts might create legal and operational uncertainty and unnecessary delay to court proceedings. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to the debate, and indeed the observations with regard to the timing of any extension of these powers.
I would observe, with respect to the submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that if these provisions help victims in the Crown Court, it is not clear why they would not help victims in magistrates’ courts.
The Minister talked at length of the difficulty of implementation with regard to these provisions, but that would apply equally in the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts. Indeed, the appearance of serious offenders in the magistrates’ courts will of course be an immediate development with the changes under the Sentencing Act, which extend the sentencing powers of magistrates to three years.
Lord Keen of Elie
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes why the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing applies to offenders aged 18 and above.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst propose that the provisions in Clauses 1 and 2 apply to offenders from the age of 16, rather than only to those aged 18 and over. As drafted, Clauses 1 and 2 are explicitly limited in their application to those aged 18 or over. That is a departure from the original Conservative proposal for this power, which would have required the court to consult the relevant youth offending team if the offender in question was under 18. We therefore believe that the blanket threshold of 18 should be examined.
The age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is, of course, 10 years of age. Even if it is believed that the age of criminal responsibility might reasonably be set higher than 10—a subject of recent debate in this Chamber—there is widespread cross-party consensus that it should be significantly lower than 18. Indeed, Scotland, after extensive consultation and careful consideration, chose to set the age of criminal responsibility at 14, reflecting evidence of developmental science and, indeed, public expectations in the field of criminal law.
A 16 year-old who has been convicted of a serious offence will be expected to go before a Crown Court judge to receive their sentence, yet will face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing under these provisions. That appears inconsistent with the intent of these provisions.
We have seen both in recent cases and in parliamentary proceedings on this Bill how deeply distressing and unfortunate it can be for victims and families when an offender refuses to face the court at sentencing, an act described by Ministers as a “final insult” to those already traumatised. It is difficult to articulate why someone aged 16 who has been found guilty of a serious offence should be exempt from measures designed to ensure that they confront the consequences of their own criminal actions.
We should also reflect upon the wider tapestry of civic responsibility that has developed, and which this Government would also confer upon 16 year-olds. The Government have proposed to lower the voting age to 16. Someone aged 16 can marry; they can pay tax and join the Armed Forces. They assume a suite of responsibilities in civil society. They are treated as autonomous agents in a host of legal and social contexts, and to exempt them uniquely in this narrow but important sphere from the requirement to attend their own sentencing hearing when convicted of a crime appears inconsistent with those wider developments.
We owe it to victims and to the public to ensure that the measures we put on statute reflect a coherent and principled approach. These amendments ensure that they align with the realities of criminal responsibility and the Government’s wider policy. Someone who commits a serious crime at 16, such as murder or serious violence, should not be placed beyond the reach of these important attendant provisions. That is the inconsistency which appears to us in the present form of Clauses 1 and 2.
Accountability cannot be robust at conviction and sentencing in substance but simply optional at the point of sentencing in practice. We have seen very recent examples of relatively young people aged 15 and 16 committing the most heinous offences, in some instances murder. There can be no doubt, of course, that the existing framework for youth justice should be maintained and remain separate and distinct from these provisions. Nevertheless, when it comes to those of 16 years and older, their personal conduct does take them before the Crown Court. They appear there for sentencing and there is no principled justification for differentiating on the basis of age alone between 16 and 18 when culpability and legal responsibility have already been established. With that in mind, I respectfully commend these amendments.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, briefly, these amendments would treat offenders over the age of 16 in the same way as offenders over the age of 18 in relation to three aspects of the compulsory attendance regime. The first aspect is the requirement that the court consult a youth offending team before making an order; the second is the use of force against young offenders, and the third is the use of prison sanctions in the case of service offenders.
The Member’s Explanatory Statement explains that these amendments probe why these provisions apply only to offenders over the age of 18. The position that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has taken is that they should apply to everyone over the age of 16. I suggest that the answer to the question is that, modest as they are, these provisions make different arrangements for offenders under 18 because they are designed to protect 16 and 17 year-old offenders, who are children and not yet adults. I submit, and we on these Benches believe, that it is right that contemporary criminal justice attempts to treat offenders under 18 in a way that acknowledges the particular vulnerabilities of 16 and 17 year-olds.
In the first group of amendments today, the noble Baroness said that the Government broadly agree with that position. The amendments seek to remove the distinction between 16 and 17 year-olds on the one hand and adults, albeit young adults, on the other. We say that this would be a retrograde step and that it should be opposed. I would add that of the measures that are proposed in the amendments, those sanctioning the use of force against 16 year-olds—to bring them to sentencing hearings against their will—would be particularly egregious and potentially very damaging.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start by reassuring your Lordships’ House that an attendance order can be made in respect of all offenders, including children. Most children are not tried in the Crown Court; they are tried in the youth court, even for serious offences. It is very rare for children of this age to appear in the Crown Court. If they do, an attendance order for their sentencing hearing can be made. The only difference is that force will not be used to get those children to court. The reason is that current operational policy, informed by the Taylor review of 2020, restricts the use of force on children. Domestic policy is also informed by the UK Government’s signatory status to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We have committed to complying with its duties under the convention. During the debate a week ago in your Lordships’ House on the age of criminal responsibility, I said that this Government recognise that children in the youth justice system can be some of our most vulnerable citizens. Many of them are themselves victims of neglect and abuse, at the very least, and there is a disproportionate occurrence of special educational needs and neurodivergence in this cohort.
While we acknowledge that some children have committed very serious crimes for which they must be punished, this Government do not treat them merely as small adults. We have devised a separate but related regime for them. Where a child fails to attend court, or is disruptive once there, that may be treated as a contempt of court, but the maximum penalty is a fine, with the court taking into account limited means and making relevant arrangements for younger children. Lowering the threshold from 18 to 16 would cut across that safeguarding architecture. The Government’s view is that the strongest coercive path should be reserved for adults, where the legal, operational and ethical framework properly supports their use. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendments.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their measured observations on these proposed amendments. There is broad agreement across the House that attendance at sentencing is about accountability, about dignity for victims and about respect for the court. Refusal to attend sentencing has rightly been described by Ministers as a final insult to victims and families. The question before the House, then, is not whether the principle is right but to whom it should be applied.
These provisions are about ensuring that offenders confront the consequences of their actions, allowing victims to see justice done and hear sentencing remarks. They also uphold the authority and integrity of the court.
We are dealing with a situation in which 16 and 17 year-olds find themselves prosecuted in the Crown Court for serious offences, including murder, in respect of which they receive long custodial sentences. A 16 year-old can be convicted of murder or serious violence; that same 16 year-old would face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing. Accountability cannot logically begin at conviction, however, and then disappear at sentencing. From a victim’s perspective, the same harm emerges regardless of whether an offender is 16, 17 or 18 years of age. The distress caused when an offender refuses to attend sentencing does not diminish by virtue of their age.
There is also the wider policy context that I mentioned before, which is that we now treat 16 year-olds, in essence, as adults in respect both of the proposal that they should be able to vote and of the fact that they can marry and can join the Armed Forces, and in respect of their wider social and political autonomy.
These amendments do not impact on the youth justice system. They do not remove judicial discretion. The courts will always retain discretion and take account of the welfare, capacity and safeguarding of 16 year-olds. In these circumstances, it respectfully appears to us that this proposal does not undermine Clauses 1 and 2, but rather seeks to strengthen them for the benefit of victims: someone whose conduct is serious enough to warrant Crown Court sentencing should not be shielded from accountability at the point of sentencing. But, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions that have been made. I shall begin with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, in his amendments, which seek to clarify what is meant by, for example, the “relevant local authority” in this Bill, as well as to put extra provisions in place concerning parental responsibility. We support the aim behind Amendment 17 that others with parental responsibility for the child in question are properly and, indeed, promptly informed if a prohibited steps order is made against an offender. These are clearly well-intentioned amendments that highlight that certain aspects of the Bill need to be thought through a little more carefully and clarified. I hope that the Minister will provide assurances about how that can be achieved.
I also thank my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for bringing forward his amendments, which would allow the Crime Court to take into account not only the interests of justice but the best interests of the child when deciding whether to make a prohibited steps order. On these amendments, we are not at this stage able to adopt a settled position. That is not because the underlying principle is unsound, but because further clarification is required from the Minister. As drafted, one of the exemptions to the making of a prohibited steps order is where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, but that, as has been observed, is a broad and somewhat opaque formulation. We would be grateful if the Minister could explain what circumstances the Government envisage falling within that exemption. In particular, can the Minister offer examples of cases in which it would genuinely be in the interests of justice for a child to remain under the parental responsibility of an individual convicted of a serious sexual offence and sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment?
These amendments would add an explicit reference to the best interests of the child. That is a familiar concept in family law, but its interaction with the existing exemption is not at all clear. I invite the Minister to clarify whether the Government consider that the child’s best interests are already subsumed within the interests of justice, or whether this amendment would materially alter the test applied by the court.
Amendments 18, 20, 24, 30, 31 and 32 in my name reflect our concerns about the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. As drafted, both clauses state that a prohibited steps order against an offender that restricts their parental responsibility will not immediately cease to have effect if an offender is acquitted on appeal. Instead, both clauses include sections that set out a review process whereby the relevant local authority must make an application to the court for the acquitted offender. That is hardly consistent with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to as a short, speedy and summary order in circumstances where there is a successful appeal.
The clauses as drafted unnecessarily complicate and confuse the issue. The law should be clear that an acquittal brings the prohibited steps order to an end. People who are found to be not guilty of an offence should not have their parental responsibility, or indeed any other rights, restricted, even on a temporary basis. That principle is straightforward and our amendments seek only to ensure that the legislation reflects that clarity. I hope that will have the support of the House, and I urge the Minister to reconsider and simplify the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. There is no compelling reason why these review orders should be left in place for innocent citizens and then be the subject of applications by a local authority on their behalf to another division of the court.
Amendment 18 is tabled to affirm our support for the provision of Clause 3 that, where an offender only has their sentence reduced, a prohibited steps order should continue to apply. We on these Benches already have reservations over why an offender’s length of imprisonment or detention must be four years or more for parental responsibility to be restricted. I note that the amendment made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, refers to a period of six months rather than four years. Clearly, there is scope for consideration as to where the line might be drawn as a matter of policy. If a sentence of four years is reduced on appeal, we do not believe that this should result in a prohibited steps order ceasing to have effect. It is quite unlike the situation where there is an acquittal on appeal. Such an outcome could create significant uncertainty for the child for whom the offender previously had parental responsibility. Crucially, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the offender remains guilty of a serious sexual offence against the child regardless of any adjustment in the sentence. An increased risk to the child’s safety or well-being could well emerge from such a situation.
There is also the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, about what happens in circumstances where a sentence is increased under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. I invite the Government to address that point because clearly it has not been considered in the context of the present drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. For these reasons, I hope the Government will take all these amendments very seriously and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start by repeating what I said in the debate about an earlier group. A prohibited steps order is not intended to be an additional punishment; rather, it is a tool devised to protect children. The aim of keeping the child safe and doing what is best for them is the central factor in every case. As I have already said, these powers are not intended to replicate, far less replace, the powers of the family court. Crown Court judges are simply not trained to make decisions about children, and they do not have the time to do so. The point has been made most powerfully by both the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. To ask the Crown Court to replicate the procedures of the family court could lead only to more time being needed to consider every case. As I have now said on at least three occasions today, the one thing the Crown Courts do not need is for cases to take longer.
Lord Keen of Elie
“(d) the National Crime Agency.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds the National Crime Agency to the list of relevant bodies.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this group which concern the operation of Clauses 6 and 7 and the scope and operation of the victim contact scheme. I turn first to Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I recognise the intention behind this amendment and the principle that underpins it: that victims whose close family members have been murdered, killed unlawfully or subjected to infanticide abroad should not find themselves falling between the cracks of the victims’ code simply because the offence occurred outside the United Kingdom. There is a strong case for ensuring that any victim should receive clear information and appropriate support on how to engage with the criminal justice system. The amendment seeks to give effect to that principle by requiring an appendix to the victims’ code setting out how it applies in such circumstances.
That said, it is also right to acknowledge that this amendment raises practical and operational questions that would need careful consideration. These include questions about jurisdiction, the extent to which criminal justice processes are engaged domestically, and how responsibilities would be allocated between domestic agencies and those overseas. I therefore look to the Minister to address how the Government would envisage this operating in practice while recognising and engaging with the important principle that the amendment seeks to advance.
Amendments 47A and 47B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, extend the definition of “victim” to include those who have experienced persistent antisocial behaviour meeting the statutory threshold for an antisocial behaviour case review. They also create a victim identifier linked to compliance with the victims’ code across criminal justice agencies. Both proposals are ideas that I am sure will instigate interesting debate; I look forward to hearing the noble Lord expand on them, and the Government’s response.
Amendments 56 and 57 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby—which may or may not be spoken to—concern transparency and accountability in decisions taken by hospital managers not to disclose information requested under Sections 44F or 44K. Clearly, if hospital managers are to be entrusted with the discretion to withhold information in cases that may directly affect victim safety, it is entirely reasonable that there should be clear written reasons for such decisions and a meaningful route to appeal. Transparency in decision-making is essential, not only for victims but for other parties, such as the Probation Service, which are tasked with managing risks.
I turn to Amendments 36 and 37 in my name. Amendment 36 is a technical amendment that adds the National Crime Agency to the list of relevant bodies to which Clause 6 does not apply. Given the National Crime Agency’s distinct operational role and intelligence-handling functions, it may be appropriate that it be expressly included in that provision. I hope the Government will see this amendment as a sensible clarification rather than as a point of contention.
Amendment 37 would require the Secretary of State to extend the victim contact scheme to certain categories of victim who are currently excluded from it—victims of offenders sentenced to less than 12 months for violent and sexual offences; victims of coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking or harassment; and bereaved families in cases of manslaughter or death by dangerous driving. It would also require information to be communicated in a timely manner and for annual data to be published on the scheme’s uptake and accessibility.
The importance of this amendment has only been heightened by recent legislative developments. The Sentencing Bill, which has now passed, represented a marked shift in sentencing policy, particularly through the automatic and blanket presumption against short custodial sentences, regardless of offence type. During the passage of that legislation, particularly in debate in this House, a number of noble Lords repeatedly raised the consequences for victims. Although the Government may respond by saying that in exceptional circumstances this presumption may be overturned, the reality is rather clearer. An increasing number of offenders convicted of violent and sexual offences will now serve their sentences in the community, rather than in custody.
From the victim’s perspective, that is not an abstract policy choice. It has immediate and practical consequences for their perception of justice being served, for their sense of safety, for their ability to plan their lives and for their need to receive appropriate information. Under the current framework, many of these victims are excluded from the victim contact scheme because the custodial threshold is not met. That is now, I suggest, a glaring inconsistency in the light of the Government’s Sentencing Act. If anything, victims whose offenders are serving sentences in the community have a greater need for timely, accurate and trauma-informed information, not a lesser one. Further, without timeliness the scheme risks becoming meaningless. Information provided late is often information too late to be of use, and, without transparencies, such as through the publication of annual data on uptake and accessibility, there can be no meaningful accountability for offenders or for the Government.
We now live in a sentencing landscape that places a far greater reliance on community supervision. The Government have said that they expect to more or less double the number of people being tagged rather than incarcerated. The need for transparency and accurate data has never been more pressing. Amendment 37 insists that, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it must accept the corresponding responsibility to support and protect victims properly. In the absence of custody, robust victim engagement is really not an option; it is essential. I therefore urge the Government to engage seriously with this amendment and, if they are minded to resist it, explain how victims are to be adequately protected in a system that is going to leave an increasing number of offenders in the community. I beg to move.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 42, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay; to the two amendments in my name, Amendments 47A and 47B—I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for adding her name to them; and to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, on which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, may speak to us by some supernatural means. I am not quite sure, but the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I will try to cover it.
I point out that what all these amendments have in common is that they have been laid with the active engagement and support of the Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman. The Minister mentioned that she knows and has a high regard for her. Rather than going on at great length about each amendment, although I am sure that your Lordships are dying to hear about them, I suspect that it would be better to have follow-up meetings involving Claire Waxman to go into the detail as to why she feels, and we feel, that these amendments are important enough to raise in Committee.
On bereaved victims of murder abroad, as in Amendment 42, we covered this ground in previous legislation when we attempted to get it into a Bill. My noble friend Lady Finlay will be able to go into much more detail about this but, in essence, we are dealing with a slight anomaly in the way that victims are treated. On average per annum, between 80 and 90 individuals who are UK citizens are murdered while they are abroad. At the moment, the experience of their families when those unfortunate incidents happen ranges from quite good to absolutely appalling. That is because there is no consistency in the way they are treated.
The Government have made attempts to get their house in order on what happens within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction. Where we seem to have an issue is in getting the FCDO to apply a form of guidance, and above all training, across its key consulates in the areas where these incidents take place to ensure that those consulates are properly equipped, if and when such a tragedy appears, to deal with it effectively and consistently. The experience from the victims whose loved ones have been murdered abroad is that, in some cases, the consulates are absolutely brilliant and go out of their way to be helpful, while in other instances the victim truly is left entirely on their own. In particular, if this has happened when the partner of the person who has been murdered is abroad, they may find no help whatever and not be familiar with the language of that country. You can imagine the complexity and agony of trying to deal with all of that, on top of the shock of having had somebody very close to you murdered. However, my noble friend will go into that in more detail.
What Amendments 47A and 47B have in common is that for certain victims of antisocial behaviour, when that behaviour really is persistent—it often conforms to an escalating pattern—and has a deep effect on the victim, there is not consistency at the moment in the way that is dealt with. Amendment 47A tries to ensure that the authorities are more effective in identifying that pattern of behaviour and are able to join the dots, put them together and recognise that the behaviour has triggered a threshold at which proper support and access to victim services should be allowed.
Again, Amendment 47B is about joining up the dots. The way in which antisocial behaviour is dealt with is that it might come to the attention of the police, or it might come to the attention of a local authority or a housing association. There is no consistent way of that information, first, being recorded in a consistent and helpful manner, and, secondly, being communicated across those different boundaries in a way that enables whichever of those three jurisdictions is looking at the pattern of behaviour to pull the evidence together that it needs to understand exactly what has been going on. This is a request for a unique identifier for each victim which would, I hope, be the start of a process to enable that information to be channelled in a more consistent and co-ordinated manner. That would obviously be helpful to the victims, but also extremely helpful to whichever authority is trying to identify just how severe that pattern of antisocial behaviour is, and whether the effect it is having on the subject—the victim—is sufficient for it to trigger comprehensive wraparound support.
Lastly, I will deal with the three amendments that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will deal with in more detail. They concern where somebody in one’s family has been murdered by an individual who is identified as mentally disordered and who is then detained because of their mental disorder. The ability of the victims to get access to the sort of information which they can get from the Prison Service and the courts is completely different from what is able to be accessed from the hospital system. Again, some hospitals and hospital managers go out of their way to be understanding and helpful, and try to give the victims whatever succour and information they can. Others refuse point blank. They say that a variety of laws and processes prevent them doing that and that they are not at liberty to do it. All that we and the Victims’ Commissioner are asking is to look at this closely.
Julian Hendy, the founder of an organisation called Hundred Families, is very involved in this; he can give chapter, book and verse. First, we need to establish just how much of a problem this is, perhaps through meetings. Secondly, what are the different ways in which we might do something about it? Thirdly, how complicated is that: does it need to be in primary legislation, or are there other ways of doing it?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
This Government have not been in power over the whole of the last of the decade, and we are doing our best to look at it. I will certainly look at it and discuss it with her. We are simply saying that, at this stage, we do not think primary legislation is the right way of dealing with it.
Finally, I turn to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, in the names of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who is not in his place, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. Before I do, let me say that I recently had the privilege of meeting with Emma Webber and with Julian Hendy of Hundred Families. They explained very clearly to me the issues as they see them, and it was a very moving experience. I pay tribute to their strength and honour the memories of those they have lost. Their experiences, along with the experiences of all victims of crime, must continue to guide us.
Part of the rationale for providing information to victims is to help them to feel safe and so they can plan for an offender’s eventual release or discharge. That is why the legislation requires that hospital managers provide victims with specified information where appropriate, regardless of any assessment by a hospital manager of the victim’s safety and well-being, because we acknowledge that the hospital manager’s assessment could well be different from the victim’s own assessment.
Where hospital managers receive a request for information from an eligible victim outwith the specified list within the Bill, they will consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to provid it, and this assessment can of course include considering the risk to the victim. Where there are specific concerns about a victim’s safety, there are other, more appropriate processes to be followed. It is important to note that this is not the primary purpose of the victim contact scheme.
Where a decision is made that it is not appropriate to provide some information, reasons can and should be provided wherever possible. However, these should reflect the victim’s communication preferences, and considerations about this would, in our view, be most appropriately set out in operational guidance, which would also provide the necessary flexibility to adjust requirements as we monitor practice.
We agree that victims should have a route for some recourse where information is not provided. There are existing complaint routes for all cohorts, and the Government consider that a more effective way of going about this would be to make sure hospital managers understand and fulfil their obligations to victims at the outset, rather than introducing additional bureaucracy. My officials are working closely with the Department of Health and Social Care to consider routes by which to support hospital managers, including whether a joint departmental protocol, or via planned updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice—statutory guidance under the Mental Health Act 1983—might provide an appropriate vehicle.
In relation to all the amendments in this group and many of the others, we are listening and we want to get it right. We will continue to work with your Lordships and with victims’ groups, but for now I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this wide-ranging and thoughtful debate on the operation of the victim contact scheme and the wider support network for victims. The debate has demonstrated broad consensus on the principle that victims’ rights and access to information must keep pace with changes in sentencing policy and criminal justice practice. The question is not whether victim engagement matters but whether our current structures are fit for purpose in the systems we now operate.
Several amendments in the group had common concerns: gaps in coverage within the victims’ code and the victim contact scheme; lack of transparency, consistency and accountability in how information is provided; the risk that victims fall through the cracks; and the technical thresholds or institutional boundaries that exist. Taken together, these amendments seek to ensure that victim support is timely, trauma-informed, consistent and capable of scrutiny. The amendments also recognise that, among others, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it assumes a greater, not a lesser, responsibility to support victims. Victim engagement must be strengthened not weakened in a non-custodial sentencing landscape. I therefore urge the Government to consider carefully how victims are to be protected and informed under current policy. In the meantime, I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.
Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsMonday 9th February 2026
(1 week, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 141-I(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (6 Feb 2026)
Lord Keen of Elie
“Victim personal statements(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue revised guidance on the content of victim personal statements.(2) The revised guidance issued under subsection (1) must stipulate that when making a victim personal statement, a victim must be able to say anything they wish about the defendant, provided it is not contrary to any statutory limitations on free speech, makes allegations of untried criminal conduct or is disorderly language.(3) The court must disregard any prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review how to make victim personal statements less restrictive and clarify what can be included.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 39 in my name would require the Secretary of State to issue revised guidance on victim personal statements, clarifying what victims may include and ensuring that the courts appropriately disregard prejudicial material.
Victim personal statements are a valuable and important part of our criminal justice process. They allow victims to articulate in their own words the impact that a crime has had on them and on their families. This personal element is often deeply cathartic and can provide a sense of agency in a system that victims have described as otherwise procedural and somewhat distant. However, as this Bill was scrutinised in the other place, it became clear that many victims and practitioners find the current approach to personal statements unclear and, in some cases, unnecessarily restrictive.
Members spoke of victims feeling that they were sometimes advised to omit heartfelt and deeply personal material from their statements. These omissions were not for any legal reason, but appeared to be due to an overly cautious interpretation of the guidance. There is also a concern that victims do not always understand what is and is not permissible, and that this lack of clarity can undermine their confidence in the entire process.
One recurring theme from previous debates is that victims should not be left uncertain about what they can and cannot say, nor should they feel that their legitimate expressions of harm are being suppressed for procedural reasons. At the same time, the amendment acknowledges the equally important principle that personal statements must not be vehicles for
“allegations of untried criminal conduct”,
or material that is contrary to
“statutory limitations on free speech”
or due process. It is designed precisely to strike the appropriate balance. It would not remove any existing safeguards. It simply asks the Secretary of State to revisit and clarify the guidance governing the content of personal statements in a way that gives victims clarity and a genuine sense of voice.
The amendment would require revised guidance to be issued within six months of the Bill passing. The revised guidance must stipulate that, when making a victim personal statement, the victim should be able to say
“anything they wish about the defendant”,
so long as it does not go beyond lawful free speech, make untested allegations of new criminal conduct, or contain “disorderly language”. These are sensible and well-established legal boundaries.
The amendment also states that the court must disregard any
“prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement”.
In practice, this would simply enshrine what is already understood by judges: that victims may express themselves freely, while judges continue to confine themselves to factors that are legally relevant and admissible. Placing this in the Bill would reassure victims that greater freedom of expression in their statements will not be misconstrued as diminishing the fairness of proceedings, or indeed as providing a basis for an appeal. This would not mean that victims would be able to litigate matters that fall outside the scope of the case before the court, nor would it mean that victim personal statements would supplant other evidence or judicial reasoning. It would mean that victims would know where they stand, and that they would not be discouraged from expressing the full impact of their experience simply because the existing guidance is interpreted excessively cautiously.
The importance of clarity in this area cannot be overstated. Victims and their families often report that they do not know what is expected of them when making a personal statement, or that they are told they must temper their comments in ways that feel artificial or perhaps insensitive. That undermines public confidence in the system and risks denying victims a meaningful voice at a critical moment in the justice process. This amendment offers a proportionate way forward. It respects judicial integrity and would preserve the lawful limits on personal statements. At the same time, it would provide victims with the clarity and the dignity that they deserve. It would ensure that they can say what they need to say without fear that well-meaning but over cautious guidance may curtail their voice.
I present the amendment in a constructive spirit. I look forward to the Minister outlining how the Government believe that the current guidance is operating—whether it achieves its objectives, and whether there is an appetite for revision that reflects victims’ legitimate expectations—and speaking to the points raised by Members on both sides of the House and in the other place. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My brief observations draw on my experience of what happened about 20 years ago when the statements were being developed. For more serious cases, such as murder and manslaughter, there was an attempt to give the victim’s family an advocate. It had transpired that drafting these statements was not easy, and so this was trialled for a few years. It proved to be an extremely expensive way forward, and the scheme came to an end with the financial crisis of 2008.
That left us with the problem, in all these cases, of how you formulate what was then called a victim impact statement and is now called a personal statement? They are extraordinarily difficult to formulate. Those with experience of civil cases will know that, if you ask a witness to produce something in his own words, or you ask the claimant in a case to do the same, you get something you could never put before the court, because it would never really convey what had to be put forward. Therefore, the way in which progress was made was along the cautious lines of developing guidance. I think such guidance always needs to be kept under review. You need consultation with the Crown Court judges, who see this all the time. Clarity in the guidance is essential, but I greatly caution against allowing a victim to do more than explain to the court the way in which the crime has affected the victim, his family and the community. Going beyond that seems to raise all sorts of problems, and the last thing one wants to do is to revictimise a victim by saying, “You shouldn’t say that in court”. Clarity is essential, but I say, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, that his formulation goes too wide of the mark.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, clearly, we have to achieve a balance between preserving due process in the justice system and empowering victims. We have to be able to reassure victims but, at the same time, protect the judicial process. We must reduce the risk of misunderstanding, or indeed even of appeal, in the context of these statements.
However, there does seem to be a widely held concern that these guidance provisions are not working as they should at the present time. There seems to be an understanding that further work is needed to clarify how victim guidance is construed and applied. I suggest that it is not simply a matter for the criminal practice directions, but one that we should consider, whether in the form of a review or further directions or guidance from the House.
In the circumstances, I seek to withdraw the amendment, but I do so on the basis that the Government understand the need to revisit this issue and why the guidance is not working, and will come to a view as to how it can be improved going forward.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches, the Liberal Democrats have been concerned for a long time about the victim’s right to access court transcripts. We have tabled amendments to a number of Bills, including, most recently, the now Victim and Prisoners Act 2024, and I have Amendment 41 to this Bill. I thank open justice campaigners for the contact that we have had with them during the Victims and Prisoners Act and since then.
During the Victims and Prisoners Bill, the then Minister finally agreed to a trial in certain locations that would ensure that victims could have access to sentencing remarks but to nothing else. Ministers of both this and the last Government have said that it would just cost too much to extend the scheme but, as we have said, the process that is used is extraordinarily expensive, and technology should be our friend these days. To give the Committee a feel of some of the figures that we have been made aware of, we have seen people quoted £30 for a copy of sentencing remarks to over £300 for an original transcript, and where victims requested a transcript of the entire court case we have seen figures of £7,500 and even £22,000.
Victims and their families are in principle able to access remarks at no cost. I am not just talking about since the pilot; I am talking about some of the other things, and I will come on to the detail later on. They can sometimes get access at no cost, but the problem is that the paperwork that some courts have required families to fill out is burdensome and intrusive, requiring families to declare salaries, debts, bank balances and more. That really should not be the case when they are getting to the end of a trial, with all the burdens that that has brought them.
Amendment 41 would go beyond sentencing remarks but not as far as our amendments to the Victims and Prisoners Bill. It would include transcripts of judicial summings-up, bail decisions and conditions that are relevant to their case. It would also set a time limit for the Secretary of State to ensure that the transcripts were provided within 14 days.
We thank the Government for confirming that access to the judge’s sentencing remarks is being rolled out across the country, but we remain concerned that some victims need access to more. This is because for far too long, as we discussed in an earlier group, victims have been advised by the police and prosecutors either not to attend a trial or to frame their own remarks carefully.
I have three brief quotes on that. The first is:
“I wanted to go and watch the trial after I had given my evidence but was told by the prosecution barrister that it would not look good with the jury. The police said the same. I didn’t really question it. I was so scared to do anything that *might* have a detrimental effect on the outcome”.
Another victim said:
“We were advised not to attend because it may make us look bitter”.
And another said:
“I was told I couldn’t watch the court case after giving evidence as I’d look like I wasn’t scared of the perpetrator and it could harm the jury’s decision”.
Open justice campaigners say:
“This advice from professionals is in direct contrast to Judges we meet, who very much want the victims to attend hearings”.
So there is a gap there.
The reason why we propose including judicial summings-up and bail decisions is that there is often more detail in things like bail decisions and conditions that affect the victim directly. I have recently been involved in advising a family where there was a bail condition that required the alleged perpetrator not to go within two miles of the victim. That was changed without the victim’s knowledge, and suddenly she found the perpetrator nearby and could not understand why. A victim in that sort of instance should be able to ask for the details of those. It was clear that she was completely unaware that the bail conditions had been changed after the perpetrator’s solicitor had asked for a hearing. For judicial summing up, there is often more detail in there that can help the victim to come to terms with the entire process. That is one reason why we are pushing for that.
We would still like occasionally for some victims in really traumatic cases, particularly where a therapist advises this—this is not in the amendment, and there is a reason for that—to be able to access the entire court transcript, but we recognise that that is unlikely until technology can provide it at virtually no cost to the court. I think we are nearly there, but at the moment the structure of the way in which people can apply for help and the way that transcripts are made is overly expensive, given the world that we are living in in 2026. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 41, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and Amendment 73 in my name. Both these amendments are designed to strengthen victims’ engagement with the justice system by enhancing access to, and the availability of, transcripts of important court decisions.
We give full and unequivocal support to Amendment 41. This is a broader right than the one we were able to secure during the passage of the Sentencing Bill, where our amendments sought to ensure victims’ access to transcripts of sentencing remarks. Initially, that amendment was opposed by the Government, who argued that embedding a statutory duty for universal access and universal publication would create significant operational and resource pressures and risk increasing judicial workload.
The importance of these amendments has been further underscored by the report—released, I believe, today—that the Ministry of Justice has instructed the deletion of a substantial archive of court records held by Courtsdesk: data analysis that supports journalists and civil society in scrutinising the justice system. That archive has long been relied on to track sentencing outcomes and judicial decisions. Its removal has understandably raised concerns about the future accessibility of court information and the practical operation of open justice.
In that context, the case for clear, structured and victim-centred access to sentencing information becomes even more compelling. If independent archives and informal routes to transparency are diminishing, it is all the more important that Parliament ensures that formal mechanisms exist to guarantee access to core judicial material, particularly for victims whose lives are directly affected by these decisions.
In previous debates, Ministers made it clear that they supported the principle of transparency and of victim access to sentencing remarks. Sentencing remarks can already be published in high-profile cases but the Government maintained that expanding those limited provisions into a broad statutory requirement, as initially tabled, was not necessary to achieve the objective of openness and could impose burdens that the current system was not equipped to bear. We therefore tabled a more diluted version of our amendment to extend free provision of Crown Court sentencing transcripts to victims who request them.
The importance of this measure cannot, in my view, be overstated. Sentencing remarks explain the judge’s reasoning as well as the factors taken into account when outlining legal judgment behind a sentence. For victims and their families, this explanation is essential to understanding why justice has been administered in the way it has and becomes particularly important in the context of, for example, unduly lenient sentence appeals.
Amendment 73 complements the amendment passed in the Sentencing Bill, now the Sentencing Act, by addressing the publication of sentencing remarks online. It would require that, when a request is made for sentencing remarks delivered in the Crown Court, those remarks are made available publicly online within 14 days, subject to an important safeguard. The court must first inform the applicant of their right to request that the remarks not be published and, if such a request is made, the remarks must not be published.
This opt-out mechanism is a proportionate and indeed pragmatic response to government concerns that prevented broad publication being adopted previously. Ministers explained that, while they supported the principle of transparency, they could not accept a universal statutory obligation to publish all sentencing remarks, citing the risk of significant workload increases and resource pressures on an already stretched judiciary and courts system. By allowing individuals to choose not to have their own remarks published, this amendment preserves transparency for the public while safeguarding privacy and individual choice and reducing operational risk.
We stand in favour of open justice: the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. When victims and the wider public can access the reasoning behind sentencing decisions, confidence in the rule of law and in the integrity of judicial decision-making is strengthened. A criminal justice system that is opaque risks undermining the very legitimacy that it seeks to uphold. If victims cannot see the reasoning behind the rulings that affect their lives, they and the public will struggle to have confidence that justice has actually been done. When sentences are handed down with discretion and complexity, the need for transparency is greater, not less. For these reasons, we support Amendment 41 and look forward to the Minister’s response to Amendment 73.
Sentencing Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsWednesday 21st January 2026
(4 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Sentencing Act 2026 View all Sentencing Act 2026 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL BIll 161-I Motion for Consideration of Commons Disagreement and Amendments in Lieu - (21 Jan 2026)
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to see the Sentencing Bill return to your Lordships’ House for, I hope, the final time. Subject to your Lordships’ agreement, the Bill will have completed all its stages and will shortly become law. That moment will be hugely significant for our prison and probation services. It will put them on a sustainable footing and deliver punishment that works. I am very proud of having played my part in taking the Bill through Parliament. Apart from a brief Bill on the Sentencing Council, this is my first experience of getting a Bill through, and I have been struck by the fantastic teamwork from everyone involved.
I will briefly set out the Government’s rationale for disagreeing with Amendment 7 and tabling our own amendments in lieu. Before I do so, I thank again the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. In keeping with their approach throughout the passage of the Bill, they have engaged constructively and openly. Once again, their interventions have made this a better Bill.
The Government fully supported the intention of Amendment 7: to promote transparency in the courts and improve the experience of victims as they navigate the justice system. We could not accept it as drafted due to the risk that it would significantly increase judicial workload at a time when courts are working intensively to drive down the court backlog. However, I am delighted that we have tabled an amendment in lieu, which expands the provision of Crown Court sentencing transcripts, free of charge, to all victims who request them. This new clause represents an important step forward for victims, ensuring that they are able to request and receive relevant sentencing remarks for free.
Sentencing remarks set out the judge’s reasoning, helping victims to understand how the sentence was reached without having to visit the courtroom—an experience that can be retraumatising for many. This change will embolden victims to look back on their bravery, and to process their experience at their own pace. This clause also delivers a major step forward for transparency more broadly, enabling victims to digest sentencing remarks outside the pressures of a courtroom setting, and free of charge. This is consistent with Sir Brian Leveson’s Independent Review of the Criminal Courts and the 2017 Lammy Review, which sought to shape a more open justice system fit to serve every victim.
The detail on timeframes and processes for providing transcripts will be set out in regulations, but I can confirm to the House that our intention is that the regulations will specify that transcripts will be provided within 14 days of a request being made. This timeframe will support requests under the unduly lenient sentence scheme, which currently allows referrals up to 28 days after sentencing. I also assure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that we are considering his amendment to the Victims and Courts Bill, which would extend this deadline to 56 days, extremely carefully.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the honourable Member for Chichester in the other place for raising important questions about the definition of “victim” and why it is necessary to allow for exceptions. We are carefully considering the scope of the definition of victim for these purposes, but I assure noble Lords that this clause does not restrict us to a narrow definition. We will ensure that there is as much consistency as possible in the definition of victim for the purpose of the code, and we will specifically consider the circumstances that the honourable Members for Chichester and Bexhill and Battle raised in the other place yesterday, where a victim is personally unable to request sentencing remarks. We have no intention of restricting access in these circumstances.
Further details will be set out in regulations, including any necessary safeguards or limited exceptions. We will ensure that any exceptions are limited, and our intention is that all victims will be able to request and receive their Crown Court sentencing remarks free of charge. But there may be circumstances where exceptions or omissions are necessary; for example, to protect the identity of another victim. I reassure noble Lords that these regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so your Lordships’ House will have the opportunity to scrutinise the regulations carefully.
I can also confirm that an assessment of the previous pilot for free sentencing remarks for rape and serious sexual offence victims is under way. The results will be published shortly. This explores application volumes, costs of provision and any feedback from the courts on the process. It also includes applicant survey feedback, shared by victims or by those applying on their behalf.
This change represents a profound step forward for victims and for transparency in our justice system. For the first time, every victim whose case is heard in the Crown Court will have the right to access, free of charge, a clear explanation of how the sentence was reached. This is a landmark moment for transparency and open justice and a meaningful improvement for victims across the country. I urge all noble Lords to support the Government’s Motion, and I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his remarks and the explanation he gave for the government amendment in lieu of our own amendment. I also thank him for his sustained engagement with Peers across the House, both in and outside the Chamber.
The Government have now committed to publishing sentencing remarks for all Crown Court trials, and we thank the Minister for this step. It was only in response to our successful Conservative amendment that the Government finally acted. It was regrettable that they opposed our original amendment in both Houses, but we welcome their amendment as a step forward in the right direction.
Sentencing remarks explain the judge’s reasoning in determining the sentence imposed. This is important not only for the victims, whose lives are disrupted in the most profound way by crime, but for the transparency required in the justice system. The provision of sentence remarks upon request will mean that victims who are unable to visit the courtroom, whether for practical reasons or because the experience is simply too traumatising, will be able to understand the reasoning behind sentences handed out to offenders.
This amendment builds on the work of the previous Conservative Government, who successfully piloted free access to sentencing remarks for victims of murder, rape and other sexual offences. This amendment now rightly widens that scope to all victims. It is wrong that a victim of, for example, aggravated burglary should have to pay to read the reasoning behind the sentence of the criminal who robbed their shop. This was a clear gap in the law that will now be filled.
The government amendment contains provisions for the timeline and processes for providing transcripts to be set out in regulations. I thank the Minister for his assurance that regulations will specify that transcripts will be provided within 14 days of a request being made. Under our current system, victims have just 28 days to submit an application for the unduly lenient sentence scheme. This can be a complex legal process to contend with in less than a month. It is our intention, as indicated by the Minister, to double the time that victims have available to 56 days. I am grateful that the Minister shares my commitment to ensuring that victims receive their transcripts before that point. Without timely access to these remarks, victims would risk being shut out of the scheme and denied access to justice.
Finally, I turn to the matter of publication. Open justice is an essential foundation of our democracy and sentencing will no doubt become more complex and discretionary under this Bill. We therefore believe that, in principle, sentencing remarks should be made available to the wider public to maintain transparency and accountability. Although the Government are unable to commit to the public release of sentencing remarks at this point, we note the progress made on this issue and we will raise the matter again during the passage of the Victims and Courts Bill.
This amendment represents a significant step forward for victims and for transparency in our justice system. It ensures that those affected by crime can access the reasoning behind sentences, and it builds on a clear Conservative record of reform. While there is more to do, we have now made real progress, and we will continue to press for full public access to sentencing remarks in future legislation.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Marks will no doubt repeat some of the niceties, but I too am glad to see this step forward. I shall ask the Minister some questions on the government amendment.
First, there is the phrase
“sentencing remarks … relevant to”
the victim will be supplied. From what the Minister has said, is that distinguishing one particular victim from another victim in the same case, or what is meant by sentencing remarks relevant to the victim? I have to say that, if I were a victim, I would think that everything that was said in sentencing would be relevant. It also occurs to me that, if the court is required to edit the remarks before supplying them, that is actually more work for the court, which is something that the Government are obviously aware of. I take it that “remarks relevant to the victim” are different from
“circumstances in which, for the purposes of this section, sentencing remarks are relevant to a victim”,
in paragraph (11) of the proposed new clause. Can the Minister clarify what is meant by “circumstances” in this context?
There is also provision for the “omission of information” and making
“further provision about the supply of a transcript”,
which I take it covers not supplying it, though I am obviously not pushing that point. Like the noble and learned Lord, I am concerned to know about publication. A number of us have heard from the Lady Chief Justice of the progress that has been made and the success in using new technology in this context. I also ask what consultation is planned on circumstances, on exceptions and so on—the various points that will be covered by the regulations.
The Minister has said, and we are grateful for this, that answers will be given to questions asked by my honourable friend the Member for Chichester. Briefly, they are whether the term “victim” is to be the same as the definition used in the victims’ code, including where the victim is unable personally to request sentencing remarks; and, where the amendment provides for exceptions, what sort of exceptions—this goes back to my point about consultation—and what sort of information may be omitted. And possibly overarching all this, will the Government be publishing a review of the pilot that was carried out recently? We have heard about it, we gather it has been successful, if limited, so can we hear more about it?
Age of Criminal Responsibility
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(4 weeks, 2 days ago)
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Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I thank the right reverend Prelate. I think it is from 15 to 13.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, as has already been noted, until just a few years ago, the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland was eight. In the last three or four years, it has been raised from eight to 12. Does the Minister agree that before we take any further steps with regard to the age of responsibility in England, it would be appropriate to examine and analyse the impact of the changes on policing, crime prevention and public safety in Scotland which have emerged since the change in the age of criminal responsibility there almost four years ago?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I say to the noble and learned Lord that the Government keep all these matters under review.
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 2025
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(1 month ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, as many noble Lords will be aware, I am passionate about the rehabilitation of offenders. I have seen at first hand how transformative employment can be for those seeking to rebuild their lives after offending.
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, which I will refer to as the ROA, governs the disclosure of cautions and convictions for most employment purposes. Its purpose is simple but vital: to ensure that, once a conviction is spent, individuals are not defined for ever by their past. For most people, once a conviction or caution becomes spent, it does not need to be disclosed when applying for work. This supports rehabilitation, helps to reduce reoffending and allows people to move on with their lives. However, this must always be balanced against the need to protect the public. That is why the ROA is accompanied by the exceptions order 1975, which sets out specific roles and activities where fuller disclosure is required. This is typically work involving vulnerable people, such as children, or a high degree of public trust. This instrument amends the exceptions order in a targeted and proportionate way.
Before I turn to the detail, I want to make something clear: even when an employer is aware of a spent conviction or caution, that should not amount to an automatic bar to employment. The Government encourage employers to take a balanced and thoughtful approach, considering factors such as the age of the individual at the time of the offence, how long ago it occurred, its relevance to the role and what safeguards can be put in place. In my own business experience, I have employed many people with criminal records. Time and again, they have proved to be among the most loyal, committed and capable colleagues. That experience has shaped my belief that disclosure rules must be fair and proportionate. They must give employers the information that they need to manage risk responsibly while still giving people the chance to rebuild their lives. We know that finding employment after release can reduce reoffending by up to nine percentage points, which is why we are strengthening links between prisons, probation and employers through employment advisory boards and the new regional employment councils.
In developing these proposals, officials have looked at evidence around gaps in the current framework and have considered the findings of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. This instrument addresses those gaps and does so carefully. The instrument makes four amendments to the exceptions order. First, it extends access to enhanced DBS checks to self-employed individuals or personal employees working closely with children and vulnerable adults. Secondly, it brings within scope staff employed by the MoJ’s contracted provider of electronic monitoring and field services. Thirdly, it includes registered healthcare professionals employed or engaged by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions or by their contractors and subcontractors. Finally, it enables appropriate disclosure checks for pedicab drivers in London, bringing them into line with taxi and private hire vehicle licensing following the Pedicabs (London) Act 2024. In each case, the amendment allows spent convictions to be considered as part of an informed and proportionate decision-making process, when assessing suitability for the role or licence in question. Relevant departments have committed to producing or updating guidance to support fair and consistent decision-making.
There is a compelling case for these changes. The first amendment closes a clear safeguarding gap. Families increasingly hire tutors, carers and therapists directly, often in unsupervised settings, yet without this change those individuals can only be asked for a basic criminal record check. Extending access to enhanced checks, including barred lists where appropriate, gives families the same reassurance that they would have if services were provided through an organisation such as a school. It also delivers on a key recommendation of the Alexis Jay inquiry.
The second amendment relates to electronic monitoring staff. These individuals play a crucial role in maintaining the integrity of court orders and release conditions. They have access to sensitive systems and exercise significant discretion. By enabling standard rather than basic disclosure checks, providers can better identify and manage risks and protect public confidence in the justice system.
Thirdly, the amendment covering registered healthcare professionals working for the DWP or its contractors reflects the vulnerability of the people they support. Around 2 million health assessments are carried out each year for individuals with long-term conditions or disabilities. Enabling fuller disclosure ensures that suitability for these roles can be properly assessed and appropriate safeguards maintained.
Finally, on pedicabs in London, following years of operating without regulation, TfL is now introducing a licensing regime. For that regime to command public confidence, pedicab drivers must be subject to the same safeguarding standards as taxi and private hire drivers. Without this amendment, TfL would be limited to basic checks, which is simply not sufficient, given the nature of the work.
This instrument strikes a careful and necessary balance. It strengthens safeguarding where it is needed, closes identified gaps and maintains the central principle of the ROA. The people who have moved on from their offending deserve the chance to rebuild their lives. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his clear exposition of this matter. From these Benches, we are supportive of the order before us. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act has, for more than 50 years, played an important role in supporting rehabilitation and enabling people who have offended to move on with their lives. That principle commands strong support, but it has always been recognised that rehabilitation cannot be an absolute and that there are particular roles, especially those involving children, vulnerable adults or positions of trust, where fuller disclosure is both reasonable and necessary to protect the public.
This order is modest in scope and targeted in nature. It does not represent a wholesale expansion of disclosure but rather responds to specific and well-evidenced gaps in the current framework. In particular, extending eligibility for enhanced DBS checks to self-employed individuals and those employed directly by families who work with children is a sensible and overdue step. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse commissioned under a Conservative Government made it clear that safeguarding should not depend on the technicality of whether someone is employed through an organisation or directly by a parent. Families deserve the same level of assurance in either case.
Similarly, we recognise the logic of bringing electronic monitoring contractor roles within the exception order. These are sensitive positions with real risks of corruption and serious consequences if safeguards fail. Ensuring that employers can properly assess suitability is essential for maintaining confidence in the criminal justice system. The inclusion of registered healthcare professionals carrying out DWP assessments is also proportionate. These individuals occupy positions of trust and have access to sensitive personal data. It is reasonable that the department is able to take a full view of suitability when making appointments to such roles.
Finally, aligning the DBS regime for pedicab drivers in London with that already in place for taxis and private hire vehicles is both logical and, indeed, necessary. Regulation without proper disclosure would expose Transport for London to unnecessary operational and reputational risk and would be out of step with public expectations.
However, as my honourable friend Kieran Mullan noted in the other place, support for these changes comes with a note of caution. The system for obtaining enhanced DBS checks is already under strain, with delays in some police force areas. As eligibility is expanded, it is incumbent on the Government to ensure that the system can cope and that safeguarding improvements are not undermined by avoidable backlogs.
Taken together, these measures strike the right balance between rehabilitation and public protection. They are proportionate, targeted and consistent with existing safeguarding frameworks.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for his contribution. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this instrument is necessary and proportionate. The amendments before the Committee address clear and specific safeguarding gaps, covering individuals working closely with children and vulnerable adults, electronic monitoring staff, healthcare professionals supporting vulnerable claimants and pedicab drivers in London. They strengthen public protection in high-trust roles, while remaining true to the purpose of the ROA, supporting rehabilitation and enabling people to move on. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, mentioned Kieran Mullan’s comments in the other place. I have been assured that the DBS system can cope with this volume coming through. I commend the instrument to the Committee.
Sentencing Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsTuesday 6th January 2026
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I co-signed Amendment 76, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and shall support it. The amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, would achieve the same outcome. Either amendment would right this injustice. The present position is simply cruelty.
I have very little to add to the speeches, all of which have been principled and humane. Across the House, noble Lords have gone to great lengths to acknowledge and address the risk of further offending while seeking to end the appalling injustice of the continued indefinite incarceration of IPP prisoners. My noble friend Lady Ludford referred the House to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and challenged the Government to come forward with a response to the human rights case. There is none.
I simply do not understand the reasoning behind the proposition that we cannot or will not release IPP prisoners when prisoners serving determinate sentences are entitled to be released, and are released, at the end of their terms. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, pointed out, resistance to ending this injustice fails to balance the actual harm of the present regime to IPP prisoners against the possible risk of further offences by a released IPP prisoner. The Government have a duty to balance risks and harms. On this issue, the balance is between the actual harm to IPP prisoners and the theoretical but possible harm that is risked by releasing them.
As we have heard, subsection (6E) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 76 would leave the Parole Board in charge. It is more than reasonable. Justice and humanity demand that we end this.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, these amendments address the most complex and sensitive of legacies in our sentencing framework. Few issues illustrate more clearly the challenge of balancing public protection, fairness to victims, management of risk and the injustice to individuals who have already served far beyond their original tariff. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, correctly pointed out that there is an issue here of proportionality; we seem to sometimes lose sight of that.
Amendment 76 does not provide for automatic or immediate release. Instead, it would require the Parole Board, where it does not direct release, to fix a future release date, subject to conditions intended to ensure public protection but also to instil some element of hope. The amendment would preserve a central role for the Parole Board, including, of course, powers to issue directions, vary release dates and reconsider decisions where public safety requires it. The inclusion of time limits seeks to balance progression with caution, though views may differ as to whether these limits are set at the right level.
These are complex judgments, and reasonable views can differ on how best to reconcile rehabilitation and public protection. These proposals represent a thoughtful attempt to impose coherence and fairness on an area of law that has become impossibly difficult, while attempting to keep public protection firmly in view. I hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the principles underlying these amendments and explain how the Government intend to address the long-term sustainability of the IPP regime. The status quo is untenable.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their amendments on IPP sentences and for their impassioned speeches this evening. As the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, kindly said, I share their commitment to addressing this issue with compassion, evidence and tenacity. I thank the many noble Lords who have participated in debates, meetings and discussions on this issue. I am grateful for their challenge and support, both in your Lordships’ House and at our Peers meetings, which I plan to continue in the future.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, we welcome the inclusion of the additional condition proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, in Amendments 83 and 86, to ensure that, for a transitional period, an offender who has breached a licence condition or court order in relation to their victim is not automatically released. It is an important amendment for protecting victims and maintaining confidence in the justice system. We are also supportive of Amendment 87, which excludes certain serious offenders from automatic release. This aligns with our Amendment 25 and ensures that those who pose the greatest risk to the public cannot benefit from automatic release.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords for tabling these amendments. Although we are still convinced that the approach in the Bill is right, it is only right that it receives thorough scrutiny. In drafting these measures, we have sought to strike a balance between ensuring that offenders can be safely managed in the community and the need to achieve a sustainable prison system. Nothing would be worse for victims than running out of prison cells.
The new system has been carefully designed to achieve this and to ensure consistent and proportionate responses to risk and non-compliance across all offence types. The offence-based exemptions proposed by Amendments 79 and 87 would undermine that consistency and may not reflect an individual’s actual risk level. The Bill already contains significant safeguards so that offenders who pose a greater risk are excluded from 56-day fixed-term recall. This includes those recalled on account of being charged with a further offence and those subject to multi-agency supervision levels 2 and 3. This applies to many sexual, violent and domestic abuse offenders.
Before any recalled offender is re-released, professionally qualified probation officers will undertake a thorough review of the release plans and licence conditions. They will ensure that needs and risks are managed, with a focus on mitigating risks against known victims. Furthermore, a prisoner given a fixed-term recall can be transferred to a standard recall if certain conditions are met, including if their risk escalates and they are then managed at multi-agency supervision levels 2 and 3. Offenders will leave prison to probation supervision and can be recalled again if considered a risk.
Amendments 80 and 81 seek to allow release from fixed-term recall at an earlier point than 56 days. The Independent Sentencing Review found that the current short duration of fixed-term recalls—14 or 28 days—does not provide enough time for offenders to address their risky behaviours in custody or for further risk reduction measures to be implemented. The Government agree with this assessment. This has been carefully considered with operational colleagues, and 56 days is enough time to undertake and put in place risk-management plans. Our proposed framework already provides sufficient flexibility without any further legislative change needed.
The Bill already allows the Secretary of State to keep an offender in custody past 56 days by overriding automatic re-release and converting a fixed-term recall to a standard recall. Where this happens, release is subject to Parole Board approval or, under the existing risk-assessed recall review process, allowing offenders to be released at any point before the 56 days where it is assessed safe to do so. For example, an offender could be recalled because of an increased risk linked to substance misuse. Having received structured support in custody that can be continued in the community, probation staff assess they can now be safely managed in the community. In this situation, they can be re-released before 56 days.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I shall move this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, who unfortunately cannot be present. I wish to express first his appreciation of the time the Minister has taken to speak to him about the issue raised by this amendment. I can explain it very briefly. In the independent review conducted by Mr David Gauke, he considered whether foreign national offenders should be removed to reduce pressure on capacity and ensure that punishment was served for crimes committed in the United Kingdom. Under the then existing law, foreign national offenders had to serve 50% of their sentence but could then be removed and returned to their own state, where they would get no further punishment. The review recommended that the 50% rule be reduced to 30%—this was accepted and brought in by a statutory instrument—and that those who were sentenced to three years or less could be removed without serving any part of their sentence here. Clause 32 proposes the removal of the three-year time limit, so that any offender, however serious the offence is, can be removed without serving any part of their sentence whatever.
The amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, seeks to do three things. First, it seeks to restore the position recommended by Mr David Gauke: to ensure that people who receive sentences of more than three years could not be removed without serving part of their sentence. Secondly, it would make it clear that it is inapplicable to a person who has been deported and returns. That is to stop the revolving door of committing a crime, being deported, coming back, committing a crime and going round and round. Thirdly, it would require the Secretary of State to be satisfied, in the case of serious crimes,
“that the interests of justice are not defeated by the removal, having regard to the gravity of the offence and the impact … on those affected by it”.
There is a change from the amendment put forward in Committee in one respect, in that it drops the requirement that the offender serve his term overseas.
The most important of the three points raised by this amendment is the first: restoring the recommendation of the Gauke review. As I understand it, there are about 3,000 such offenders and it costs about £61,000 a year to keep each of them in prison here. I can see no objection to sending them back if they are to serve the remainder of the term in their own country, but it is evident from the figures that only a tiny proportion would serve such a term. The Bill as it stands, therefore, will send back at our own cost a very significant number of people who have committed crimes that deserve at least three years’ imprisonment.
It seems that the Government have said that they are not prepared to accept the amendment partly because they cannot agree to anything that will effect a reduction in prison capacity. Secondly, they are determined to make sure that the public Exchequer is relieved of the burden of paying for the imprisonment of foreign national offenders.
The purpose of this amendment is to try to reverse what can only be described as the interests of short-term expediency over the principles of sentencing, because the amendment infringes three of those principles First, if a person commits a wrong that merits three years’ or more imprisonment, that person merits equivalent punishment. Being sent back to his own country at taxpayers’ expense is not a punishment. Secondly, the purpose of sentencing is to deter crime. What deterrence is there in making it clear that, if a person comes to this country to commit a crime, he will be sent home free, without punishment? Thirdly, and most importantly, proper punishment retains public confidence in the system. If, for example, someone commits a series of shoplifting offences to go to the lower end of the three-year limit or, more seriously, comes here deliberately to commit a crime, paid for, what deterrence is there if that person knows he can go back? We hope that the Government will think again on this point.
However, on the second and third points—that is to say, dealing with the revolving door problem in the first place, while requiring the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the interests of justice are not defeated by removal, having regard to the gravity of the offence and the impact on those affected by it—why can the Government not accept them? I hope the Minister will be able to say, “Well, we’ve got to have a framework to deal with those kinds of issues” and will make it clear that, among the issues to be contained in the policy framework that governs the way in which foreign national offenders are dealt with, those two points, namely the revolving door and maintaining and examining each case to ensure that the gravity of the offence and the effect of the offender will not be that which casts doubt on the integrity of the criminal justice system, will be looked at and properly included within it. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for the carefully framed amendment and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for the very careful way in which he presented the amendment. We agree with all the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, without qualification.
When the previous Secretary of State for Justice first intimated this policy last year, I referred to it in this Chamber as being “completely mad”. I have not deviated from that opinion, I have to confess. The idea that someone coming from a safe country in Europe will commit a series of robberies and then, when caught, will be returned to their country of origin at public expense in order to pick up a different set of identity papers or a different passport and then return yet again strikes me as quite absurd. That is the revolving door point that has been touched upon, but the other points are equally important.
Of course, they may not have come from a safe country, in which case we cannot deport them, but no accommodation has been made for that either. It is going to be optional, essentially. You may seek to argue that you have not come from a safe country and therefore you cannot be deported, so you prefer to stay in prison. It is a quite extraordinary proposal that somehow punishment lies in the fact that you have been returned to your country of origin after committing a serious offence in this country. We have a foreign national who rapes a child and flees back to his country of origin, and presumably we no longer make any efforts to extradite him because as far as this policy is concerned, he has been punished. He has gone home. What is that going to do for public confidence in the justice system? It will damage it, but I cannot see any upside. It is an impossible proposal.
David Gauke proposed, very sensibly, that there should be a minimum term of punishment, and that is necessary because it is not just punishment; it is also deterrence. Without that, we end up in the strange situation in which people commit a crime, leave for their home country at public expense and return as and when they wish to do so. We have had instances of that already. I will not go into the detailed cases at this stage in the evening, but it is not uncommon for those who have been arrested and convicted of offences to return to their country of origin and then return to these islands in due course. There have recent instances of that. We strongly support the idea that there has to be a minimum term of imprisonment in these cases, while understanding the pressure on our prisons. Does the Minister truly believe that public confidence in the justice system will be improved or even maintained as and when the full implications of this proposed policy become public?
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for meeting with my noble friend Lord Timpson to discuss the amendment proposed by him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, relating to the early removal scheme and for the spirit in which this has been debated. Considering the lateness of the hour, I shall try to be brief. A number of the points I want to make, I will make very quickly, but there are one or two points that I do not think have been adequately addressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. I will perhaps just dwell on those.
To be clear, the Government’s priority is protecting victims in the UK and ensuring that foreign national offenders can never again offend here. Once deported, they will be barred from ever returning to the UK, protecting victims and the wider public. Limiting the early removal scheme to only those in receipt of a sentence of less than three years would effectively put the brakes on sustaining the removal of foreign national offenders.
Sentencing Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsTuesday 6th January 2026
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences before credit is given for a guilty plea.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, my Amendments 1 and 27 concern the interaction between the presumption of suspended sentences in Clause 1 and the application of credit for a guilty plea at the first opportunity.
In Committee, I raised what I consider to be a straightforward but important point of drafting and of principle: whether the presumption for a suspended sentence is intended to apply to the sentence before or after credit is given for a guilty plea. The purpose of that amendment was to probe how widely the Government intend this presumption to operate. The Minister’s response in Committee confirmed that the presumption would apply after guilty plea credit had been awarded. That confirmation is important, as it means that the presumption of suspended sentences is not confined to offences attracting sentences of up to 12 months, as has been repeatedly suggested, but in practice extends to offences carrying a sentence of up to 18 months, which is of course beyond the sentencing provisions of the magistrates’ court and takes us into to the realm of what is generally regarded as serious crime.
The Minister opposed this amendment on the basis that it would create inconsistency. He argued that the presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea reduced a sentence to 12 months or less but could still apply where other forms of mitigation achieved the same effect. That objection, I say respectfully, misunderstands both the purpose and the effect of this amendment. The distinction between credit for a guilty plea and other forms of mitigation is deliberate and long established. Credit for a guilty plea is not mitigation in the ordinary sense. It is a structured formulaic reduction applied for a specific policy purpose: to encourage early admissions of guilt and spare victims the ordeal of trial. Indeed, Parliament and the Sentencing Council have always treated it separately.
This amendment seeks to ensure that the starting point for the court, whether an offence ordinarily attracts custody or suspension, is determined by the seriousness of the offence and not by a subsequent procedural discount. Without this amendment, Clause 1 operates in a way that the Government have never openly acknowledged. An offender facing a sentence of up to 18 months’ imprisonment can, by entering an early guilty plea, reduce that sentence by one-third and thereby bring himself within the automatic presumption of suspension. That is not a marginal effect but a substantial expansion of the scope of Clause 1. That is what I described in Committee as opening Pandora’s box.
Once the presumption is allowed to apply after a guilty plea credit, it ceases to be confined to genuinely low-level offending. Offences such as robbery, serious assault or the possession of knives—offences that Parliament and the public would reasonably expect to attract immediate custody—are surreptitiously drawn into the presumption, even though they can carry sentences of 15 months or more. If that is the Government’s intention, it should be stated plainly, but if, as Ministers have repeatedly suggested, the presumption is aimed only at genuinely short sentences of up to 12 months, this amendment is necessary to give effect to that stated policy.
We also heard a wider concern in Committee that I think was left unacknowledged: by allowing guilty plea credit to determine eligibility for suspension, the Bill risks creating perverse incentives. Offenders may come to believe that pleading guilty is not merely a matter of sentence reduction but a route to avoiding custody altogether, and that risks undermining public confidence in the justice system.
This amendment does not undermine the policy of encouraging guilty pleas, nor does it widen the scope of custody. It is a technical clarification designed to ensure that Clause 1 operates as the Government have publicly described it and not in a far broader and unintended manner. If the Minister cannot give us these assurances, I will seek to divide the House.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
I start by setting out my appreciation for the support that the Government have received for Clause 1. Throughout the Bill’s passage, noble Lords have highlighted evidence showing that those given a community order or a suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. We are following the evidence to reduce crime, creating fewer victims and safer communities, and we are following the lead of the previous Conservative Government, who originally introduced this measure during the last Parliament without the amendment we are debating today. I am a great believer in working across the political spectrum to get the best policies that reduce reoffending. I have dedicated myself to solving this problem and creating a sustainable justice system. I strongly believe that the clause as drafted, without any further amendments, is the best policy, and I must repeat that we are not abolishing short sentences.
I can assure noble Lords that I have considered the issue of early guilty pleas, raised by Amendments 1 and 27, with great care. I have met the noble and learned Lord to discuss his concerns and I value the attention given to this issue, but it has long been the practice of the courts to give a reduction in sentence where a defendant pleads guilty. This avoids the need for a trial, enables cases to be dealt with quickly and shortens the gap between charge and sentence. The Government do not wish to disincentivise early guilty pleas, in part because of the urgent need to reduce the backlog in cases coming to court. Early guilty pleas can save victims and witnesses from concern about having to give evidence, which is particularly important in traumatic cases. These amendments risk reducing the incentive to plead guilty, potentially causing further avoidable trauma for victims, and they would create a clear and significant anomaly in sentencing.
For reasons of simplicity and coherence, it is the final sentence length given by the judge that must be relevant for the purposes of the presumption. Under these amendments, the presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea had brought the sentence down to 12 months or less, yet it could still apply where any other mitigation, such as age or being a primary carer, had the same effect. The inconsistency is stark. Two offenders receiving the same final sentence could be treated entirely differently, based solely on the type of mitigation applied. This is neither coherent nor fair.
Finally, the sunset clause proposed in Amendment 103 would introduce unnecessary instability. It would undermine public confidence and complicate operational planning for courts, prisons, probation services and local authorities. The last thing we need at the moment is instability in the justice system.
I am a firm believer in dealing with problems head-on and solving them for the long term. We inherited difficult decisions that needed to be made, but someone had to make them, because we simply cannot run out of cells. We are building 14,000 new ones, but that takes time. I came into this job to rebuild our criminal justice system to lead to fewer victims, not more. Clause 1 is a crucial means of achieving that, and undermining it through further exclusions is not the right way forward. There will be a long shadow over those who vote for amendments to put even more pressure on the prison system.
I hope that I have explained why the Government’s position is the right one and I hope for cross-party support for a truly cross-party policy. After all, this was originally a Conservative measure, reintroduced in this Bill by Labour and supported by the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Green Party in Committee in the Commons. I therefore kindly urge noble Lords not to support these amendments.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
I am obliged to the Minister for his observations. However, I have a number of points.
First, the apparent use of statistics comparing repeat offending by those who suffer a suspended sentence with those who are given a prison sentence is, potentially, very misleading. In general, repeat offenders will receive a sentence of imprisonment, whereas single offenders will often receive a suspended sentence. It is those who are inclined towards the repetition of criminal conduct who are imprisoned, and therefore the comparison made with these statistics is, potentially, highly misleading.
Secondly, I do not accept the reference to any other mitigation. The procedural mitigation—procedural discount, in reality—granted in respect of a guilty plea is not comparable. It was not in the past considered comparable with the other aspects of mitigation mentioned by the noble Lord.
The Government have repeatedly described this policy as targeting only genuinely short sentences. Sentences of more than 12 months are not genuinely short sentences; they are sentences that can be imposed only by the Crown Court. They are regarded as sentences applicable to serious criminal conduct; that is not the purpose of Clause 1 in its present form. The Government wrote in their own manifesto that the sentences criminals receive
“often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.
Allowing serious offenders to evade custody will do little to rebuild public confidence in the justice system. If the Government truly intend to suspend sentences of up to 18 months as a matter of policy, they should have plainly said so. If they do not, they should accept this amendment. In these circumstances, with some regret, I beg to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Keen of Elie
“(i) the offender has been convicted of a sexual offence, within the meaning of section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, or (j) the offender has been convicted of an offence which constitutes domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, this amendment concerns an exemption to the presumption of suspended sentences for those convicted of sexual offences and domestic abuse. We listened carefully to the points raised by noble Lords in Committee. It was suggested then that our amendments were overly expansive, risked undermining the central objective of the Bill—to free up spaces in prison—and that we might constrain judicial discretion.
We have listened to, and taken into account, those concerns. The amendment before your Lordships today is far more tightly drawn. It does not seek to carve out a long list of offences, even though that might be our preferred position; nor does it attempt to undermine Clause 1’s central objective. Instead, it is narrowly focused on two categories of offending, where the case for custody, even for shorter sentences, is at its strongest: sexual offending and domestic abuse.
This amendment would preserve the presumption in favour of suspended sentences in the vast majority of cases, with exemptions only for sexual offences and domestic abuse. That seems proportionate and indeed, I would venture, necessary. Much of the debate in Committee rested on the assertion that short custodial sentences are ineffective or even counterproductive when judged solely by reoffending rates. Even if one accepts that the data paints a mixed picture, it is a mistake to treat sentencing policy as though it serves only one function. Prison is not simply about reoffending statistics; it serves other essential purposes: deterrence, public protection, the expression of society’s condemnation of serious wrongdoing, the maintenance of public confidence in the justice system and, crucially in cases such as these, the protection and reassurance of victims.
For victims of sexual assault or domestic abuse, the distinction between a custodial sentence and a suspended one is not an abstract policy question. It is the difference between knowing that their abuser has been removed from the community and knowing that they remain at liberty. This point is reinforced by the Government’s recent recognition of the scale of the problem. Violence against women and girls has been described as a national emergency, and a strategy announced to halve such violence within a decade, including the creation of specialist rape and sexual offence investigation teams in every police force by 2029. These measures, this Government note, will provide officers with the right training to understand the mindset of both abusers and victims, and ensure consistent investigation of sexual offences across the country.
Much has been made of the evidence on reoffending, but even the Government’s own publications urge caution on these. Official statistics emphasise that comparisons between custodial and non-custodial sentences do not control for differences in offender characteristics. Those receiving short custodial sentences, as I noted earlier, typically have far longer and more serious criminal histories than those given community or suspended sentences. The reality is not a simple dichotomy between bad short custodial sentences and good suspended sentences. Outcomes depend heavily on the risk posed by the offender and the need for immediate public protection. In cases of sexual offences and domestic abuse, those considerations weigh heavily in favour of custody. Nor should we overlook the deterrent effect of custody. While difficult to measure with precision, deterrence remains a central principle of sentencing. Removing custody from the toolkit for these offences was sending the wrong signal to offenders, and indeed to victims and the general public.
In Committee, it was also argued that carving out exceptions undermines judicial discretion. With respect, that argument sits uneasily with the structure of this Bill. The Bill already imposes a statutory presumption in favour of suspended sentences. This amendment simply ensures that, in the most serious and sensitive cases, Parliament does not compel courts to start from what I suggest is the wrong place. We believe this amendment is modest and targeted. It reflects a simple proposition that, for sexual offenders and domestic abusers, short custodial sentences continue to have a vital role to play. If the Minister cannot provide the appropriate assurances for this limited exception, then I will seek leave to divide the House.
Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, and I wish to echo two points. The first is that it is so important to victims of sexual violence and domestic abuse that they do not fear that their abuser, the perpetrator of those crimes, is somehow automatically going to be back in their community. The reassurance that they would get from knowing that the custodial sentence is available is important to those victims.
The second point is, as my noble and learned friend has raised, the issue of the Government’s mission to halve violence against women and girls and the strategy for violence against women and girls that is being brought forward. May I gently suggest to the Minister that, if the Government are serious about that, then they should accept this amendment? If they do not accept it, then that suggests that they are not as serious about their intentions on violence against women and girls as they are claiming.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
While the Government understand the concern that underpins this amendment, we do not believe it is necessary. It was not included by the last Conservative Government when they originally introduced this measure. Let me be clear: we are not abolishing short sentences. Public protection is our main priority, and we will make sure that the most dangerous offenders are put where they belong: behind bars.
In response to the noble Baronesses, Lady May and Lady Fox, I recognise that prison sentences, even if short, can be critical to safeguarding victims of domestic abuse or VAWG. Courts will still have discretion to impose immediate custody in any case involving significant risk of physical or psychological harm to an individual—for example, to protect an at-risk domestic abuse victim. Courts will also have discretion to impose immediate custody in exceptional circumstances and where offenders breach court orders.
Through Committee stage amendments in the other place, we strengthened the wording in the Bill even further, so that there can be no doubt. Where offenders breach court orders, including VAWG-related protective orders, they can receive an immediate custodial sentence. For example, if someone breaches a domestic violence protection order—a civil breach rather than a criminal offence—and assaults their partner, the presumption would not apply and they could go straight to prison.
With thanks to the Liberal Democrats, and, importantly, the Member for Eastbourne in the other place, we are also introducing a new judicial finding of domestic abuse at sentencing, so these offenders are better identified and monitored throughout the system. This has been welcomed by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and, in this place, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
The noble and learned Lord clearly cares deeply about the experience of victims. But if this amendment were to pass, it would undermine the fundamental problem that this legislation will fix—the issue the previous Government neglected for 14 years. I urge the noble Lord and noble and learned Lord to withdraw this amendment, and to support the Government’s position.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about fault for the issue of prison capacity, staffing and resources will bring little comfort to the victims of sexual offences and domestic abuse. His reference to offences that attract a sentence of 12 months or less omits the point that, of course, Clause 1 in its present form would apply to offences attracting a sentence of 18 months or less, albeit there is then a discount for a guilty plea because of a procedural provision.
I am obliged to my noble friend Lady May and to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for their contributions. The fact is that sexual offending and domestic abuse are uniquely serious and harmful—that has been recognised by the present Government. They are characterised by repetition, coercion and control, and they have a profound victim impact. In such cases, custody serves functions that a suspended sentence cannot: protection of victims, reassurance, deterrence and public confidence. For sexual offences and domestic abuse, immediate public protection should take precedence over other considerations, including questions of prison capacity. That includes abstract arguments on rehabilitation and what is non-conclusive data regarding reoffending rates as between suspended sentences and prison sentences.
This Government have pledged in their manifesto to halve violence against women and girls. They are hardly proposing to go in that direction with the present form of Clause 1. It is not enough that there should be exceptional circumstances; the very essence of a sexual offence and of domestic abuse is an exceptional circumstance. The public recognise that, and this Government should recognise that. I seek leave to divide the House.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I acknowledge the positive contributions of all noble Lords to this debate. From these Benches we are supportive of the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, which focus on purposeful activity in custodial sentences and on ensuring that offenders have access to suitable education and training.
On defining the purpose of imprisonment, as proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, we welcome the recognition of rehabilitation as one of many purposes. At the same time, we note that the Bill addresses the objectives of sentencing and imprisonment far more generally and question whether it is necessary to place a statutory definition in the Bill.
We remain opposed to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to remove the court’s power to remand a person in custody for their own protection or, in the case of children or young people, for their welfare. As I observed in Committee, this power is tightly circumscribed and used only in rare but very real circumstances where it may be the only safe option available to the court. Removing that safeguard would potentially leave vulnerable individuals, including children, without protection at a time when they most need it. I take issue with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this very limited power involves some element of injustice.
I do not agree with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, albeit I recognise that he may have been somewhat surprised to find himself in this group with an issue regarding legal aid. Again, I acknowledge the important contributions from all noble Lords on this issue.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the removal of Clause 35 from the Bill. I completely appreciate the importance of unpaid work orders, and I completely appreciate that they can do a great deal of good. However, the idea that they would be the subject of what I called “naming and shaming” in Committee—whereby offenders carrying out such unpaid work would be photographed and their photographs would then be given publicity—seemed to us on these Benches to be potentially profoundly damaging to their rehabilitation and the important relationship of trust that needs to exist between probation officers and their clients. We think that for probation officers to carry out this photography and publication would be profoundly damaging. The Government have recognised the need to remove the clause, and I am very grateful that they have done so.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his engagement on the issue of whole life orders, and I acknowledge that the Government have now stepped forward with their own amendment to address the previous inconsistencies in the statutory provisions. In light of that, I will not press Amendment 62, which is rendered unnecessary by virtue of the Government’s amendment.
Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)
My Lords, your Lordships may recollect that, in Committee, I supported an amendment which would have removed Clause 18 from the Bill altogether. While also suggesting that Clause 19 would be best removed, I laid an amendment to the effect that a guideline could be prevented from being issued only if both the Lady Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor agreed that that should happen.
I am grateful to both the noble Lords, Lord Lemos and Lord Timpson, for the time and trouble they have taken in discussions, which have included me and my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I am also particularly relieved that the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, explained in the all-Peers letter that went round—forgive me, I do not remember the precise date before Christmas—which drew attention to the fact that both the Sentencing Council and the Lady Chief Justice had been engaged in these amendments, that that should not be taken in any way as suggesting that either are happy with them or supported them.
Indeed, on 25 November, the Lady Chief Justice appeared before the Justice Committee of the House of Commons and explained that the clauses that we are concerned with do not sit easily with the independence of the Sentencing Council. She explained that there were no conceivable circumstances in which the Lady Chief Justice or Lord Chief Justice would seek to exercise the veto. She also made the important point that the mood of the Sentencing Council is “pretty bleak” because of the uncertainty hanging over its head. That was particularly important, as she explained, because the Sentencing Council is due to be very busy revising sentencing guidelines, which will be necessary as a result of the contents of this Bill, particularly because of the reduction in the use of suspended sentences. It will also be busy if the proposals that the Government have foreshadowed—to increase the sentencing powers of magistrates—come to be enacted, because, again, guidelines will have to be changed to reflect that. None the less, as I have said, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, agreed in Committee to consider these matters further and I am particularly grateful for the care with which he and the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, have treated my concerns.
I regret that His Majesty’s Government were not able to accept the amendments that I laid in Committee, because these clauses remain unfortunate, to put it as mildly as I can. Clause 18, requiring a business plan to be approved by the Lord Chancellor, might be thought to serve no obvious purpose, save to empower the Lord Chancellor to exert some pressure on the Sentencing Council. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, just explained to the House, that pressure will have no statutory effect. That is because the Government have just now accepted that the Sentencing Council would still be obliged to carry out the positive statutory duties laid on it by statute, and to exercise the discretionary powers conferred on it by statute. But if the Lord Chancellor is to exert pressure—pressure which, in my respectful opinion, continues to be inconsistent with the independence of the Sentencing Council—he must at least do so as soon as practicable and explain himself, which are both positive steps.
Clause 19 as now proposed to be amended remains—this should not be sugar-coated—a potential executive veto. That veto too, if it is to come, must now come as soon as practicable, and the grounds on which it can be exercised have been identified. I recognise that that is an improvement, if perhaps only a slight one, on the original drafting.
As the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, explained, there is perhaps a hope—and, indeed, an expectation—within the Government that these powers will never be used in a way which brings conflict between the Government and the Sentencing Council, and between the Government and the Lady Chief Justice. But it is important, when conferring powers, to contemplate how they might be used by others who perhaps are not so benign in their attitudes as the current Government and Lord Chancellor.
It seems that the Government have laid the foundations for what could be the destruction of the Sentencing Council through executive interference. Were such interference to occur, I fear that the Sentencing Council would cease to function for the simple reason that all its members—all fiercely independent—would leave.
I concluded that there would be no purpose in relaying my amendments. I am grateful to both Ministers for the tentative steps that have been taken to ameliorate the impact of these clauses, and for that reason I support them.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, it appears that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has decided that he will make some submission.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Well, that apparent position represents the truth.
First, I agree with—and in a sense have only very little to add to—the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett. Your Lordships will remember that I moved in Committee that both Clauses 18 and 19 should not stand part of the Bill.
That said, I join with the noble and learned Lord in thanking the noble Lords, Lord Timpson and Lord Lemos, for their engagement with us on some compromise position. I am not sure that this represents an entire compromise of their position, because I still feel that the Bill would be better off without these clauses. However, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, has explained that the intention is entirely benign. I share the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, that other Governments may not take such a benign view, but express the hope that that will not eventuate.
Viscount Eccles (Con)
My Lords, I will make a very short intervention before my Front Bench replies. I believe we should remember that Farage, in more or less a chance remark, said he thought that the council should be abolished. So, the issues raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, are very important, and I very much admire the detailed presentation he made to your Lordships’ House on these clauses.
I am grateful for what I would regard as the rescue mission on which the Government have gone to make the best of a bad job. Certainly, the hare that was run in March last year, to which the Government made their reply, was a very unfortunate hare. It was something to do with two-tier justice. It would have been better to let that hare run. Hares run in circuits: they come back to where they started and, very often, everything settles down. Instead of that, we have had to have some very careful work done to get us to where we are.
All over the House, we will be grateful that the Sentencing Council has in effect received a vote of confidence. We were looking for that and we are very grateful that it has happened. But we should not forget the rather troubled way in which the two parties that have the greatest experience of government and the implementation of policy got themselves into a tangle quite unnecessarily.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I am obliged to the Ministers for their engagement on this issue. However, we should bear in mind that our statutory provisions are designed to address powers and not intentions. It is certainly questionable whether we should be enacting provisions which we consider will never be used. They are on the statute book and they are available for use.
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, for outlining the issues here. The language he used was indicative of the reservations we all have with regard to this course of action: “unfortunate”, “inconsistent” and “a slight improvement”. It is not a ringing endorsement of anyone’s legislation.
The Government’s stance on the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary remains demonstrably unclear and uncertain. On the one hand, they repeat that sentencing is a matter for our independent judiciary—I quote the Ministers. We did not support the original Clauses 18 and 19 as drafted, but nor do we support these amendments, as they appear to simply illustrate the Government’s internal inconsistency with regard to the Sentencing Council. These amendments simply add more confusion to the puzzled stance the Government have towards the Sentencing Council.
On Report, the Government have now implemented amendments to reduce the degree to which their own Bill reduces the Sentencing Council’s independence. But do the Government retain any idea of how independent they would like the Sentencing Council to be?
Lord Lemos (Lab)
I am very grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to today’s debate. It is obviously a subject on which your Lordships have thought very carefully and deeply, so I appreciate those contributions and note them all with great significance.
However, I hope all noble Lords will agree that these proposed amendments at least reflect the seriousness with which we have taken concerns raised in Committee. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, acknowledged that. I also hope we have answered the important questions about how the provisions will operate in practice, which both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, again acknowledged.
We recognise that there is further detail to work through around how both these approval measures will work, and I am very grateful for the ongoing discussions between officials in the Ministry of Justice and in the Sentencing Council on these important considerations.
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 97 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, to which I have added my name. The case for devolving prisons and probation to Wales has already been eloquently made by him, so I will confine my remarks to three points.
First, prison policy in England and Wales continues to be developed largely through an English lens, with insufficient recognition of the realities in Wales. Many of the services on which effective sentencing depends—health, housing and substance misuse support—are devolved. This creates a fragmented system, which is most sharply felt at the point of release. Release from custody is precisely where reserved and devolved responsibilities collide. The number of people released into homelessness from Welsh prisons rose by 34% in 2024-25. Probation staff themselves warn that, without major reform and investment, the ambitions of the Bill cannot be delivered. Can the Minister say how His Majesty’s Government intend to manage this persistent jagged edge between reserved and devolved responsibilities?
Secondly, Wales has no women’s prison, which means that Welsh women are routinely sent to serve short sentences in England, most for under 12 months. At the same time, Wales has one of the highest imprisonment rates in western Europe, while a significant proportion of those held in Welsh prisons are from England. Against that backdrop, plans to expand capacity at HMP Parc have been approved, despite serious concerns about safety. So, my additional question is: how do His Majesty’s Government justify expanding prison capacity in Wales without addressing the systematic issue of Welsh women being imprisoned far away from their families and support networks, or aligning responsibility for the devolved services on which it depends?
Thirdly, Welsh-speaking prisoners continue to report neglect of their language rights. Were prisons in Wales accountable to the Senedd, stronger Welsh-language duties would apply. Can the Minister explain how the current arrangements adequately protect the use of the Welsh language within prisons in Wales?
To close, with a Senedd election imminent, as already mentioned, clarity from His Majesty’s Government is essential. So, for the avoidance of doubt, can the Minister tell the House whether it is the policy of His Majesty’s Government to oppose the full devolution of prisons and probation to Wales in principle, or whether they are willing to establish a structured process with the Welsh Government to consider how the devolution could be achieved?
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 58, which introduces an annual report on prison capacity. This is an issue that we pressed in Committee and I am grateful to the Government for having listened and for bringing forward this amendment. The amendment places a clear duty on the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the number of people in custody, the number of available prison places, and projected changes. That is a welcome and important step. If Parliament is being asked to legislate for significant changes to sentencing and release policy, it is only right that we are also given a regular and transparent account of the state of the prison estate that underpins those decisions.
Ideally, we would have liked this report to go further. There is a strong case for including more detailed information on the drivers between sentencing policy, probation capacity and reoffending. However, I recognise that the Government face a balancing act between the need for transparency and the administrative constraints on producing such reports, and I accept that the amendment strikes a reasonable and proportionate compromise.
On Amendment 92 and the issue of the child cruelty register, again I thank the Government for their ongoing communication on this important topic and their assurances that they would like to implement a policy in support of a child cruelty register. This is an issue for which my right honourable friend Helen Grant from the other place has campaigned tirelessly, and I pay tribute to her for the effort she has made in bringing this to the forefront of our legislative proposals. It has been requested that this amendment be reserved for a Home Office Bill rather than legislation from the Ministry of Justice, and in these circumstances, and having regard to that undertaking from the Government, I will withdraw the amendment in my name. However, I add that it will be tabled in subsequent legislation in this parliamentary Session to ensure that we do not delay in ensuring that that action is taken.
On Amendment 97 and the submissions from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, I can say only that I hesitate to intrude to the west of Offa’s Dyke.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions. The questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on Welsh justice will be part of our ongoing discussions on devolution. I look forward to further discussions on that. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Foster, is sufficiently reassured about this Government’s commitment to transparency and accepts the reasons for our not accepting Amendments 59 to 61.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 93 and 94. Amendment 93 is concerned with the impact of changes in the law on sentences that are currently being served under the law that was in force preceding the change. In other words, offenders were sentenced under a law that has been altered. The amendment calls for reports to be provided every three years, with a view to such changes in the law leaving defendants suffering from injustice.
Amendment 94 concerns the direct effect of such changes in the law on sentences that are currently being served or that have been imposed. Proposed new subsection (1)(a) in Amendment 94 concerns cases where the offence itself for which the sentence was imposed has been abolished, and proposed new subsection (1)(b) in Amendment 94 concerns a case where the sentence has been materially altered.
The amendment would enable a person serving a sentence for an offence that had been abolished, or where the sentence had been altered, to seek a review of the case of the sentence that is currently being served. On such a review, the sentence originally imposed could be quashed, or there could be a resentencing.
In practice, of course, Amendment 94 would come into play only where either the offence had been abolished or the available sentence had been reduced, because one cannot imagine an offender seeking a change of sentence where the available sentence had been increased.
Underlying both amendments is a concern that changes in the law would have the effect that an offender’s sentence would not have been imposed or would have been less severe had the law at the time of sentencing been the reformed law rather than the law under which the offender was sentenced, and that such changes should take effect to the benefit of the offender who would not be at such risk now.
I would suggest that it is a matter of simple justice that changes in the law which would have resulted in an offender serving a sentence less severe, or not being convicted of any offence, should have the benefit of the change in the law that pertained at the time of sentencing, so that a review would be appropriate.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, has addressed what is clearly an anomaly in our sentencing policy that raises a clear issue of fairness, and we do not dissent from the principle that has been advanced with regard to that matter. Indeed, I acknowledge the thoughtful and careful way in which the matter has been addressed by all noble Lords. With regard to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I have nothing to say.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, I will begin by addressing Amendment 63. I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, for raising this and for her work and expertise as a member of the Youth Justice Board and as a magistrate. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s long-standing interest and work in this area, including from this Dispatch Box.
Youth sentencing, as I think all noble Lords who have spoken know, is largely out of scope of this Bill. But I should say—and I am very happy to put it on the record, for myself and for my noble friend the Minister—that this amendment raises an issue with which we have a great deal of sympathy.
We recognise that, when a child turns 18, that can have a significant impact on the outcome of criminal justice proceedings, and that is, in a sense, the heart of the argument that the noble Baroness is making. A child who reaches the age of 18 before their first appearance will be tried and sentenced as an adult. However, sentencing guidelines state that, in such cases, the court should take as its starting point the sentence that would have applied at the time the offence was committed. That does not quite deal with some of the points that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby was making; I acknowledge that. They also state that the offender’s maturity, along with other relevant factors, should continue to be considered.
This amendment, however, would significantly alter the youth sentencing framework, and I note the careful way in which the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, asked for the Government’s response. If we were to accept these recommendations, the Government feel that there would be ramifications across the wider justice system. The youth sentencing framework has been specifically designed for children and there may well be unforeseen consequences, which we should think about carefully, of applying that framework to young adults. I am sure that your Lordships can appreciate that such a change requires thorough consideration beyond the confines of this Bill. So, although I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment at this stage, I hope she will take what I have said as some reassurance.
I now turn to Amendments 93 and 94. I would like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling them. I am afraid I am going to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Marks, as I probably did in Committee too, by restating that the Government already believe that existing mechanisms are sufficient to address perceived injustices.
Unduly lenient sentence reviews and criminal appeals are two routes by which cases can be reviewed. From 1 January to 8 December 2025, 933 sentences were considered by the Attorney-General’s Office as valid to be reviewed under the unduly lenient sentence scheme. The Government cannot support an amendment that puts more pressure on the justice system, which I think everyone in your Lordships’ House recognises is under considerable pressure, by requiring the courts to reconsider the sentences of those who apply. We do not believe this would be workable or sustainable, and we do not want to duplicate existing functions at a time when the system is under so much pressure.
As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, knows—we discussed this in Committee—we await the Law Commission’s report on criminal appeals, which is due later this year. Your Lordships’ House has my assurance that we will consider its findings with great care, especially those which relate to the important points made today. Once the report has been published, we will of course discuss it further. For the moment, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.
Lord Keen of Elie
“Court transcripts of sentencing remarks(1) Where a request is made for the sentencing remarks delivered in the Crown Court, the court must, subject to subsection (2), make those remarks available within 14 days of the request being received.(2) Sentencing remarks may be published only where a judge of the Crown Court has approved their release, having regard to—(a) the accuracy of the record, and(b) the need to comply with any reporting restrictions or other legal prohibitions.(3) Sentencing remarks made available under this section must be published free of charge and may be made available online.”
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 68 and indeed 69 concern transparency in sentencing. We listened carefully to the Government’s response in Committee and both these amendments have been revised in light of those responses. We believe that they now represent a fair and proportionate compromise between the principle of open justice and the practical constraints that may face the courts.
I will deal first with Amendment 68, with which there is particular concern, and which involves the publication of sentencing remarks within two weeks or 14 days of a request. Many of the arguments made in Committee about transparency in the justice system continue to hold true and I will not seek to repeat them. What was notable, however, was the broad consensus across the House that victims should be able to access the sentencing remarks for crimes committed against them.
In response to the original drafting, which required mandatory publication of all sentencing remarks, the Government argued that this would impose a significant financial and administrative burden. So, Amendment 68 no longer imposes a universal obligation. Instead, it requires that Crown Court sentencing remarks be provided only where a victim specifically requests them. This reflects the reality that the Crown Court handles cases concerning the most serious offences. Statistics indicate that that is about 10% of all cases.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Can the noble and learned Lord clarify, at an appropriate point, subsection (2) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 68? It says:
“Sentencing remarks may be published only”
in certain circumstances. My first question is: is that meant to restrict the rights of the victim under subsection (1) of the proposed new clause to obtain the remarks, or is it concerned with further publication?
My second question relates to the proposed new subsection (2), which says:
“Sentencing remarks may be published only where a judge … has approved their release, having regard to—”
two factors, which it lists. Is it intended that those are the only factors that the sentencing judge can have regard to—that is
“the accuracy of the record and … the need to comply with any reporting restrictions”—
or is it intended, which I would hope not, that the sentencing judge would have some general discretion here?
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
I am obliged to the noble Lord. It is intended that the court should have regard only to the two elements that are referred to therein.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, before the Minister gets to his feet, can I rather impertinently squeeze in a request that probably has little to do with Amendment 68? I am doing it now, so there we are.
A few years ago, I, along with other people, conducted a review into the work of the Criminal Cases Review Commission. One of the problems we found is that many prisoners who were dissatisfied with the way their conviction had been arrived at, and the way in which the Court of Appeal had subsequently dealt with it, found it almost impossible to get hold of a transcript of the sentencing remarks. Following the questioning of my noble and learned friend by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it looks as though such a convicted prisoner would not be able to make use of this amendment to get hold of the sentencing remarks my noble and learned friend is partly complaining about. Can the Government please bear in mind—not tonight obviously—that this is a real practical difficulty for people in prison who feel, for good reason, that they have been improperly convicted and wish to have the CCRC consider their case? It is much more difficult for the CCRC, and certainly for the dissatisfied defendant, to advance their cause if they cannot get hold, either because it is difficult or because it is expensive, of the sentencing remarks.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for tabling Amendments 68 and 69. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, makes a good point and I will take it back to the department.
We share the commitment to transparency across the justice system, but we do not agree that these amendments are needed. I will first address Amendment 68 and I reassure the noble and learned Lord that the Government are working to significantly improve the transparency of sentencing remarks. In certain cases of high public interest, sentencing remarks are already published online. Sentencing remarks can be and are filmed by broadcasters, subject to the agreement of the judge.
The Government have recently extended provision of free transcripts of sentencing remarks to victims of rape and other sexual offences whose cases are heard in the Crown Court. It remains the case that bereaved families of victims of murder, manslaughter and fatal road offences can request judges’ sentencing remarks for free.
However, expanding this to everyone who applies would be prohibitively expensive. The amendment would create significant operational and resource pressures on the courts and judiciary. It would also require new systems and staff to process requests and manage publication. The cost and complexity would be detrimental to the work we are doing to create an affordable and sustainable justice system.
We are, however, embracing AI and are actively exploring the opportunities it presents to reduce the cost of producing transcripts in the future and to making them far more widely available to victims. While I recognise the intent behind this amendment to promote transparency, sentencing remarks are already accessible through established transcription services.
I now turn to Amendment 69 and again assure noble Lords that this Government remain committed to improving the collection and publication of data on foreign national offenders. We have already taken action to increase transparency on the data published. As I have discussed with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, we are developing and publishing more data specific to prisons and probation in Wales. Notably, in July 2025, for the first time, the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group.
We are also working closely with colleagues in the Home Office to enable earlier identification of foreign national offenders. Currently, this is routinely done after sentence when cases are referred to the Home Office. Being able to verify the nationality of offenders ahead of sentencing would facilitate more timely removals and provide an opportunity for enhanced data collection. However, methods to verify any information provided must be cost effective and prevent placing additional pressure on operational staff. Investment in digital and AI tools can help us to collect, analyse and publish more data, but we are still building this capability.
For that reason, we cannot accept a statutory duty to publish this information before the necessary operational and technical infrastructure is in place to deliver it. If noble lords are interested in wider data specifically related to prisons, I can highly recommend the Prison Reform Trust’s Bromley Briefings Prison Factfile publication, which draws on data, including regarding foreign national offenders, from a wide range of sources. It is free and is online.
I hope I have reassured noble Lords about this Government’s commitment to transparency and explained why the Government do not support these amendments. I urge the noble and Learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 68 is modest, targeted and proportionate. It would bring much-needed consistency to our justice system. As the Minister observed, transcripts of sentencing are already provided to victims of rape and certain specified offences. There is no principled reason why victims of other serious or traumatic crimes should be treated differently. Victims of offences such as aggravated assault or aggravated burglary may be unable to attend a sentencing and should not have to pay to understand the court’s reasoning with regard to sentencing. It appears to us that Amendment 68 addresses a clear and, frankly, unfair gap in the law. In these circumstances, I seek to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 68.
Lord Keen of Elie
“(4A) In section 244ZA (release on licence of certain violent or sexual offenders), at end insert—“(9) The “requisite custodial period” in subsection (8) does not apply to any person convicted of—(a) rape,(b) assault by penetration,(c) inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity,(d) paying for the sexual services of a child aged under 13,(e) kidnapping or false imprisonment with the intention of committing a sexual offence,(f) creating or possessing indecent photographs of children,(g) grievous bodily harm,(h) grooming,(i) stalking,(j) causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable child or adult, or(k) death by dangerous driving.””
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 74 and 75, in my name, concern exemptions to the Government’s so-called earned progression model. We do not oppose in principle the idea that prisoners who demonstrate genuine rehabilitation should be eligible for early release. Where offenders have taken meaningful steps to address their behaviour and reduce their risk, there is a case to be made for earned progression. However, Clause 20 does not deliver that outcome.
Throughout Second Reading and in Committee, the Minister referred to an earned progression model and to examples such as that in the Texas system, yet, as drafted, Clause 20 contains no such mechanism. As the House of Commons Library briefing makes clear, the release point is automatic rather than earned. Prisoners will be released at the one-third point of their sentence unless additional days have been imposed by a court for misconduct. That is not earned progression; it is default release. Barring significant further transgressions, release is determined by the passage of time alone.
The Lord Chancellor has sought to reassure the public by stating that the most serious offences are excluded, yet the Ministry of Justice’s own data confirms that offenders convicted of rape, grievous bodily harm and the creation of indecent images of children will be eligible for this automatic scheme. If those offences do not qualify as serious, it is difficult to understand what offences would.
This is not a technical adjustment to sentencing mechanics; it is a profound change to how the state responds to some of the gravest crimes. As drafted, the Bill would reduce custodial time for over 60% of rapists and more than 80% of child sex offenders. It would permit those convicted of stalking, an offence which we know is strongly associated with escalation into homicide, to be released automatically after serving just one-third of their sentence, without any assessment of ongoing risk.
Amendment 74 would exclude from these provisions those convicted of a range of serious offences, including offences involving the death of a vulnerable person. Amendment 75 would require consultation to ensure that other serious offence categories are appropriately excluded before these measures come into force. In the other place, a similar amendment which included an even broader list of exemptions attracted support from all parties. All 65 Liberal Democrat MPs present for the Division voted in favour of the amendment. Other parties in support of the amendment included the Green Party, the independents, Plaid Cymru, Reform and indeed some members of the Government. It is rare to have such cross-party unanimity, but Members in the other place clearly recognised the dangers that Clause 20 poses to the public.
Noble Lords may notice that Amendment 87, from the Liberal Democrats, includes the same list of offences, as well as two further categories of offences, which should, they suppose, be exempt from automatic release following fixed-term recall. I call on noble Lords to consider consistency here, as much as concern.
Clause 20 applies to a far more serious cohort of offenders than other provisions in the Bill, and clearly there is concern beyond this Chamber. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner has described the early release of perpetrators after weeks in custody as “simply unacceptable”. The Victims’ Commissioner has warned that victims will be left “unnerved and bewildered”. These are not political voices but independent authorities concerned about public safety.
Public confidence is often regarded as fragile where the justice system is concerned. When victims see those who have harmed them released automatically after a fraction of their sentence, trust is bound to be eroded. Amendment 74, in particular, would be a proportionate safeguard to ensure that early release is not applied to those whose crimes are too serious and too dangerous to justify it. If the Government are not prepared to give an assurance with regard to Amendment 74, I will seek to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 90 in this group, which would insert a proposed new clause on extended determinate sentence prisoners, who I will refer to as EDS prisoners.
Currently, the majority of people serving an EDS first become eligible for parole after serving two-thirds of their custodial term and every two years thereafter, with eventual automatic release at the end of the custodial term on extended licence if they are unsuccessful in gaining parole earlier. This proposed new clause would create a power for the Secretary of State to refer to the Parole Board a prisoner serving an EDS at the earlier halfway point of the sentence, instead of the two-thirds point, if the Secretary of State is of the view that there is a reasonable prospect that the board will direct release. It is therefore in line with recommendation 4.2 of the sentencing review. As that review affirmed, this measure would improve incentives for rehabilitation and enhance the effectiveness of measures to address the overcrowding crisis, without in any way changing the public protection mechanisms that currently apply to EDS prisoners.
The Minister said in Committee, at col. 1842 of Hansard, on 3 December last year, that the Government rejected the independent review’s recommendation 4.2 on the grounds that the EDS was imposed because the offender was considered dangerous. It is quite right that an EDS is a public protection sentence, but, in statute, the parts intended to fulfil its public protection function are the involvement of the Parole Board and the extended licence period. There are no public protection concerns in statute to justify referral to the Parole Board at the two-thirds point of the sentence instead of the halfway point, as is proposed for most other determinate sentence prisoners.
Under the provisions of this new clause, and in line with the recommendations of the review, the Parole Board would still engage in exactly the same careful, reasoned and deliberate decision-making process at the 50% point as it currently does at the 66% point. Moreover, the average length of an EDS is nine years, with many serving far longer than that. It is therefore a serious oversight that, for no good reason, measures to address overcrowding are ignoring EDS prisoners, who constitute 10% of people in prison. That is more than 9,000 people, who are serving an average of nearly a decade.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, this debate is about a central purpose of the Bill: to put the prison system on a sustainable footing. There is no doubt that the offences listed in Amendment 74 and referenced in Amendment 75 are serious crimes. Indeed, they are so serious that many perpetrators of these offences will receive life or extended determinate sentences.
I remind noble Lords that there are 17,000 prisoners serving those sentences, convicted of the most serious crimes. They include many serious sexual offenders. These offenders will be unaffected by the reforms we are bringing forward in this Bill. They will remain in prison as long as they do now.
Amendments 74 and 75 raise a more fundamental issue. Are we willing, as the previous Government clearly were, to leave the prison system on the brink of collapse? This did not happen overnight. It was not inevitable. It was the choice the party opposite made again and again for 14 years. They abandoned their posts and put public safety at risk by allowing prisons to reach bursting point. To cover up their failures, they covertly let out more than 10,000 prisoners early as part of their chaotic scheme. If it were not for the decisive action of this Government, the police would have been unable to make arrests and courts unable to hold trials, which would have been a breakdown of law and order unlike anything we have seen in modern times. We must continue to take decisive action to address the consequences of their mismanagement. If these amendments were to pass, they would undermine the fundamental issue that the Bill is designed to fix —the issue they neglected for 14 years.
I took this job to fix this issue and countless others that we inherited. As someone who has dedicated their working life to improving the criminal justice system, it matters to me personally. I am convinced that this Bill is the only and best way to fix this problem. I refuse to stand in front of victims of serious crimes, look them in the eye and tell them that we have no space in our prisons to lock up dangerous offenders and that their rapist or abuser cannot go to prison at all because there is no space. Let me be very clear: running out of space is the consequence if these amendments pass. I hope that all noble Lords will agree with me that we cannot, in good conscience, vote for amendments that we know will cause such great harm. Our immediate priority must be stability, and that is what our measures deliver. We are building more prison places than at any time since the Victorian era. By the end of this Parliament there will be more people in prison than ever before. I recall that the previous Government managed only 500 extra places in 14 years.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his constructive engagement on this amendment and for raising important questions about how victims will be protected. I remind noble Lords that, once released, offenders will be subject to a period of intensive supervision supported by a significant expansion of electronic tagging. The highest-risk offenders, as assessed by probation, will continue to be actively supervised until the end of their sentence. They will continue to be subject to any licence conditions needed to manage risk and protect victims, including restriction zones where appropriate. All offenders will remain on licence with the possibility of recall to custody if they breach the terms of their licence. Of course, if an offender behaves badly in custody, they will spend even longer inside, up to the full length of their sentence.
As noble Lords know, the proposals for the progression model, which Clause 20 seeks to implement, are the result of extensive work by the Independent Sentencing Review. The review, led by David Gauke and supported by a panel of eminent experts from all parts of the criminal justice system, arrived at its recommendation after extensive research and consultation. All proposals, including the new framework for release, have been thoroughly considered. We now need to put in place an effective release framework that will support a sustainable prison estate and protect the public by ensuring that space is prioritised for the most dangerous offenders. I therefore urge the noble and learned Lord not to press Amendments 74 and 75. If he wishes to test the opinion of the House, I encourage all noble Lords to vote against this amendment and help this country end the cycle of crisis in our prisons for good.
Dangerous offenders are also the subject of Amendment 90 tabled by my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Carter. It proposes that extended determinate sentences should include a progression element that would enable the parole eligibility date to be brought forward. While I thank the noble Lord for raising this important issue, the Government’s position remains that prison is the right place for these dangerous offenders. To receive an extended determinate sentence, a specified violent, sexual or terrorism offence must have been committed. The court will also have decided that the offender is dangerous—I repeat, dangerous—and that there is a significant risk of serious harm to the public from the offender committing a further specified offence. These dangerous offenders must remain in prison for as long as they do now. I ask the noble Lord not to move his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, we do not oppose an earned progression model in principle but, as was recognised by all parties in the other place, Clause 20 does not deliver an earned progression model. Clause 20 contains no mechanism for earning release. That is not, or at least it was not until recently, a party-political point. The House of Commons Library confirmed that release occurs automatically at the one-third or halfway point for offenders. Barring serious further offences in custody, release is guaranteed.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, talked repeatedly about the earned progression model. I do not know which one he was referring to, but it is not the one in Clause 20. That is simply a mystery. What we have is a means by which violent and dangerous individuals will be released after they have served one-third of the sentence imposed by a court. Is that supposed to imbue our justice system with public confidence? Automatic early release for serious offenders is bound to undermine that confidence.
While the Minister may make criticisms of prison capacity and what occurred during the previous 14 years of government, I remind him that two wrongs do not make a right. You do not cure one mistake by committing an even worse mistake, and that is what is being proposed here. Automatic early release is going to endanger the public. It ensures that releases apply to offenders whose crimes are serious and dangerous. It is not proportionate, it is not targeted and it is not possessed of any safeguards. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Victims and Courts Bill
Lord Keen of Elie ExcerptsTuesday 16th December 2025
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 27 October 2025 - (27 Oct 2025)
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to see the noble Baroness, Lady Griffin, in her place, and I wish her a very speedy recovery. I also congratulate her on her precision and the brevity of her remarks. I wish I was going to be as brief as she has been.
Lord Garnier (Con)
So does my noble and learned friend; that is a free drink that he is not going to get.
Unusually for a modern criminal justice Bill, which was ably introduced by the Minister, this is, relatively speaking, a remarkably short one. It has only 18 clauses. It is rather spoiled, however, as there are 53 pages of schedules. I dream of the day when any Government decides to stop producing criminal justice Bills of voluminous length, but there we are.
I understand the political and moral basis for the provisions about defendants who refuse to appear in court to be sentenced. I listened with great care to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, on that. However, I agree with my noble friend Lord Sandhurst’s scepticism about whether they will work in practice. We will see how those arguments develop in Committee.
I do, however, welcome the proposals with regard to the ULS scheme. I had to operate it myself as a law officer when the Minister was at the Crown Prosecution Service. I think it is fair to say that we suffered together in that struggle. There will be more to say in Committee about the NDA provisions, which amend the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024.
This afternoon, I want to address a point about overseas victims not mentioned in the Bill. I spoke about this on 7 February 2024, on the fourth day in Committee on the then Victims and Prisoners Bill. I make no apology for doing so again, and I will table the same amendment to this Bill that I tabled to that Bill. In introducing these remarks, I refer to my interest as a barrister whose practice includes corporate crime cases.
Multinational companies have been fined more than £1.5 billion over the past 10 years or so after investigations by the Serious Fraud Office into corruption abroad. But only 1.4% of those fines—about £20 million—has been used to compensate victim countries or communities abroad. In my view, this needs to change.
Much of this corruption occurs in African countries that are already suffering terrible economic hardship, food and energy crises, and inflation. They are in dire need of economic support to repair the damage caused by corruption.
United Kingdom Governments have been vocal in their support for compensating foreign state victims of corruption. But the action actually taken to compensate foreign states tells a different story and leaves us open to charges of hypocrisy. Most corruption cases brought before the English courts involve foreign jurisdictions. We step in as the world’s policeman, investigating and prosecuting crimes that take place in other countries, but keep all the fines for ourselves. This is important because corruption causes insidious damage to the poor —and the not so poor—particularly in emerging markets. The United Nations says that it
“impedes international trade and investment; undermines sustainable development; threatens democracy and deprives citizens of vital public resources”.
The African Union estimated in 2015 that 25% of the continent’s gross domestic product was lost to corruption. Every company convicted of overseas corruption in this jurisdiction should be ordered to compensate the communities it has harmed. That would be both just and effective. Compensation should come through investment in programmes targeted at decreasing corruption and benefiting local communities; for example, by building and resourcing more schools and hospitals.
At first glance, English law encourages compensation. It is required to take precedence over all other financial sanctions—so far, so good. But, as with many noble ambitions, problems lurk in the detail. Compensation is ordered in criminal cases only where the loss is straightforward to assess, even though the trial judge is usually of High Court or senior Crown Court level and will deal with complex issues every day.
For example, in 2022, in a case in which I appeared for a victim state, Glencore pleaded guilty to widespread corruption in the oil markets of several African states. Although it was ordered to pay £281 million, not a single penny has gone back to the communities where the corruption happened, largely because it was held that the compensation would be too complicated to quantify. The Airbus deferred prosecution agreement tells a similar story. The company was required to pay €991 million to the United Kingdom in fines, but compensation to the numerous Asian countries where the corruption took place formed no part of the agreement.
The process for compensating overseas state victims—and particularly overseas state victims—needs simplification so that real money can be returned to them. An answer perhaps lies in incentivising the corporations that commit the crimes to pay compensation voluntarily on the understanding that it would not increase the total amount, including penalties and costs, that they would have to pay. The company could be given further incentive by receiving a discount on the fine it would still be required to pay to the United Kingdom Treasury, or an increase in the fine if it refuses or fails to make redress.
The required changes are, I suggest, straightforward and would cost the taxpayer nothing. It could create a standard measure of compensation, which would ensure consistency and transparency, as well as avoiding the difficulty of calculating a specific amount of loss or damage in each case. The compensation figure could equal whichever is the higher of the profit made by the company from its corrupt conduct or the amount of the bribes it paid to obtain the profits. This already happens when companies are sentenced, save that all the money goes to the Treasury. The defendant company would pay nothing more, but at least some of the money would benefit the victim state or the communities harmed within it.
Of course, it would be naive to think that compensation paid to a foreign state could never lead to further corruption. That is clearly a risk. To address this, defendant companies would be encouraged or required to enter into an agreement with the relevant state, which would include obligations to comply with United Nations guidance on the treatment of compensation funds and to identify projects for which the funds would be used, possibly with the involvement of a local non-governmental organisation.
To encourage states to enter into these types of agreements, corporations would be permitted to donate the compensation funds, for example, to the World Bank or International Monetary Fund for projects in the region instead, or to pay down a country’s debt, if an agreement cannot otherwise be reached.
The benefit of this approach is that, unlike at present, where there is no disadvantage in doing nothing, it puts the onus on the defendant companies to take restorative action—something that will appeal to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It also addresses the difficulties in quantifying losses by creating a simple approach that gives companies early sight of the amount that they will have to pay.
The Bill is, I am sure, full of wonderful provisions, but it does lack this wonderful diamond which needs to be added to the ring around the Minister’s finger— I do not know how far I can go with that one. But let us do this. We can then hold our heads high and enhance our national reputation in the fight against international corruption. This is not a matter of party politics. It is a matter of simple justice.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, victims demand effective and speedy justice, and we should deliver effective and speedy legislation.
We welcome many measures in the Bill which build on the previous Government’s efforts in the Criminal Justice Bill and in the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. Clearly, this Bill is intended to put victims first when addressing issues of justice and to enhance their voice in the criminal justice process. It is vital that victims are heard and that the justice system is transparent and accessible to victims. That includes, in particular, how offenders are sentenced and how victims can access the information given by the court on that issue.
We are grateful for many of the provisions in the Bill and for the fact that the Government have been open to constructive suggestions during its passage, resulting in new clauses and clarifications that have now been added to it. Indeed, we are supportive of the steps taken by the Government to strengthen the Bill’s approach to parental responsibility so that restrictions apply to offenders who have committed offences against any child rather than just their own.
There are, however, certain areas where we believe that there is further scope still for the Bill’s provisions to be improved, and there are several important points upon which the Bill is silent. In particular, that touches upon the issue of justice delayed being justice denied—a point made by a number of noble Lords.
There is also the parallel development of legislation going through this House that was touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: in particular, the Sentencing Bill. It is important to be clear that, although this Bill puts victims at the centre of justice, there is concern that the Sentencing Bill currently passing through this House tends to do the opposite. Under the suspended sentence presumption in the Sentencing Bill, many offenders who would previously have gone to prison will now remain in the community. For victims, this often means living alongside the offenders, seeing them in the street, in local shops and in shared public spaces. This is not an abstract policy choice but in fact a daily reality for the victims of crime. Can a system that leaves victims to live with the consequences of offending in this way really claim to put victims first? This is perhaps a tension between the Government’s victims Bill and their proposed sentencing provisions.
Turning to the clauses of the Bill itself, we are broadly supportive of Clause 1 on sentencing. Sentencing is not a purely administrative act but a moment of public accountability. For victims, the sentencing hearing is often the first and only opportunity to see an offender confronted with the true consequences of their actions, and their physical presence in court matters to victims. Indeed, the absence of an offender at sentencing, particularly where it is deliberate, can no doubt exacerbate the victim’s trauma arising out of the original offence.
With regard to the specific provisions, there is a reference to reasonable force being employed to bring an individual into court. That raises question marks of onus. Will it be for the police officer to prove that only reasonable force was employed? It might be more appropriate to approach this on the basis that such force as is necessary will be employed, provided that it is not disproportionate. That would be a safety net for police officers, who might very often be accused of using unnecessary force in the situation that they are faced with. There is also a need to ensure that police and prison officers, who are already under significant pressure, are provided with the appropriate instruction, training and means to carry out this task. That will need to be addressed in due course.
Turning to Clauses 3 to 5 on the restriction of parental responsibility, we generally support the Government’s steps in this area, as I indicated earlier. It is, as the Government consider it, an important child protection measure. But there is a question mark as to the four-year threshold provision, touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Meston. Are we otherwise to throw the onus back on the family court to address this issue? Equally, are interim measures to be left to the family court to determine and deal with? We hope these issues will be addressed going forward in discussion with the Minister. I look forward to that opportunity.
On Clauses 6 and 7 on victims’ rights, again we are broadly supportive of these measures. It is essential that we extend these measures in order that victims can be confident that their interests and concerns are being properly dealt with.
Some criticism was made of the length of Schedule 2. It is only fair to observe that Schedule 2 is of such length because of the attendant number of existing statutory measures that are required to be amended, which maybe does not reflect very well on our existing statutory provision but is the necessary consequence of having so many diverse provisions that touch on this very issue. There are one or two issues that we want to raise with the Minister in due course. For example, Schedule 2 requires certain parties to take such steps as they “consider appropriate”, which seems rather open- ended. We hope that in time the Minister will have an opportunity to address that sort of issue in Schedule 2 so that we can be reassured as to the effectiveness of these measures going forward.
On Clauses 8 to 10, with respect to the position of the Victims’ Commissioner, we are broadly supportive of all these measures and acknowledge the very considerable contribution that was made in this regard by the late Baroness Newlove. We look forward to her replacement with the experience that she has had as Victims’ Commissioner for London.
Clause 11 deals with the extension of the right to prosecute to those other than qualified solicitors or barristers. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that by extending this to those with CILEX qualifications we will increase diversity. That is to be welcomed. The noble Lord, Lord Gove, is also undoubtedly correct that the provision will dilute qualification. The question is whether it will dilute the quality of prosecution. That will have to be monitored with very conspicuous care going forward. I look forward to the Minister explaining to us how the Government will seek to monitor that. It is important that we have Crown prosecutors available, but equally they should be of a quality and standard to ensure fair and effective prosecution. That is a matter for the interests of victims and for society as a whole.
I turn briefly to Clause 12, which deals with the introduction of regulations to set rates of remuneration in the case of private prosecutions. Let it be noted that private prosecutions are a very significant and important aspect of overall prosecutions within our courts. Such matters as shoplifting, for example, which are a scourge upon society and the high street, are generally taken up as prosecutions privately by major institutions. Indeed, in the case of fraud, again private prosecutions play a very important part, not just in respect of minor fraud but very often in the case of major fraud, which is extremely expensive to prosecute.
The Minister said that what would be introduced would be fairer, with safeguards and so on. I wonder if she is being a little economical when she describes the matter in that way. I take as my guide the Explanatory Notes, which
“have been prepared by Ministry of Justice in order to assist the reader”—
in this case, myself. If we look at the Explanatory Notes, we are reminded that, in the case of a private prosecution, it is provided by the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 that there will be “reasonably sufficient” compensation to the prosecutor as required. The Legal Aid Agency monitors this matter, and it employs the Senior Courts Cost Office guidelines for solicitors in respect of such costs. Those particular costs have been the subject of review by the Master of the Rolls, pursuant to a recommendation from the Civil Justice Council, so that in 2021 those rates were increased for the first time in 11 years. There is now a provision for them to be reviewed annually in line with the services producer price index.
Consequently, those reasonable rates of remuneration are now about five times higher than the criminal legal aid rates. That has nothing to do with the reasonableness of remuneration for those undertaking private prosecution; it has everything to do with the poverty of the criminal legal aid rates that are in place at the present time. You do not encourage the very formidable burden of private prosecution by trying to bring down a reasonable level of remuneration to what is, frankly, a poverty level of remuneration that has had, and continues to have, a very significant impact on the prosecution of criminal offences in our courts. It is not just physical buildings; you have to invest in people as well as property. We have failed singularly to invest in people, and that has to be improved. I would rather see a victims provision that said we are going to pay a reasonable rate to those undertaking criminal prosecution, so that we can get adequate prosecutors and so that we can get adequate defence counsel, than to say that, in order to try to remove this embarrassing disparity, we will try to impoverish those who take up the burden of private prosecution.
Of course, the Minister said this will have no chilling effect on private prosecutions. I merely raise the question: where is the impact assessment? Perhaps we will hear in due course.
I move on to Clauses 13 and 14, which deal with sentencing reviews. With regard to unduly lenient sentencing, a number of noble Lords have observed that there is a need for transcripts to be available to victims in order that they can understand how a sentence was arrived at and, if necessary, make a request to the law officers that a ULS review should be carried out. In that context, I have no difficulty with the suggestion that the Attorney-General should have 14 days from the time of the request in order to deal with that matter. But, while I accept that the unduly lenient sentence mechanism is not an appeal mechanism for victims, it is a means by which victims can make a request of the law officers, and they have to be given a reasonable period of time to do that. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that, for that to be effective, there has to be a more realistic time limit available.
I turn briefly to matters which we say should properly be in the Bill but are not yet there, although I look forward to their introduction in due course, possibly at the instigation of the Minister herself.
First, there are no provisions to address the courts backlog. Let us be clear that, without any doubt, that is the greatest barrier to victims achieving justice, disposal and closure. We know that there are many Crown courtrooms that are not sitting on a single day, indicating that there is at least the property capacity to deal with it. I equally acknowledge the need for not just property but personnel. It would be good to see that fundamental problem addressed in the Bill as well. I also note that, where offers of additional court sitting days have been made by the Lady Chief Justice, they have not been fully taken up by the Government. It would be helpful to know why not, given the enormous backlog that we face at the present time.
Secondly, there is no real provision for increased transparency. Again, we come back to the issue of court transcripts. It appears to us that there is at least perhaps a halfway house: I appreciate that, very often, the Government will come up with the cost implications of transcripts as well as the time implications, but surely there is scope for a mechanism whereby, if victims request a transcript of sentencing remarks, the court should be able to request that transcript as soon as the request is made. It would not be in every case, by any means, and it would curtail both costs and delay.
The third area, touched on in the other place, is data on who actually commits crimes. The Bill contains no provision that mandates the collection and publication of data on offenders’ visa status, asylum status or related immigration information. That is important from the point of view of public perception and victims’ perception. To what extent is crime going to be committed by those who have come into this country unlawfully, for example? You have to satisfy public concern on that issue, and the appropriate way to do that is by collecting the appropriate data.
There is then the question of the need to recoup outstanding fines. I understand that at the present time there is something in the region of £1 billion in outstanding fines, and recovering that could only help the Ministry of Justice in its improvement of courts services and of legal aid rates, surely. But the scale of unpaid fines is “truly astounding”. Those are not my words: I am quoting the London Victims’ Commissioner. Surely some further steps need to be taken in that regard.
That question of fines then comes to the issue of overseas corruption, which was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I listened with interest to the point he made, and has previously made, about the need to ensure compensation for the countries that are the victims of corruption. I look forward to considering the amendments which he has made it clear he intends to bring forward in that regard.
Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, mentioned the possible concern that the issue of jury trials would be dropped into the Committee’s amendments. My understanding is that, as a matter of precedent, that never, ever happens, and what happens is that, if someone wishes to see an amendment, they indicate that they will bring it back on Report. In any event, I do not anticipate that the premature and perhaps ill-thought-out proposals that have emanated from the Ministry of Justice on the limitations to jury trial will come before the House any time soon—but, if they do, I have no doubt they will meet with the most robust response.
Before closing, I thank the Minister for the clarity with which she presented the Bill. I look forward to further engagement with her on its terms.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I have tried very hard to keep this non-partisan, but I have to say very gently to the noble Lord that it is a bit rich to hear from a member of the party opposite about what has happened to the criminal Bar, when pretty much everybody who was working there at the time—that includes me—knows it was the considerable cuts made to legal aid under the previous Administration that put the criminal Bar into the parlous state it is now in. But I say no more about that contentious subject, because this is not an opportunity for us to fall out. The noble Lord and I can debate the respective merits of barristers, solicitors and CILEX lawyers in due course.
I agree with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti about the importance of private prosecutions and entirely understand her concerns. I hope she is aware that the Government intend to look at some of the issues, for example, that surround disclosure in private prosecutions. We all know the cases to which I refer. She said she has reservations about corporate private prosecutions. I was about to say something, then the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, rather made the point for me that some very important commercial organisations have brought private prosecutions in relation to quite big frauds—sometimes very big frauds indeed. Economic crime is one of the scourges of our society. The investigation and prosecution of those crimes consumes a huge amount of public resource. The Government are certainly of the view that there is a place for private prosecution to help to ensure that economic crime is prosecuted successfully.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, drew my attention to the Explanatory Notes—again—as did the noble Lord, Lord Meston. If we have got them wrong, we will correct them by Report.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
I was not suggesting for a moment that the Explanatory Notes are wrong; they just happen to contradict the Minister.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I would, of course, always say that I am right, would I not? In that sense, they are wrong.
The noble and learned Lord made the point about needing to invest in people. I will give another gentle reminder about who was in power for the past 14 years.
Turning to the question of the unduly lenient scheme, I entirely agree with noble Lords that there is no point in having a right that nobody knows they have, and we plainly are not getting this right in terms of information. It needs to be more broadly known about. The question of whether 28 days is the appropriate period is one to which the Government are giving urgent consideration. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, said that it should be made the same as for defendants. It is: they have 28 days. That is where the period came from: there is parity between the two. But that does not necessarily mean it must remain.