Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 16th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to see the noble Baroness, Lady Griffin, in her place, and I wish her a very speedy recovery. I also congratulate her on her precision and the brevity of her remarks. I wish I was going to be as brief as she has been.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

So do we.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

So does my noble and learned friend; that is a free drink that he is not going to get.

Unusually for a modern criminal justice Bill, which was ably introduced by the Minister, this is, relatively speaking, a remarkably short one. It has only 18 clauses. It is rather spoiled, however, as there are 53 pages of schedules. I dream of the day when any Government decides to stop producing criminal justice Bills of voluminous length, but there we are.

I understand the political and moral basis for the provisions about defendants who refuse to appear in court to be sentenced. I listened with great care to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, on that. However, I agree with my noble friend Lord Sandhurst’s scepticism about whether they will work in practice. We will see how those arguments develop in Committee.

I do, however, welcome the proposals with regard to the ULS scheme. I had to operate it myself as a law officer when the Minister was at the Crown Prosecution Service. I think it is fair to say that we suffered together in that struggle. There will be more to say in Committee about the NDA provisions, which amend the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024.

This afternoon, I want to address a point about overseas victims not mentioned in the Bill. I spoke about this on 7 February 2024, on the fourth day in Committee on the then Victims and Prisoners Bill. I make no apology for doing so again, and I will table the same amendment to this Bill that I tabled to that Bill. In introducing these remarks, I refer to my interest as a barrister whose practice includes corporate crime cases.

Multinational companies have been fined more than £1.5 billion over the past 10 years or so after investigations by the Serious Fraud Office into corruption abroad. But only 1.4% of those fines—about £20 million—has been used to compensate victim countries or communities abroad. In my view, this needs to change.

Much of this corruption occurs in African countries that are already suffering terrible economic hardship, food and energy crises, and inflation. They are in dire need of economic support to repair the damage caused by corruption.

United Kingdom Governments have been vocal in their support for compensating foreign state victims of corruption. But the action actually taken to compensate foreign states tells a different story and leaves us open to charges of hypocrisy. Most corruption cases brought before the English courts involve foreign jurisdictions. We step in as the world’s policeman, investigating and prosecuting crimes that take place in other countries, but keep all the fines for ourselves. This is important because corruption causes insidious damage to the poor —and the not so poor—particularly in emerging markets. The United Nations says that it

“impedes international trade and investment; undermines sustainable development; threatens democracy and deprives citizens of vital public resources”.

The African Union estimated in 2015 that 25% of the continent’s gross domestic product was lost to corruption. Every company convicted of overseas corruption in this jurisdiction should be ordered to compensate the communities it has harmed. That would be both just and effective. Compensation should come through investment in programmes targeted at decreasing corruption and benefiting local communities; for example, by building and resourcing more schools and hospitals.

At first glance, English law encourages compensation. It is required to take precedence over all other financial sanctions—so far, so good. But, as with many noble ambitions, problems lurk in the detail. Compensation is ordered in criminal cases only where the loss is straightforward to assess, even though the trial judge is usually of High Court or senior Crown Court level and will deal with complex issues every day.

For example, in 2022, in a case in which I appeared for a victim state, Glencore pleaded guilty to widespread corruption in the oil markets of several African states. Although it was ordered to pay £281 million, not a single penny has gone back to the communities where the corruption happened, largely because it was held that the compensation would be too complicated to quantify. The Airbus deferred prosecution agreement tells a similar story. The company was required to pay €991 million to the United Kingdom in fines, but compensation to the numerous Asian countries where the corruption took place formed no part of the agreement.

The process for compensating overseas state victims—and particularly overseas state victims—needs simplification so that real money can be returned to them. An answer perhaps lies in incentivising the corporations that commit the crimes to pay compensation voluntarily on the understanding that it would not increase the total amount, including penalties and costs, that they would have to pay. The company could be given further incentive by receiving a discount on the fine it would still be required to pay to the United Kingdom Treasury, or an increase in the fine if it refuses or fails to make redress.

The required changes are, I suggest, straightforward and would cost the taxpayer nothing. It could create a standard measure of compensation, which would ensure consistency and transparency, as well as avoiding the difficulty of calculating a specific amount of loss or damage in each case. The compensation figure could equal whichever is the higher of the profit made by the company from its corrupt conduct or the amount of the bribes it paid to obtain the profits. This already happens when companies are sentenced, save that all the money goes to the Treasury. The defendant company would pay nothing more, but at least some of the money would benefit the victim state or the communities harmed within it.

Of course, it would be naive to think that compensation paid to a foreign state could never lead to further corruption. That is clearly a risk. To address this, defendant companies would be encouraged or required to enter into an agreement with the relevant state, which would include obligations to comply with United Nations guidance on the treatment of compensation funds and to identify projects for which the funds would be used, possibly with the involvement of a local non-governmental organisation.

To encourage states to enter into these types of agreements, corporations would be permitted to donate the compensation funds, for example, to the World Bank or International Monetary Fund for projects in the region instead, or to pay down a country’s debt, if an agreement cannot otherwise be reached.

The benefit of this approach is that, unlike at present, where there is no disadvantage in doing nothing, it puts the onus on the defendant companies to take restorative action—something that will appeal to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It also addresses the difficulties in quantifying losses by creating a simple approach that gives companies early sight of the amount that they will have to pay.

The Bill is, I am sure, full of wonderful provisions, but it does lack this wonderful diamond which needs to be added to the ring around the Minister’s finger— I do not know how far I can go with that one. But let us do this. We can then hold our heads high and enhance our national reputation in the fight against international corruption. This is not a matter of party politics. It is a matter of simple justice.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, victims demand effective and speedy justice, and we should deliver effective and speedy legislation.

We welcome many measures in the Bill which build on the previous Government’s efforts in the Criminal Justice Bill and in the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. Clearly, this Bill is intended to put victims first when addressing issues of justice and to enhance their voice in the criminal justice process. It is vital that victims are heard and that the justice system is transparent and accessible to victims. That includes, in particular, how offenders are sentenced and how victims can access the information given by the court on that issue.

We are grateful for many of the provisions in the Bill and for the fact that the Government have been open to constructive suggestions during its passage, resulting in new clauses and clarifications that have now been added to it. Indeed, we are supportive of the steps taken by the Government to strengthen the Bill’s approach to parental responsibility so that restrictions apply to offenders who have committed offences against any child rather than just their own.

There are, however, certain areas where we believe that there is further scope still for the Bill’s provisions to be improved, and there are several important points upon which the Bill is silent. In particular, that touches upon the issue of justice delayed being justice denied—a point made by a number of noble Lords.

There is also the parallel development of legislation going through this House that was touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: in particular, the Sentencing Bill. It is important to be clear that, although this Bill puts victims at the centre of justice, there is concern that the Sentencing Bill currently passing through this House tends to do the opposite. Under the suspended sentence presumption in the Sentencing Bill, many offenders who would previously have gone to prison will now remain in the community. For victims, this often means living alongside the offenders, seeing them in the street, in local shops and in shared public spaces. This is not an abstract policy choice but in fact a daily reality for the victims of crime. Can a system that leaves victims to live with the consequences of offending in this way really claim to put victims first? This is perhaps a tension between the Government’s victims Bill and their proposed sentencing provisions.

Turning to the clauses of the Bill itself, we are broadly supportive of Clause 1 on sentencing. Sentencing is not a purely administrative act but a moment of public accountability. For victims, the sentencing hearing is often the first and only opportunity to see an offender confronted with the true consequences of their actions, and their physical presence in court matters to victims. Indeed, the absence of an offender at sentencing, particularly where it is deliberate, can no doubt exacerbate the victim’s trauma arising out of the original offence.

With regard to the specific provisions, there is a reference to reasonable force being employed to bring an individual into court. That raises question marks of onus. Will it be for the police officer to prove that only reasonable force was employed? It might be more appropriate to approach this on the basis that such force as is necessary will be employed, provided that it is not disproportionate. That would be a safety net for police officers, who might very often be accused of using unnecessary force in the situation that they are faced with. There is also a need to ensure that police and prison officers, who are already under significant pressure, are provided with the appropriate instruction, training and means to carry out this task. That will need to be addressed in due course.

Turning to Clauses 3 to 5 on the restriction of parental responsibility, we generally support the Government’s steps in this area, as I indicated earlier. It is, as the Government consider it, an important child protection measure. But there is a question mark as to the four-year threshold provision, touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Meston. Are we otherwise to throw the onus back on the family court to address this issue? Equally, are interim measures to be left to the family court to determine and deal with? We hope these issues will be addressed going forward in discussion with the Minister. I look forward to that opportunity.

On Clauses 6 and 7 on victims’ rights, again we are broadly supportive of these measures. It is essential that we extend these measures in order that victims can be confident that their interests and concerns are being properly dealt with.

Some criticism was made of the length of Schedule 2. It is only fair to observe that Schedule 2 is of such length because of the attendant number of existing statutory measures that are required to be amended, which maybe does not reflect very well on our existing statutory provision but is the necessary consequence of having so many diverse provisions that touch on this very issue. There are one or two issues that we want to raise with the Minister in due course. For example, Schedule 2 requires certain parties to take such steps as they “consider appropriate”, which seems rather open- ended. We hope that in time the Minister will have an opportunity to address that sort of issue in Schedule 2 so that we can be reassured as to the effectiveness of these measures going forward.

On Clauses 8 to 10, with respect to the position of the Victims’ Commissioner, we are broadly supportive of all these measures and acknowledge the very considerable contribution that was made in this regard by the late Baroness Newlove. We look forward to her replacement with the experience that she has had as Victims’ Commissioner for London.

Clause 11 deals with the extension of the right to prosecute to those other than qualified solicitors or barristers. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that by extending this to those with CILEX qualifications we will increase diversity. That is to be welcomed. The noble Lord, Lord Gove, is also undoubtedly correct that the provision will dilute qualification. The question is whether it will dilute the quality of prosecution. That will have to be monitored with very conspicuous care going forward. I look forward to the Minister explaining to us how the Government will seek to monitor that. It is important that we have Crown prosecutors available, but equally they should be of a quality and standard to ensure fair and effective prosecution. That is a matter for the interests of victims and for society as a whole.

I turn briefly to Clause 12, which deals with the introduction of regulations to set rates of remuneration in the case of private prosecutions. Let it be noted that private prosecutions are a very significant and important aspect of overall prosecutions within our courts. Such matters as shoplifting, for example, which are a scourge upon society and the high street, are generally taken up as prosecutions privately by major institutions. Indeed, in the case of fraud, again private prosecutions play a very important part, not just in respect of minor fraud but very often in the case of major fraud, which is extremely expensive to prosecute.

The Minister said that what would be introduced would be fairer, with safeguards and so on. I wonder if she is being a little economical when she describes the matter in that way. I take as my guide the Explanatory Notes, which

“have been prepared by Ministry of Justice in order to assist the reader”—

in this case, myself. If we look at the Explanatory Notes, we are reminded that, in the case of a private prosecution, it is provided by the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 that there will be “reasonably sufficient” compensation to the prosecutor as required. The Legal Aid Agency monitors this matter, and it employs the Senior Courts Cost Office guidelines for solicitors in respect of such costs. Those particular costs have been the subject of review by the Master of the Rolls, pursuant to a recommendation from the Civil Justice Council, so that in 2021 those rates were increased for the first time in 11 years. There is now a provision for them to be reviewed annually in line with the services producer price index.

Consequently, those reasonable rates of remuneration are now about five times higher than the criminal legal aid rates. That has nothing to do with the reasonableness of remuneration for those undertaking private prosecution; it has everything to do with the poverty of the criminal legal aid rates that are in place at the present time. You do not encourage the very formidable burden of private prosecution by trying to bring down a reasonable level of remuneration to what is, frankly, a poverty level of remuneration that has had, and continues to have, a very significant impact on the prosecution of criminal offences in our courts. It is not just physical buildings; you have to invest in people as well as property. We have failed singularly to invest in people, and that has to be improved. I would rather see a victims provision that said we are going to pay a reasonable rate to those undertaking criminal prosecution, so that we can get adequate prosecutors and so that we can get adequate defence counsel, than to say that, in order to try to remove this embarrassing disparity, we will try to impoverish those who take up the burden of private prosecution.

Of course, the Minister said this will have no chilling effect on private prosecutions. I merely raise the question: where is the impact assessment? Perhaps we will hear in due course.

I move on to Clauses 13 and 14, which deal with sentencing reviews. With regard to unduly lenient sentencing, a number of noble Lords have observed that there is a need for transcripts to be available to victims in order that they can understand how a sentence was arrived at and, if necessary, make a request to the law officers that a ULS review should be carried out. In that context, I have no difficulty with the suggestion that the Attorney-General should have 14 days from the time of the request in order to deal with that matter. But, while I accept that the unduly lenient sentence mechanism is not an appeal mechanism for victims, it is a means by which victims can make a request of the law officers, and they have to be given a reasonable period of time to do that. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that, for that to be effective, there has to be a more realistic time limit available.

I turn briefly to matters which we say should properly be in the Bill but are not yet there, although I look forward to their introduction in due course, possibly at the instigation of the Minister herself.

First, there are no provisions to address the courts backlog. Let us be clear that, without any doubt, that is the greatest barrier to victims achieving justice, disposal and closure. We know that there are many Crown courtrooms that are not sitting on a single day, indicating that there is at least the property capacity to deal with it. I equally acknowledge the need for not just property but personnel. It would be good to see that fundamental problem addressed in the Bill as well. I also note that, where offers of additional court sitting days have been made by the Lady Chief Justice, they have not been fully taken up by the Government. It would be helpful to know why not, given the enormous backlog that we face at the present time.

Secondly, there is no real provision for increased transparency. Again, we come back to the issue of court transcripts. It appears to us that there is at least perhaps a halfway house: I appreciate that, very often, the Government will come up with the cost implications of transcripts as well as the time implications, but surely there is scope for a mechanism whereby, if victims request a transcript of sentencing remarks, the court should be able to request that transcript as soon as the request is made. It would not be in every case, by any means, and it would curtail both costs and delay.

The third area, touched on in the other place, is data on who actually commits crimes. The Bill contains no provision that mandates the collection and publication of data on offenders’ visa status, asylum status or related immigration information. That is important from the point of view of public perception and victims’ perception. To what extent is crime going to be committed by those who have come into this country unlawfully, for example? You have to satisfy public concern on that issue, and the appropriate way to do that is by collecting the appropriate data.

There is then the question of the need to recoup outstanding fines. I understand that at the present time there is something in the region of £1 billion in outstanding fines, and recovering that could only help the Ministry of Justice in its improvement of courts services and of legal aid rates, surely. But the scale of unpaid fines is “truly astounding”. Those are not my words: I am quoting the London Victims’ Commissioner. Surely some further steps need to be taken in that regard.

That question of fines then comes to the issue of overseas corruption, which was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I listened with interest to the point he made, and has previously made, about the need to ensure compensation for the countries that are the victims of corruption. I look forward to considering the amendments which he has made it clear he intends to bring forward in that regard.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, mentioned the possible concern that the issue of jury trials would be dropped into the Committee’s amendments. My understanding is that, as a matter of precedent, that never, ever happens, and what happens is that, if someone wishes to see an amendment, they indicate that they will bring it back on Report. In any event, I do not anticipate that the premature and perhaps ill-thought-out proposals that have emanated from the Ministry of Justice on the limitations to jury trial will come before the House any time soon—but, if they do, I have no doubt they will meet with the most robust response.

Before closing, I thank the Minister for the clarity with which she presented the Bill. I look forward to further engagement with her on its terms.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I have tried very hard to keep this non-partisan, but I have to say very gently to the noble Lord that it is a bit rich to hear from a member of the party opposite about what has happened to the criminal Bar, when pretty much everybody who was working there at the time—that includes me—knows it was the considerable cuts made to legal aid under the previous Administration that put the criminal Bar into the parlous state it is now in. But I say no more about that contentious subject, because this is not an opportunity for us to fall out. The noble Lord and I can debate the respective merits of barristers, solicitors and CILEX lawyers in due course.

I agree with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti about the importance of private prosecutions and entirely understand her concerns. I hope she is aware that the Government intend to look at some of the issues, for example, that surround disclosure in private prosecutions. We all know the cases to which I refer. She said she has reservations about corporate private prosecutions. I was about to say something, then the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, rather made the point for me that some very important commercial organisations have brought private prosecutions in relation to quite big frauds—sometimes very big frauds indeed. Economic crime is one of the scourges of our society. The investigation and prosecution of those crimes consumes a huge amount of public resource. The Government are certainly of the view that there is a place for private prosecution to help to ensure that economic crime is prosecuted successfully.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, drew my attention to the Explanatory Notes—again—as did the noble Lord, Lord Meston. If we have got them wrong, we will correct them by Report.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I was not suggesting for a moment that the Explanatory Notes are wrong; they just happen to contradict the Minister.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I would, of course, always say that I am right, would I not? In that sense, they are wrong.

The noble and learned Lord made the point about needing to invest in people. I will give another gentle reminder about who was in power for the past 14 years.

Turning to the question of the unduly lenient scheme, I entirely agree with noble Lords that there is no point in having a right that nobody knows they have, and we plainly are not getting this right in terms of information. It needs to be more broadly known about. The question of whether 28 days is the appropriate period is one to which the Government are giving urgent consideration. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, said that it should be made the same as for defendants. It is: they have 28 days. That is where the period came from: there is parity between the two. But that does not necessarily mean it must remain.

Restriction of Jury Trials

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Wednesday 10th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Ultimately, we must ensure that the Crown Court has the capacity to deal with those who commit the most serious crimes, so that victims do not have to face those agonising delays and do not withdraw before their case even gets to court. Justice is simply not being served in that situation, and the Government will not watch idly while the system continues to fail those victims. It is for that reason that we are bringing forward our bold proposals and reforms, coupled with record investment—to ensure that victims and the wider British public are served and so that we can put to bed once and for all justice delayed being justice denied”.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the Secretary of State for Justice recently stated, in the context of rape prosecution delays, that 60% of victims pull out of their cases because

“the trauma of waiting is too hard”—

a claim that was repeated in government briefings. The overwhelming response from experienced criminal lawyers is that this figure is misleading and that, as one leading King’s Counsel commented, the Justice Secretary’s remarks were “cynical or staggeringly gullible”. Given that the Crown Prosecution Service’s own figure for those who drop out of rape complaints due to delay is 8%, will the Minister ask the Secretary of State for Justice to correct Hansard and remove his inaccurate statement from the record?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is an enormous pleasure to face the noble and learned Lord again, after such a short time, on pretty much exactly the same topic. The statistic given by my right honourable and learned friend the Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State refers to, if you like, the journey taken by a victim from the moment of the decision being made to report an offence to the police to the ultimate disposal of the case in the Crown Court. The statistic that over 60%, or roughly around 60%, drop out at that stage is entirely correct. During that process, pre-charge adult rape victim attrition is 58% and post-charge adult rape attrition is 10%. So the statistic is correct, and it is a terrible indictment upon the system that this is happening. Every single one of those figures is a person who did not see justice for what they say happened to them.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I think that a very valid point has been made. I immediately think of the situation—

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

The noble Lord has already spoken.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I am intervening.

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[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Perhaps I could just finish my second point very quickly. It is simply that, even if the public do not think there is any harm in just deporting someone who has committed a crime, I would caution Government not to rely on public opinion. It does not always stay constant, but I can be sure that, if a serious crime is committed and someone is deported without being punished, this provision will come back to haunt the Government, and I do not want that to happen.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the principle of deportation of foreign national offenders attracts almost universal support. I say “almost” because the cohort of foreign national offenders may not entirely embrace the idea. However, if we introduce a system whereby they are deported without custody or punishment, I suspect that they will come on board with the idea as well.

It occurs to me that the Government are going to approach this with considerable and conspicuous care and take on board the very considered amendment advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and Amendment 142 from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. It will, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, come back to bite us if it is discovered by very professional criminals that you can come here, execute your robbery, contract killing or whatever else and then, when you are caught, we pay your air fare home. It does not make an awful lot of sense.

With regard to Northern Ireland, I would take Amendment 146 as a probing amendment inviting the Minister to explore the impact of the Windsor Framework on this proposal.

I note that, if a foreign national offender in Northern Ireland is offered the option of deportation or lengthy custody in Northern Ireland, he might well be inclined to the former, but that is just a practical proposal. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I start by thanking noble Lords and the noble and learned Lord for tabling their amendments, their interest in this topic and their considered words. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, that prisoner transfer agreements are very important. A few weeks ago, I went to Albania and met the Justice Minister and consulate colleagues to reiterate how important it is and to see what more we can do.

Our priority is to protect victims in the UK and ensure that these offenders can never again offend here. Once deported, offenders will be barred from ever returning to the UK, protecting victims and the wider public.

I will address the amendments in turn. Amendment 122A, limiting the early removal scheme to those in receipt of a sentence of less than three years, would mean a more restrictive early removal scheme than we currently operate. On the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, on foreign national offenders, there are more than 3,200 FNOs who would not be eligible for removal under Section 260 because they are serving a fixed-term sentence greater than three years. The impact on our ability to manage prison capacity would be substantial. We already transfer prisoners to serve the remainder of their sentence in their home country under prisoner transfer agreements, where they are in place.

However, these are not suitable in all cases, and it is important that we retain multiple paths for removal to reduce prison capacity and speed up removals, especially when you consider that it costs an average of £54,000 a year to house these offenders. Once removed, FNOs are barred from ever returning to the UK, keeping victims and the wider British public safe.

The early removal scheme remains a discretionary scheme that will not be suitable for all foreign national offenders, and we are reviewing the existing guidance that includes a range of reasons it can be refused.

The “stop the clock” provision means that those who re-enter the UK in breach of their deportation order, following an ERS removal, are liable to serve the remainder of their sentence here.

I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, that we are working with the Home Office to revise the policy framework that underpins the scheme and ensure that clear operational guidance is in place before the measure is commenced. I am happy to write to the noble Lord on his detailed questions. The eligibility of those who have returned after a previous removal is one consideration, as is the commitment made in the other place to consider those convicted of stalking offences.

Amendment 142, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, seeks to introduce immediate deportation for foreign nationals given sentences of at least six months. This would require the Government to make an immediate deportation order in respect of persons who have committed less serious offences. In the Bill, we are extending automatic deportation to persons given a suspended sentence of 12 months or more.

We will also increase the deportation consideration threshold to include anyone given a suspended sentence of any length. In this, the Government are going further than any previous Government in tackling foreign criminality. We have ramped up the removals of foreign criminals, with almost 5,200 deported since July 2024—an increase of 14% compared with the same 12 months previous.

However, just as we no longer transport convicts to the other side of the world for stealing a loaf of bread, we do not think it appropriate to have immediate deportation for less serious crimes in the way proposed by the noble Lord. Lowering the threshold in the way that his amendment does would result in a disproportionate duty to deport for low-level offending. It would lead to significantly more appeals being made against such decisions, arguing exceptionality. It would increase the operational burden to pursue deportation in cases where it was unlikely to be successful because the offending was relatively minor.

On Amendment 146, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for their understanding of my lack of knowledge on the intricate details of the Windsor Framework. In fact, I think that when the Windsor Framework was going through Parliament, I was very happily running a shoe repair business.

This amendment seeks to disapply parts of the withdrawal agreement and Article 2 of the Windsor Framework in relation to the automatic deportation provisions in the UK Borders Act 2007. I think that the intention behind the amendment is to ensure that deportation decisions in Northern Ireland can be taken on the same basis as deportation decisions in the rest of the UK.

It is the Government’s view that Clause 42 is compatible with Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol and the Windsor Framework. Therefore, we do not agree that there is a need for this amendment. To reiterate, it is the Government’s view that the deportation of foreign national offenders is not prohibited by these provisions. It is our view that immigration is a reserved matter, and we apply the same immigration laws across the whole of the UK.

I want to reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Lawlor, and the noble Lord, Lord Weir, that foreign national offenders, regardless of where they are in the UK, should be in no doubt that we will do everything to make sure they are not free on Britain’s streets, including removal from the UK at the earliest possible opportunity.

I note that the stated purpose of Amendment 141A as tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is to probe the effect of Clause 42 on survivors of modern slavery, human trafficking or domestic abuse. I reassure the noble Baroness that the Government take their responsibilities towards vulnerable people very seriously. The Home Office has published guidance on how to identify and support victims of modern slavery and human trafficking. Where removal of a person would breach the UK’s obligations under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, deportation must not proceed. Victims of domestic abuse whose relationship has broken down can apply for permission to settle in the UK permanently. Victims of domestic abuse who meet the threshold for deportation will be considered for deportation in the same way as other persons.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the opportunity to set out the Government’s position regarding the impact of Clause 42 on people who have a reasonable claim to be a victim and survivor of modern slavery, human trafficking or domestic violence. Such a claim does not amount to immunity from deportation for people convicted of an offence, although in some circumstances temporary permission to stay may be granted to victims of human trafficking or slavery. The changes brought about by Clause 42 will not alter this.

I thank noble Lords and Baronesses for this debate and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend said he thought I would agree. I agree.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have stated that the aim of this measure is to increase public confidence that justice is seen to be done as more individuals are diverted into the community. They claim that if individuals are seen to be giving back to their community then this will act as a deterrent against committing crime. I wonder whether there is an element of wishful thinking from the Government about this. The ability to take photos of offenders picking up litter is hardly a substitute for the prospect of time in custody.

If the Government intend to enact the substance of the Bill then perhaps any efforts to act as a deterrent are welcome, even a measure as small as this one. However, we would have to ensure that it is exercised properly and with a clear framework around it. Probation officers are already operating under extraordinary strain; they should not be required to improvise policy on a ground such as this, particularly when it has obvious implications for privacy, data protection and public confidence. There would have to be clear statutory guidance on when a photograph may be taken, the safeguards that exist against misuse and the redress that is available if things go wrong. As a number of noble Lords have mentioned, we must also guard against a drift towards humiliation or the selective publication of images in a way that would stigmatise individuals or particular communities.

If the purpose of Clause 35 is to demonstrate that unpaid work is both visible and constructive then the Government would have to ensure that the practice reflects those aims. Perhaps with proper regulation this might be possible, but without that it risks becoming another ill-defined power handed to an already overstretched Probation Service. We urge the Minister to commit to setting out clearly the safeguards and practical requirements that will clearly be required if a clause such as Clause 35 is ever implemented.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Bennett, and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, for tabling these amendments and raising their concerns about Clause 35. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Foster and Lord Bach, for raising their concerns.

I am sure we can agree that people who commit crimes should show that they are giving back to society. This clause is about building public confidence in community sentences. Local communities should know that those who harm them are paying back and be able to see the positive work being done. As my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti pointed out, it is important that they can clearly see the benefits of community payback and have their say on the work undertaken by nominating projects in their area.

I understand there may be concerns about the potential impacts of this measure and I reassure noble Lords that careful consideration is being given to how it is implemented. I have listened to noble Lords’ comments and will take them away to thoroughly consider. I also reassure noble Lords that publication will not apply in all cases. Exemption criteria will be set out in secondary legislation. This will be used alongside clear operational guidance on the circumstances where publishing would not be appropriate. The criteria are to be determined but may include factors such as specific offence types or personal circumstances which present heightened risks to the offender, their families or others. Probation practitioners will use this guidance and their professional assessment to determine the right course of action. We should have confidence that they will use the power only where appropriate. I confirm to noble Lords that I have heard the points they have made and reiterate that we will reflect carefully before Report.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments may appear useful in a time where sentencing laws are revised with increasing frequency, as illustrated by this Bill. A call for transparency and data is also generally welcome. Both amendments reflect a desire to ensure that justice keeps pace with changes in law and society. I am sure that anyone can support that general intention. We would invite the Government to address constructively the concerns that lie behind these amendments.

However, it appears that there may be very real practical issues and difficulties about any such amendment to the Bill. To take one simple example, the Bill, when it becomes law in its present form, will determine that someone who is sentenced to 12 months or less should have a suspended sentence. At the point when the Bill becomes law, is everyone then serving a custodial sentence of 12 months or less going to seek review on the grounds that the sentence should now be suspended? It seems to me that there are an awful lot of practical difficulties around that possibility.

Then, of course, we are going to have people reviewing the Sentencing Council recommendations from time to time who will say, “Wait a minute: they used to recommend three years for what I did, but they are now recommending two. Could I please have a review?” While the amendments are well intentioned, it occurs that there could be an immense number of practical difficulties, putting aside even the imposition upon the courts to review sentences at regular levels.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for these amendments, which I understand are seeking to ensure fairness in sentencing outcomes and are clearly rooted in the commitment, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, to ensure that justice keeps pace with society.

That said, it is important to recognise that mechanisms already exist to address perceived injustices, including criminal appeals and sentence reviews, and mandating a formal review every three years with accompanying data and recommendations therefore risks duplicating existing oversight functions and placing additional burdens on the justice system. As the noble Lord will appreciate, there are already pressures in our justice system and it is especially important that we ensure that any reforms that create additional burdens are proportionate, targeted and deliverable.

I note, however, that the recent Leveson review calls for a full review of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 to modernise how criminal records are disclosed. The Government are considering this recommendation and will update the House in due course. In addition to that, the Law Commission was invited by the Government to consider the law on criminal appeals. Its consultation closed earlier this year and the responses are currently being analysed. We can expect the Law Commission to report to the Government with recommendations next year. Given that those pieces of work are in train, I hope that gives the noble Lord some assurance that those recommendations will be carefully considered. While we are sympathetic to the principle that fairness underpins these amendments, for the reasons I set out, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Foster of Bath (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 147. Noble Lords will be well aware that, in earlier debates, I have argued that what we do—whether it is for a custodial or non-custodial sentence—is of course about punishment but should also be about taking steps to reduce reoffending. I have therefore argued that either the police or the Probation Service must put in place measures to help with that, which would include things such as education, skills, and also measures to help people with drug, alcohol, and—as I have added—gambling disorders. We have had those debates already.

However, in today’s debate, I have mentioned the fact that something like 20% of people in prison are on remand, awaiting sentencing. As a result of the huge backlog in the Crown Courts, which I have also mentioned, it is a fact that many of those on remand will be in prison awaiting sentencing for quite a long time. So, it seemed to me perfectly reasonable that, while they are in prison, there should be opportunities that might help them in later life anyway, in terms of the same sorts of measures. This amendment very simply says that those who are in prison on remand should have made available to them the same level of provision that is provided for prisoners after sentencing. It is as simple as that, it seems to be common sense and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, turning first to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I must say from the outset that we on these Benches cannot support it. The power to remand a person in custody for their own protection—or, in the case of a child or young person, for their own welfare—is not one that the courts use lightly. It is already tightly circumscribed and deployed only where the alternative would expose an extremely vulnerable individual to serious harm.

To remove that safeguard entirely would be a mistake. There are rare, but very real, occasions when a defendant’s personal circumstances, exploitation by criminal gangs or acute safeguarding concerns mean that the only safe option, in the immediate term, is to keep them in secure accommodation. That judgment, made by a court on evidence and subject to challenge, is not one that we believe Parliament should now deprive them of. Where children are concerned, the imperative is even stronger. The court’s paramount concern must be people’s welfare, and removing this power risks leaving young people unprotected in precisely those situations where intervention is most vital. For these reasons, we cannot support Amendment 140.

We strongly support the principle underlying Amendment 147 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foster. Far too many people spend far too long in remand—months and, sometimes, well over a year—awaiting trial or sentence. For all practical purposes, they experience incarceration in the same way as sentenced prisoners. They are deprived of liberty, separated from their families and often held in conditions indistinguishable from the sentenced estate. Yet those in remand do not have the same access to rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy or other forms of support that are routinely offered post sentence.

That is increasingly difficult to justify, particularly given that time spent on remand is overwhelmingly treated as time served for the purposes of the ultimate custodial sentence. If we accept that remand can form a significant part of an individual’s total period in custody, it cannot be right that this is, in effect, dead time, in which they are able neither to progress their rehabilitation nor to address the issues that may have contributed to their offending behaviour.

Therefore, the amendment proposed by the noble Lord is a valuable contribution to a discussion that is long overdue. It does not prejudge the precise mechanisms or impose unworkable obligations on overstretched services, but it rightly challenges us to consider whether the current disparity is effective or conducive to reducing reoffending. The Government should engage seriously with the spirit of these proposals.

Taken together, the amendments highlight two themes that run throughout our debates on the Bill: the need to protect the vulnerable and the need to ensure that custody, whether pre or post sentence, serves a constructive purpose. I hope that the Minister will commit to further work in this area, and I look forward to his response.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her amendment and for taking the time to discuss her related concerns with my noble friend Lord Timpson. I also thank her for her support for the Bill and its overall intentions—that is very much appreciated coming from someone with her track record.

Amendment 140 would remove an important safeguard which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, is very rarely used but remains an option for the courts as a measure of last resort and out of concern for the defendant. Eliminating this provision could leave vulnerable individuals without any viable protection, particularly where alternative care arrangements were simply unavailable or could not be implemented swiftly enough. We fear that those may be the consequences. Examples where it may be used include where it is the only option available to the court to keep someone safe, such as in cases where the defendant is a member of a gang and could be subject to repercussions if they were not protected.

I hope it will also reassure your Lordships that the Mental Health Bill, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to, is now in the other place. It includes a reform to end the use of remand for one’s own protection under the Bail Act where the court’s sole concern is the defendant’s mental health. This reform should ensure that remand for one’s own protection is, therefore, used only as a last resort in the circumstances I have outlined.

At this stage, repeal would leave a gap in the available provision. Courts must retain the flexibility to act decisively in safeguarding individuals when no other option exists. The amendment would risk unintended consequences for vulnerable defendants and undermine the protective function of the justice system.

Amendment 147, which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foster, for tabling, seeks to allow prisoners held on remand to access rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support before the start of their sentence. The Government’s view is that the amendment is not necessary, given that remand prisoners can already access those programmes where prisons run them.

There is also an important legal distinction here that I should highlight to your Lordships. Remand prisoners are held in custody pending trial or sentencing, and some have not yet been convicted. Of course, we recognise that people are spending more time on remand; therefore, as I have said, where these services are available and in the right circumstances, they should be able to access them. However, remand prisoners are legally distinct from sentenced prisoners, and we have to reflect that in the priorities for resources.

There are already mechanisms in place to support remand prisoners, including access to healthcare. At the moment, the Government have no plans to expand all rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support to remand prisoners. This would require substantial changes to prison operations and resourcing, and could divert resources from those already convicted and serving sentences. We recognise, however, some of the changes in the remand population. My noble friend the Minister and I would be very happy to continue to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about these matters but, given what I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the speeches in this debate have been comprehensive and committed, so I have little to add to them. All noble Lords who have spoken have done so passionately and persuasively about ending this scandal. I use the word “scandal”—it has been rightly called a disgrace, a stain on our system, and many other things. The passion for justice of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, shone through every sentence of his speech and has to oblige the Government to end this appalling injustice. We have been guilty, in a country dedicated, nominally at least, to ideals of justice, of the grossest of injustices in this case. It must end, and it must end now.

We have a chance to end it now, completely and for ever. We thought we had abolished IPPs in the LASPO Act when we stopped any new IPP sentences being passed. My noble friend Lord McNally, then Minister of State, and the noble Lord, Lord Clarke, Secretary of State at the time, believed that the power to reverse the burden of proof in that Act would be exercised, so that we would never have this long tail of IPP prisoners who have now served way beyond their tariffs.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, explained how unjust it was that IPP prisoners were treated unlike any other offenders. For those prisoners, we have abandoned any principle that the punishment should fit the crime, in favour of a system of preventive detention with a heavy burden placed throughout on prisoners to prove their fitness for release after their proper punishment—often very short punishment—has been completed. The principle of punishment fitting the crime has been ignored, as has been illuminated by nearly all the speeches today. That illumination has extended to the complete ineffectiveness of the action plan in the case of many IPP prisoners, however well-intentioned it was at the time. Those prisoners could end up, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, pointed out, imprisoned for the rest of their lives if they fail to qualify for release under the action plan.

The sensible way to end this now is to accept one or more of the amendments before the Committee in order to ensure the early release of all remaining IPP prisoners and to end their risk of recall within a reasonable time span. I do not mind which amendment is adopted. I note that after his detailed and learned analysis, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, was broadly content to endorse any of the solutions proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Woodley and Lord Moylan, the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Fox, or the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and myself. I too am content with any of those solutions. The important thing is to persuade the Government now to accept one of them and finally to put an end to this injustice.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in what is a profoundly serious and necessary debate, and to those who have tabled the amendments before us: the noble Lords, Lord Woodley and Lord Blunkett, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and my noble friend Lord Moylan. These amendments reflect a shared recognition across parties and across the Committee that the legacy of the IPP regime remains one of the most challenging unresolved issues within our criminal justice system and, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, observed, a “stain” on our justice system.

Under our system of criminal justice, we do not detain and imprison people because we perceive that they are probably or even certainly going to commit a crime at some indeterminate and uncertain point in the future. But that is essentially the basis upon which we detain IPP prisoners in custody after they have served the prison term of their original offence. It is, of course, worrying that many IPP prisoners may present a serious risk to the public if released. However, under the logic that flows through much of this very Bill, the Government must be prepared to advocate for society to accommodate such a risk by community supervision rather than endless detention.

As the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, observed, the Justice Committee’s 2022 report described the IPP system as “irredeemably flawed”, and he seeks to give effect to its recommendation. Whether or not Members support that specific mechanism, it is beyond dispute that thousands of IPP prisoners remain trapped in a system never intended to endure, with outcomes that the state itself acknowledges are simply wrong.

My noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment raises another vital point: the ability for prisoners on extended licence to seek annual review after the qualifying period. Whatever one’s view of automatic termination on mandatory timelines, there is clear force in the principle that people must not be left without a meaningful hope or a clear route to progress.

The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, spoke to his Amendments 116 and 117 on recall and automatic release. Again, many noble Lords will be uneasy that individuals can be recalled indefinitely for minor, technical breaches, long after tariff expiry. This, again, points to the need for clarity, confidence and, indeed, proportionality in the present system. It cannot be simply risk aversion that dictates outcomes.

The amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, supported by others, propose a future release mechanism whereby the Parole Board can set a specified release date, subject to compliance with directions. This recognises the reality described by countless practitioners that progression can become possible only if there is a clear destination and a structure to reach it. Amendment 130 then introduces a safeguard enabling the Secretary of State, if necessary, to seek variation to protect the public.

No one in this debate has suggested that risk can be ignored. Equally, nobody advocates arbitrary release of dangerous offenders. But every proposal brought to the Committee today has an element of public protection embedded in it. Where Members may differ is only on the most responsible and principled route to resolve a system that all agree has patently failed. The point is to choose not the easiest path but the right one. The public are entitled to a system that protects them, but then IPP prisoners and their families are entitled to justice and to fairness. The rule of law should produce finality—indeed, it must produce finality.

I thank noble Lords again for the seriousness with which they have approached this debate. I look forward to continued constructive engagement as the Bill proceeds—and to the necessary outcome that justice demands, not just for IPP prisoners but for our collective conscience.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I will take the noble and learned Lord’s comments away and read that again, but that is also why our quarterly Peers’ meetings on IPP are so important in discussing all these topics.

We must do all that we can to support all IPP prisoners to reduce their risk and progress towards a release decision, but I would not be doing my job to protect the public if they were to be released without the independent Parole Board deciding it is safe to do so. My hope is that every IPP prisoner gets the opportunity to be released and have a successful life in the community, but we need to do that in a way that sets those prisoners up for success in the community. The Government’s view is that any change that removes the protection of the statutory release test is not the right way to do this.

I am aware of criticism of some parts of the IPP action plan, including those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but it remains my view that the steps we are taking through it are the best way to support this progression. It has contributed to a 10% reduction in the IPP prison population in the 12 months to 30 September 2025. The number of people who have never been released fell by around 14% in the same period. Since the publication of the first action plan in April 2022, the unreleased IPP population has fallen by 39% and is now below 1,000. The focus that I and colleagues have on the IPP action plan means that I need to do more and more work on it, to see where we can add improvements all the way.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Blunkett for his amendments, which seek to allow the Secretary of State to make provision for the automatic re-release of those serving an IPP or DPP sentence who are recalled to prison. My noble friend will be aware of the deep respect I have for his ongoing commitment, drive and tenacity to do all he can to support those serving the IPP sentence. I greatly value his contribution to today’s debate, as well as the thoughtful insights and individual cases he raises with me outside the House.

I appreciate that noble Lords have questioned why we are introducing fixed-term recalls for offenders serving standard determinate sentences but do not accept this change for IPP offenders. There are two crucial differences: the threshold for recall and the level of risk that the offender poses. IPP offenders can be recalled only for behaviour or breaches of their licence that are causally linked to their offending. That is a high bar, and one higher than for recalling prisoners serving standard determinate sentences. I must remind noble Lords what that means in practice: that the Probation Service no longer believes that controls available in the community are sufficient to manage that offender’s risk to keep the public safe, and that the public are therefore at risk of further sexual or violent offending.

A fixed-term recall for IPP offenders would not provide sufficient time for an individual to demonstrate that their risk had reduced, or to receive the required support to reduce their risk, before being automatically re-released. This would put victims and the public at risk. While we will return to the question of recall in more detail later in this debate, I must remind noble Lords that we have built significant safeguards into our fixed-term recall changes. These mean that many offenders who pose a similar risk to IPP offenders recalled to prison are also not eligible for a fixed-term recall.

The Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 introduced a power for the Secretary of State to release recalled IPP prisoners where it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that they should remain in prison. This is referred to operationally as release after a risk assessed recall review, or RARR. Recalled IPP offenders have already been re-released using this power, when they were due to wait for a number of months before their scheduled oral hearing before the Parole Board.

The revised IPP action plan, published on 17 July this year, now includes a commitment to enable swift re-release following a recall through RARR, where it is safe to do so. This means that HMPPS is considering all IPP offenders recalled for being out of touch, or in relation to allegations of further offences, for RARR, and is trialling an extended referral period to allow more time to consider cases for potential use of RARR before referral to the Parole Board. I respectfully suggest that this power means we already have the ability to do what the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to achieve: a quicker re-release of recalled individuals where it is safe to do so.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for his amendment, for my noble friend Lord Blunkett’s reflections on it and for their ongoing interest in this important issue. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to allow a prisoner whose licence is not terminated by the Parole Board at the end of the relevant qualifying period to make an annual application to the Parole Board for consideration of licence termination. The Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 made significant changes to the IPP licence period by reducing the qualifying period for referral to the Parole Board and introducing a provision for automatic licence termination. This automatic provision provides greater certainty to offenders than the annual referrals about when their licence will terminate, which is also important for victims. These changes have resulted in the number of people serving a sentence in the community falling by 65%.

Furthermore, at the four-year point after initial release, if supervision is not suspended or the licence is terminated by the Parole Board at the end of the three-year qualifying period, probation practitioners can further consider applying for suspension of supervision at their own discretion. We must also consider the potential effect on victims of going through an additional Parole Board review just a year after the previous one, but I acknowledge that the noble Lord’s amendment would preserve the role of the Parole Board in this process. I am happy to have further conversations with him and other noble Lords on this point in the coming weeks.

I thank noble Lords for their work on this important issue, and I hope that they are assured not only of the work that we are currently undertaking but of our absolute resolve to make further progress for those serving the IPP sentence. I will continue to work closely with noble Lords and look forward to seeing them at the upcoming round table, and to discussing the points raised between now and Report. I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that the concept of us imprisoning individuals on the grounds of a perception that they may commit a crime at some indeterminate point in the future is utterly anathema to our whole system of criminal justice?

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

Our expert probation staff who manage the risks in the community are experts in determining the risk that offenders pose, including IPP offenders. It is therefore their professional judgment and their decision whether they recall someone or not.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

94: Clause 20, page 38, line 7, at end insert—
“(ab) but sections 244ZA(8)(a) and (aa) do not apply to any person convicted of—(i) rape,(ii) assault by penetration,(iii) rape of a child under 13,(iv) assault of a child under 13 by penetration,(v) inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity,(vi) paying for the sexual services of a child aged under 13,(vii) kidnapping or false imprisonment with the intention of committing a sexual offence,(viii) creating or possessing indecent photographs of children,(ix) grievous bodily harm,(x) grooming,(xi) stalking, or(xii) causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable child or adult.(ac) but sections 244ZA(8)(a) and (aa) cannot come into force until the Secretary of State has consulted on and ensured exclusions for all offences considered to be serious violence, offences against children, sexual offences and domestic abuse offences.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would disapply the clause 20 early release provisions of the Bill in relation to those convicted of the offences listed in the amendment, and would require the Secretary of State to consult on and ensure exclusions for those convicted of other serious violent and sexual offence categories.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst. It will not surprise the Minister that I broadly support the principle underlying Clause 20 of the Bill. If prisoners can prove that they have made positive steps towards rehabilitation, we would not oppose the principle that, in those circumstances, there are arguments for releasing such offenders early.

However, regrettably, this is not the outcome that Clause 20 will give effect to. On many occasions during Second Reading and Committee, the Minister has made reference to the “earned progression model” and the Texas system. Under Clause 20 as drafted, there is no such reward for good behaviour or evidence of meaningful rehabilitative steps. The independent House of Commons Library briefing is quite clear on this point: the release point is a default automatic release date and the only way it will not apply is if a prisoner has been subject to additional days for proven misconduct before a judge. That is not earned progression; it is automatic release with a very low threshold of eligibility. There is no assessment of behaviour, remorse, work or engagement with treatment programmes. There is no review by the Parole Board. There is no evaluation of risk. There is only the clock.

The Lord Chancellor said that the public can be reassured because the “most serious offences”, as he termed them, will be excluded. However, the ministry’s own data confirms that offenders convicted of rape, child grooming and attempted murder will be eligible. If such offences are not within the Government’s definition of “serious”, I must ask the Minister to outline exactly which offences are considered serious. Every rape of a child or an adult, every victim of grooming and every life shattered by serious violence represents profound and enduring harm. On what basis are we telling victims that these crimes do not count and that they will meet their offenders at just one-third of their custodial sentence?

This is not a technical or procedural matter. It is a question of fundamental justice and of public protection. It is also a question of whether this House is prepared to legislate knowingly and deliberately to reduce prison time for such serious offenders. The Bill, as drafted, would cut custodial sentences for more than 60% of rapists and over 80% of offenders convicted of child sex offences. It would allow those convicted of stalking —an offence with one of the highest reoffending rates and a well-established connection to homicide—to be released automatically after serving only one-third of their sentence, and it would do so without assessment of risk and without any evidence of rehabilitation.

Amendment 94 would exclude from the early release provisions of Clause 20 those convicted of the most serious sexual and violent offences, including rape, child sexual abuse, stalking, grievous bodily harm and causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable child or adult. The amendment would also require the Secretary of State to consult and ensure exclusions for other serious offence categories before these drastic changes to sentencing came into force. The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in the other place were in rare agreement over this amendment—it was almost like a recall of a coalition concern. In that other place, I understand that 65 out of the 71 Members of the Liberal Democrat Party voted in favour of it.

We are told that the justification for these provisions is prison overcrowding, but the emergency powers that already exist to manage emergency capacity pressures have been installed and are not to be removed. The measures in this Bill will be permanent. They are not temporary; they are a long-term shift in sentencing policy that will reshape the criminal justice system for a generation. We spent much time earlier in Committee arguing against the presumption of suspended sentences, but Clause 20 deals with a far higher category of offenders: those who have been put into custody for several years but will now automatically be released at the one-third point.

The Government propose to release an estimated 43,000 offenders into the community who would previously have been imprisoned. As with many other clauses in the Bill, Clause 20 will place yet more pressure on probation services if implemented, and they already face a shortfall of 10,000 officers. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust warns that the system is already at breaking point and that releasing thousands more high-risk offenders without necessary supervision poses a serious threat to the safety of victims and to public confidence. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner has said that allowing perpetrators back into communities after only 28 days is “simply unacceptable”. The Victims’ Commissioner warned that victims will be left feeling “unnerved and bewildered”. These are not political opponents of the Bill but respected independent authorities speaking on behalf of victims and the public at large.

The Howard League warns that earned release models are undeliverable without a functioning rehabilitation infrastructure, yet prisons remain impoverished and dangerously unstable. Drugs and violence are rife. Education provision has been cut by up to 60% in some prisons, and half of prisoners receive no education or employment support at all. In that context, early release cannot be earned because there is nothing meaningful with which to earn it. Every Member of this House understands the need to reduce pressure on the prison estate, but public protection and public confidence must remain at the forefront of legislative change. The public expect that those who commit serious crime face real punishment and real consequences. More than 6,500 of the most serious criminals, including rapists, stalkers, violent attackers and even murderers, will qualify for early release.

The public do not expect Parliament to legislate to let these criminals out after one-third of their sentence. Every time a victim reads in the paper that the person who raped or attacked them has been released early, or a family sees the person responsible for the death of a child or a relative back in the community far sooner than they were told originally, that will create fissures in the rule of law. Public confidence matters because without it, the justice system loses legitimacy.

Amendment 94 is a proportionate and necessary step to ensure that early release is not granted to those whose crimes are simply too serious to justify automatic release. It represents the minimum safety measure that this House must insist on. The Government must accept that such serious offenders should not walk free after serving one-third of their sentence, and do so by default. If we take that step, we will lose sight of what our justice system is all about. I urge the Government to reconsider and to support the amendment in the interest of victims, of public protection, of public confidence, and of the integrity of our justice system. I beg to move.

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Public confidence is vital. Having no prison places is the worst situation for victims. I hope I have explained why the Government’s approach is the right one, and I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. However, he has done nothing to reassure us that Clause 20 as drafted offers an earned progression model of any kind whatever. These are not temporary changes to relieve prison overpopulation but permanent changes to our justice system. We will, I suspect, return to these on Report but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 94 withdrawn.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of the amendments, as they seek to turn the Government’s earned progression scheme from a superficially attractive promise into a credible and responsible model for rehabilitation and, consequently, for public safety. As drafted, with release contingent only on the absence of serious misconduct, the provision does not amount at all to earned progression; it is simply accelerated release by default.

We know from recent evidence that meaningful rehabilitation in prison, such as through education and vocational training work, is far from universal. Only this year, the Government cut the provision of education services for prisoners by 20%, and for some prisons by up to 60%. The Justice Committee’s 2025 report found that roughly half of all prisoners are not engaged in education or employment programmes, and many remain confined for 22 hours a day. In those conditions, expecting that prisoners will earn their release by default is neither realistic nor responsible.

In that light, it is not only reasonable but imperative to link early release to engagement in meaningful activity. That is what Amendment 94A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, seeks to do: it insists that a one-third release point is conditional on participation in meaningful activity. That would ensure that early release is genuinely earned and based on reform rather than simply time served.

Equally, the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Carter, seek to embed an earned progression principle for both standard and extended determinate sentences, rather than treating release as an automatic milestone after half the sentence has been served. This makes the model proportionate and conditional on real change, rather than automatic and unearned.

If we accept the Bill without amendments to the supposed progression model, we will knowingly legislate to release on terms we cannot expect to support rehabilitation or protect the public. Frankly, that is not reform; that is risk. But, if we accept the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter, we would reprioritise a system that balances the need to manage prison populations with the social imperative of reducing reoffending.

I thank all noble Lords for their submissions on these matters and for the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Carter, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister in reply.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Bach for his amendment, which was supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor; I thank her for her kind comments about my previous work.

The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to modify the provisions of the Bill by regulations, so that no prisoner is released after serving one-third of their sentence unless they have earned release through purposeful activity. I want all prisoners to be in work or education, if they are able; however, we need to be realistic about what is possible in different types of prisons. Currently, prisoners do not have equal access to the full range of classes and employment required to meet their needs. To confirm, our education budget has been increased by 3%—but, unfortunately, that buys us less education. So, while one is up, the other is down. However, I think there are other things I can do to make improvements in that area.

We also need to be mindful that many prisoners may behave well but still struggle to engage with some activities. There are high levels of mental ill-health, trauma and neurodiversity that should be considered, and we often need to meet these needs before engagement with education and work can be productive. As noble Lords know, this is an area that I am passionate about. Positive change is necessary, but it is better achieved through gradual operational and policy improvements rather than legislative measures. I also agree that the Probation Service is vital to the ongoing support of offenders after release.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carter, for Amendments 95 and 128, which address release points for more serious offenders. Regarding Amendment 95, I must clarify that Clause 20 already sets an automatic release point of half way for these offences. Of course, if the offender behaves badly, they could have days added to their sentence. It is essential that the progression model can be implemented quickly and effectively. The best way to do that is via a system which we know works and is legally robust: the existing adjudication system.

Through Amendment 128, the noble Lord also raised an important question about prisoners serving an EDS. It would allow the Secretary of State to refer offenders serving an EDS to the Parole Board for consideration for release at the halfway point of their custodial term. At present, offenders serving an EDS are referred to the board after serving two-thirds of the custodial term, which is a statutory requirement.

The noble Lord’s amendment is similar in effect to a recommendation of the Independent Sentencing Review that the extended determinate sentences should include a progression element that would enable the parole eligibility date to be brought forward to the halfway point. But the Government rejected that recommendation on the basis that, for an offender to receive an extended determinate sentence, the court will have decided that they are dangerous. These are offenders who have committed serious offences, such as rape, other sexual offences or violence against a person. To impose an EDS, the court will have decided that there was a risk of them doing so again in the future. This is not the case with standard determinate sentences. Having seen all the evidence, the trial judge will have imposed a custodial term that reflects the seriousness of the offence. Prison is the right place for dangerous offenders such as these. Our firm view is that they should not be able to achieve an early release through progression and should remain in prison for as long as they do now.

I turn briefly to Amendment 139C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I assure the noble Baroness that we monitor the performance of the adjudication system and it remains under constant review. I get regular data on prisons, but I am happy to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with the answers to her question.

We have effective scrutiny structures in place through His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons and independent monitoring boards. They are able to provide valuable insight into the operations of the prisoner adjudication system. To reassure noble Lords, I ask questions about the adjudication system on every prison visit.

As noble Lords are aware, I am passionate about this area and have routinely pressed for improvements, but my view is that this is best achieved through existing monitoring and scrutiny rather than legislation. I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to my Amendments 111 to 113. When asked by the Deputy Chairman, I said that I did not wish to do so, but that was because I did not realise that we had jumped an amendment.

These three amendments concern recall for a fixed term. The first point is the question of whether recall should be for a maximum of 56 days rather than a fixed period of 56 days. As presently structured, recall to prison is to an automatic release date 56 days after the recall occurs. The purpose of my three amendments is both to make the 56-day period a maximum period, not a fixed period, and to make automatic release subject to the exclusion in those cases where it applies—and in that it has much sympathy with the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The process for determining the period will need to be fixed by regulations, but the intention is clear, and I am happy to discuss how substituting a flexible period for a fixed period might be implemented.

The fact is that recalls happen for a number of reasons, some of which may be relatively trivial breaches of conditions. I am concerned—as was my honourable friend Jess Brown-Fuller, the MP for Chichester, who moved similar amendments in the other place—about the effect of a blanket fixed period of recall irrespective of the seriousness or otherwise of the breach that brought about the recall, and believe it may be inappropriate.

It may be that 56 days or eight weeks, which is quite a long time, is far too long for a prisoner who faces recall for missing a probation appointment, for example. It would almost inevitably interfere with work where an offender had found work. It could interfere with housing and educational or rehabilitative programmes in the community. Community programmes are, I understand, typically held open for four weeks, so eight weeks would mean that they were closed. An eight-week recall might have a damaging effect on mental health treatments which a recently released prisoner was undertaking. Addiction programmes might be undesirably affected. A shorter recall might avoid that.

Furthermore, an unnecessarily long recall for a minor infringement of conditions would do nothing to reduce the prison capacity shortage as it continues, while a shorter recall would mitigate it. Other recalls may be much more serious. In such cases, 56 days may be too short a period. The 56-day automatic release provision in our Amendment 113 would take effect subject to the provision excluding automatic releases in serious cases, so that those who had committed more serious offences would not be automatically released at the 56-day point. That might be particularly appropriate if an offender who had been guilty of domestic abuse or stalking had been recalled for intimidating, harassing or stalking their victims. While they would presently be required to be released under the proposals as I understand them, our amendment would rectify this.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, would make the cause of an offender’s recall a necessary consideration when determining whether the offender should be released at the end of the automatic release period. This is a prudent approach. We do not want people with a record of breaking probation conditions given the chance to do so again after just 56 days. We therefore support the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for these amendments and for providing me with the opportunity to clarify the Government’s position on recall reforms. The policy in this Bill is designed to support rehabilitation and reduce the need for future recalls, but recall remains an essential safeguard to protect the public when risk increases. The 56-day period provides more time to undertake a thorough review of an offender’s release plans and licence conditions, ensuring that needs and risks are managed. There is a specific focus on mitigating risks against known victims.

I turn first to the amendment tabled to Clause 26 by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. The existing recall test set out in operational guidance already provides a clear and robust framework for decision-making. It ensures that recall is used appropriately when risk can no longer be safely managed in the community. Legislation is a blunt and inflexible tool and would create barriers to recall where swift action was needed to protect the public. Let me give a brief illustration. An individual on licence for stalking and harassment begins to show a marked deterioration in their mental health. They commit breaches, entering an exclusion zone and making indirect contact with a victim online. None of those incidents taken alone would have met a rigid statutory test such as imminent risk or persistent non-compliance but, viewed together, they clearly indicate escalating risk.

It is important to note that the clause already includes a power for the Secretary of State to amend the recall power in Section 254 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, specifically to make provision about the circumstances in which a person may or may not be recalled. This means that there is already flexibility to adjust the recall framework in future should evidence show that further refinement is needed. For these reasons, it is not necessary to legislate to amend the recall threshold at this time, but I am keen to review what more can be done beyond the Bill to bear down on the use of recall and ensure that it is really the last resort.

The offences listed in Amendment 121, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, are extremely serious. While some of these cases would fall within the scope of the new recall model, many of the perpetrators of the offences referenced are excluded. This is because they will have received life sentences or extended determinate sentences and therefore remain subject to standard recall arrangements. This means that their re-release will be subject to approval by the Parole Board or the Secretary of State.

Criminal Court Reform

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the Minister for repeating the Statement from the other place. I thank the Secretary of State for Justice for his Statement on jury trial, although I wonder whether he understood many of its implications before delivering it to the press and then to Parliament. The Government’s troubling habit of engaging in legislation by leakage, of which their recent Budget is another precedent, should, however, not distract us from the content of this Statement.

In 2017, while leading the review of racial bias in the criminal justice system, the now Secretary of State for Justice declared that juries were the only stage of the criminal justice system without racial bias. In 2020, he declared:

“Jury trials are a fundamental part of our democratic settlement”.


Now, the Secretary of State for Justice declares that, in order to preserve jury trials, he must abolish most jury trials. This has echoes of the logic of the lunatic asylum. Herod declares that to preserve the family unit, he must strike down the firstborn. Or, more recently, there was Gordon Brown’s decision to preserve Britain’s wealth by selling off half of our gold reserves at near the bottom of the market. That decision left the country poorer; this decision will leave the justice system weaker.

This is the Government dismantling the institutions they claim to defend, then insisting that destruction is somehow salvation. A judge sitting alone in a Crown Court trial will have to provide not just a verdict but reasons for the verdict. Does the Minister agree? Such reasoning is bound to be the subject of scrutiny and then potential appeal. If so, are the Government planning to abolish such a right of appeal on the merits of the decision? In that event, parties with no right of appeal may have recourse to judicial review. Or do the Government also plan to abolish the right to judicial review in such circumstances?

Just how deep do the Government plan to cut into the body of the justice system, and do they actually believe that our system of criminal justice can survive such radical surgery? The Secretary of State for Justice tells us that this radical surgery is required to deal with the enormous backlog of cases in the Crown Court, estimated at almost 80,000 cases. So will the Minister tell us whether this proposed legislation is going to be retrospective? That would be an unprecedented and unconscionable attack on an accused’s rights. If in an each-way case, for example, an accused has already decided upon trial by jury and is now preparing for and awaiting that jury trial, are the Government going to retrospectively remove that fundamental right? If so, can the Minister cite a precedent for such retrospective changes to our system of criminal law?

However, if these changes are not to be retrospective, then the tens of thousands of cases that the Secretary of State for Justice refers to as justification for this exceptional measure remain untouched. The backlog will not be cut. Victims and accused will be no closer to justice. In stripping away a centuries-old right, the Government will sacrifice principle but fail to fix the problem. To significantly dismantle the right to trial by jury and gain virtually no benefit is not just an exercise in incompetence but an act of constitutional vandalism. We are being reminded of a problem, but we are not being presented with a solution.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, at the heart of this Statement is a wholesale attack on the jury system. The Government intend first doing away with jury trials in all but indictable-only offences or offences where the likely sentence is three years or less and, secondly, doing away with the defendant’s right to elect for jury trial altogether.

On the first, a radical restriction of jury trials, do the Government accept that they propose going far further than the Leveson report suggested, both on which cases would be tried by a jury and on the make-up of the new courts? Two fundamental questions arise. Importantly, since, apart from robbery and some other offences generally involving violence, offences under the Theft Act are not indictable only, would not all but the most serious cases of dishonesty be triable by judge alone?

Do the Government really think that the likely length of a prison sentence is the only true measure of severity? Is that not a fundamental mistake? Let us take the Horizon scandal. Almost no postmasters received a sentence of more than three years. Harjinder Butoy received the longest sentence—three and a quarter years—only to be released after 18 months when his conviction was overturned, leaving his life in ruins. Most sentences were between six and 18 months, yet those cases destroyed hundreds of lives, driving many to a breakdown or suicide. Those defendants would have no right to a jury trial.

What about the public servant or the professional who stands to lose career, income, reputation and family when charged with minor shoplifting, and who wants the defence of honest mistake or absent-mindedness determined by a jury? What about the teacher or health worker charged with indecent exposure, who will never work with children again if convicted but who is denied the right to a jury trial to decide on a defence of false identity?

The proposal is for judges or magistrates to decide on the likely length of the sentence and the mode of trial, apparently to prevent the defendants gaming the system. In the Statement, the word “gaming” is in bold. Does that give a clue to the Lord Chancellor’s thinking? That is an absurd preconception. Do not many defendants elect jury trial precisely because they want a trial by their peers, with no preconceptions or predetermination of their guilt? The public believe that jury trials are fairer. They recognise that 12 heads are better than one. They know instinctively, as advocates know from experience, that judges vary, one from another, in their prejudices and judgment. Does the Minister not agree? The public trust juries, and public trust in the fairness of our justice system is severely threatened by these proposals.

How are judges or magistrates to assess the likely sentence before a case has even started or any evidence been heard? Does the Minister believe that that would be either possible or fair? At the very least, should defendants not be entitled to a proper hearing to put their arguments for having a jury trial before the court? Should not these measures be temporary or provisional until waiting lists are reduced? In the Commons, Kim Johnson, a Labour MP, suggested a sunset clause, but the Lord Chancellor rejected that.

Jury trial has been a fundamental right of citizens in this country for more than 800 years. Lord Devlin described it as

“the lamp that shows that freedom lives”.

The Statement mentions Magna Carta and it prioritises ending delays over jury trials. But Magna Carta does not do that. King John was not asked to take his pick between Article 39 on jury trials and Article 40 on justice delayed or denied—the Barons insisted on the right to receive both jury trial and timely justice, and we should do that now.

Will the Government not take further steps to reduce delays? Steps should and could be taken, including having many more court sitting days, repairing the courts, having more efficient listing, and using more and smarter technology. Do the Government really insist that the delays could not be cut over time with greater investment? Possibly in some long, technical fraud trials—where the points taken are genuinely not jury points, such as dishonest intent or who knew what and when—the mode of trial might be changed. More generally, do the Government really want to sacrifice the right to jury trial because they admit defeat on cutting delays?

I have a final but entirely unrelated question on the Statement. The Lord Chancellor said that £550 million extra was to be spent on victim support services over three years, but said not a word on how it was to be spent. Can the Minister give us more detail, either now or in writing later?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for the points they made on these reforms. I have a great deal of respect for the insight that both bring and their observations about the Statement.

I begin with the remarks of the noble and learned Lord. Many people may think that it a bit rich of the party opposite to complain about this, when everybody knows that this is a situation created by them due to the consistent cuts in the criminal justice system over many years. Victims are now reaping what the party opposite sowed. We on these Benches have to try to put this right.

Many matters were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks; I hope he will forgive me if I do not respond to them all in my short response now. However, there are answers to almost all of them. For example, he asked how we estimate the likely sentence. That it is done using the sentencing guidelines. It is done all the time at the moment; magistrates do it day in, day out in the magistrates’ courts, when they decide where someone should be tried. It is a task that can be undertaken.

One of the things I want to say from the Dispatch Box is that I have changed my mind. I have been a criminal barrister for many decades. When I practised as a criminal barrister, I too felt that any attempt to touch what happens with jury trials was fundamentally wrong. However, I then became a judge in the Crown Court and saw what was actually happening. Every judge in the Crown Court up and down this country will have experienced sitting with other judges at lunchtime and saying, “I cannot believe that this case I am trying here and now is actually in the Crown Court. It shouldn’t be here”.

We are not sacrificing jury trials—of course we are not. It has never been that every criminal case was tried by a jury; 90% are currently tried in the magistrates’ courts. The question is, where do we draw the line? That is why this Government asked Sir Brian Leveson to conduct an independent review, and we will accept his conclusions. It would be frankly irresponsible not to do so; we cannot ignore what he is saying. We are not going far further, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, implied; we are doing exactly what Sir Brian suggested: having a Crown Court Bench Division to deal with cases where the likely sentence is three years or less.

This is a package to deal with the problems we face with the criminal justice system; it is not about cutting jury trials. There are three limbs to it. The first is about investment: record investment is being made in the criminal justice system in sitting days and legal aid payments to the criminal Bar and criminal solicitors, whose fees went down for ages. The second is about structural reform, which is what we are discussing now; that includes the removal of the right to elect, the reform of appeals in the magistrates’ courts, the Crown Court Bench Division and some reforms to fraud trials. The third is about efficiency, and that is what Sir Brian is considering in the second part of his report.

Gaming the system is a real problem. I am afraid that there are rumours out there that some people are less than scrupulous once they get arrested by the police. Some of those people know that the delays are such in the Crown Court that, if they elect trial by jury and decide to sit around and wait, particularly if they are on bail, they will have not just one Christmas at home, but at least two or maybe three. They will probably be tagged, and when they come back to the Crown Court when their trial date finally arrives, many of them plead guilty there and then. That means that the time they spent on the tag then has to be taken into account and offset against any available sentence, so they walk away with time served. I have seen that, and that is gaming the system. We cannot have it. It cannot be right that victims of serious offences wait for years for their cases to be heard—possibly dropping out—meaning that unscrupulous defendants can do that. These are real people’s real lives. If tradition is going to survive, it has to adapt.

Timeliness is an essential ingredient of fairness. Sir Brian estimates that juryless trials would be at least 20% faster than those conducted with a jury. It makes sense—of course it does—because you do not have to swear in a jury; such things take time.

Governments must make sure that public services are able to meet the demands of the day and to deliver for the public and the most vulnerable. This means that every generation may well face the prospect of significant reform in order to make things better.

One of the things that the Crown Court is having to contend with is that trials have become more complicated. There is good news: the police are arresting more people, and more of them are coming through the courts. That is what we want to see. But things such as advances in science, such as DNA, advances in techniques, such as the prevalence of CCTV evidence, and social media make proving a case, and, indeed, defending a case, much more complicated than it was. That is why we simply have to move the line to a slightly different place.

For the courts, there is no single thing government can do to resolve this crisis that would not require the system to deal with some change. The delays to justice faced by thousands of victims across the country are unacceptable. They cannot be allowed to grow unchecked. There is no quick fix. The changes we are proposing to make will require legislation. We are intending to fix the system so that it is good for the next generation. That is why we are not intending to impose a sunset clause here. These are meant to be lasting reforms, not an unstable system where nobody is quite sure what is happening. These are lasting reforms to make the system fit for purpose.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, would she kindly answer the question: is it intended that these proposals will be retrospective? If not, how on earth are they going to impact upon the present backlog?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

At present, there are no plans to make them retrospective, but that is why it is going to take time. That is why it will take time to work its way through. But if we do not do this, not only would we not be tackling the current backlog, we would be letting it grow. That is why it cannot continue.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 1st December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Amendment 60 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee would make it clear that a public event attendance prohibition requirement would not be available if its enforcement was not reasonably practicable. I share the doubts of my noble friend on practicability. Indeed, the widest orders in this category—that is, prohibiting attendance at any public event rather than particular events—may generally be too wide in any case, because it is going to be very difficult to define a “public event”.

Moving to a more general point, one of the difficulties with the restrictions in this group is the difficulty not just with practicability but with enforcement, spoken to in the last group by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, foresaw difficulties in determining practicability, which he thought might be fatal to these conditions. I can see his point that there are difficulties. The question for the Committee in considering whether these conditions ought to be permitted is to see how far they would in practice be imposed if not practicable, and then to consider the question of practicability.

I suggest that the answer to the difficulties is a combination of the justification points relating to community orders, if I can put it that way, and the enforcement possibilities offered by new technology and intelligence. As far as intelligence is concerned, I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that it is pretty easy to find out where the pubs are. But there are other difficulties of intelligence which new technology and intelligence-gathering techniques might be needed to address.

However, when I talk about justification, it is right that we should remind ourselves that the conditions are intended to augment community orders and suspended sentences, and those sentences are intended to be, in part at least, punishment, no differently from a curfew order or a residence requirement. They are in part, therefore, punitive. However, the alternative may be custody, which is a far more serious punishment, and one that with the best will in the world offers a substantially reduced chance of the offender having the opportunity to undertake any rehabilitative activity at all.

The other point is new technology and intelligence techniques. Noble Lords have mentioned electronic monitoring, as well as alcohol monitoring and other devices, but electronic monitoring using tagging is a considerable part of the answer. Although I have some sympathy with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on the civil liberties implications of these conditions, monitoring by tagging is no different from monitoring by curfew or by a residence requirement, which we have had for a very great deal of time, but the new technology enables a more flexible and wider approach to conditions. However, I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that civil liberties are restricted at their very worst by imposing sentences of immediate imprisonment where people are in custody.

Amendment 106 in my name would allow exemptions or variations by probation officers to allow a person to attend employment, education or rehabilitation programmes, but those exemptions or variations would be exceptions to the imposition of the restriction zone condition. The amendment also requires a report on the operation of restriction zone conditions.

The purpose of this amendment in each of its sub-clauses is to enable both the courts when imposing conditions and probation professionals to weigh in the balance, on the one hand, the extra security and the protection of victims or potential victims which may be offered by the imposition of a restriction zone condition, against on the other the desirability of encouraging offenders to benefit from opportunities of employment, education or rehabilitative activity. It is a classic balancing exercise of a type that is undertaken every day by members of the public and professionals in daily life when they consider questions of risk against opportunity, and that is really what we are talking about here. The point is that our amendment does not come down exclusively on one side or the other. The idea of it is to enable the imposition of these restriction zone conditions, not to conflict with the provision of educational or other opportunities. So, the condition could still be made, but subject to those exemptions or restrictions, which will permit the desirable activity.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, supporting my noble friend Lady Hamwee in her amendment, said that it was unfair to oblige venues and others to police these conditions, and of course I see that. But these conditions are not perfect, they will not be perfectly enforceable, and they will not be completely practicable in the sense that they will always prevent the restricted activity. However, for the most part, in practice, offenders are likely to observe these conditions simply because they are there, and for fear of being caught and punished for their breach.

Questions of affordability were raised, and of course more resources are going to be needed to police and enforce these conditions, but those costs have to be measured against the costs of custody.

The noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, raised an interesting point with her amendment when she suggested that the Parole Board should have oversight of restriction zones. For my part, I am not quite sure how that will work—it seems an onerous obligation on the Parole Board—but I take her point that there should be some oversight of restriction zones. In a general sense, that could be undertaken by the Sentencing Council in considering sentencing guidelines to judges on how they are to be imposed, and by training of probation officers in how they are to be implemented.

On electronic monitoring, of which the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, spoke, if it is proportionate and appropriate and is subject to restrictions that are decided upon to ensure that it is, then, broadly speaking, I agree with her points.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will begin by speaking to the probing amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough. In doing so, I am sure I will reflect the concerns already expressed in other parts of the Committee about these provisions in the Bill.

It has already been made clear that we on these Benches do not in principle oppose the idea of giving courts new tools to protect the public. These are tools that might, if properly designed and enforced, help to manage some offenders in the community rather than defaulting to custody, and we support that aim. But Clauses 14 and 15 do little more than say that courts now have these powers. The Government have provided little, if any, detail as to how these powers will be enforced. A ban that cannot be enforced is a false promise and, indeed, as a consequence, a danger to public confidence.

The Government want this House to support the expansion of suspended sentences and community-based orders. Yet to support them in this effort, they are asking us to sign off on a national regime of pub, club, concert and public event bans, without explaining how these will function on the ground. There is no credible enforcement plan. Are we seriously proposing that every pub, bar, off-licence and concert venue across the country becomes a mini probation checkpoint? Do we expect landlords, doormen, waiters and bar staff to act as de facto probation officers, verifying the identity of every customer against confidential court orders? The result would be unacceptable. If such pub bans become unenforceable and are reduced to a tick-box exercise in sentencing documents while nothing on the ground actually changes, the sanction will become meaningless. That would not be an improvement in justice.

The burden that such a regime would place on the hospitality and nightlife sector would be considerable. Pubs and nightlife venues are already under severe financial and structural pressure, as we know from various reports from the Night Time Industries Association. As a consequence of the national insurance increases, further tax pressures and red tape imposed on these venues by the Government, some 209 pubs—an average of eight a week—have closed permanently and many more continue to struggle. It is simply unrealistic, never mind unfair, to add to this burden by requiring them to police court-imposed bans on individuals under threat of legal liability.

The Government may argue that the burden of enforcement will not lie on public events or drinking establishments, but, in that case, they must lay out in detail how they plan on enforcing these orders with a Probation Service that, as everyone would accept, is already under severe strain. Simply saying that they have additional funding is not enough. We require specifics if we are to trust that the Government can cope with the pressures of managing offenders in the community. If the Government cannot explain clearly how these bans will be notified, enforced or policed, how can this House responsibly vote for this provision? We on these Benches must ask: on what basis are we expected to vote to expand suspended sentences for a broad group of offenders, if we cannot be satisfied that community supervision will actually work and without the most basic detail on banning access to pubs or events?

The amendments offer a simple test. They would require the Government, before we hand out sweeping powers to courts, to set out a clear, practical enforcement regime. They demand a reasonable amount of certainty. Who will be notified: pubs, events, promoters, the police? What will happen when an offender is banned from public events or drinking establishments? How will these bans be communicated? How will they be recorded? How will they be checked? What enforcement mechanisms will be used if an offender breaches the ban? Who will bear the cost and responsibility of monitoring: the state, the Probation Service or venues? If the Government cannot provide that clarity, these provisions risk being no more than symbolic restrictions. They will simply result in theatrical sentencing with no real-world effect, and that, in turn, will undermine public confidence and public safety.

The choice is not between doing nothing and embracing these sweeping new powers; it is between legislation grounded in operational reality and legislation built on aspiration and illusion. These amendments do not oppose the idea of community-based orders; they demand that, if we are to entrust courts and probation with greater powers, those powers must be backed by a robust, enforceable system and not simply by faith. We owe that to the victims of crime, to the public, and to the men and women who work in establishments such as pubs and other public venues.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, moved her Amendment 60, which is intended to probe the enforceability of public event attendance prohibition requirements, which points to another important question that is central to the debate on these orders. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, spoke to his Amendment 106, which would allow for exemptions to restriction zone conditions, such as to allow a person to attend employment, education or rehabilitation programmes. I would have thought that these would be included in the specified restriction zone, but I look forward to the Government’s response on these points.

On the part of the amendment that requires an annual report on the orders’ use and effectiveness, we on these Benches support the underlying sentiment. Without the requisite evidence, we cannot be sure that the provisions in the Bill are working or will work. We therefore fully support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson. We look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to these important probing amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

65: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Public event attendance prohibition statistics: duty to publish(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, direct His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service to record and publish, in relation to all offenders recorded who have breached a public event attendance prohibition requirement—(a) the total number of breaches;(b) a breakdown of the prior or associated offence or offences for which those offenders were given a public event attendance prohibition requirement;(c) the number of offenders who have breached the public event attendance prohibition requirement on more than one occasion, recorded by number of repeat breaches.(2) The data recorded under subsection (1) must be compiled and published separately in respect of each of the following kinds of public event attendance prohibition requirement—(a) a requirement prohibiting attendance at a specified public event, (b) a requirement prohibiting attendance at public events of a specified description, and(c) a requirement prohibiting attendance at any public event.(3) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for the data recorded under subsection (1) to be published and laid before Parliament—(a) within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, and(b) annually thereafter.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require HMPPS to publish the number of offenders who breach public attendance prohibition requirements and to log what their associated offences were.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments were tabled by me and my noble friend Lord Sandhurst.

As we have already seen, the Bill introduces new prohibition powers: prohibitions on attending public events, restrictions on entering drinking establishments, restriction zones limiting movement and electronic monitoring to enforce compliance. In principle this all sounds very sensible, but we must again ask the critical question: how will these powers work on the ground?

On the prohibitions with respect to drinking establishments, legally the offender must comply but enforcement is then shared. Probation must monitor and the police must act. In practice, this is far from straightforward. How will breaches be reliably detected? GPS or electronic monitoring may indicate proximity but cannot confirm entry. Reporting from licensees or police may be inconsistent. Once a breach is detected, how quickly can probation services respond and are resources sufficient to manage multiple offenders across wide areas? Without clarity, we cannot be confident that these powers will work.

That is precisely why Amendments 71 and 76 are tabled. They would require the Probation Service to record and publish breaches, repeat breaches and underlying offences. They also probe the reliability of electronic monitoring. Can GPS monitoring operate reliably in towns, cities and rural areas? Will probation teams receive training to know how and when to respond? As I have said before, we know that probation services are already stretched. Surely new powers that add a substantial responsibility to their workload have to be considered with care. We simply seek clarity as to how these services will be managed in these circumstances.

These amendments come from a place of reality, not of opposition. They affirm the Government’s policy while probing whether it can be delivered reliably. I look forward to the Minister’s response on how these powers will operate in practice. I beg to move.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for their amendments. The new community requirements in Clauses 13 to 16 are vital reforms. I am glad that I have had the opportunity to speak to them in some detail today. Amendments 65, 71 and 75 seek to require HMPPS to publish the number of offenders who breach these requirements and to log what their associated offences were. While I am sympathetic to the intent behind this, we do not agree that it is necessary. The Ministry of Justice already publishes detailed sentence outcome statistics. These include the type of disposals handed out at court and are split by detailed offences and offender characteristic. We regularly assess the effectiveness of all community requirements.

Furthermore, HMPPS publishes a range of staffing and case load data on a quarterly basis. We must be conscious of adding more work into the service. We also place great value on the independent oversight and assurance provided by HM Inspectorate of Probation. It already inspects the service and provides insight into how it is performing. Given the information that is already available, we do not agree that adding a statutory requirement to publish this information is necessary or proportionate. But I assure the noble and learned Lord that I will keep an open mind. I will continue to review regularly what data is published, what can be stopped and what can be added.

Amendments 74 and 76 probe the use of electronic monitoring to enforce restriction zones as part of a community or suspended sentence order. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for tabling these amendments. With regard to Amendment 74, I can assure him that electronic monitoring will be imposed alongside these orders in the vast majority of cases. However, electronic monitoring is not appropriate in all cases. Some offenders have no fixed abode. They may live complex and chaotic lifestyles. Imposing an electronic monitoring requirement would likely set up these individuals to fail, instead of helping them to improve outcomes for victims, the public and the offender themselves. A court will be able to impose a restriction zone without electronic monitoring when it cannot obtain the consent of someone whose co-operation is required, such as the home owner, where the appropriate local arrangements are not in place to enable electronic monitoring, or where it would be inappropriate. It is right that the decision about what requirements to include as part of the sentence sits with the judiciary hearing the individual case.

If a court does not believe that a restriction zone will be effective without electronic monitoring, it has a range of other requirements at its disposal. When a requirement is not electronically monitored, the Probation Service will monitor offenders’ behaviour for any potential breach. It will have a suite of options available to respond to breaches if it identifies that they have not complied—for example, from police intelligence or victim concerns.

I will end by briefly turning to the question of how these are to be monitored in practice and the reliability of the technology that allows the Probation Service to do so. The use of electronic monitoring to enforce these requirements will mean that we receive retrospective data that provides clear evidence of an individual’s whereabouts. This ensures that those receiving a restriction zone are robustly monitored. GPS is a reliable technology that has been part of electronic monitoring since 2018. This will allow the Probation Service to assess whether someone has breached their restriction zone. As I have said before, if this happens, probation staff have a range of enforcement options at their disposal.

I thank the noble and learned Lord for the constructive discussions on these matters and hope that I have provided sufficient reassurance on the points raised. I therefore urge him to withdraw Amendment 65.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, we have already discussed why transparency, reporting and practical assurances are essential.

First, enforcement is only as good as the system that is supporting it. It is not enough to create restrictions in law if those tasked with monitoring them lack the resources and capacity to act effectively. Secondly, repeat offenders are a particular concern. If data on repeated breaches is not recorded and published, the restrictions risk being meaningless for those most likely to violate them. Thirdly, public confidence is at stake here. To create a law that cannot be implemented correctly is unwise. Restrictions that are not transparent, not measurable and not enforceable will undermine trust in the entire system.

These amendments are not intended as a challenge to the principles in the Bill. They are seeking operational clarity. Therefore, while at this time I am willing not to press them, I indicate to the Minister that we will return to them at a later stage.

Amendment 65 withdrawn.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 1st December 2025 Lords Chamber

I suggest that the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Burnett, should be congratulated on introducing the compromise—not a compromise that I would go for but a compromise that would work—and if the clause is to stand, their wise approach should be heeded.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I must confess that as I read the provisions of this Bill, it triggered a childhood memory. The late Dr Dolittle curated a number of very strange and unusual animals, which included the pushmi-pullyu: a gazelle with two heads, which faced in opposite directions at the same time.

Why would I be prone to such a memory on reading the provisions of this Bill? Let me begin with some quotations from the Government. First,

“sentencing in individual cases is a matter for our independent judiciary”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 3/4/25; col. 211.]

Secondly,

“it is at the discretion of the independent judiciary whether to impose a suspended sentence”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1369.]

Thirdly,

“the decision on which requirements to include in an order is a matter for the judge sentencing the case”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1378.]

Finally:

“It is right for the judiciary to retain discretion to consider this and make the sentencing decision”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1344.]


Yet Clause 1, in opening the Bill, says that the judiciary must apply a presumption, other than in very narrowly prescribed circumstances, so that even if a judge wished to impose a custodial sentence of a certain length, they would be unable to do so if it did not fall under a specified exemption or exceptional circumstances.

How did the Minister endeavour to bring this together in the first day of Committee? He said that

“it is at the discretion of the independent judiciary whether to impose a suspended sentence”,—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1369.]

following the “appropriate guidance” of the Sentencing Council. But this guidance is now to be in the control of the Government, by virtue of the Lord Chancellor’s veto, thereby potentially eliminating any sense of “independence”.

So I ask the Minister: in which direction is this two-headed Bill going to proceed? It cannot walk in two different and diametrically opposed directions at the same time. Is it towards the goal of judicial independence, or towards the goal of executive control? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, concluded by saying that these provisions were wrong-headed. I think they are even worse: they are double-headed, and that has to be resolved.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling these amendments. I am very grateful for their continued and constructive engagement on the Bill.

Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, proposes to abolish the Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The noble Lord’s prediction is correct: I put on record that we strongly believe that it is right to retain the council, in view of the continued importance of its work in developing sentencing guidelines. He does not look completely surprised.

Over time, the council has developed offence-specific guidelines covering hundreds of offences, alongside a series of overarching guidelines. These guidelines have helped bring greater consistency, transparency and public understanding to the sentencing process. We welcome that.

The council also holds an important constitutional position, as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, within the firmament of our justice system. It bridges the interests and responsibilities of Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary on sentencing policy and practice, while protecting the important responsibility of judges and magistrates to make individual sentencing decisions—I think I am reflecting what the noble and learned Lord said. For these reasons, I am afraid we do not support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I urge him to withdraw it.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Thomas. They have indicated quite clearly their opposition to Clause 18 and propose an alternative approach to Clause 19. I am grateful for their careful consideration of this. Their concerns are shared by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I know that they were experts in this field and their opinions therefore carry a great deal of weight with the Government. As the Minister made clear at Second Reading, in bringing forward these clauses we are aiming to maintain public confidence in the guidelines that the council produces, particularly in view of the sustained public scrutiny that the council has been under of late, which is partly reflected in these debates.

Events surrounding the imposition guideline, on which I do not propose to dwell but which obviously I need to reference, earlier this year highlighted an example of the issues that can arise where guidelines cover areas of policy that should properly be for Ministers and Parliament to determine. We are keen to avoid a similar scenario arising in future, and that is why Clauses 18 and 19 have been drafted to introduce approval measures that provide greater democratic and judicial oversight of the council’s work.

I recognise that noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Marks, are keen for more information about the intention of Clause 18. Put briefly, this clause will allow the Lord Chancellor to have a greater say over the guidelines that the council intends to develop across the year, ensuring that any plans are properly reflective of wider priorities across government and Parliament and with the wider public. As no noble Lord has so far mentioned this, I should stress that in preparing this clause we have had regard to similar provision that exists for comparable bodies across the justice system, such as the Law Commission.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

84: After Clause 19, insert the following new Clause—
“Court transcripts of sentencing remarks(1) All transcripts of sentencing remarks made in the Crown Court must be published within two sitting days of being delivered.(2) All published sentencing remarks must be made freely available, including online.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require all sentencing remarks made in the Crown Court to be published and made available to all.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 84, 85 and 148A in my name. These amendments concern the publication of sentencing remarks, the collection and publication of sentencing data, and the review of the effect of this Bill on community and voluntary sectors once it comes into force.

The Government are, of course, of the opinion that the near blanket presumption of suspended sentences will lead to less crime in the long run. Reports have suggested, however, that it will increase offences by almost 400,000 per year. I certainly hope that the Government are right in their assessment because, clearly, safer streets is a goal which would unite all noble Lords.

If we are to assess whether this Bill is anything of a success, we need the data to support it. We on these Benches do not and will not simply accept reform based on blind faith. Reform has to be backed by accountability, visibility and evidence. Amendment 84 concerns sentencing remarks. We propose that all transcripts of sentencing remarks from the Crown Court be published and be made freely available online for the public to access.

Sentencing is not just a technical exercise. It is a moment of public judgment. A judge’s remarks concern the reasoning behind both why a particular sentence was imposed and why it was for a particular duration. That reasoning is essential for victims, families, communities and the public at large to understand what justice looks like in practice. Without that transparency, justice is done behind a veil, and that is liable to undermine confidence. In a sense, the Government agree with that principle—at least they did when their manifesto was written.

In their manifesto, they observed of criminals that

“the sentences they receive often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.

I suggest that the publication of sentencing remarks is key to rebuilding public confidence and holding the judicial system to account. It is trite that open justice is an essential foundation of our democracy. If sentencing is to become more complex and discretionary under the Bill, especially with the expanded use of suspended sentences and community orders, public understanding and scrutiny will become even more important.

Research by the International Association for Court Administration has shown a clear link between transparency in sentencing and public confidence in the justice system. Yet, even now, our current system remains opaque. Though sentencing remarks may be broadcast in a limited number of high-profile cases, many judgments remain inaccessible. Of course, transcripts are available, but only at cost and if requested. For many victims and their families, as well as third parties such as researchers, that is a prohibitive barrier. We must replace selective access with universal and consistent transparency, especially in the wake of this Bill.

Amendment 85 would require the courts to report key sentencing data and the Government to publish aggregate statistics at certain periods. That would provide the public with information on how many sentences are given for which offences, their length and offender demographics. If we are to place thousands more offenders under community supervision and expand the use of suspended sentences, we must be able to monitor the consequences: who is being sentenced, for what and with what impact on reoffending or public safety. Without such data, the Bill becomes a blind experiment, and we will not know whether it is achieving its objectives. We must not shy away from accountability or reject the principles that underpin democracy.

Amendment 148A addresses the impact of the Bill on the community and voluntary sectors. I am sure we all recognise that these organisations provide vital support to those most affected by crime, whether they are victims or offenders, and often they are the backbone of effective rehabilitation in the community. The Bill’s provisions will place new and substantial demands on those services, and without proper oversight we risk overwhelming the charities, community groups and voluntary agencies tasked with delivering critical interventions. Many of the arguments made in support of Amendments 84 and 85 apply to this amendment too. It would require the Government, within 12 months of commencement, to publish an assessment of the Bill’s impact on the sector. Again, that is not some bureaucratic nicety but a matter of transparency and fairness.

We cannot turn a blind eye to the practical realities on the ground. To accept this amendment is to place evidence and accountability at the forefront of this information. We owe that to this sector and the wider public. Therefore, I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I want to say a word about Amendment 84 on sentencing remarks. I was proposing to leave it until the Victims and Courts Bill, but this gives me an initial run at it, as it were. I am glad to have the opportunity to ask the Minister for an update on the MoJ’s work on this. At a 3 September meeting of the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, I asked the then Lord Chancellor about progress in this area. She said:

“I do not believe we are far from having a tech solution that meets the test of accuracy … we are testing market solutions for speed and accuracy. Then we will need to take a view on operational viability and how quickly it could be rolled out”.


She said:

“It is a long process, and it has a cost attached to it”,


but went on to emphasise that

“accuracy … is the problem at the moment”.

If the Minister could update the Committee, that would be very welcome. The point in general is not only about sentencing remarks. My honourable friend for Richmond Park has been pursuing the matter of transcripts. She realises that this is important not only with sentencing remarks but with full transcripts of trials—victims, if that is a word I can use, when there has been a not guilty finding, need help to understand what has happened. As the noble Lord has said, access after the event, to go back and look to see what was said, is very important. None of us relies on our memory—we all look at Hansard, for instance. The publication within two sitting days may be overambitious, when I look at what the Lord Chancellor said—but then she has perhaps not met our Hansard writers, who do it in much less than two days.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord for the opportunity to discuss these important issues. I appreciate that these amendments seek to improve transparency and public understanding of the criminal justice system, and this Government agree wholeheartedly on the importance of open justice. However, we do not consider that these amendments are necessary to achieve that aim.

I turn first to Amendment 84. I reassure noble Lords that the Government are taking action to increase the openness and transparency of the system. In certain cases of high public interest, sentencing remarks are already published online, and sentencing remarks can also be filmed by broadcasters, subject to the agreement of the judge. The sentencing of Thomas Cashman for the appalling murder of Olivia Pratt-Korbel was one such example. The Government have recently extended provision of free transcripts of sentencing remarks to victims of rape and other sexual offences whose cases are heard in the Crown Court, and it remains the case that bereaved families of victims of murder, manslaughter and fatal road offences can request judges’ sentencing remarks for free. We are also actively exploring opportunities offered by AI to reduce the costs of producing transcripts in future and to make transcripts across the system more accessible. But this amendment introducing this additional provision of court transcripts would place a significant financial burden on the courts and divert resources away from where they are needed most in the wider system.

The release of any court transcript requires judicial oversight to ensure accuracy and adherence to any reporting restrictions and to make sure that other public interest factors have been considered. This amendment would therefore have significant operational and resource implications for HMCTS and the judiciary. It would place extra demands on judicial capacity in the Crown Court and on HMCTS at a time when the system is under immense pressure, so while we agree entirely on the importance of transparency within the justice system, we cannot accept the amendment at this time. However, I reassure noble Lords that we will continue to consider this closely. In particular, I want to explore what opportunities AI presents to improve transcriptions and data. I am sure that noble Lords agree that the potential is there and that we need to find the best way to harness it. I will write to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on the point around data and accuracy.

I turn to Amendment 85. Again, we agree with the principle of improving transparency but not with the necessity of the amendment itself. This Government are committed to improving the collection and publication of data on foreign national offenders. The Ministry of Justice has already taken action to increase transparency on the data published. Notably, in July, for the first time the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group. We are also working closely with colleagues in the Home Office to establish earlier identification of foreign national offenders. Being able to verify the nationality of offenders ahead of sentencing will facilitate more timely removals and may also provide an opportunity for enhanced data collection. We will keep this under review as part of our ongoing work to strengthen the data collection and publication system that we inherited from the previous Government.

Implementation of these measures may require a new mechanism to verify the information provided, which must be cost effective and prevent placing additional pressure on operational staff. For this reason, we cannot accept a statutory duty to publish this information before the necessary infrastructure is in place to support it. Our measured approach will continue to support the return of more foreign national offenders while ensuring maximum transparency for the public.

I am grateful to the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord for Amendment 148A concerning measuring the impact of the Bill on the voluntary and community sectors. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Porter of Fulwood, who has championed this subject during the Bill’s passage. She made a thoughtful and impassioned contribution at Second Reading and in today’s debate. The voluntary and community sector plays a vital role in developing and delivering services to people in our care. The sector supports HMPPS and the MoJ by bridging gaps and providing continuity that reduces reoffending and drives rehabilitation through targeted specialist support. Many of the services we provide would not be possible without the vital contribution of the voluntary sector, including charities such as Women in Prison, the St Giles Trust, PACT and many others. The Independent Sentencing Review made recommendations for where the third sector can be utilised to support the Probation Service and offenders on community sentences or on licence.

We already work closely with third-sector organisations to deliver better outcomes in the criminal justice system. For example, we work in partnership with the charity Clinks through the HMPPS and MoJ infrastructure grant to engage a network of around 1,500 organisations. In collaboration with Clinks, we have convened a series of roundtables with voluntary and community sector representatives and policy colleagues to explore the review’s recommendations and how the sector can make the greatest contribution to probation capacity.

I have carefully considered Amendment 148A. However, it will not be possible to fully understand the impact within 12 months, nor based just on data from the first six months of the Act being in force. Implementation of the Bill’s provisions will be phased over time and closely linked to the outcomes of the Leveson review and its implementation. In addition, the sector’s experience will be influenced by the introduction of new commissioned rehabilitative services contracts. Measuring the impact within such a short timeframe amid these overlapping and confounding factors would be highly complex. But again, I want to explore the opportunities that AI presents to collect and use better data in future. I can assure noble Lords that we will continue to work closely with the sector to ensure that it is considered and utilised in the implementation of this Bill.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on this group. Their contributions have underscored the wide recognition across this Committee that transparency, accountability and evidence must underpin any credible approach to sentencing reform. These amendments do not seek to frustrate the Bill in any way; they seek to ensure that its objectives can be properly understood, monitored and delivered. Regarding Amendment 84, we have heard throughout this debate the importance of public confidence in the criminal justice system, and confidence cannot exist without visibility.

On Amendment 85, I once again make the simple point that you cannot manage what you do not measure. With respect to Amendment 148A, I too acknowledge the contribution made by the noble Baroness, Lady Porter; her thoughtful and insightful contribution reflected her long-standing experience and interest in this issue. At this time, I withdraw the amendment, but I give notice to the Minister that we will return to this issue at a later point in the process of the Bill.

Amendment 84 withdrawn.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 14, leave out “not more” and insert “less”
Member's explanatory statement
The presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences of less than 12 months.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the set of amendments in my name. I am sure that, throughout the course of this Committee, many noble Lords will debate and question precisely which offenders they think should be excluded from the numerous provisions for suspended sentences included in the Bill. The Government have made the underlying principle behind their approach quite clear: that only those who pose a serious risk of harm to a particular individual should be denied the privilege of a suspended sentence. On these Benches, we believe that the exemptions to Clause 1 should be much wider. We have tabled many amendments to that effect, and I will speak to them at several points throughout this Committee. I am sure that noble Lords will disagree with some of our suggestions, and I welcome the debate that will ensure that we scrutinise the Bill with care. The Bill received just one day of Committee in the other place. It is therefore imperative to carry out our duty to provide the Bill with the scrutiny that it requires.

These amendments do not directly relate to the specific offender types who we believe should spend their sentences in custody. Rather, this group of amendments seeks to clarify important practical and operational points of the Bill, which either the Government did not account for or appear to be in favour of. I have tabled these amendments to highlight the harmful effects that the Bill will have on communities and individuals, if it becomes law in its present form.

Amendments 1 and 12 may seem relatively minor in the grand scheme of the Bill, but, without their inclusion, a significant number of dangerous criminals will be free to roam the streets. There are many crimes for which a 12-month sentence is imposed, and these amendments seek to ensure that such offenders are past the cut-off point for suspended sentences to apply.

Just last month, a sex offender, Hadush Kebatu, was released from prison by accident. The Foreign Secretary said repeatedly that he was “livid” that such a man had been let loose and was free to roam the streets. Further, the Home Secretary called the same man a “vile sex offender”. Countless Government Ministers expressed their thoughts and sympathies for the victim and her family, and we on these Benches could not agree more with that assessment of Mr Kebatu.

Mr Kebatu was serving a 12-month sentence. He was convicted for trying to sexually assault a 14 year-old girl. A 41 year-old man convicted of a child sexual offence was allowed to roam the streets and the Government purported outrage, yet under the provisions of their own Sentencing Bill offenders such as Mr Kebatu would be at large not simply for a handful of days but for the entirety of their sentence. When questioned about this, the Minister simply explained that there were separate provisions for foreign-national offenders, but this misses the point. It does not detract from the fact that there are thousands of offenders convicted of charges similar to those of Mr Kebatu, all of whom would be let out on to the streets after their conviction for child sexual assault. Will the Minister finally accept this as being the Government’s stance with respect to these proposals?

In an ideal world, I would rather see all such offenders behind bars for the entire duration of their sentence, and I have tabled further amendments to that effect. However, Amendments 1 and 12 seek at least to close this obvious gap in justice to some degree by ensuring that only offences with sentences of less than 12 months are eligible for suspension. That way the one-year sentences imposed on men such as Mr Kebatu and other sexual offenders would be served in custody and not on our streets.

Amendments 2 and 13 similarly seek to plug apparent drafting oversights in the Bill. At present, it is not yet clear whether the presumption of a suspended sentence would apply to that sentence before or after a guilty plea is submitted. Given that in all published materials of the Government they have indicated that only short- term sentences of up to one year should be suspended, I can only guess that they intended for Clause 1 to take effect before guilty pleas were submitted. I have therefore tabled Amendments 2 and 13 to ensure that the presumption of suspended sentences should apply before any credit is given for a guilty plea.

If this is an amendment which the Government wish to oppose then I suggest they must make clear to all noble Lords, and indeed to the public, that they in fact wish to suspend sentences for all crimes up to 18 months, rather than 12 months. That is because any offender charged with a crime of 18 months has the ability to reduce it by a third by submission of an early guilty plea, which will subsequently make them eligible, apparently, for an automatic suspended sentence. I suggest that this will simply open a Pandora’s box for a whole new subset of crimes that will fall into the eligibility criteria of Clause 1.

The exclusion of an express clause negating credit for a guilty plea in this context will have unintended and dangerous implications for our justice system. It risks fundamentally undermining public confidence in justice if offenders come to recognise that by pleading guilty they can simply avoid prison altogether and serve their sentence in the community. That distorts incentives in a manner that no responsible Government should welcome. It may even encourage individuals charged with serious crimes, regardless of whether or not they committed them, to plead guilty, purely to escape a custodial sentence. That cannot be a principle on which our system of justice is based. I hope that the Minister will take this point seriously, and I look forward to hearing his response.

Amendments 3 and 14 address a further operational incoherence in Clause 1: the length of time for which a suspended sentence would be imposed. Under the Bill as drafted, there is no clarity as to whether suspended sentences imposed automatically under this presumption would be suspended for the maximum period. In many cases, an offender could therefore benefit from a dramatically reduced suspension period, serving little to no meaningful time under supervision. My amendments seek to ensure in statute that this is simply not the case. If the intention is truly to uphold the integrity of sentencing, any suspended sentence imposed as a substitute for immediate custody must be suspended for the maximum allowable period. Anything less would undermine the very concept of accountability that the public rightly expect from our justice system.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great honour to have the opportunity to speak for the Government in Committee on the Sentencing Bill. As noble Lords know, I have devoted much of my life and career to criminal justice reform, in particular the question of how to reduce reoffending. Therefore, I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to speak to the amendments on short sentences, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. While I am grateful to noble Lords for their constructive and thoughtful input on this Bill, inside and outside the Chamber, I remain convinced that the position of the Bill is the right one. I appreciate the words from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, along those lines.

Let me be clear at the outset: we are not abolishing short sentences. Judges will still have discretion to send offenders to prison where there is a significant risk of physical or psychological harm to an individual, where they have breached a court order or in exceptional circumstances. However, the evidence shows that those given a community order or suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. That is a key driver behind the presumption to suspend short sentences and why it must continue to apply to sentences of 12 months or less.

We are following the evidence to reduce crime, leading to fewer victims and safer communities, and we are also following the lead of the previous Conservative Government who originally introduced this measure during the last Parliament, without the additional amendments we are debating today.

Given the clear evidence on short sentences, the Government do not agree with introducing further exemptions. To do so could increase reoffending and so create more victims. I came into this job to build a criminal justice system that leads to fewer victims, not more.

I will now turn to the specific points that noble Lords have raised in this debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, have both raised important points on early guilty pleas through Amendments 2 and 13. I can assure noble Lords that I have reflected on these amendments and considered them at length and with great care, but it has long been the practice of the courts to give a reduction in sentence where a defendant pleads guilty. This avoids the need for a trial, enables cases to be dealt with quickly, and shortens the gap between charge and sentence. Moreover, it can save victims and witnesses from the concern about having to give evidence. This is particularly important in traumatic cases.

Furthermore, the amendments proposed would create inconsistencies. The presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea mitigation brought the sentence down to 12 months or less, whereas it could still apply where the court applied any other mitigation that had the same effect. For these reasons, the Government do not support these amendments.

Through Amendments 3 and 14, noble Lords have also proposed requiring courts to impose suspended sentence orders with a maximum operational period of two years. This would not be appropriate for every suspended sentence order without consideration of the particular facts of the case, and would place additional burden on the Probation Service. The evidence shows that those given a community order or suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. We are following the evidence to reduce crime, leading to fewer victims and safer communities.

It is absolutely clear that the last Government left our Probation Service under immense pressure. Fourteen years of austerity came alongside a botched privatisation. The scars are still there, and we are fixing it. Sentencing must always be proportionate to the offence committed, taking into account all the circumstances of each case. It is right for the judiciary to retain discretion to consider this and make the sentencing decision. This amendment would remove that discretion.

I thank the noble Lords again for their amendments and the opportunity to debate them. I hope I have sufficiently explained why our approach of following the evidence is the right one to take. With that in mind, I ask them not to press their amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this part of the Committee debate, and I thank the Minister for explaining the position of the Government with regard to these proposed amendments.

On early guilty pleas, it appears to me, respectfully, that if the Government are going to maintain the position that has been set out, they should be explicit in the Bill that they are not dealing with suspension in respect of sentences of 12 months; they are dealing with suspension in respect of sentences of up to and including 18 months. That is far from clear in the Bill. Whether or not the Government accept our amendment, it is a point that has to be made clear so that public confidence can be maintained in the nature of the sentencing system that is going to be introduced.

With regard to the matter of suspension and the maximum suspension period of two years, we maintain that if these moves are going to be taken, it is only appropriate that the suspension should be for a period long enough to enable some form of rehabilitation to take place, because otherwise it is simply pointless. Again, I ask the Government to reconsider their position, but at this stage I will withdraw this amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

6: Clause 1, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender—(a) has been convicted of three or more other offences in the 12 months leading to the conviction for which a suspended sentence would otherwise have been passed (the “current offence”);(b) has been convicted of 10 or more offences prior to the current offence;(c) has been convicted of the same offence as the current offence on three or more previous occasions; (d) is convicted of an offence (the current offence) with a mandatory minimum custodial sentence;(e) has previously received a suspended sentence order or a custodial sentence for the same offence as the current offence;(f) has breached a suspended sentence order or orders on three or more occasions, either by breaching community requirements or committing a further offence;(g) has a history of poor compliance with court orders, according to a written or oral statement from a probation officer;(h) at the time of the current offence, was—(i) subject to a supervision order, or(ii) on licence, or subject to supervision, under Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (release, licences, supervision and recall);(i) is convicted of an offence eligible for consideration under the Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme under sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988; or(j) is being sentenced for three or more offences concurrently.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent suspended sentences from being passed in a range of circumstances.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments touch on similar issues to those we have already addressed. They highlight what we say is a fundamental flaw in Clause 1—the blanket presumption of suspended short custodial sentences even for offenders who pose a serious and ongoing risk to the public.

Under the Bill as it is framed, there is the real possibility that individuals convicted of crimes such as robbery, grievous bodily harm, sexual assault, burglary and offences involving knives or other bladed weapons could serve the entirety of their sentences in the community. As we have just noted, that may be far less than a suspension of two years if the Government proceed as they intend. From the point of view of public safety and public confidence in the justice system, that appears to be unacceptable.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for raising the point about emergency workers: they deserve all our attention and we are very proud of what they do in often very difficult circumstances. I will take away his challenge on that.

I have met a number of people—especially women—in prison who are there for assaulting an emergency worker. While those assaults should not happen at all, often those people were in a very traumatic situation and, when the emergency services came to their aid, they reacted in the wrong way. That is something we need to bear in mind as well.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions from across the Committee and for the response from the Minister. Everybody appreciates that Clause 1 is not prohibiting anything. Nevertheless, a number of noble Lords, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked eloquently and correctly about the discretion of our judges and the trust that we should place in our judges. But that is not what Clause 1 is doing. Clause 1 is saying they must apply a presumption. They are not being trusted with it; they are being told they must apply it. That is one of the issues that we need to address.

A number of specific exceptions were tabled in the amendments, but I take on board the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham about it being far more straightforward to produce some generic description in this regard. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, pointed out, it may even be something that should be left to the Sentencing Council at the end of the day. But that is another issue. I read this quotation:

“Even when criminals are found guilty, the sentences they receive often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.


That is from the Labour manifesto. My fear is that Clause 1 is simply going to reinforce that perception, and that is one of the concerns that we have with it.

I appreciate the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about the potential for a suspended sentence to lead to support and rehabilitation. The problem is that those facilities are simply not available at the present time and, in any event, we do not know what period of suspension might or might not be imposed by the courts. It may well be one or two years, but, as the Bill is framed, it may be much less and leave no sensible opportunity for either support or rehabilitation.

There is also the matter of statistics. The noble Lord, Lord Foster, alluded to some well-known statistics about the fact that those who are in custody for short sentences are much more likely to repeat offences when they come out of prison than those who have been given a suspended sentence. But one must bear in mind that those who have been given a suspended sentence have generally committed a far less serious offence than those who have been given a custodial sentence, and that those who are given custodial sentences for relatively minor offences are given those custodial sentences because they are repeat offenders. One must bear in mind Disraeli’s observation that there are lies, there are damned lies and there are statistics and, therefore, we have to approach them with a degree of care. I understand and appreciate that there is more generic evidence to suggest that suspended sentences, when properly applied, controlled and maintained, can have beneficial effects—nobody doubts that for a moment—but there is a very real need here to address, among other things, the whole scourge of repeat offenders.

This arises particularly in the context of Amendment 8 from my noble friend Lord Jackson, which highlights burglary as a particular offence. Burglary is an intensely intrusive crime that leaves victims traumatised, and it is inclined to attract repeat offenders. Its social damage is considerable. There are particular crimes of that nature, given their impact on society as a whole, that should attract something more than a suspended sentence, given the fear is that somebody will simply repeat them. Similar observations can be made on knife crime as well.

I fully understand that there is a need to revisit Clause 1 and its implications. We have sought to do so by identifying particular or specific exceptions to it. There is, as I indicated, and as outlined by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, potentially a better route to that conclusion. Indeed, to echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, there is hopefully a simpler route to that conclusion. For present purposes, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

30: Clause 2, page 6, line 39, at end insert—
“(2B) But a suspended order is not available in relation to that sentence if the sentence is in relation to—(a) any offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which involves a child under 13;(b) any offence of grooming or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity;(c) any offence of creating, distributing or possessing indecent images of children;(d) any offence of assault occasioning grievous bodily harm (GBH) or wounding with intent; (e) any offence involving use or possession of a knife or other offensive weapon in the commission of a violent offence;(f) any offence of stalking or harassing a victim with repeated conduct;(g) any offence against a vulnerable person (including children or adults) involving serious harm or risk;(h) any domestic abuse offence where the victim is a current or former partner or family member, including controlling or coercive behaviour and any offence involving violence, threats, or psychological abuse.(2C) The changes made by this section to the power under sections 264 and 277 of the Sentencing Code must not come into force until the Secretary of State has consulted on, and ensured the necessary exclusion list under subsection (2B) is operational for, all offences considered to involve serious violence, sexual offences, offences against children or vulnerable persons and domestic abuse offences.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would disapply the ability of the court to suspend sentences to those convicted of the offences listed in the amendment, and would require the Secretary of State to consult on and ensure exclusions for those convicted of other serious violent and sexual offence categories.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the group of amendments in my name raise important points concerning Clause 2. Our concerns here stem from the same concerns that gave effect to our proposed amendments in respect of Clause 1. Of course, we have sympathy for the current pressures on our prison system, but we must also recognise that, in essence, an undiscriminating provision to let offenders remain in the community without custodial punishment is by no means the solution. Indeed, in many ways, the present provisions create greater challenges than Clause 1 in respect of the ability for the suspension of sentences for offenders who have been sentenced for up to three years’ imprisonment.

These are not petty criminals. This provision would apply to those going to prison for crimes such as robbery, grievous bodily harm, sexual assault, organised drug dealing and possession of an offensive weapon. Amendments 30 and 32 provide a list of offences where we believe it would be unacceptable to allow such offenders to serve suspended sentences. I accept that, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham observed when we debated Clause 1, there may be scope for a generic provision here rather than a long list of specific offences, and certainly we will give consideration to that. However, we do not consider that someone convicted of, for example, sexual offences related to a child or grooming should avoid custody entirely.

Without any effective form of custodial sentence, we risk two important consequences. First, the deterrent effects that are inherent to custodial sentences cease to operate. Secondly, serious offenders will have the opportunity to reoffend, having received no effective rehabilitation, and will have continued access to their victims.

Amendments 30 and 32 similarly make provisions for offences of assault and wounding with intent involving weapons such as knives. We believe it is important that offenders convicted of these serious crimes serve their sentences in custody rather than at large in the community. Those convicted of such violent offences should have to spend some time in custody. This is not only to ensure the continued safety of the wider public, but to ensure that the public’s perception is that serious crime of this nature is punished. I again repeat that, although we recognise that prisons are under considerable strain, we cannot allow that to be the chief or principal consideration when it comes to the imposition of sentences.

Finally, Amendments 30 and 32 seek to exclude offenders who have engaged in stalking or harassment, and also those who have been guilty of domestic abuse

“where the victim is a current or former partner or family member”.

I suggest that it is self-evident why such offenders should serve their sentences in prison and not have access to their victims. I note that even in Clause 1, there is an exception in respect of “significant risk of … harm” to “a particular individual”, where the presumption will not apply. Why is there no similar provision in respect of Clause 2 when we are dealing with far more serious offences than those addressed by virtue of a sentence of 12 months?

Amendments 31 and 33 seek to highlight further operational issues with respect to the Bill, and Clause 2 specifically. The clause, in essence, leaves the door open to a multitude of issues that would never arise if a custodial sentence was going to be present. It is entirely possible that someone convicted of assault on several occasions could be handed down a sentence of less than three years under the current sentencing guidelines. This provision would operate to provide that person with the possibility of serving a suspended sentence. Without meaningful accountability, law breaking and crime will continue to proliferate.

I draw particular attention to the proposed new subsection (2B)(g) in Amendment 31, which provides that suspended sentence orders should not be imposed on those who have

“a history of poor compliance with court orders”.

I respectfully suggest that this is an obvious point to make. Those who clearly have a history of not following community orders should not be placed immediately back into society after committing a crime. Yet that is a very real possibility under the provisions of Clause 3.

It would appear that Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, is perhaps underpinned by the same concerns that are rooted in our amendments, namely the real possibility of dangerous offenders on the streets, thereby putting the public at risk. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to exempt specified offences of terrorism, violence and sexual offences from suspended sentences. We support the intention behind that amendment and certainly hope that the Government will take it seriously.

I have sought simply to illustrate a few of those instances where it should not be appropriate for a suspended sentence to be available. That is not only so that the crime is met with a proportionate punishment but is also required to ensure that the public can maintain confidence in the criminal justice system. I hope that the Government will take these amendments seriously, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Sandhurst, for sharing their views and tabling these amendments, which aim to prevent sentences for certain categories of offences from being suspended. I would be interested to hear more about the Marie Collins Foundation; I have never heard of that organisation before. If it would be helpful, I would be interested in having a meeting with the noble Lord and the foundation to learn more and see what I can gain from that.

I must be clear that it is at the discretion of the independent judiciary whether to impose a suspended sentence, taking into account all the circumstances of the offence and following the appropriate guidance set by the Sentencing Council. For example, sentencing guidelines are clear: it may not be appropriate to suspend a sentence if the offender presents a risk to any person or if appropriate punishment can be achieved only by immediate custody. If the offender breaches the order by failing to comply with any of the requirements or committing a new offence, they can be returned to court. If the breach is proven, the courts are required to activate the custodial sentence unless it would be unjust to do so. Of course, criminals serving suspended sentences also face the prospect of being sent to prison if they fail to comply with the terms of these orders. So, under this Bill, someone could receive a two-and-a-half-year sentence, suspended for three years, and with an electronically monitored curfew lasting for two years. In this scenario, if they breach their curfew or commit a further offence, they face the prospect of being sent to prison.

I would like to reassure noble Lords that there is already provision within this Bill to prohibit the use of suspended sentence orders under any circumstances in relation to sentences for offenders of particular concern and extended determinate sentences. These sentences can be imposed in relation to the specific offences listed in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Russell, where the court is of the opinion that the offender is dangerous. Currently, if an extended determinate sentence is imposed for two years or less, it is imposed alongside a standard determinate sentence, and both can be suspended. However, the Bill will change that position so that where an extended sentence is imposed, it cannot be suspended under any circumstances, including when it is imposed alongside a standard determinate sentence.

I turn to terrorism sentences. Where a life sentence is not imposed, unless there are exceptional circumstances, a serious terrorism sentence is required if a court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public and the offence was likely to cause multiple deaths. The minimum sentence of imprisonment will then be 14 years and therefore a suspended sentence order would not be available. The noble Lords have also proposed to exempt offences with mandatory minimum sentences and those eligible for referral under the unduly lenient scheme. If the offence being sentenced has a mandatory minimum sentence and is capable of being suspended, judges still retain the discretion to impose an immediate custodial sentence when there is the appropriate outcome.

To be clear, we are not abolishing short sentences. Offences falling under the unduly lenient sentence scheme are rightly treated very seriously. I reassure noble Lords that Clause 2 does not interfere with existing mechanisms that allow for the review of sentences in these cases. We believe that these safeguards protect the public while preserving judicial discretion. Sentencing in individual cases is rightly a matter for the courts, considering the full circumstances of the case.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, which would prevent the court from suspending a sentence where an offender has not complied with previous court orders and to exempt offenders convicted of multiple previous offences from being suspended. I can reassure noble Lords that the sentencing guidelines are clear. Where an offender has not complied with previous court orders and the court thinks that they are unlikely to comply in the future, that may be a reason not to suspend the sentence.

Additionally, when an offender is in custody—for example, when they have breached their licence conditions by committing a further offence and have been recalled into custody as a result—the court will not suspend the sentence. Sentences are generally served concurrently when the offences arise out of the same incident, or where there is a series of offences of the same or a similar kind, especially when committed against the same person. The key point is that the court should ensure that the overall sentence imposed on the offender is just and proportionate. Noble Lords will know that this Government take prolific offending extremely seriously, and previous offending is already a statutory aggravating factor.

I must also be clear that a suspended sentence is not a soft option. The courts can impose a range of requirements on an offender, ranging from curfews to exclusion zones. This Bill includes tough new restriction zones, which will restrict offenders to a specific geographic area. These will be electronically monitored in most cases and are intended to serve as not just a punishment but an important tool to protect and reassure victims.

Reoffending is unacceptably high for victims and the public, and we must drive it down. That is why we are ramping up intensive supervision courts, targeting the prolific offenders whose criminal behaviour is often driven by addiction or other needs. The international evidence is clear: these courts cut crime, with a 33% decrease in the rate of arrest compared to offenders who receive standard sentences. That is just one way in which this Government are putting the necessary structures in place to build a sustainable justice system going forward.

Suspended sentence orders in appropriate cases give offenders a chance to stay in work, keep stable housing and access support in the community. All of this goes towards reducing repeat offending and supporting rehabilitation, and it is right that that remains the case. By targeting the causes of offending in the community, we can lower reoffending rates and in turn reduce the number of victims. I hope noble Lords are now assured of the Government’s position on this, and I therefore ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I thank the Minister and other noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments are designed to ensure that dangerous or repeat offenders cannot avoid custody due to a general presumption of suspension.

I hear what the Minister said about the discretion of the independent judiciary, but it seems to me that he is attempting to go in two different directions at the same time—we have only just looked at Clause 1, where he is imposing upon the discretion of the independent judiciary a presumption that has to apply. There is no discretion there; they must abide by the presumption. So, in a sense, we go from one extreme to the other with regard to the justification for these provisions in the Bill, and it is very difficult to understand any underlying logic or principle that is being applied here. I do hope that the Government will give further consideration to Clause 2 and the proposed amendments to it, but, for present purposes, I will withdraw this amendment.

Amendment 30 withdrawn.

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[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

That sounds sensible.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 3 is of course a novel sentencing tool, and it is entirely correct that the Committee should probe its design with some care. Many of the amendments before us seek reassurance that the scheme will be fair and proportionate, and indeed that it will be workable in practice. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with her amendment, draws attention to the basic question of impact. An income reduction order must not be set at a level that undermines an offender’s ability to work, train or maintain stable housing. If these orders are to be effective, they must support rehabilitation, not jeopardise the very stability on which it depends. The noble Baroness’s amendments highlight that there is a risk here that requires very clear scrutiny.

The amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst raise a series of questions about the architecture of the scheme. As drafted, the Bill establishes broad powers to reduce an offender’s income, yet it leaves almost all the crucial detail to regulations that we have not yet seen and that may in due course prove insufficiently robust.

Amendments 37 to 44 ask the Government to place in the Bill the essential elements that will govern how these orders operate in the real world. They begin by posing the most basic question of all: what do the Government mean by “monthly income”? Are we assessing gross or net income? How are fluctuating earnings to be treated? What of the self-employed or those on irregular or zero-hours contracts? It is very difficult to see how a fair and consistent system can be construed without clear statutory guidance on these points. If Parliament is to authorise a mechanism allowing the state to deduct a portion of a person’s income month after month, it is surely right that we also understand with precision how that income is to be defined, what thresholds will apply, how caps are to be set and which factors the court must take into account before imposing an order.

Amendment 44 goes to the heart of our concern that the Bill as currently drafted lacks the necessary clarity about the conditions under which an income reduction order may be imposed. Leaving this almost entirely to secondary legislation again risks undermining both transparency and fairness—surely qualities that are fundamental to the integrity of such a system.

These amendments illuminate the substantial gaps in the present drafting and ensure that Parliament does not sign off on a broad new power without understanding how it will work in practice and what safeguards will accompany it. I look to the Minister to provide the clarity that has so far been somewhat lacking. For our part, we do not oppose the principle of creating a more flexible and enforceable means-based penalty. But, before we take such a significant step, we must be satisfied that the framework is sound, that the protections are clear and that the consequences, particularly for those on the margins, have been fully thought through. I hope the Minister will address these concerns.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, one of the three guiding principles of the David Gauke Independent Sentencing Review was to expand and make greater use of punishment outside prison. We are determined to make sure that crime does not pay, which is why we introduced Clause 3, giving courts the power to impose income reduction orders on offenders who receive suspended sentence orders. From the debate we have just had and from my prior conversations, I know that noble Lords have a keen interest in how these will work in practice, and I am grateful for the opportunity to debate this at greater length today. I have been employing prisoners for over 20 years. Many are on day release and, in some cases, a proportion of their earnings goes back to victims. Income reduction orders are inspired by that principle: offenders must pay back to society for the harm they have caused.

I first turn to Amendments 37, 41, 42 and 44, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. They seek to specify what must be contained in the regulations detailing this scheme. I assure noble Lords that we are working cross-government to develop a process for delivering income reduction orders in a way that works cohesively with the rest of the powers that sentencers have at their disposal. We have intentionally kept the legislation flexible to ensure that we can deliver this measure in that way. For example, we do not agree that it would be appropriate for income reduction orders to be mandatory in certain circumstances. This would unnecessarily curtail judicial discretion to decide whether an order should be imposed based on the full facts of an individual case.

The Sentencing Council is actively considering what updates to its guidelines are needed to account for the Bill’s reforms, including these orders. My officials are working closely with the council. I reassure noble Lords that regulations will be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure, so noble Lords will have the opportunity to debate and discuss these details prior to implementation.

I turn to Amendments 38 and 40 and am happy to explain the rationale behind the drafting of this Bill. Let me be clear: this measure is a penalty for high-income individuals. It will ensure that criminals who break the law, and who benefit from keeping their jobs and continue to earn a significant salary, pay back to society. I doubt that anyone in the Committee would disagree with that. The intention is to set an income threshold that would apply at an appropriately high level. But the Bill sets a baseline that the threshold for an income reduction order can never be below. The aim is to ensure that those with incomes in line with the minimum wage cannot ever receive this penalty. The minimum wage is set at an hourly rate, and 170 times that is a reasonable approximation of the hours likely to be worked over a month.

Noble Lords have also questioned why there is an upper limit. A core tenet of our criminal justice system is fairness and proportionality. So, setting a maximum percentage of an offender’s excess monthly income that can be collected protects individuals from receiving an excessively harsh penalty. We need to ensure that the punishment fits the crime. If the court determines that a higher penalty is appropriate and the offence is serious enough to carry an unlimited fine, the court will still be able to impose that, either instead of or as well as an income reduction order.

But income reduction orders must not be a disincentive to employment or amplify existing hardship. As someone who has championed the employment of ex-offenders for years, this is the last thing I would want to happen. Therefore, they will be applicable only to offenders who earn or are deemed likely to earn a significant income. We will set the minimum income threshold through secondary legislation at an appropriate level. This will ensure that low-income households are not in the scope of this measure.

As with any other financial penalty, judges will consider an offender’s means and circumstances when choosing whether to apply an income reduction order at sentencing. This can include, but is not restricted to, income, housing costs and child maintenance. Additionally, the provisions in the Bill allow the Secretary of State to set out in regulations the deductions that must be made when calculating an offender’s monthly income for the purposes of assessing whether an income reduction order can be applied.

Amendment 79, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, proposes to create a power for a sentencing court to require an offender to make periodic payments or other contributions towards the maintenance and welfare of their dependants. I must inform the noble Lord that there are existing mechanisms to deal with payments to dependants. For example, the family courts are able to make spousal maintenance payments on divorce.

This proposed new clause would require the court to inquire whether an offender has responsibility for children or other dependants. Although this is well intentioned, it risks creating practical difficulties. Inquiring whether a person holds parental responsibility, has dependent children or other dependants—and subsequently inquiring about the circumstances and reasonable needs of those dependants—may require interpretation of family court orders, birth records or informal care-giving arrangements for the purposes of verification. Imposing such a duty risks delaying sentencing.

This Government have committed to identifying and providing support for children affected by parental imprisonment. As such, the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Education are working to determine the best way to do this to ensure that children get the support they need. This builds on a range of services offered by His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service to help families and significant others, where appropriate, to build positive relationships with people in the criminal justice system. This includes social visits, letter writing, video calls, family days and prison voicemail. I hope this addresses the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith. I ask the noble Lords not to press their amendments.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Leeds]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 45A in the place of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who, regrettably, is not able to be here today. It seems that in wider society there is a greater push for harsher punishment and longer sentences, and there is a tension with what the purpose of such punishment is. This amendment is designed to provide some elucidation on that. It would define in law the purposes of imprisonment and require the courts and the Secretary of State to have regard to the purposes of imprisonment.

His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service’s strategic objective is to

“carry out sentences given by the courts, in custody and the community, and rehabilitate people in our care through education and employment”.

But there is no statutory or other provision that directly addresses the fundamental purposes of imprisonment. While the Bill sets out the statutory purposes of sentencing, these do not provide guidance to judges on whether imprisonment is appropriate, nor on what should occur once an offender is incarcerated. The need to confront this, we suggest, is quite urgent. There is tension, obviously, between punishment, rehabilitation and restoration.

In the absence of a clear understanding of the purpose of imprisonment, it seems important both for prisoners and their wider families and community, as well as victims, that the expectations of what the particular punishment sets out to do are clear, rather than just handing out a prison sentence and hoping that something good will happen. I should also add that, in my own experience of prisons and talking to people engaged in prison rehabilitation, the resources to enable such rehabilitation to happen—such as education and so on—are reducing, and this cannot be good.

At present, the public express little confidence in the courts and prisons, in part as a result of the lack of clarity around the purpose and use of imprisonment. A clear parliamentary statement on this issue would serve prisoners, who would better understand why they have been imprisoned. This is about clarity. A number of jurisdictions, such as New Zealand, have legislated guidance for courts and the community more broadly regarding this issue. On behalf of those who have signed up to this amendment, I say that this is an amendment that could be taken seriously and would help the judicial system.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, we on these Benches fully support the principle that victims’ rights, safety and experiences must be considered. Included already in the statutory purposes of sentencing is the protection of the public. In practice, courts make an effort to take victims’ interests into account. The explicit addition to Clause 4 raises an interesting principle, and the amendment serves, perhaps, as a useful reminder of the centrality of victims in our justice system. We look forward to hearing the Government’s response to Amendment 45.

Amendment 45A, in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, would place in statute the purposes of imprisonment and require both the courts and the Secretary of State to have regard to them. The first of these principles is

“the incapacitation of prisoners in order to restrict their ability to re-offend in the community”.

I simply observe that the purposes of Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill are to the opposite effect. They raise presumptions in favour of the release of prisoners into the community, rather than their incapacitation to restrict their ability to reoffend. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to that.

I note that Amendment 45A would reinforce principles already central to sentencing and prison policy, which can only be good for public confidence. If it can lead to improvements in rehabilitation and public protection, then all to the good. Again, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reflections on the four aims proposed in Amendment 45A.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for bringing forward Amendment 45 in his place, and for the spirit in which it has been proposed. The Government share the noble Lords’ goal and dedication to ensure that victims are properly protected within our justice system. That is why Clause 4 makes it clear that the protection of the public explicitly includes victims of crime. This is a significant and, I must stress, intentional step forward. Although I wholeheartedly share the noble Lords’ intentions and commitments, I do not believe that the additional wording proposed in the amendment would add substantive value to what is already being achieved by the changes we are making in the Bill.

Clause 4 will make it clear that courts should consider the protection of victims as part of sentencing. That is very important. This amendment would simply restate what is already made explicit by Clause 4. Of course, the Government’s commitment to protecting victims is not limited to the changes we are making in Clause 4. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, asked me to comment on the centrality of victims to the justice system. I am so happy to do that that I rewrote this speaking note this morning, with the help of the officials.

The Bill contains other important measures that will protect victims. As noble Lords know, we are introducing new restriction zones, which will limit the movements of offenders instead of the movements of victims. We are also creating a new domestic abuse flag at sentencing so that domestic abusers are more consistently identified. This will help prisons and probation services manage offenders effectively and ensure that victims are better protected.

We are taking many steps outside the Bill to protect victims. We are continuing the provision of free sentencing remarks to victims of rape and sexual offences, and we are expanding the use of specialist domestic abuse courts—a very important cause, with which I have been associated for many years—with trained staff to support victims and more co-ordinated management of perpetrators.

I turn to the amendment proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, in the absence of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who has made an important contribution to this debate by raising whether the purpose of imprisonment should be defined in legislation. I spent many years chairing the agency board of HMPPS, and one of my jobs was to set the strategy. We spent a long time debating precisely this point and how we should frame it, so I understand the issues the right reverend Prelates seek to address.

Although I agree wholeheartedly that our debates should be guided by principles and evidence, and not by headlines—the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said that one of the most important duties of new legislation is to win public confidence; I entirely share that sentiment— I am afraid that I respectfully disagree that a definition in statute is needed. The purposes of sentencing, including imprisonment, are already set out in statute and reflected in Sentencing Council guidelines. These principles should guide our courts every day and provide the flexibility needed to respond to changing circumstances and emerging threats. With those comments in mind, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames has added his name to this amendment, which would ensure that sentencing guidelines

“provide that domestic abuse is an aggravating factor”.

Clause 6 puts into statute a provision that if the court is passing a sentence and

“is of the view that the offence involved domestic abuse carried out by the offender”,

then the court must state that. This clause is a very important acknowledgement of offences involving domestic abuse. My honourable friend the Member for Eastbourne played no small part in getting this on to the statute book.

Enabling the understanding of offences involving domestic abuse is important, generally and for the victim. I assume that the court being required to state that the offence involved domestic abuse will better enable the MoJ to keep data about this. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to confirm that or, at any rate, note the point that keeping data is important. We are going at little more than a snail’s pace in recognising domestic abuse; it is quite laborious achieving each step. I doubt I need to elaborate on this to noble Lords, but it is important for the victim to have not just a general recognition, but something which is official, stated by the court, of what they have gone through and what underlies it. That is of great significance to the individual.

However, simply providing for findings of domestic abuse provoked the question: and then what? Amendment 46 is intended to provide the answer by putting the matter into sentencing guidelines as an aggravating factor. I believe that the commission of an offence in the domestic context is already an aggravating factor under the sentencing guidelines, with which I struggled over the weekend. However, domestic abuse is more than context. I think the MoJ must accept that, otherwise new Section 56A would refer to domestic context, not domestic abuse. It is important; as people say, you cannot deal with what you cannot name. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I speak briefly to Amendment 46 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. As I read it, the amendment seeks to treat domestic abuse as an aggravating factor when determining all sentencing. Of course domestic abuse is a serious pervasive crime and it clearly has profound long-term impacts on its victims. This amendment appears to promote some degree of clarity and consistency, and, indeed, fairness in sentencing. It would ensure that the courts can take full account of both the nature and the impact of domestic abuse when deciding on an appropriate sentence. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s views on it.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for drawing attention to this important topic. They, along with their colleagues in the other place, have campaigned tirelessly on this issue.

I want to reassure the noble Baroness that we believe that this will improve the quality of data. The amendment we are debating today would require sentencing guidelines to provide that domestic abuse is an aggravating factor in sentencing. I fully appreciate the intent behind the amendment, and the Government wholeheartedly agree that judges should consider domestic abuse when sentencing, but I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that this is already the position and explain why the Government do not consider a further amendment necessary.

Domestic abuse is already treated as an aggravating factor through the Sentencing Council’s guidelines. Courts are required by law to follow this, unless it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. The Sentencing Council has looked carefully at this issue and has issued an overarching guideline on domestic abuse. That guideline makes it clear that the presence of domestic abuse can make an offence more serious. In addition, a wide range of offence-specific guidelines include

“an offence committed within a domestic abuse context”

as a specific aggregating factor.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

47: After Clause 6, insert the following new Clause—
“Parents of young offenders(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the effectiveness and use by the courts of the following powers in the Sentencing Code—(a) sections 365 to 375 (parenting orders), and(b) sections 380 to 383 (costs, fines and other financial orders where offender aged under 18).(2) The assessment undertaken under subsection (1) must make recommendations on—(a) ways to increase use of the Sentencing Code powers to make parenting and financial orders, and(b) other potential sentencing changes to promote greater parental responsibility in respect of young offenders.(3) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment made under this section before Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to assess the use of the courts’ existing powers to make parenting orders and financial orders to parents of young offenders.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment would require the Secretary of State to undertake a full assessment of how the courts are using their existing powers to make parenting and financial orders for young offenders. These powers are already available under the Sentencing Code but in practice are used far less than Parliament had originally intended. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice has confirmed that more than 1,000 such orders were made in 2010, yet only 27 have been made in recent years. That is a striking decline, which raises serious concerns about whether important statutory powers designed to support families and address the causes of youth offending are being neglected or overlooked.

The purpose of these orders is not to punish parents but to support them, to help restore discipline and stability in the home and, ultimately, to prevent the next crime before it happens. Through assessing their effectiveness and making recommendations to increase their use, this amendment seeks to strengthen parental responsibility and engagement in the rehabilitation of young offenders. Children are of course among the most vulnerable in our society and it is our responsibility as lawmakers, indeed as parents, and ultimately as adults, to ensure that when young people offend, there is structure, support and the necessary resources in place to prevent them reoffending. I suggest that this amendment is a measured and constructive step towards achieving that aim.

I note that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is not in his place, but I will just mention his Amendment 87. The amendment addresses a very different but equally important aspect of youth justice: the question of transparency in cases involving the most serious offending by those under 18 years of age. The amendment would require reporting restrictions to be lifted at the point of sentencing where a young offender received a custodial sentence of four years or more. To receive a custodial sentence of over four years is telling of the crimes committed. I appreciate that anonymity has been a protective safeguard for most children within the justice system, and of course rightly so, but where an offence of such gravity that it warrants a substantial custodial sentence has been committed, there is a strong public interest in transparency and accountability. So I would welcome the Minister’s response not only to my own amendment but to that tabled by the noble Lord.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord for raising these important issues. Obviously, the Bill focuses on the adult system, but I am pleased that we have this opportunity to debate these amendments about the youth justice system, about which all of us are concerned. However, our position is that neither of these amendments are necessary.

Amendment 47 would require the Secretary of State to assess the effectiveness of certain orders available when dealing with a child under the age of 18. This includes parenting orders, and costs, fines and other financial orders. I am very happy to acknowledge the importance of these orders, as stressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. They are very much part of the toolkit for dealing with youth offending and youth justice and have an important role in supporting greater responsibility for a child’s offending—excuse my voice; the NHS’s work in restoring my mellifluous tones is not quite complete yet. Whether they are used in a particular case is best determined by the court with access to professional advice from the youth offending team. When we were discussing this prior to this Committee tonight, we recognised the importance of youth offending officers having a view on what would be most effective in working with parents who should be doing more.

It is right that the court retains the discretion to determine whether such interventions are well placed to support the child’s rehabilitation—so we are not opposed to that—and that it has access to information on their individual circumstances. However, as the Minister said at Second Reading, we will be reviewing the position on youth sentencing separately in light of the changes that the Bill will introduce in due course, and we will be very happy to return to these important matters then. Therefore, although we do not agree that primary legislation is necessary for a dedicated assessment of these orders, I can confirm to noble Lords that we will consider this matter.

Amendment 87 is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, who is not in his place, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, has set out the issue. I thank the noble and learned Lord, but let us be clear that the most serious childhood offences which result in longer custodial sentences are dealt with in the Crown Court. Here, it is at the discretion of the independent judge whether to impose restrictions to protect the identity of a child defendant. Reporting restrictions exist to protect vulnerable child victims, witnesses and defendants. They are very important. Being named in the press can obviously have a significant negative impact on the safety, prospects and opportunities of a child. That said, in all cases, judges have discretion to lift reporting restrictions once a child has been convicted, or before, where they are considered unreasonable—for example, in the well-known case of Axel Rudakubana, who was 17 when charged with the Southport murders. The Government’s view is that our existing system strikes the right balance between the fundamental importance of open justice and proportionate safeguards for children. With that in mind, I ask the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord not to press their amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

Does the Minister acknowledge that there has been a very striking decline in the use of parenting and financial orders since 2010?

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

We are conscious of that and we discussed it in our pre-briefing this morning, and we want to find out what that is all about. The important point to make at this stage, without jumping to conclusions, is that we want this to be part of the armoury, but we want youth offending officers to have discretion about what will really work with the parents. Anyway, you have got me on one of my favourite subjects, so I should get off it.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I am obliged to the Minister for getting on and then getting off this topic. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

48: After Clause 6, insert the following new Clause—
“Child cruelty offences: notification and offender management requirements(1) A person (“relevant offender”) is subject to the notification requirements of subsections (2) and (3) for the period set out in subsection (4) if the relevant offender is convicted of an offence listed in subsection (6).(2) A relevant offender must notify to the police within the three days of the time of their conviction or their release from custody, and annually thereafter, providing —(a) the relevant offender’s date of birth,(b) their national insurance number,(c) their name on the notification date and, where using one or more other names on that date, each of those names,(d) their place of residence on the date of notification,(e) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which, at the time the notification is given, they regularly reside or stay, and(f) any information that may be prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State.(3) A relevant offender must notify to the police, within the period of three days beginning with the event occurring, about—(a) their use of a name which has not been notified to the police under subsection (2), (b) a change to their place or residence, and(c) any other prescribed change of circumstances as defined in regulations made under this section.(4) The dates of discharge from notification requirements under this section are the same as those set out in Section 88B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.(5) The information required by subsections (2) and (3), once received, must be—(a) monitored regularly by the police and probation service, and(b) retained for the purposes of offender management.(6) The relevant offences are—(a) causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult, or allowing them to suffer serious harm (section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004),(b) child cruelty, neglect and violence (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933),(c) infanticide (section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938),(d) exposing children whereby life is endangered (section 27 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861),(e) an offence under sections 4, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 or 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1860, if the victim is under the age of 16,(f) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—(i) female genital mutilation (section 1),(ii) assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia (section 2),(iii) assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia (section 3), and(g) cruelty to children (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933).”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would create notification requirements for people convicted of child cruelty, analogous to the Sex Offenders Register. Their information and personal details would be kept on record by the police for the purposes of offender management, with the aim of reducing the risk to children from future offences.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 48 seeks to establish a notification and offender management requirement clause for criminals convicted of child cruelty offences. For convicted child sex offenders, there already exist notification requirements, whereby those who have abused vulnerable and dependent children in the worst possible way must notify the police of their home address and other relevant details following their release from prison.

I know that the sex offender register is not a perfect system and that monitoring former convicts does not mean that we can control their every action, but it does act as a safeguard. It provides the police with the oversight needed to manage offenders and reduce the risk to victims, and it means that those who commit sex offences cannot just disappear back into the community. There is evidence that it is working, with sex offender reoffending rates having decreased in the past 15 years. Given that overall sexual offences have increased nearly fourfold over that same period, a decrease in reoffences does suggest that this part of the justice system is working. It is reasonable to argue that mandating the keeping of an offender register will have had some part to play in that reduction in the case of those offences.

It is unfortunate that similar provisions do not exist for those convicted of child cruelty offences. The offence is in a sense different, but the principle is largely similar. Child cruelty, like child sexual offences, is heinous, life-altering abuse to some of the most vulnerable members of our society. The only difference at present is that, once released, those guilty of such cruelty offences are not managed once their sentence and probation is over. A person can commit these horrific crimes—causing or allowing the death of a child, neglect and violence to a child or even female genital mutilation in some cases—and, once they have served a period of imprisonment, they are free to slip back into the community unnoticed. There is no centralised way for the police to know who these people are and where they are living.

This is all the more an issue given the fact that, in the majority of child cruelty cases, the offender very often has had parental responsibility for the victim. This means that they will often have connections to the child’s current guardian and in many cases to other family members with connections to the child. There is, therefore, the very heightened risk that they will be able to secure access to a child in these situations, yet there is no means of oversight or management of these people.

Amendment 48 seeks to correct this anomaly by introducing something analogous to the sex offender register. It would require those convicted of child cruelty offences to notify the police of their details following their release. They would need to share their home address, any other places of residence and any other name that they might choose to use. It would provide the police and probation services with the necessary information to identify individuals who might continue to pose a threat within a family community. It would give child victims some additional safeguard from the risk posed by such convicted offenders. It would also act as a deterrent to these offenders, just as entry in the child sex offenders register has done.

The child protection system should exist to save children from abusive circumstances and give them a measure of safety. This simple step of introducing a register would allow some additional protection for these victims and ensure a greater public awareness of the risks that such convicted persons would pose. I beg to move.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for raising this matter. I pay tribute to Helen Grant MP and her constituent, Paula Hudgell. They have campaigned tirelessly and movingly on this important issue. Earlier this week, the Deputy Prime Minister had the great honour of meeting Paula and Helen to hear the Hudgells’ story and learn more about their campaign. This Government are taking decisive action to protect our children from those who would commit abhorrent crimes against them.

Currently, under Sarah’s law, the police can and do proactively disclose information regarding offenders to members of the public when they believe that a child is at risk of serious harm. For example, if the police become aware of an adult who has ever had a conviction, caution or charge for child abuse having unsupervised access to a child, the police can and will disclose this to the person best able to protect that child—usually their parent, carer or guardian. Sarah’s law also enables members of the public to make an application to the police for this information if they are worried about child protection.

In the Crime and Policing Bill, this Government are going further. We are strengthening Sarah’s law by placing it on a statutory footing. The clauses in that Bill will mean that chief police officers will have a statutory duty to follow the Secretary of State’s guidance on Sarah’s law. In practice, this will reinforce the police’s responsibility to make disclosures whenever that is necessary to protect children. We have also committed over £2 billion to support the roll out of the families first partnership programme to improve the early identification of risks to children and to take appropriate action.

The Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill will establish multi-agency child protection teams in every area. Additionally, we are placing a new duty on safeguarding partners to include education and childcare settings in their multi-agency safeguarding arrangements. We want to ensure that every opportunity is taken to keep our children safe. We are not standing still on this issue. We are exploring the best way to close the gap that Paula has rightly identified. This is why I and Ministers in the Home Office have instructed our officials to explore options for tracking offenders and offences involving child cruelty. I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw this amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I thank the Minister. In the light of his undertaking that the Government are pursuing this matter—vigorously, I take it—and intending to produce something, whether they term it a register or otherwise, so that the police can not only disclose information but access information, which is a more critical element here, at this point I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 48 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

49: Clause 11, page 26, line 7, at end insert—
“(2) After paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 9 to the Sentencing Code insert—“(1A) The minimum number of days on which the offender may be instructed to participate in activities must be specified in the relevant order.”” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces the maximum-days requirement with a minimum number of days for rehabilitation activity requirements, ensuring that there is a minimum threshold of activity that offenders must complete.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, repeated reference has already been made to the independence of the judiciary and to the need to allow the judiciary full discretion in the matter of sentencing, but the provisions in the Bill at Clauses 11 and 12 erode these principles and put the whole issue at risk. The requirements in these clauses will remove a degree of judicial discretion, transferring certain sentencing powers from the courts to the Probation Service, and ultimately, of course, to the Government.

We on these Benches believe that the judiciary, who are specifically trained and appointed, and not probation officers, are best equipped to make decisions on sentencing. Clause 11, as drafted, removes the requirement to specify the maximum number of activity days to be undertaken as part of a community order or a suspended sentence order. The Government’s intention appears to be to create flexibility for probation services, so that they can gauge and tailor the number of days that offenders must complete.

Of course, we appreciate that, at present, there is a discrepancy between the maximum days of activity ordered by the courts and the number completed in reality. But nowhere in the Bill does there appear to be, once the initial sentence order and length are passed, judicial oversight of the number of days that probation officers may then set; nor does there appear to be any minimum threshold or expectation of participation specified in the Bill.

Putting this conferral of sentencing power on to the Probation Service creates an obvious misalignment of, among other things, incentives. Overworked probation officers, already contending with quite unmanageable case loads, are liable to be motivated not only by what is right for rehabilitation and public safety but by what is administratively possible. The unavoidable consequence is that the number of activity days ordered will be determined by capacity pressures within the Probation Service rather than by the rehabilitation requirements of individual offenders. The clause, as currently drafted, could enable an offender to engage in little or no meaningful rehabilitative activity whatever. Such an outcome would, of course, be a betrayal of victims and simply an illusion of justice.

On the other hand, the judiciary are trained and entrusted to assess evidence, consider proportionality, and understand risk and the need to balance public protection with rehabilitations. It is in these circumstances that we give notice of our intention to oppose Clauses 11 and 12 standing part of the Bill.

Amendments 49 and 50 seek to remedy the issue of probation officers operating in a quasi-judicial capacity. Amendment 49 would ensure that the court specifies a minimum number of days required under probation activity requirement. This would mean that, rather than setting a maximum threshold, which is seldom met in practice, there would be no ambiguity for officers or offenders over the number of days that must be completed. This is a simple and practical proposal that has the effect of dealing with the impact of Clauses 11 and 12.

Amendment 50 would clarify in statute that, where activity days are to be set for offenders, the number of days must always be set by the court itself. Without these amendments, decisions relating to punishment will, effectively, be delegated from the court to the Probation Service, rather than being determined at the point of sentence by the judiciary, and we believe it is essential that it should remain in the hands of the judiciary.

I turn briefly to Amendments 125 and 126, which concern early termination of community orders and suspended sentences. These amendments would provide that a court may not terminate such orders early, unless a specified minimum proportion of rehabilitation days has actually been completed. This would prevent the unacceptable scenario in which an offender could be released from requirements without having undertaken the substance of the sentence that was originally imposed.

Again, at present, there are no checks or balances under the Bill to ensure that this is not the case. These amendments would ensure proper accountability and preserve the authority of the sentencing decisions made by the court, and they would also provide probation officers with a degree of flexibility. I hope that the Government recognise the constructive nature of these amendments.

We all recognise the intense pressure under which prisons and probation services currently operate, but the response to systemic problems cannot be to weaken judicial powers or diminish meaningful sentencing. Offenders must not be permitted to slip through the cracks in a system that is stretched to its limits. It is our duty in Parliament to reinforce judicial authority, not to erode it. It is for these reasons that I urge the Government to reconsider the implications of Clauses 11 and 12, and to recognise the importance of the amendments that have been tabled. Judicial sentencing power must remain with the courts, and I hope that the Government will listen to these concerns and engage constructively on this issue.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, has raised an interesting and very debatable question, which is what the role of the judiciary should be in allotting rehabilitation time and activity and what the role of the probation officer can reasonably be. In theory, I should be with him, because I am always anxious to protect the independence and autonomy of the judiciary, but I look at our court system, and what is feasible, and I look at the detailed work that would be necessary, which probation officers are trained and equipped for—not necessarily resources-equipped but equipped in terms of their training—and I am unconvinced that it would be a good idea to move away from what Clause 11 and 12 do towards a larger role for the judiciary.

I say that having gone, decades ago, to look at the court system in Texas, as the Minister himself has done more recently, and having seen proactive courts, with the judge handing out details of rehabilitation requirements and looking at people as individuals, and the applause ringing around the court when the judge commended the offender who had fulfilled the requirement, and the sight of one offender who had not fulfilled the requirement being taken away by the state marshal.

The whole set-up was very interesting, but very difficult to graft into our system without enlarging the judiciary substantially, giving it time to do this kind of thing. We are probably better to build on the foundation of the Probation Service, despite the fact that it went through such a terrible time with the privatisation process and is still well below the level it needs to be in terms of numbers and training. The Bill provides a more reliable route, even though my instinct is to be on the side of protecting the autonomy of the judiciary. This is a job that probation officers are probably in a better position to do than our hard-pressed judiciary.

--- Later in debate ---

With that in mind, I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment. We can, however, return to this on Report if he is still not content with my response. I am also happy to talk to him before then if he would find it helpful.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his answer and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for his contribution. I fear that the Minister is not properly distinguishing between issues of rehabilitation and issues of sentencing. There is a matter of principle that has to be addressed in this context, and there is a risk that the Bill in its present form will turn sentencing into some form of administrative exercise performed by the Probation Service rather than by the court.

I believe we will have to return to this on Report, but I look forward to discussing the matter further with the Minister. At this time, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 49 withdrawn.

Separation Centres: Terrorist Offenders

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, we are told that the independent review into separation centres’ operation, following the attack at His Majesty’s Prison Frankland, has been completed but remains unpublished. Given that the continued non-disclosure of its findings undermines transparency and accountability, will the Minister tell us why the review has not been published and when it will be published? Could he also explain what interim changes have already been made to the regime to ensure that vulnerable staff and other prisoners are not exposed to unacceptable risks in the meantime?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

The Government are carefully considering the findings of Jonathan Hall KC’s independent review into the operation of separation centres, which was commissioned following the dreadful attack at HMP Frankland in April. We will publish Mr Hall’s report and our response in due course—I would add imminently. On the regimes in our separation centres, Members of your Lordships’ House will be pleased to know that I have been to see the centre at HMP Frankland to meet a number of the staff, who are incredibly brave and professional public servants. We are making a number of operational improvements to improve their safety as well.