Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

My point is not that all these things would happen; it is not even that most of them would happen, but some of them might. Then think of all the ideas I have not had, which local people will. This is always the way in which the private sector second-guesses and outperforms politicians. There are all sorts of things that may happen if we give people the opportunity, but none of these things can happen if we deny people the right to return.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

This is all very fascinating. I hope we get back to Heligoland soon, and maybe the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, but I have to ask the noble Lord: where was he when his Government decided that the straightforward thing to do was to go for the cession of sovereignty?

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I was a Member of the European Parliament, and I spoke out quite strongly against that Government. I hope the noble Lord knows me well enough to know that I was never a party line man. I thought it was an appalling thing to do then, and I still think it is an appalling thing to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

It is clear that the Chinese interests—and indeed those of other countries, which I think goes to the heart of why we are seeing this as a key strategic point of view—go beyond simply trying to create trading relationships. We know that Mauritius has around 1.3 million people, much smaller than even my own beloved Northern Ireland—but President Xi is not beating down the doors for a state visit to Belfast any time soon, as far as I am aware. Whether it is China, India or anyone else, whatever the assurances that are there, what are the practical implications and what can we do to assure ourselves that there will not be a level of mission creep?

I will continue very briefly, as I suppose time is moving on. Amendments 61 and 62 probe the position as regards airspace and maritime assurances. Again, this has been sold particularly on the basis of it being not simply the British position but the US position, so I think we need to see some level of joint assurance in relation to that. There has been a concern—and some level of suspicion, which I seek assurances that the Government can allay—that the position of the Americans has been effectively to go along with this treaty. There was, I think, a level of reluctance. It was reported initially that the Americans had given a level of lip service. I think we want to get a much greater level of reassurance that they have bought into this, rather than simply acquiescing with something that one of their allies has asked for. Specifically, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, there are some restrictions in terms of notification that seem to undermine the security implications.

For instance, if we look at the airspace side of things, there is a 12-mile zone around Diego Garcia, but airspace around the rest of the Chagos Islands is simply with Mauritius. On a maritime basis, we know that the treaty details that the archipelago waters, the territorial seas and the EEZ around the Chagos Islands are all within the control of Mauritius. Where there can be a level of restriction or interference on airspace or maritime boundaries, that can also create a concern. We seek assurances from government that what is being proposed—and this is a question of belt and braces—is actually going to provide the genuine level of defence. If so much else is potentially being sacrificed to bring about this deal, we need to make sure that we have something that is ironclad as regards our defences.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

It is probably best to let the Americans be the judge of their own best interests. They seem to be rather keen on this treaty and its ratification. The Secretary of State in Washington, who is also currently head of the National Security Council, called its conclusion a “monumental achievement”. He does not seem to be concerned that it might open the road to Chinese influence; nor do the Indians, who are, of course, close friends of the Mauritians and are as concerned as we and the Americans are about Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. The treaty is seen as a barrier to that, not an opening to it.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

Of course, the noble Lord knows better than anyone that Governments do each other favours in these situations, and Heads of Government will sometimes say, “I need you to say the following”, but I am pretty sure the Secretary of State said at the beginning that he was extremely worried by what he described as a serious threat to our national security when the deal was first put forward.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I am not sure what remarks the noble Lord is referring to. I am talking about the position taken by the current Administration of the United States.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I appreciate what the noble Lord has said in relation to the response in the public sphere by the American Government. Whatever one’s views—and there will be a range of views towards the current American Government across this Chamber—it is a fair accusation that they occasionally lapse into a certain level of hyperbole. It is either the greatest thing that has ever happened or the worst disaster. We should not necessarily take an enthusiastic apparent public endorsement as something being a great thing from the Secretary of State or the current President as a full reassurance of the American position.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I think it is probably best to take what they say at face value. They probably mean what they say.

I will now attempt to address the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and surprise her by saying that I think they are extremely sensible. I understand the thinking behind them. I understand her concerns that are encapsulated in Amendments 83 and 85 to 87, but I think the amendments are probably unnecessary. I suspect that the statements the noble Baroness is calling for could be made today. I suspect that we will hear them before the debates on this Bill are over, but it seems to me important that we should hear them, so I understand what the noble Baroness is saying.

I would like briefly to refer to the consistent and cogent arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, for a sovereign base area solution rather than the solution that is written into the treaty. I do not know why the last Government looked at it but decided not to pursue it. I do not know what the reasons were. They were probably, I would guess, topographical—we are talking about a very large area, rather than the two restricted areas on Cyprus—but I do not know, and I think it is a valid question to ask.

The big point, surely, is that we are where we are. We have a treaty, and we cannot ratify it until we pass this Bill. That is why I disagree strongly with the four amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell. He comes straight out and says that he wants renegotiation. He wants the treaty renegotiated in four separate respects, but we are where we are. The treaty exists. If we were to decide to reopen the negotiation, I think we could expect a rather hostile reaction in the United States. The principal concern of the United States is security of tenure and the continuing co-operation of third countries over supply chains. That is what they are concerned about—not our blue eyes but security of tenure of the base. Given that, some in Washington would argue that it is time for the United States to switch sides, to ditch us and do a direct deal with the Mauritians. That argument has been made in Washington and could be made again if we get ourselves into such a mess that, having secured a treaty that the Conservative Government sought and the Labour Government have concluded, we were to decide, after all, that it was not a treaty we wanted and that we wanted to go back to the start and negotiate something different. I can imagine the United States losing patience with us.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I know that the noble Lord speaks with great insight but the whole point of the amendments, with which I agree—that is why I back my noble friend Lady Goldie in particular—is on the specific issue of security. Yes, as I have said on the Floor of the House before, there were 11 rounds of negotiation but, at the end of them, agreement could not be reached because—I speak from my own insight and experience—back in 2019, that element of security was not assured. When I returned to London, I asked Boris Johnson directly, in good faith—I was not the OTs Minister but I had a good rapport with the then Prime Minister—and he could not give me that assurance. That is what I have pressed for throughout the passage of the Bill.

It has come up repeatedly that there were 11 rounds of negotiations. I have spent a lot of time in business and, as the noble Lord knows, in government. When you are looking for a negotiation and seeking to agree something, the fact that there were 11 rounds would suggest—I know this for a fact—that that agreement could not be reached.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I respect what the noble Lord says and he knows what he is talking about. I also respect what the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, asked for in requesting four statements. We should be asking for statements rather than changes to the text of a treaty. We voted in July for the ratification of this treaty; we cannot ratify the treaty until we pass this Bill, and we should pass the Bill.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to my Amendment 54. I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I think we are all pleased that we are where we are. It seems very strange to say that we cannot be discussing the Bill—that was almost the way it was put.

My amendment really follows on a little from what the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, talked about. During Committee in another place, concerns were expressed that other countries may seek to lease individual Chagos Islands and reference was made to reports that India and China were in consultation with the Republic of Mauritius. At that time, the Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the honourable Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, responded robustly. He stated:

“I want to say on that point that this is absolute nonsense. Is the shadow Minister willing to provide any evidence that that is going to take place? This treaty protects the security of the outer islands and expressly prohibits foreign forces building bases on them—something on which her Government did not succeed in their negotiations”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/25; col. 686.]


What is this great protection to which he referred?

Noble Lords will find that in paragraph 3 of the first annex to the Mauritius treaty. It states:

“In accordance with this Agreement, in respect of the Chagos Archipelago beyond Diego Garcia, Mauritius agrees”—


this is point d—that,

“except in circumstances of necessity for a response to a humanitarian emergency or natural disaster in instances where the United Kingdom or the United States of America is unable or unwilling to provide such a response, Mauritius and the United Kingdom shall jointly decide on authorisations permitting the presence of non-United Kingdom, non-United States or non-Mauritian security forces, either civilian or military”.

I cannot see anything there to validate the Minister’s assertion that the treaty

“expressly prohibits”

foreign forces building bases on the islands. What it says is that they cannot do so without the agreement of the UK Government.

For me, this presents two real concerns. First, and most importantly, there is nothing in the treaty to provide any kind of safeguard in relation to the leasing of islands for purposes other than security and defence. This would leave the door wide open for other countries to seek to lease the islands, ostensibly for purposes other than security and defence. The argument made by the Minister in the other place was that the suggestion that there was a problem was nonsense. It seems to me to be very well founded. The extraordinary thing about these provisions is the fact that they relate to islands of immense geostrategic importance, yet the protections in relation to them are effectively non-existent. That seems very complacent to me.

There is nothing to prevent a hostile country leasing an island and either combining security and defence purposes with others, in the hope of hiding the former, or on beginning with non-security and defence purposes and then changing over to them. Can the Minister tell me how that could be prevented? What would happen if an island is leased for non-security and defence purposes, yet it subsequently becomes apparent that it is being used for those purposes and that the country has dug in well and has no intention of relinquishing the islands? How could they be dislodged? Would the Minister here like to respond on that? I found the suggestion from that Minister in the Commons that there are no presenting difficulties quite alarming. It suggested a certain otherworldliness with a high degree of disconnection from political reality.

Secondly, the other difficulty is the completely opaque nature of the protection that is provided and the lack of parliamentary scrutiny. At the moment, we would have no knowledge about when or if approaches were made by the Republic of Mauritius to seek UK agreement for other countries to use other islands, and we need to know that. My Amendment 54 would address this concern by requiring the Minister to develop regulations stating that before the UK can agree to a proposal from the Republic of Mauritius—made under Annex 1(3)(d) of the treaty—that any island other than Diego Garcia be used for security and defence purposes by another country, that proposal must be brought to Parliament and endorsed by a vote of both Houses. Will the Minister give me a reason why that should not happen?

In ending, I will ask at this stage about the point made in the debate on the fourth group about whether the Government were asked to give their consent before the deal between Mauritius and India was done. I am not sure that we got a response to that. It was going to give India a defence presence. I would really like to know how long the Government knew before that happened. Did they know and when did they agree to it?