Sentencing Bill

Lord Lemos Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Lemos]

54: Clause 18, page 36, line 18, at end insert—
“(2A) As soon as practicable after receiving a business plan submitted under subsection (1), the Lord Chancellor must consider the plan and decide whether to approve it.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Lord Chancellor to respond as soon as practicable to the Sentencing Council’s request for approval of the Council’s business plan for a financial year.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 54 in the name of my noble friend the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Timpson. I begin by thanking noble Lords for their careful and detailed scrutiny of Clauses 18 and 19. I and my noble friend the Minister are particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Keen, Lord Thomas and Lord Burnett, for their further engagement in the meetings we have had since Committee.

In Committee, I promised your Lordships that the Government would reflect carefully on our current approach. Amendments 54 to 57, in the name of my noble friend the Minister, are the product of those considerations and reconsiderations. I must first note for the record that we shared the amendments in draft with the Lady Chief Justice and the Sentencing Council before tabling. I stress that, in keeping with convention, they were not invited to express a view on the merits of our proposed approach, nor did they do so.

The Government remain of the view that providing for approval of the Sentencing Council’s business plans and guidelines is the best way of maintaining public confidence in the council and its work. That said, we recognise that it would help to clarify what is expected from the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice when considering any requests from the council. Our amendments seek to add important safeguards to both processes and to increase their transparency. We are particularly grateful to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee for the recommendation concerning Clause 18, which has informed and inspired the Government’s approach through these amendments.

I first turn to the concerns raised about the consequences for the council if the Lord Chancellor were to reject a request to approve a proposed business plan. As I explained in Committee, Clause 18 provides the Lord Chancellor with the opportunity to review a business plan before it is finalised. This ensures that the council has appropriately considered priorities from the Government and Parliament in developing the business plan. This should help to give the council a greater understanding of the Lord Chancellor’s priorities and help minimise the risk of disagreement later on during guideline development. If the Lord Chancellor decided not to approve a business plan, Amendment 55 requires them to notify the council and, as soon as practicable, lay a document before Parliament stating their reasons for that decision. Amendments 56 and 57 make similar provision in respect of sentencing guidelines.

Taken together, the Government’s amendments will ensure that any reasons for rejecting a business plan or guideline are publicly available and drawn to the attention of Parliament. This is an important commitment to accountability that will increase the transparency of both approval processes. Since this is a point that was raised in Committee, I confirm that nothing in this clause is intended to prevent the council from carrying out its statutory functions in the event that a business plan was to be questioned or rejected.

I will now address the concerns arising from Clause 19’s requirement that the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice must each individually approve definitive sentencing guidelines before the council can publish them. We want to make it clear in the Bill that a very high bar must be met for any guidelines to be rejected.

Amendments 56 and 57 therefore provide that guidelines can be rejected only in instances necessary to maintain public confidence in the justice system. Our intention is that a rejection will occur in only very rare cases, when it is truly necessary to maintain public confidence in the justice system; it is absolutely not our intention for guidelines to be rejected arbitrarily. It is with that in mind that we have put these safeguards in place.

I hope noble Lords will recognise that this approach represents a significant constraint on any involvement in the guidelines and will help safeguard against guidelines being rejected without proper justification. By requiring approval from both the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice, it is the Government’s intention for there to be close collaboration between the two on any approval requests from the council. In drafting this measure, we have also had regard to their existing joint responsibilities for the council, including, for example, the appointment of its members. We are keen to ensure parity between them in respect of the approval of guidelines.

Finally, we are also keen to provide assurance that the council’s work will not be subject to unnecessary delays, which, again, was a concern raised in Committee. Through Amendments 54, 56 and 57, we therefore propose that any approval requests from the council are to be considered by the Lord Chancellor and, in the case of the guidelines, the Lady Chief Justice, as soon as practicable.

I stress that we remain very grateful to the council for its continued work in bringing greater consistency, transparency and public understanding to the sentencing process. We look forward, from the Government’s perspective, to working closely with the council in the months ahead. I beg to move.

[Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)]

My Lords, your Lordships may recollect that, in Committee, I supported an amendment which would have removed Clause 18 from the Bill altogether. While also suggesting that Clause 19 would be best removed, I laid an amendment to the effect that a guideline could be prevented from being issued only if both the Lady Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor agreed that that should happen.

I am grateful to both the noble Lords, Lord Lemos and Lord Timpson, for the time and trouble they have taken in discussions, which have included me and my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I am also particularly relieved that the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, explained in the all-Peers letter that went round—forgive me, I do not remember the precise date before Christmas—which drew attention to the fact that both the Sentencing Council and the Lady Chief Justice had been engaged in these amendments, that that should not be taken in any way as suggesting that either are happy with them or supported them.

Indeed, on 25 November, the Lady Chief Justice appeared before the Justice Committee of the House of Commons and explained that the clauses that we are concerned with do not sit easily with the independence of the Sentencing Council. She explained that there were no conceivable circumstances in which the Lady Chief Justice or Lord Chief Justice would seek to exercise the veto. She also made the important point that the mood of the Sentencing Council is “pretty bleak” because of the uncertainty hanging over its head. That was particularly important, as she explained, because the Sentencing Council is due to be very busy revising sentencing guidelines, which will be necessary as a result of the contents of this Bill, particularly because of the reduction in the use of suspended sentences. It will also be busy if the proposals that the Government have foreshadowed—to increase the sentencing powers of magistrates—come to be enacted, because, again, guidelines will have to be changed to reflect that. None the less, as I have said, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, agreed in Committee to consider these matters further and I am particularly grateful for the care with which he and the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, have treated my concerns.

I regret that His Majesty’s Government were not able to accept the amendments that I laid in Committee, because these clauses remain unfortunate, to put it as mildly as I can. Clause 18, requiring a business plan to be approved by the Lord Chancellor, might be thought to serve no obvious purpose, save to empower the Lord Chancellor to exert some pressure on the Sentencing Council. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, just explained to the House, that pressure will have no statutory effect. That is because the Government have just now accepted that the Sentencing Council would still be obliged to carry out the positive statutory duties laid on it by statute, and to exercise the discretionary powers conferred on it by statute. But if the Lord Chancellor is to exert pressure—pressure which, in my respectful opinion, continues to be inconsistent with the independence of the Sentencing Council—he must at least do so as soon as practicable and explain himself, which are both positive steps.

Clause 19 as now proposed to be amended remains—this should not be sugar-coated—a potential executive veto. That veto too, if it is to come, must now come as soon as practicable, and the grounds on which it can be exercised have been identified. I recognise that that is an improvement, if perhaps only a slight one, on the original drafting.

As the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, explained, there is perhaps a hope—and, indeed, an expectation—within the Government that these powers will never be used in a way which brings conflict between the Government and the Sentencing Council, and between the Government and the Lady Chief Justice. But it is important, when conferring powers, to contemplate how they might be used by others who perhaps are not so benign in their attitudes as the current Government and Lord Chancellor.

It seems that the Government have laid the foundations for what could be the destruction of the Sentencing Council through executive interference. Were such interference to occur, I fear that the Sentencing Council would cease to function for the simple reason that all its members—all fiercely independent—would leave.

I concluded that there would be no purpose in relaying my amendments. I am grateful to both Ministers for the tentative steps that have been taken to ameliorate the impact of these clauses, and for that reason I support them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the Ministers for their engagement on this issue. However, we should bear in mind that our statutory provisions are designed to address powers and not intentions. It is certainly questionable whether we should be enacting provisions which we consider will never be used. They are on the statute book and they are available for use.

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, for outlining the issues here. The language he used was indicative of the reservations we all have with regard to this course of action: “unfortunate”, “inconsistent” and “a slight improvement”. It is not a ringing endorsement of anyone’s legislation.

The Government’s stance on the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary remains demonstrably unclear and uncertain. On the one hand, they repeat that sentencing is a matter for our independent judiciary—I quote the Ministers. We did not support the original Clauses 18 and 19 as drafted, but nor do we support these amendments, as they appear to simply illustrate the Government’s internal inconsistency with regard to the Sentencing Council. These amendments simply add more confusion to the puzzled stance the Government have towards the Sentencing Council.

On Report, the Government have now implemented amendments to reduce the degree to which their own Bill reduces the Sentencing Council’s independence. But do the Government retain any idea of how independent they would like the Sentencing Council to be?

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to today’s debate. It is obviously a subject on which your Lordships have thought very carefully and deeply, so I appreciate those contributions and note them all with great significance.

However, I hope all noble Lords will agree that these proposed amendments at least reflect the seriousness with which we have taken concerns raised in Committee. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, acknowledged that. I also hope we have answered the important questions about how the provisions will operate in practice, which both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, again acknowledged.

We recognise that there is further detail to work through around how both these approval measures will work, and I am very grateful for the ongoing discussions between officials in the Ministry of Justice and in the Sentencing Council on these important considerations.

Amendment 54 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, has addressed what is clearly an anomaly in our sentencing policy that raises a clear issue of fairness, and we do not dissent from the principle that has been advanced with regard to that matter. Indeed, I acknowledge the thoughtful and careful way in which the matter has been addressed by all noble Lords. With regard to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I have nothing to say.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I will begin by addressing Amendment 63. I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, for raising this and for her work and expertise as a member of the Youth Justice Board and as a magistrate. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s long-standing interest and work in this area, including from this Dispatch Box.

Youth sentencing, as I think all noble Lords who have spoken know, is largely out of scope of this Bill. But I should say—and I am very happy to put it on the record, for myself and for my noble friend the Minister—that this amendment raises an issue with which we have a great deal of sympathy.

We recognise that, when a child turns 18, that can have a significant impact on the outcome of criminal justice proceedings, and that is, in a sense, the heart of the argument that the noble Baroness is making. A child who reaches the age of 18 before their first appearance will be tried and sentenced as an adult. However, sentencing guidelines state that, in such cases, the court should take as its starting point the sentence that would have applied at the time the offence was committed. That does not quite deal with some of the points that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby was making; I acknowledge that. They also state that the offender’s maturity, along with other relevant factors, should continue to be considered.

This amendment, however, would significantly alter the youth sentencing framework, and I note the careful way in which the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, asked for the Government’s response. If we were to accept these recommendations, the Government feel that there would be ramifications across the wider justice system. The youth sentencing framework has been specifically designed for children and there may well be unforeseen consequences, which we should think about carefully, of applying that framework to young adults. I am sure that your Lordships can appreciate that such a change requires thorough consideration beyond the confines of this Bill. So, although I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment at this stage, I hope she will take what I have said as some reassurance.

I now turn to Amendments 93 and 94. I would like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling them. I am afraid I am going to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Marks, as I probably did in Committee too, by restating that the Government already believe that existing mechanisms are sufficient to address perceived injustices.

Unduly lenient sentence reviews and criminal appeals are two routes by which cases can be reviewed. From 1 January to 8 December 2025, 933 sentences were considered by the Attorney-General’s Office as valid to be reviewed under the unduly lenient sentence scheme. The Government cannot support an amendment that puts more pressure on the justice system, which I think everyone in your Lordships’ House recognises is under considerable pressure, by requiring the courts to reconsider the sentences of those who apply. We do not believe this would be workable or sustainable, and we do not want to duplicate existing functions at a time when the system is under so much pressure.

As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, knows—we discussed this in Committee—we await the Law Commission’s report on criminal appeals, which is due later this year. Your Lordships’ House has my assurance that we will consider its findings with great care, especially those which relate to the important points made today. Once the report has been published, we will of course discuss it further. For the moment, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.