Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 14, after “months” insert “before any credit is given for a guilty plea”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences before credit is given for a guilty plea.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendments 1 and 27 concern the interaction between the presumption of suspended sentences in Clause 1 and the application of credit for a guilty plea at the first opportunity.

In Committee, I raised what I consider to be a straightforward but important point of drafting and of principle: whether the presumption for a suspended sentence is intended to apply to the sentence before or after credit is given for a guilty plea. The purpose of that amendment was to probe how widely the Government intend this presumption to operate. The Minister’s response in Committee confirmed that the presumption would apply after guilty plea credit had been awarded. That confirmation is important, as it means that the presumption of suspended sentences is not confined to offences attracting sentences of up to 12 months, as has been repeatedly suggested, but in practice extends to offences carrying a sentence of up to 18 months, which is of course beyond the sentencing provisions of the magistrates’ court and takes us into to the realm of what is generally regarded as serious crime.

The Minister opposed this amendment on the basis that it would create inconsistency. He argued that the presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea reduced a sentence to 12 months or less but could still apply where other forms of mitigation achieved the same effect. That objection, I say respectfully, misunderstands both the purpose and the effect of this amendment. The distinction between credit for a guilty plea and other forms of mitigation is deliberate and long established. Credit for a guilty plea is not mitigation in the ordinary sense. It is a structured formulaic reduction applied for a specific policy purpose: to encourage early admissions of guilt and spare victims the ordeal of trial. Indeed, Parliament and the Sentencing Council have always treated it separately.

This amendment seeks to ensure that the starting point for the court, whether an offence ordinarily attracts custody or suspension, is determined by the seriousness of the offence and not by a subsequent procedural discount. Without this amendment, Clause 1 operates in a way that the Government have never openly acknowledged. An offender facing a sentence of up to 18 months’ imprisonment can, by entering an early guilty plea, reduce that sentence by one-third and thereby bring himself within the automatic presumption of suspension. That is not a marginal effect but a substantial expansion of the scope of Clause 1. That is what I described in Committee as opening Pandora’s box.

Once the presumption is allowed to apply after a guilty plea credit, it ceases to be confined to genuinely low-level offending. Offences such as robbery, serious assault or the possession of knives—offences that Parliament and the public would reasonably expect to attract immediate custody—are surreptitiously drawn into the presumption, even though they can carry sentences of 15 months or more. If that is the Government’s intention, it should be stated plainly, but if, as Ministers have repeatedly suggested, the presumption is aimed only at genuinely short sentences of up to 12 months, this amendment is necessary to give effect to that stated policy.

We also heard a wider concern in Committee that I think was left unacknowledged: by allowing guilty plea credit to determine eligibility for suspension, the Bill risks creating perverse incentives. Offenders may come to believe that pleading guilty is not merely a matter of sentence reduction but a route to avoiding custody altogether, and that risks undermining public confidence in the justice system.

This amendment does not undermine the policy of encouraging guilty pleas, nor does it widen the scope of custody. It is a technical clarification designed to ensure that Clause 1 operates as the Government have publicly described it and not in a far broader and unintended manner. If the Minister cannot give us these assurances, I will seek to divide the House.

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[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

I start by setting out my appreciation for the support that the Government have received for Clause 1. Throughout the Bill’s passage, noble Lords have highlighted evidence showing that those given a community order or a suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. We are following the evidence to reduce crime, creating fewer victims and safer communities, and we are following the lead of the previous Conservative Government, who originally introduced this measure during the last Parliament without the amendment we are debating today. I am a great believer in working across the political spectrum to get the best policies that reduce reoffending. I have dedicated myself to solving this problem and creating a sustainable justice system. I strongly believe that the clause as drafted, without any further amendments, is the best policy, and I must repeat that we are not abolishing short sentences.

I can assure noble Lords that I have considered the issue of early guilty pleas, raised by Amendments 1 and 27, with great care. I have met the noble and learned Lord to discuss his concerns and I value the attention given to this issue, but it has long been the practice of the courts to give a reduction in sentence where a defendant pleads guilty. This avoids the need for a trial, enables cases to be dealt with quickly and shortens the gap between charge and sentence. The Government do not wish to disincentivise early guilty pleas, in part because of the urgent need to reduce the backlog in cases coming to court. Early guilty pleas can save victims and witnesses from concern about having to give evidence, which is particularly important in traumatic cases. These amendments risk reducing the incentive to plead guilty, potentially causing further avoidable trauma for victims, and they would create a clear and significant anomaly in sentencing.

For reasons of simplicity and coherence, it is the final sentence length given by the judge that must be relevant for the purposes of the presumption. Under these amendments, the presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea had brought the sentence down to 12 months or less, yet it could still apply where any other mitigation, such as age or being a primary carer, had the same effect. The inconsistency is stark. Two offenders receiving the same final sentence could be treated entirely differently, based solely on the type of mitigation applied. This is neither coherent nor fair.

Finally, the sunset clause proposed in Amendment 103 would introduce unnecessary instability. It would undermine public confidence and complicate operational planning for courts, prisons, probation services and local authorities. The last thing we need at the moment is instability in the justice system.

I am a firm believer in dealing with problems head-on and solving them for the long term. We inherited difficult decisions that needed to be made, but someone had to make them, because we simply cannot run out of cells. We are building 14,000 new ones, but that takes time. I came into this job to rebuild our criminal justice system to lead to fewer victims, not more. Clause 1 is a crucial means of achieving that, and undermining it through further exclusions is not the right way forward. There will be a long shadow over those who vote for amendments to put even more pressure on the prison system.

I hope that I have explained why the Government’s position is the right one and I hope for cross-party support for a truly cross-party policy. After all, this was originally a Conservative measure, reintroduced in this Bill by Labour and supported by the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Green Party in Committee in the Commons. I therefore kindly urge noble Lords not to support these amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I am obliged to the Minister for his observations. However, I have a number of points.

First, the apparent use of statistics comparing repeat offending by those who suffer a suspended sentence with those who are given a prison sentence is, potentially, very misleading. In general, repeat offenders will receive a sentence of imprisonment, whereas single offenders will often receive a suspended sentence. It is those who are inclined towards the repetition of criminal conduct who are imprisoned, and therefore the comparison made with these statistics is, potentially, highly misleading.

Secondly, I do not accept the reference to any other mitigation. The procedural mitigation—procedural discount, in reality—granted in respect of a guilty plea is not comparable. It was not in the past considered comparable with the other aspects of mitigation mentioned by the noble Lord.

The Government have repeatedly described this policy as targeting only genuinely short sentences. Sentences of more than 12 months are not genuinely short sentences; they are sentences that can be imposed only by the Crown Court. They are regarded as sentences applicable to serious criminal conduct; that is not the purpose of Clause 1 in its present form. The Government wrote in their own manifesto that the sentences criminals receive

“often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.

Allowing serious offenders to evade custody will do little to rebuild public confidence in the justice system. If the Government truly intend to suspend sentences of up to 18 months as a matter of policy, they should have plainly said so. If they do not, they should accept this amendment. In these circumstances, with some regret, I beg to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

25: Clause 1, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(i) the offender has been convicted of a sexual offence, within the meaning of section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, or (j) the offender has been convicted of an offence which constitutes domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment concerns an exemption to the presumption of suspended sentences for those convicted of sexual offences and domestic abuse. We listened carefully to the points raised by noble Lords in Committee. It was suggested then that our amendments were overly expansive, risked undermining the central objective of the Bill—to free up spaces in prison—and that we might constrain judicial discretion.

We have listened to, and taken into account, those concerns. The amendment before your Lordships today is far more tightly drawn. It does not seek to carve out a long list of offences, even though that might be our preferred position; nor does it attempt to undermine Clause 1’s central objective. Instead, it is narrowly focused on two categories of offending, where the case for custody, even for shorter sentences, is at its strongest: sexual offending and domestic abuse.

This amendment would preserve the presumption in favour of suspended sentences in the vast majority of cases, with exemptions only for sexual offences and domestic abuse. That seems proportionate and indeed, I would venture, necessary. Much of the debate in Committee rested on the assertion that short custodial sentences are ineffective or even counterproductive when judged solely by reoffending rates. Even if one accepts that the data paints a mixed picture, it is a mistake to treat sentencing policy as though it serves only one function. Prison is not simply about reoffending statistics; it serves other essential purposes: deterrence, public protection, the expression of society’s condemnation of serious wrongdoing, the maintenance of public confidence in the justice system and, crucially in cases such as these, the protection and reassurance of victims.

For victims of sexual assault or domestic abuse, the distinction between a custodial sentence and a suspended one is not an abstract policy question. It is the difference between knowing that their abuser has been removed from the community and knowing that they remain at liberty. This point is reinforced by the Government’s recent recognition of the scale of the problem. Violence against women and girls has been described as a national emergency, and a strategy announced to halve such violence within a decade, including the creation of specialist rape and sexual offence investigation teams in every police force by 2029. These measures, this Government note, will provide officers with the right training to understand the mindset of both abusers and victims, and ensure consistent investigation of sexual offences across the country.

Much has been made of the evidence on reoffending, but even the Government’s own publications urge caution on these. Official statistics emphasise that comparisons between custodial and non-custodial sentences do not control for differences in offender characteristics. Those receiving short custodial sentences, as I noted earlier, typically have far longer and more serious criminal histories than those given community or suspended sentences. The reality is not a simple dichotomy between bad short custodial sentences and good suspended sentences. Outcomes depend heavily on the risk posed by the offender and the need for immediate public protection. In cases of sexual offences and domestic abuse, those considerations weigh heavily in favour of custody. Nor should we overlook the deterrent effect of custody. While difficult to measure with precision, deterrence remains a central principle of sentencing. Removing custody from the toolkit for these offences was sending the wrong signal to offenders, and indeed to victims and the general public.

In Committee, it was also argued that carving out exceptions undermines judicial discretion. With respect, that argument sits uneasily with the structure of this Bill. The Bill already imposes a statutory presumption in favour of suspended sentences. This amendment simply ensures that, in the most serious and sensitive cases, Parliament does not compel courts to start from what I suggest is the wrong place. We believe this amendment is modest and targeted. It reflects a simple proposition that, for sexual offenders and domestic abusers, short custodial sentences continue to have a vital role to play. If the Minister cannot provide the appropriate assurances for this limited exception, then I will seek leave to divide the House.

[Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, and I wish to echo two points. The first is that it is so important to victims of sexual violence and domestic abuse that they do not fear that their abuser, the perpetrator of those crimes, is somehow automatically going to be back in their community. The reassurance that they would get from knowing that the custodial sentence is available is important to those victims.

The second point is, as my noble and learned friend has raised, the issue of the Government’s mission to halve violence against women and girls and the strategy for violence against women and girls that is being brought forward. May I gently suggest to the Minister that, if the Government are serious about that, then they should accept this amendment? If they do not accept it, then that suggests that they are not as serious about their intentions on violence against women and girls as they are claiming.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

While the Government understand the concern that underpins this amendment, we do not believe it is necessary. It was not included by the last Conservative Government when they originally introduced this measure. Let me be clear: we are not abolishing short sentences. Public protection is our main priority, and we will make sure that the most dangerous offenders are put where they belong: behind bars.

In response to the noble Baronesses, Lady May and Lady Fox, I recognise that prison sentences, even if short, can be critical to safeguarding victims of domestic abuse or VAWG. Courts will still have discretion to impose immediate custody in any case involving significant risk of physical or psychological harm to an individual—for example, to protect an at-risk domestic abuse victim. Courts will also have discretion to impose immediate custody in exceptional circumstances and where offenders breach court orders.

Through Committee stage amendments in the other place, we strengthened the wording in the Bill even further, so that there can be no doubt. Where offenders breach court orders, including VAWG-related protective orders, they can receive an immediate custodial sentence. For example, if someone breaches a domestic violence protection order—a civil breach rather than a criminal offence—and assaults their partner, the presumption would not apply and they could go straight to prison.

With thanks to the Liberal Democrats, and, importantly, the Member for Eastbourne in the other place, we are also introducing a new judicial finding of domestic abuse at sentencing, so these offenders are better identified and monitored throughout the system. This has been welcomed by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and, in this place, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks.

The noble and learned Lord clearly cares deeply about the experience of victims. But if this amendment were to pass, it would undermine the fundamental problem that this legislation will fix—the issue the previous Government neglected for 14 years. I urge the noble Lord and noble and learned Lord to withdraw this amendment, and to support the Government’s position.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about fault for the issue of prison capacity, staffing and resources will bring little comfort to the victims of sexual offences and domestic abuse. His reference to offences that attract a sentence of 12 months or less omits the point that, of course, Clause 1 in its present form would apply to offences attracting a sentence of 18 months or less, albeit there is then a discount for a guilty plea because of a procedural provision.

I am obliged to my noble friend Lady May and to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for their contributions. The fact is that sexual offending and domestic abuse are uniquely serious and harmful—that has been recognised by the present Government. They are characterised by repetition, coercion and control, and they have a profound victim impact. In such cases, custody serves functions that a suspended sentence cannot: protection of victims, reassurance, deterrence and public confidence. For sexual offences and domestic abuse, immediate public protection should take precedence over other considerations, including questions of prison capacity. That includes abstract arguments on rehabilitation and what is non-conclusive data regarding reoffending rates as between suspended sentences and prison sentences.

This Government have pledged in their manifesto to halve violence against women and girls. They are hardly proposing to go in that direction with the present form of Clause 1. It is not enough that there should be exceptional circumstances; the very essence of a sexual offence and of domestic abuse is an exceptional circumstance. The public recognise that, and this Government should recognise that. I seek leave to divide the House.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I acknowledge the positive contributions of all noble Lords to this debate. From these Benches we are supportive of the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, which focus on purposeful activity in custodial sentences and on ensuring that offenders have access to suitable education and training.

On defining the purpose of imprisonment, as proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, we welcome the recognition of rehabilitation as one of many purposes. At the same time, we note that the Bill addresses the objectives of sentencing and imprisonment far more generally and question whether it is necessary to place a statutory definition in the Bill.

We remain opposed to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to remove the court’s power to remand a person in custody for their own protection or, in the case of children or young people, for their welfare. As I observed in Committee, this power is tightly circumscribed and used only in rare but very real circumstances where it may be the only safe option available to the court. Removing that safeguard would potentially leave vulnerable individuals, including children, without protection at a time when they most need it. I take issue with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this very limited power involves some element of injustice.

I do not agree with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, albeit I recognise that he may have been somewhat surprised to find himself in this group with an issue regarding legal aid. Again, I acknowledge the important contributions from all noble Lords on this issue.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the removal of Clause 35 from the Bill. I completely appreciate the importance of unpaid work orders, and I completely appreciate that they can do a great deal of good. However, the idea that they would be the subject of what I called “naming and shaming” in Committee—whereby offenders carrying out such unpaid work would be photographed and their photographs would then be given publicity—seemed to us on these Benches to be potentially profoundly damaging to their rehabilitation and the important relationship of trust that needs to exist between probation officers and their clients. We think that for probation officers to carry out this photography and publication would be profoundly damaging. The Government have recognised the need to remove the clause, and I am very grateful that they have done so.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his engagement on the issue of whole life orders, and I acknowledge that the Government have now stepped forward with their own amendment to address the previous inconsistencies in the statutory provisions. In light of that, I will not press Amendment 62, which is rendered unnecessary by virtue of the Government’s amendment.

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[Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)]

My Lords, your Lordships may recollect that, in Committee, I supported an amendment which would have removed Clause 18 from the Bill altogether. While also suggesting that Clause 19 would be best removed, I laid an amendment to the effect that a guideline could be prevented from being issued only if both the Lady Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor agreed that that should happen.

I am grateful to both the noble Lords, Lord Lemos and Lord Timpson, for the time and trouble they have taken in discussions, which have included me and my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I am also particularly relieved that the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, explained in the all-Peers letter that went round—forgive me, I do not remember the precise date before Christmas—which drew attention to the fact that both the Sentencing Council and the Lady Chief Justice had been engaged in these amendments, that that should not be taken in any way as suggesting that either are happy with them or supported them.

Indeed, on 25 November, the Lady Chief Justice appeared before the Justice Committee of the House of Commons and explained that the clauses that we are concerned with do not sit easily with the independence of the Sentencing Council. She explained that there were no conceivable circumstances in which the Lady Chief Justice or Lord Chief Justice would seek to exercise the veto. She also made the important point that the mood of the Sentencing Council is “pretty bleak” because of the uncertainty hanging over its head. That was particularly important, as she explained, because the Sentencing Council is due to be very busy revising sentencing guidelines, which will be necessary as a result of the contents of this Bill, particularly because of the reduction in the use of suspended sentences. It will also be busy if the proposals that the Government have foreshadowed—to increase the sentencing powers of magistrates—come to be enacted, because, again, guidelines will have to be changed to reflect that. None the less, as I have said, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, agreed in Committee to consider these matters further and I am particularly grateful for the care with which he and the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, have treated my concerns.

I regret that His Majesty’s Government were not able to accept the amendments that I laid in Committee, because these clauses remain unfortunate, to put it as mildly as I can. Clause 18, requiring a business plan to be approved by the Lord Chancellor, might be thought to serve no obvious purpose, save to empower the Lord Chancellor to exert some pressure on the Sentencing Council. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, just explained to the House, that pressure will have no statutory effect. That is because the Government have just now accepted that the Sentencing Council would still be obliged to carry out the positive statutory duties laid on it by statute, and to exercise the discretionary powers conferred on it by statute. But if the Lord Chancellor is to exert pressure—pressure which, in my respectful opinion, continues to be inconsistent with the independence of the Sentencing Council—he must at least do so as soon as practicable and explain himself, which are both positive steps.

Clause 19 as now proposed to be amended remains—this should not be sugar-coated—a potential executive veto. That veto too, if it is to come, must now come as soon as practicable, and the grounds on which it can be exercised have been identified. I recognise that that is an improvement, if perhaps only a slight one, on the original drafting.

As the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, explained, there is perhaps a hope—and, indeed, an expectation—within the Government that these powers will never be used in a way which brings conflict between the Government and the Sentencing Council, and between the Government and the Lady Chief Justice. But it is important, when conferring powers, to contemplate how they might be used by others who perhaps are not so benign in their attitudes as the current Government and Lord Chancellor.

It seems that the Government have laid the foundations for what could be the destruction of the Sentencing Council through executive interference. Were such interference to occur, I fear that the Sentencing Council would cease to function for the simple reason that all its members—all fiercely independent—would leave.

I concluded that there would be no purpose in relaying my amendments. I am grateful to both Ministers for the tentative steps that have been taken to ameliorate the impact of these clauses, and for that reason I support them.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, it appears that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has decided that he will make some submission.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Well, that apparent position represents the truth.

First, I agree with—and in a sense have only very little to add to—the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett. Your Lordships will remember that I moved in Committee that both Clauses 18 and 19 should not stand part of the Bill.

That said, I join with the noble and learned Lord in thanking the noble Lords, Lord Timpson and Lord Lemos, for their engagement with us on some compromise position. I am not sure that this represents an entire compromise of their position, because I still feel that the Bill would be better off without these clauses. However, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, has explained that the intention is entirely benign. I share the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, that other Governments may not take such a benign view, but express the hope that that will not eventuate.

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[Viscount Eccles (Con)]

My Lords, I will make a very short intervention before my Front Bench replies. I believe we should remember that Farage, in more or less a chance remark, said he thought that the council should be abolished. So, the issues raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, are very important, and I very much admire the detailed presentation he made to your Lordships’ House on these clauses.

I am grateful for what I would regard as the rescue mission on which the Government have gone to make the best of a bad job. Certainly, the hare that was run in March last year, to which the Government made their reply, was a very unfortunate hare. It was something to do with two-tier justice. It would have been better to let that hare run. Hares run in circuits: they come back to where they started and, very often, everything settles down. Instead of that, we have had to have some very careful work done to get us to where we are.

All over the House, we will be grateful that the Sentencing Council has in effect received a vote of confidence. We were looking for that and we are very grateful that it has happened. But we should not forget the rather troubled way in which the two parties that have the greatest experience of government and the implementation of policy got themselves into a tangle quite unnecessarily.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the Ministers for their engagement on this issue. However, we should bear in mind that our statutory provisions are designed to address powers and not intentions. It is certainly questionable whether we should be enacting provisions which we consider will never be used. They are on the statute book and they are available for use.

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, for outlining the issues here. The language he used was indicative of the reservations we all have with regard to this course of action: “unfortunate”, “inconsistent” and “a slight improvement”. It is not a ringing endorsement of anyone’s legislation.

The Government’s stance on the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary remains demonstrably unclear and uncertain. On the one hand, they repeat that sentencing is a matter for our independent judiciary—I quote the Ministers. We did not support the original Clauses 18 and 19 as drafted, but nor do we support these amendments, as they appear to simply illustrate the Government’s internal inconsistency with regard to the Sentencing Council. These amendments simply add more confusion to the puzzled stance the Government have towards the Sentencing Council.

On Report, the Government have now implemented amendments to reduce the degree to which their own Bill reduces the Sentencing Council’s independence. But do the Government retain any idea of how independent they would like the Sentencing Council to be?

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to today’s debate. It is obviously a subject on which your Lordships have thought very carefully and deeply, so I appreciate those contributions and note them all with great significance.

However, I hope all noble Lords will agree that these proposed amendments at least reflect the seriousness with which we have taken concerns raised in Committee. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, acknowledged that. I also hope we have answered the important questions about how the provisions will operate in practice, which both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, again acknowledged.

We recognise that there is further detail to work through around how both these approval measures will work, and I am very grateful for the ongoing discussions between officials in the Ministry of Justice and in the Sentencing Council on these important considerations.

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[Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 97 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, to which I have added my name. The case for devolving prisons and probation to Wales has already been eloquently made by him, so I will confine my remarks to three points.

First, prison policy in England and Wales continues to be developed largely through an English lens, with insufficient recognition of the realities in Wales. Many of the services on which effective sentencing depends—health, housing and substance misuse support—are devolved. This creates a fragmented system, which is most sharply felt at the point of release. Release from custody is precisely where reserved and devolved responsibilities collide. The number of people released into homelessness from Welsh prisons rose by 34% in 2024-25. Probation staff themselves warn that, without major reform and investment, the ambitions of the Bill cannot be delivered. Can the Minister say how His Majesty’s Government intend to manage this persistent jagged edge between reserved and devolved responsibilities?

Secondly, Wales has no women’s prison, which means that Welsh women are routinely sent to serve short sentences in England, most for under 12 months. At the same time, Wales has one of the highest imprisonment rates in western Europe, while a significant proportion of those held in Welsh prisons are from England. Against that backdrop, plans to expand capacity at HMP Parc have been approved, despite serious concerns about safety. So, my additional question is: how do His Majesty’s Government justify expanding prison capacity in Wales without addressing the systematic issue of Welsh women being imprisoned far away from their families and support networks, or aligning responsibility for the devolved services on which it depends?

Thirdly, Welsh-speaking prisoners continue to report neglect of their language rights. Were prisons in Wales accountable to the Senedd, stronger Welsh-language duties would apply. Can the Minister explain how the current arrangements adequately protect the use of the Welsh language within prisons in Wales?

To close, with a Senedd election imminent, as already mentioned, clarity from His Majesty’s Government is essential. So, for the avoidance of doubt, can the Minister tell the House whether it is the policy of His Majesty’s Government to oppose the full devolution of prisons and probation to Wales in principle, or whether they are willing to establish a structured process with the Welsh Government to consider how the devolution could be achieved?

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 58, which introduces an annual report on prison capacity. This is an issue that we pressed in Committee and I am grateful to the Government for having listened and for bringing forward this amendment. The amendment places a clear duty on the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the number of people in custody, the number of available prison places, and projected changes. That is a welcome and important step. If Parliament is being asked to legislate for significant changes to sentencing and release policy, it is only right that we are also given a regular and transparent account of the state of the prison estate that underpins those decisions.

Ideally, we would have liked this report to go further. There is a strong case for including more detailed information on the drivers between sentencing policy, probation capacity and reoffending. However, I recognise that the Government face a balancing act between the need for transparency and the administrative constraints on producing such reports, and I accept that the amendment strikes a reasonable and proportionate compromise.

On Amendment 92 and the issue of the child cruelty register, again I thank the Government for their ongoing communication on this important topic and their assurances that they would like to implement a policy in support of a child cruelty register. This is an issue for which my right honourable friend Helen Grant from the other place has campaigned tirelessly, and I pay tribute to her for the effort she has made in bringing this to the forefront of our legislative proposals. It has been requested that this amendment be reserved for a Home Office Bill rather than legislation from the Ministry of Justice, and in these circumstances, and having regard to that undertaking from the Government, I will withdraw the amendment in my name. However, I add that it will be tabled in subsequent legislation in this parliamentary Session to ensure that we do not delay in ensuring that that action is taken.

On Amendment 97 and the submissions from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, I can say only that I hesitate to intrude to the west of Offa’s Dyke.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions. The questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on Welsh justice will be part of our ongoing discussions on devolution. I look forward to further discussions on that. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Foster, is sufficiently reassured about this Government’s commitment to transparency and accepts the reasons for our not accepting Amendments 59 to 61.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 93 and 94. Amendment 93 is concerned with the impact of changes in the law on sentences that are currently being served under the law that was in force preceding the change. In other words, offenders were sentenced under a law that has been altered. The amendment calls for reports to be provided every three years, with a view to such changes in the law leaving defendants suffering from injustice.

Amendment 94 concerns the direct effect of such changes in the law on sentences that are currently being served or that have been imposed. Proposed new subsection (1)(a) in Amendment 94 concerns cases where the offence itself for which the sentence was imposed has been abolished, and proposed new subsection (1)(b) in Amendment 94 concerns a case where the sentence has been materially altered.

The amendment would enable a person serving a sentence for an offence that had been abolished, or where the sentence had been altered, to seek a review of the case of the sentence that is currently being served. On such a review, the sentence originally imposed could be quashed, or there could be a resentencing.

In practice, of course, Amendment 94 would come into play only where either the offence had been abolished or the available sentence had been reduced, because one cannot imagine an offender seeking a change of sentence where the available sentence had been increased.

Underlying both amendments is a concern that changes in the law would have the effect that an offender’s sentence would not have been imposed or would have been less severe had the law at the time of sentencing been the reformed law rather than the law under which the offender was sentenced, and that such changes should take effect to the benefit of the offender who would not be at such risk now.

I would suggest that it is a matter of simple justice that changes in the law which would have resulted in an offender serving a sentence less severe, or not being convicted of any offence, should have the benefit of the change in the law that pertained at the time of sentencing, so that a review would be appropriate.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, has addressed what is clearly an anomaly in our sentencing policy that raises a clear issue of fairness, and we do not dissent from the principle that has been advanced with regard to that matter. Indeed, I acknowledge the thoughtful and careful way in which the matter has been addressed by all noble Lords. With regard to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I have nothing to say.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I will begin by addressing Amendment 63. I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, for raising this and for her work and expertise as a member of the Youth Justice Board and as a magistrate. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s long-standing interest and work in this area, including from this Dispatch Box.

Youth sentencing, as I think all noble Lords who have spoken know, is largely out of scope of this Bill. But I should say—and I am very happy to put it on the record, for myself and for my noble friend the Minister—that this amendment raises an issue with which we have a great deal of sympathy.

We recognise that, when a child turns 18, that can have a significant impact on the outcome of criminal justice proceedings, and that is, in a sense, the heart of the argument that the noble Baroness is making. A child who reaches the age of 18 before their first appearance will be tried and sentenced as an adult. However, sentencing guidelines state that, in such cases, the court should take as its starting point the sentence that would have applied at the time the offence was committed. That does not quite deal with some of the points that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby was making; I acknowledge that. They also state that the offender’s maturity, along with other relevant factors, should continue to be considered.

This amendment, however, would significantly alter the youth sentencing framework, and I note the careful way in which the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, asked for the Government’s response. If we were to accept these recommendations, the Government feel that there would be ramifications across the wider justice system. The youth sentencing framework has been specifically designed for children and there may well be unforeseen consequences, which we should think about carefully, of applying that framework to young adults. I am sure that your Lordships can appreciate that such a change requires thorough consideration beyond the confines of this Bill. So, although I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment at this stage, I hope she will take what I have said as some reassurance.

I now turn to Amendments 93 and 94. I would like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling them. I am afraid I am going to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Marks, as I probably did in Committee too, by restating that the Government already believe that existing mechanisms are sufficient to address perceived injustices.

Unduly lenient sentence reviews and criminal appeals are two routes by which cases can be reviewed. From 1 January to 8 December 2025, 933 sentences were considered by the Attorney-General’s Office as valid to be reviewed under the unduly lenient sentence scheme. The Government cannot support an amendment that puts more pressure on the justice system, which I think everyone in your Lordships’ House recognises is under considerable pressure, by requiring the courts to reconsider the sentences of those who apply. We do not believe this would be workable or sustainable, and we do not want to duplicate existing functions at a time when the system is under so much pressure.

As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, knows—we discussed this in Committee—we await the Law Commission’s report on criminal appeals, which is due later this year. Your Lordships’ House has my assurance that we will consider its findings with great care, especially those which relate to the important points made today. Once the report has been published, we will of course discuss it further. For the moment, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

68: After Clause 19, insert the following new Clause—
“Court transcripts of sentencing remarks(1) Where a request is made for the sentencing remarks delivered in the Crown Court, the court must, subject to subsection (2), make those remarks available within 14 days of the request being received.(2) Sentencing remarks may be published only where a judge of the Crown Court has approved their release, having regard to—(a) the accuracy of the record, and(b) the need to comply with any reporting restrictions or other legal prohibitions.(3) Sentencing remarks made available under this section must be published free of charge and may be made available online.”

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 68 and indeed 69 concern transparency in sentencing. We listened carefully to the Government’s response in Committee and both these amendments have been revised in light of those responses. We believe that they now represent a fair and proportionate compromise between the principle of open justice and the practical constraints that may face the courts.

I will deal first with Amendment 68, with which there is particular concern, and which involves the publication of sentencing remarks within two weeks or 14 days of a request. Many of the arguments made in Committee about transparency in the justice system continue to hold true and I will not seek to repeat them. What was notable, however, was the broad consensus across the House that victims should be able to access the sentencing remarks for crimes committed against them.

In response to the original drafting, which required mandatory publication of all sentencing remarks, the Government argued that this would impose a significant financial and administrative burden. So, Amendment 68 no longer imposes a universal obligation. Instead, it requires that Crown Court sentencing remarks be provided only where a victim specifically requests them. This reflects the reality that the Crown Court handles cases concerning the most serious offences. Statistics indicate that that is about 10% of all cases.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can the noble and learned Lord clarify, at an appropriate point, subsection (2) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 68? It says:

“Sentencing remarks may be published only”


in certain circumstances. My first question is: is that meant to restrict the rights of the victim under subsection (1) of the proposed new clause to obtain the remarks, or is it concerned with further publication?

My second question relates to the proposed new subsection (2), which says:

“Sentencing remarks may be published only where a judge … has approved their release, having regard to—”


two factors, which it lists. Is it intended that those are the only factors that the sentencing judge can have regard to—that is

“the accuracy of the record and … the need to comply with any reporting restrictions”—

or is it intended, which I would hope not, that the sentencing judge would have some general discretion here?

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. It is intended that the court should have regard only to the two elements that are referred to therein.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister gets to his feet, can I rather impertinently squeeze in a request that probably has little to do with Amendment 68? I am doing it now, so there we are.

A few years ago, I, along with other people, conducted a review into the work of the Criminal Cases Review Commission. One of the problems we found is that many prisoners who were dissatisfied with the way their conviction had been arrived at, and the way in which the Court of Appeal had subsequently dealt with it, found it almost impossible to get hold of a transcript of the sentencing remarks. Following the questioning of my noble and learned friend by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it looks as though such a convicted prisoner would not be able to make use of this amendment to get hold of the sentencing remarks my noble and learned friend is partly complaining about. Can the Government please bear in mind—not tonight obviously—that this is a real practical difficulty for people in prison who feel, for good reason, that they have been improperly convicted and wish to have the CCRC consider their case? It is much more difficult for the CCRC, and certainly for the dissatisfied defendant, to advance their cause if they cannot get hold, either because it is difficult or because it is expensive, of the sentencing remarks.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for tabling Amendments 68 and 69. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, makes a good point and I will take it back to the department.

We share the commitment to transparency across the justice system, but we do not agree that these amendments are needed. I will first address Amendment 68 and I reassure the noble and learned Lord that the Government are working to significantly improve the transparency of sentencing remarks. In certain cases of high public interest, sentencing remarks are already published online. Sentencing remarks can be and are filmed by broadcasters, subject to the agreement of the judge.

The Government have recently extended provision of free transcripts of sentencing remarks to victims of rape and other sexual offences whose cases are heard in the Crown Court. It remains the case that bereaved families of victims of murder, manslaughter and fatal road offences can request judges’ sentencing remarks for free.

However, expanding this to everyone who applies would be prohibitively expensive. The amendment would create significant operational and resource pressures on the courts and judiciary. It would also require new systems and staff to process requests and manage publication. The cost and complexity would be detrimental to the work we are doing to create an affordable and sustainable justice system.

We are, however, embracing AI and are actively exploring the opportunities it presents to reduce the cost of producing transcripts in the future and to making them far more widely available to victims. While I recognise the intent behind this amendment to promote transparency, sentencing remarks are already accessible through established transcription services.

I now turn to Amendment 69 and again assure noble Lords that this Government remain committed to improving the collection and publication of data on foreign national offenders. We have already taken action to increase transparency on the data published. As I have discussed with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, we are developing and publishing more data specific to prisons and probation in Wales. Notably, in July 2025, for the first time, the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group.

We are also working closely with colleagues in the Home Office to enable earlier identification of foreign national offenders. Currently, this is routinely done after sentence when cases are referred to the Home Office. Being able to verify the nationality of offenders ahead of sentencing would facilitate more timely removals and provide an opportunity for enhanced data collection. However, methods to verify any information provided must be cost effective and prevent placing additional pressure on operational staff. Investment in digital and AI tools can help us to collect, analyse and publish more data, but we are still building this capability.

For that reason, we cannot accept a statutory duty to publish this information before the necessary operational and technical infrastructure is in place to deliver it. If noble lords are interested in wider data specifically related to prisons, I can highly recommend the Prison Reform Trust’s Bromley Briefings Prison Factfile publication, which draws on data, including regarding foreign national offenders, from a wide range of sources. It is free and is online.

I hope I have reassured noble Lords about this Government’s commitment to transparency and explained why the Government do not support these amendments. I urge the noble and Learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 68 is modest, targeted and proportionate. It would bring much-needed consistency to our justice system. As the Minister observed, transcripts of sentencing are already provided to victims of rape and certain specified offences. There is no principled reason why victims of other serious or traumatic crimes should be treated differently. Victims of offences such as aggravated assault or aggravated burglary may be unable to attend a sentencing and should not have to pay to understand the court’s reasoning with regard to sentencing. It appears to us that Amendment 68 addresses a clear and, frankly, unfair gap in the law. In these circumstances, I seek to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 68.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

74: Clause 20, page 38, line 7, at end insert—
“(4A) In section 244ZA (release on licence of certain violent or sexual offenders), at end insert—“(9) The “requisite custodial period” in subsection (8) does not apply to any person convicted of—(a) rape,(b) assault by penetration,(c) inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity,(d) paying for the sexual services of a child aged under 13,(e) kidnapping or false imprisonment with the intention of committing a sexual offence,(f) creating or possessing indecent photographs of children,(g) grievous bodily harm,(h) grooming,(i) stalking,(j) causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable child or adult, or(k) death by dangerous driving.””

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 74 and 75, in my name, concern exemptions to the Government’s so-called earned progression model. We do not oppose in principle the idea that prisoners who demonstrate genuine rehabilitation should be eligible for early release. Where offenders have taken meaningful steps to address their behaviour and reduce their risk, there is a case to be made for earned progression. However, Clause 20 does not deliver that outcome.

Throughout Second Reading and in Committee, the Minister referred to an earned progression model and to examples such as that in the Texas system, yet, as drafted, Clause 20 contains no such mechanism. As the House of Commons Library briefing makes clear, the release point is automatic rather than earned. Prisoners will be released at the one-third point of their sentence unless additional days have been imposed by a court for misconduct. That is not earned progression; it is default release. Barring significant further transgressions, release is determined by the passage of time alone.

The Lord Chancellor has sought to reassure the public by stating that the most serious offences are excluded, yet the Ministry of Justice’s own data confirms that offenders convicted of rape, grievous bodily harm and the creation of indecent images of children will be eligible for this automatic scheme. If those offences do not qualify as serious, it is difficult to understand what offences would.

This is not a technical adjustment to sentencing mechanics; it is a profound change to how the state responds to some of the gravest crimes. As drafted, the Bill would reduce custodial time for over 60% of rapists and more than 80% of child sex offenders. It would permit those convicted of stalking, an offence which we know is strongly associated with escalation into homicide, to be released automatically after serving just one-third of their sentence, without any assessment of ongoing risk.

Amendment 74 would exclude from these provisions those convicted of a range of serious offences, including offences involving the death of a vulnerable person. Amendment 75 would require consultation to ensure that other serious offence categories are appropriately excluded before these measures come into force. In the other place, a similar amendment which included an even broader list of exemptions attracted support from all parties. All 65 Liberal Democrat MPs present for the Division voted in favour of the amendment. Other parties in support of the amendment included the Green Party, the independents, Plaid Cymru, Reform and indeed some members of the Government. It is rare to have such cross-party unanimity, but Members in the other place clearly recognised the dangers that Clause 20 poses to the public.

Noble Lords may notice that Amendment 87, from the Liberal Democrats, includes the same list of offences, as well as two further categories of offences, which should, they suppose, be exempt from automatic release following fixed-term recall. I call on noble Lords to consider consistency here, as much as concern.

Clause 20 applies to a far more serious cohort of offenders than other provisions in the Bill, and clearly there is concern beyond this Chamber. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner has described the early release of perpetrators after weeks in custody as “simply unacceptable”. The Victims’ Commissioner has warned that victims will be left “unnerved and bewildered”. These are not political voices but independent authorities concerned about public safety.

Public confidence is often regarded as fragile where the justice system is concerned. When victims see those who have harmed them released automatically after a fraction of their sentence, trust is bound to be eroded. Amendment 74, in particular, would be a proportionate safeguard to ensure that early release is not applied to those whose crimes are too serious and too dangerous to justify it. If the Government are not prepared to give an assurance with regard to Amendment 74, I will seek to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 90 in this group, which would insert a proposed new clause on extended determinate sentence prisoners, who I will refer to as EDS prisoners.

Currently, the majority of people serving an EDS first become eligible for parole after serving two-thirds of their custodial term and every two years thereafter, with eventual automatic release at the end of the custodial term on extended licence if they are unsuccessful in gaining parole earlier. This proposed new clause would create a power for the Secretary of State to refer to the Parole Board a prisoner serving an EDS at the earlier halfway point of the sentence, instead of the two-thirds point, if the Secretary of State is of the view that there is a reasonable prospect that the board will direct release. It is therefore in line with recommendation 4.2 of the sentencing review. As that review affirmed, this measure would improve incentives for rehabilitation and enhance the effectiveness of measures to address the overcrowding crisis, without in any way changing the public protection mechanisms that currently apply to EDS prisoners.

The Minister said in Committee, at col. 1842 of Hansard, on 3 December last year, that the Government rejected the independent review’s recommendation 4.2 on the grounds that the EDS was imposed because the offender was considered dangerous. It is quite right that an EDS is a public protection sentence, but, in statute, the parts intended to fulfil its public protection function are the involvement of the Parole Board and the extended licence period. There are no public protection concerns in statute to justify referral to the Parole Board at the two-thirds point of the sentence instead of the halfway point, as is proposed for most other determinate sentence prisoners.

Under the provisions of this new clause, and in line with the recommendations of the review, the Parole Board would still engage in exactly the same careful, reasoned and deliberate decision-making process at the 50% point as it currently does at the 66% point. Moreover, the average length of an EDS is nine years, with many serving far longer than that. It is therefore a serious oversight that, for no good reason, measures to address overcrowding are ignoring EDS prisoners, who constitute 10% of people in prison. That is more than 9,000 people, who are serving an average of nearly a decade.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, this debate is about a central purpose of the Bill: to put the prison system on a sustainable footing. There is no doubt that the offences listed in Amendment 74 and referenced in Amendment 75 are serious crimes. Indeed, they are so serious that many perpetrators of these offences will receive life or extended determinate sentences.

I remind noble Lords that there are 17,000 prisoners serving those sentences, convicted of the most serious crimes. They include many serious sexual offenders. These offenders will be unaffected by the reforms we are bringing forward in this Bill. They will remain in prison as long as they do now.

Amendments 74 and 75 raise a more fundamental issue. Are we willing, as the previous Government clearly were, to leave the prison system on the brink of collapse? This did not happen overnight. It was not inevitable. It was the choice the party opposite made again and again for 14 years. They abandoned their posts and put public safety at risk by allowing prisons to reach bursting point. To cover up their failures, they covertly let out more than 10,000 prisoners early as part of their chaotic scheme. If it were not for the decisive action of this Government, the police would have been unable to make arrests and courts unable to hold trials, which would have been a breakdown of law and order unlike anything we have seen in modern times. We must continue to take decisive action to address the consequences of their mismanagement. If these amendments were to pass, they would undermine the fundamental issue that the Bill is designed to fix —the issue they neglected for 14 years.

I took this job to fix this issue and countless others that we inherited. As someone who has dedicated their working life to improving the criminal justice system, it matters to me personally. I am convinced that this Bill is the only and best way to fix this problem. I refuse to stand in front of victims of serious crimes, look them in the eye and tell them that we have no space in our prisons to lock up dangerous offenders and that their rapist or abuser cannot go to prison at all because there is no space. Let me be very clear: running out of space is the consequence if these amendments pass. I hope that all noble Lords will agree with me that we cannot, in good conscience, vote for amendments that we know will cause such great harm. Our immediate priority must be stability, and that is what our measures deliver. We are building more prison places than at any time since the Victorian era. By the end of this Parliament there will be more people in prison than ever before. I recall that the previous Government managed only 500 extra places in 14 years.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his constructive engagement on this amendment and for raising important questions about how victims will be protected. I remind noble Lords that, once released, offenders will be subject to a period of intensive supervision supported by a significant expansion of electronic tagging. The highest-risk offenders, as assessed by probation, will continue to be actively supervised until the end of their sentence. They will continue to be subject to any licence conditions needed to manage risk and protect victims, including restriction zones where appropriate. All offenders will remain on licence with the possibility of recall to custody if they breach the terms of their licence. Of course, if an offender behaves badly in custody, they will spend even longer inside, up to the full length of their sentence.

As noble Lords know, the proposals for the progression model, which Clause 20 seeks to implement, are the result of extensive work by the Independent Sentencing Review. The review, led by David Gauke and supported by a panel of eminent experts from all parts of the criminal justice system, arrived at its recommendation after extensive research and consultation. All proposals, including the new framework for release, have been thoroughly considered. We now need to put in place an effective release framework that will support a sustainable prison estate and protect the public by ensuring that space is prioritised for the most dangerous offenders. I therefore urge the noble and learned Lord not to press Amendments 74 and 75. If he wishes to test the opinion of the House, I encourage all noble Lords to vote against this amendment and help this country end the cycle of crisis in our prisons for good.

Dangerous offenders are also the subject of Amendment 90 tabled by my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Carter. It proposes that extended determinate sentences should include a progression element that would enable the parole eligibility date to be brought forward. While I thank the noble Lord for raising this important issue, the Government’s position remains that prison is the right place for these dangerous offenders. To receive an extended determinate sentence, a specified violent, sexual or terrorism offence must have been committed. The court will also have decided that the offender is dangerous—I repeat, dangerous—and that there is a significant risk of serious harm to the public from the offender committing a further specified offence. These dangerous offenders must remain in prison for as long as they do now. I ask the noble Lord not to move his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, we do not oppose an earned progression model in principle but, as was recognised by all parties in the other place, Clause 20 does not deliver an earned progression model. Clause 20 contains no mechanism for earning release. That is not, or at least it was not until recently, a party-political point. The House of Commons Library confirmed that release occurs automatically at the one-third or halfway point for offenders. Barring serious further offences in custody, release is guaranteed.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, talked repeatedly about the earned progression model. I do not know which one he was referring to, but it is not the one in Clause 20. That is simply a mystery. What we have is a means by which violent and dangerous individuals will be released after they have served one-third of the sentence imposed by a court. Is that supposed to imbue our justice system with public confidence? Automatic early release for serious offenders is bound to undermine that confidence.

While the Minister may make criticisms of prison capacity and what occurred during the previous 14 years of government, I remind him that two wrongs do not make a right. You do not cure one mistake by committing an even worse mistake, and that is what is being proposed here. Automatic early release is going to endanger the public. It ensures that releases apply to offenders whose crimes are serious and dangerous. It is not proportionate, it is not targeted and it is not possessed of any safeguards. I wish to test the opinion of the House.