Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 335A and 335B, which relate specifically to child abduction across the United Kingdom. Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549 relate specifically to the abduction, detaining and retention of children abroad who came from Northern Ireland—I was about to say “in Northern Ireland”, but that would be a tautology.

I am very grateful to all the organisations that have written to a number of Peers regarding child abduction. My two amendments are probing amendments, in which we seek to understand how Clause 104 will work and what the effect will be on a person who is a victim of domestic abuse, within the meaning of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and who takes their child outside the UK to safeguard themselves or the child from domestic abuse, or who gets abroad and then decides to remain abroad to continue to safeguard themselves or their child.

Clause 104 arises from a recommendation from the Law Commission following the case of Nicolaou in 2012. That case focused on whether a parent commits an offence under Section 1 of the Child Abduction Act 1984 if they initially have the appropriate consent to take a child outside the UK, for a defined period, but then fail to return the child after that period expires. The background is this: a father took his son to Cyprus for an agreed contact visit but did not return him to the UK at the end of the specified time, despite court orders from both Cypriot and English courts for the child’s return. An arrest warrant was issued for the child abduction.

In June 2012, the High Court ruled that an offence had not been committed under Section 1 of that Act in this specific scenario. The section, as written at the time, applied to the act of taking or sending a child out of the UK without consent, not the failure to return them after a period of consented absence. This case, along with another, R v Kayani 2011, highlighted a significant loophole in the Child Abduction Act 1984, which the Law Commission subsequently made recommendations to address. Its recommendation in its report Simplification of Criminal Law: Kidnapping and Related Offences is very legalistic in its approach. It makes no reference to having considered domestic abuse as a defence, for example, or even a contributory factor.

Article 12 of the 1980 Hague convention on abduction provides that, where a year has elapsed after a child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in another contracting state, the court has a discretion not to require the child’s return if the child is

“settled in its new environment”.

Clause 104 makes it a criminal offence to retain a child outside the UK “at any time” after the child is taken or sent outside the UK without the appropriate consent. It therefore criminalises conduct in a situation where a court may decide not to order the return of the child to the UK. Clearly, this is not in keeping with either the spirit or the letter of the Hague convention.

Additionally, it could significantly hamper efforts to enable the safe return of children and their taking parents—the parents who removed them—and could increase the number of cases where children are compelled to return alone, without their mothers, possibly to the care of an abusive father or to state care. My question to the Minister is: what is the position of someone who uses a defence of being a victim of domestic abuse as the reason why they have not returned to the UK with the child? If a court were asked to adjudicate on such an issue, would it demand evidence of abuse? I ask that because your Lordships’ House knows that in such cases, often the victim mother—it usually is a mother—will have been living in the UK with the perpetrator of domestic abuse and coercive control, but not many would have been to the courts. On that basis, what protection is there for that victim and their child in this position?

The real problem is that the Law Commission report, which has informed Clause 104, does not cover this difficult territory at all—nor do the Explanatory Notes for the Bill. My amendments are genuinely to probe the Government’s intention on how they would manage a case that involved domestic abuse and coercive control. While we agree that Clause 104 is important, letting it pass without taking account of the complex issues relating to those parents who are fleeing domestic abuse will be problematic and could even lead to miscarriages of justice. I beg to move.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, we should be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her probing Amendments 335A and 335B, raising the problem of wrongful retention of children in the context of the criminal law and, in particular, the Child Abduction Act 1984. Essentially, that Act criminalised the wrongful taking of children, but not their wrongful retention after the end of a permitted period of contact.

In 1984, when the omission of unlawful retention was pointed out in debate on the Child Abduction Bill, as it then was, in another place, it was not addressed by the then Government. Indeed, the opposition spokesman at the time, now the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, said that it must be “for another day”. Moving on to 2012, the continuing discrepancy was highlighted by the decision of the High Court in the case of Nicolaou, referred to by the noble Baroness, which was indeed a classic case of unilateral retention of a child abroad in the face of court orders. In 2014, a Law Commission report speculated about the rationale for the difference between removal and retention cases and recommended what the Bill now seeks to do in Clause 104.

So, 41 years after the noble Lord, Lord Dubbs, spoke of “another day”, it now seems to have arrived. Unjustified retention of a child can be both irresponsible and very harmful. Whether the decision to retain the child is planned or is more spontaneous, it can have a considerable emotional and practical consequence for all concerned, not least the child. I suspect that, with a little more analysis and resolve back in 1984, we would not be where we are today. However, there have been significant developments in the intervening period to make us think about what, if anything, is currently required in legislative terms.

First, as the noble Baroness has mentioned, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is now well established as a successful measure that deals with most cases of this sort, providing for the immediate protection and swift return of children to their home country when justified. In most cases, the use of the Hague convention, coupled with any necessary consequential proceedings in the home country, means that the wrongful retention of children is adequately and firmly dealt with in the family courts without recourse to criminal proceedings.

Secondly, there is now a far wider understanding of the nature and effects of abusive and alienating behaviour and attitudes as experienced by mothers and children, and, to some extent, by fathers. This is the sort of behaviour covered by the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. In reality, the retention of children by one parent occurs within a very wide range of scenarios. These are fact-sensitive cases. At one end of the range is the spiteful and vindictive parent who wants to remove the child from the other parent’s life. At the other end of the range are the cases of fearful and protective parents who realise that the child is at risk if returned to the other parent. In between those extremes are any number of variable situations and motivations.

The Law Commission report noted:

“The general policy of the law is that parental disputes about the care of children should be pursued in civil rather than criminal proceedings”.


If that is the general policy, criminalisation should be reserved to a limited number of cases of this sort, and criminal prosecution should be seen as a last resort to mark disapproval of plainly wrongful and harmful retention of a child. Moreover, overlapping criminal and family court proceedings should be avoided wherever possible, and the use of, or threats of, criminal prosecution should remain well out of the armoury of most warring parents. That is why, when resolving Hague proceedings, many parents often formally agree not to instigate or support criminal proceedings against each other. Such agreements remove one source of control and recrimination, and they serve to keep the focus on the children rather than on the parents’ grievances against each other.

I therefore hope that the Government will accept the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, or at least undertake some further analysis of what is needed for cases where the parent concerned is seeking to safeguard themselves or the child from harm. If not, will the Government confirm that any prosecution of these offences will continue to require the consent of the DPP under Section 4(2) of the 1984 Act? Will they confirm that there will be a restrictive approach to the prosecution, and that the guidance on prosecution will be reviewed and updated to cover the important points raised by the amendment?

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 335A and 335B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for setting out these probing amendments, because, as the Minister will know, there is concern that this change will criminalise domestic abuse survivors, who constitute the overwhelming majority of parents involved in retention cases.

As we have heard, Clause 104 is intended to close the gap in legislation, which the Law Commission recommended back in 2014. However, that recommendation did not take domestic abuse into account. Our understanding has evolved significantly since then, and, given our current knowledge of perpetrator behaviour, post-separation abuse and the Government’s stated commitment to end violence against women and girls, we should look at whether implementing that recommendation now would be appropriate. We need to consider the significance of domestic abuse in these proceedings.

On the difference between removal and retention, these actions are not equivalent. Treating them as equivalent fails to recognise that retention often reflects a delayed recognition of abuse, which the parent understands once they are safe among family and friends. As Clause 104 currently stands, these women would be criminalised and therefore deterred from returning with their child. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, set out how we could see some perverse outcomes from this.