Monday 15th December 2025
(1 day, 14 hours ago)
Lords ChamberCrime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 111(Corrected)-VI(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Sixth Marshalled List) - (15 Dec 2025)
Lord Clement-Jones
“(aa) if the name change is by deed poll, seven days prior to submitting an application for change of name (if that day is earlier than the day specified in paragraph (a)), or” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that if a person is changing their name by deed poll, they must notify a new name to the police prior to submitting the application.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses a vital aspect of public protection, closing the loopholes that allow registered sex offenders to evade detection and monitoring by changing their identity. Effective management of offenders in the 21st century requires a justice system that is not only legally robust but properly resourced and technologically capable.
On these Benches, we strongly welcome Clause 87, which requires sex offenders to notify the police of a name change seven days before using that new name, in the words of the clause. This is a significant improvement on the current retrospective notification regime, which has allowed offenders to disappear from the radar of the authorities. However, my Amendment 317 seeks to tighten this provision further regarding deed polls. As currently drafted, an offender could theoretically go through the legal process of obtaining a deed poll to change their name without the police being aware until the moment they intend using it, again using the language of Clause 87.
My amendment specifies that if a name change is by deed poll, the offender must notify the police seven days prior to submitting the application. This would ensure that the police are alerted at the very start of the administrative process of changing identity rather than at the end. It provides authorities with the vital time needed to conduct appropriate risk assessments and, if necessary, intervene before a new legal identity is formally established. This proposal has been championed by campaigners such as Sarah Champion MP in the other place, and it is a common-sense safeguard to ensure that the police are always one step ahead.
I stress that the management of offenders today is not just about physical monitoring but about digital monitoring. Just as we have seen criminal recruitment drives for money mules take place on social media platforms, we know that the internet provides avenues for offenders to reoffend or breach their conditions. Although Amendment 317 seeks to tighten the management regime legislative framework, I urge the Government to ensure that the police and relevant agencies have the digital resources and data-sharing capabilities required to enforce these new powers effectively rather than relying on a fragmented system that allows offenders to slip through the net. This measure would strengthen the safety net around our communities immeasurably. I hope that the Minister will accept this amendment as a logical extension of the Government’s own objectives in Clause 87. I beg to move.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
My Lords, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was designed for a world with low demand for gender recognition certificates and did not anticipate modern safeguarding realities. I believe that that context has fundamentally changed, and that creates a serious gap that my amendment seeks to close. The system is no longer confined to a small number of older adults. New Ministry of Justice data shows that almost 10,000 GRCs have been issued. Last year alone, over 1,169 were granted. That is the highest number on record and more than triple the annual figure five years ago. This is quite a dramatic generational shift: almost a quarter of new certificates now go to people born since the year 2000. Demand has changed but safeguarding has not kept up.
I recently tabled a Written Question to the Government after I had seen multiple cases of male-born sex offenders changing their gender identity, so by the time they appeared in court or were sent to prison they identified as women. I was curious, so I asked the Government what safeguards would prevent a convicted rapist or sex offender going on to obtain a gender recognition certificate and being legally recognised as a woman. First, I was troubled that this Question, when it came to be answered, had been transferred to the Minister for Equalities rather than being answered by the Home Office. I believe it is fundamentally a matter of safety and not about equality. It should have been answered by the Home Office, so I worry that that demonstrates a confusion at the heart of the Government on this issue. Rape and sex offences are not about equality or identity but about safety.
Moreover, and more importantly, the response ignored the core issue. While of course we welcome the measures on name changes, passports and police notification, they do not prevent a convicted sex offender, if I understand it correctly, changing their legal sex under the Gender Recognition Act and going on to live the remainder of their life legally as a woman. To me, that highlights a serious safeguarding gap, and this amendment seeks to close that.
Noble Lords may ask why this is necessary and what this risk is that I speak about. We must be frank—sexual predators cannot be cured. The risk may be managed but it is not eliminated. That is why we have the lifelong monitoring regimes we have. That is why MAPPA exists and why I believe that the law must ensure that those who pose a permanent risk to women and girls, and men and boys, cannot access a legal mechanism that alters their status in ways that Parliament never intended.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch. Both amendments have been spoken to very well and very strongly.
I want talk about one particular case, of a sex offender called Clive Bundy, who was in prison for some years for sexually abusing and raping his daughter, Ceri-Lee Galvin, from a young age. It was incestuous sexual abuse and rape. He went to prison in 2016 and before he was released, he declared he was a woman. Bundy then changed his name via deed poll, very generously helped and abetted by the prison authorities, to aid his release.
I have spoken about this issue in this House before, and there are a number of reasons why it has been brought to my attention. One reason is that Clive Bundy changed his name to Claire Fox—consequently, I know about it. Claire Fox now wanders freely. However, the most important reason is that I was contacted by his daughter, Ceri-Lee Galvin. Before we had the Supreme Court ruling, I raised this a number of times in a number of Bills to note that Ceri-Lee Galvin as a victim had been badly betrayed by this story. She was never told that her incestuous, rapist father was being released, because he was not—Claire Fox was. And of course, guess what? If you google Claire Fox, you will get horror stories, but they are about me and not him.
In all seriousness, it was a deed poll change. Therefore, Clive Bundy might well be on the sex offenders register, but Clive Bundy does not exist. Claire Fox exists, but Claire Fox is Clive Bundy the rapist and is therefore free to live in the same town as his daughter, which he has done, and he has harassed her. I will not go into the details, but Ceri-Lee Galvin has been incredibly brave in giving up her anonymity to talk about this story to the press various times. As she says, she cannot get anywhere when she tries to lobby on this point.
Therefore, in theory, Claire Fox—Clive Bundy—is not on the sex offenders register and can apply to work with young children in the local area, where her daughter goes to nursery, and nobody knows that this person is a child rapist. There must be something that the Government can do to strengthen the safeguarding, which I know is their intention in this group of amendments. Therefore, the two non-government amendments should be seriously taken up by them. They would not contradict their aims but would ensure that their aims are more than just written on paper but actually protect victims and future victims.
It is not a question of making a moral judgment. I do not care whether Clive Bundy thinks that he is a woman; that is irrelevant to me. I do not even care that he has taken my name—which, by the way, is a fashionable thing to do; to use a gender critical name is apparently a form of trolling which happens in America quite a lot. But that is irrelevant. The point is how we protect people when have a sex offenders register that does not reflect reality.
By the way, special privacy measures are given, meaning that when I have asked questions in the past, I have been told that because this person has chosen to change gender and is therefore now Claire Fox, they cannot investigate Clive Bundy. If Clive Bundy as Claire Fox turns up for a meeting to volunteer with the Girl Guides, no one can even ask whether they are the same person. We cannot even go there. This is ridiculous and it is not what the Government want. Therefore, I hope the Government are open to these two very important amendments on deed poll and gender recognition certificates.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I want first to pick up on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, and both her comments and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and ask the Minister a question. Am I right in thinking that given that the Prison Service—and I think also the Probation Service—must do a full assessment of risk on any transgender prisoner, the protections they seek are already there?
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean, for raising the case of Karen White. The Scottish Prison Service apologised because it did not do what it should have done: a full risk assessment. Had it done that, she would not have been placed on a women’s wing. I therefore hope the Minister can confirm that the protections for the public, particularly for victims, remain, because now, following the Karen White case in particular, real care is taken to make sure the law is followed. I would find it extraordinary if crimes were just dropped off the list because somebody had a transgender recognition certificate—so could the Minister confirm that this is not the case?
Turning now to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones’s amendment, we on these Benches also welcome Clause 87, but it needs strengthening. My noble friend’s amendment is very clear: we have to be able to stop offenders changing their names without the knowledge of the police. That also plays into the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean. Research from the Safeguarding Alliance has shown that key legislation is being made redundant because of a loophole that people can use to get through the cracks. This is not just about transgender issues; it is about people just changing their name regardless of their gender. Frankly, this makes Sarah’s law and Clare’s law utterly useless. I hope the Minister is prepared to consider this.
The remaining amendments in this group, from the Government, look as though they are sensible adjustments to the arrangements regarding sex offenders obtaining driving licences in Northern Ireland. We look forward to hearing from the Minister in more detail on those.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I was not going to participate in this debate until I heard about the Scottish case and the Scottish Prison Service admitting that it got it wrong and that it did not carry out what they should have done.
I recall Julia Hartley-Brewer interviewing the SNP Scottish Justice Secretary. The Justice Secretary was saying that it was terribly difficult to reach an assessment, make a judgment and try to get it right. Julia Hartley-Brewer said, I believe, “What is the problem? Just look down his trousers and you will find the answer”. I commend that as the best answer I have ever heard.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, beginning with the amendments that regulate the name changes of sex offenders, I am glad that Members across your Lordships’ House agree on the necessity of regulations. Clause 87 is a sensible measure from the Government, and the amendments that build on its principle are similarly prudent. An individual who commits a crime as intrusive and offensive as a sexual offence demonstrates that they are a threat to public order and safety. After all, that is the reason why we have a sex offender register. Criminals who have proven that they pose a risk should be monitored by the authorities, and the authorities should have the necessary details to monitor and manage them.
Amendment 317 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would ensure that those who change their name by deed poll are legally required to alert the police of this change. The amendments in the name of the Minister extend the provision restricting the granting of driving licences in a new name to Northern Ireland. All these amendments seek to consolidate the existing legislation to ensure that there are no gaps there or in the Government’s new law, and we support the principle behind them.
The most consequential of the amendments in this group is that tabled by my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch. It would serve to bar those who commit sexual offences from obtaining a gender recognition certificate. This is a very necessary measure. I am glad that the Government have not yet granted an exemption for sex-offending transgender criminals, which would allow them to attend a prison different from their biological sex. Hailing from north of the border—where, as others have commented, there have been several incidents of that happening—I believe that it is a very worrying scenario indeed.
The Government have still not implemented the Supreme Court’s judgment in the For Women Scotland case, neither in statute nor in guidance. There is still the chance that those who commit sexual offences can end up in the wrong prison through obtaining a gender recognition certificate. I am not remotely suggesting that the Government would wilfully do this, but I hope that, given their record on prisoner administration, the Minister can understand our concerns.
No safeguards currently exist outside of ministerial discretion. A way to guarantee that this does not happen would be to bar sex offenders from obtaining a certificate in the first place; it is a bare minimum. In sending such people to prison, we are admitting that they are not trustworthy among the public; why, then, should we risk the safety of prisoners of the opposite sex? For those reasons, I support my noble friend’s amendment, and I hope the Minister can too.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the amendments in this group from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch. There are also a number of amendments in my name, which I will formally move and explain what they mean in a moment.
Clause 94, which we will come to in more detail later, provides for the police to restrict changes of name on registered sex offenders’ identity documents. Where the police consider it necessary to prevent sexual harm, they will be able to issue a notice to a registered sex offender, which may require them to apply for the police’s authorisation to change their name on specified documents. This will ensure that registered sex offenders who are deemed to be at risk of using a name change to commit sexual harm are unable to continue offending under a new name and pass under the radar of law enforcement. I am grateful for noble Lords’ broad support for the Government’s general direction of travel on these points.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
Does that mean that if somebody changes a name and does not inform the police, the new name can be put on the sex offenders register?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is my understanding of the position. I hope that helps the noble and learned Baroness. That is the principle behind what we are proposing here today. Again, I say to the whole Committee that this is, ultimately, management based on risk, not on gender.
Baroness Maclean of Redditch (Con)
May I press the Minister on one specific point? I understand what he is saying about management of risk, but would it be possible for a convicted sex offender—a serious sex offender or rapist—to be prevented, on the basis of risk, from obtaining a gender recognition certificate, should they wish to do so? Would it be possible for that to be barred in a specific case, should that individual be assessed as posing a risk to public safety?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 ensures that convicted sex offenders are already subject to post-conviction controls. They are managed according to their risk, and the sex offenders register is about looking at the position with regard to the individual having the risk on the basis of their actions. It would not be possible to stop someone applying for a gender recognition certificate. Ultimately, they would be placed on the sex offenders register based on their risk, not on their gender. With that, I hope that the noble Lords will not press the amendments.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, may I also ask a question for clarification? It is not really about GRC but about the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made about name change. I know that the Minister covered that in his comments, but I am still left a little confused. Can a person who is a convicted sex offender and on the sex offenders register change their name by deed poll and have their new name omitted, therefore, from the sex offenders register? Surely, as soon as a sex offender changes their name, if they are changing their name from a male name to a female name, that needs to be updated on the sex offenders register.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My understanding of the position is that the individual is on the sex offenders register, regardless of the name that they are currently providing. The risk is around the individual. If a registered sex offender seeks to change their name, the provisions in the Bill will apply, as proposed in the Bill here today.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
On a final clarification—possibly the Minister will write to us, because there is some confusion—I have always said that it is about managing risk and that it has nothing to do with gender. When I have raised this issue in the past, my concern has been that once gender is added into the mix, risk somehow gets forgotten slightly.
First, the point of the sex offenders register is not just for the authorities to know that they are there but for all sorts of institutions to know. I have been told in the past that an enhanced privacy privilege is given to those who change gender. Is that not true? Therefore, even probing that means that we will leave it well alone.
Secondly, in relation to DBS checks and so on, a change of gender, a change of identity—forget the politics of it—can mean that nobody knows that you are the person on the sex offenders register. If the DBS check is in one name, there is no way of knowing that you are the same person who is the rapist. That was why I used the Clive Bundy-Claire Fox example—Clive Bundy, as Claire Fox, would not show up on DBS checks or be on the sex offenders register if they went to work with children. That cannot be right or what the Government intend.
Maybe I have got it all wrong, but nobody from the Government has reassured me. By the way, my questions and amendments in the past were to the previous Government, so this is not having a go at this Government. This has been an unholy mess over two Governments.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
It may help the Committee if I say that both the original name and the new name would be recorded. For clarity, where a DBS check applicant has changed their names, they are required to state all names that they have been previously known by on the application form. In submitting that form, applicants sign a legal declaration declaring that they have not knowingly provided false information. Failure to disclose previous names and deliberately avoiding detection of previous convictions would lead to an individual being liable for prosecution. I hope that helps to clarify the position with regard to the amendments. I invite the noble Lords not to press them at this stage.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am on the “how to change your name” government website, which says that if you are a sex offender, violent offender or terrorist offender, you must go to your local prescribed police station where you are known within three days of changing your name. It is a criminal offence if you do not tell the police straightaway. There will be probation and other things going on in the background as well.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
It is worth clarifying that this group of people are not necessarily the kind of people I trust. This idea that a local sex offender—or terrorist, since we have been talking about Bondi Beach—thinks, “God, it would be against the law if I didn’t declare that I’ve changed my name”, and would be frightened by the possibility that they would be breaking the law, seems a tad naive.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I remind the Committee that the position of any of these individuals—as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned in her initial contribution—will be subject to consistently heavy management. These are serious offenders. There is a Probation Service. There is a MAPPA process. There is the registration. I have given the assurance that both names will be included in that registration.
Every piece of legislation that any House of Commons and House of Lords passes is subject to people breaking it. That happens, but there will be significant consequences in the event of that occurring. I am simply saying to the noble Baroness who has proposed this amendment, and to the proposals in the Bill that are genuinely welcome across the Committee, that there is significant supervision of sex offenders, and the requirements are as I have outlined to the Committee already. I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I am glad he focused on risk mitigation, and I think we got there in the final few paragraphs of his response. We need to take very seriously what he said, and I hope that if anything he said needs qualification, he will write to us subsequently, because this is a really important area.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Child sexual abuse image-generators: Scotland) inserted after clause 63.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Child sexual abuse image generators: Northern Ireland) inserted after clause 63.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 16, makes it possible for the regulations made by the Secretary of State to prevent a relevant offender getting a British driving licence in a new name as a replacement for a previous driving licence issued in Northern Ireland.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 94, page 121, leave out lines 4 to 8.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 94, page 120, line 20, makes it possible for the regulations made by the Secretary of State to prevent a relevant offender getting a British driving licence in a new name as a replacement for a previous driving licence issued in Northern Ireland.
““section 93B relevant offender” means a relevant offender who is subject to the restriction in section 93B(1);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a definition of “section 93B relevant offender” into the new section about regulations restricting replacement of driving licences of sex offenders with new names in England and Wales and Scotland.
“(3) After section 93I of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by subsection (2)) insert—“93J Restriction on granting replacement driving licences in new name (Northern Ireland)(1) The Department for Infrastructure in Northern Ireland (“the Department”) may by regulations make provision to prevent a person from being granted a licence to drive a motor vehicle under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)) (a “replacement licence”) if—(a) the person holds, or has held, a driving licence,(b) the name to be specified in the replacement licence (“the new name”) is different from the name specified in the driving licence most recently granted to the person, and(c) it appears to the Department, on the basis of information provided by the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (“the Chief Constable”), that the person is a section 93B relevant offender who was not authorised to apply for a driving licence in the new name.(2) The regulations may, in particular, include provision for authorising or requiring—(a) the Chief Constable to disclose specified information to the Department, and(b) the Department to disclose specified information to the Chief Constable,where the disclosure falls within subsection (3).(3) A disclosure falls within this subsection if it is made—(a) for the purposes of enabling the Department or the Chief Constable to carry out their functions under or by virtue of the regulations, or(b) in connection with the detection or investigation of an offence under section 93B(3).(4) The regulations may, in particular, make provision about how the Department or the Chief Constable may or must use information disclosed to them by virtue of subsection (2).(5) The regulations may include provision amending Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)). (6) In this section—“driving licence” means a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)) or under Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988;“section 93B relevant offender” means a relevant offender who is subject to the restriction in section 93B(1);“specified” means specified in regulations under this section.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the Department for Infrastructure to make regulations for Northern Ireland restricting replacement of driving licences of sex offenders in a new name.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“15A In section 136 (Part 2: Northern Ireland), in subsection (11), after “sections” insert “86B, 87A, 93A, 93H,”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the term “Secretary of State” is not read, in relation to Northern Ireland, as meaning the Department of Justice in provisions inserted into Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where there is different provision about Northern Ireland.
“(2A) In subsection (5) for “the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland” substitute “a Northern Ireland department”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 17.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes regulations of the Department for Infrastructure under section 93J inserted by my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 17 subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
“(b) for “the Department of Justice” substitute “a Northern Ireland department”.(4) In subsections (8) and (9) for “the Department of Justice”, in each place it occurs, substitute “a Northern Ireland department”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 94, page 121, line 17.
Lord Blencathra
“ScheduleDisqualification for riding a cycle: minor and consequential amendments1 The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 has effect in relation to a person disqualified for riding a cycle as if it was amended as follows.2 In section 26 (interim disqualification)—(a) omit subsection (7) to (11);(b) in subsection (12), for “section 34 or 35” substitute “section 34”.3 Omit sections 34A to 37A (provisions relevant only to a person disqualified for driving a mechanically propelled vehicle).4 In section 38(1) (appeal against disqualification), for “section 34 or 35” substitute “section 34”.5 In section 39 (suspension of disqualification pending appeal) omit subsections (3) and (4).6 In subsection 40 (power of appellate courts in England and Wales to suspend disqualification) omit subsections (7) and (8).7 In section 41 (power of appellate courts in Scotland to suspend disqualification) omit subsections (3) and (4).8 Omit section 41A (suspension of disqualification pending determination of applications under section 34B).9 In section 42 (removal of disqualification)—(a) in subsection (3) omit “(disregarding any extension period)” wherever those words appear, and(b) omit subsection (3A)(b), (3B) and (5)(a).10 Omit sections 44, 44A and 45A (endorsement of licence and driving record).11 In section 46 (combination of disqualification with orders for discharge)—(a) in subsection (1), for “sections 34, 35, 36, 44 or 44A” substitute “section 34”;(b) in subsection (2)—(i) omit “or” at the end of paragraph (a), and(ii) omit paragraph (b);(c) in subsection (3), for “sections 34, 35, 36, 44 and 45A” substitute “section 34”.12 In section 47 (supplementary provisions as to disqualifications and endorsements)—(a) in subsection (1)—(i) for “section 34, 35 or 44” substitute “section 34”, and(ii) omit “or endorsement”;(b) omit subsections (2) to (4).13 Omit sections 48 to 50 (exemption from disqualification and endorsement for offences against construction and use regulations, etc).”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to amend the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 as it applies to persons disqualified for riding a cycle.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Lucas is making a good recovery from an operation and has asked me to move or speak to his amendments for him. I suspect that he is watching on parliamentlive.tv to see if I get it right, so I hope the Committee will forgive this awful breach of protocol when I say, “Ralph, switch off the TV; just rest up and recover”. I shall move his Amendment 330, speak to his other amendments in the group and speak to my own amendments at the end, if I have time.
The purpose of this amendment is to fine-tune Part II of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 as it applies to persons disqualified from riding a cycle. The proposed new schedule would omit Sections 34A to 37A, 41A and the other odd section on the ground that they are relevant only to disqualified drivers of mechanically propelled vehicles. For example, Sections 34A to 34C cater for reduced disqualification on successful attendance on a course and apply only to persons convicted of a specified motoring offence. Section 35 relates to persons convicted of an offence in which fixed penalty points are to be taken into account, but fixed penalty points do not apply to cyclists. Sections 35A to 35D, which relate to custodial sentences, do not sit well with the proposed new cycling offences. Sections 36 to 37A all relate to motor vehicles, whether it be by disqualification until a driving test is passed, the revocation of a driving licence or the surrender of a revoked driving licence to the Secretary of State. Accordingly, all those sections would be omitted.
Noble Lords may well ask which of the disqualification provisions in Part II would therefore remain, as they apply subject to those minor and consequential amendments set out in the schedule. My noble friend has listed them: Section 26, interim disqualification; Section 38, appeal against disqualification; Section 39, suspension of disqualification pending an appeal; Sections 40 and 41, power of appellate courts to suspend disqualification; Section 42, removal of disqualification; Section 43, the rule for determining the end of a period of disqualification; Section 46, combination of disqualification and orders for discharge; and Section 47, supplementary provisions as to disqualification. That concludes Amendment 330.
On Amendment 338, my noble friend says that new Clause 29A(7) introduces new subsections (8) to (12). This amendment would extend the clause to new subsection (12A), forming part of another amendment that I propose to speak to later.
On Amendment 339, the thrust of Clause 106 is to bring cycling offences pretty much into line with those that apply to motor vehicles. However, at present, provision for obligatory disqualification is omitted for the most serious offences, so it may be said that there will be a lacuna in the law—disqualification, with motor vehicles being, inter alia, an added deterrent to offending. Accordingly, the amendment now before the Committee would amend Section 34 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 by prescribing that the period of disqualification for the two most serious offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous cycling will not be less than five years and two years respectively. The other two offences of causing death or serious injury by careless or inconsiderate cycling, where the culpability is less, will be subject to obligatory disqualification for not less than 12 months. No additional amendment of Section 34 would be required.
The only alteration that would be made by Amendment 340, in respect to the penalties for certain serious cycling offences, is the insertion of references to “obligatory” in column 5 of Part I of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The expression relates to disqualification. Without it, certain provision in the amendment of Section 34 would be of no effect.
Amendment 342 is my noble friend’s last amendment in this group. He says that it would insert three subsections. He proposes a substitute for new Section 29A(12) to extend the penalties for certain serious cycling offences set out there. The proposed new subsection (12A) would amplify the definition of “disqualified”, and subsection (12B) would introduce proposed new Schedule 11A.
The only amendment that would be made by proposed new subsection (12) is with respect to the penalties for certain other serious cycling offences not catered for in new subsection (11), again with the insertion of the word “obligatory” in column 5 of Part I of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. As before, the expression relates to a disqualification. It too is necessary if Section 34 is to bite.
Proposed new subsection (12A) addresses the fact that “disqualified”, as currently defined, is couched in terms that at present can apply only to disqualified drivers of “mechanically propelled” vehicles. In other words, “disqualified” is for holding or obtaining a driving licence. That formulation is retained in paragraph (a).
As for the riders of cycles, I am sure noble Lords are well aware that a driving licence is not required for them. Therefore paragraph (b), in relation to them, inserts a different formulation. It redefines “disqualified” as disqualified for riding a cycle
“on a road or other public place”,
the latter expression being in conformity with the same wording in the new cycling offences created by this provision.
Finally, proposed new subsection (12B) would introduce a new Clause 106(11)(a), containing as it does
“minor and consequential amendments of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988”.
That concludes my noble friend’s amendments. If one thought that the debate on the last amendment was highly technical, this one is even more technical. I shall set a test at the end by asking questions to see whether all noble Lords have got it.
I turn now to my own Amendments 337B to 337F. I am certain that the Minister will see that in the Marshalled List there are four groups of amendments tabled by many more Peers than just me who are deeply concerned at the scourge of dangerous cycling inflicting serious damage on pedestrians and aiding criminality. I am sure the Minister saw the news item last week on the Met finally cracking down on the big, heavy, illegal bikes capable of 70 mph that are used for snatching phones. Many of them are driven by food delivery couriers—mainly Deliveroo. I encounter them every night on my way home on the pavements outside Millbank.
We also have the problem of thousands of e-bikes—mainly Lime—lying scattered over our pavements; of companies deliberately selling massive off-road bikes, which people then use on our streets; of some e-bikes being so heavy that they are breaking the legs of users; and of thousands of people riding on our pavements, with grossly inadequate enforcement to stop it.
The penalties under Clause 106 are inadequate and I have suggested increased penalties for anyone convicted, as has my noble friend Lord Lucas. However, I submit that no one will ever be convicted under its subsections, because a conviction depends on someone, presumably a police officer, concluding that the cycling
“falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist”,
and that a competent cyclist would conclude that it was dangerous. Will the Minister tell me how many times the Home Office expects to find a police officer present to witness this behaviour and come to the subjective conclusions in subsections (4) and (6)? We need a simple objective test, as is in my Amendment 337E, which would mean that anyone
“who rides a cycle on any pavement … is to be regarded as cycling without due care and attention”.
I challenge any noble Lord to dispute that. It seems to me pretty obvious that that has to be the case.
My Amendment 337C introduces
“a presumption that it is automatically dangerous cycling if the person is riding a bicycle capable of exceeding the legal 15.5 mph speed limit and weighs more than 30 kilograms”.
Thirty kilograms is a new concept, but it is now essential. A non-electric bike weighs between 8 kilograms and 15 kilograms, and most electric bikes now weigh about 25 kilograms. However, the company Lime has increased the weight of its bikes to 35 kilograms, leading to a phenomenon known as “Lime bike leg”. In August, the Telegraph reported the following, which the BBC also covered:
“I’m a trauma surgeon and treat patients with ‘Lime bike leg’ weekly … It’s a really common cause of leg injuries today”.
Lime bikes are 25kg heavier than normal pedestrian bikes. The report continued:
“Doctors have observed an increase in lower leg injuries caused by heavy e-bike frames falling on their riders”
and breaking their legs.
I fed into a road safety algorithm, “What would be the effect of a 35-kilogram bike with a 70-kilogram man sitting on it hitting a pedestrian at 25 mph?” and the answer was, “Almost certainly in every case: fatal with pretty horrific, catastrophic injuries”. Even at 15.5 mph, the injuries would be life-threatening, and totally fatal in the case of a child. Therefore, we must introduce a weight restriction, as well as strictly enforcing the 15.5 mph speed limit.
Would a “competent and careful cyclist” ever ride a bike on a pavement, or ride a 35-kilogram bike faster than 15.5 mph? Of course not. If someone is riding one of these massive, heavy, fast bikes, we do not need a subjective judgment on the quality of the riding; the criterion for dangerous cycling has been met per se.
My Amendment 337D would add an aggravating factor. It simply makes the point that if an innocent pedestrian is killed by a person using an illegal e-bike capable of going faster than 15.5 miles per hour and weighing more than 30 kilograms, an additional penalty should be applied. I apologise for my typo in the amendment; it says 25 kilograms, but it should be 30 kilograms. I suggest an additional five years, and a minimum of 15 years where a life sentence has been given. This is not for the ordinary cyclist who is reckless but for someone deliberately using a big, heavy, fast, killer bike.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I take this opportunity to wish my noble friend Lord Lucas a very speedy recovery from his operation. I also thank the Minister and the Home Office for in part adopting my Private Member’s Bill, with which the Minister is very familiar, but they do not go far enough. That is why I have taken the opportunity to table Amendments 341, 343 and 344.
I have asked for a separate debate on Clause 106, because a number of us have had long discussions with the excellent clerks in the Public Bill Office. Although there is a clause in my Private Member’s Bill that relates to insurance—I put on record the concerns of the insurance industry, not least the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, about the lack of insurance provisions in this Bill—I am told that it is not in order to put it in this Bill. I will raise those issues when we discuss Clause 106 standing part.
My Private Member’s Bill is my third attempt at such a Bill. The first attempt was during Covid, when we had no Private Members’ Bills because we were quite rightly busy passing all the regulations for processing Covid at every level. Then another year was missed, but my current Private Member’s Bill still remains on the Order Paper. I still hope that it will be adopted in full before the end of this parliamentary Session.
The genesis of my Private Member’s Bill was the very sad case, with which I am sure the Minister and the Home Office are familiar, of Kim Briggs, who was mown down on a public road by a bike that was completely illegal. It did not have brakes that failed; there were no brakes fitted to it at all. It was designed to be used exclusively on the velodrome for speed trials. Poor Kim Briggs stood no chance at all: she was mown down and killed. I realised when I met Matt Briggs, Kim’s widower, that current laws do not treat road traffic offences the same way as any other incident caused by other motoring offences. That is completely wrong.
A bicycle is not a vehicle, but it can have devastating consequences, as in the case of the death of Kim Briggs and several others. E-bikes, as we have heard, are heavier and go faster. Then, of course, we have e-scooters, which are, in fact, vehicles and are meant to be completely illegal.
My Amendment 343 is taken straight from my Private Member’s Bill. We were promised that there were going to be trials for a period of time—there were going to be pilot schemes to use e-bikes on a rented basis in a number of cities. These trials have gone on and on for ever, and during that time there have been at least six, 10 or a dozen deaths and a number of injuries caused by the misuse of these electric scooters. They are used as delivery vehicles and are used by criminals to steal smartphones and other items—handbags and all sorts—particularly at this time of year.
I would like to understand why—I hope the Minister will agree to do this in summing up this debate—we cannot bring those trials and the pilot schemes to an end, report to both Houses and bring in appropriate legislation. It is meant to be completely illegal to ride—to drive, in fact—an e-scooter in a public place. You are allowed to own them and operate them on private land, which normally means a car park or some other part of your estate. The gist of the amendment is to ensure that the Government will assess whether it is appropriate to legalise the use of privately owned electric scooters in public places in order to regulate their safe use and introduce compulsory insurance. That is where I wish the Government to go.
The cost to the country and to all of us who drive a vehicle is horrendous. It runs into millions every year because there is no means of registering or insuring these e-bikes or, indeed, e-scooters, as I have mentioned. So that is the general thrust of my Amendment 343: to bring these pilots to a halt and, if there is a case for e-scooters to remain, making them legal, whether rented or privately owned, to ensure that they are safe and registered and can be insured. I think that would be a great step forward and much safer indeed.
Amendment 344 asks simply that there should be an annual report on cycling offences. I was almost mown down by a very fast-moving—I have to say younger—woman coming at me at speed on a pavement. Now, unless I am mistaken, it is currently illegal, it is against the Highway Code, to cycle or use an e-scooter or an e-bike on a pavement, but these cyclists are doing so with alacrity. Fortunately, I managed to hop out the way, even with my advanced years. I noticed that there was a police van, and I asked the police whether they had witnessed this incident. They assured me that they had witnessed the incident, but they told me there is a policy of no pursuit of any person who commits road traffic offences, whether in the Highway Code or earlier road traffic offences. The question I would like to ask the Minister and the Committee today is: what are we doing here passing new provisions if the current provisions are simply being flouted and ignored, giving free licence to people who want to ride an e-bike, an e-scooter or a pedal bike on the pavement when it is illegal to do so? I would welcome an answer to that question.
As far as my Private Member’s Bill goes, I am delighted that Clauses 1 and 2 are more or less incorporated in Clause 106 in full, so a big thank you to the Minister for doing that. With Clause 2, I would like to understand why it was considered appropriate to remove the reference to Section 28 of an earlier Act in the earlier subsections of Clause 106.
Amendment 341 would prefer 14 years as an offence for causing death or injury in those circumstances, which is the tariff for other road traffic accidents of that severity. I think that is the intention of the Government, not imprisonment for life. I would welcome the Minister’s consideration of the amendments and my remarks. It is entirely inappropriate that we have laws in existence which are simply being flouted and that the pilot scheme and trials for e-scooters have not been brought to a halt. In tribute to those who died, such as the late Kim Briggs, more needs to be done to ensure that these very serious road traffic offences are finally recognised for their gravity, whether caused by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling and whether resulting in death or serious injury. There should be compulsory insurance and therefore registration going forward.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
I will speak to my Amendments 341A to 341D, 342A to 342F, 346A, 346B and 498A, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord McColl, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for adding their names to some of those amendments.
In 2015, 444 pedestrians were injured by cyclists. In 2024, this had increased to 603. Of those, the number of seriously injured rose from 97 to 181, and 25 of the casualties died. These numbers are based on police reporting, so it is clear that they are a minimum. They do not include incidents where the police did not attend a collision or incidents where pedestrians either did not need immediate medical treatment or later attended their GP or a hospital setting without telling the police.
Every day, particularly in our large towns and cities such as London, we see cyclists ignoring traffic regulations and putting people at risk, particularly pedestrians who have a disability or a lack of mobility, even when those same people are using pedestrian crossings. At night many cyclists are not displaying lights, wear dark clothing and ride dark cycles, and pedestrians and other road users just cannot see them.
I do not believe that cyclists are a group of people who are more criminal than the rest of society or than any other road users. However, they are less accountable than people who drive buses and cars, and general deterrence theory does not work for them. General deterrence theory claims that the risk of detection is the most effective deterrent to crime. Drivers of motor cars, lorries and buses know that there is a good chance that their behaviour will be noticed and probably investigated because they will be identified.
This identification process has allowed major strategic road safety measures to take effect. First, the licensing of drivers has allowed drivers to be prohibited from driving by the suspension of their licence. The introduction of automated cameras monitoring traffic speed and regulation has produced mass enforcement at dangerous locations to enhance police enforcement, which had proved inadequate, given the rise in the number of vehicles on the road and the miles of roads available. But these two measures are not available against cyclists. They have no licence or registration mark. This means that not only does the technology not work against them, but they cannot be identified for other road users, and they have no identification mark to offer for an investigator to identify them after they have behaved badly.
My amendments are all designed to remedy that situation. The Government usually respond to my proposals in a few predictable ways. First, they say that the health benefits of cycling outweigh the regulatory costs. I propose that at least 603 people in 2024 would not agree. How can the blatant disregard of our laws, intended to keep us safe, be allowed for cyclists, and why does their right to a healthy life trump the rights of pedestrians to feel safe?
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 346A and 346B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who has just spoken, as I have added my name to them. I support the other amendments in this group in general terms. There is a lot of dissatisfaction about the arrangements for cycles, e-bikes and e-scooters, and with the never-ending nature of e-scooter pilot schemes, which my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering has rightly condemned.
I am grateful to the Minister for introducing the new offences in Clause 106 to put cyclists on an equal footing with car drivers if they cause death or serious injury by dangerous or careless cycling. I am grateful to him for generously giving up time to meet me, with his officials, to discuss my various amendments to this Bill.
The truth is that, like others who have spoken, I do not believe that the Government’s proposals go far enough. I have been campaigning on the issue of the dangers of e-scooters and e-bikes for some years. It is a bit like online harm to children: you could see the matter getting worse day by day. We needed to take early action, yet nothing was done. I mainly blame the Department for Transport or its Ministers for this. They have a history of making the wrong judgment on important matters: investing in roads not railways in the 1950s and 1960s; pursuing HS2 rather than upgrading the existing railways, particularly in the north of England; and now prioritising cycling and e-scooters over pedestrians.
We have a Wild West. As a pedestrian, particularly in central London, you take your life in your hands every day. Scooters and cycles regularly ride on pavements and, because of electrification, they can go at high speeds—up to 70 miles per hour, according to the Sunday Telegraph. They cannot be heard and they steal up behind you, or approach at speed, making the pavement potentially as dangerous as the road. Those good enough to use the road or the huge number of cycle lanes that now pepper our capital have no compunction—they jump lights all the time. There is an arrogant culture of non-compliance with the law, made worse by recent legislation to give cycles priority. Both my husband and I have been knocked over.
The behaviour of cyclists and of some of those on scooters makes it dangerous to walk, particularly in the rush hour. Hired e-scooters are dumped on pavements, posing a hazard to walkers. If I was disabled, like my noble friend Lord Shinkwin, who has an amendment in a later group, I would now be extremely nervous about walking around town at all. The problem is relevant to everyone, not just those unlucky enough to be involved in a serious incident, so what can be done?
There has to be a major change in enforcement, since riding on pavements and through traffic lights is already illegal. I was glad to hear of the work by the City of London Police, and to read in the Metro last week that the Met have been having a bit of a crackdown, but these initiatives are, I fear, a drop in the ocean. I would add that some riders are criminals, out to steal your phone or your handbag, transporting drugs or riding bikes that have themselves been stolen. Three members of my family have had their bikes stolen in recent years.
The indulgent culture that I have described is fuelled by Department for Transport neglect and police failure to give this area of lawlessness any priority, although it actually represents a crime wave. It reminds me of those mopeds stealing handbags in Italy—that beloved country—when I was young, but experience here is now far worse. Who would have thought that this would happen in England?
The accident and fatality statistics are chilling. As we have heard, 603 pedestrians were struck by bikes in 2024, with one fatality; in 2023, four accidents were fatal and 188 people suffered broken bones. We have also heard from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, about the increase in lower leg injuries caused by Lime-style bikes, because they are so heavy. My conclusion is that there is a case for much stronger action, both from the perspective of neighbourhood safety and local crime prevention and as a contribution to reducing serious crime.
With his long experience at the Home Office, I know that the Minister is keen to take measures that work, so I would like him to make three changes. First, we need a national initiative to give scooter and cycle crime priority in enforcement by the police. I remember the Met’s Operation Bumblebee in the 1990s having a huge impact on burglary and its acceptability.
Secondly, we need to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with his knowledge, experience and common sense. We should agree to his proposal for a registration system, which, in an era of CCTV cameras, would hugely aid enforcement and be popular with every honest cycle or scooter owner, because it would make it easier for them to get stolen bikes back and deter the gangs from seizing banks of bikes for resale.
Thirdly, we should accept the noble Lord’s amendment to treat bikes and scooters that go more than 15.5 miles per hour like motorbikes or mopeds. They would need number plates and insurance, and riders would wear helmets, limiting head injuries and freeing up time in A&E. If riders cannot be shamed into keeping off pavements, the risk of being booked—what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, described as the “risk of detection”—should be restored, at least for these ultra dangerous vehicles. It may help to persuade the Minister that New York, in the land of the free, has already imposed a 15 miles per hour limit on e-bikes. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh also mentioned the benefits that insurance would bring. I realise that it does not seem to be in scope and, although everything they said is valid, I do not want that to be used as another excuse for delay.
I look forward to hearing from the Minister. This is his Bill, not the Department for Transport’s, and I hope he will be brave. For years, the department has done nothing to tackle this dreadful issue, having been persuaded by e-scooter and cycle lobbyists and, in his time, by Boris Johnson. As in other walks of life, and in the words of John F Kennedy, we pay a heavy price for allowing a problem to go unsolved.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I rise with a degree of trepidation after the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I declare an interest in that I am a regular cyclist on both a normal road bike and an e-bike.
What we have going on in the world of cycling and e-scooters has some parallels with your Lordships’ House, in the sense that it is a giant experiment in self-regulation. As we know from your Lordships’ House, particularly from some recent arrivals, the individually subjective interpretation of “self-regulation” can mean, on the one hand, regulation that suits oneself or, on the other hand, regulation that thinks about everybody else. I will say no more on that subject.
We have made a huge strategic mistake alongside a great success. We have been very successful, more than we ever imagined, in encouraging cycling across this country. But, while we have successfully encouraged cycling and put cycling infrastructure in place, the element we have completely ignored is how to do it safely, and how to enforce rules and laws. With the benefit of hindsight, to do the one without the other is blindingly stupid. The results are all around us—I see them every day when the weather is nice enough for me to bicycle here. There is virtually no policing at all. The chances of you being caught are non-existent.
I recall, about 14 years ago, a fatal accident not far from where I live in Fulham. For a period of about a week, there was a very heavy and visible police presence in the area where there had been the accident. Your Lordships will be aware that at every major traffic light junction, there is an area in front of where the cars are meant to stop, which is a box with a bicycle logo inside it that is meant only for bicyclists. Noble Lords will be aware, if they are observant, that not only is that box usually full of moped delivery drivers trying to get ahead and go as fast as they can but, in many cases, it is also full of motorists, many of whom I suspect have no idea what that box is there for. That happens every day.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I support the thrust of a number of the amendments that appear in this very broad group. Undoubtedly, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell, told us, we have a significant problem, particularly in London. My own anecdotal experience is of cyclists and e-cyclists totally flouting the law, riding on the pavement and riding the wrong way down one-way streets. This is particularly prevalent among delivery riders.
I tend to walk around London—probably a couple of miles a day; most days around the West End and to and fro your Lordships’ House—and I can confidently say that I have never once seen a cyclist or an e-cyclist stopped for any very overt offences. The noble Lord suggests that he has been stopped.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
I thought the noble Viscount was going to say “red light”.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
Perhaps so. It is not a question of having ineffective enforcement; I would say that we have no enforcement whatever—at least none that I have ever seen. If you have a law that is not enforced at all and is defined by people ignoring it, you have a serious problem. We should not be making additional laws on the subject if we do not have a high degree of confidence that they will be enforced, or else we are wasting everybody’s time here.
I invite the Minister, in the context of all the amendments in this big group, to give us a broad overview of what the Government are going to do about enforcement. I know there are other amendments later also talking about enforcement, but unless he can convince us about that, I suggest that there is not much point to many of the provisions in this part of the Bill.
I note that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with whom I agree on many aspects of this and other Bills, knocks the ball into the Government’s court to come up with a registration scheme for cycles. This causes me some reflection. I think it would be extremely difficult to do and would be a very large step indeed, so my preference would be for more enforcement—in essence, people being stopped for those offences—rather than the amount of complication that such a scheme would generate. Children riding cycles on their way to school, for example, cannot have points because they do not have licences. I can imagine any number of unintended consequences. However, we need to do something, and if it is a licensing scheme for the heavier, faster e-bikes, maybe that is what has to happen, and I think the Government need to grasp that.
I was very taken with my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s Amendment 337E. Stating for the avoidance of doubt that if you cycle on a pavement, you are by definition cycling without due care and attention seems eminently sensible, just to make the law a bit clearer. Amendment 346B on e-bikes in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is very important. I should declare an interest in that I have a mountain bike and an e-bike. I have two, as it happens, and I use them occasionally—not at the same time, I have to say; that would be too difficult.
People who want to move around London quickly have a choice. Either they buy a motorcycle and pass a complicated series of tests to get that motorcycle licence—if they go for the full licence; it is a lesser standard for smaller machines. They need to tax the vehicle; they need to insure it; and they need an MoT if it is of that age. Or they could ignore all that and get an illegal electric cycle with comparable performance to a moped, and no one seems to be stopping them, as far as I can see. They have no insurance, no tax, no registration and, happy days, no one is stopping them for any offences whatever.
There are, of course, proper electric motorbikes where you have to wear a helmet, have a registration and so forth—indeed, I think there are a few Peers who come to your Lordships’ House on such machines. We have a very broad spectrum, but at the moment a lot of people, particularly delivery drivers, are riding vehicles that are not being pedalled; they are just pushing an electric throttle, in essence. These are obviously illegal: even as an amateur, I can see that a policeman would have every right to stop them and impound that vehicle, so I think we have to make that clearer. I think by 15.5 miles an hour, we mean a maximum powered speed, because of course if you head downhill, you will go much faster, as with a conventional cycle. However, I think we have to say, for the avoidance of doubt, “That is a motorcycle”, if it does not meet the criteria, “and if you ride that without tax, registration, insurance and so forth, you are committing a series of significant offences, and you will be arrested and prosecuted for such”.
Lord Shinkwin (Con)
My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for not being in my seat when my noble friend Lord Blencathra began his remarks on Amendment 330. I am very grateful to the Government Whip for taking into account the rather pathetic speed with which I can get from the Library to the Chamber. I thank him for that.
At 429 pages in length, with 16 parts, 21 schedules and 159 pages of amendments, this Bill is truly a legislative Christmas tree. I am worried it is about to topple on the Minister, which would not be very festive. I will therefore keep my remarks disproportionately brief and save the bulk of them for my related amendment, Amendment 346C, which is due to be considered later in group 9.
However, I thank those noble Lords who tabled these important amendments on dangerous, careless and inconsiderate cycling. In my view, they are pure common sense. I would say that we are reinventing the wheel in ensuring public safety on our roads and pavements, but I am not sure we have progressed that far, such is the scale of the anarchy that currently plagues our streets. We have, as we have heard, so much to do to reverse it.
The worst thing is that the situation we find ourselves in is entirely self-inflicted, predictable and even logical. Our response needs to be equally as logical. That is why I support these amendments; they point a practical way forward in the struggle—and there is no denying this is a struggle—against the very real threat posed by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling, especially to anyone with a mobility, visual or hearing impairment.
In conclusion, I welcome these amendments, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, most of what I wanted to cover has already been spoken to, so I have very little to add. I did, however, want to pick up on a couple of points the noble Lord, Lord Russell, covered. For me, this is about disorder. There is a sense of unfairness for a lot of people that if you are a driver, you are subject to a huge number of restrictions—especially in London, with tighter-than-ever speed limits—and yet cyclists ride along in a way that seems to be flouting the laws of the road.
I will also pick up on something my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady McIntosh covered about the length of the trials that go on for e-scooters. I believe the same can be said for the seemingly never-ending approach to the consultation on pedicabs. We legislated for pedicabs to be subject to regulations 18 months ago, and it took us years to do that. TfL has done one consultation, has just completed another and it will be 2026 before regulations for pedicabs are in place. The length of time it takes for us to actually do anything which is seemingly common sense adds to people’s sense of frustration and disappointment that things that should not be happening are allowed to happen just because there is no simple enforcement.
The other thing I want to add is about delivery bikes. Often, they are the worst perpetrators of cycling on pavements, going through red lights and cycling at speed. We know they are doing this because there is a commercial imperative for them to act in that way.
Rather curiously, I was approached recently by one of the big digital delivery service businesses. It is concerned that the new provisions for additional protection against assault for retail workers do not apply to its delivery drivers. I am not advocating for what it is asking for, but, as I said to this particular company in reply to its email to me, my question to the company is: what is it doing as a business to make sure that its delivery drivers actually obey the law and do not drive in an anti-social way, on pavements, and so on?
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. Many of the amendments seem to be shaped by individuals’ bugbears that they experience a lot on the streets of London. This group of amendments looks to increase penalties for dangerous cycling and raises other issues regarding cycling and scootering which cause danger to others. I welcome some of the amendments; they have raised interesting points.
The Bill sees cycling offences updated and brought in line with driving offences. I will give some context to the debate today. It should be remembered that, according to figures released by the Department for Transport in September, in 2024, 82 pedal cyclists were killed in Great Britain, while 3,822 were reported to be seriously injured and 10,645 slightly injured. Going further, in the latest DfT accredited official statistics, published on 25 September, its pedestrian fact sheet shows that nine pedestrians were killed and 738 seriously injured by one pedal cycle. Let us compare this to the 1,047 pedestrians killed by one car, and the 19,241 seriously injured. Clearly, any death or serious injury on our roads is one too many, but it is important that, as we debate this legislation, we understand the full picture.
We on these Benches support a proportionate and evidence-based approach to updating the law, where any changes do not discourage people from cycling, which we believe is an important mode of sustainable transport. However, as we have heard in this debate, we have seen a rise in fast food deliveries by e-bikes and e-scooters, and in micromobility sharing schemes. They have become like an explosion across our cities. Time is literally money for all of these riders—those delivering food are being paid per minute to use these bikes or scooters. Therefore, riders take risks. They break the Highway Code, moving at high speeds across pavements and roads, as we have heard, putting themselves and others at risk. We want to see an end to this danger on our roads.
I am intrigued by the discussion on the e-scooter trials, which have gone on a long time. Let us be clear: they were extended five times by the previous Government. They started in 2020 and have now been extended to May 2028. It is clear that this has been going on under two different parties in government.
The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, look to tackle the issue of dangerous cycling through the disqualification of a person from cycling. While at first glance this may appeal, in reality it would pose significant challenges with regard to enforcement, as cyclists, as we have heard, do not require licences. It is very unlikely that a person disqualified from cycling who decides to ignore that disqualification would be caught and convicted.
Logically, the only potential way to address this would be to introduce a licensing system for cyclists, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, proposes in Amendment 346A, where he has set out his thinking in detail. However, that is likely to be complicated, costly and disproportionate. In contrast, the noble Lord’s other amendments—seeking to add 12 points to a person’s driving licence for dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling that causes serious injury or death—seem more sensible and a reasonable way forward, which would give a greater range of options for the judge in such cases. We agree that this would be far more manageable than trying to bring in a national licensing scheme for all cyclists and cycles. Given that 84% of people aged 18 years or over who cycle hold a driving licence, according to the latest Cycling UK report, this could be an effective penalty.
Amendment 337F, from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, looks to define a “cycle” as including a pedal cycle, an e-bike and an electric scooter. Given the rise in different types of micromobility, we believe that this is a reasonable amendment to try to cover all types of cycles that can cause injury, as they may otherwise fall through a loophole.
Amendment 346B, from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, seeking to clarify the definition of e-bikes and motorbikes, looks reasonable—certainly on an initial reading—but we would like to hear the Minister’s thoughts on it. Are there any practical reasons that could make this difficult? We have sympathy with its aims, but we look forward to hearing the Government’s response.
The other amendments in this group are clearly looking to tighten up further the law on dangerous, careless and inconsiderate cycling. Some, such as Amendment 341, from the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, look to change the penalties for causing death by dangerous cycling. We do not believe that these amendments are needed and we do not support them. However, it is important that road traffic law is enforced with equal vigour for cyclists and all road users, to secure everyone’s safety. One of the challenges not covered in the Bill or in our discussions today—it is the elephant in the room—is the limited number of road traffic police officers across the country and the clear need to invest in this part of the police workforce.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the many important points that have been raised by noble Lords today, to see how we can ensure that our streets are safer for all road users.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to this important group of amendments.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, I believe that the data provides an important context to this area. In 2023, there were four pedestrian fatalities and 185 serious injuries where a pedestrian was hit by a cyclist. Over the past decade, the average number of pedestrians killed annually by a cyclist has been three per year. On the roads more widely, in 2023, there were 87 pedal cyclist fatalities in Great Britain, with almost 4,000 people seriously injured and a further 10,000 classed as slightly injured. The most recent data from 2024 shows that fatalities from pedal cycles fell to 82 but serious injuries remained significant, even as overall pedal cycle traffic increased.
Moreover, as the Government recognise, the current maximum penalties for dangerous or careless cycling—a fine of up to £2,500 for dangerous cycling or £1,000 for careless cycling—are plainly inadequate to reflect the severity of incidents that result in serious injury or death. I therefore welcome that the Bill introduces the new offences of causing death by dangerous cycling, punishable with up to life imprisonment, and of causing serious injury by dangerous cycling, punishable with up to 5 years’ imprisonment. Those are severe sentences, but rightly so. In my view, they are reasonable and proportionate measures.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh spoke to her Amendment 341, which would remove the life sentence from the causing-death offence and replace it with 14 years’ imprisonment. With all due respect to her, I believe that, on this occasion, the Government have got the maximum penalty right. The penalties for the new cycling offences exactly mirror the penalties for causing death or serious injury by dangerous driving in the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Causing death by dangerous cycling is just as serious as causing death by dangerous driving. As such, it is entirely appropriate for the punishments to be the same. However, we must do more.
While cyclists are required to abide by the Highway Code and other relevant traffic legislation, we know that far too many do not. We have heard many descriptions from across your Lordships’ House this evening of the conduct of cyclists in London and elsewhere. One only has to walk down Whitehall and over Lambeth Bridge to witness the appalling conduct of a number of cyclists. We heard from my noble friend Lady McIntosh about her own experience, from the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe.
All too often, cyclists jump red lights, and they fail to stop at pedestrian crossings. While we rightly take injuries and death caused by cycling very seriously, the far greater problem is the general nuisance caused by cyclists who do not abide by the rules of the road. We currently hold drivers to a far higher standard than we do cyclists, and, quite frankly, enforcement needs to catch up.
This is even truer with regard to electric cycles. My Amendment 346 would create a new offence of altering the maximum speed and the rate of acceleration of an electric bike. Currently, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, referred to, an electrically assisted pedal cycle is defined by 2015 regulations as being a bike with a maximum speed of 15.5 miles per hour and having an electric motor not exceeding 250 watts of continuously rated power output. Any bike with a maximum speed above that should be classed as a motorbike for the purposes of road traffic policing. In this regard, I agree entirely with Amendments 337F and 346B tabled by my noble friend Lord Blencathra and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, respectively. The Bill as drafted focuses on cycles but does not explicitly include electrically assisted pedal bikes—e-bikes—or e-scooters. That legal ambiguity could quickly be exploited. Amendment 337F seeks to ensure that there is no loophole. Amendment 346B in the name of noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, seeks to make absolutely clear that where an electric bike is capable of exceeding 15.5 miles per hour, it should be treated as a moped or motorbike for policing purposes.
These amendments complement the new offence that I am proposing through my amendment. By placing penalties and sanctions on those who might try to modify their electric bikes to increase the speed above the limit, we give the police the necessary enforcement powers to prevent anti-social and reckless cycling that places pedestrians in harm’s way. Many modern e-bikes are heavy, fast and capable of inflicting severe harm, especially if ridden irresponsibly on pavements or in pedestrian zones. To treat such vehicles as equivalent to push bikes would be to ignore both the mechanics and the risks.
On Amendment 337E, I wholeheartedly agree with my noble friend Lord Blencathra. Pavements are designated for pedestrians. Cyclists riding on pavements or in pedestrian-only areas pose a clear danger to the most vulnerable. By making it explicit that cycling on a pavement or in another pedestrian-only area counts as
“cycling without due care and attention”,
the amendment eliminates the ambiguity that currently hampers consistent enforcement. It is another aspect of a cyclist’s behaviour that should not occur but is all too often the norm. It reflects a simple principle of equity. Where a pedestrian is hit by a vehicle on the road, the driver of such a vehicle may be prosecuted for careless or dangerous driving. A pedestrian hit by a cyclist on the pavement deserves to be treated with no less seriousness.
I also support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, relating to putting penalty points on driving licences for serious offences. That recognises the true severity of such offences. Misconduct on a bike should impact the standing of those with driving licences, especially where the behaviour demonstrates a disregard for road and pedestrian safety. On all these amendments, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, it seems an awful long time since my cycling proficiency test. We can debate whether standards have slipped in the 50-plus years since I took my test, but I think it is a common experience of all noble Lords who have spoken that a small minority of cyclists’ reckless actions potentially put people at risk. As a temporary resident of London during the week, I regularly see cyclists on pavements and going through red lights. I can report that, on crossing a zebra crossing one evening, I myself was almost hit by a cyclist, who was then pulled over by a police car not 100 metres later, much to my satisfaction. So it is possible for enforcement to happen.
I want to start with enforcement, because it is a thread that has run through a number of noble Lords’ contributions. It is right that strict legislation is already in place for cyclists, and the police do have the power to prosecute if these laws are broken. Cyclists have a duty to behave in a safe and responsible way that is reflected in the highway code. The Road Traffic Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, mentioned, imposes a fine of £2,500 for dangerous cycling and of £1,000 for careless cycling. The Road Traffic Act 1988 also makes it an offence to ride a bike if a person is unfit to do so due to drink or drugs. A considerable amount of activity is undertaken by the police to enforce these potential breaches of legislation. In fact, the Government themselves have pledged £2.7 million for each of the next three years to support police enforcement action on road traffic offences in the form of Operation Topaz, which is a strategic partnership between the Department for Transport, the Home Office and the National Police Chiefs’ Council.
I was pleased also to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about the City of London Police, who I know have taken this matter extremely seriously. They have cycling police officers who can catch offenders who have gone off-road into areas where vehicles or police officers on foot could not catch them, so it is important we recognise that. We have had contributions today from the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Lord Shinkwin, Lord Hogan-Howe, and Lord Blencathra, who introduced amendments on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. We have also heard from the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell of Beeston, Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lady Pidgeon and Lady McIntosh of Pickering. All have touched on the issues of enforcement and whether the legislation is significant enough.
I want to draw the Committee’s attention to Clause 106, which is where these amendments are coming from. Clause 106 underlines the Government’s determination that cyclists who cause death or serious injury should face the full force of the law, as if that were done by a motor vehicle. The criminal justice system should not fail fully to hold to account the small minority of cyclists whose reckless actions lead to tragic consequences. A number of contributors to the debate have mentioned their personal experiences and have also witnessed incidents. There is a whole cohort of cyclists who obey the law and who perform well, and as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would anticipate me saying, there is a health benefit to cycling that should be recognised and encouraged. However, there is certainly a holding to account of death and serious injury, and that is where the Government are coming from as a starting point to the debate today.
A wide group of amendments has been put forward, and I will try to touch on each amendment in turn. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, spoke on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. I spoke to him before he went on his short, I hope, leave of absence from the House and discussed these amendments with him briefly. I wish him well for his speedy recovery and thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing the amendments on his behalf.
Amendments 330, 338, 339, 340 and 342 would allow persons to be disqualified from cycling upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 106. Again, let us not forget that Clause 106 contains the penalty of significant jail time, and potentially a life sentence with significant jail time added to it. I agree that dangerous or careless cyclists are a serious risk to others, but disqualification would pose significant challenges. This may touch on other, later amendments, but self-evidently, cyclists are not currently required to have licences, and the only obvious way to address this would be to introduce a licensing system. However, such a system would be complicated, costly and, I would argue, potentially disproportionate, in that it would be created solely to enforce offences perpetrated by a small minority of people. Again, I do not think the noble Lord intended his amendment to serve as a barrier to cycling, but my concern is that it would risk implementation of this and would not really be workable.
In his own right, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, introduced Amendments 337B and 337F. Again, these would introduce greater criminal penalties for cyclists riding heavier, faster e-bikes. I do understand that, as has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords, it is e-bikes that have been illegally modified for greater speed that represent an inherently greater risk to other road users. There is no longer any weight limit, following enactment of the Electrically Assisted Pedal Cycle Regulations 1983, but they do specify that the electrically assisted speed for e-bikes is limited to 15.5 miles per hour. E-bikes that can achieve greater speeds would not be compliant with these regulations and therefore would be classed as motor vehicles. Because they are motor vehicles, a person using such could already be prosecuted under the existing offences in the Road Traffic Act 1988 of causing death or serious injury, which carry the same penalties as proposed in the new cycling offences: a life sentence with a 14-year potential sentence.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
Just for clarification, the Minister said that they will be classed as motor vehicles. Does that mean they are still motor vehicles, even though they might not be registered or insured?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
They are classed as motor vehicles for the purposes of the legislation if they can travel above 15.5 miles per hour; but they are not, self-evidently, for the reasons I have already outlined, subject to the licensing arrangements that we have to date.
Mandatory uplifts based on specific vehicle type would be a novel but also an inconsistent approach to sentencing. Sentencing should always reflect the facts of the case and the level of culpability. Introducing rigid statutory additions could undermine the principle of proportionality, create inconsistency and risk setting an undesirable precedent. On the noble Lord’s amendments on changing the “careless and inconsiderate” cycling definition, I understand his desire to put beyond doubt that cycling on a pavement or in an area intended only for pedestrians should be considered as cycling without due care and attention. However, cycling on pavements is already an offence in its own right, as set out in Section 72 of the Highways Act 1835, which is an awfully long time ago and has stood the test of time. It is also an offence under Section 129 of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984. Given that these offences are still in place, I would suggest that, along with those in the Bill for serious offences, that provides a sufficient deterrent.
Amendment 337F would insert the definition of a cycle. Again, I come back to Section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which already defines cycles, and this definition includes compliant electrically assisted pedal cycles. As I said earlier, an e-bike that does not comply with the relevant legislation is a motor vehicle for the purposes of the legislation, not a cycle.
I turn to a series of amendments—341A to 341D, 342A to 342F, 346A, 346B and 498A—in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which propose that a person could receive up to 12 points on their driving licence upon conviction of any of the offences in Clause 106. Reaching 12 points on their driving licence would, of course, disqualify them from driving a motor vehicle.
As I have mentioned already, cyclists do not require any form of licence to cycle, therefore the noble Lord proposes points on a driving licence as an alternative penalty. In the Sentencing Bill, which is currently before your Lordships’ House, there is already a new driving prohibition requirement that the court can impose when giving a community or suspended sentence order. This prohibition will allow a court to take a more flexible and tailored approach to punishment than a driving disqualification, and it will be available irrespective of the offence that has been committed. I hope that the noble Lord agrees that the provision in the Sentencing Bill goes some way towards meeting his objective.
The noble Lord’s Amendments 346A and 498A seek to create a registration scheme for the purposes of enforcing the new offences in Clause 106—
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, on the point about the prohibition that might come from the Sentencing Bill, is the danger that unless the sentencing guidelines shift to reflect that new piece of legislation, you will end up with a very inconsistent approach in at least 43 police force areas as applied by the magistrates in those areas? If it is just a random event, they might lose their driving licence because of anti-social behaviour, some of which might be on a cycle. I understand the principal point that the Minister makes but I am not convinced that it will lead to a radical change in the way that cyclists are called to account through their driving licence.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
It is ultimately for the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the Sentencing Bill, to look at sentencing guideline issues later. I cannot give assurances on those points today. However, the Sentencing Bill is currently before this House and it is trying to look at those issues as a whole. When it is law, my noble friend Lady Levitt and others will look at guidelines and those potential enforcement issues as a matter of some urgency. The Sentencing Bill proposes, in some way, one of the issues that the noble Lord seeks to achieve.
Again, self-evidently, a registration scheme for cycles would make enforcement of offences easier. The absence of a registration scheme does not make enforcement impossible. As the noble Lord will know, the police would be expected to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry that are open to them by examining other evidence before them at the time of any potential incident.
As with the example of licensing for cyclists that I referred to earlier, the House must accept that the likely significant cost and complexity of introducing a registration scheme for cyclists would mean, for example—this was mentioned in one of the contributions today—that all cycle owners, including children and those making new purchases, would have to submit their information to a central database. That central database would be required to keep the information and the ownership up to date, and some form of registration plate would need to be affixed to a cycle. To give the noble Lord one statistic, the Bicycle Association has estimated that nearly 1.5 million new cycles were sold in 2024. That is a big undertaking. I know that the noble Lord understands that, but the enforceability of the existing legislation is the key, and the work that we are doing, which I have opened my remarks with, would be key to that and would counterbalance the potential cost to the public purse of establishing the registration scheme.
Amendment 346B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, seeks for e-bikes, which are currently faster and more powerful, to be treated as motorbikes or mopeds for policing purposes. The Electrically Assisted Pedal Cycles Regulations 1983 mean that e-bikes which do not comply with existing regulations will be treated as motor vehicles for policing purposes. The Department for Transport, which has overall responsibility for these areas, has published fact sheets explaining that e-bikes which do not comply with regulations will be treated as motor vehicles.
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has tabled Amendments 341, 343 and 344, which seek to reduce the penalty for causing death by dangerous driving from life imprisonment to 14 years’ imprisonment. We have taken the view—I am pleased with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on this—that the offences in the Bill bring into line this behaviour so that it is subject to maximum penalties equivalent to those already in place for dangerous driving offences, which is life imprisonment.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
The Minister referred in a debate last week to a Bill currently before the House with micromobility provisions. It would be interesting to know whether the consultation has already taken place before that aspect of the Bill. I am sure that it is in his notes, but I cannot for the life of me remember what Bill it was. Also, the amount of funding from the Home Office that the department has announced is an operational matter. It is very welcome, but how will he ensure that each individual force such as the Met will use that money and implement enforcement?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
There are operational issues. We put the money into Operation Topaz for all police forces to examine them, and ultimately it is for the forces to determine. The City of London Police has determined who is a problem in the City of London. There is a strong argument for parts of the country to face further enforcement measures because self-evidently there are problems. There will be public consultation before any new regulations come into force. It is a Department for Transport matter, so I hope that the noble Baroness will allow me to reflect on that with regard to when the consultation is. I will get back to her as a matter of course.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 344 seeks to require reporting annually on cycling offences. We already publish annual statistics on those killed and seriously injured—in fact, a number of noble Lords and Ladies have quoted those in the debate today. Therefore, I suggest that this is already covered.
Amendment 346, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to make it an offence to tamper with an e-bike. I accept that some people may well tamper with or modify their e-bikes to increase their speed, but as I already mentioned, this is already an offence under Section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Should the police issue a fixed penalty notice, this would result in a £300 fine and six penalty points, and should the case go to court, it could result in an unlimited fine and driving disqualification.
I have tried to cover a number of points; I apologise for not referring individually to every point made by every noble Lord. The broad thrust is that there is a problem—we recognise that. There should be enforcement—we are trying to address that. There is a new measure in the Bill, Clause 106, to increase the level of penalty for causing death and serious injury by dangerous cycling. We recognise that and I welcome the support of the House. A range of discussion points and measures have been brought forward today around lifting, increasing or changing the penalties accordingly. We may well revisit those on Report, but the Government are right in recognising the problem, putting some money into enforcement and making dangerous cycling and causing death by cycling further offences with serious consequences.
I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw and not to press his amendments on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
I am sorry that I could not be here at the beginning of this group. My noble friend has given a very encouraging response to the many amendments—
Lord in waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, the Minister has gone over time, but in any case the noble Lord needed to be here at the start of the group to be able to intervene during the debate.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful. This Minister would not have gone over time had he not given way, but he now has gone over time and so will sit down. I commend the course of action that I suggested to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for his decency in replying as fully as he possibly could. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, that there are many more groups to go on cycling, and I think he will have a chance of input there.
The general thrust that the Minister detected is one thing, but, if I may say so, my forecast was right. I said at the beginning that the general thrust I would detect was that Peers from all sides would be highly critical that not enough is being done. Clause 106 is okay as far as it goes, but there is a much wider problem out there, as articulated by nine other Peers from all sides, in addition to me. My noble friends LadyMcIntosh of Pickering and Lady Stowell asked why this never-ending consultation is taking place. Someone said that, as this is a Home Office Bill, why does it not just get on with it? It may be a Home Office Bill, but it is the Department for Transport’s policy, and that is where the rot lies.
Those who criticised the last Government were absolutely right to do so. I condemn in no uncertain terms the Department for Transport under the leadership from 2019 to 2022 of Mr Grant Shapps, who was obsessed with getting more and more e-bikes and e-scooters on the road. The reason the consultations were extended was, in my view, and in what was tipped off to me, that he wanted to get so many more e-bikes out there that it would be impossible to pull back on them. It is like the police saying that everybody is shoplifting and so there is nothing they can do about it. Mr Shapps wanted to say, “Everyone has got e-bikes now, so we cannot put in a registration system and we cannot control them”.
If noble Lords want further evidence of the Department for Transport’s attitude, in February 2024 it went out to consultation again. The consultation was to double the size of the electric motor from 250 watts to 500 watts and to introduce an additional speeding system. There were 2,100 responses; the vast majority of professionals—police forces and others—totally condemned it, and the Department for Transport had to pull that back, and rightly so. But mark my words, it will try it on again and again.
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made a very good point: why should cyclists have a right to a healthy life but not the pedestrians who are getting mowed down? He tabled some good amendments that would be excellent. He made the point that although everyone has called for more enforcement, you cannot have more enforcement if you do not know the bike and the identity of the person riding it.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe made the point that the amendments just do not go far enough. She used the term Wild West. I assume she was quoting the press release—I have it here—from the Mayor of London, Mr Sadiq Khan, who said that very thing last month: London is now a Wild West for e-bikes.
The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, made an absolutely excellent speech, and I commend him for it. He is right to say that we have boosted cycling, which is a good thing, but have not boosted the safety protocols. He is right about cyclists jumping red lights. You do not have to go far to see that; go to our prison gates at the Peers’ entrance and stand there and look at the pedestrian crossing and the lights. Last week, when the lights changed to red for the cars, I was halfway across when a cyclist tried to come through. I stopped and said: “Get back! Get back!” He did actually stop and move back a bit. That happens all the time. They use the red lights as an excuse; when cars stop, the cyclists belt through.
My noble friend Lord Goschen made the point that there is no enforcement at all. He wondered why anyone would bother to buy a moped or a small motorbike, when you have to have an MOT and insurance and pass a test, when they can buy an e-bike which goes 70 miles an hour and does everything you want, and you do not have to do anything to register or insure it, and no one will stop you when you break the law.
My noble friend Lord Shinkwin made the comment, rightly so, that there is a threat to disabled people. I am glad the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, welcomed my definition of cycles. It is possible that that was the only thing she agreed with me on, but I will take any little crumbs of comfort. I am glad that my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel supported most of my amendments, as I fully support his. I did ask for tougher penalties, but I am now content that the penalties are okay.
The Minister, in his speech, which was as courteous as usual, said that only a small minority break the law. He is right, I think, when that applies to the conventional cyclists and not e-bikes. In the past, it was my experience that it was a tiny minority of Lycra louts—the ones with their heads down between the handlebars and their backsides up in the air, belting through lights. I submit that I am certain that the majority of e-bike riders are breaking the law one way or another, either by excessive speed or by riding through lights or on the pavement. I can say with absolute certainty that 100% of the food delivery drivers are breaking the law, but more of that in another group. I disagree with the Minister that we cannot have a simple presumption that if people are riding a bike on the pavement then it is automatically, per se, and without any other judgment needed, seen as driving without due care and attention.
I simply say this again. I always come in with slightly more trenchant views than many other colleagues in the House, but we have had support today from colleagues with much more moderate amendments than mine. I am fairly certain we will see that when we come to the other groups. The Minister has to go back to the Department for Transport and tell it to get off its high horse and on to its bike. We must have proper amendments to toughen up the law and deal with all the other abuses of e-bikes, particularly in London. In those circumstances, on the assumption that we will be doing more work on this, I beg leave to withdraw my noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 330.
“(b) in subsection (1) at the beginning insert “Subsection to subsection (1A),”;(c) after subsection (1), insert—“(1A) The court may only make a stalking protection order against a defendant if conditions A and B are met—(a) condition A is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has engaged in stalking behaviour towards a person; (b) condition B is that the order is necessary and proportionate to protect that person from stalking, or the risk of stalking, carried out by the defendant.”.”
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 330A, I will speak to Amendment 330B, tabled in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and to Amendments 330AZA and 356E, tabled in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. In doing so, I welcome this weekend’s announcements that were part of the Government’s strategy to halve violence against women and girls in the next 10 years, and I look forward to the publication of the strategy later this week.
We owe much to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her 2019 stalking Bill that created stalking protection orders—SPOs—which were introduced in January 2020. The Government have recognised that the SPO process is in need of reform. Strengthening the use of SPOs was a manifesto commitment within their plan to have violence against women and girls over the next decade. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services’ response to the stalking super-complaint highlighted the need to change the legal framework for SPOs and align them more closely to orders available in domestic abuse cases. The amendments in this group seek to reform SPOs to ensure the victims of stalking are swiftly protected from further harm.
Amendment 330A seeks to clarify the evidential threshold for obtaining an SPO, to bring this in line with domestic abuse protection orders—DAPOs—and so ensure swifter and less onerous access to these protective orders. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 provides that the magistrates’ court may make an SPO if it is satisfied that the offender has carried out acts associated with stalking. However, the legislation does not explicitly state the evidential standard to be applied. This lack of clarity can lead to inconsistent interpretation and application across police forces and courts in England and Wales. In practice, some courts have applied the criminal standard of proof when determining whether the conditions for an SPO are met. This approach means that police forces need to gather evidence similar to that required for a full criminal prosecution in order to secure an SPO. Consequently, victims face significant delays in obtaining protection, leaving them at risk.
For example, a woman called Juliana experienced online harassment, criminal damage and vexatious complaints to her employer by her stalker. She reported it to the police, and her perpetrator was arrested. While an SPO was considered throughout the investigation, there was slow progress made by the police to submit her application. Multiple witness statements were obtained to support her SPO and legal services within the police were contacted. Seven months later, Juliana is still awaiting a court date for the hearing. Due to the time elapsed, she is concerned that her perpetrator will soon be let out on bail and she will have no protective measures in place. By contrast, under Section 32 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, a court may issue a DAPO on the civil standard of proof. This lower evidential threshold allows for swifter intervention and the earlier safeguarding of victims.
According to the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, approximately half of stalking victims do not have a prior relationship with the offender, which means that there is a disparity in protection between the victims who qualify for a DAPO, who have a relationship with the offender, and those who must rely on an SPO. Given that stalking related to domestic abuse and stalking not related to domestic abuse have comparable impacts on victims, I suggest that the threshold should be consistent for both types of protective order.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have Amendments 330AA, 330AB and 330C. I have also signed Amendments 331 and 332 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, which start at Amendment 330A. She and I have been involved in strengthening the law for victims of stalking since the stalking law inquiry in 2011, which led to the first stalking laws, enacted 13 years ago on 25 November 2012.
Two decades ago, I was stalked for three years by my Conservative political opponent when I stood for Parliament in Watford. After he was caught in 2008, even though he pleaded guilty to over 60 crimes, including criminal damage to property and criminal damage using a knife, there was no separate crime of stalking from harassment. So the abusive and some sexual literature that was circulated widely on the streets, the anonymous letters to residents, the silent calls late at night when I was on my own in my flat and the feeling of always being watched just did not count in the court—other than as the same as an argument between neighbours over the height of a hedge.
The police came and advised us on security and precautions for our house, and my then teenage foster son had to learn from the police how to always put on plastic gloves before picking up any post. I never knew which of my supporters the stalker would target next. Now, we recognise that this is a tried and tested formula for stalkers—going for their friends, their family and, in this case, my political supporters.
When the stalking law came in it was much welcomed. However, after it was implemented, the practicalities became clear. Often, neither the police nor the CPS would use a charge of stalking until that case was proven beyond all possible doubt. So there was no mechanism to provide protection to victims of stalking earlier in the perpetrator’s fixation. That is why the stalking protection orders, introduced in 2019 by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, were thought to be a really helpful tool to help dissuade perpetrators and give reassurance to victims that they would be safe. But we have to consider now whether they are fully effective.
This group of amendments seeks to address the weaker points of SPOs, the result of which is causing considerable distress to victims of stalking, both domestic and non-domestic. My Amendment 330AA seeks to better protect victims from offenders who try falsely to use educational or religious reasons to gain proximity to their victims. The Bill currently states that the prohibitions or requirements in an SPO should
“avoid … any conflict with … religious beliefs”,
and with attending work and educational establishments. Although that is not inherently objectionable in itself, it should be a matter for guidance and probably not in the legislation, as this clause would give priority to an offender’s right to freedom over the safeguarding of the victim. We know that stalking perpetrators already use religious beliefs in attempts to contact their victims, in defiance of protective orders. There are examples of offenders claiming to attend the same religious institution as their victim in an attempt to be allowed into the area. The problem is that the inclusion of the clause in the Bill risks these claims becoming more commonplace. Thus, it should be dealt with in the form of guidance.
My Amendment 330AB would ensure consultation with victims when SPOs are varied, renewed or discharged. Currently, there is no requirement to hear the views of the victim—if they wish them to be heard—despite the fact that the victim is the individual being protected by the SPO and thus may have relevant information that the court should hear prior to making a decision. It is unreasonable to expect the police or other authorities to know all the details of a victim’s activities, so it is important that a victim’s views are sought prior to an application being decided upon.
This amendment would require police to consult with a victim following an application to change an SPO. As an illustration, Lisa is a victim of stalking, and her offender made an application to vary certain terms of a restraining order. The proposed changes—allowing the offender to travel down certain arterial roads on the pretence that it was their route in and out of London—seemed inherently reasonable. However, it was only when Lisa’s views were sought that it became evident that the road included a petrol station she frequented and cut through a park in which her children walked regularly. This information would not have been readily available if the victim was not consulted. In this case, the information provided by the victim enabled the CPS to mount an effective defence. The application to vary the terms of the restraining order was then denied.
Amendment 330C would create a requirement to issue guidance on SPOs. Currently, the Bill says that the Secretary of State “may” issue guidance in relation to stalking. A briefing, along with many other significant pieces of work, such as the stalking super-complaint and the HMICFRS reports, made clear the confusion and inconsistency when it comes to the response to stalking. The need for guidance is clear. The Domestic Abuse Act’s section on guidance states that the Secretary of State “must” issue guidance. This amendment proposes similar wording to support future clarity and consistency.
Amendment 331 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to which I have added my name, is important. It would ensure that stalking is part of the VAWG strategy, which is due to be published this week, while also ensuring that the terms of reference for the Wright review cover non-domestic stalking; too often, the police do not take that seriously. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, that the review is under way. We did not withdraw the amendment because we wanted to make sure that some of the details discussed today will be covered.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I was very happy to add my name to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I arrived slightly later to the party than the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Brinton, because I was not around when they nobly started tackling this difficult subject. However, once I arrived, I was happy to try to help in whatever way I could.
The amendments in this group are interwoven with an awful lot of other legislation that we have passed in recent years and are discussing today because many of the same traits, particularly behavioural traits, are still there, together with some of the challenges that the different authorities have in trying both to understand this behaviour and to do something about it. The parallel drawn in Amendment 330A between the DAPO, to which domestic abuse perpetrators are subject, and the stalking protection order, which has nothing like the same power or speed, is a good analogy. I ask the Government to look at and consider that very carefully. If the Government were to talk with the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, they would find, I suspect, that Dame Nicole Jacobs—a dame as of last week—would be very interested in discussing it further with them and would argue the case for that.
Amendments 330AZA and 356E, which deal with the ingenuity, frankly, of perpetrators in using online means to find different ways to get at their victims, has many parallels with what we look at in many areas that deal with online abuse. I appeal to the Government that we be joined up, in terms of the experience that different departments and specialist teams are gaining through the different pieces of legislation and guidance that we are enacting, so that we are learning from one another and not operating in silos, which, I fear, we sometimes do.
Amendment 330AA, which would remove the excuse of one’s religion or the need to be in an educational establishment—again, another ingenious excuse for finding a way to get to the perpetrator—is a loophole that I hope the Government will look at very carefully.
A stalking protection notice to accelerate and streamline the process would be extremely valuable. I am sure that, if the Minister and his team were to talk about this with some of the most advanced areas of the country and police forces—in particular, the county of Cheshire, which has five gold stars for doing this really well—and to ask whether they would find a stalking protection notice useful in order to move quickly, the answer would, I suspect, be a resounding yes. Going to talk to the people who are on the front line in dealing with this day in, day out would be a very useful use of time.
On Amendment 330C, of course the Secretary of State should have the power to issue stalking guidance, not least because, as stalkers get more and more ingenious and devious in some of the ways they find to make their victims’ lives horrible, it is important that the guidance keeps up. It is often two steps behind. The people who suffer because of that are the victims and the people who gain are the perpetrators, because it gives them the breathing room to do what they do and the law is quite slow to catch up.
I am broadly in sympathy with all these amendments. Stalking is one of the main causes of distress to victims in this country, alongside domestic abuse and anti-social behaviour. They are the unholy trinity and the largest volume affecting people, predominantly women. The ways perpetrators pursue their victims are often quite complex. These are quite devious and often quite intelligent individuals. We need an intelligent response in order to do something about it.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, this debate has underlined that stalking is not an occasional nuisance but a pattern of behaviour that our systems still struggle to recognise and act on early enough. The debate shows a familiar picture: warning signs are missed, threats are minimised and tools that Parliament has already provided are used patchily, if at all.
These amendments point towards a more joined-up and confident response, in which the police, prosecutors and other agencies share information, understand the particular dynamics of stalking and intervene at a much earlier stage, including online, before behaviour escalates into something far more dangerous. Looking ahead, there is now a real opportunity to embed that approach in the forthcoming review and in the VAWG strategy. Many of the ideas we have discussed—stronger use of stalking protection orders and notices, better guidance and training, and clearer expectations of consistency across forces—could and should be reflected on here.
The underlying purpose of these amendments is surely uncontroversial: to ensure that the law and practice keep pace with the reality of stalking and to give victims a response that matches the seriousness of the threat they face, so that this debate becomes a turning point rather than a missed opportunity.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, stalking is an offence which constitutes severe harassment and can instil grave fear into victims, as we have just heard. It is absolutely right that the law bears down on perpetrators of stalking. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 gave magistrates’ courts the power to impose stalking protection orders on application by the chief officer of police. Clause 97 extends this power so that a Crown Court can impose such an order where a person has been acquitted of any other offence.
The Government will no doubt argue that they are taking the necessary action to further prevent cases of stalking through this part of the Bill, but let us not forget another Bill they are currently taking through your Lordships’ House. The Sentencing Bill will suspend sentences for anyone charged with the offence of stalking. Section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 states that a person found guilty of stalking is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to 51 weeks—less than the 12-month time limit for the presumption of a suspended sentence order.
Furthermore, the offence of breaking a stalking protection order is also likely to lead to a suspended sentence under the Sentencing Bill. Although a custodial sentence of up to five years can theoretically be imposed on conviction on indictment, the Sentencing Council’s guidelines state that in most cases of culpability and severity the starting point will be one year’s custody, and the ranges can go down to 12 weeks in custody and even a community order. This may very well be proportionate for low-level stalking offences, but the fact is that a person with a high degree of culpability and a medium to high level of harm will fall into the range that will mean their sentence is highly likely to be suspended.
If the Government are serious about bearing down on stalking, I suggest that letting anyone convicted of that offence walk free is not a good move for the safety of the victim. The Minister might try to rebut this argument by talking about the stalking protection orders, but I gently say to him that there is no good in letting a stalker roam the streets just because they have an order slapped on them. Given the falling police numbers, what is the likelihood of a person who violates their order actually being arrested? I also suggest that victims of stalking will not feel safer simply because their stalker has been given a court order.
What makes this even worse is that there is a very real possibility that a person who breaks the terms of their suspended sentence order will still not receive a custodial sentence. Although the automatic presumption will not apply in that case, the Government have opposed Conservative amendments to explicitly exempt people with a history of non-compliance from suspended sentences. They have also resisted our amendments to exempt repeat offenders from being handed suspended sentences.
Under this Government’s legislation, there is a very real possibility that a stalker could continually stalk their victim, break their stalking protection order and their suspended sentence order and never face jail time. That is not protecting victims. Against this backdrop, I suggest that it does not matter what we do in this place regarding stalking; we can table all the amendments we like to toughen up the protection orders, but they will not protect victims or prevent stalkers if the Government let than walk free. I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, did not have much to say about what is in this Bill. He has opportunities to talk about another Bill; let him do that at another time. I am talking about this Bill. He never mentioned what was going on in this Bill, the measures within it or, indeed, the amendments before us in his opening contribution—not a single word. Maybe he should reflect on that, because he has not endeared himself to me in these discussions.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord asks, “Do I ever?”—he does occasionally, and I will give him the benefit of the doubt, but I was not really impressed that he did not say one single word about what is currently before the Committee. Let us have a discussion about the Sentencing Bill with my noble friends Lady Levitt and Lord Timpson another time. That is being completed. Anyway, let us leave that to one side.
I hope to be helpful in part to the noble Baronesses and others who have spoken. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for bringing their experience, their views and their passion for this subject to this debate. A number of amendments are before the Committee. As I said, I hope to be helpful in part on some of them.
Amendments 330A, 330AZA, 330AA, 330AB, 330B and 330C all relate to stalking protection orders, which, as Members know, are civil orders introduced in 2020 to protect victims of stalking. Amendment 330A in the name of my noble friend Lady Royall seeks to reference explicitly the required civil burden of proof—that is, on the balance of probabilities—for determining whether the behaviour of a person to be made subject to a stalking protection order amounts to acts associated with stalking. Currently, statutory guidance for the police published by the Home Office references that it is likely the courts will apply the civil burden of proof when considering stalking protection orders, but I agree with my noble friend that there could be a case for making this clearer. I therefore undertake to consider her proposals in Amendment 330A ahead of the next stage on the Bill. I hope that helps the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, who also spoke on this matter and my noble friend.
I am grateful for Amendment 330AA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I am particularly grateful to her for drawing her personal experience to the attention of the Committee. I had not realised the traumas that she had had in the run up to the 2010 election, but I had a quick chance to google those matters while she was speaking. It looks like it was an appalling experience. I am grateful to her for bringing it to the attention of the Committee.
The noble Baroness’s proposal in Amendment 330AA would remove the requirement for the restrictions in SPOs to avoid, where possible, conflict with the defendant’s religious beliefs and interference with their attendance at work or at an educational establishment. On this occasion, I understand the noble Baroness’s view that this could be brought out in statutory guidance, but it is our view in the Home Office that it is important to retain this within primary legislation, particularly regarding an individual’s rights through the European Convention on Human Rights, especially Article 9 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, so I am afraid I cannot help her on that one.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
I understand that point of not wanting it to go into primary legislation, but given the way in which it is possible to use the online world to find all sorts of ways that circumvent the conventional ways in which one would try to intimidate someone, could one not have a look at the guidance to ensure that it includes descriptions of the slightly innovative ways in which perpetrators are using it to make those charged with policing this more aware of it?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for that intervention, and I will certainly discuss those suggestions and points with colleagues from the police. The current statutory guidance for police on SPOs includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions, many of which could align with Amendment 330AZA. For example, the guidance could include prohibitions on contacting the victim or referring to the victim on social media, either directly or indirectly. Similarly, the statutory guidance for the police on DAPOs also includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions. It may well be that the points the noble Lord has mentioned are covered in that, but I will happily reflect on what he said.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
I am sure my noble friend is correct that it is, or should be, covered in guidance, but patently the judge looking at the case that I mentioned was not aware of this and said the fact that the victim had been contacted via LinkedIn was not something he could take a view on. He did not know that this was something he could take a view on. I am grateful to my noble friend for ensuring that the guidance is properly looked at.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful again to my noble friend for referring to the LinkedIn experience. My assessment, having discussed this with officials and with my colleague Ministers, is that the statutory guidance for police includes prohibitions on contacting the victim by any means, including social media. If my noble friend will let me, I will reflect on what she has said today, and I will discuss again with officials whether the guidance in its current format is sufficient to cover that point. That is my understanding, and I think it is a reasonable understanding to put before the Committee today.
Amendment 330C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, would replace the power for the Secretary of State to issue multi-agency statutory guidance on stalking with a duty to do so. This would align the provision on guidance with the Stalking Protection Act 2019 and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, supported the general direction of travel that the noble Baroness brought forward in her amendment. I agree that it is important, where appropriate, to ensure that legislative provisions tackling violence against women and girls are consistent. Accordingly, this is an amendment that I am happy to take away for further consideration and to discuss with officials.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I think the key question is why it is acceptable that there are different rules for “may” and “must” between this and domestic abuse protection orders.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
If the noble Baroness will allow me, we have agreed that we will take Amendment 330C away and have a look at it. That is not a guarantee that we will do something with it, but it is an opportunity to reflect on it. She can examine what, if anything, the Government do, and she can determine whether to table it again on Report.
Amendment 330B, again tabled by my noble friend Lady Royall, would introduce a stalking protection notice that could be imposed by a police superintendent. I think my noble friend’s motivation is to ensure that swift action can be taken. However, on reflection we view that introducing such a notice would potentially put further complexity into the legislative framework without significantly improving protection for victims. We also need to consider the proportionality of a police-issued notice backed by a criminal offence of breach that denies the respondent the opportunity to argue their case before an independent judicial tribunal. Failure to comply with a police-issued domestic abuse protection notice is not a criminal offence for this reason.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, tabled Amendment 331, which would provide a statutory review of the effectiveness of two stalking offences, and Amendment 332, which seeks to provide a statutory review of stalking awareness guidance. I hope the noble Baroness can accept—this goes to points that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend have also mentioned—that work is currently being undertaken on both these issues. In December 2024 we announced six new measures to tackle stalking, including a commitment to review the criminal law on stalking contained in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. As a number of speakers have referenced, we have already appointed Richard Wright KC to lead the review. It is intended to be completed by the end of March 2026. We have given a timetable. I do not think it is right and proper that we change that timetable now, as a number of noble Lords suggested. The review will consider measures to achieve clarity in the legislation. On completion of the review, the Home Secretary will consider the findings and recommendations before determining next steps, potentially including further legislation. I hope that helps the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.
There are a number of government amendments to the provisions in Clause 99. We have done this with guidance from stakeholders in the criminal justice system. Government Amendments 330AZB to 330AZE and 330AE clarify the process for appealing the making of a stalking order. Our Amendments 330AC and 330AD provide for applications to vary, renew or discharge a stalking protection order and avoid applications having to be heard by a higher court. Amendments 330BA, 330D, 522A and 547A extend the provisions in Clauses 97, 98 and 100 to Northern Ireland to allow the courts in Northern Ireland to make stalking protection orders. They have been introduced in conjunction with the Department of Justice and allow it to issue guidance to the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The changes have been brought forward in amendment form at the request of the Minister of Justice in Northern Ireland.
I hope I have been able to assist in part my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton—supported by the noble Lord, Lord Russell—and Lady Doocey. I undertake to examine Amendments 330A and 330C further ahead of the next stage. On that basis, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend for his positive response to so many of the amendments and I look forward to further discussions. I am sure that if any noble Lord who has participated in this debate can be of assistance in those discussions, we will be happy to have a meeting with the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(za) in subsection (1)(a) after “order” insert “by a magistrates’ court, a youth court or the Crown Court””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the cases in which an appeal against the making of a stalking protection order can be brought under section 7 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019.
“(3B) An appeal under subsection (1), (2) or (3) to the Court of Appeal may be made only with the permission of that court.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the need for permission of the Court of Appeal to appeal to it against an order made under section 4 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the reference to an appeal in new subsection (5)(a) of section 7 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019 is to an appeal under section 7.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the reference to an appeal in new subsection (5)(b) of section 7 of the Stalking Protection Act 2019 is to an appeal under section 7.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment to inserted section 364D of the Sentencing Code, together with my amendment to clause 98, page 127, line 35, provides for applications to vary, renew or discharge a stalking protection order made by any court other than a magistrates’ or youth court to be made to the Crown Court.
“(c) where the order was made by any other court, the Crown Court;”Member’s explanatory statement
See my amendment to clause 98, page 127, line 20.
“(3A) An appeal under subsection (2) to the Court of Appeal may be made only with the permission of that court.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the need for permission of the Court of Appeal to appeal to it against an order made under section 364D of the Sentencing Code.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Stalking protection orders: Northern Ireland(1) The Protection from Stalking Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 17 (N.I.)) is amended as follows.(2) In section 6 (meaning of act associated with stalking and risk associated with stalking), in subsection (1) for “7” substitute “6A”.(3) After section 6 insert—“Meaning of “stalking protection order”(1) In this Act “stalking protection order” means an order under this Act which, for the purpose of preventing a person from carrying out acts associated with stalking—(a) prohibits the person from doing anything described in the order, or(b) requires the person to do anything described in the order.(2) This Act provides for the making of a stalking protection order—(a) on an application under section 7, or(b) where a person is acquitted of an offence, successfully appeals against a conviction for an offence, is dealt with in respect of certain findings or is convicted of an offence (see section 8(1)).”(4) In section 7 (applications for orders) omit subsection (1).(5) In section 8 (power to make orders)—(a) for subsection (1) substitute—“(1) This section applies in respect of a person (“D”) where—(a) the Chief Constable has applied under section 7 to a court of summary jurisdiction for a stalking protection order against D,(b) D is acquitted of an offence by or before a court,(c) a court allows D’s appeal against a conviction for an offence,(d) a court deals with D in respect of a finding that—(i) D is not guilty of an offence by reason of insanity, or(ii) D is under a disability and has done the act charged against D in respect of an offence, or(e) D has been convicted of an offence and a court deals with D for the offence.”;(b) in subsection (2), in the words before paragraph (a), for “the order” substitute “a stalking protection order”. (6) In section 10 (variations, renewals and discharges)—(a) in subsection (1), for “a court of summary jurisdiction” substitute “an appropriate court”;(b) after subsection (3) insert—“(4) In subsection (1) “appropriate court” means—(a) where the stalking protection order was made by a court of summary jurisdiction other than a youth court, a court of summary jurisdiction which is not a youth court;(b) where the stalking protection order was made by a youth court—(i) if the defendant is under the age of 18 when the application for variation, renewal or discharge is made, a youth court;(ii) if the defendant is aged 18 or over at the time the application for variation, renewal or discharge is made, a court of summary jurisdiction which is not a youth court;(c) where the stalking protection order was made by any other court, the Crown Court.(5) For the purposes of subsection (4)—(a) a stalking protection order made by a court on an appeal is to be treated as made by the court whose decision was appealed against;(b) a stalking protection order that is confirmed, varied or renewed on an appeal remains an order of the court that first made it (or, if it was made on an appeal, the court that is treated as having made it under paragraph (a)).”(7) In section 11 (interim stalking protection orders), in subsection (2), after “application” in the first place it occurs insert “under section 7”.(8) In section 12 (procedure)—(a) after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) An application to the Crown Court under section 10 is to be made in accordance with Crown Court rules.”;(b) in subsection (5) omit “10 or”.(9) After section 12 insert—“Appeals(1) Where a stalking protection order is made in the circumstances mentioned in section 8(1)(b), (c) or (d), D may appeal against the making of the order as if—(a) D had been convicted of the offence and,(b) the order were a sentence passed on D for the offence by the court which made the order,(if an appeal would lie against such a sentence).(2) Where a stalking protection order is made in the circumstances mentioned in section 8(1)(e), D may appeal against the making of the order as if the order were a sentence passed on D for the offence by the court which made the order (if an appeal would lie against such a sentence).(3) The following may appeal against a decision under section 10 made by the Crown Court—(a) the person against whom the stalking protection order in question was made;(b) the Chief Constable.(4) An appeal under subsection (3) is to be made to the Court of Appeal, and may be made only with the permission of that court.(5) On an appeal under this section, the court may make—(a) such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and (b) such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be appropriate.(6) For appeals against decisions of a court of summary jurisdiction on an application under section 7, 10 or 11, see Article 143 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I. 26) (appeal to county court against proceedings on complaint).”(10) In section 21 (interpretation)—(a) in the definition of “stalking protection order”, for “section 7(1)” substitute “section 6A(1)”;(b) at the end insert—““youth court” has the meaning given by section 12.”(11) In section 20(3) (report on the operation of Act)—(a) in paragraph (b) omit “and the number of orders made under section 8”;(b) after paragraph (b) insert—“(ba) the number of stalking protection orders made under each paragraph of section 8(1);”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision extending the power of courts in Northern Ireland to make stalking protection orders at the end of criminal proceedings, similar to the provision made for England and Wales by clauses 97 and 98.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Guidance about disclosure of information by police: Northern IrelandIn the Protection from Stalking Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 17 (N.I.)), in section 17—(a) in subsection (2) for “this section” substitute “subsection (1)”;(b) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable about the disclosure of police information for the purpose of protecting persons from risks associated with stalking.(2B) The Chief Constable must have regard to guidance issued under subsection (2A).”;(c) in subsection (3) for “subsection (1)” substitute “this section”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This clause requires the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to issue guidance to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland about disclosure of police information about stalking.
Baroness Doocey
“(6) In determining the sentence for an offence under this section—(a) where the encouragement or assistance of self-harm is preceded by a history of domestic or “honour”-based abuse committed against the victim or other person by D, the court must treat their offence as aggravated by reason of such history;(b) where D has subjected the victim or other person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (b) to physical, psychiatric or psychological harm that results in that person’s death by suicide, the sentence shall be one of life imprisonment.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment recognises that where a victim has been subjected to domestic or “honour”-based abuse, any encouragement or assistance of self-harm is an aggravated offence for sentencing purposes, and that where such abuse, including physical, psychiatric or psychological harm, results in or significantly contributes to the victim’s death by suicide, the perpetrator can be subject to the same range of sentences as for murder.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 334A is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower. I am grateful to Southall Black Sisters for the detailed evidence it has provided. On Wednesday we are going to cover broader issues around codes of honour and the deployment of these as a motivation and an excuse for horrendous crimes against the person. Amendment 334A deals with, in some ways, an even more insidious and hidden issue. It recognises the growing number of suicides and self-harm cases linked to domestic and so-called honour-based abuse.
I remember meeting a group of young women when I was a member of the London Assembly and hearing with horror the widespread acceptance that a murder could be justified by codes of honour in their community. It most certainly cannot. Culture does not transcend or trump the law, and nor should it. We are all familiar with the concept of death by a thousand cuts. Prolonged abuse and prolonged encouragement of self-harm can have devastating consequences beyond the physical and the immediate.
Last month, an inquest into the death of Michelle Sparman, a Caribbean woman who died by suicide in August 2021, reached a landmark verdict at Inner West London Coroner’s Court. The assistant coroner concluded that Michelle’s state of mind was “contributed to by neglect”, and that her prior relationship was marked by “toxicity”, highlighting an abusive pattern of relentless coercive messaging from her ex-partner that undermined her confidence and mental well-being. Crucially, the coroner identified this abusive conduct as the key causative factor in her death—a rare explicit recognition of prolonged domestic abuse that had contributed to her suicide. But there is a serious gap in the law. Michelle’s family were told by police that suicides were outside their remit and there was no case because Michelle had not reported domestic abuse when she was alive.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Doocey in this small but perfectly formed group of amendments. My Amendment 335 would mandate a statutory consultation on the guidance to accompany the new encouraging or assisting serious self-harm offences contained in Clauses 102 and 103.
On these Benches we welcome the underlying intention of Clauses 102 and 103 to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations for a broader offence covering encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm, expanding beyond digital communication to include direct assistance. However, offences that involve encouraging self-harm must be handled with the utmost care, given the vulnerabilities inherent in such cases. The critical issue here is the risk of inadvertently criminalising legitimate support services, which has been raised with us by a number of support organisations.
The offence requires a specific intention to encourage or assist serious self-harm. This is intended to ensure that charitable organisations and mental health professionals who advise sufferers on how to moderate or manage self-harming behaviour are not criminalised. My amendment addresses this directly by requiring the Secretary of State to produce guidance and consult extensively with representatives of self-harm support charities and organisations; mental health professionals, including those providing trauma-informed care; and legal experts—prosecutors and defence practitioners—regarding the application of the specific intent requirement. This mandatory consultation is essential, in our view, to ensure that the statutory guidance clearly differentiates between criminal encouragement and legitimate therapeutic activity. Without ensuring that this guidance is informed by experts and laid before Parliament, we risk confusion among front-line practitioners and the inadvertent penalisation of those working hardest to help vulnerable people. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to this amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I fully appreciate the general principle behind these proposals. This is an incredibly serious subject, and I appreciate the sincerity with which the noble Baronesses have approached the debate.
On the amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Blower, everyone wants to reach a scenario where all possibilities are accounted for, and there are no loopholes through which those who either encourage or abet self-harm can jump. It is for that reason that I cannot offer my support for proposed subsection (6) in the noble Baronesses’ amendment. First, I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors. The general offences that fall under loosely defined so-called honour-based abuse are crimes themselves, so I am unsure why there is a need to create an aggravating offence when a criminal will already be able to be tried for those offences individually.
Primarily, though, I do not think this is the right time to be incorporating new definitions into our legal framework. There is guidance for Crown prosecutors as to what might fall under honour-based abuse and examples as to how that might look, but it is yet to be enshrined in law and it is a rather broad and non-exclusive term within our law. That is not to say that it is not easy to spot—it often is—but it should have its own delineated legal definition before it is made an aggravating factor. I agree with the noble Baroness that honour-based abuse is an increasing issue that we must tackle head on, but that cannot be done with a single amendment. However, I offer my support to the principle behind proposed subsection (6)(b).
I welcome the sentiment behind Amendment 335 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Policy rooted in pragmatism is crucial, and consultation and guidance are one of the primary ways to achieve that. The Government should base all the policy that they bring forward on the testimonies of people who dedicate their lives to the subjects that we legislate on, and that it is especially important for a policy in such a sensitive area as this. I hope the Minister agrees, and I look forward to her response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendments 334A and 335 respectively.
I am aware of the cases that have motivated the desire to have an amendment such as Amendment 334A, and I completely understand; the stories that the noble Baroness outlined cannot fail to move anyone listening to them. Having said that, the Government will not be supporting either of these amendments today, for the following reasons.
I shall deal first with the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. When a defendant has previous convictions, including those relating to a history of domestic abuse, that is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. In addition, aggravating factors that are associated with honour-based abuse, such as abuse of trust or targeting vulnerable victims, are already covered in the domestic abuse guidelines. The presence of aggravating factors such as these should therefore already result in the sentence reflecting those factors, and in my experience it always would. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about not adding an ever-increasing list of statutory aggravating factors. This is certainly the third group of amendments that I have dealt with that has proposed different forms of offences.
On the second aspect of the amendment, proposed subsection (6)(b) raises a sensitive and important issue. The Government wholeheartedly agree that, when it can be proved that suicide was the result of abuse or encouragement, the abuser should be held accountable. There are existing offences that cover this situation, such as manslaughter or encouraging or assisting suicide offences, which have maximum penalties of life imprisonment and 14 years’ imprisonment respectively. However, imposing a requirement for the court to sentence the defendant in those circumstances as though they had been convicted of murder, when in fact they have not been convicted of murder, would be at odds not only with the current sentencing approach but with the principle that people are sentenced only for matters that have been proved to the satisfaction of the court. I also make the perhaps obvious comment that there is no range of sentences for murder; there is only one sentence, which is life imprisonment. For those reasons, amending Clause 102 in this way would not be appropriate.
However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of homicide offences and of sentencing for murder, and this will include a review of the use of, and the obstacles to using, manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government are reluctant to make any piecemeal amendments in advance of the Law Commission reporting.
I turn to Amendment 335, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I thank the noble Lord for his welcome of the offence. As to the guidance that he proposes in the consultation, as many in this Committee are aware, I was principal legal adviser to a rather well-known former Director of Public Prosecutions—I spent five years working for the Crown Process Service—so it is important to me to emphasise that it is in fact for the independent Crown Prosecution Service to update guidance on prosecuting offences under this new provision. It may well be that many noble Lords know this but, while the statutory Code for Crown Prosecutors governs in general terms how prosecutors make decisions on which cases to prosecute and which not, sitting underneath that is a raft of legal guidance that is published and publicly available. It exists for two reasons: the first is so that members of the public can see the basis on which the CPS makes its decisions, but the second is so that the CPS can be held to account. If it fails to follow its own guidance, that will often provide a ground for challenging the decision made.
I understand that the noble Lord’s amendment aims to ensure that legitimate support or therapeutic activity is not criminalised, so I reassure him that the offence has been carefully drafted to avoid capturing vulnerable individuals or those providing mental health support. The offence as drafted in the Bill was recommended by the Law Commission in its 2021 malicious communications report and contains two key safeguards: first, that the person must intend to encourage or assist serious self-harm and without such intent no offence would be committed; and, secondly, that serious self-harm is defined as harm amounting to grievous bodily harm. These safeguards ensure that the offence targets only the most serious and culpable behaviour and protects those who are, for example, sharing personal experience or discussing self-harm but not encouraging it.
The offence also does not cover the glorification or glamorisation of self-harm. The Law Commission found that that was too broad and would potentially capture vulnerable people who might then be exposed to prosecution: so, taking on board the commission’s comments, the Government have not included that.
In our view, this approach ensures that the offence is necessary, proportionate and focused on genuinely harmful acts. There is also a further protection for the vulnerable, which is provided by the public interest stage of the full code test. This requires that, even where there is sufficient evidence, prosecutors must consider whether or not a prosecution is required in the public interest, and plainly the vulnerabilities of the potential defendant would come into play at that stage.
I hope that the reasons I have provided clearly set out why the Government do not support either of these amendments today, and I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, do not press their respective amendments.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I thank the Minister, who has carefully taken us through three limbs, as far as I tell: first, there will be CPS guidance in terms of the specific offence, in the way that it decides whether or not to prosecute; secondly, the way that the offence itself has been drafted; and, thirdly, the public interest test. However, will she engage with the organisations that are concerned about the offences? I think I understand what she is saying about intent, grievous bodily harm and the other limbs that mean we will not see the kinds of prosecutions that people are concerned about, but will the MoJ engage with the organisations that have concerns?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord. As far as the first of the three protections is concerned, obviously I cannot bind the Crown Prosecution Service—the whole point about it is that it is independent of government. However, based on my own experiences, where there are areas of the law that plainly need clarification as to when the Crown Prosecution Service would prosecute and when it would not, it usually issues guidance. As regards engaging with the organisations, of course, it is sometimes not easy to explain the law and the thinking behind it. It is in everyone’s interests that the organisations which are concerned for vulnerable people understand that the Government have those interests very much at heart. I would welcome the opportunity to explain to them.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. I am not a lawyer and certainly do not understand the law, even vaguely, but I really do not understand this. If what I am asking for is not necessary—I totally accept what the Minister has said—how come we have three cases of suicide a week, which is suspected to be an underestimate, and only one conviction since 2017? Those numbers do not seem to add up to me.
I take the point the Minister made about the Law Commission’s review. Reviews are helpful, but a recent report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner exposed ongoing failures by government to act on the lessons from domestic homicide reviews. Only a quarter of national recommendations were fully implemented between 2019 and 2021, and this extends to domestic abuse suicides. It is very sad that victims have waited years for concrete changes and it now seems that there is not a huge amount, according to what the Minister said in her response, that will make the difference. There needs to be something, so I will think carefully about everything she has said. I certainly plan to come back at the next stage with something that perhaps will not have so many holes in it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment for now.
Baroness Brinton
“(1B) A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1A) where—(a) the person is a victim of domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and(b) the act of detaining the child outside the United Kingdom was attributable wholly or mainly to safeguarding themselves or the child from domestic abuse.(1C) In determining whether subsection (1B) applies, the court must have particular regard to—(a) any evidence of domestic abuse directed towards the parent or the child, and(b) any risk that return of the child would expose the parent or child to further abuse.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and another in the name of Baroness Brinton, is intended to probe the effect of Clause 104 on victims of domestic abuse.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 335A and 335B, which relate specifically to child abduction across the United Kingdom. Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549 relate specifically to the abduction, detaining and retention of children abroad who came from Northern Ireland—I was about to say “in Northern Ireland”, but that would be a tautology.
I am very grateful to all the organisations that have written to a number of Peers regarding child abduction. My two amendments are probing amendments, in which we seek to understand how Clause 104 will work and what the effect will be on a person who is a victim of domestic abuse, within the meaning of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and who takes their child outside the UK to safeguard themselves or the child from domestic abuse, or who gets abroad and then decides to remain abroad to continue to safeguard themselves or their child.
Clause 104 arises from a recommendation from the Law Commission following the case of Nicolaou in 2012. That case focused on whether a parent commits an offence under Section 1 of the Child Abduction Act 1984 if they initially have the appropriate consent to take a child outside the UK, for a defined period, but then fail to return the child after that period expires. The background is this: a father took his son to Cyprus for an agreed contact visit but did not return him to the UK at the end of the specified time, despite court orders from both Cypriot and English courts for the child’s return. An arrest warrant was issued for the child abduction.
In June 2012, the High Court ruled that an offence had not been committed under Section 1 of that Act in this specific scenario. The section, as written at the time, applied to the act of taking or sending a child out of the UK without consent, not the failure to return them after a period of consented absence. This case, along with another, R v Kayani 2011, highlighted a significant loophole in the Child Abduction Act 1984, which the Law Commission subsequently made recommendations to address. Its recommendation in its report Simplification of Criminal Law: Kidnapping and Related Offences is very legalistic in its approach. It makes no reference to having considered domestic abuse as a defence, for example, or even a contributory factor.
Article 12 of the 1980 Hague convention on abduction provides that, where a year has elapsed after a child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in another contracting state, the court has a discretion not to require the child’s return if the child is
“settled in its new environment”.
Clause 104 makes it a criminal offence to retain a child outside the UK “at any time” after the child is taken or sent outside the UK without the appropriate consent. It therefore criminalises conduct in a situation where a court may decide not to order the return of the child to the UK. Clearly, this is not in keeping with either the spirit or the letter of the Hague convention.
Additionally, it could significantly hamper efforts to enable the safe return of children and their taking parents—the parents who removed them—and could increase the number of cases where children are compelled to return alone, without their mothers, possibly to the care of an abusive father or to state care. My question to the Minister is: what is the position of someone who uses a defence of being a victim of domestic abuse as the reason why they have not returned to the UK with the child? If a court were asked to adjudicate on such an issue, would it demand evidence of abuse? I ask that because your Lordships’ House knows that in such cases, often the victim mother—it usually is a mother—will have been living in the UK with the perpetrator of domestic abuse and coercive control, but not many would have been to the courts. On that basis, what protection is there for that victim and their child in this position?
The real problem is that the Law Commission report, which has informed Clause 104, does not cover this difficult territory at all—nor do the Explanatory Notes for the Bill. My amendments are genuinely to probe the Government’s intention on how they would manage a case that involved domestic abuse and coercive control. While we agree that Clause 104 is important, letting it pass without taking account of the complex issues relating to those parents who are fleeing domestic abuse will be problematic and could even lead to miscarriages of justice. I beg to move.
Lord Meston (CB)
My Lords, we should be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her probing Amendments 335A and 335B, raising the problem of wrongful retention of children in the context of the criminal law and, in particular, the Child Abduction Act 1984. Essentially, that Act criminalised the wrongful taking of children, but not their wrongful retention after the end of a permitted period of contact.
In 1984, when the omission of unlawful retention was pointed out in debate on the Child Abduction Bill, as it then was, in another place, it was not addressed by the then Government. Indeed, the opposition spokesman at the time, now the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, said that it must be “for another day”. Moving on to 2012, the continuing discrepancy was highlighted by the decision of the High Court in the case of Nicolaou, referred to by the noble Baroness, which was indeed a classic case of unilateral retention of a child abroad in the face of court orders. In 2014, a Law Commission report speculated about the rationale for the difference between removal and retention cases and recommended what the Bill now seeks to do in Clause 104.
So, 41 years after the noble Lord, Lord Dubbs, spoke of “another day”, it now seems to have arrived. Unjustified retention of a child can be both irresponsible and very harmful. Whether the decision to retain the child is planned or is more spontaneous, it can have a considerable emotional and practical consequence for all concerned, not least the child. I suspect that, with a little more analysis and resolve back in 1984, we would not be where we are today. However, there have been significant developments in the intervening period to make us think about what, if anything, is currently required in legislative terms.
First, as the noble Baroness has mentioned, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is now well established as a successful measure that deals with most cases of this sort, providing for the immediate protection and swift return of children to their home country when justified. In most cases, the use of the Hague convention, coupled with any necessary consequential proceedings in the home country, means that the wrongful retention of children is adequately and firmly dealt with in the family courts without recourse to criminal proceedings.
Secondly, there is now a far wider understanding of the nature and effects of abusive and alienating behaviour and attitudes as experienced by mothers and children, and, to some extent, by fathers. This is the sort of behaviour covered by the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. In reality, the retention of children by one parent occurs within a very wide range of scenarios. These are fact-sensitive cases. At one end of the range is the spiteful and vindictive parent who wants to remove the child from the other parent’s life. At the other end of the range are the cases of fearful and protective parents who realise that the child is at risk if returned to the other parent. In between those extremes are any number of variable situations and motivations.
The Law Commission report noted:
“The general policy of the law is that parental disputes about the care of children should be pursued in civil rather than criminal proceedings”.
If that is the general policy, criminalisation should be reserved to a limited number of cases of this sort, and criminal prosecution should be seen as a last resort to mark disapproval of plainly wrongful and harmful retention of a child. Moreover, overlapping criminal and family court proceedings should be avoided wherever possible, and the use of, or threats of, criminal prosecution should remain well out of the armoury of most warring parents. That is why, when resolving Hague proceedings, many parents often formally agree not to instigate or support criminal proceedings against each other. Such agreements remove one source of control and recrimination, and they serve to keep the focus on the children rather than on the parents’ grievances against each other.
I therefore hope that the Government will accept the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, or at least undertake some further analysis of what is needed for cases where the parent concerned is seeking to safeguard themselves or the child from harm. If not, will the Government confirm that any prosecution of these offences will continue to require the consent of the DPP under Section 4(2) of the 1984 Act? Will they confirm that there will be a restrictive approach to the prosecution, and that the guidance on prosecution will be reviewed and updated to cover the important points raised by the amendment?
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 335A and 335B in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for setting out these probing amendments, because, as the Minister will know, there is concern that this change will criminalise domestic abuse survivors, who constitute the overwhelming majority of parents involved in retention cases.
As we have heard, Clause 104 is intended to close the gap in legislation, which the Law Commission recommended back in 2014. However, that recommendation did not take domestic abuse into account. Our understanding has evolved significantly since then, and, given our current knowledge of perpetrator behaviour, post-separation abuse and the Government’s stated commitment to end violence against women and girls, we should look at whether implementing that recommendation now would be appropriate. We need to consider the significance of domestic abuse in these proceedings.
On the difference between removal and retention, these actions are not equivalent. Treating them as equivalent fails to recognise that retention often reflects a delayed recognition of abuse, which the parent understands once they are safe among family and friends. As Clause 104 currently stands, these women would be criminalised and therefore deterred from returning with their child. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, set out how we could see some perverse outcomes from this.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, having heard a number of cogent arguments from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I cannot remain silent. I was certainly persuaded on the noble Baroness’s Amendment 335A, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister has similarly been persuaded.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in this group concerning the important issue of child abduction. I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contributions this evening. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward Amendments 335A and 335B, which raise important questions about the interaction between Clause 104 and the lived reality of victims of domestic abuse. The amendments probe how the new offence will operate where a parent has acted out of fear for their own safety or that of their child, and they touch on the wider issue of how the criminal law recognises coercive, controlling and violent relationships.
We very much support the principle behind the noble Baroness’s amendments and the safeguarding concerns that they highlight. I look forward to hearing from the Minister about how the Government intend to ensure that the operation of Clause 104 does not inadvertently criminalise vulnerable parents acting in desperation to protect themselves or their children.
Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, create and support a parallel offence in Northern Ireland relating to the detention of a child overseas without consent. I recognise the importance of maintaining consistency across jurisdictions and ensuring that children in Northern Ireland benefit from equivalent protections. I would be grateful if the Minister can set out how the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland intends to exercise the new regulation-making and commencement powers. What discussions have taken place with relevant agencies to ensure that the offence can operate effectively in practice? I look forward to the Government’s response on these points.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling Amendments 335A and 335B. Her amendments have been grouped with the modest collection of government amendments—336, 496, 521 and 549—tabled in my name, which extend the provisions contained in Clause 104 to Northern Ireland.
I note the concern raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Davies, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that Clause 104 will criminalise parents who are fleeing domestic abuse where the detention of the child is primarily motivated by the intention of keeping themselves and/or the child safe. I reassure your Lordships that this absolutely is not the intention of the existing Clause 104. Indeed, in developing the provisions, very careful consideration was given to the implications of potentially criminalising a parent who has detained their child abroad.
Before I turn to the reasons why the Government will not be supporting these amendments today, I want to explain a little more about the purpose of Clause 104’s inclusion in the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her clear and even-handed explanation of her understanding of the reason why the Government included it in the first place. The clause seeks to implement the Law Commission’s 2014 recommendation that the Government should close a small gap in the law by making it a criminal offence for a parent, or person with similar responsibility to a parent, to detain a child abroad without appropriate consent, once the original consent has expired.
I am sure that I do not need to explain to anyone that the abduction of a child by a parent is an extremely distressing experience for everyone involved. For any Government, the aim is to safeguard children from abduction by preventing the unlawful removal of a child, ensuring their swift and safe return when they have been taken and upholding custody rights through international co-operation and legal enforcement. The new measure is intended to be consistent with the existing criminal framework, to stand as a deterrent and a backstop where we know that a gap in the law is being exploited, even if by very few people. Some of those who have not returned a child are themselves abusers; they are abusive parents seeking to evade the law. We cannot leave that gap unclosed.
However, I have listened very carefully to the concerns raised by your Lordships this evening, and to some sent to me by organisations with an interest in this area. I remain satisfied that there is no risk of vulnerable parents who have been victims of domestic abuse being criminalised. I hope I shall be forgiven for setting out my reasons in a little more detail; I alluded to them earlier in relation to an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, but that was in a slightly different context, and I think I need to give more detail.
Many of your Lordships will be aware that there is a two-stage test for the Crown Prosecution Service to apply when deciding whether a prosecution should be brought. The first is an “evidential sufficiency” test but, even if that stage is passed and it is felt that there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution, that is not the end of the matter. The second stage is the “public interest” test, which asks whether the public interest requires a prosecution to be brought. It is this stage of the test that is often applied in, for example, assisted dying cases. This is important, including in a domestic abuse context, because it means that prosecutors must consider the background, including whether the alleged offender was acting from benign motives or was themselves a victim of domestic abuse, before deciding whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. Additionally, and importantly, a third test applies for the new offence in Clause 104 which adds an additional safeguard: that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is required for a case to proceed.
Prosecutorial discretion remains a key safeguard, and evidence of domestic abuse would be a highly relevant factor in any decision to prosecute, or in whether the Director of Public Prosecutions would give his consent in addition. Factors that are relevant to the public interest do not require proof to the criminal standard. It is a much more “in the round” assessment than would be required if bringing some kind of criminal proceedings.
To be clear, in answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, the Government continue to believe that the civil courts remain best placed to deal with child abduction cases. That is why we support international co-operation and recourse to the 1980 Hague convention as a civil mechanism for facilitating the safe return of children. The UK continues to work with other state parties and the Hague Conference, especially in cases involving domestic abuse, to ensure that the convention operates effectively. The noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in effect agreed, that this prosecution should be the act of last resort. We agree. We are conscious, however, that criminal proceedings may be needed in some cases. It has been suggested that some parents see detaining a child abroad following any earlier consent as an easier route to keeping their child permanently outside the UK with no criminal charges or police involvement. That clearly circumvents the law. This change to the criminal law is intended to sit alongside and supplement existing civil remedies, rather than filling the courts with people who have retained their child abroad.
The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asks whether the Government would be prepared to add a domestic abuse defence, in effect. The law on defences, including those relevant to domestic abuse, is highly complex. It requires definitions and decisions about where the burden of proof lies and what the standard of proof will be. It is precisely because of this complexity that the Law Commission is currently reviewing defences in domestic abuse cases as part of its wider project on homicide and sentencing. While the primary focus of its review is on homicide, the findings are likely to have broader implications for how defences operate in domestic abuse contexts and could be relevant across a broader range of offences. A bespoke defence of domestic abuse in the offence created by Clause 104 could have implications far beyond the child abduction framework.
I hope that the noble Baroness will accept from me that the Law Commission’s findings will be carefully reviewed before any changes to the law are considered, in order to ensure that any legislative changes are informed by evidence. In the meantime, we are exploring ways to strengthen our understanding of how defences operate in non-homicide cases by gathering more robust data. For these reasons, it would be premature to legislate before the Law Commission has completed its work, but I take the point about the equality impact assessment and the gendered nature of some of these offences. I will, if I may, write to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and, obviously, to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as well.
I turn very briefly to government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549. Until now, the provisions in Clause 104 extended to England and Wales only. However, at the request of the Northern Ireland Executive, these provisions will now also apply to Northern Ireland. I note the concerns raised by the two amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but I hope that, for the reasons I have set out, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment at this stage. I hope your Lordships will join me in supporting the government amendments in this group.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to all those who have spoken. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hacking and Lord Davies, for their implied support. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for their detailed responses to the amendment and the debate we are having. They rightly confirmed that criminal proceedings must be a last resort, and that we should always aim for these cases to be settled via the family court and through the Hague process.
I am particularly grateful to the Minister for her detailed response on the two-stage test, especially the public interest test. If that is where domestic abuse issues can be assessed, that is good. I am also grateful that she has repeated that the consent of the DPP must be obtained, and that this is not up to the criminal standard. That is very reassuring.
It is always difficult when the Law Commission is working on something, because one cannot say “When is it going to be done?” I hope that it will not be too long. If issues remain after the Law Commission reports, I hope that the Government, or a future Government, will be prepared to discuss this at that point. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Levitt
“Child abduction: Northern Ireland(1) The Child Abduction (Northern Ireland) Order 1985 (S.I. 1985/1638 (N.I. 17)) is amended as set out in subsections (2) and (3).(2) In Article 3 (offence of abduction of child by parent etc)—(a) after paragraph (1) insert—“(1A) Subject to paragraphs (2A) to (3A) and (7), a person connected with a child under the age of 16 commits an offence if—(a) the child is taken or sent out of the United Kingdom with the appropriate consent, and(b) at any time after the child is taken or sent, the person detains the child outside the United Kingdom without the appropriate consent.”;(b) in paragraph (2A)—(i) in the words before sub-paragraph (a), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or by detaining a child outside the United Kingdom,”;(ii) in sub-paragraph (b) (before its substitution by paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detains the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(iii) in each of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) (as substituted by paragraph 4(3) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detains the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(c) in paragraph (2B), after “United Kingdom” insert “, or detaining the child outside the United Kingdom,”;(d) in paragraph (3A), in paragraph (b) after “out of the United Kingdom” insert “, or detaining the child outside the United Kingdom,”. (3) In the Schedule (modifications of Article 3 for children in certain cases), in each of the following provisions after “paragraph (1)” insert “or (1A)”—(a) paragraph 1(2)(a);(b) paragraph 3(2)(a) (before its substitution by paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act);(c) paragraph 3(2)(a) (as substituted by paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 3 to the 2022 Act);(d) paragraph 4(2)(a).(4) The amendments made by this section apply only in cases where the taking or sending of the child out of the United Kingdom takes place on or after the date on which this section comes into force.(5) In this section “the 2022 Act” means the Adoption and Children Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (c. 18 (N.I.)).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence in Northern Ireland for a parent etc to detain a child under 16 outside the UK without appropriate consent.