Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

330A: Clause 97, page 122, line 31, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (1) at the beginning insert “Subsection to subsection (1A),”;(c) after subsection (1), insert—“(1A) The court may only make a stalking protection order against a defendant if conditions A and B are met—(a) condition A is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has engaged in stalking behaviour towards a person; (b) condition B is that the order is necessary and proportionate to protect that person from stalking, or the risk of stalking, carried out by the defendant.”.”

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 330A, I will speak to Amendment 330B, tabled in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and to Amendments 330AZA and 356E, tabled in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. In doing so, I welcome this weekend’s announcements that were part of the Government’s strategy to halve violence against women and girls in the next 10 years, and I look forward to the publication of the strategy later this week.

We owe much to the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for her 2019 stalking Bill that created stalking protection orders—SPOs—which were introduced in January 2020. The Government have recognised that the SPO process is in need of reform. Strengthening the use of SPOs was a manifesto commitment within their plan to have violence against women and girls over the next decade. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services’ response to the stalking super-complaint highlighted the need to change the legal framework for SPOs and align them more closely to orders available in domestic abuse cases. The amendments in this group seek to reform SPOs to ensure the victims of stalking are swiftly protected from further harm.

Amendment 330A seeks to clarify the evidential threshold for obtaining an SPO, to bring this in line with domestic abuse protection orders—DAPOs—and so ensure swifter and less onerous access to these protective orders. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 provides that the magistrates’ court may make an SPO if it is satisfied that the offender has carried out acts associated with stalking. However, the legislation does not explicitly state the evidential standard to be applied. This lack of clarity can lead to inconsistent interpretation and application across police forces and courts in England and Wales. In practice, some courts have applied the criminal standard of proof when determining whether the conditions for an SPO are met. This approach means that police forces need to gather evidence similar to that required for a full criminal prosecution in order to secure an SPO. Consequently, victims face significant delays in obtaining protection, leaving them at risk.

For example, a woman called Juliana experienced online harassment, criminal damage and vexatious complaints to her employer by her stalker. She reported it to the police, and her perpetrator was arrested. While an SPO was considered throughout the investigation, there was slow progress made by the police to submit her application. Multiple witness statements were obtained to support her SPO and legal services within the police were contacted. Seven months later, Juliana is still awaiting a court date for the hearing. Due to the time elapsed, she is concerned that her perpetrator will soon be let out on bail and she will have no protective measures in place. By contrast, under Section 32 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, a court may issue a DAPO on the civil standard of proof. This lower evidential threshold allows for swifter intervention and the earlier safeguarding of victims.

According to the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, approximately half of stalking victims do not have a prior relationship with the offender, which means that there is a disparity in protection between the victims who qualify for a DAPO, who have a relationship with the offender, and those who must rely on an SPO. Given that stalking related to domestic abuse and stalking not related to domestic abuse have comparable impacts on victims, I suggest that the threshold should be consistent for both types of protective order.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that intervention, and I will certainly discuss those suggestions and points with colleagues from the police. The current statutory guidance for police on SPOs includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions, many of which could align with Amendment 330AZA. For example, the guidance could include prohibitions on contacting the victim or referring to the victim on social media, either directly or indirectly. Similarly, the statutory guidance for the police on DAPOs also includes a non-exhaustive list of suggested conditions. It may well be that the points the noble Lord has mentioned are covered in that, but I will happily reflect on what he said.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

I am sure my noble friend is correct that it is, or should be, covered in guidance, but patently the judge looking at the case that I mentioned was not aware of this and said the fact that the victim had been contacted via LinkedIn was not something he could take a view on. He did not know that this was something he could take a view on. I am grateful to my noble friend for ensuring that the guidance is properly looked at.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful again to my noble friend for referring to the LinkedIn experience. My assessment, having discussed this with officials and with my colleague Ministers, is that the statutory guidance for police includes prohibitions on contacting the victim by any means, including social media. If my noble friend will let me, I will reflect on what she has said today, and I will discuss again with officials whether the guidance in its current format is sufficient to cover that point. That is my understanding, and I think it is a reasonable understanding to put before the Committee today.

Amendment 330C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, would replace the power for the Secretary of State to issue multi-agency statutory guidance on stalking with a duty to do so. This would align the provision on guidance with the Stalking Protection Act 2019 and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, supported the general direction of travel that the noble Baroness brought forward in her amendment. I agree that it is important, where appropriate, to ensure that legislative provisions tackling violence against women and girls are consistent. Accordingly, this is an amendment that I am happy to take away for further consideration and to discuss with officials.

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[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his positive response to so many of the amendments and I look forward to further discussions. I am sure that if any noble Lord who has participated in this debate can be of assistance in those discussions, we will be happy to have a meeting with the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 330A withdrawn.