Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Baroness Coffey

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 271D, I shall speak also to Amendments 272ZZA, 272ZZB, 272ZZC, 272ZZD, 272ZZE, 272ZB, 272ZC, 272AA, 272AB and 272AC.

There is a troubling message throughout this legislation of the fundamental belief that third parties, whether they be unions or the state in Part 5, will make decisions on behalf of individuals rather than individuals being able to make decisions for themselves. The challenge with third parties making decisions is that they pay no price when they are wrong, and that is evidenced in this clause. Clause 113(6) states:

“The Secretary of State is not liable to any worker for anything done (or omitted to be done) in, or in connection with, the discharge or purported discharge of the Secretary of State’s functions by virtue of this section”.


That is an unacceptable subsection in this clause, hence my Amendment 272ZZE.

The reality is that workers whose claims are taken up or not taken up by the Secretary of State risk having their rights mishandled or ignored, yet, under the clause as drafted, they would have no recourse, remedy or ability to challenge that failure. We think that that sets a dangerous precedent, because we are granting power without responsibility. We would be creating a regime in which decisions that affect individuals’ livelihoods and legal rights can be made from behind a veil of immunity. That is neither just nor consistent with the principles of good governance. We need to be clear that, if a private employer or a trade union behaved with this level of impunity, we would not accept it, so why are we accepting it from the state?

The fundamental principle underlying Amendments 271D, 272ZZA, 272ZZB, 272ZZD and 272ZC is consent. Clause 113 currently allows the Secretary of State to initiate legal action in a worker’s name without requiring that worker’s consent. That is deeply problematic. Legal proceedings, particularly employment proceedings, can be deeply personal, reputationally sensitive and complicated. To bring such proceedings without the individual’s explicit and informed consent is a serious encroachment on personal autonomy. My Amendment 271D would insert a requirement that the worker must provide written consent before the Secretary of State may act on their behalf. That is not a mere administrative formality; it is the cornerstone of the individual’s control over their own legal affairs.

What if consent was not initially required or given but circumstances change? That is addressed in my Amendment 272ZZA, which would establish a clear opt-out mechanism. It would ensure that the worker is given notice before proceedings begin and is afforded 28 days to object. If they do, the case does not proceed. Surely this strikes a balance between the state’s interest in pursuing enforcement and the worker’s right to decide how their own case is handled. Legal action is not always welcome, even when it is justified. The consequences of litigation, especially in employment, can be damaging professionally and personally. Workers may prefer alternative dispute resolution.

However, consent and opt-out are not enough on their own. Even with consent, the state must be bound by a duty to act in the worker’s best interests. That is why I have proposed an amendment requiring that the Secretary of State should have regard to the worker’s stated objectives, the potential impact on their current and future employment, and the proportionality of taking legal action in the specific context. That is a safeguard to prevent well-meaning intervention becoming harmful or heavy-handed.

Then there is the matter of control. A worker may initially consent to the Secretary of State taking the lead but later wish to take back control of the proceedings, perhaps because they have secured private representation or circumstances have changed. My Amendment 272ZZD addresses this. It would ensure that the worker retains the right to reclaim their case and that the Secretary of State must accommodate that request. It affirms that ultimate control remains with the individual and not with the state.

Finally, my Amendment 272ZC would introduce a fundamental principle, that of subsidiarity. The state should not intervene unless there is absolutely no other viable route to justice. If the worker has representation or access to advice or union support, that route should be exhausted first. Legal action by the Secretary of State should be a last resort, not a first impulse.

These amendments are not intended to frustrate enforcement—far from it. They are designed to ensure that enforcement is fair, consensual and genuinely in the interest of the person whose rights are at stake. Workers are not passive subjects of policy; they are individuals with agency, judgment and a right to decide how they wish to pursue justice. We must ensure that the Bill does not cross the line from protection into paternalism.

I turn to Amendments 272AA and 272AC. Amendment 272AA simply calls for an annual report—nothing excessive, just a basic record of how often these powers have been used, what types of claims have been pursued, the outcomes and any costs or awards recovered. This is a common-sense transparency measure. If the state is litigating on behalf of private individuals, we should, at the very least, be keeping track of how that power is being exercised and with what effect.

Amendment 272AB, however, is the more pressing amendment because it would place a sunset clause on the power, causing it to expire at the end of the next Parliament unless it is actively renewed. It would also require an independent review to assess whether this power has delivered real value for workers, for justice and for public money, because the truth is we simply do not know if this clause is necessary. We do not know if workers even want the state litigating on their behalf; we do not know if the outcomes justify the costs; and we certainly do not know if this is the most effective way to improve enforcement. If this power is to remain, Parliament should be given clear evidence that it works and works better than the alternatives.

Finally, Amendment 272ZB would introduce a simple but important safeguard: a public interest test before the Secretary of State can bring proceedings on a worker’s behalf. Without this, we risk allowing the state to pursue claims that may be frivolous, politically motivated or unnecessary, potentially at public expense and also to the detriment of both workers and employers. Litigation should not be used to make a point; it should be used to deliver justice where it truly matters. This amendment would ensure that such powers are exercised responsibly and proportionately, and only where there is a clear public benefit. I beg to move.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose the Question that Clause 113 stand part of the Bill. I raised this in Second Reading, and I appreciate the discussions that have taken place with officials and the Minister since, but I genuinely believe these are novel powers.

I appreciate that we are perhaps just not going to agree today on how far the Equality Act 2006 goes, but when I tabled Questions to the Minister, they were passed to the EHRC. The commission said that, since it had received those powers—I think it was commenced in 2007—no powers had been used to initiate legal proceedings that were not judicial review or as an intervener. It gave me the distinct impression that it did not necessarily believe that it should be initiating legal proceedings in this regard. It has its own policy and that is under consultation. However, it does beg the question, given some of the other consultations that the Government have initiated, whether they will in future seek to take over any such duties or powers that the EHRC has in a variety of legal proceedings, because the EHRC is not using powers that the Government think it has. However, I think that is still really a matter of debate.

Building on the amendments that have been tabled by my noble friends on the Front Bench, I think this is an odd situation. I appreciate we have discussed elements of Clause 113 before; indeed, the other day we debated my noble friend Lady Noakes’s sensible amendment that this should be in the public interest. It would be helpful to understand from Ministers what they see will happen as a consequence of this. Where are we getting to? What is going on?

I have deliberately degrouped some parts of this discussion on Clause 114—about the money side—but it is useful to understand that, for the purposes of this clause, this is not just about people who are working; it is about people who do not have a job with the person they are seeking to take to court. We had a debate some time ago about why that could be, and we got into a debate about what sort of special privileges there might be. Nevertheless, this seems quite an extraordinary shift in the capability of the Government, first, to initiate these proceedings anyway and, secondly, to do so when the worker involved does not intend to do so. That is why, I appreciate, the legal wording really restricts any inclusion of the worker at a future date, which specifically seems to be ruled out in various provisions in the clause, except in Clause 113(5), which allows the worker to be brought in at an appeal stage. However, I am concerned more generally about this approach of a new agency.

Another element that really concerns me is subsection (6), which in essence provides:

“The Secretary of State is not liable to any worker for anything done (or omitted to be done)”.


I expect that is there to cover circumstances—we may have had a brief exchange on this already—in which the worker says, “You didn’t go after this bit or that bit”; it is kind of “Tough luck”. As it stands, it is not clear to me whether, if the worker is unhappy with the action taken, double jeopardy is allowed: will the worker be allowed to initiate separate claims against the employer, if they feel that the Secretary of State and the enforcement officers have admitted different things?

Overall, this clause is an unnecessary innovation. I am concerned about it, and I would be grateful for some broad examples of how it could be used in the future.

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[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 279GZA seeks to understand what “and, in certain cases” means in Clause 149. I would be grateful for an explanation. I looked extensively in Schedule 12 and saw only the insertion of a regulation to do with Northern Ireland. I would be grateful to understand that.

I am happy to support Amendment 323, which seems a sensible way of trying to ensure that justice is delivered effectively and people can still have fair access while also making sure that we make the best use of employment tribunal judges’ time.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Coffey for introducing her amendment and also to the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, for speaking to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the first of which proposes a report on the expansion of legal aid in employment tribunals. It would not itself change entitlement but seeks to prompt a structured exploration of the options. Legal aid is, of course, a complex and often contested area, and this amendment simply calls for a government-led review that considers both employer compliance and the financial position of workers. It is reasonable to assess whether the current system adequately supports access to justice in employment disputes.

I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I will discuss with him outside but, just to get it on the record, I am curious to know whether the “report on the options”, which he describes in subsection (1) of the proposed new clause in his lead amendment, extends to small and medium-sized employers as well. I am interested to know whether he thinks they should be included within that survey based on the fact that many of them will also suffer some financial hardship.

On the proposed new clause on summary judgments in employment tribunals in Amendment 323 by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, such a power could offer a means of reducing the burden on tribunals, improving efficiency and focusing resources on cases where the issues genuinely require full examination. In short, both amendments are interesting and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Baroness Coffey

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments tabled after Clause 75, which would require the Secretary of State to assess the impact of repealing the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023 in terms of emergency service provision and the broader resilience of our public infrastructure during industrial action. These are pragmatic and proportionate amendments, and I regret that they are even necessary, but the manner in which Clause 75 proposes to repeal this legislation—abruptly and with no review, consultation or supporting evidence—leaves us no choice.

The 2023 Act was narrowly drawn. It applied only to a tightly defined set of sectors—ambulance services, fire and rescue, health, transport, nuclear decommissioning and border security—in which a complete withdrawal of labour poses serious and obvious risks to life, safety, national security or national functioning. It did not ban strikes or criminalise union membership. It allowed a minimum service level to be set, by regulation, after consultation with affected sectors. In other words, it was a public protection measure, a mechanism of last resort, and it mirrored provisions already in countries across Europe and beyond.

The Government now seek to repeal the law, seemingly on the basis that it achieved nothing. They will no doubt point to the fact that industrial action has continued since the Act came into force. Indeed, we know from statistics that 160,000 working days were lost to strike action in the first quarter of 2025 alone. However, that statistic proves nothing about the value, or otherwise, of the Act. It proves only that the right to strike continues to be exercised, as it should be.

The Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act was never intended to eliminate strike action, and its success should not be judged by whether workers stopped striking. It should be judged by whether the public was kept safe when strikes did happen, whether ambulances still reached heart attack victims, basic fire cover was maintained and border infrastructure functioned at a minimum level.

That is a relevant test, and the Government have produced no evidence to show that those minimum protections were either unnecessary or ineffective. In fact, if the Act truly achieved nothing, why the rush to repeal it? Governments do not normally spend valuable legislative time repealing laws that they believe have no impact. The truth is that this law has teeth: it provides leverage, and it establishes a legal baseline. The Government want to remove it not because it is useless but because it places limits on how far certain interests can allow disruption to stretch.

Even if one believes the Act was flawed, the responsible course would be to review its effects before repealing it, particularly when the law was so recent and implementation across sectors was still under way. Consultations on minimum staffing levels had not been concluded in all sectors, practical guidelines had only begun to take shape and the real-world application of the law was still emerging, so to repeal it now is to abandon public protection in the name of political symbolism, to uproot a tree before it even had time to settle and declare it a failure for not bearing fruit.

What is most striking, however, is that the Government have provided no evidence that repealing the Act will lead to improved industrial relations, despite making that very claim in the impact assessment for this Bill. It is asserted almost in passing that the removal of the Act will restore trust or reduce tensions in negotiations, but where is the proof of that? Where is the analysis? Where is the independent data or stakeholder feedback to support that optimism?

We are told to take it on faith that repealing a legal framework designed to protect the public will somehow produce a more harmonious climate between unions and employers. But we are not here to govern by faith—we are here to scrutinise and to ask hard questions, and to legislate with due diligence. I put this to the Minister directly: can the Government point to any serious evidence, whether from unions, employers, emergency service leadership or international examples, that repealing this Act will improve negotiation outcomes, reduce disruption or lead to faster resolution of disputes? If not, why are we legislating in the dark?

What is the Government’s alternative? If we strip away the only existing mechanism for maintaining safe service levels during strikes, what replaces it? Nothing in the Bill offers an equivalent safeguard. There is no provision for voluntary cover agreements, no incentives for minimum staffing, no rapid arbitration scheme and no contingency powers for life and limb services. We must assume that the Government are content to simply let key public services fall to zero capacity during industrial disputes. There will be no legal recourse, no duty to plan and no obligation to protect the public. That is not reform.

Meanwhile, the public, who continue to support the right to strike in principle, also expect a functioning state. They expect to be able to call an ambulance and get one; they expect transport to limp along during industrial disputes, not collapse entirely; and they expect public safety to be preserved. The amendments before us are not extreme; they merely require a clear-sighted review of the implications of this repeal, something that any responsible Government would do as a matter of course.

I urge noble Lords to support these amendments. If the Government are confident that repealing the Act would strengthen industrial relations and carry no risk to public welfare, they should have no objection to reviewing that impact and reporting to Parliament. If they are not confident, I submit that the repeal should not proceed at all.

In short, the issue here is not ideology; it is competence. We are about to discard the only statutory mechanism for ensuring minimum service level provision during strikes—a model recognised across Europe and endorsed by ILO principles—without evidence, without a plan and without a single word of accountability to Parliament. As I said earlier, that is not governance; it is recklessness. I beg to move.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to each of the three amendments in this group, starting with Amendment 254. A significant part of the reason for the minimum services, as my noble friend has just laid out, was to recognise that certain issues were affecting daily life.

It is worth while considering the timing of aspects of this, not long after the end of the Covid lockdowns, and recognising the economic challenges that our country faced. In combination with people’s need to access urgent medical support, bearing in mind that a number of activities had been cancelled many times already, the impact of seeing further strikes—cancelling a basic level of operation for patients—was starting to become potentially very difficult for the country to manage and for patients in getting better.

Other sectors were also discussed, and transport is a good example. I expect that none of the train operating companies used this, partly because many of them found different ways to keep trains running on a basic level—good examples of that would be Greater Anglia or South Western Railway. Greater Anglia will soon become a nationalised rail operator, so I would be very interested to know—I appreciate that the Minister may not have an answer today—what the practice will be in the future as a consequence of this. At the time, the operating company Abellio was able potentially to have gone to this piece of legislation to keep trains running, although it did not have to. Will nationalised rail companies be allowed to continue to keep services running so that users can get to work, or wherever they need to go, even though there are other people on strike? My expectation, candidly, is that no nationalised company will in any way go against any trade union strike. I cannot see a Labour Government Minister using that, so by repealing this legislation the Government will have lost a lever on behalf of many of the users of public services, or services put forward for public use, across the country.

At one point there was a discussion about schools. A similar issue had arisen with children during Covid, through no fault of their own and no fault of the teachers. Schools were kept open, by and large, physically for certain workers but also online. Undoubtedly, there was a challenge for education but also, frankly, the inconvenience to working parents when schools go on strike is particularly harmful and is disruptive to those families and the wider economy. But it was decided not to do that. We reverted back to making sure, in the spirit of the Act’s intentions, that we would keep it to what were deemed to be absolutely key public services. Otherwise, there would have been significant detriment to the wider public.

Amendment 258, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, on a review into the impact on small businesses, would be very helpful. Huge changes are being put in place after nine years of a piece of legislation that from the economy’s perspective has worked reasonably well. I appreciate that the trade unions may not have liked it—and I recall it being voted against, back when this was being debated in the House a decade ago—but it is vital to the wider economy that we get our companies growing.

It seems to change every time, but I think that overall the number one mission of this Government is growth and the economy. Yet they are starting to do things, through this Bill and other situations, that seem to be driven by ideology rather than pragmatism and practicality. As a consequence, the basics and the consequences of some of this legislation, or the repealing of existing legislation, need to be considered in proper economic depth. I would love this to have happened with an updated impact assessment for us to consider before we conclude the Bill. By the way, I am grateful to the Minister for making sure that the letter the Secretary of State sent me has been placed in the Library so that every Peer can see it, but it worries me that that issue will not be considered further.

Amendment 256 links with the idea of a certification officer. I will come to series of amendments on that soon, so I am not sure how much of a certification officer role will be left. When it applies its thoughts on how it goes about the enforcement of the laws to which it is subject—and which it is also doing on behalf of trade union members—it should consider our role in the world and, in particular, how that contributes to make sure that we have a growing economy. I am sure all Members of your Lordships’ House would agree that we need it to grow.

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[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 257B simply because I did not see the answer in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. This is quite a straightforward one for the Minister.

In Section 293 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, the regulations are normally done by negative resolution—or the annulment, as set out in new subsection (6). However, I want to understand why the Government felt that these particular regulations needed to be done through the affirmative procedure. They are not the only changes—that I am aware of—in the Bill to that section, or others, of the Act. Can the Minister explain why they have been singled out? Given the trend of your Lordships’ House over many years, why do we not move to having affirmative resolutions instead of annulments for these ones in the future? I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Coffey for her amendments; they are measured, necessary and principled amendments to Clause 85, which rightly restore a degree of parliamentary scrutiny that had been quietly eroded in the original draft of the Bill. As we stated at Second Reading, there are 173 delegated powers in the Bill, which is unacceptable—not just to those the legislation will impact, but to the House.

In the Minister’s contributions on similar legislation in the past, she expressed her strong reservations about the use of delegated powers. I recall well her interventions, which were made with clarity and conviction, as she tabled amendments recommended by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. But we now find ourselves considering a clause that does precisely what she once warned against because it carves out certain sensitive and constitutionally significant areas and exposes them only to selective scrutiny.

The original version of Clause 85 created a two-tier system. Some regulations would require affirmative approval from this House, while others—no less consequential—would not. This piecemeal approach to oversight is not only undesirable but unnecessary. Regulations made under Section 293 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act are not merely technical: they pertain to fundamental matters, such as the rights of trade unions, the balance of power between employers and employees, and the protections afforded to those who take lawful industrial action. It is therefore only right and proper that all regulations made under this section should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure: they should be laid before and approved by both Houses of Parliament.

My noble friend’s amendment achieves this. It does so with economy of language, but with significant constitutional consequence. It removes the artificial distinction introduced by subsection (5), and instead applies a uniform standard of scrutiny to the entirety of Section 293.

Since the Government took office, many of us across these Benches have expressed concern about the growing use of skeleton Bills, Henry VIII clauses and broad enabling powers that allow Ministers to legislate without adequate consultation or scrutiny. This amendment is a quiet but firm step in the other direction back towards balance, principle and the proper functioning of Parliament.

Again, I thank my noble friend for tabling her amendment, and I hope the Government will not merely accept it but embrace it to show their commitment to transparency and to the constitutional propriety of this House.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Baroness Coffey

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 267ZA, 267AA and 267AB in my name in this group. Schedule 7 tries to bring together a whole bunch of legislation in a meaningful and sensible way so that it can handily be used in future. I could have extended some of these amendments, but I decided to focus Amendment 266A on paragraph 35(5)(b) of Schedule 7, which relates to Clause 89 on the delegation of functions. I could have considered a whole number of these, because this is a classic Henry VIII clause—put something in primary, shove something through regulations and, hey presto, a whole Act can change before our very eyes. In particular, Clause 89(6), which I address in Amendment 267AB, stood out to me.

My concern is that we start off with this agency, the enforcement officers and all these different things, but Clause 89(1) says:

“The Secretary of State may make arrangements with a public authority”.


I do not think “a public authority” is defined anywhere else in legislation at all. This is the first time I have seen it defined, as

“a person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature”.

That could be a whole bunch of people. What does it really mean? Are they seeking to act in the public interest, or in a different way?

The Explanatory Notes do say what they are, but, as the Minister and the Committee will know, they are not part of legislation. One of the reasons for bringing this out is to try to understand from the Minister precisely what it means. The consequence of these bits of the legislation is that, by statutory instrument, this novel area that we are getting into could be changed very quickly, away from what might have seemed a sensible agency, though I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, would rather have operational independence.

This is why I have peppered through my amendments in this group the very specific point that it should be a public authority that has civil servants in it and is not a non-ministerial department. I think that there are about 24 non-ministerial departments. Perhaps really only two—the Supreme Court and the Crown Prosecution Service—should be non-ministerial, recognising the accountability that, understandably, Parliament and the public expect.

The difference of a non-ministerial department is that it is accountable to Parliament. The device to do that is principally through the Select Committee in the House of Commons, perhaps the Public Accounts Committee, not so much in the House of Lords. Therefore, significant parts of the work being done are left to an occasional accountability meeting, whereas if civil servants are not in a non-ministerial department, the Secretary of State is directly responsible and can be held to account by Parliament and can hold those civil servants to account. I am therefore very nervous about how easy it will become to change Clause 89(6) and what that then means. It would be better for the Government to have more in the Bill about what it is.

As we are starting to get into Part 5, could it be that the public authority starts to become not-for-profit groups of solicitors who start to have these enforcement functions? Could arms of trade unions suddenly start enforcing and be able do all these different elements and to take employers to court so this starts to spread? The reason for my amendments is to try to get better legislation about what this is supposed to be. I am desperately trying to make sure that the only people to whom these things can be delegated will be civil servants who honour what the Government have set out in Part 5 and that the variety of enforcement officers and the fair work agency will be directly accountable and have the executive powers of the Secretary of State. That can be done only if people are civil servants and they are not in a non-ministerial department. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Coffey for her amendments that comprise this group, and I speak in support of them. They bring much needed clarity and constitutional discipline to the question of to whom the Secretary of State may delegate important public functions.

Clause 89, as drafted, grants the Secretary of State, as my noble friend has explained, broad discretion to delegate enforcement and other key responsibilities to a public authority. However, the current definition of that term is overly expansive. It could include not only departments under direct ministerial control, but also non-ministerial departments and other bodies with a degree of operational independence from the Government, which raises fundamental issues of accountability.

If enforcement powers, which could be potentially intrusive and far-reaching, are to be delegated, they should be exercised by those within the direct chain of ministerial responsibility. They are civil servants who operate under the authority of Ministers and who are, in turn, accountable to Parliament. Amendment 267ZA, therefore, rightly confines the scope of Clause 89 to public authorities that are comprised of civil servants and are not non-ministerial departments. That would ensure such functions are not handed to bodies that lack clear ministerial oversight or democratic accountability.

Amendment 267AA serves as a necessary consequential safeguard because it ensures that any legal substitution of the Secretary of State with another authority in the eyes of the statute is similarly limited to such core public bodies. Without this clarification, we risk a situation where statutory references to ministerial powers are extended, potentially without scrutiny, to entities with a more ambiguous constitutional status. This is not about casting aspersions on the competence or integrity of non-ministerial departments. Many do good work, but they are deliberately designed to operate at arm's length from Ministers. They should not be the recipients of powers that the public rightly expects to be exercised under ministerial responsibility.

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[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 267BA, 267BB and 267D in my name. This is where we get to the composition of the board. In this group of amendments, the most important that I have tabled is probably Amendment 267D. It would remove the words “trade unions” but would insert “employees”. I am conscious that, of course, trade unions represent employees, but I was surprised by the composition of the board: that the word “employee” did not turn up as to who the members of the board were supposed to represent. To that end, one reason why I laid Amendment 267D is that we should remember that only 22% of UK workers belong to a trade union. That leaves 78% who, at the moment, may not necessarily be represented in the consideration of the advisory board. I think it is important that we rectify that.

It is possible that independent experts and others may be involved. By the way, this happens on a variety of other bodies—I think it is so on the Health and Safety Executive. Usually, the organisations representing employees are trade unions, but the point is made that it does not have to necessarily be trade unions. It could be professional associations—that has happened in the past as well, from my recollection.

In looking at the composition of the board, I noticed that my noble friends on the Front Bench have come up with a slightly different approach. Mine has tried to be pretty straightforward and to, in effect, insert an independent chair, who should be put forward to the relevant committee in the House of Commons for consideration before their appointment.

Deliberately, I have put in some specifications as to who should chair the board. Recognising that this is all going to be about enforcement of legislation, considering a wide range of issues including taking legal action when it has not been requested by people, by workers, I have specified that we should consider this board, which is going to be very important to the Secretary of State because there are a number of situations where the legislation says that the Secretary State “must” consult the advisory board. To that end, it would be worth while to have somebody who is a qualified barrister, a KC, but who shows a particular level of accomplishment without needing to look to tribunal judges or similar to chair that board. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 267B, 267C and 268A standing in my name, and I also thank my noble friend Lady Coffey for introducing her amendment, and, of course, my noble friend Lady Noakes for signing them. Amendments 267B and 267C are not mere technicalities; they are a matter of principle. They are a matter of representation and ensuring that the new fair work agency advisory board truly reflects the full diversity and complexity of the modern UK labour market.

As drafted, Clause 90(4) proposes a tripartite board composed equally of individuals representing trade unions, employers and so-called independent experts. While the intention of the balance is commendable, the provision as it stands is both overly simplistic and insufficiently representative of the contemporary workface. As my noble friend highlighted, trade unions, for all their historic importance, now represent only 22.4% of employees across the United Kingdom, 12.3% of the private sector—so the bulk of those are in the public sector.

As my noble friend also pointed out, that leaves a staggering 77.6% of working people whose voices, interests and concerns are not captured through union representation. To restrict employee representation on this advisory board solely to trade union nominees is to exclude the overwhelming majority of the workforce. That is neither democratic nor representative. It is outdated.

This amendment seeks to rectify that imbalance by introducing a more inclusive and nuanced structure. It proposes that the board includes two representatives from the trade unions, rightly acknowledging their important role; three representatives of employees beyond the trade union movement, an expansion that ensures that the voices of non-unionised workers, gig economy participants, freelancers and precarious workers are also heard; five employer representatives to be appointed only after the Secretary of State has sought advice and recommendations from recognised business representative organisations, a process that will ensure that these appointments are rooted in sectoral legitimacy rather than political expediency; and three independent experts to provide critical objective insight grounded in academic, legal or practical labour market expertise. That structure would do three things. It would broaden representation, professionalise appointments and future-proof the board against the ever-evolving nature of work.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Baroness Coffey

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 8. I commend my noble friend Lord Wolfson on his excellent speech, bringing the reality of employing so many people into the heart of this debate, along with the constraints and the concerns being raised, while still recognising that I understand why so many people consider casual work and zero-hour contracts to be particularly poor when people are trying to have certainty of employment over some time. I also support Amendments 7, 12 and 13—in essence, any amendment that refers to specifying the reference period in the Bill.

I say that because, when thinking of 26 weeks, I think in particular of the hospitality industry in coastal areas. There are a number of employers around the country who literally shut down their businesses, or move to a much lower level of needing people, at certain times of the year, and then, in the summer, are desperately trying to find people. We need to give flexibility. The 12 weeks simply does not recognise that, as has been referred to. It is perfectly usual for people to work at different points throughout the year, potentially in on annualised-hours contract, but varying the number of hours expected to match the demand of customers requiring a particular service. I fear that the 12 weeks does not address that sort of business.

Across the country, 2 million people work in the hospitality industry. It is one of our biggest industries, and for many families it is key to how they support their household income. For the flexibility that employers want, and—thinking of how many people lose their childcare at certain times of the year—for employees to have flexibility around their hours worked, bringing in casual staff is a key element in how employers keep those businesses going.

There is another element that needs thinking through. While I appreciate that the Government seek to reduce the number of agency and bank workers in the NHS, let us not get away from the fact that, unfortunately, many NHS trusts are actually terrible employers. A lot of people leave or reduce their permanent contracts because they simply cannot get the flexibility that they need working in the NHS. That could be for caring reasons, for all sorts of people—it does not matter whether it is men or women; people provide care to their families and to their friends. I am concerned, and I intend to discuss further with NHS Professionals how this will impact on the NHS fulfilling its expectations for people right across the country. I appreciate that it is not simply NHS Professionals; many individual trusts have their own bank. That is intended to provide flexibility based on need, and recognises that simply not everybody can work the NHS shifts expected.

Thinking of the 26 weeks or the 12 weeks, I am also concerned that, at the other end of the Corridor, 650 Members of Parliament are all individual employers. They have to sign contracts, which are provided, but when people are ill or go on maternity leave, MPs can and do take people on through certain term contracts. I am concerned that there will be unintended consequences for the provision of services. As a real example, if you had to guarantee hours beyond when the employee came back, you could end up in a situation that you simply could not manage.

It is for those reasons that we need to think very carefully about the reference period when we are considering the different employment situations that small employers find themselves in, as well as the large sectors, such as hospitality and retail, which have already been discussed.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 3, 6 and 17 stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt. Before turning to the detail, I would like to frame the debate in its proper context.

At the heart of this issue lies the question of incentives. Much of the discussion around zero-hours contracts rightly concerns the security and well-being of workers. We must not lose sight of the fact that only a relatively small proportion of the workforce is employed on such contracts, or in other forms of temporary work. Many of these individuals are young people—as my noble friend Lady Lawlor illustrated in her very detailed speech—who are starting out in their careers. Others are disabled people, who may be able to work only a limited number of hours due to their personal circumstances. If we make the regulatory environment too rigid, we inadvertently create a disincentive to hire precisely these groups. We reduce the number of vacancies, reduce opportunities and end up harming those we most wish to support. Good intentions do not alone lead to good results. It is the incentives that lead to results.

I thank my noble friend Lord Moynihan and the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Goddard, for their contributions in this group, and I will come on to others. My noble friend Lord Moynihan made a compelling argument to leave out this part of the clause altogether, because it is simply unworkable in its current form. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

I turn to the specifics of my amendments. Job security is vital, and there can be no disagreement on that point, but we have to recognise that guaranteed-hours contracts are not always practical or appropriate across all sectors of the economy. The principle that we wish to uphold is simple: autonomy. Workers themselves are best placed to judge their own circumstances and to decide whether a guaranteed-hours contract would suit their needs.

Research from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, published in its report on zero-hours contracts, found that workers on such contracts often report a better work-life balance and higher well-being compared with other workers. This is an important reminder that flexibility, when genuinely chosen, can be empowering rather than exploitative.

Not every worker wants a rigid schedule. Young people, parents with caring responsibilities and disabled people may actively prefer the flexibility that variable hours allow. A one-size-fits-all approach simply does not reflect the realities of the modern labour market. Sectors such as retail, hospitality and tourism, and other seasonal industries, are heavily dependent on flexible staffing to meet seasonal demand. It is these very sectors that offer the vital entry-level opportunities to workers who might otherwise struggle to find employment.

Despite the Government’s understandable ambition to improve labour market fairness, the Bill as currently drafted risks reducing that flexibility rather than enhancing it. The automatic obligation placed upon businesses to offer guaranteed-hours contracts once certain thresholds are met would impose significant and disproportionate administrative burdens, even when the worker involved may have no desire to change their current arrangements.

The problem is particularly acute for larger employers, such as national retailers, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Wolfson, who delivered an expert speech. They would be forced into a continual cycle of recalculations and offers, simply because an employee’s working patterns have shifted slightly. As my noble friend Lady Verma explained, that affects small businesses as well. In practice, firms would face a daily or weekly obligation to offer a new contract based on changing patterns, resulting in huge and unnecessary administrative costs. This would not only create inefficiency but would discourage businesses offering overtime and additional work voluntarily, thereby reducing opportunities for those who value flexibility.

The amendments I propose take a different approach. Instead of an automatic right to be offered a guaranteed-hours contracts, we propose a right to request a guaranteed-hours contract. It entirely respects the spirit of the Government’s intentions. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has already explained, it would impose the same the obligations on employers as the Government’s Bill. This would preserve the choice for workers, empowering them to seek greater stability when they wish, but it would avoid imposing blanket obligations on employers that may lead to perverse outcomes. The Government’s current drafting, with an automatic right to guaranteed hours, risks creating a bureaucracy that neither workers nor businesses have asked for.

On the subject of businesses, it is worth referring to the letter received from five employers’ organisations. For reference, those are Make UK, the CBI, the IoD, the Federation of Small Business and the British Chambers of Commerce. They say in that letter:

“Not every job can be made compatible with every possible need. This reform means businesses incur admin costs whenever an employee works variable hours. The result is that firms are discouraged from offering variable hours even when the flexibility is requested by workers, including voluntary overtime. The cost associated with administering and calculating contract offers on a rolling basis whenever staff work additional hours is also disproportionate and provides no clear benefit to workers”.


I could not have put it better myself.

There has been some reference on the other side, by the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, to the Low Pay Commission, which met seven years ago. That ignores the fact that, over the last seven years, working practices more generally through the economy—whether on flexible-hours contracts or not—have changed very dramatically, partly as a consequence of the pandemic. I note that the FSB has now signed the letter which includes the quote I have just delivered, so it has clearly changed its mind.

I recognise that there may be an even simpler and more effective alternative to the right to request, which would be an automatic offer of a guaranteed-hours contract combined with the right for the worker to opt out if they so wish, so Amendment 17 introduces a worker opt-out mechanism. A qualifying worker may opt out of receiving a guaranteed-hours contract provided that the employer has provided clear written information about the guaranteed-hours system, the worker has given written notice in a prescribed form, and the employer reminds the worker at regular intervals, at least every six months, that they can opt back in at any time. Under that model, every eligible worker would be enrolled on to a guaranteed-hours contract after the reference period by default.

However, those workers who genuinely value the flexibility of their zero-hours arrangement—and there are many, particularly, as we have already discussed, young people, carers and so on—would have the right to decline the offer by providing written notice. This approach would strike a better balance, because it would ensure that guaranteed hours are the norm unless the worker themselves chooses otherwise, thereby protecting workers who might otherwise feel pressured not to request more security. Equally, it would avoid the unnecessary administrative burden on employers of offering contracts that in many cases would be rejected. We would be sparing businesses the cost and disruption of a process that delivers little practical benefit where flexibility is mutually valued by both employer and employee. It would ensure that the choice remains a real and continuing one, recognising that workers’ needs and circumstances evolve.