Ukraine

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I too look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Soames. While it is his first in this Chamber, it is but his latest contribution to an already long and distinguished parliamentary career.

We are about to reach the ninth anniversary of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the first anniversary of the latest and most violent phase of the conflict, during which the total casualties have run into the hundreds of thousands—a butcher’s bill that will only grow, and grow rapidly, over the coming months. As this reality continues to unfold and the suffering of the Ukrainian people mounts, the question I hear most frequently is: how and when will it end? The answer, of course, is that nobody knows. Just about all wars begin and end in politics, and this one is no different. Eventually, there will have to be a political conclusion, but that appears to be a long way off and it does not imply, as some seem to believe, the appeasement of Russia.

In thinking about what it might imply for the near term, it is worth taking a step back and reflecting on broader strategic objectives. The Ukrainians are clear about theirs: the full restoration of their country’s pre-2014 borders, including the recovery of Crimea. The Russians’ position today is less certain. Their initial objective was undoubtedly the removal of the Ukrainian Government and their replacement by a regime friendly to, if not under the control of, the Kremlin. Whether events of the past year have changed this calculus is open to debate, but I doubt it.

Putin is certainly aware that making progress towards his original objective is a lot harder and taking far longer than he had imagined, but there is no reason to suppose that he has given up on it. To the contrary, there is much evidence to suggest that he is doubling down on his original intent.

As far as the UK is concerned, our strategic objective must be to ensure that Putin’s aggression is widely perceived to have failed; that such illegal assaults on the international order are seen as not just very costly but unlikely to succeed. But I believe we should go further. As I observed last week, in conjunction with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, Russia’s war in Ukraine is being spearheaded by the Wagner organisation—a group that has at the heart of its activities terror, torture, murder, rape and all other forms of brutality. A supposedly civilised world should not countenance the existence of such a force, and we should seek to eliminate its presence from the wider international scene.

From looking at these strategic objectives, it is apparent that they differ markedly. That is unsurprising in the case of Russia and Ukraine, but it is also true with regard to the UK’s aims and, I suspect, those of many other countries that support Ukraine. This makes it very difficult to see what shape a long-term political solution might take. However, there is far less uncertainty about the near term. This is because, if Putin’s aggression is to be widely perceived as having failed, Russia must end up in no better a position than when it started the conflict and preferably in a worse one. That means Ukraine recovering its southern coastline and at least some of the Donbass.

Both those outcomes are, at best, some way off, so for the moment we need not concern ourselves about how much further the Ukrainian Government’s ambitions might stretch. That may become a pressing issue if Russian forces are driven back significantly, but there are a great many bridges to cross, both literally and figuratively, before we get anywhere near that point. For now, we should focus our minds and efforts on those bridges, and not worry unduly about what forks may lie along the road in the far distance.

Our immediate priority, like that of Ukraine, must therefore be further reversals of Russia’s territorial gains. But Ukraine’s continued success in this regard relies not just on the sustained valour of its people but on the willingness of western nations to maintain their high level of material support. That, in turn, depends to an extent on the perception of military progress—something of a chicken-and-egg situation.

My conclusion from all this is that the Ukrainian forces will need to make demonstrable gains over 2023. That, though, begs the question of the means required to achieve such an outcome, so I turn to some detailed points and questions for the Minister.

We have seen the very recent, welcome decisions, by Germany in particular, on the provision of tanks to go along with the other armoured fighting vehicles and artillery already delivered and promised. We should be in no doubt, though, that offensive action to retake and hold ground is a very different proposition from mounting a defence against the kind of unco-ordinated and poorly led attack that we saw from Russian forces last summer. Tanks in sufficient numbers will be very helpful in this regard, but the ability to manoeuvre sizeable units with concentrated firepower, to clear obstacles, both natural and man-made, and to co-ordinate different elements, both on the ground and in the air, is a significant challenge to any military. Of course, the offensive forces need extensive logistical support, technical capabilities and, crucially, sufficient weapon stocks. The important aid that we and other countries have given to Ukraine has resulted in a multiplicity of equipment types, each with its own logistic tail and often with different ammunition requirements.

Can the Minister therefore tell the House what assessment His Majesty’s Government have made of the scale of development of Ukraine’s offensive capabilities and, in particular, of its sustainability in the light of the requirements I have outlined above? Is there more that we should be doing to improve the coherence of Ukraine’s capabilities rather than focusing just on quantity?

I turn to the air. It is clear that the continued existence of capable ground-based air defences on both sides has led to something of a stalemate. What advice and aid is the Ministry of Defence giving the Ukrainians to help them break the impasse, particularly in light of the advantage that air superiority would give an attacking force? I note the Government’s announcement yesterday that the UK will provide fast-jet pilot training for Ukrainians. This may be an important contribution to Ukrainian capability, but training pilots, even advanced training, takes a long time and they need aircraft to fly once they are trained—not that we have much to offer in that regard. Our Typhoon force is already overstretched maintaining the air defence of these islands and flying combat air patrols over NATO nations bordering the conflict.

Can the Minister explain how this initiative will fit into Ukraine’s broader operational plans? Is it intended to bolster the military effort in the present conflict or is it part of the longer-term development of the Ukrainian armed forces? Can he also say what impact this new undertaking is likely to have on our military? Given the signal failure, over the past few years, of the military flying training system to deliver sufficient capacity to meet the RAF’s needs, only compounded by the recent problems with the engine on the Hawk T2 aircraft, how confident is he that it can now rise to such an additional demand? Is this not yet another example of the stripping out of our military capabilities, which has gone on for so many years, coming home to roost? Until now, the Ukraine war has largely focused attention on the paucity of our weapon stocks, but this latest initiative highlights a much deeper and wider problem of capacity. Will the revision of the defence Command Paper address this?

Finally, I turn to an issue already raised by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and very ably highlighted yesterday by the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, in the briefing on Ukraine that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, kindly arranged for us. Outside of the NATO area, Russia seems to be having considerable success in the battle of the narratives. This has important implications for the longer term. In the Middle East, Asia and Africa, the danger posed by Russia and the plight of Ukraine are widely misunderstood. There is indeed sympathy for Russia, which is supposedly facing encirclement by a hostile and aggressive NATO. I know that the Minister understands the importance of countering this narrative, but can he reassure the House that the Government are working hard with allies to develop a co-ordinated and sustained response? We may not be able to win over everybody, but at the moment we are winning over far too few.

The conflict in Ukraine continues to throw up many complex and difficult questions, but this is a time for clarity. We should not expect the war to be decided this year, but it will be a decisive period in determining whether both we and Ukraine are able to achieve our objectives. With that in mind, we should bend every sinew to promote Ukrainian military success over these crucial months.

Integrated Review: Update

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 31st January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The 2021 integrated review and defence Command Paper highlighted that we must focus on capabilities rather than troop numbers per se. Through Future Soldier, the Army will have a whole focus of over 100,000, comprising 73,000 regular service personnel and 30,100 Army Reserve. However, the noble Lord made an important point about hollowness. Over time and under successive Governments, there has been underinvestment in our land capability requirements. We have recognised that and set out a plan. Future Soldier is part of that. We have published an equipment plan of £242 billion over 10 years, and the Army’s proportion of that is £41 billion, covering, for example, Challenger 3, Boxer and Ajax.

I remind the noble Lord that this Government were responsible for a record-breaking finance settlement for defence—the biggest since the Cold War—and it should be acknowledged that we have made a serious attempt to try to redress the hollowing-out process over many years.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, whatever the fresh defence Command Paper has to say, it will be of value only if the Government strike an appropriate balance between ambition and resource. The Minister keeps referring to the largest spending increase on defence since the Cold War. Since virtually all spending reviews since the Cold War have meant a reduction in defence expenditure, that is not a very high bar to clear. Will the forthcoming spending review support the defence Command Paper or undermine it?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord may consider that it is not a very high bar, but it is higher than any of the other bars that have been set, and the facts speak for themselves. He will be aware that the challenge for defence is that we have to balance the operational and remote resource demands of today with the overarching vision to modernise to meet the demands of tomorrow. In the MoD, we are confident that we can reconcile these conflicting tensions.

Armed Forces: Resilience

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, for securing this important debate at such a crucial time for the defence of our country. I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hintze, on an excellent maiden speech, and I greatly look forward to the contribution of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Peach, who has much wisdom and experience to contribute on this subject and to the House’s wider deliberations.

Resilience is a crucial issue for any military organisation, but for ours more than most—and for ours in particular. It is not our policy, on the whole, to start wars; we are usually on the receiving end of them, which means that we are generally at a disadvantage at the beginning of any conflict. An aggressor has the advantage of choosing the time, place and manner of military action, and will very often seek to take advantage of an opponent’s weaknesses. There will be weaknesses, since no nation’s military can be strong everywhere, at all times. That means that we need the capacity to absorb the first blow, to roll with it, recover our balance, adapt to the circumstances and demands of the particular conflict, and then to seize and exploit the initiative. Even the briefest study of military history will serve to illustrate the point.

What gives us the necessary resilience, and what are the particular capabilities and characteristics that enable us to overcome disadvantage and get on to the front foot? The most commonly heard answer to this question and one that we have certainly heard today is the size of our Armed Forces—the numbers of ships, troops and aircraft. Indeed, size does matter. Losses are often highest in the early stages of a conflict. Start with too little, and there may be insufficient capability left on which to base a recovery. The noble Lord, Lord West, may have a view on that from his own experience.

One argument sometimes put forward in defence of reduced numbers is that we do not intend to fight in high-intensity conflict on our own, and that it is our membership of alliances such as NATO that creates the necessary scale. To an extent that is true, but only to an extent. The argument itself can pose dangers. If too many members of an alliance continue to reduce force levels on the basis that contributions of others will create the necessary mass, that mass will never be achieved. That has certainly been the situation in NATO for many years now.

We need larger Armed Forces. Numbers have been progressively reduced by successive Governments on the basis of cost saving, with no underpinning strategic rationale. In the early 1990s, for example, the Government insisted on defence cuts as a post-Cold War peace dividend, despite the fact that we had just been involved in a conflict that had stretched our resources to the utmost and had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. It is worth remembering that the only way that we were able to field a division in the first Gulf War was by cannibalising just about the whole of the British Army of the Rhine—and all three services are much smaller now.

Inadequate force levels are not just a problem in high-intensity conflict, though. The Government’s appetite for the employment of the military instrument frequently exceeds their willingness to sustain appropriate capacity. At the moment, for example, Typhoon squadrons are spending long periods deployed on operational duty in response to the dangerous situation in Ukraine. Of course, it is absolutely right that they should do so, but the relatively small size of the force means that people are frequently away from their families, they are unable to train effectively when they are at home base, and morale is suffering as a consequence. Poor morale leads to poor retention, which simply exacerbates the problem.

Numbers of troops and of platforms are by no means the whole story. Soldiers in battalions, sailors in ships and air crew in aircraft are of little use if they do not have the systems that allow them to succeed in modern combat or the weapons with which to fight. The Defence Secretary has confirmed what we have all known for a long time: that the Army cannot field a fighting division. But this shortcoming is not a consequence of too few soldiers; it is because they do not have the necessary communications, logistics support, armoured mobility, weapons systems or munitions. The same is true of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. Both services can field some remarkable capabilities, but not in the number required or with the necessary sustainability. One of the earliest lessons of the war in Ukraine was the reminder—for those who needed it—of the appalling rate of consumption of weapons in such conflict.

I will not give comfort to potential adversaries by detailing the UK’s specific weaknesses here. The noble Baroness the Minister knows full well what they are. I will simply note that, in evidence to your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee at the end of last year, the Defence Secretary confirmed that the UK had for far too long “hollowed out”—his words—our stocks of weapons and munitions. He has publicly repeated this statement in just the past few days. So, while we certainly need to expand the size of our Armed Forces, our immediate and urgent priority is to ensure that our current force structure can fight effectively and enduringly in high-intensity conflict. At the moment, it cannot.

This brings me to another dimension of the problem. Additional defence expenditure is of course required to bring weapons stocks not just to where they before we—rightly—donated a significant portion of them to Ukraine, but to where they should have been in the first place. We need suppliers, however, with whom we can contract for such purchases. The kinds of complex weapons that have been so successful in Ukraine cannot be produced overnight, and particularly not in the numbers that we and our allies need. That will require industrial capacity that does not exist at the moment.

We must expand our idea of resilience beyond the military community to encompass the industrial base that supports it. Such industrial capacity depends on private sector investment in the appropriate plant and personnel. But this will be forthcoming only if the investors see a reasonable prospect of a sustained return, which will in turn depend upon a fairly steady drumbeat of orders from our and other Governments. All too often, however, the procurement tap is turned on and off erratically in the face of short-term budgetary pressures. This is not the way to encourage long-term investment in industrial capacity. There is a need for a much more strategic approach to defence procurement if we are to sustain the industrial base necessary to national resilience.

Such an approach needs to address issues of culture as well as quantity. May I recommend the recently published report from your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee into the extent—or otherwise—that defence policy has moved from aspiration to reality? One of the report’s more concerning findings is that high-technology companies consider the Ministry of Defence to be one of the world’s worst customers. They say that its institutional resistance to innovative ideas, its low appetite for risk, its unwillingness to invest in experimentation and the subsequent commercialisation of novel approaches all conspire to deter high-tech companies from working with the MoD. But we have seen in Ukraine how an imaginative fusion of civilian and military approaches and technology can produce startling battlefield successes.

War and the threat of defeat can of course force co-operation between apparently strange bedfellows, but we cannot afford to wait until we are embroiled in an actual conflict before we face up to this challenge. We need a change of culture in our day-to-day processes, but the Ministry of Defence cannot do this alone. The Treasury, too, needs to adopt a much more entrepreneurial and co-operative approach to innovation, risk and long-term investment.

I have tried this afternoon to demonstrate that defence resilience is a complex issue and not just a question of numbers, important though they are. But underpinning all this is the inescapable question of money; 2% of GDP is simply inadequate to fund the aspirations set out in last year’s independent review and defence Command Paper. Both of those documents are being reviewed, but the reviews are taking place in the face of an even more dangerous world, so the equation will only have become worse. It is well past time that the Government faced up to their responsibilities in this regard. Fine words butter no parsnips—particularly when we cannot afford the parsnips in the first place.

Defence: Type 45 Destroyers

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Well, I do not completely recognise the figures that the noble Lord uses and he will know the constraint I am under in referring to specific operational activity. However, what I would say is that, as he will be aware, we always keep an eye on operational requirement, which is why we plan scheduled maintenance to make sure that we are always able to maintain the essential task that we require of the Navy.

I know that the noble Lord sometimes wears a mournful demeanour when asking me Questions at the Dispatch Box, but I think he will agree that the shipbuilding programme for the Royal Navy is very exciting. For the first time in 30 years, we are building two types of frigate simultaneously at UK yards.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Type 45 is a crucial air defence platform for the protection of surface task forces, but ships are no use whatever without weapons. So how long would the Type 45s’ current stock of surface-to-air missiles be expected to last in a high-intensity conflict?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I would be reluctant to speculate on a specific answer to the noble and gallant Lord at the Dispatch Box; I need to go away and make some inquiries and I will endeavour to respond to him as best as I can.

Royal Navy: F35B

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 8th September 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

On the HMS “Prince of Wales”, that has of course been a regrettable development. I can confirm that the “Prince of Wales” is alongside in Portsmouth and will proceed to Rosyth dry dock in due course. In the meantime, HMS “Queen Elizabeth” has departed to carry out duties with the United States. On the broader question of the fleet, the noble Baroness will be aware that the fleet has been a very important supporter of the carrier project. Many of our ships were in attendance discharging duties. Most recently, there have been ships in the Mediterranean escorting Russian ships. I therefore reassure your Lordships that the fleet is in a good state. What is exciting is the planned development of the fleet, not just with Type 26 and Type 31 but now with Type 32 and Type 83 coming into scope.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness’s previous answer focused on the size of one carrier air group on one carrier. Even when Lightning numbers have been increased, the UK will still have only one air group for two carriers—an average of half an air group per carrier. The United States has an average of over one-and-a-half air groups per carrier, because it recognises that only this will enable it to maintain operational tempo. The Government have shown great ambition for deployments of the carrier and carrier air groups; will they recognise that if they are to sustain this ambition into the future, they need to provide the necessary resources to back it up?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

There are various situations where the United States and the United Kingdom approach differently configurations of capability. The noble and gallant Lord will be aware of the planned increase of the F35B flight support in 2025, when it will go from 26 at the moment up to 48. The ultimate plan is to increase it to 74. That is exciting and should reassure noble Lords that there is very robust capability.

Afghanistan: British Special Forces

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I think we all understand that journalism has a role in a democratic society, and journalists have a job to do and documentary producers seek to discharge that role. What I think is reprehensible is—in discharging that role without producing substantive evidence or explaining why that evidence has never been investigated before—to proceed to traduce reputations and, as I say, tarnish an honourable military force of which we are extremely proud, the British Army, in which the overwhelming majority of soldiers are upstanding, competent and professional individuals who abide by the law.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister accept that there are two issues involved here, legal and reputational? In law, people are innocent until they are proved guilty, but reputations can be besmirched by programmes such as “Panorama” even if there is insufficient evidence to bring a legal case. If there is evidence then quite clearly it needs to be pursued vigorously, but, if there is not, does the Minister accept that it would be insufficient for the MoD simply to say, “There is insufficient evidence to bring a criminal case”? It will have to adopt a more proactive approach to demonstrate to the British public that their confidence in the Special Forces is not misplaced and that proper procedures were followed.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I think we all understand the noble and gallant Lord’s interests in this with great sympathy. He will understand why I have to be generic in my references. We are actively seeking that new evidence. If it can be produced, action will be taken. There may then be the broader issue, if no new evidence can be produced, of what constitutes responsible journalism and what are the unacceptable consequences of irresponsible journalism.

Ukraine: Defence in a Competitive Age

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 7th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The MoD constantly reviews our obligations—both our primary responsibility to defend the nation and our responsibility to contribute to global security with our global partners, whether in NATO or elsewhere. We therefore constantly review what we need to achieve and discharge that role. We constantly assess what we can donate; I thank the noble Lord for his helpful comments, and know he will be aware of the generous nature of that donation, recognised not just within the United Kingdom but by Ukraine. On payment, when we come to replenish stocks, which will be necessary due to our gifts of equipment to Ukraine, that will be dealt with by the Treasury special reserve.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister will be aware that your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee has just started an inquiry into last year’s defence Command Paper. One of the issues that it will seek to test is the proposition that structure can be replaced by solutions based on science and technology. Can the Minister assure us that, when departmental representatives come before the committee, they will be able to set out a clear strategy, explaining how this can be done? I also ask the Minister whether it would not be appropriate for the Government to be slightly less self-congratulatory about the recent increases in defence expenditure, welcome though they are, since they have merely repaired part of the damage that was done in 2010 and subsequently, when our defence expenditure was 2.5% of GDP?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I did not intend to sound self-congratulatory; I was merely pointing out the facts, which are a fairly stark improvement, as the noble and gallant Lord will be aware, on what has happened in previous years, under different Governments. On his point about the Command Paper and its relevance and fitness for purpose, I argue that it outlines a very comprehensive vision to reform and renew our Armed Forces for an age of global and systemic competition, dealing with threats and situations that are increasingly new to us. I welcome the noble and gallant Lord’s committee carrying out its analysis, and I am sure that, when representatives from the MoD appear before it as witnesses, they will give of their best, as usual, and endeavour to inform and assist it in its investigation.

Ukraine: Lethal Weapons

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 5th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I referred earlier to the second international donor conference held on 31 March. At that conference, the international community committed to widening its package of military support for Ukraine. This included exploring new ways of sustaining the armed forces of Ukraine over the longer term, including the provision of increasingly capable air and coastal defence systems, artillery and counter-battery capabilities, armoured vehicles and protected mobility, as well as wider training and logistical support. I hope that reassures the noble Lord that there is a coherent response.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, have the Government made any assessment of the industrial capacity for the increased production of the kinds of modern weapons that are being employed in Ukraine and of the resilience of their associated supply chains, particularly for sophisticated electronic components?

Ukraine

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 25th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I start by adding my warm congratulations to my noble friend Lord Sedwill on his excellent and perceptive maiden speech, with which I entirely agree.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did not begin yesterday, but in 2014. The seizure of Crimea and the involvement of Russian forces in the Donbass region pointed clearly to Putin’s contempt for international law and national sovereignty. What a pity we did not respond sufficiently robustly then. This most recent escalation, in the face of all diplomatic attempts to avert it, has, I hope, laid to rest the lie that Putin is simply concerned about and reacting to the so-called threat from NATO. It has long been obvious for those with eyes to see or to read Putin’s own words that his objective is to return Ukraine to the status of a Russian fiefdom. Nor should we delude ourselves that he will stop with Ukraine: if he is successful there, he will turn his eyes to other countries that were once part of the Soviet empire. It is therefore crucial that he is prevented from gaining his objective in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian people are paying the price of Putin’s aggression and rightly have our sympathy. But let us also remember the poor Russian conscripts who are being made to shed their blood by the deranged actions of a gangster regime that plunders the resources of its country for personal benefit, mounts assassinations in other countries as well as its own, interferes in the democratic processes of other nations, and bullies, invades and kills its neighbours. Those parts of the international community that care about peace and freedom and stand for a rules-based order within which all can thrive can no longer ignore or excuse the threat that Putin poses to this continent.

So what is to be done? In the short term, we must of course impose robust, targeted and enduring sanctions that enjoy wide support in the international community, in Europe and beyond. That will not be easy. Such sanctions will harm those imposing them, some much more so than the UK. Mustering the necessary international resolve and endurance is likely to tax our diplomatic skills to the limit. Sanctions will not, however, be enough. Putin will fail in Ukraine only if the Ukrainian people continue to resist and engage him in an unconventional military campaign that is protracted and costly. This is their intention, but do they have the wherewithal? We cannot fight for them, but we can and should give them all the indirect military support we can to enable them to carry on the fight.

We must also learn the strategic lessons of this conflict. Not long ago, some observers were questioning the continued relevance of NATO. In part, this was because they saw future threats to the security of Europe as originating principally from outside the continent. Even the UK’s integrated review, while acknowledging the challenge still posed by Russia, indicated a tilt more towards the Asia-Pacific region. The peace and security of our own continent should always be our top priority. Even those who did not foresee a threat to European peace—and many of us did—should remember the unbounded capacity of the future to surprise us, usually in unpleasant ways. NATO remains the bedrock of European security and must be strengthened.

However, we have strategic weaknesses that must now be addressed urgently. Globalisation, for all its benefits, has brought with it significant vulnerabilities. The economic, commercial and societal dependencies that can result from such globalisation make it more difficult for us to respond appropriately to international crises when they involve nations on whom we rely for goods and services. It is neither possible nor desirable for us to turn back the clock completely in this regard, but we need to strike a much better balance between commercial benefits and national resilience.

The Prime Minister has spoken about the need for the West to wean itself off Russian oil and gas, and that is right. However, that scratches only the surface of the problem. What about the rare earth metals that are so important to modern technology? What about other resources on which UK industry relies, such as titanium for Rolls-Royce aero engines, 20% of which has been supplied by Russia?

This is not just about Russia. Putin is the source of the current crisis, but we are vulnerable in other parts of the world. If we are to stand up to China’s assault on the rules-based international order, as the integrated review claims we will, we cannot leave ourselves vulnerable to Chinese economic industrial or technological intimidation.

The immediate priority is to offer Ukraine all the support we can and to help mobilise international efforts in this regard. However, we must also learn the strategic lessons and ensure that we are better placed in future to stand up to threats to international peace and security.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I too welcome the Bill, which, in addition to sustaining the legal basis for our Armed Forces, brings with it some worthwhile innovations. Inevitably, though, its provisions tend to raise as many questions as they answer. It is on some of these loose ends that I wish to concentrate today.

One of the most controversial aspects of the Government’s approach to the Bill has, as we have heard, been their rejection of the recommendation in the Lyons review that cases of murder, manslaughter and rape committed in the UK should be tried in civilian courts except as agreed by the Attorney-General. I accept that there may be valid reasons for the Government’s decision. The military justice system will continue to have responsibility for dealing with such offences involving service personnel outside the UK, but our military footprint abroad has been reduced significantly in recent years so such cases will probably occur infrequently.

The military justice system may find it very difficult to sustain the skills and experience necessary to carry out its responsibilities overseas if it is unable to prosecute domestic crimes of this nature. If it is to do so, however, it must be demonstrably comparable to the civilian process. There is at the moment a very serious issue of credibility, which must be addressed. Conviction rates in cases of rape brought before service courts are significantly lower than for similar crimes tried in civilian courts. Why? Supporters of the Lyons recommendation might point to fundamental deficiencies in the service justice system. I suspect that the Minister would reject such a proposition but, if so, she needs to set out credible reasons for the stark differences in outcome between the two systems. Perhaps she could take the opportunity to do so this afternoon.

The inclusion of OR7 ranks in the list of those eligible for appointment as lay members of a court martial takes us closer to the idea of a jury of one’s peers, although not all the way. It does, however, raise the question of rank gradient. There is a tendency in the military for juniors to defer to seniors even when wisdom does not necessarily lie with the greater rank. This was in the past a significant issue in aircraft cockpits—not just in the military, I might add—and a factor in a number of avoidable accidents. It took a dedicated programme of training and cultural change across the entire aviation community to address the problem. Does the Minister envisage the need for something similar for lay members of service courts?

My final points concern Clause 8, which places a duty on “specified persons and bodies” exercising certain functions to have “due regard” to the principles laid out in the Armed Forces covenant. I welcome the intent behind this clause. It certainly represents necessary progress but it leaves a number of unresolved issues. The relevant functions that fall within the ambit of the Bill are restricted to housing, healthcare and education. These are undoubtedly the functions about which service personnel, veterans and their families are most concerned but, as we have already heard today, they are by no means the only areas of difficulty.

My other concern relates to the legal implications of Clause 8. As far as I can see, there are none. It requires the relevant bodies to have “due regard” to the provisions of the Armed Forces covenant but it does not specify any outcomes. There is nothing that could be effectively challenged in law, nor are there any potential remedies for a failure to comply with the provisions. The alternative—to specify particular outcomes—is not viable. What outcomes would one specify? In any case, it must be for those most closely involved to determine priorities. Veterans and their families should not suffer from their service, but that does not automatically place their needs above those of others.

So how are we to ensure that the very welcome intent of Clause 8 is delivered in practice? We cannot just rely on veterans to raise concerns. What formal avenues will be open to them? With whom should they register those concerns, and what processes of investigation and judgment would this trigger? In any case, most of those most in need, particularly those suffering from mental illness, will be just those least able to deal with the pressures and demands of an uncertain appeal process. Balancing the need for flexibility and local decision-making with certainty in enforcement is a challenge, but it must be faced if Clause 8 is to function effectively. A comprehensive and proactive audit process would allow us to assess the practical implementation of the clause and to develop recommendations for both closing loopholes and tightening application. Does the Minister agree that this is necessary if the Government’s worthy aspirations are to be given practical effect?