Armed Forces Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 48, 50, 51 and 52 in my name.

Amendment 48 is about payment to the new non-executive board members. The members of the RFCAs and all their forebear organisations, commencing with the county territorial associations in 1908, whether acting locally or nationally, have never been paid. The volunteer ethos is of very considerable significance, especially in the world of reserves and cadets. Imagine how it will look to the reservists, who volunteer and put their lives on the line, and to the cadet forces, if the non-executives are to be paid. It is a really bad look and unlikely to attract the best of society who are absolutely committed to the reserves and cadets.

Furthermore, we are living in a time of scarce resources, especially in the field of defence. Yet here is the MoD deliberately adding cost, when it knows there is a ready supply of volunteers who will do, and indeed are doing, this work for no financial reward. One can guess the reaction of those who have shown, over many years, their dedicated and unpaid commitment to the reserves and cadets, to the appointment of paid non-executives with no apparent commitment to the reserves or cadets. It is a mistake to offer money to entice people to apply for these roles.

I turn now to Amendment 50, which seeks to reinstate lords-lieutenant. Lords-lieutenant are the sovereign’s representatives in their respective lieutenancies or counties. It is their foremost duty to uphold the dignity of the Crown. Historically, each lord-lieutenant was responsible for organising the county’s militia. The Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907 established county territorial associations, with the lord-lieutenant as the president of the county association. The relationship of lords-lieutenant with the military today is maintained via their presidency of their county RFCAs. All lords-lieutenant are affiliated to one of the 13 regional RFCAs; one of them is president and they rotate the presidency among them.

This is constituted in primary legislation, most recently in Schedule 4 to the Reserve Forces Act 1996. Removing that would remove the final vestiges of a military role and an important part of the symbolic relationship of the lords-lieutenant to the Crown. Service personnel hold the sovereign in the highest regard. To cut off this link between reservists and the Crown seems, to say the least, inappropriate. Lords-lieutenant have evidenced considerable concern over the review’s proposals and the consequences of breaking this important link. Under the Armed Forces Bill, the involvement of the lords-lieutenant, which was established under paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Schedule 4 to the Reserve Forces Act 1996, is to be abolished. Paragraph 4(2)(b) of Schedule 6 to this Bill will omit

“section 111 and Schedule 4 (provisions of schemes for the constitution of associations)”.

It has been suggested, as an afterthought, that the continued involvement of the lords-lieutenant might be achieved through secondary legislation or regulation. The involvement of the lords-lieutenant is currently in primary legislation and to relegate it to regulations is nothing short of insulting. It also makes it much easier to amend, change and delete it. If it is proposed to amend the law in a way that affects a class of persons, it is customary to consult them. Even if there is no statutory duty to do so, there have been cases where the courts have held that failure to consult is a reason for upholding judicial review of the Government. I understand that the Association of Lord-Lieutenants has not been consulted. I urge the Minister to consider the amendment carefully.

Amendment 51 addresses the establishment of a national council. The strength of the RFCAs lies in their embeddedness across the regions. This was not accidental; it reflects the original Haldane model from 1908—a decentralised, citizen-based structure designed to mirror national diversity and ensure societal ownership of the territorial Reserve Forces. It has endured and worked for over a century. What is today described as “connecting defence with the nation” is rooted in this model, so it is right that Schedule 6 of the Bill establishes regional councils through paragraph 14 of proposed new Schedule 4A. What is extremely odd, though, is that the drafters have not understood that the regional councils are irrelevant if their views are not brought together and debated centrally, so that a single considered professional message can be delivered to Ministers.

Abolition of the membership, discussed in the debate on the last group, also presents a conundrum as to where the regional council members will be elected from. When we questioned this, we were told, “Don’t worry, it’ll be dealt with in secondary legislation”. This is a quite extraordinary response. Without a national council, the regional councils are completely irrelevant, and without a membership they will be ineffective. This seems to be an attempt to pay lip service to devolution, while in fact cutting it off at the roots. A national council is fundamental to the functioning of the new structure, and the amendment would establish one.

Amendment 52 addresses the external scrutiny team. The Council of Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations external scrutiny team provides an independent annual assessment to Parliament of the state, capabilities and health of the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces, identified as fundamental to advising Ministers and the single services on the effectiveness of training, fighting efficiency and leadership of the reserve, thus meeting the FR 2020 proposition to reservists. It was established following the Future Reserves 2020 review and operates with statutory duties mandated by the Reserve Forces Act 1996.

The Armed Forces Bill, in paragraph 5(b) of Schedule 6, introduces the concept that the Defence Council can remove responsibility for producing the annual assessment or report and award it to someone else at stroke of a pen. This is not the case in the current legislation. Will the Minister therefore explain what lies behind this change? To whom might the responsibility for producing the independent assessment be transferred? What would be considered appropriate grounds for transferring it? When might this happen? How will Ministers ensure the assessment continues in future to be conducted properly and truly independently of the MoD? I beg to move.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to these amendments, and I agree with the points that have been so well made by the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley. I will start my brief remarks by making just a couple of general points. First, while there have been some criticisms of the arrangements of reserves and cadet forces, particularly in fairly recent reviews, most of these have been attended to subsequently. The general opinion was that, in the round, the Reserve Forces and cadets operated extremely well and were extremely valuable, and the arrangements that had been set in place had served this country extremely well for a very long time. There is, therefore, a burden of proof on anyone seeking to change the current arrangements to show why any proposed alterations will be better than the arrangements that are already in place. I fear that the Government fail on this count in many instances in this particular part of the Armed Forces Bill.

Secondly, the Minister has previously indicated to the Committee that some of the shortcomings might be attended to in secondary legislation, and the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, just referred to this. That is all very well, but as everybody in this Chamber knows, we cannot amend secondary legislation; we take it or leave it, and usually, we have to take it. Of course, there must be secondary legislation for the detailed implementation of an Act and the measures in it; but issues of principle should be settled in primary legislation, not in secondary legislation, for some of the reasons that the Lord, Lord De Mauley, just pointed out. Quite a number of the issues covered by the amendments this evening are issues of principle and, therefore, belong in primary legislation, not in secondary legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That might be a matter for us to consider in the conversation that we have. I do not want to go on for too long, but I understand many of the comments that different people have made this evening; I agree with some of them to a larger or lesser extent. I have never thought, generally speaking, that, in certain circumstances, unpaid work is the way forward. This is one of those situations, in respect of the board: I do not think it undermines the voluntary ethos as a whole because, here, it is related to board membership. In that circumstance, it is perfectly reasonable, given the new board that we wish to set up, that the position should be remunerated, although I accept the point that, in the broader establishment of lords-lieutenant and others across the wider—

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

The Minister has said that he does not believe that having paid non-executive directors will lessen their commitment. That is not the question, though. Surely the question is: does having unpaid representatives lessen their commitment? It does not. So why do we want to change it?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is the difference. I understand the whole point about the voluntary ethos generally across the reserves and cadet associations; I absolutely accept that. I am saying, with respect to the board members, that, where you are creating a national board that wants to take on certain statutory functions, that position should be remunerated. That is the difference between us. In the end, personally, I think that that is not inconsistent with the belief that you can have a voluntary ethos.

Look—we have voluntary organisations all over the country that display a voluntary ethos of which we are all proud. At the top of those organisations are people, including board members, who are remunerated. We would not expect them to be able to do that job of work without that remuneration. That is the principle and the point that I am making.

We are committed to equality of opportunity and to breaking down barriers that prevent people contributing to public life, so we want public appointments to be open to all those who have the skills, experience and commitment, not only to those with the financial means to do so without compensation. The Government’s objective is to attract the best candidates from the widest possible range of backgrounds, and retaining the option to remunerate supports that aim. I hope that explains the Government’s position while accepting, again, that many noble Lords will disagree with it. That is my point about payments for the strategic oversight board while respecting the voluntary ethos more widely within the reserves and cadets associations.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th September 2026 Lords Chamber

The historic reason for having regional associations was not bureaucracy but fostering local connections. This remains just as important today. Indeed, the Commons committee recognised the importance of retaining regional representation and local connections, so I urge the Government to think carefully about whether the measures in Clause 38 protect these. Does the proposed NDPB deliver a properly governed national body that retains genuinely empowered regional structures? In Scotland, that should mean meaningful and guaranteed representation; a clear role for both highland and lowland; proper engagement with Scottish civic and public institutions; and sufficient delegated authority to ensure that decisions affecting Scottish reservists, cadets, employers and the reserve estate are informed by people who understand Scotland. Until the Minister can demonstrate that this is the case, important questions remain unanswered. Therefore, I support opposing the question that Clause 38 stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, let me start by saying that I agree with everything that has been said so far. I have put my name to some amendments in subsequent groupings that seek to ameliorate some of the worst aspects of Schedule 6, where I think the Government have got it badly wrong. I will seek to develop those arguments further when we come to those amendments.

Let me pose a question to the Minister. My understanding, like that of the noble Earl, Lord Minto, is that this move is largely driven by a desire to centralise much stronger financial control. If such central financial control is necessary for financial efficiency and propriety, how on earth will the Government carry out their agenda of decentralisation more widely across the country? Since this is a Government who seek to promote devolution, decentralisation and much greater local control, how on earth can this particular part of the Armed Forces Bill be consonant with that policy? They simply cannot have it both ways. I wonder whether the Minister, when he responds, could address that point.

[Lord Moore of Etchingham (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure and honour to follow the several noble Lords, including two noble and gallant Lords, who have already spoken; of course, they have tremendous expertise. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, because she made a point that is very important for the more general argument and not just about Scotland: the reserves are not a reserved matter. That says something about how it all operates and how local it is.

I have the honour, as a Sussex man, of being a member of the Sussex Club. We have an absolute rule that we have no speeches ever but, at our annual dinners twice a year, as well as the loyal toast, of course, we have two other toasts. One says, “Prosperity to the county of Sussex”. The other is to the forces of the Crown.

The link between those two toasts says it all. This is partly why we do not have speeches. This is what we are talking about here: this is why it matters, and why it is rooted. We must remember that the origins of all our armies, unlike the origins of the Royal Navy, are not as standing armies but as regiments raised. That is how the loyalty of the people has always been bound in. It is quite a serious historical, emotional and cultural matter.

However, we should not rest our argument only on that point, central though it is. It could be argued that for some reason, these arrangements are out of date. We would then need to think about whether they would be more efficiently done if they are centralised. The noble Earl, Lord Minto, said that centralised non-departmental bodies are a majorly difficult feature of modern British government. It is all to do with the problem of answerability. What comes into rhetoric a great deal in modern government is that we need “an independent body” to do something or other. That sounds lovely, because we all want independence, but what does that independence mean? It means a person with a bureaucratic background being appointed by bureaucrats. There is almost no answerability to the public more widely, or even to Parliament. Therefore, I would be suspicious of that.

Following on from what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said, this is relevant now because the Government have inherited this measure from their officials, but it is not consonant with their own policies. The so-called “Manchesterism” from the Prime Minister is, in a way, a modern and more urban version of the thing we all are praising in relation to the reserves in the counties. It is the idea that local loyalty matters, that local people understand these questions better and that power should be devolved. This measure is going in absolutely the wrong direction.

This matters particularly because this Government are trying to shift all of that. Also, we must not forget the wider picture. We live in a dramatically more dangerous world than we have done for a very long time. The loyalty we are talking about needs to be constantly cultivated. People need to understand why their service matters. This will make it harder for them to understand, at a time when we want them to volunteer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 46, 47 and 49 in my name. To understand the importance of these amendments, one needs to appreciate the significance of the nationwide membership of the RFCAs. The 2019 Sullivan report on the RFCAs, which recommended conversion to an NDPB, itself provides an explanation at paragraph 2.2.2, where it says:

“A key strength of the RFCAs is their extensive volunteer membership (numbering around 8000), bringing with it a wide breadth of expertise and community links—without which the RFCAs would unlikely have access to the information and knowledge needed to discharge the duties … Their position as the link between Defence and the wider public, continuity of staff and expertise, and tri-Service drive enables the RFCAs to deliver across all functions, particularly community and employer engagement (the latter proven by the success on the Armed Force Covenant and Employer Recognition Scheme work strands). This is particularly valuable in cases where local knowledge and understanding may be limited in MoD customers”.


What is proposed in the Armed Forces Bill is the removal of all the regional chairs from the central board—the new decision-making arm of the RFCA. If the Armed Forces Bill proceeds as drafted, the members who currently elect those chairs will be completely disenfranchised, with the consequence of a loss of defence’s connection with society and the advocates and supporters of the reserves and cadets across the UK. The members have made it very clear that this will be sufficiently significant that it will lead to a reduction in the membership to a negligible number. Is that really what the Government want, when they state in the strategic defence review their ambitions to increase the size of the reverses, to increase the number of cadet and to create a completely new homeland and critical national infrastructure defence force, and that a whole-of-society approach to defence is essential?

In discussions with the MoD over the last 12 months, matters had developed to a point at which the MoD had agreed in writing, confirmed by a Government Minister at the RFCAs’ annual conference, that regional chairs would indeed sit as full members on the national board in order to protect the societal links and work done by the engaged and experience membership. Stepping back from that commitment, as the Bill does, is already being taken very badly by the membership.

I do not blame the Minister; I do not believe that the implications of what is proposed have been explained to him. They cannot have been, because if they had he would not be proceeding with this. This is about something more important even than the Permanent Secretary’s perception of how he will improve his oversight of what, in the context of the MoD’s overall budget, is a relatively small amount of funding that the RFCAs receive and use on maintenance of the volunteer estate. It is about the country’s ability to defend itself in time of war, because the effect of Section 38 and Schedule 6 will do irreparable damage to the Government’s ability to defend the country through the use and expansion of the Reserve Forces, of which the RFCAs are a demonstrable key enabler.

This will also have a damaging effect on the Government’s aim of growing the cadet forces, in which, again, local RFCAs are pivotal enablers. The Denny report, entitled The Impact and Value of School-Based Cadet Forces in the UK, identified that those with cadet service were statistically unlikely to be not in education, employment or training—something rather topical these days.

Turning to Amendment 49, I mentioned earlier what the Sullivan report says about a key strength of the RFCAs being their extensive volunteer membership. I will give a couple of examples of how the membership helps defence. My first example is that in the first decade of this century, the country was mobilising reservists in large numbers to go to Iraq and Afghanistan to bolster the Regular Army. The Regular Forces live on the patch: there are welfare officers, commanding officers and RSMs’ wives—a whole machine that is wheeled in action to look after the welfare of the families left behind. For the reservists, who are scattered over the area from which their unit recruits, which can be several counties or several cities, there is no such welfare machine. That is when the RFCAs’ membership comes into action, visiting and offering help and advice.

Reservists have the added complication of a civilian employer. An RFCA member who is an employer can visit them and explain what is happening and the legal position. I commanded a reserve regiment during the mobilisation of large numbers of reservists for Operation TELIC between 2003 and 2005. Without the support and influence of the RFCA, particularly with employers, the reserves would have responded less effectively. It allowed me to command and lead while employment matters could be successfully dealt with by the RFCAs. I know that other commanding officers had similar experiences. It was the RFCA that led on the work relating to employment that was subsequently woven into the Future Reserves 2020 White Paper.

My second example is that, being apolitical, the RFCAs have been extremely helpful in defence, especially in the devolved Administrations. In Scotland, when the Government announced the expansion of the cadet forces in schools, one of the nationalist papers printed a story suggesting that this was about training child soldiers. Its apolitical position allowed the RFCA, through its members and connections, to persuade the Government in Scotland that that was not a fair representation. They agreed, and the story died.

The SDR proposed increases in the size of the reserves and the cadets; the creation of a new homeland defence force; that defence should become a whole-of-nation responsibility; and that resilience in the civilian community needs to be improved. Therefore, it seems quite extraordinary that the RFCA’s membership, which could do so much to enable these things, should be abolished for no good reason.

Further, as was said earlier, this is directly against the new Prime Minister’s drive on the devolution of power and influence outwards. Whereas the Reserve Forces Act 1996 included in its Schedule 4 detail on the grass-roots membership, this is completely and deliberately removed by Clause 4(2)(b) in Part 3 of Schedule 6 to the Armed Forces Bill. There would henceforth be no reference at all to membership in primary legislation, for the first time since 1908. Thousands of volunteers across the UK would immediately be disfranchised and lost.

It has been suggested that the membership might be reinvented through secondary legislation; the Minister referred to this earlier. However, we all know that this is a poor way of doing it. It relegates the voluntary concept to a secondary level of importance and makes it much easier to amend, change and delete it. I beg to move.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to these amendments for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, set out so clearly and cogently. I do not intend to repeat them all, as I agree with everything he said, but I want to make a couple of wider points centred on the requirement for a regional approach to our reserves and cadets.

There has been wide acknowledgment of the benefits that such an approach would bring. However, a couple of things have not been mentioned to the extent that they should be. First, there is the matter of footprint. The Reserve Forces and cadets allow us a military footprint across the United Kingdom that is no longer possible with our sadly depleted regular forces. This matters. It means that defence and defence issues can be represented locally by people who are local; the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, pointed out one example of where this has been an inestimable benefit in Scotland. That is one very important point.

My other point concerns the matter of identity. Within military organisations, identity matters—identity of the group. In the regulars, it is perhaps identification with your ship, your regiment or your squadron but, as far as regulars are concerned, it is identity with your locality. That is fundamental to it, and that identity is fundamental to the effectiveness of any military organisation. The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton, said that the Bill does not seek to destroy the regional aspect of the Reserve Forces. That may be true to an extent, but he knows as well as anyone here that the regional nature of the Reserve Forces is not just about the wiring diagram. It is about the authority that those regional forces have; that is absolutely fundamental.

In response to an earlier amendment, the Minister said that devolution is achieved through overarching strategic direction and that mayors cannot do what they like. Actually, though, that is the whole point: within certain limits, they can. The point of devolution is giving them authority along with responsibility. There is overarching strategic direction, although it will not necessarily work in the case of mayors because you could have a Conservative mayor and a Labour national Government; I am not quite sure how far the Conservative mayor would follow the national Government’s overarching strategic objectives, but we are not discussing that matter here today. So I accept that there is an overarching strategic directive, but it is strategic. It is not operational or tactical. Therefore, local authorities will have a great deal of freedom to decide things, but they will need the authority to carry through on those decisions. Authority goes along with funding in many instances, but with other things besides. That is one of the reasons why Schedule 6 is potentially so damaging for the Reserve Forces.

This speaks to what we would term “mission command” in military parlance. You give overall direction on the broad objectives that you want to see achieved, but you leave a great deal of freedom open to your subordinate organisation—in this case, the regional forces—to decide how it is to be done. Yet they must have authority along with that responsibility. If mission command is to operate effectively, at a superior level, you need to listen to your subordinates’ concerns when they tell you that something simply will not work so you must come up with a different plan. At the moment, as the legislation is framed, the link between the subordinate and superior formations will be, at best, neutered and, at worst, cut off completely.

Amendments 46 and 47 seek to ensure that the RFCAs are properly represented at a senior level and that their voices can be heard. However, that plays both ways. If their voices are not heard, they will lack authority at the local level. If they lack authority at the local level, it will have an impact on recruiting and retention, with lower morale and lower effectiveness. Nobody in this Chamber wants to see that, I know.

Equally, Amendment 49 seeks to ensure that the RFCA’s wider membership is enshrined in primary legislation and that its breadth and diversity are retained so that, again, the wider community and regional links are retained and have credibility across that regional community.

As I said earlier in Committee, I have concerns about Schedule 6 overall. If we are to retain it, I plead with the Minister to take these issues away and correct those bits of it that will restore the authority and the voice of the local Reserve Forces and cadets, in particular through the RFCAs.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to intervene very briefly in support of my noble friend Lord De Mauley. I declare my interest as a former Defence Minister and as the Minister who was responsible for piloting the Reserve Forces Act 1996 through your Lordships’ House; I suspect that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, is the only person present who might remember that, having directly witnessed it. I declare a further interest in that my wife, who is the lord-lieutenant of Buckinghamshire, is the president of the South East Reserves Forces’ and Cadets’ Association.

In mentioning my part in giving birth to the 1996 Act, I do not wish the Committee to suppose that I am opposed to changing it. I am not an old reactionary—at least, not in this regard—as I am the first to recognise that the world as it was in 1996 is not the world we are confronted with today. When it comes to the Government’s stated aim of placing greater emphasis on our Reserve Forces in creating a more lethal and integrated force model for defence, I am wholly in favour.

However, in acknowledging the deficiencies of the 1996 Act against that policy backdrop, we should not at the same time downplay its strengths. One of its major strengths, as other noble Lords have emphasised and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, so well described, is to acknowledge the importance of ensuring the buy-in of the civil community in the delivery of well-supported, well-motivated, administratively efficient reserves and cadet units.

Future Capability of the Armed Forces

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the most obvious and urgent thing to say about military capability is that we have nothing like enough of it, either now or as currently planned for the future. This must be addressed as a matter of urgency but, in the limited time available to us in this debate, I want to make three points about the nature of those capabilities.

First, I warn against oversimplification when considering future force structures. Recent debate has focused on the need for much greater numbers of uncrewed and, in some cases, autonomous vehicles in all three environments—what are commonly but inaccurately termed drones. I agree with the general proposition, but such vehicles are not the solution to everything. Ukrainians have used them very successfully to make up for their relative shortage of front-line personnel, and we can certainly employ them to create more mass. They will be a key feature of the future force mix, but they will form part of the force structure, not the whole of it. It is crucial that we adopt transformational technologies, but we should not imagine that any one of them will solve all our problems.

Secondly, whatever capabilities we have at the start of any high-intensity conflict, they will not be sufficient to sustain our effort through to victory. Some, perhaps much of them, will be destroyed in the early fighting and will have to be replaced. At the same time, technological developments and enemy initiatives will force us to adapt accordingly. It is worth remembering that many of the capabilities the Ukrainians are employing so successfully against Russia today did not exist four years ago. Therefore, we will need an agile, innovative and rapidly scalable industrial base that can support such an effort—not just traditional defence companies but the high technology sector more widely. This will require a substantial and steady stream of investment over time to underpin the necessary research and development and, importantly, to attract the necessary private sector investment.

Finally, I warn against focusing solely on capital investment. Military capability requires not just the right equipment but the people who can operate it effectively in the most demanding and dangerous conditions. That means that both regulars and reserves need regular and rigorous training. Without it, we will be sending them into combat inadequately prepared for what they will face. This not only weakens our war-fighting effectiveness but exposes our people to unnecessarily high risk. This would be an act of criminal negligence.

Our training requires not just equipment but the fuel, the spares and the other support necessary for its operation. This is paid for by resource funding, not capital. Such funding is under pressure and, despite some rebalancing in the investment plan, it remains insufficient. Our people are already inadequately trained for high-intensity conflict. In-year pressure on the defence budget means that this will get worse. I understand that the MoD can do little about the problem in the current financial year, but I ask the Minister to assure the House that the position will be transformed in future years. The Government simply cannot go on failing our people and the country more widely in this way.

Most of what I have urged—I could have urged much more—comes down to funding. The settlement in the defence investment plan was inadequate and incoherent in the light of the commitment that the Government have rightly made to NATO. This failure endangers us all and it must be put right very quickly.

UK Defence Capability

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

It has been well reported. I have said from this Dispatch Box, and the First Sea Lord has said it as well, that the availability of submarines is not where the Government would want it to be. That is why we are investing, for example, £4.5 billion in the dockyards in Plymouth. The dockyards in Plymouth need investment, the dockyards in Scotland need investment, and we are looking at that. We are also looking at original ways of seeing whether we can provide docking facilities to increase the availability of submarines by looking at various provisions that do not require building or rebuilding a whole new dock. The noble Lord is quite right to point out that we need to do better on the availability of submarines. Of course we do. We will not comment on exactly how, and the noble Lord would not expect me to, but of course availability needs to improve and we are looking at how we can do that.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the focus has been on the defence investment plan, which is, of course, crucial, but does the Minister agree that capability is not just about capital investment? Resources expenditure, which is treated differently, is crucial. It pays for the fuel and spares that our people need to conduct training that is fundamental to their operational capability and it pays their salaries and for the standard of their accommodation. Does he agree that any plan that the Ministry of Defence brings forward that does not fund resource adequately will just continue the hollowing out of our Armed Forces that has taken place over the past two decades?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord for the question. In any investment plan going forward, obviously the emphasis tends to be on capital as the noble and gallant Lord says—how many planes will we have, what we will do with munitions, and those sorts of things. However, he is quite right to point out the resource element of the budget—the day-to-day expenditure that pays for wages, training and all those things—is equally important, otherwise we run into trouble, particularly mid-year if there is a need to rebalance and look how to resource the particulars. The noble and gallant Lord often points out that if we do not get the resource allocation right, it impacts on the morale of the very people who serve our country. He is quite right to point that out. Discussions about the correct split between CDEL and RDEL is also going on.

King’s Speech

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 21st May 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in February, the Prime Minister warned of the dangerous time in which we live. He went on to say:

“In the 1930s, leaders were too slow to level with the public about the fundamental shift in mindset that was required. So we must work harder today to build consent for the decisions we must take to keep us safe”.


Wise words—which makes the deafening silence that has followed all the more astonishing. Where is the national conversation that we were promised and that is crucial to convincing people, most particularly the younger generation—not to mention the Treasury—of the need to face squarely the perils ahead? At the moment, it is nowhere, and certainly not in the gracious Speech. So perhaps I can help the Minister who will wind up by suggesting some key elements that should underpin such a conversation.

The first is to remind people of what the Athenians taught the Melians during the Peloponnesian war: the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. If we allow ourselves to become weak, our good intentions will count for nothing. The only intentions that will have any meaning will be those of the powerful, and, if those intentions are malign, we will just have to suffer them. The second point is that our strength is directed towards and essential to the deterrence of major conflict. Weakness makes war more, not less, likely—either that or abject surrender to the demands of an aggressor. Effective deterrence is expensive, but a failure of deterrence far more so, and the horrendous costs are then paid in blood as well as in treasure.

Effective deterrence occurs in the mind of a potential adversary: they must be convinced that malign action on their part will result in consequences that will be unacceptable to them and that conflict will result in their defeat, no matter what measures they pursue. They must therefore be clear that we have the full range of capabilities and the political will to ensure such an outcome.

Strength is of course enhanced by acting in concert with others, which is why NATO remains crucial to our security, but membership of an alliance does not absolve us of the need to pull our weight. To our shame, we are slipping well down the weight scales within NATO. Moreover, it makes no sense for NATO to rely upon a single-source supplier for crucial strategic capabilities, as we do upon the United States. This is not just a matter of one unpredictable Administration: come the day they are needed, those capabilities may be unavailable or diminished for all sorts of reasons. NATO needs to be much more resilient to such uncertainties, and this means that European members must develop alternative sources of such strategic capability, most of which will be beyond the reach of any individual nation. European partnerships to fund, develop and operate those capabilities are urgently required, but the capabilities that are necessary for victory will not all be present at the start of any conflict, either in nature or in quantity.

It is notable that many of the systems and methods that the Ukrainians are now employing so successfully against the Russians did not exist four years ago. The lesson here is that we need in Europe an agile, innovative and rapidly scalable industrial base—not, I should note, just traditional defence companies—that can rapidly adapt to the circumstances of a conflict and produce at large scale the technologies crucial to success.

The final point is that properly resourced military forces of appropriate size are essential but not by themselves sufficient for effective deterrence. Our political system, social structure and domestic infrastructure need to be resilient to the attacks they are already suffering, which would increase manifold in the lead-up to and during any conflict. Weakness in this area undermines our deterrent posture. As the Government’s own defence review made clear, we currently have shortfalls in many of the requirements for effective deterrence. We must make good those deficiencies as a matter of urgency, not just articulate vague aspirations for the future. That means fiscal choices that may be hard politically but are obvious in logic. It is a choice between pain now and a likelihood of catastrophe in the future. This is the message our political leaders must take to the country. These are the measures on which they must deliver. Yes, it will be a challenge, but it is one to which they must rise. It is time, indeed beyond time, for them to lead.

Strategic Defence Review: Funding

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

There is a debate in Grand Committee on Monday about defence resilience, so we can start the conversation there. Of course, there is a broader conversation that the noble Lord referred to, and we are working hard to deliver that as well. I accept that there is a debate about defence spending. However, in 2024-25, the total DEL was £60.2 billion. In 2028-29, it will be £73.5 billion under current plans. That is a £13.5 billion increase in that final year.

On the SDR, the noble Lord will know, notwithstanding the debate going on around it, that the Government are not waiting for the publication of the SDR. Significant investments are being made already. The Leonardo investment in Yeovil around helicopters was announced recently. Again on helicopters, just yesterday nearly £900 million was announced Boeing UK for Chinook and Apache maintenance. There is huge investment in shipbuilding in Scotland, which is immense for Scotland and something about which we can all be pleased. The nuclear deterrent is being renewed. We have ordered 12 F35As. All those things are important. We are not waiting for the SDR; we are investing already. The debate will no doubt continue on the total amount, but it is wrong to say we are not investing anything.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I offer my sympathies to the Minister for being put up, once again, to defend the indefensible. Would he agree that the people of this country have a right to expect their leaders to, well, lead? The need is not in doubt. The Prime Minister goes to places such as Munich and gives very eloquent speeches, setting out the urgency of the requirement, but back at home the issue apparently remains on his desk, where I assume it has been sitting for months. Could the Minister take the message back to his colleagues—it is a message with which I know he agrees, although he cannot say so—that the time for leadership is not now, it is long past? We need to get on with this. The situation is too urgent and too dangerous to permit a further delay.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The DIP is being finalised. As the noble and gallant Lord said, the DIP is on the Prime Minister’s desk, as he said recently at the Liaison Committee, and is being considered. The only point I make to the noble and gallant Lord is the one I made to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and often make to the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie. I accept the debate and discussion about the totality of the amount that should or should not be spent within the total the Government have available. Alongside that discussion and debate, significant change is happening and significant investment is being made. The defence budget is rising. I know it is not rising in the way the noble and gallant Lord would wish it to but, as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and without repeating it to save time for other noble Lords to ask questions, significant investment is going into the defence industry and defence capabilities across our nation, of which the British public can be proud.

UK Homeland Defence

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 23rd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Let me deal with two separate issues on that. First, should the UK develop its own sovereign capability and do as much as we can to have the industry and intelligence that we need ourselves? Of course we should. The Government are taking action to rebuild and develop our own capabilities and industry. I have to say, with respect to the US, as the noble Lord has heard me say many times from this Dispatch Box, let us be under no illusions: the US-UK relationship is fundamental to the defence of our nation and fundamental to the protection of our values not only in this country but in Europe and across the world. The intelligence sharing and military-to-military co-operation that takes place is still absolutely essential to the defence of that. I know the noble Lord agrees with that. I will not get into what the President has said or has not said. All I am saying is that, for the intents of defending this country, our alliance with the United States is fundamental, and we should respect it for that.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, surely the point here is not the threat from Iranian missiles, which would be operating at extreme range with limited payload and very poor accuracy. The lessons to be drawn from this conflict are the vulnerability of military and civilian sites to combined missile and drone attack, which are capabilities Russia has in abundance and the targets set in the UK will be particularly vulnerable to. The Minister has pointed out some of the investment that has been made since the SDR, but it is wholly inadequate to restore the military capability we need to defend these islands and to provide the necessary degree of resilience to such attacks. If the Government do not do something urgently in financing these capabilities correctly, then this country will be vulnerable to such attacks for years to come.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I say to the noble and gallant Lord that, of course, we await the defence investment plan, but we are not waiting for it before we do things. I have pointed out the investment we have made into some air defence systems already, but he is quite right to point out that we need to make progress at pace, as quickly as we can, to defend against potential missile threats but also against drone threats, which he quite rightly points out. We are assessing what we can do, are trying to work at pace on that, and will do all we can to protect our country—which, as everyone says, is the first duty of any Government.

Defence Industrial Strategy 2025: Economic Growth and Job Creation

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I agree with that. It is really important for the defence industrial strategy that we liaise with all the devolved Governments and, as my noble friend says, with local devolved councils and mayoral authorities. Kim McGuinness is the Mayor of the North East, in my noble friend’s part of the country, and I know of the work that he has done with local authorities. It is essential that we work with them to deliver the economic growth that we want across all the regions of England and nations of the UK.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the defence industrial strategy will have no economic effect. What might make an impact is a defence investment plan, backed up by the necessary level of resources. The absence of such a plan is undermining business confidence and investor confidence. When will the Government start taking such crucial decisions at a pace that matches the urgency of the international situation we face?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I accept the point with respect to the publication of the defence investment plan. As the noble and gallant Lord will know, that will be published as soon as it is ready. Look at what has been happening. Noble Lords across this Chamber demanded that the Government spend money on Leonardos, and we announced investment in them just recently. We have also invested huge sums of money on the Clyde and at Rosyth to build new ships. We are investing huge sums of money to develop the dockyards in Plymouth to improve the availability of the submarines, and we are also making numerous investments, such as in Rolls-Royce, with a £9 billion nuclear programme over the next few years. I understand the point the noble and gallant Lord is making, but the Government are not standing still—we are already spending billions of pounds investing in our defence industry.

Ministry of Defence: Budget Shortfall

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The defence investment plan will deal with choices according to the budget that it has set for it. Even if you increase the budget, you still have to make choices about what you spend that money on. The Chief of the Defence Staff and the other chiefs are involved in this, discussing what capabilities we need, with the budget that we have, to ensure that we have the war-fighting readiness we need. Those choices are taking place.

Considerable sums of money are being spent at present—billions of pounds. I keep repeating this: under current plans, the total budget in 2024-25 was £60.2 billion; in 2008-29, on current plans, it will be £73.5 billion. Billions of pounds of additional money is being spent. We are seeking to ensure that we spend it properly and appropriately to fight the wars of the future.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister is quite right, but he knows as well as the rest of us that those are meaningless figures: what really matters is how much you can buy for the money you are spending. Given the accounting changes that have taken place over the intervening years, we are currently spending a lower percentage of GDP on defence than we were in 2010, when we were not facing the very serious threats to European security that we see today. How do the Government explain this?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The Government explain it by using the figures I have just outlined. There is billions of pounds of additional money. You cannot alter the fact that it is going from the figure I just gave to the noble Lord, Lord Young, to the figure it will be. The noble and gallant Lord knows far better than me that choices have to be made within that budget about what capabilities you will spend it upon. One of the choices that confronts us is what lessons we learn from Ukraine, and what capabilities we need to ensure that we fight the war of the future and not the war of the past. That is part of the discussion that is going on at present.

Boarding of Sanctioned Vessels

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My noble friend heard the careful Answer that I gave to the noble Baroness; I hope that went some way to answering the question that he has posed. It is not as though we have not been doing anything. Let me set out the facts for my noble friend; I asked for them and mentioned them a couple of days ago. As a consequence of sanctions, Russia’s oil revenues are down 27% compared with October 2024 and 544 vessels have had sanctions imposed on them by us, with 200 of these sidelined through actions taken by ourselves and our partners. So I take the noble Lord’s point about the need to go further and faster, but we are taking action, and that action has had some consequence on the Russian war machine.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, shadow fleets pose a threat not just to the effectiveness of sanctions but to critical undersea infrastructure, and therefore require a more robust response than they have had hitherto. That requires not just expert, trained personnel, which we absolutely have, but the necessary maritime and air support assets, which are much more problematic. It is noticeable that, in the US incident recently, the Navy contributed a Royal Fleet Auxiliary manned by merchant seamen rather than a warship, presumably because we did not have one available. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence is arguing about which capabilities should be cut so that we can live within the wholly inadequate defence budget. When will the Government more widely start acting as though they believe the warnings that they rightly continue to issue about the perils of the international situation that we face?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord will know that we await the defence investment plan, which will lay out the capabilities that the Government believe that we need for war-fighting readiness. The noble and gallant Lord will also know that we have taken action in the Baltic to protect underwater critical infrastructure, with “Proteus” and other capabilities. He will also know that, with respect to the interdiction of the shadow vessel between Iceland and Scotland, we used RAF surveillance aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft, as well as the RFA ship. It is also worth pointing out that, notwithstanding the might of the United States, it asked for our support and help in doing what it did, and we were happy to give it.