Sentencing Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I find myself back in the comfortable spot where I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Of course, that is something that we will come to later, no doubt, when we discuss the independence and the constitutional role of the Sentencing Council. If noble Lords are worried that I am being too glib, because “exceptional circumstances” seems too vague an alternative to a prescriptive list of offences which are exceptional, the answer is, on the one hand, to trust the judges—this is about their discretion, and they know jolly well about the awful case that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned, and about situations where people are repeatedly not paying their fines or breaching community orders, which should be exceptions to the 12-month presumption.

The second part of the argument is that the judicial limb of our constitution has in the form of its Sentencing Council—and I use that language deliberately because I am for the independence of the Sentencing Council—a council to help guide judges so that there can be an element of consistency in courts around the country as to the approach on what is exceptional, and therefore what type of case justifies the exception to the presumption and the philosophy of this measure that short sentences are a bad idea.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I hesitate to intervene on this matter, but I wonder what thought has been given by the Ministry of Justice to simplification. The Sentencing Code is now a very lengthy document. The way in which the title of the clause has been put is very sensible: it says that there is a presumption for a suspended sentence. However, one goes on to read the entirety of this text, with the words “the court must … unless”, and then there is a whole series of exceptions to that order. Why do we have to have complexity?

There are two strong reasons against it. First, there will not be parliamentary time to alter this if we get it wrong. Secondly, it is much better to leave this to the guidance of the Sentencing Council. If the Bill could say “the Sentencing Council will provide guidelines to bring about that there should be a presumption against short sentences”, would that not achieve what we want without language? I heavily criticise the parliamentary draftsmen for this unnecessary complexity. Can we go not go back to the Victorian age and do things simply? I know these words are likely to fall on deaf ears, but it would be so much better if we had simple sentencing legislation and left it to the Sentencing Council, which can adjust it as we see whether it works, because one thing experience shows is that we try one type of sentence and, a few years later, we want to tinker with it.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, as a judge who did not sit very often in crime but had to do it from time to time, I have been listening with increasing dismay to what has been discussed in these increasingly elaborate proposals. I hope that the Minister will listen to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, because that was the first bit of absolute good sense, whether we need to call it Victorian or just remind ourselves that the Victorians did a lot of things extremely well. At the end of this discussion and throughout this Bill, could we not do three things: simplify, trust the judges, and trust the Sentencing Council to do a lot of what is going to be, at the moment, in primary legislation?

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I hope that I have addressed noble Lords’ concerns and clearly explained why the current position in the Bill is the right one.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Perhaps I might ask the Minister about the way he ran his business. One of the important roles of a legislature is to get things technically right. There is no disagreement, as I can see, on the view that that the policy is right, but can we not do things more simply? Throughout the Bill, I have asked the Minister: can we look at producing a piece of workable, simple legislation that can be adapted if what is set out is not right? I believe that this is something a legislature ought to address, where policy is not at issue.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

The principle that the noble and learned Lord raises is the right one. I do not believe that we can change things in this Bill now, but the message that I can relay will be very helpful. There is another point around complexity: how this is then communicated to the hard-working staff on the front line, who will need to interpret and put into action what we are proposing here.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I will respond to the Minister. First, it is always our duty to put legislation right, otherwise we might as well all go home. Secondly, the Sentencing Council is there to give practical guidance; it is not our job as a legislature to tinker with the detail. I urge the Minister to go back and see whether we can produce, instead of the complexities inherent in this clause, something that just expresses the presumption and leaves the Sentencing Council to do its job. It will do it far more competently, I am sure, than the Ministry of Justice.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

We will come back to that later in Committee, when we talk about the Sentencing Council. But I reassure the noble and learned Lord that I will take back to colleagues his point about clarity and simplicity.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Yes, luckily they have, so I do not really need to be nervous at all.

Often, in putting my or the Green Party’s views—which obviously overlap quite a lot—I feel that I am speaking from the street. I talk to a lot of people who probably do not know much about this sort of thing, and they probably agree with me on some of it.

On simpler legislation, I know for a fact that the Met Police would like simpler legislation around protests. It is absolutely sick of the confusion and it is time for us to revisit it. However, that is not for today.

Amendment 29A would make a simple but important change: it would require courts to consider the use of a community order before imposing a suspended sentence order. This would strengthen the Government’s own intention to reduce the overuse of short prison sentences—an aim that I and, I am sure, many across the Chamber, including the Minister, warmly welcome. However, unless we make it clear that community orders must be properly considered first, we risk creating what justice organisations call a net-widening effect. In other words, people who should have received a community order may instead receive a suspended sentence order simply because it appears to be a tougher alternative to custody.

A suspended sentence order is still a custodial sentence. It carries the weight and the lifelong consequences of a criminal record, and it places people at far greater risk of imprisonment if they breach its terms. By contrast, a community order is a genuinely non-custodial disposal. It is designed, when properly resourced, to address the underlying causes of offending, whether those are mental health needs, alcohol or drug dependency, or others. Community orders enable people to keep their jobs, maintain their homes, stay connected to their families and communities, and continue caring responsibilities—all factors that are well established as reducing the risk of reoffending.

If the Bill’s aim is to reduce the crisis in prison capacity, we must avoid funnelling people into suspended sentences where a community order would be more effective and safely promote rehabilitation. Otherwise, we simply increase the pipeline into custody through breach, defeating the very purpose of the Government’s reforms. We also risk the danger that this disproportionately affects women as it currently stands, which we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

This amendment is supported by Justice and aligned with the recommendations of the Independent Sentencing Review, which suggested

“introducing ‘crime reduction’ as an overarching principle”

to guide sentencing. Community sentences can play a crucial role in achieving that. They provide a real opportunity for rehabilitation and practical programmes that help people rebuild their lives without the barrier of a custodial sentence on their record. Crucially, community orders can command public confidence when victims are properly informed about what they involve and understand how these sentences can reduce future harm.

Amendment 29A would simply ensure that the most proportionate, most effective and least harmful sentence is considered first. It would strengthen the Bill’s stated ambition of reducing pressure on prisons while supporting better outcomes for individuals and communities. I hope that the Minister sees this as a constructive amendment that aligns with the Government’s own agenda. I urge the Committee to give it serious consideration.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I support what is behind the amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones, for two reasons. First, we still send far too many women to prison; we need to reduce that number. Secondly, a community sentence probably should be in priority to a suspended sentence.

However, it is not that simple. I will not come back to this point again, but the amendments show precisely why this should be left to the Sentencing Council, which can weigh up the detail of the terms and conditions that it is appropriate to attach to a suspended sentence, as you can make them almost as tough as a community order. The judgment of how the public perceive suspended sentences and community orders can also be left to the council. Unless we satisfy the public’s perception that we are punishing people, the result will be that the judges will think, “Okay, we’ve got to go above 12 months”. That would be a disaster, particularly in the case of women.

I support the excellent ideas behind the amendments. However—and I promise not to say any more about the Sentencing Council today—they are a very strong argument for changing this Bill and making it sensible.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to these amendments, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

Amendment 15, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to insert an explicit reference to Section 77 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to make it plain that courts may mitigate a sentence to a community order where appropriate. This amendment is not necessary. The Bill does not alter the courts’ ability to consider the full range of mitigating factors, nor does it disturb their discretion to impose a community sentence where that is the just and proportionate outcome. What it does is imposes an obligation to suspend a prison sentence where otherwise a prison sentence might be imposed. Those powers remain firmly in place. To single out Section 77 of the Sentencing Act for restatement in the Bill might imply that the legislation would otherwise curtail judicial discretion to impose a community sentence. That is not the case. For this reason, we do not consider the amendment to be needed or helpful.

Amendment 29A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would place a statutory duty on courts to consider a community order before imposing a suspended sentence order. Although we understand and appreciate the intention behind the proposal, we do not support it. The courts are already required to work upwards through a full hierarchy of sentencing options, including setting community sentences, before custody is reached. That is the well-established principle in law and practice. Sentencing judges are highly experienced in applying those principles.

To introduce a further procedural step will not add substance but create additional bureaucracy in an already very complex framework. It risks increasing administrative burdens on the probation services and court staff, and generating uncertainty about what additional assessments or reports might be required to satisfy the new duty. We should not legislate for processes that the system is not resourced or structured to deliver. Above all, a suspended sentence of imprisonment is, by definition, imposed only when the custody threshold has already been crossed. To require courts to revisit considerations that are already inherent in the sentencing exercise risks weakening clarity and undermining judicial confidence in the tools at their disposal.

For all these reasons, although we respect the intentions behind both amendments, we do not believe that they would strengthen the sentencing framework. We cannot support them.