Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Lemos

Committee stage
Monday 1st December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling these amendments. I am very grateful for their continued and constructive engagement on the Bill.

Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, proposes to abolish the Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The noble Lord’s prediction is correct: I put on record that we strongly believe that it is right to retain the council, in view of the continued importance of its work in developing sentencing guidelines. He does not look completely surprised.

Over time, the council has developed offence-specific guidelines covering hundreds of offences, alongside a series of overarching guidelines. These guidelines have helped bring greater consistency, transparency and public understanding to the sentencing process. We welcome that.

The council also holds an important constitutional position, as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, within the firmament of our justice system. It bridges the interests and responsibilities of Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary on sentencing policy and practice, while protecting the important responsibility of judges and magistrates to make individual sentencing decisions—I think I am reflecting what the noble and learned Lord said. For these reasons, I am afraid we do not support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I urge him to withdraw it.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Thomas. They have indicated quite clearly their opposition to Clause 18 and propose an alternative approach to Clause 19. I am grateful for their careful consideration of this. Their concerns are shared by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I know that they were experts in this field and their opinions therefore carry a great deal of weight with the Government. As the Minister made clear at Second Reading, in bringing forward these clauses we are aiming to maintain public confidence in the guidelines that the council produces, particularly in view of the sustained public scrutiny that the council has been under of late, which is partly reflected in these debates.

Events surrounding the imposition guideline, on which I do not propose to dwell but which obviously I need to reference, earlier this year highlighted an example of the issues that can arise where guidelines cover areas of policy that should properly be for Ministers and Parliament to determine. We are keen to avoid a similar scenario arising in future, and that is why Clauses 18 and 19 have been drafted to introduce approval measures that provide greater democratic and judicial oversight of the council’s work.

I recognise that noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Marks, are keen for more information about the intention of Clause 18. Put briefly, this clause will allow the Lord Chancellor to have a greater say over the guidelines that the council intends to develop across the year, ensuring that any plans are properly reflective of wider priorities across government and Parliament and with the wider public. As no noble Lord has so far mentioned this, I should stress that in preparing this clause we have had regard to similar provision that exists for comparable bodies across the justice system, such as the Law Commission.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Will the Minister explain why the Law Commission, which is a body that looks at law reform for the Government, is to be equated with the independent Sentencing Council, which constitutionally balances the three interests? It would be very helpful to have that explanation. A second explanation it would be helpful to have is: is it intended that the business plan sets out in detail what is going to be in the guidelines so that the Lord Chancellor can look through it to see whether there is likely to be the kind of short sentence or two that occurred in this guideline that is unacceptable? It would be very interesting to know the Government’s thinking on both these points.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I take the point that the noble and learned Lord makes that the Law Commission is different. That is why I said that we have had regard to that. On the second question that the noble and learned Lord raises, perhaps I can come to that in just a moment.

Clause 19 provides that the council can issue definitive guidelines only if the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice each individually approve them. The amendments from the noble and learned Lords propose instead that the council should be free to issue definitive guidance unless both the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice indicate that they do not consent. While I appreciate the sentiment and the spirit of compromise behind these amendments—which the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Thomas, also referred to— I am afraid that we are not convinced that they would be the best way of securing the public confidence in sentencing guidelines that we seek. This is because they run the risk of definitive guidelines being published and implemented for use by the courts, even if the Lord Chancellor or, indeed, the Lady Chief Justice had indicated their discontent with them. We consider the current drafting of Clause 19 to be a practical and effective means of achieving our policy objective because it provides that the consent of the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice must first be obtained before a definitive guideline can be published and implemented.

I emphasise that, in developing our current drafting, we have sought to reflect the distinct roles and responsibilities that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to between Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary, as well as the careful balance that has been established for sentencing policy and practice. In particular, we are clear that these approval measures do not interfere—I hope that this is obvious, but I will emphasise it anyway—with the judiciary’s responsibility for setting sentences in individual cases.