Lord Verdirame
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(1 day, 10 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have added my name to both amendments in this group for the reasons that have been so eloquently set out by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.
The first point is that proscription is a very significant power for the Executive. The consequences are severe. Conduct that was hitherto perfectly lawful becomes not only unlawful but criminal. For that reason, we need to have proper checks and balances. The second reason, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that these amendments are actually quite modest. They do not try to limit or amend the scope of the criminal offences, which was the case with some of the amendments perhaps in the previous group; all they try to do is increase parliamentary scrutiny. To me, the case for doing so seems unanswerable.
The third point is that, as we know, there has been an intense debate on the proscription of Palestine Action, and views on that may differ. But my opinion is that, whichever view one takes, one should be able to support both these amendments—particularly in light of the very interesting exchange in the previous group between the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, where the idea that seemed to emerge was that there might be some way forward on tightening “glorification” by reference to proscribed organisations.
But if the reference point is proscribed organisations, we must be absolutely certain that we are getting proscription right, and we must be able to interrogate fully any proscription that the Government decide. For that reason, I think there is simply no answer to Amendment 454. We need to have one order per organisation that the Government intend to proscribe. It is no answer to say that this would place an undue burden. Civil servants will obviously have to spend considerable time putting together the evidence for proscription and, as part of that, requiring them to prepare two different orders is not asking for too much. Nor is it an answer to say that this would be an increased burden for Parliament.
When we vote on or scrutinise a proscription, we take a decision of great importance, for the reasons I have mentioned before. We should not be put again in a position, as was the case a few months ago, where we have to decide on the proscription of very different organisations—where, on the one hand, you have organisations for which the case for proscription is probably uncontroversial, and on the other hand you have examples of organisations for which there is objectively an argument to be had as to whether proscription is a good idea or not. For these reasons, I give my full support to both these amendments.
My Lords, I too support both amendments. I support Amendment 449 because proscription is a huge power. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “awesome”, and it is indeed an awesome power: it can turn ordinary behaviour into crime. Parliament should not be asked to rubber-stamp those decisions without proper scrutiny. Proscription can criminalise membership, association and even everyday activity, yet at present these decisions are made almost entirely within the Executive, with very limited parliamentary oversight, and that concentration of power carries risks. It leaves decisions open to mistakes or overreach and of course it can also undermine public confidence in counterterrorism law.
Parliament and the public need assurance that proscription is based on sound reasoning, reviewed independently and grounded in evidence. One thing we did not really have when we were asked to proscribe Palestine Action was evidence. Since then, we have had hints of various kinds, telling us that we will see when the evidence comes out and we will understand why that proscription was justified. But so far, I would argue, it has not been justified. Independent scrutiny is particularly important when the intelligence underpinning a proscription is classified and supposedly cannot be shared widely. Where decisions are urgent or complex, having a committee report afterwards helps Parliament and the public understand the reasoning and reinforces the legitimacy of the action taken.
I would have also supported this going further to address the recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson KC—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—that proscriptions should be time-limited and expire after a set period, such as two years, unless Parliament is asked to proscribe yet again. As we know, once proscription has happened, in effect it lasts forever. Decisions this serious should not be made in private and left to drift. Parliament deserves a proper look at the evidence, so I hope that the Minister is going to bring us the evidence, as he keeps hinting in various speeches.
Amendment 454 is an excellent amendment, I have to say, because, when we proscribed Palestine Action, it was bracketed with two groups. I cannot even remember their names. They were right-wing, fascist organisations, and we had absolutely no choice about that. Had we dealt with each of those individually, we could have made a much better decision, I would argue. It seems that we just have to trust the Government—and who trusts the Government any more? Certainly not me, and many of the general public agree with me. Asking us to trust the Government is not the way it should be. It really should have better oversight.
I give way also to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
Maybe the Minister can take all the questions in one go. The threshold may be the same, but there are three separate decisions and each decision is based on different evidence. We are dealing analytically with three distinct decisions, and that is the reason why there should be three different orders.
I suspect that the historical examples to which the Minister referred—I am not certain; perhaps he can explain—were cases in which all the various organisations were in the same context, whether it was organisations related to Afghanistan, ISIS or al-Qaeda. What we had in the case of Palestine Action was the lumping together of very different organisations: a British extreme movement and two white supremacist Russian movements. They have nothing to do with each other, and the evidence is different. Does the Minister accept that, in those circumstances in particular, where we are dealing with very different decisions based on different evidence, there should be an order per organisation?
The noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Verdirame, have made fair and reasonable points. We group them for speed and efficiency, and historically they have been grouped because we want to clear a number of proscription orders at the same time. However, I put this point on the table for the Committee: if, in the light of the advice of the security services of officials, ministerial interrogation of that and, now, the added locus of the Intelligence and Security Committee having sight of and being able to be briefed on those orders, we brought three orders into one order, the threshold remains the same, and that threshold will have been crossed by those organisations. It might be that its members have a sympathy for the Palestinian cause rather than the Russian nationalist cause, but the threshold decided by ministerial jurisdiction, on advice from officials and the security services, is the same: they have crossed the threshold of the 2000 Act for a terrorist organisation. Making them separate orders would still mean that Members of both Houses would have to vote and say, “We do not accept that they have crossed the threshold”. That is a different decision.
I am conscious of time. Those points have been made. I hope I have put the Government’s case with the response I made to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and with my “take it or leave it” explanation of the points on disambiguation of the orders. Members can reflect on it. In the meantime, I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.