Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who brings so much expertise and wisdom to this debate.

This is a short Bill, yes, on a narrow point, but it raises some important constitutional questions. It concerns the power of the Home Secretary under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act to deprive a person of British citizenship. As we know, under this provision the Home Secretary may deprive a person of citizenship in two cases: first, if she is satisfied that the deprivation will be conducive to the public good; and, secondly, if she is satisfied that citizenship was obtained by fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. I do not have any problem with the second scenario; it is the first one which is intensely problematic.

There is a limit to the exercise of this power. A deprivation order may not be made if that person would be rendered stateless, and thus would result in a breach of our obligations under the statelessness convention. But this limit, however important, is insufficient. In practice, as has been mentioned before, people with two nationalities, such as me, are British citizens only for as long as the Home Secretary of the day is satisfied that depriving us of our citizenship would not be conducive to the public good. Under the law as it is, it is easier for me to be stripped of my British citizenship than of my barony. This rule is based on an idea of citizenship that is simply unfit for a modern liberal democracy. Yes, the power is used sparingly, as the Minister said, but we are, as the noble Lord, Lord German, pointed out, a country that, in Europe, uses this power to an exceptional degree. We strip citizenship at rates that are higher than those of almost any other country in the world, as was noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent report, Accountability for Daesh Crimes.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation observed that there is a sharp contrast between the high number of deprivation orders in these cases, which are usually national security cases, and the low number of prosecutions or temporary exclusion orders. To put these things in perspective, from 1972 to 2006 only 10 people were deprived of citizenship, whereas from 2010 to 2023 there were 1,080 deprivations of citizenship, and of those 222 were on the basis of the “conducive” test—104 of those deprivations were in one year alone, 2017.

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, we need to think of how this power would be used by a Home Secretary who comes to office with a rather different conception of the public good from that of his or her predecessors. We have to be very alive to those risks. There is little in the language of Section 40 to which we could point to invite restraint if faced with a Home Secretary determined to make even more extensive use of the power of deprivation than has been the case so far.

The problem with this Bill is that it makes a power that is already excessive even worse by reversing the decision of the Supreme Court in the N3(ZA) case. The Supreme Court ruled that a person deprived of British citizenship automatically and retrospectively regains their citizenship following a successful appeal. It is still possible, even after the Supreme Court ruling, for the deprivation order to be made and enforcement action pursuant to that order to be taken, despite the affected person bringing the appeal.

As a matter of principle, it seems to me that, given that the power of the Secretary of State is already so extensive, and in the light of the severe consequences that the exercise of that power has, it is wrong to allow deprivations which our courts have found to be unlawful to continue to have effect pending an appeal. It seems to me even more important for a power such as this that we should stick with the ordinary approach, which is that the decision of the court should take effect pending the appeal and, where circumstances justify, the Government could seek a stay—or, as the noble Lord, Lord German, explained, there could be some work around identifying the grounds on which such a stay should be granted.

Another problem with the Bill is that it creates an incentive for the Government to pursue every possible point in order to preserve the continuing effect of an order. On matters of such importance, if anything, the incentive should be the opposite.

Last but certainly not least, British children born during unlawful deprivation periods find themselves in an even worse limbo. Under the Supreme Court ruling in N3, children would acquire British citizenship if their parents’ appeal is successful, and they would do so immediately. Under the Bill, children would not acquire citizenship, even though the most authoritative determination of the law at that point would support their acquisition of citizenship. I appreciate that the consequence of the Supreme Court’s approach is that a child would be treated as a British citizen during the appeal period and that, if the Government are ultimately successful, that child would have to be regarded as never having acquired British citizenship. But, as a matter of principle, I would rather we erred by treating a non-citizen child as a citizen temporarily than by depriving a child who was a British citizen all along of the benefits of British citizenship.

I have two questions on this point which echo points raised by the noble Lord, Lord German. First, the national security reason, which is stated as the main justification for this Bill, does not apply to children. Being the child of an individual who may pose a threat to national security is not a national security concern. So what is the reason for extending the consequences of the measure to children? Secondly, would the Government be open to considering ways of mitigating the effects of the Bill on children, in the light of the fact that the consequences for them cannot be justified under the underlying justification for the Bill—namely, national security?

I do not have any objection in principle to Parliament taking the view that a law, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court, must be changed. It does not mean that the Supreme Court was wrong about the law. As lawmakers, we have a different perspective from that of judges. Our role is to make the law and sometimes change it, and that may at times require reversing a decision of the Supreme Court. In this case, however, I see no legislative reason and no reason of principle that justifies a fundamentally different conclusion from that reached by the Supreme Court. As for the position of the children of the persons who have been deprived of British citizenship, there is a strong reason for considering forms of mitigation.

It seems to me that by extending the powers in Section 40, as the Bill requires us to do, we are going in exactly the opposite direction of that which we should be taking, which is to restrict a power that has been on the statute books for a long time but that is way too illiberal and exorbitant.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

According to the Times, Home Office research last year concluded that there was “no evidence” that hostile policies changed the behaviour of migrants. Can the Minister confirm or deny that they are accurate quotes from Home Office research?

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I hesitated to come in before and I apologise for not participating at Second Reading, but I followed the debate closely. I must declare an interest: I have been instructed before by the Government as a member of the Bar on matters relating to the subject matter of the Bill. But I can speak freely on Amendment 13 because it is not anything on which I advise. I wish to speak in support of it.

The negotiation of removal or readmission agreements is, of course, a matter for the Government and not for Parliament. But there are many examples in treaty negotiations of Governments invoking pressure from their parliaments—or even from their courts—as a reason for not being able to make a concession or for insisting on concessions from the other side. It seems to me that it might end up strengthening the hand of the Government in these negotiations if they are able to say that Parliament is insisting on them.

The most difficult negotiation is, as we have heard, with the European Union. The European Union is not opposed to readmission agreements. On the contrary, it concluded a number of them with many countries, from Turkey to Belarus. Incidentally, the readmission agreements with Belarus and Russia have been suspended, quite rightly, because of the situation that has arisen. A number of us, I think, would have regarded those agreements as problematic from a human rights point of view even before that.

The reason why a readmission agreement with the UK is difficult is that the UK is a country from which European Union member states would have to take people back, rather than send them back. The Government published a draft readmission agreement for negotiation with the EU in the summer of 2020. That text is still available on the government website. If the EU had accepted that treaty, it would have allowed the UK to send people back to EU member states—not only permanent residents and nationals, but also third-country nationals who have transited through an EU member state. The provisions in that draft treaty proposed by the UK were identical to a number of provisions found in readmission agreements concluded by the European Union, including the one with Turkey. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong about this, but I think that negotiations with the EU on the Government’s draft proposal never took off.

It is worth noting that both the UK and the EU—and that includes the EU in its own capacity and EU member states—are subject to quite wide-ranging treaty obligations on both migrant smuggling and human trafficking. These treaties impose various obligations of international co-operation, including, in the case of the migrant smuggling protocol, the obligation to

“cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea”.

Generally speaking, these are obligations of conduct rather than by result. They do not oblige the EU to accept the terms of the treaty proposed by the UK. They do, however, require the EU, EU member states and all parties to those treaties to engage in good faith negotiations with the UK on readmission, particularly where very similar treaties have been concluded in other contexts. It would be a very unattractive position for any party to these treaties to take the view that they are open to readmission agreements only when they are in their interest and not when they are not.

It seems to me that Amendment 13 would bring some of these questions to the surface by requiring the Government to update Parliament on the status of these negotiations and on the reasons why these negotiations might not be progressing. That is outlined in subsection (3) of the new clause proposed in Amendment 13. It would not be a case of government and Parliament speaking with separate voices; on the contrary, it would be a case of Parliament adding its voice and adding pressure for the purposes of achieving an objective that both Parliament and government consider important.

My final point concerns the language of “formal legally binding agreements” in subsection (1). It is broadly right that this should be the optimum arrangement—the formal legally binding agreement—but it is also the case in this sort of practice that states will often conclude agreements that are not binding. The European Union has two such agreements with Guinea and the Gambia. For various reasons, those agreements, in some cases, are more appropriate. My understanding—and the Minister will, again, correct me if I am wrong—is that the arrangement with Albania that was announced a few weeks ago is actually part of a non-binding arrangement that was built on an existing treaty. The treaty itself is the one from 2021, but the further agreement that was announced by the Prime Ministers at their recent meeting is an example of such a non-binding agreement that can, in certain circumstances, be a better way of achieving that same objective. I would agree, however, with the notion that the formal and legally binding agreement is the gold standard in this kind of situation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, this Bill sets out a duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the removal of a person who has arrived in or entered the UK illegally and satisfies the four conditions set out in Clause 2. In the majority of cases, formal returns agreements are not required in order to carry out removals. Most countries co-operate with returns, and these relationships are managed through official-led engagement with immigration counterparts in receiving countries and through consular services based in the UK. Returns agreements can be a useful tool to solidify or improve returns co-operation and are sometimes requested by the receiving country. We carefully consider whether it is beneficial to enter into negotiations to formalise a returns relationship, having regard to the potential requests that the other side would seek to incorporate into an agreement, such as a liberalisation of the UK visa requirements in respect of their nationals.

As of May 2023, the Home Office has 16 returns agreements in place. Recent additions to the list include Albania, India, Nigeria and Pakistan. Just last week, the Prime Minister announced the start of negotiations on a new returns agreement with Moldova. A number of these agreements are sensitive, and receiving countries might withdraw co-operation if they are publicised, so it would be detrimental to formalise and publish all such agreements. There are also some countries where the existing security and country situation might prevent returns taking place, such as Sudan and Afghanistan. We continue to monitor the situation closely in those countries with a view to resuming enforced returns as soon as is practicable and safe.

I should add that, while returns agreements have a valuable role to play, they are not silver bullets. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has, in terms, accused this Government of ripping up the Dublin convention, but may I just remind the noble Lord that the UK was a net recipient of migrants under the Dublin scheme? As my honourable friend Tim Loughton said in the other place:

“In the last year that we were covered by the Dublin convention, before the pandemic struck, we applied to the EU for 8,500 returns under that returns agreement and only 105 were granted—that is 1.2%—so what he says is complete nonsense. It did not work when we were in the EU, and he is now expecting to magic up some agreement that the EU will not give us anyway”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/23, col. 792.]


Mr Loughton was, at that time, intervening on the speech of Stephen Kinnock in the other place.

In addition to the returns agreements, we also have our world-leading migration and economic development partnership with Rwanda. I remind the House that there is no limit on the numbers that can be relocated to Rwanda under the partnership agreement.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, cited various figures, including in relation to the current asylum backlog. I remind noble Lords that, under Clause 4, any asylum claims made by persons who meet the conditions in Clause 2 are to be declared inadmissible. It is, of course, important to deal with the current backlog. The Prime Minister announced today that the initial decision legacy backlog is down by over 17,000, but there is no correlation between these legacy cases and the cohort to be removed under the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, asked about the impact assessment for the Bill. We have already published the equality impact assessment, and we will publish an economic impact assessment in due course. Noble Lords will have to wait patiently for the economic impact assessment. In the interim, I do not propose to comment on impact assessments issued by NGOs or leaks in the media.