Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, I want to strongly support these amendments, and I shall be relatively brief. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, was kind enough to inform the Committee that in her presence I described the present situation as illogical. In fact, I think I spoke a good deal more strongly than that, and she has been kind enough not to repeat the totality of my remarks.

This is a reform which has been proposed and urged upon successive Governments for years. I found the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, utterly persuasive and completely unanswerable. I take issue with him on only one point, which is when he expressed a little bit of surprise that the CPS would be supporting him. When I was the head of the CPS, I strongly supported this reform. Indeed, shortly after I stepped down from that position, I wrote a column in the Times asking this question: what is it about prosecuting war criminals in this context that the Government do not like? I never received a reply to that question which I understood, and the question is still live.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I also offer my support but express some concerns that I believe could be addressed. I do not think I need to say very much as to the reasons I support the amendments, because the speakers before me have all done such a stellar job.

The one point that I would perhaps clarify is that a number of these offences under international law impose on the UK an obligation to prosecute or extradite. The problem that we have is that, in many cases, we cannot extradite. We cannot extradite in some cases because there is no jurisdiction that can, in practice, begin a criminal prosecution. But sometimes we cannot extradite because the jurisdictions to which we would extradite are jurisdictions where the suspect would face the death penalty or torture. In those cases, the individuals would, in effect, find a safe haven here because of our generous human rights protection, to which I think we should all remain committed. So we may end up with individuals who cannot be deported or extradited and whom we cannot prosecute unless we have some reform of universal jurisdiction. That is the need for this change, which would also bring us into line with international obligations.

My concerns are the following. First, we need to remember that universal jurisdiction is the last resort. In a lot of these cases, it is true that the country where the offence was committed, or of which the alleged offender is a national, will not be able to prosecute. However, ideally, the prosecutions should take place in a jurisdiction that has a closer connection with either the offence or the offender. Where that is not possible, we need to look at other options. Another option is prosecution before an international court and tribunal. As we know, under the ICC statute, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is always complementary to national jurisdictions. Only in the third instance, and as a last resort, should we look at prosecution under universal jurisdiction. It is only when everything else fails, which unfortunately might happen quite often, that prosecution under universal jurisdiction should be contemplated.

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[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I ask the noble Lord to continue the discussions with those of us proposing this amendment today, but our amendment is not as ambitious as he suggests. I wish it were, but actually it is much more limited. On some of the points he raised about the kinds of people who could be brought for prosecution to the United Kingdom under universal jurisdiction more widely, yes, that could happen in a country like Germany, but it would not happen under this amendment. This is about people coming here and being able to do so with impunity rather than immunity, simply because we do not have any powers to arrest them or take them to court.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

I appreciate that it is about only those who are within the jurisdiction, but a lot of officials come within the jurisdiction at different points in time and for different reasons. There was another case a few years ago in which I was also instructed, concerning the visit of the Egyptian head of intelligence to the United Kingdom. On that occasion, there was an attempt to arrest him, which failed, and his immunity was upheld. That is the sort of scenario where we need clarity.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am very glad that my noble friend has raised that point, because it is very relevant. If, for instance, the Foreign Office were to say to the Attorney-General, “We are bringing someone here to have discussions about how to secure peace in Sudan”, but they might have been involved with the RSF or the Sudanese Army in some of the atrocities there, there would be no requirement to prosecute them, because in those circumstances the Attorney-General simply would not allow the prosecution to proceed.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

It is not quite like that, because the Foreign Office would have to issue special permission for the person who came within the jurisdiction, and now that we have clarified the law, that would give that individual immunity. As for the Attorney-General’s decision not to consent, there is a risk that that could be subject to judicial review, and there have already been attempts in that space. But I agree that that is a very important procedural requirement, and it is already in the Act.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 472 and 473. On the arguments and all the difficulties and intricacies, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, cannot be doubted, given his involvement and the things he has done. In the end, however, I am a simple person. I know that there are complications and it is difficult, but if these amendments are accepted, it would allow the possibility of exploring all those intricacies and complications.

The really annoying thing for most of us is when people whom we know have committed terrible atrocities—when the evidence is incontrovertible—can leave the places they have devastated and come here to do their shopping and have holidays. This country, and particularly this present Government, say that everything is going to be best under the rule of law. Lord Bingham, in his book The Rule of Law, said some wonderful things—that the rule of law is the nearest thing we have to a universal origin. In other words, there are no areas the rule of law does not cover. I say that because there is a possibility of enshrining what Lord Bingham was talking about.

Globalisation has given we citizens of the world the possibility of living in a global village. It is no longer about living on this little island—we all belong to this huge global village, and whoever touches any citizen in our global village touches us. It is not just the people who live in Ukraine or somewhere else: they touch them, and they are touching us.

We are therefore partly involved in all this. The United Kingdom must not become a haven, as the noble Lord said, for those who committed such atrocities and are escaping justice and the places where they were done. We must not be a place that gives the impression that the door is open and they can come here. They do their shopping, and some even bring their children to send them to university or other places of learning; I have known this. They think that they are getting away with it. To me, that is what must not happen.

Margaret and I came to this country in 1974, and it was another nearly six years before Idi Amin’s Government fell. We were terrified to have any contact with the Ugandan embassy, because the people he had sent before his Government fell had committed terrible atrocities. Margaret and I knew these characters and they got away with it. In his regime, nearly 900,000 people were murdered, including the chief justice, the chancellor of the university, the head of the civil service—I could go on and on. These dictators and people like that seem to have a very long arm that prevents anybody getting near them.

For me, these amendments are opening a door for further conversation. The proposers of the two amendments were wise in saying that this, if it is to happen, should be laid at the door of the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General, who has a lot of advisers and very able people, will look at it and make a decision on whether prosecution happens. They are not simply opening it out to every court, to everybody, to think they can have a go. It is so limited. If we do not do this, as a country that really upholds the rule of law, and if we do not have this universal jurisdiction as an armoury in place, we will simply have people coming here when they have committed terrible atrocities, and they will look as though they are untouchable.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, my old home city, for the way in which he has approached these amendments. I thank him for the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which he chairs, and through him I pass on my thanks to my old colleague Sarah Champion, the MP for Rotherham, for the work she has done on this issue. As he knows, we had an opportunity to debate the committee’s report in Grand Committee. I was fortunate that my noble friend Lord Katz took the debate on that occasion and was able to set out the Government’s response, which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, will realise has not really changed in the intervening months since that debate. However, I am grateful to him, my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their supportive comments, and I will come on to comments from other noble Lords in due course. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is not in her place at the moment, and missed the start of the debate so was therefore not able to speak in this debate—although she tried—but if she reads Hansard tomorrow, she can make any points she was going to raise in a letter to me and we will consider those prior to Report, which I hope is a fair compromise.

Before I go on to the main bulk of the arguments, I refer to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and his comments on the death of Mr Ryan Evans, of Wrexham, which is close to both him and me. It is obviously a deeply sad incident and his death in Ukraine in 2024 followed a Russian strike, as the noble Lord outlined. The UK Government continue to support efforts to ensure accountability for the crimes that are committed in Ukraine. This includes supporting the independent investigation of the International Criminal Court into the situation in Ukraine, as well as providing assistance to Ukrainian domestic investigations and prosecutions of international crimes. Although I cannot give him much succour today in relation to that particular issue, I hope he will pass on the Government’s condolences to Ryan’s parents. We are obviously happy to have further representations on that matter should he wish to make them in due course.

The points made by my noble friend Lord Katz in the previous debate—and those with which I shall respond to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool—relate to the fact that the UK applies its universal jurisdiction only to a very few specific international crimes. Our approach to universal jurisdiction is designed to ensure that those suspected of, or accused of, crimes are investigated, charged and tried fairly and impartially at every stage, with access to all available evidence. This is in accordance with local constitutional and legal frameworks. It remains the case—and I know this will disappoint those noble Lords who have spoken in support today—that we do not believe that it is necessary at this time to extend the scope of the UK’s policy on universal jurisdiction to include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is the long-standing view of successive Governments in general that where there is no apparent link between the UK and an international crime—and this goes to the point the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, made—we support the principle that such crimes are best investigated and prosecuted where they are perpetrated. That also goes to some of the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, because the advantages of securing evidence and the witnesses required for a fair investigation and a successful prosecution are part of a credible judicial process.

It should be noted that the UK already has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity where they are alleged to have been committed by UK nationals or residents. In some cases where the UK does not have jurisdiction, such as in Ukraine—I have just mentioned the situation in relation to Mr Ryan Evans, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley—we are trying to ensure that we build domestic capabilities, and we support the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General to ensure that allegations of war crimes are fully investigated by independent, effective and robust legal mechanisms.

To go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, the most serious international crimes not covered by the UK’s universal jurisdiction policy are generally already subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which, again, I would argue today, is better placed to prosecute such offences where they are not being dealt with by the relevant domestic authorities. The UK is a strong supporter of the ICC and its mission to end impunity. I know that we will do what we can to ensure that the crimes that have been mentioned today are dealt with by that international court, but I have to say that the debate that we had in the Moses Room, led by my noble friend Lord Katz, and the response I have given to the amendments today are the Government’s position. I accept and respect the points that have been put to the Committee today, but given the considerations that I have mentioned, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alton, to withdraw his amendment. In saying that, I suspect we will return to these matters on Report. The Government will always reflect on what has been said in Committee, but I hope in due course the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

I apologise for interrupting, but I just wanted to make sure that I am not misunderstood. The ICC is there where it has jurisdiction, but the problem that we have is that, in some of these countries, there is no ICC jurisdiction yet. Syria is not a party to the ICC; Ukraine has become a party to the ICC but only as of 1 January 2025. Any offence in Ukraine predating that would be an issue in terms of ICC jurisdiction. That is where the gap in universal jurisdiction policy is quite relevant. I just wanted to clarify my position, which was not to say that we do not need it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I accept that, and I thought I understood the noble Lord’s position clearly, but I am grateful for his clarification. It still adds to the general point that I have made today, and I go back to the original, overarching point that the UK applies universal jurisdiction to only a very few specific international crimes. Our approach—through long-standing support of successive Governments—is that, where there is no apparent link between the UK and an international crime, we support the principle that such crimes are best investigated and prosecuted close to where they are perpetrated. That may not be a position that satisfies the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, or his supporters today, but it is one which I hope I have clarified. I note also—which I did not mention earlier—the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for the general approach of the noble Lord, Lord Alton. With that, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

What if it is just one organisation per order? Just in case a speaking note over there with my noble friend says “Oh, but what if we need to proscribe many on the same day?” It is still possible. Just make multiple orders. But it will be one organisation per order so that no Member of Parliament or Member of your Lordships’ House can ever be told “If you vote against this order, you’ve just voted against the proscription of something like al-Qaeda”—even though it was the Women’s Institute that was included in the order. I mean no disrespect to the Women’s Institute. I think Members of the Committee take my point: one organisation per order and real scrutiny of each proscription. I really do suggest that there is no reasonable opposition to that if what we take seriously in this Committee is parliamentary scrutiny of exceptional executive action, however necessary it may sometimes be.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name to both amendments in this group for the reasons that have been so eloquently set out by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

The first point is that proscription is a very significant power for the Executive. The consequences are severe. Conduct that was hitherto perfectly lawful becomes not only unlawful but criminal. For that reason, we need to have proper checks and balances. The second reason, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that these amendments are actually quite modest. They do not try to limit or amend the scope of the criminal offences, which was the case with some of the amendments perhaps in the previous group; all they try to do is increase parliamentary scrutiny. To me, the case for doing so seems unanswerable.

The third point is that, as we know, there has been an intense debate on the proscription of Palestine Action, and views on that may differ. But my opinion is that, whichever view one takes, one should be able to support both these amendments—particularly in light of the very interesting exchange in the previous group between the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, where the idea that seemed to emerge was that there might be some way forward on tightening “glorification” by reference to proscribed organisations.

But if the reference point is proscribed organisations, we must be absolutely certain that we are getting proscription right, and we must be able to interrogate fully any proscription that the Government decide. For that reason, I think there is simply no answer to Amendment 454. We need to have one order per organisation that the Government intend to proscribe. It is no answer to say that this would place an undue burden. Civil servants will obviously have to spend considerable time putting together the evidence for proscription and, as part of that, requiring them to prepare two different orders is not asking for too much. Nor is it an answer to say that this would be an increased burden for Parliament.

When we vote on or scrutinise a proscription, we take a decision of great importance, for the reasons I have mentioned before. We should not be put again in a position, as was the case a few months ago, where we have to decide on the proscription of very different organisations—where, on the one hand, you have organisations for which the case for proscription is probably uncontroversial, and on the other hand you have examples of organisations for which there is objectively an argument to be had as to whether proscription is a good idea or not. For these reasons, I give my full support to both these amendments.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I too support both amendments. I support Amendment 449 because proscription is a huge power. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “awesome”, and it is indeed an awesome power: it can turn ordinary behaviour into crime. Parliament should not be asked to rubber-stamp those decisions without proper scrutiny. Proscription can criminalise membership, association and even everyday activity, yet at present these decisions are made almost entirely within the Executive, with very limited parliamentary oversight, and that concentration of power carries risks. It leaves decisions open to mistakes or overreach and of course it can also undermine public confidence in counterterrorism law.

Parliament and the public need assurance that proscription is based on sound reasoning, reviewed independently and grounded in evidence. One thing we did not really have when we were asked to proscribe Palestine Action was evidence. Since then, we have had hints of various kinds, telling us that we will see when the evidence comes out and we will understand why that proscription was justified. But so far, I would argue, it has not been justified. Independent scrutiny is particularly important when the intelligence underpinning a proscription is classified and supposedly cannot be shared widely. Where decisions are urgent or complex, having a committee report afterwards helps Parliament and the public understand the reasoning and reinforces the legitimacy of the action taken.

I would have also supported this going further to address the recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson KC—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—that proscriptions should be time-limited and expire after a set period, such as two years, unless Parliament is asked to proscribe yet again. As we know, once proscription has happened, in effect it lasts forever. Decisions this serious should not be made in private and left to drift. Parliament deserves a proper look at the evidence, so I hope that the Minister is going to bring us the evidence, as he keeps hinting in various speeches.

Amendment 454 is an excellent amendment, I have to say, because, when we proscribed Palestine Action, it was bracketed with two groups. I cannot even remember their names. They were right-wing, fascist organisations, and we had absolutely no choice about that. Had we dealt with each of those individually, we could have made a much better decision, I would argue. It seems that we just have to trust the Government—and who trusts the Government any more? Certainly not me, and many of the general public agree with me. Asking us to trust the Government is not the way it should be. It really should have better oversight.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I give way also to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

Maybe the Minister can take all the questions in one go. The threshold may be the same, but there are three separate decisions and each decision is based on different evidence. We are dealing analytically with three distinct decisions, and that is the reason why there should be three different orders.

I suspect that the historical examples to which the Minister referred—I am not certain; perhaps he can explain—were cases in which all the various organisations were in the same context, whether it was organisations related to Afghanistan, ISIS or al-Qaeda. What we had in the case of Palestine Action was the lumping together of very different organisations: a British extreme movement and two white supremacist Russian movements. They have nothing to do with each other, and the evidence is different. Does the Minister accept that, in those circumstances in particular, where we are dealing with very different decisions based on different evidence, there should be an order per organisation?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Verdirame, have made fair and reasonable points. We group them for speed and efficiency, and historically they have been grouped because we want to clear a number of proscription orders at the same time. However, I put this point on the table for the Committee: if, in the light of the advice of the security services of officials, ministerial interrogation of that and, now, the added locus of the Intelligence and Security Committee having sight of and being able to be briefed on those orders, we brought three orders into one order, the threshold remains the same, and that threshold will have been crossed by those organisations. It might be that its members have a sympathy for the Palestinian cause rather than the Russian nationalist cause, but the threshold decided by ministerial jurisdiction, on advice from officials and the security services, is the same: they have crossed the threshold of the 2000 Act for a terrorist organisation. Making them separate orders would still mean that Members of both Houses would have to vote and say, “We do not accept that they have crossed the threshold”. That is a different decision.

I am conscious of time. Those points have been made. I hope I have put the Government’s case with the response I made to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and with my “take it or leave it” explanation of the points on disambiguation of the orders. Members can reflect on it. In the meantime, I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Report stage & Committee stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Verdirame]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 25, at end insert—
“(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the citizenship, during the appeal period, of a child of a person who makes an appeal under inserted section (2B).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the citizenship of the child of a person who has been deprived of citizenship, and who has made a successful appeal against the deprivation order, is not affected by the provisions of the Bill.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have tabled this amendment, which has the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to whom I am extremely grateful. There were other noble Lords who would have wished to support the amendment but missed the rather brief moment that we had to table amendments to the Bill.

The amendment does not go as far as the Malthouse amendment in the other place, which would have given courts the power to decide whether or not a successful appeal would take effect immediately. Under our amendment, following a successful appeal by the deprived person, the deprivation order would continue to have effect in respect of the deprived person but it would not have effect in respect of any children of that person born after the original deprivation order was made. As the Minister said at Second Reading, it is already the case that, where the child has acquired citizenship through the parent before the deprivation order, the child’s citizenship is unaffected.

Even if amended as we propose, the Bill would still fully address the two risks identified by the Government as being the main drivers of this legislation. First, the deprived person could still be barred from returning to the United Kingdom. In his wind-up speech, the Minister concluded by asking:

“are noble Lords willing to take that risk”—[Official Report, 14/10/25; col. 268.]

to let the person in? Under this amendment, deciding whether to take that risk would be a matter for the Government.

The second risk identified by the Minister was that a deprived person could tactically renounce any other citizenship they might have, so that even if the Government were to succeed in having the deprivation order reinstated through further appeals, the person would have a chance to bring himself or herself within the scope of the stateless provision in Section 40(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981. This risk would not arise with the amendment. The deprivation order would continue to have effect against the deprived person throughout the entire appeal process. A tactical renunciation of any further citizenship would not place the deprived person in a better position.

We all appreciate that separating the citizenship position of the principal from that of the child is not an ideal solution and may pose practical difficulties, including guardianship arrangements, but families would at least have the option of seeking to put these arrangements in place. We must not forget that what we are discussing is the position of children who, following the successful appeal, according to our courts would ordinarily be entitled to British citizenship.

If the Government are successful in the further appeals, an argument against the amendment might be that a non-British child would have temporarily benefitted from British citizenship and possibly spent a few years living in Britain with British family. If the Government are unsuccessful in their further appeals, however, the argument against the Bill without the amendment is, in my view, even stronger. In this scenario, without the amendment, we would have left a British child stranded in places—including prisons or camps—where his or her rights are systematically violated.

With the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we had a very useful meeting with the Minister, and I am grateful to him and his officials for meeting us. A concern raised at that meeting was that the amendment might necessitate certain consequential amendments of Section 2(1)(a) of the British Nationality Act. In effect, what would be required is inserting a cross-reference in that provision to the new subsection of Section 40A which the amendment would introduce. This would be a limited and manageable consequential amendment, but I suspect this will not persuade the Government, who I understand remain opposed to this amendment for other reasons.

We appreciate that the Bill has a high level of support across Government Benches and Opposition Benches. These measures may affect a small number of individuals, but it is a growing number, and they raise important issues of principle. That is why we consider they are certainly worth us debating again. I beg to move.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I place that in the mix because it is outside the scope the Bill. I affirm, as I hope I have already done, that the Government’s policy position is that this would be unworkable and would lead to potential areas of risk. Having said that, as I said to the noble Lord in response to his introductory comments, we will keep this under review and monitor it. If issues arise, they will no doubt be drawn to the Government’s attention, the borders inspector can examine them and, indeed, the Government can reflect upon them. On policy grounds, I still urge that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has spoken. I know there is considerable concern around the House, beyond the noble Lords and Baronesses who have spoken today, about this issue.

I will make three brief points. The first is to echo the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. I, too, was surprised to hear that the consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) might be out of scope. This is a Bill to make provision about the effect during an appeal of an order under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act. Within that that theme—that umbrella of effect—in my view, it would be entirely possible to have a consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) concerning the acquisition of citizenship during the appeal period by children.

The second point concerns the extended period of uncertainty that the Minister referred to. There is another way of looking at this. If the Government are ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, we will be faced with an unknown number of individuals who are now children but who will, at that point, be young teenagers, coming back to this country. In some cases, they will be returning to this country having spent many formative years in prisons or camps in north-east Syria and elsewhere. So, even from a national security point of view, we may end up in a rather challenging position.

Finally, I thank the Minister for his comment on the impact and on the Government’s commitment to keep implementation of the Bill under review. We will, I hope, have an opportunity to return to the question of implementation, to the position of children affected by the deprivation of citizenship and, more generally, to the Government’s policy on the deprivation of citizenship. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who brings so much expertise and wisdom to this debate.

This is a short Bill, yes, on a narrow point, but it raises some important constitutional questions. It concerns the power of the Home Secretary under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act to deprive a person of British citizenship. As we know, under this provision the Home Secretary may deprive a person of citizenship in two cases: first, if she is satisfied that the deprivation will be conducive to the public good; and, secondly, if she is satisfied that citizenship was obtained by fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. I do not have any problem with the second scenario; it is the first one which is intensely problematic.

There is a limit to the exercise of this power. A deprivation order may not be made if that person would be rendered stateless, and thus would result in a breach of our obligations under the statelessness convention. But this limit, however important, is insufficient. In practice, as has been mentioned before, people with two nationalities, such as me, are British citizens only for as long as the Home Secretary of the day is satisfied that depriving us of our citizenship would not be conducive to the public good. Under the law as it is, it is easier for me to be stripped of my British citizenship than of my barony. This rule is based on an idea of citizenship that is simply unfit for a modern liberal democracy. Yes, the power is used sparingly, as the Minister said, but we are, as the noble Lord, Lord German, pointed out, a country that, in Europe, uses this power to an exceptional degree. We strip citizenship at rates that are higher than those of almost any other country in the world, as was noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent report, Accountability for Daesh Crimes.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation observed that there is a sharp contrast between the high number of deprivation orders in these cases, which are usually national security cases, and the low number of prosecutions or temporary exclusion orders. To put these things in perspective, from 1972 to 2006 only 10 people were deprived of citizenship, whereas from 2010 to 2023 there were 1,080 deprivations of citizenship, and of those 222 were on the basis of the “conducive” test—104 of those deprivations were in one year alone, 2017.

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, we need to think of how this power would be used by a Home Secretary who comes to office with a rather different conception of the public good from that of his or her predecessors. We have to be very alive to those risks. There is little in the language of Section 40 to which we could point to invite restraint if faced with a Home Secretary determined to make even more extensive use of the power of deprivation than has been the case so far.

The problem with this Bill is that it makes a power that is already excessive even worse by reversing the decision of the Supreme Court in the N3(ZA) case. The Supreme Court ruled that a person deprived of British citizenship automatically and retrospectively regains their citizenship following a successful appeal. It is still possible, even after the Supreme Court ruling, for the deprivation order to be made and enforcement action pursuant to that order to be taken, despite the affected person bringing the appeal.

As a matter of principle, it seems to me that, given that the power of the Secretary of State is already so extensive, and in the light of the severe consequences that the exercise of that power has, it is wrong to allow deprivations which our courts have found to be unlawful to continue to have effect pending an appeal. It seems to me even more important for a power such as this that we should stick with the ordinary approach, which is that the decision of the court should take effect pending the appeal and, where circumstances justify, the Government could seek a stay—or, as the noble Lord, Lord German, explained, there could be some work around identifying the grounds on which such a stay should be granted.

Another problem with the Bill is that it creates an incentive for the Government to pursue every possible point in order to preserve the continuing effect of an order. On matters of such importance, if anything, the incentive should be the opposite.

Last but certainly not least, British children born during unlawful deprivation periods find themselves in an even worse limbo. Under the Supreme Court ruling in N3, children would acquire British citizenship if their parents’ appeal is successful, and they would do so immediately. Under the Bill, children would not acquire citizenship, even though the most authoritative determination of the law at that point would support their acquisition of citizenship. I appreciate that the consequence of the Supreme Court’s approach is that a child would be treated as a British citizen during the appeal period and that, if the Government are ultimately successful, that child would have to be regarded as never having acquired British citizenship. But, as a matter of principle, I would rather we erred by treating a non-citizen child as a citizen temporarily than by depriving a child who was a British citizen all along of the benefits of British citizenship.

I have two questions on this point which echo points raised by the noble Lord, Lord German. First, the national security reason, which is stated as the main justification for this Bill, does not apply to children. Being the child of an individual who may pose a threat to national security is not a national security concern. So what is the reason for extending the consequences of the measure to children? Secondly, would the Government be open to considering ways of mitigating the effects of the Bill on children, in the light of the fact that the consequences for them cannot be justified under the underlying justification for the Bill—namely, national security?

I do not have any objection in principle to Parliament taking the view that a law, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court, must be changed. It does not mean that the Supreme Court was wrong about the law. As lawmakers, we have a different perspective from that of judges. Our role is to make the law and sometimes change it, and that may at times require reversing a decision of the Supreme Court. In this case, however, I see no legislative reason and no reason of principle that justifies a fundamentally different conclusion from that reached by the Supreme Court. As for the position of the children of the persons who have been deprived of British citizenship, there is a strong reason for considering forms of mitigation.

It seems to me that by extending the powers in Section 40, as the Bill requires us to do, we are going in exactly the opposite direction of that which we should be taking, which is to restrict a power that has been on the statute books for a long time but that is way too illiberal and exorbitant.