Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Report stage & Committee stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Verdirame]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 25, at end insert—
“(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the citizenship, during the appeal period, of a child of a person who makes an appeal under inserted section (2B).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the citizenship of the child of a person who has been deprived of citizenship, and who has made a successful appeal against the deprivation order, is not affected by the provisions of the Bill.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have tabled this amendment, which has the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to whom I am extremely grateful. There were other noble Lords who would have wished to support the amendment but missed the rather brief moment that we had to table amendments to the Bill.

The amendment does not go as far as the Malthouse amendment in the other place, which would have given courts the power to decide whether or not a successful appeal would take effect immediately. Under our amendment, following a successful appeal by the deprived person, the deprivation order would continue to have effect in respect of the deprived person but it would not have effect in respect of any children of that person born after the original deprivation order was made. As the Minister said at Second Reading, it is already the case that, where the child has acquired citizenship through the parent before the deprivation order, the child’s citizenship is unaffected.

Even if amended as we propose, the Bill would still fully address the two risks identified by the Government as being the main drivers of this legislation. First, the deprived person could still be barred from returning to the United Kingdom. In his wind-up speech, the Minister concluded by asking:

“are noble Lords willing to take that risk”—[Official Report, 14/10/25; col. 268.]

to let the person in? Under this amendment, deciding whether to take that risk would be a matter for the Government.

The second risk identified by the Minister was that a deprived person could tactically renounce any other citizenship they might have, so that even if the Government were to succeed in having the deprivation order reinstated through further appeals, the person would have a chance to bring himself or herself within the scope of the stateless provision in Section 40(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981. This risk would not arise with the amendment. The deprivation order would continue to have effect against the deprived person throughout the entire appeal process. A tactical renunciation of any further citizenship would not place the deprived person in a better position.

We all appreciate that separating the citizenship position of the principal from that of the child is not an ideal solution and may pose practical difficulties, including guardianship arrangements, but families would at least have the option of seeking to put these arrangements in place. We must not forget that what we are discussing is the position of children who, following the successful appeal, according to our courts would ordinarily be entitled to British citizenship.

If the Government are successful in the further appeals, an argument against the amendment might be that a non-British child would have temporarily benefitted from British citizenship and possibly spent a few years living in Britain with British family. If the Government are unsuccessful in their further appeals, however, the argument against the Bill without the amendment is, in my view, even stronger. In this scenario, without the amendment, we would have left a British child stranded in places—including prisons or camps—where his or her rights are systematically violated.

With the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we had a very useful meeting with the Minister, and I am grateful to him and his officials for meeting us. A concern raised at that meeting was that the amendment might necessitate certain consequential amendments of Section 2(1)(a) of the British Nationality Act. In effect, what would be required is inserting a cross-reference in that provision to the new subsection of Section 40A which the amendment would introduce. This would be a limited and manageable consequential amendment, but I suspect this will not persuade the Government, who I understand remain opposed to this amendment for other reasons.

We appreciate that the Bill has a high level of support across Government Benches and Opposition Benches. These measures may affect a small number of individuals, but it is a growing number, and they raise important issues of principle. That is why we consider they are certainly worth us debating again. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I place that in the mix because it is outside the scope the Bill. I affirm, as I hope I have already done, that the Government’s policy position is that this would be unworkable and would lead to potential areas of risk. Having said that, as I said to the noble Lord in response to his introductory comments, we will keep this under review and monitor it. If issues arise, they will no doubt be drawn to the Government’s attention, the borders inspector can examine them and, indeed, the Government can reflect upon them. On policy grounds, I still urge that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has spoken. I know there is considerable concern around the House, beyond the noble Lords and Baronesses who have spoken today, about this issue.

I will make three brief points. The first is to echo the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. I, too, was surprised to hear that the consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) might be out of scope. This is a Bill to make provision about the effect during an appeal of an order under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act. Within that that theme—that umbrella of effect—in my view, it would be entirely possible to have a consequential amendment to Section 2(1)(a) concerning the acquisition of citizenship during the appeal period by children.

The second point concerns the extended period of uncertainty that the Minister referred to. There is another way of looking at this. If the Government are ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, we will be faced with an unknown number of individuals who are now children but who will, at that point, be young teenagers, coming back to this country. In some cases, they will be returning to this country having spent many formative years in prisons or camps in north-east Syria and elsewhere. So, even from a national security point of view, we may end up in a rather challenging position.

Finally, I thank the Minister for his comment on the impact and on the Government’s commitment to keep implementation of the Bill under review. We will, I hope, have an opportunity to return to the question of implementation, to the position of children affected by the deprivation of citizenship and, more generally, to the Government’s policy on the deprivation of citizenship. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who brings so much expertise and wisdom to this debate.

This is a short Bill, yes, on a narrow point, but it raises some important constitutional questions. It concerns the power of the Home Secretary under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act to deprive a person of British citizenship. As we know, under this provision the Home Secretary may deprive a person of citizenship in two cases: first, if she is satisfied that the deprivation will be conducive to the public good; and, secondly, if she is satisfied that citizenship was obtained by fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. I do not have any problem with the second scenario; it is the first one which is intensely problematic.

There is a limit to the exercise of this power. A deprivation order may not be made if that person would be rendered stateless, and thus would result in a breach of our obligations under the statelessness convention. But this limit, however important, is insufficient. In practice, as has been mentioned before, people with two nationalities, such as me, are British citizens only for as long as the Home Secretary of the day is satisfied that depriving us of our citizenship would not be conducive to the public good. Under the law as it is, it is easier for me to be stripped of my British citizenship than of my barony. This rule is based on an idea of citizenship that is simply unfit for a modern liberal democracy. Yes, the power is used sparingly, as the Minister said, but we are, as the noble Lord, Lord German, pointed out, a country that, in Europe, uses this power to an exceptional degree. We strip citizenship at rates that are higher than those of almost any other country in the world, as was noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent report, Accountability for Daesh Crimes.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation observed that there is a sharp contrast between the high number of deprivation orders in these cases, which are usually national security cases, and the low number of prosecutions or temporary exclusion orders. To put these things in perspective, from 1972 to 2006 only 10 people were deprived of citizenship, whereas from 2010 to 2023 there were 1,080 deprivations of citizenship, and of those 222 were on the basis of the “conducive” test—104 of those deprivations were in one year alone, 2017.

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, we need to think of how this power would be used by a Home Secretary who comes to office with a rather different conception of the public good from that of his or her predecessors. We have to be very alive to those risks. There is little in the language of Section 40 to which we could point to invite restraint if faced with a Home Secretary determined to make even more extensive use of the power of deprivation than has been the case so far.

The problem with this Bill is that it makes a power that is already excessive even worse by reversing the decision of the Supreme Court in the N3(ZA) case. The Supreme Court ruled that a person deprived of British citizenship automatically and retrospectively regains their citizenship following a successful appeal. It is still possible, even after the Supreme Court ruling, for the deprivation order to be made and enforcement action pursuant to that order to be taken, despite the affected person bringing the appeal.

As a matter of principle, it seems to me that, given that the power of the Secretary of State is already so extensive, and in the light of the severe consequences that the exercise of that power has, it is wrong to allow deprivations which our courts have found to be unlawful to continue to have effect pending an appeal. It seems to me even more important for a power such as this that we should stick with the ordinary approach, which is that the decision of the court should take effect pending the appeal and, where circumstances justify, the Government could seek a stay—or, as the noble Lord, Lord German, explained, there could be some work around identifying the grounds on which such a stay should be granted.

Another problem with the Bill is that it creates an incentive for the Government to pursue every possible point in order to preserve the continuing effect of an order. On matters of such importance, if anything, the incentive should be the opposite.

Last but certainly not least, British children born during unlawful deprivation periods find themselves in an even worse limbo. Under the Supreme Court ruling in N3, children would acquire British citizenship if their parents’ appeal is successful, and they would do so immediately. Under the Bill, children would not acquire citizenship, even though the most authoritative determination of the law at that point would support their acquisition of citizenship. I appreciate that the consequence of the Supreme Court’s approach is that a child would be treated as a British citizen during the appeal period and that, if the Government are ultimately successful, that child would have to be regarded as never having acquired British citizenship. But, as a matter of principle, I would rather we erred by treating a non-citizen child as a citizen temporarily than by depriving a child who was a British citizen all along of the benefits of British citizenship.

I have two questions on this point which echo points raised by the noble Lord, Lord German. First, the national security reason, which is stated as the main justification for this Bill, does not apply to children. Being the child of an individual who may pose a threat to national security is not a national security concern. So what is the reason for extending the consequences of the measure to children? Secondly, would the Government be open to considering ways of mitigating the effects of the Bill on children, in the light of the fact that the consequences for them cannot be justified under the underlying justification for the Bill—namely, national security?

I do not have any objection in principle to Parliament taking the view that a law, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court, must be changed. It does not mean that the Supreme Court was wrong about the law. As lawmakers, we have a different perspective from that of judges. Our role is to make the law and sometimes change it, and that may at times require reversing a decision of the Supreme Court. In this case, however, I see no legislative reason and no reason of principle that justifies a fundamentally different conclusion from that reached by the Supreme Court. As for the position of the children of the persons who have been deprived of British citizenship, there is a strong reason for considering forms of mitigation.

It seems to me that by extending the powers in Section 40, as the Bill requires us to do, we are going in exactly the opposite direction of that which we should be taking, which is to restrict a power that has been on the statute books for a long time but that is way too illiberal and exorbitant.