Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Harper and Lord Hanson of Flint

Committee stage
Thursday 10th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Can I probe the Minister on the point he made in response to my noble friend’s amendment on data sharing and the GDPR? The Minister said—and I understand why he said it—that he felt my noble friend’s amendment was unnecessary. Is he able, either today, in writing or on a future day, to reassure the House that there are not cases where we are dealing with foreign criminals or those who have entered the country illegally where either his department or relevant officials are stopped from dealing with them because of that? Is he basically saying that it is not a problem—that there are no cases of dealing with criminality or these gangs where there is an information-sharing problem? If he is happy to reassure us that there really is not a problem and the existing GDPR framework works effectively, then clearly that is very reassuring. Is he able to say that?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will look in detail at the Hansard report of the contributions that have been made today and reflect on them, but my assessment is that I can give the noble Lord that assurance. If there is any difference in the detail that he has mentioned, I will double-check with officials to make sure that we are clear on that.

The noble Lord should know, and I think he does know, that one of the Government’s objectives is to turbocharge the removal of foreign national criminals with no right to stay in the United Kingdom after their sentence, and indeed during it, and to ensure that those with offences that are a bar to their entry to the United Kingdom are monitored and acted on accordingly. That is an important principle. Without rehearsing the arguments around that with him now, I can say that the past year has shown that we have had an increase in the number of foreign nationals who have been removed, and it is our objective to try to do that.

To give the noble Lord reassurance, I will ensure that my officials and I examine the Hansard report, and, if the reassurances I have given are not sufficient for him, he has the opportunity to revisit this issue on Report, as does the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. In the light of that, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment, and that she and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, do not press their other amendments.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Harper and Lord Hanson of Flint

Committee stage
Thursday 10th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Perhaps I can help the noble Lord. If he was in the building, he would have voted that particular way; otherwise, he would not have been a Northern Ireland Minister for very much longer. However, it is immaterial whether he was in the building or not; the Government he supported voted to abolish ID cards. Let me put that to one side, however; it is a debate for another day.

The proposed new clause in Amendment 102 is intended to require all foreign nationals to provide biometric information on arrival to the United Kingdom or face arrest if they fail to do so. I have no problem with biometric information and using it to secure our borders and protect the public. I have no problem with the fact that it is already a cornerstone of our immigration system, as it enables us to identify foreign nationals who are coming in and out of, or staying in, the United Kingdom. Individuals who seek to enter the UK are required to provide biometric information as part of their application for entry clearance or, indeed, an electronic travel authorisation. This allows us to do what I think the noble Lord wants us to do: to verify identity and assess suitability before arrival. We already compare applicants’ fingerprints against immigration and law enforcement databases, and that already enables us to identify those who may pose a threat in coming to United Kingdom. Requiring biometrics to be provided before a person travels to the UK also reduces the need for Border Force officers to deal with people who pose a threat on arrival.

Where a person arrives in the UK without the necessary entry clearance or electronic travel authorisation, we already have existing powers to capture their biometric information, and we can use reasonable force where necessary to do so. We already check biometrics at the UK borders, using e-gates that can match facial images to images contained in passports. For visa holders, we check their fingerprints at the primary control desks. Let me remind the Committee that the Government remain vigilant in their duty to protect our borders. As recently as March 2025, we introduced new legislation which significantly enhanced our ability to collect such biometric information at the border.

I know the noble Lord has good intentions, but were this new clause to be enacted, all foreign nationals would need to provide their biometric information, including people who are normally excused. This would include people who are physically unable to enrol with their biometrics or who are exempt from immigration control, such as sovereigns or heads of state, and that is neither practical nor proportionate.

For me, this is a key issue. The noble Lord and I are both former Northern Ireland Minsters, so he will know that under the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, there is no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. As part of the common travel area arrangements, the UK does not operate routine immigration controls on journeys within the common travel area, and no immigration checks are undertaken. Under his new clause, we would be unable to implement a policy of taking everyone’s biometric information as they enter Northern Ireland from Ireland without introducing a hard border. I do not think he wants that, but that is what the new clause would mean.

Turning to Amendment 149, on seizing identity documents—

[Lord Harper (Con)]

If the Minister thinks that my noble friend’s amendment has some merit, one way of dealing with this issue as the EU implements its EES checks would be to exchange biometric information with the Irish Republic so that, as people come into the common travel area, we can collect that information. Earlier, we talked about sharing information with our European partners. Dealing with the issue in this way does not require a hard border on the island of Ireland, but it hardens the border around the common travel area, which I think would be welcomed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Politics is about the exchange of views and ideas and the delivery of policies. I think we have reached an impasse. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, and Opposition Back-Benchers think that the scheme would have worked, and the Government think that the scheme was expensive and would not have worked. That is the clear blue—or red—water between us on this. I am grateful for my noble friend Lady Lister’s support for the Government in taking the steps that we have taken.

The UK will also exit the UK-Rwanda treaty as part of ending this partnership and it is therefore appropriate for the Government to repeal the safety of Rwanda Act. Clause 37 will achieve this. In doing so, it is also important that we address the issue that has been endemic in the discussion we have had today, that somehow this was a deterrent and the removal of this clause and the removal of the scheme will therefore end that deterrent. I just refer noble Lords to Clauses 1 to 12 of this Bill, which establish a new Border Security Command and put in place resources of £150 million and £280 million over the next few years to establish very strong action on the meaningful issues that are important to us all.

We have created co-operation with the French, Dutch, Germans and Belgians through the new Border Security Commander on tackling the small boats at source. There is the work that the border commander has been doing with the French Government as part of the preparations for today’s conference between the President of the Republic of France, the Prime Minister and other representatives. There is also the work that the Government will do under Clauses 13 to 17 of this Bill to create new offences to bring people to justice if they provide activity on the issue of supplying articles, handling articles, collecting information and offences committed outside the United Kingdom. There is also Clause 18 on endangering another during the sea crossing to the United Kingdom, as well as powers to search on electronic devices to bring people to justice in that way. This Bill is full of deterrent activity that, if and when implemented by the Government after being passed by both Houses, will make a real difference.

I am pleased to say to the House that, hot off the press today, the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of France have now finished their deliberations and, speaking with the President at a news conference just a few moments ago, the Prime Minister has confirmed a new UK-France returns pilot scheme. The Prime Minister has said that the scheme will come into force in a matter of weeks. Migrants arriving via small boats will be detained and returned to France in short order. In exchange for every return, a different individual will be allowed to come here via safe and legal routes, which individuals in this House have been pressing this Government to have. There will be strict security checks, open only to those who have not tried to enter the UK illegally. The suggestion is that, under the pilot, 50 people per week will be sent back to France across the channel—as I recall, even in this very week alone, that will be 46 more than left under the Rwanda scheme.

For the first time since we left the European Union, the UK has secured a bilateral agreement with France to pilot the return of illegal migrants across the channel. This tightly controlled pilot will be, I hope, the premise for further action downstream. The UK-France summit today has seen both nations strengthen co-operation on border security. We know that there is no silver bullet on this issue. We know that the returns pilot is part of a border crackdown, but it is the culmination—and this goes again to the value of the Border Security Command in this Bill—of six months’ work by the Border Security Commander with the Home Secretary, my right honourable friend the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley, the French Interior Minister and the French-established new Compagnie de Marche. That is real progress in developing real, positive action. I can even go back to our discussions about Europol earlier today, on ensuring that we tackle smuggling gangs and disrupt their business model, that we have stronger law enforcement and that we dismantle this multi-million pound black market. This is not just about gangs; it is about lives.

The Rwanda scheme was ineffective, costly and did not deliver. The Government’s proposals in this Bill, and the statements by the Prime Minister and the President of France today, will add greatly to the potential to impact this heinous crime and business.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Can I just check, now that the Prime Minister and the French President have announced the details of the scheme, whether the Minister’s contention is that what has been announced today—once it has had a pilot and been scaled up—is, in effect, the Government’s attempt to put in place a deterrent that he thinks will, over the term of this Parliament, have the desired effect of driving down the number of people crossing the channel to effectively as low as you can get it? Is that his contention?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government are doing a range of things. The border security Bill is one of them. We have put the £150 million and £280 million for future SRs into the Border Security Command. Our work with the French so far has prevented 12,000 crossings this year alone through joint patrols and intelligence services. We are funding a new unit of specialist officers to increase patrols. We have a new specialist intelligence unit stationed at Dunkirk being launched today. Additional drone pilots are being launched. We have funded an extra 100 specialist National Crime Agency intelligence officers who will be stationed with Europol—to go back to the points that we mentioned earlier.

The NCA has seized 600 boats. Germany is already looking at changing its laws because of action that we have taken with the Border Security Command. We have put in place a landmark agreement with Iraq. We have practised and worked through illegal working raids. Arrests have increased by 50%. We have boosted asylum decision-making. Since the election, 30,000 people have gone back—a 12% increase since the previous Government. We have work upstream with Vietnam and Albania to stop people making the journeys from those countries in the first place.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

So he really cannot say.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Look, if we are going to talk about more people coming, can we go back to 2016? Can the noble Lord tell me how many people arrived on a small boat in 2016, compared with July 2024? I will tell him. There were 400 in 2016 and over 30,000 in 2024. We have a legacy of complete and utter failure by that Government, of which he was a significant member in the Cabinet. These are strong, practical measures; the Rwanda scheme was not, which is why I commend Clause 37 to the House. I ask the noble Lord to reflect on what we have said. If he chooses to vote at some point to remove Clause 37, I and, I think, many other Members of this House will stand together to oppose him.

Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025

Debate between Lord Harper and Lord Hanson of Flint

Tuesday 1st July 2025 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to be here today to bring forward these regulations, which are enabled by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, during the passage of which some nine years ago I recall sitting for many hours. The IPA provides a framework designed to protect the public by giving law enforcement and the intelligence services the tools they need to prevent, detect and prosecute crime. It also safeguards the privacy of individuals by setting out stringent controls over the way the IPA powers are used.

Communications data reveals the who, where, when and how of a communication but not, I emphasise, its content, such as what was written or said. CD is routinely relied on as evidence in 95% of serious organised crime investigations and has played a significant role in every major terrorism investigation over the past decade.

These regulations will update the public authorities listed in Schedule 4. Only those public authorities listed in the schedule are permitted to use the CD powers in the Act and therefore have the authority to compel communications data from telecommunications or postal operators. In addition to this safeguard, Part 3 of the IPA sets out the specific statutory purposes for which the communications data may be acquired by the relevant public authorities. The Communications Data Code of Practice provides guidance on the process of making a Part 3 application under the Act, which ensures that the power is used only when it is both necessary and proportionate. The IPA requires public authorities to have regard to the code in the exercise of their functions.

These regulations add 11 new entries to the schedule: the Intellectual Property Office, an executive agency sponsored by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology; the Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency, an executive agency sponsored by the Department for Transport; the Security Industry Authority, an executive non-departmental public body sponsored by my department, the Home Office; Counter Fraud Services Wales, an organisation hosted by the Velindre University NHS Trust; the integrated corporate services counter fraud expert services team—a bit of a mouthful—situated within the Department for Business and Trade; the integrated corporate services counter fraud expert services team situated within the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; the counter fraud and investigation team situated within the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; and the South East Coast Ambulance Service, the North West Ambulance Service, the West Midlands Ambulance Service and the East Midlands Ambulance Service.

Except for the four ambulance trusts, the public authorities to be added are all new entrants to the schedule and to CD powers. Following their addition to Schedule 4, the seven newly added public authorities will be able to apply for an independently approved authorisation via the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which, if granted, can be used to compel tele- communications or postal operators to disclose CD for the purposes set out within their designation in Schedule 4. They will not be given the power to internally authorise CD applications.

The four entries relating to the English ambulance trusts retain their CD powers and the ability to internally authorise applications. The umbrella definition of “an ambulance trust in England”, which included a total of 10 English ambulance trusts, has therefore been removed and replaced with the four named individual ambulance trusts. Therefore, six English ambulance trusts will be removed from the schedule because they have confirmed to us that they no longer require those CD powers. The Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust and the Scottish Ambulance Service board will also be removed from the schedule, having confirmed that they no longer need to retain their CD powers.

This SI makes no change to the ambulance service in Northern Ireland and its designation in the schedule. The regulations will amend the Insolvency Service’s designation to include the Department for Business and Trade following the machinery of government changes. There is no change to the Insolvency Service’s ability to acquire CD for the purposes already listed in Schedule 4.

In summary, communications data is vital for evidence in criminal and national security investigations. These changes will enable the aforementioned public authorities —I have mentioned them in this introduction—to carry out and fully work through their essential statutory duties in order to safeguard the public from threats. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I will not detain noble Lords for long. I have three questions for the Minister. First, I want a little detail on the process that is undertaken by the department. Who triggers the review into which organisations have these powers, whether that is as a result of requests from organisations that currently do not have powers but require them or whether it is a periodic review that the department will undertake? It would be helpful to know a bit more about the process.

Secondly, I have a question on the powers that are now given to the Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency, which is an executive agency of the Department for Transport. I have looked at those powers and at the other parts of the Department for Transport that have similar powers. They all seem very sensible, so I support the change that is being made. My question is on the Driver & Vehicle Licensing Agency, which is another executive agency of the Department for Transport. As far as I can tell, it does not have these powers, but I would have thought that the same arguments that apply to the DVSA—around public safety and the criminality involved in, for example, forging driving licences, which are important identity documents—would also require the use of communications data. Why has the DVSA been given these powers and not the DVLA? Surely the arguments for one are also true in the case of the other.

The other area is that provoked by the report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee on the arguments around the ambulance trusts. It makes a reasonably coherent argument that there seems to be some inconsistency. I understand that organisations that require these powers must demonstrate that they have a compelling need and that they have appropriate compliance activities in place. It seems a little odd, therefore, that the powers are being removed from all the ambulance trusts in England. They are being restored for four of them but I do not understand, because there is no detail set out, what it is about those four that means that there are compelling needs that do not apply to the others. Also, of the four that are kept, only one had requested to keep the powers; the others had not expressed a preference. Given that organisations are supposed to have a compelling need in order for them to have these powers—I remember the debate when, as the Minister set out, the Investigatory Powers Bill was going through both Houses of Parliament; I was Chief Whip at the time—it seems to me that, in the case of three of those ambulance trusts, the compelling need case cannot have been made because they did not respond to say that they needed the powers. The powers appear to have been left with them only because they had not specifically said that they did not want them, but that does not appear to be the legal and policy test applied by the department. I would be grateful if the Minister could set that out.

I have a final point on resourcing. The instrument and its Explanatory Memorandum say that there is going to be an increase in requests made to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office because all these organisations will need approval to use these powers. The assessment by the department says that it expects those requests to be minimal, but it does not set out the basis on which it has reached that conclusion. Obviously, there are resourcing requirements that will flow from that, so it would be helpful if the Minister could set out the basis on which that conclusion was reached.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for the short and useful debate. As my noble friend Lord Jones, who I have known for a very long time, said, it is useful to challenge the Executive on a number of matters to date.

If I may, I will start with my noble friend Lord Jones, who made an all-encompassing comment regarding the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The current IPC is Sir Brian Leveson. He will be well known to Members of this House and has served in a number of capacities, including as a High Court judge. The commissioner is assisted by a team of 13 commissioners, who must all have held senior judicial office. Together they are responsible for the use of investigatory powers by public authorities. They are supported by a body of civil servants, known as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which includes authorising officers and inspectors. Self-evidently, as I mentioned earlier, they were put in place by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Their responsibilities include a statutory obligation to inspect the use of certain investigatory powers and to exercise delegated functions, as part of which they independently review communications data under Section 60A applications submitted by public authorities.

My noble friend touched on a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the budget. In the financial year 2023-24, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office operated within a budget of £15.74 million, of which it spent only £13.06 million. That was confirmed in the IPCO annual report 2023, which was published in May of this year. I hope that helps my noble friend.

I am grateful for his service, not just in both Houses but on the Intelligence and Security Committee, and for his kind words about my service. I hope that also answers in part the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper—who I will come back to in a moment—and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, made a very valid point about what the process is for a public authority to be added to Schedule 4. Public authorities can be added to Schedule 4 either through primary legislation or by the use of a delegated power provided at Section 71. The delegated power provided at Section 71 provides that we have an enhanced affirmative procedure, which includes the requirement for a 12-week statutory consultation with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

The changes being made here are, in a sense, the result of the bodies themselves asking either to be included or removed from the Act. If they wanted to be added to Schedule 4, they had to supply a very comprehensive business case that officials in the Home Office have examined and evaluated in some detail. The Home Office has then had to include a 12-week consultation process with public authorities and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. In this case, the consultation period for the new additions began on 23 October 2024 and completed on 17 January 2025. The IPC agreed that the seven public authorities had made a clear case for access, and the IPC response informed the Home Secretary’s policy assessment to include the amendments in the regulations that we have put before the Grand Committee today.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I would be grateful if the Minister would allow me to probe this a bit further. To be clear, on the ambulance trust, given that the wide-ranging power for all ambulance trusts in England already existed in the schedule, what exactly was the trigger for a consultation? These trusts already had the power; this just changes the way the power has been described in the legislation. Further, if there was some kind of interaction between the trusts and the department and some trusts specifically asked for this, for those that did not, given that there was a conversation and a consultation process and there is supposed to be a compelling need, why has the power been left in place for those ambulance trusts that did not say they needed it?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord puts his finger on the point that, originally, all ambulance trusts were included in the schedule. As part of their general reflection, the six English ambulance trusts that are being removed by the regulations today specifically said they do not need those powers anymore. That left Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Scotland and Wales equally said they do not want the power, so they are being removed, and Northern Ireland has not requested removal and therefore is in the schedule.

Of the four remaining trusts, one of them determined that it wanted to retain the powers under the Act. Again, as part of the consultation, that went through the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which agreed. Three of the trusts did not respond to the Home Office in relation to the consultation and discussion that we had. They had not requested to be removed. We asked them if they wanted to stay on, and they have not responded. For the safety of the Home Office’s reputation and for the security of reducing risks, we have left them on, but we will continue to press them to ensure that, if they wish to be removed, they can be.

I have discussed already with officials that I think we should be going back to those trusts again. We can bring a further instrument forward, but I do not think it is appropriate that we take them off because they have not responded. There is an argument about whether they should have responded—that is a legitimate challenge to put to me and to the Home Office, and I am having discussions on it internally—but I do not want to take them off in case that decision was just a slip between cup and lip.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am grateful for that answer. I can certainly understand—and do not necessarily disagree with—a safety-first approach from the Minister. I have one further question: given that ambulance trusts broadly all do the same thing, has the Home Office or the health service undertaken any work to understand for what reasons those trusts that have wanted to keep the powers are using those powers, to test whether they are actually necessary? If they are necessary, for what reason do those trusts that do not want the powers, or have not asked for them, not need them? It does not seem entirely obvious why some ambulance trusts would need the powers and some would not.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is a fairly valid challenge. The decision to apply is for the ambulance trusts. They were initially all included. Some have determined that they have not used this power, and therefore they do not wish to have it any more. One trust has maintained the power because it wishes to use it, and three have not responded, so we have kept them on just in case because we do not want to risk operational errors.

The type of purpose that they could use it for may well be, for example, that an individual who comes into contact with the ambulance trust is in the middle of a mental health episode, is disorientated, does not know who they are and is not aware of where they are, what they have done or where they have been. There could be individuals who are involved in alcohol intoxication. There is a range of reasons why there might need to be access. As it happens, the vast majority of trusts have said they do not need or want this power. If one trust has said it wants to retain the power, it is reasonable that we assess that further downstream. But the determination is that the trusts themselves decide whether they want that power. Therefore, we are making sure that there are no operational risks in that.

On removing the authorities that did not respond, I am not particularly pleased that we did not have a response from three authorities—I will put that on the record. They should respond accordingly. But there is always the danger that, if we took them off now, they may end up using their powers without realising they do not have them any more. They may find themselves in a litigious position, and I do not want to see that either.

For the moment, that is a very valid challenge and this should be kept under review, but that is the logic behind it—if that helps the noble Lord.