Afghanistan (Roulement)

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd April 2014 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

The next roulement of UK armed forces in Afghanistan is due to take place in June 2014. As HQ Task Force Helmand will have integrated into Regional Command (South West) on 1 April 2014, around half of the units deploying will come under Command of a UK one star within the United States Marine Corps Commanded Headquarters. The remainder will deploy elsewhere within Camp Bastion and in Kandahar and Kabul as part of the UK’s overall contribution. The forces deploying include¹:

Nuclear Safety Committee/Nuclear Research Advisory Council

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Monday 31st March 2014 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I am today announcing the start of the triennial reviews of the Defence Nuclear Safety Committee (DNSC) and the Nuclear Research Advisory Council (NRAC). Triennial reviews are part of the Government’s commitment to ensuring that non-departmental public bodies continue to have regular independent challenge.

The DNSC’s remit includes all safety aspects relating to the naval nuclear propulsion plant and nuclear weapon systems, including related issues of design, development, manufacture, storage, in-service support, handling, transport, operational training, support facilities and capabilities, and the safety of workers and the public.

The NRAC is responsible for reviewing the atomic weapons establishment (AWE) nuclear warhead research and capability maintenance programme, including the requirement for above ground experiments and other facilities and techniques necessary to develop and maintain a UK nuclear weapon capability in the absence of underground testing; NRAC also examines AWE’s programme of international collaboration.

The reviews will examine whether there is a continuing need for DNSC and NRAC’s function, their form and whether they should continue to exist at arm’s length from Government. Should the reviews conclude there is a continuing need for the bodies, they will go on to examine whether the bodies, control and governance arrangements continue to meet the recognised principles of good corporate governance.

I will inform both Houses of the outcome of the reviews when they are completed.

Iraq Fatality Investigations

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Thursday 27th March 2014 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I wish to inform the House of the progress that my Department has made in establishing a process by which a small number of fatalities of Iraqi nationals arising from UK operations in Iraq, where the deceased person was in the custody of or under the control of UK forces, can be subjected to an examination akin to a coronial inquest.

This step has been prompted by the High Court’s decision in the Ali Zaki Mousa (No 2) judgment. In that judgment the court held that the arrangements set up for criminal investigations by the Iraq historic investigations team and the Royal Navy police acting under the Armed Forces Act 2006 are sufficiently independent to meet the requirements of article 2 of the European convention on human rights. But the court also held that, in a number of cases in which a prosecution did not result, a public procedure (similar to a coroner’s inquest) would also be needed so as to involve the public and the families of the deceased to the extent necessary to discharge fully the UK’s investigative obligations under article 2.

The High Court indicated that this requirement could be met by holding

“inquisitorial inquiries modelled on coronial inquests”.

I have agreed to do so in up to 11 cases; the precise number will depend on the outcome of the Iraq historic allegations team’s investigations into the allegations and any resulting trials.

I am pleased to announce that Sir George Newman, who retired from the High Court bench in 2007, has consented to chair the first two investigations. Sir George’s wide experience will be invaluable and I am grateful to him for taking on this important role.

Sir George will investigate the death of Mr Naheem Abdullah as a result of injuries sustained at a road block in Maysan province on 11 May 2003, and the death of Mr Hassan Said as the result of gunshot wounds sustained on 2 August 2003. In both of these cases, the UK service personnel accused were acquitted after early termination of their trials. As a result of the early termination of the trials, resulting in evidence not being publicly presented, an inquisitorial inquiry is needed to meet the requirement for public and family access.

Sir George has been directed not to consider issues of individual or collective culpability, and no prosecutions will result from his examination of these cases. These fatality investigations will serve a similar purpose to a coronial inquest by providing the families of the deceased and the wider public with the fullest possible information as to how the deceased died. Sir George will shortly publish fuller details of his remit and of the procedures that he will adopt.

Sir George will, of course, receive the full support of the Ministry of Defence. He will produce a report setting out his findings and recommendations, and I will arrange for this to be published at the earliest opportunity.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields) (Lab)]

2. What discussions he has had with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on staff pay and conditions in the new DE&S model.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

We have agreed with Treasury Ministers that Defence Equipment and Support will be established as a bespoke central Government trading entity from 1 April this year, with the necessary freedom to operate, including freedom, within very broad limits, to set the pay and conditions of its civil service staff.

[Mrs Lewell-Buck]

I thank the Secretary of State for that response, but bearing in mind that bringing private skills into Defence Equipment and Support is likely to create a two-tier work force and, if handled badly, could demoralise an already hollowed-out department, will the Secretary of State update the House on what discussions he has had with employee representatives and trade unions within Defence Equipment and Support regarding changes to employees’ pay and conditions?

[Mr Hammond]

There have been discussions with the trade unions and there will of course be further discussions with the trade unions as DE&S-plus develops its pay model, but we do have to face the reality that this part of the public service is very much commercial-facing. It deals with commercial bodies and it interacts and exchanges staff with commercial contractors, and we have to be able to pay competitive rates and we have to adopt competitive employment practices if we are to get the best deal for the taxpayer and the best deal for our armed forces.

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that reforming defence procurement is a key step in driving better value for money for the defence budget, and will he join me in paying tribute to the staff of DE&S in my constituency, especially those involved in the draw-down of kit and equipment from Afghanistan?

[Mr Hammond]

The staff at DE&S at Abbey Wood perform an extraordinary range of functions and play a vital part in this new whole-force concept. It is about how the armed forces work together, regulars and reserves, with civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence—whom I am happy to put on the record in the House today are not pen-pushers, as some parts of our media would have us believe, but vital components of our defence infrastructure.

[Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Moor View) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State is ever the optimist, but he will know that staff in DE&S and industry need certainty, and nothing in the changes to DE&S fits that description. His Department still has not confirmed the arrangements to bring the managed service providers into the business. He talked about the flexibilities and freedoms being broad—they are not in the public domain yet, and April is almost upon us. Is he not cutting it just a little fine?

[Mr Hammond]

No. The contract notices for the procurement of the managed service providers will be published shortly. We are finalising the terms of the memorandum of understanding between the Treasury and the MOD, but the broad parameters have been agreed. The freedoms will be very broad, but there will be some constraints, as I hope the hon. Lady would expect. There will be an overall envelope of resources for operating costs, which will be subject to a downward trajectory over time, representing efficiency. Within that envelope, there will be very broad freedom to tailor pay and conditions to the requirements of the marketplace.

[Sir Tony Baldry (Banbury) (Con)]

Did the shadow Secretary of State for Defence not say in December of last year that we all wanted to see the best of the public sector alongside the best of the private sector? If everyone is in agreement on this—from the shadow Secretary of State for Defence to Lord Levene—it must be a good idea. Presumably, the only really important thing here is ensuring value for money for taxpayers.

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. Friend is exactly right: it is about ensuring that the armed forces get the kit they need and have been promised when they need it, and that the taxpayer gets a fair deal. By creating DE&S as a trading entity with freedoms and flexibilities to enter the marketplace and hire the people it needs to do the job properly and effectively, we will ensure that outcome.

[Sarah Newton (Truro and Falmouth) (Con)]

3. What progress his Department has made on its planned increase in the activity of reserves in Cornwall.

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[Dr Thérèse Coffey (Suffolk Coastal) (Con)]

4. What assessment he has made of the effectiveness of military assistance provided to civil authorities during recent flooding.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

The MOD’s ongoing support to the civil authorities has been significant and achieved real effect on the ground, with a peak of about 5,000 personnel from all three services available to provide everything from sandbagging to aerial reconnaissance. We provided assistance to nine county councils and five unitary authorities. We are now in the recovery phase, with 220 service personnel still engaged. Once the task is complete, we will work with the civil authorities to assess in detail our armed forces’ contribution to the overall national response and to look at how the contribution of the armed forces to civil resilience can be enhanced and accelerated in future emergencies.

[Dr Coffey]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that answer. I bring to the House’s attention the honourable membership of the Institution of Royal Engineers that I hold because I am a Member of Parliament for a constituency with Royal Engineers in it. Will he join me in congratulating the Royal Engineers on their work across the country, not only in helping to fix the problems, but in being involved in the emergency checks, which means that we are able to get around the entire country in just a matter of weeks?

[Mr Hammond]

I am happy to join my hon. Friend in congratulating the Royal Engineers on the role they have played. There is a continuing detachment of Royal Engineers inspecting thousands of flood defences around the country, triaging them so that the Environment Agency can target its specialist engineers on those most at risk.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

One reason why civil authorities may be reluctant to call in military assistance is the full costing regime in the MOD. Has the Secretary of State considered introducing a marginal costing scheme, which would make that interaction easier for all the parties concerned?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Lady is understating the case—one of the reasons most certainly is fear of what the costs will be. The MOD’s position is clear: we would like to do more to support the civil authorities, and we want to make sure that the defence budget is neither advantaged nor disadvantaged from doing so. That implies a full marginal costing recovery regime, and I have written to my colleagues at the Treasury suggesting that we look at a change to the regime to make the situation much clearer to the civil authorities in advance.

[Miss Anne McIntosh (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

May I add my congratulations to RAF Linton-on-Ouse and the neighbouring Royal Engineers who have helped in both the vale of York, and Thirsk and Malton during previous floods? On the funding, I understand that one reason why civil authorities were slow to take up the offer from the military was precisely the issue of who was to pay. Will my right hon. Friend explain to the House from which budget the payment will be drawn?

[Mr Hammond]

In almost all cases—perhaps I can say in all cases—the net additional cost of military operations that is recoverable from authorities that have lead responsibility under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 will be 100% funded under the Bellwin formula, in accordance with the statement that the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government made to the House about the increase in the percentage recovery rates to 100% to cover this emergency.

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

5. What plans he has to increase employment opportunities for the spouses of armed forces personnel.

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[Katy Clark (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)]

15. What recent progress his Department has made on its response to the internal radiation leak aboard HMS Vanguard; and if he will make a statement.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

Let me make it clear to the hon. Lady that there has been no issue with the reactor on HMS Vanguard or, indeed, any of our submarines. I announced to the House on 6 March that there had been a small fuel element breach in the naval test reactor at Dounreay, but that did not lead to a leak of radiation from the reactor circuit.

[Katy Clark]

I thank the Secretary of State for his answer. What assessment has he made of whether the reactors on all Vanguard and Astute-class submarines will last the full lifetime of the submarines?

[Mr Hammond]

As I explained to the House when I made my statement, the purpose of the naval test reactor at Dounreay is to run the reactor hard and flat out, as it were, ahead of the operational reactors on the submarines, to see what happens as they approach the end of their planned life. The reactors on board our submarines have nothing like the percentage fuel burn that the reactor at Dounreay has now experienced, so we are looking at something that has developed at a much further advanced stage of the life of the reactor. We have, however, taken the decision, on a precautionary basis, to refuel HMS Vanguard during her planned deep-maintenance period. Once the reactor at Dounreay is decommissioned, it will be examined in detail and we will then have much greater evidence of what has caused the issue and be able to make sensible decisions about the future.

[Gemma Doyle (West Dunbartonshire) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Secretary of State advise whether and when the Commodore at Clyde naval base was alerted to a potential issue with the reactors of the Vanguard submarines, and whether, no matter whose responsibility it was, he would have expected the relevant local authorities— namely Argyll and Bute and West Dunbartonshire councils—to be alerted?

[Mr Hammond]

If there had been any health and safety risk or any risk to the environment, I certainly would have expected the relevant local authorities to have been notified, but there was none at any time. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency has a written agreement with the MOD that allows it oversight of these matters in military bases in Scotland. If it had thought there was any risk at any time, it would have notified the necessary civil authorities.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

My first priority remains the success of our operations in Afghanistan. Beyond that, my priorities are maintaining budgets in balance, developing our reserve forces, reinforcing the armed forces covenant and reforming the defence procurement organisation so that our armed forces can be confident of being properly equipped.

[Mr Gray]

The people of Wiltshire love the Army and will welcome the 4,000 soldiers who are shortly due to return there from Germany, but we also love Stonehenge and the mysterious mists and swirling druidical mysteries that surround the stones. Will the Secretary of State look carefully at reports that houses to be built to house the 4,000 soldiers will block off the rising sun at the summer equinox, and if they do, will he make sure that it does not happen?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is right to highlight the importance of preserving important sites such as Stonehenge and of having a careful approach to the design of any development that might impact on them. I, too, have seen the press articles to which he referred. I am happy to reassure him that although Larkhill is an important element of our strategy for accommodating troops returning from Germany—we intend to invest about £800 million in the area to accommodate 4,300 service personnel—no decision has been taken about the location of additional service accommodation. A public consultation is about to close, and organisations such as English Heritage have very clearly expressed the issues that he has raised. We will make a decision in due course.

[Yvonne Fovargue (Makerfield) (Lab)]

Although we welcome the events in France and, indeed, around the UK to commemorate the 70th anniversary of D-day in 1944, does the Secretary of State not agree that it would be appropriate to hold a national event in London at that great symbol of sacrifice, the Cenotaph, to provide a real focal point for remembrance here?

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[Mr Hammond]

As the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), has already said, the status of Ukraine is quite different from the status of NATO countries—NATO countries enjoy the article 5 guarantee, which protects and assures their security—but we are doing everything we can to reassure our NATO allies about the protection that we offer. I am able to advise the House this afternoon that we have taken the decision this morning to offer NATO UK Typhoon aircraft from late April to augment the Polish contribution to the NATO Baltic air policing mission. I hope that will provide reassurance to our NATO allies in the east.

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

T6. In thinking about the importance of learning from the past, has the Secretary of State read “Why England Slept”, a little book by John Fitzgerald Kennedy? It is about Britain not being prepared in the 1930s for what was going to happen in Germany. Does he think that England, or Britain, is sleeping now, with an uncertain and unpredictable presence in the east of Europe?

[Mr Hammond]

I have not read the book, but I have said consistently in this House and elsewhere since I came into this post that we should not forget Russia’s very significant rearmament programme. Russia remains a major military force on the continent of Europe, and its interests are not always aligned with ours, as we have seen only too clearly over the past few weeks.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

T4. Much as no one wishes to see the cold war return, do not recent events between Russia and Ukraine indicate that this is not some flight of fancy, but that it really could happen, and does that not mean that we must be extremely careful never to let down our nuclear or conventional defence guard?

[Mr Hammond]

What those events do show is that we have been right throughout in maintaining the need to continue with a strategic nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantor of Britain’s sovereignty and freedom of action. The world is a very uncertain place, while the time horizons for the provision of military equipment are very long, and we are looking forward 40 or 50 years in the planning. The events of the past months and years show that it would be a very brave man indeed who said that there would be no threat to our sovereignty and independence over that time horizon.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

T7. Last week, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), admitted that he had wasted £50 million on the Cipher cyber-security project. This weekend, we heard that the NATO website and other websites came under attack following the recent actions in Ukraine. Will the Minister give us a timely assessment of the UK’s and NATO’s cyber readiness, particularly with regard to the situation in Ukraine?

[Mr Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

T5. To pick up the theme from the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman), between 1935 and 1939, defence expenditure doubled in response to the deteriorating security situation in Europe. Does the Department do any contingency planning to determine how our defence capability could be improved rapidly if there was a greater call on our nation’s defence resources?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

As I have said before in the House, part of the outcome of the strategic defence and security review in 2010 was that we should focus, while consolidating our armed forces, on our regeneration capability in case the need arose, or the resources became available, for capabilities or scale of operations that we do not have.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

We were delighted that the Secretary of State and his Australian counterpart made it through the Barrow fog to visit the shipyard on Thursday to announce major new infrastructure investment to make the Successor programme possible and the cutting of steel on the seventh Astute-class submarine. Did his conversations with the company and the work force on that day maintain his confidence that the leak in the test Vanguard reactor will not affect the build of the Astute programme?

[Mr Hammond]

I am not sure that I discussed that matter with the work force at Barrow, although I did have some interesting conversations that reassured me greatly about their commitment to the programme. We are clear that the incident at Dounreay will not have any impact on the progress of the Astute or Successor programmes.

[Andrew Rosindell (Romford) (Con)]

T8. Will the Secretary of State join me in paying tribute on St Patrick’s day to all the Irish citizens who currently serve in Her Majesty’s armed forces and the 100,000 who sacrificed their lives in the British armed forces during the first world war? Does he agree that our defence partnership with Ireland would be immensely strengthened if it considered joining NATO?

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[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

T9. In Budget week, will the Defence Secretary join me in commending Britain’s improved economic outlook, thanks to the Chancellor’s stewardship, which potentially gives rise to finding the annual £65 million required to run the second aircraft carrier? Does my right hon. Friend agree that operating two carriers would strategically extend and involve Britain’s diplomatic military influence in a manner not seen for a generation?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

I am happy to join my hon. Friend in congratulating the Chancellor on the remarkable recovery in Britain’s economic prospects. He knows well my own view, which is that having invested £3 billion each in building our carriers, it would look strange if we did not make every possible effort to find the relatively small amounts of money that will enable them to be operated, so that we can have a set of doctrine based on the continuous availability of a carrier at sea.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State gave a written statement saying that the armed forces complaints commissioner is now to become an armed forces ombudsman. Will he explain why an announcement of such importance to the House and the armed forces family was not made on the Floor of the House, rather than through The Times and through a written statement, as that would have given us far greater awareness of what was going to happen?

[Mr Hammond]

May I suggest to the hon. Lady that, as many of her colleagues have clearly understood, if Members wish to pursue a written statement further, they always have the option of asking an urgent question?

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

Given that Russia has effectively annexed Crimea, in contravention of the Budapest agreement signed by Britain, the United States and Ukraine in 1994, and that it continues to threaten eastern Ukraine, what consideration has my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, or indeed NATO, given to mounting maritime exercises in the Black sea so that a message may be sent to Mr Putin’s Russia that any attack on Odessa would be a step too far?

[Mr Hammond]

We are clear that a graduated response to these unjustified actions by Russia is necessary, but it should be a diplomatic response in terms of economic and trade sanctions. Meetings are ongoing today across the European Union to try to agree the best way to deliver that response.

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[Mr Henry Bellingham (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

Is the Secretary of State aware that some Scandinavian armies are not allowed out after dark? This pernicious human rights culture is already infiltrating our armed forces. What will he do to exempt our armed forces from human rights laws?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

There are issues about the encroachment of judicial processes into the operation of the armed forces. A number of cases currently before the courts, or pending, could have a significant impact, and we are watching them closely. We are clear that once we commit our armed forces to combat, they must be able to carry out operations without fear of constant review in the civil courts. If we find that the current cases develop in a way that makes that difficult, we will come back to the House with proposals to remedy the situation.

Service Complaints System

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Thursday 13th March 2014 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

A fair, effective and efficient system for handling complaints is an important part of our delivery of the armed forces covenant, and it has rightly been the focus of considerable public debate. I am grateful to the Defence Select Committee for the close attention which they have given to this subject, and their constructive recommendations. I am particularly indebted to Dr Susan Atkins, the Service Complaints Commissioner (SCC), not only for her work in the context of the current system, but also for her advice and engagement on how we can do better. Many service complaints are dealt with promptly and successfully. However, it is generally recognised that the current system can only operate effectively across the armed forces by devoting a level of resources which is not sustainable in the longer term.

The then Minister for Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), informed the Select Committee last year that my Department was engaged in discussions with Dr Atkins on alternative models for handling complaints, and on the reform of the role of the commissioner. I am pleased to tell the House that this work has produced the outline of a new model for the service complaints system which we believe offers important advantages over the system introduced by the Armed Forces Act 2006.

The central feature of the new model is that the Service Complaints Commissioner would, in the future, have the power to consider whether a service complaint has been handled properly, once it has completed its normal internal stages. This is in contrast to the current arrangements under which the SCC cannot become involved in the handling of an individual complaint, other than to monitor its progress through the system. In the new model, where the commissioner finds no evidence of maladministration, a complaint would remain closed. However, if the commissioner considers that there has been maladministration in the handling of a complaint, he or she would make recommendations, formally to the Defence Council, for the complaint to be reopened and reconsidered. The Defence Council would remain responsible for the decisions taken in response to the SCC’s recommendations, thus maintaining the authority of the chain of command, but the SCC would be informed of those decisions and the reasons for them.

This aspect of the new model should lead to a higher proportion of complaints being decided more quickly. Complainants will gain a new right to apply to the independent commissioner, if they believe that the handling of their complaint has been subject to maladministration, instead of having the right to pursue further appeals within the internal complaints process. The commissioner will, in turn, be able to concentrate his or her attention on the cases of potential maladministration, including those which may have systemic implications.

The commissioner would also have a new role at an earlier stage of the complaints procedure. Where a decision is made not to allow a complaint to be considered within the service complaints system, because is it out of time or excluded on other grounds, a service person could ask the SCC to determine whether that decision was correct. At the same time, the commissioner will maintain the vital role which Dr Atkins performs today, of offering an alternative route for a service man or women, who does not wish to approach the chain of command directly, to have their concerns fed into the system. This remains an important safeguard, especially where allegations of bullying or harassment are involved. Finally, the requirement for an annual report to be laid before Parliament would continue, taking account of the new functions of the SCC.

The proposals I have outlined above represent a significant change to the way that service complaints are handled, and in particular to the role of the commissioner. As a result, I have decided that this new role would be better reflected in a change in the title of the commissioner’s post to the “service complaints ombudsman”.

Changes of this nature will require amendment to the Armed Forces Act, and an early opportunity will be sought to introduce the necessary legislation once detailed work, in which the commissioner will again be engaged, is complete.

In today’s armed forces, there is a strong commitment to ensuring that complaints from service personnel are taken seriously and handled fairly. No service man or woman should lack confidence in seeking redress through the current system. However we can do better, and, in particular, I believe we can resolve complaints more quickly. I believe that the approach I have outlined will strengthen the chain of command, support the interests of complainants, and enhance the contribution of the future service complaints ombudsman.

Armed Forces Pay Review Body

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Thursday 13th March 2014 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

The 2014 report of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB) has now been published. I wish to express my thanks to the chairman and members of the review body for their report.

In line with the Government’s 2011 autumn statement, which announced that public sector pay awards will average 1% for each of the two years following the public sector pay freeze, the AFPRB has recommended an increase of 1% to base armed forces salaries for 2014-15. In addition, the AFPRB has recommended a 1% increase to compensatory allowances and recruitment and retention payment categories, except for mountain leaders, parachute jumping instructor, aeromedical and escort duty where there is no increase, and the lowest rate for nursing, which is frozen this year prior to being phased out by April 2016. The AFPRB has also recommended an increase to food and accommodation charges, together with a number of targeted measures, including two additional levels of longer separation allowance.

The AFPRB’s recommendations are to be accepted in full and will become effective from 1 April 2014, except where the AFPRB report indicates otherwise.

Copies of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body report are available in the Vote Office.

Nuclear Submarines

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Tuesday 11th March 2014 Ministerial Corrections

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman can rest assured that within the circle of nuclear experts—it is quite a small circle—there has already been discussion on these issues in the past two years. There is no requirement to notify level 0 events, but we did notify the Scottish Environment Protection Agency and, of course, the military nuclear regulator. It is important to note that SEPA’s primary focus is on emissions from the site—that is, what is in the discharge from the site—and there has been no measurable change in the radiation discharge. That is the important point for people living in those communities.

[Official Report, 6 March 2014, Vol. 576, c. 1085.]

An error has been identified in the answer given to the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Andrew Miller) on 6 March 2014.

The correct answer should have been:

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman can rest assured that within the circle of nuclear experts—it is quite a small circle—there has already been discussion on these issues in the past two years. There is no requirement to notify level 0 events, but we did notify the Scottish Environment Protection Agency and, of course, the military nuclear regulator. It is important to note that SEPA’s primary focus is on emissions from the site—that is, what is in the discharge from the site—and there has been no measurable change in the alpha-emitting particulate discharge. That is the important point for people living in those communities.

Defence Infrastructure Organisation

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Monday 10th March 2014 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

On 24 May 2012, I informed the House that the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) would commence a procurement process to assess whether the involvement of a strategic business partner offered the best value-for-money solution for defence. Today, following the successful conclusion of the competitive stage of the procurement process, I am pleased to announce our decision that the appointment of a strategic business partner does represent the best way forward for the DIO and value for money for the taxpayer. After analysis of the proposals received, I can inform the House that Capita, which is working in conjunction with URS and PA Consulting, is the preferred bidder. Final negotiations will now be concluded with a view to contracting in the spring.

Following the establishment of the DIO in April 2011, a significant transformation programme was put in place to ensure that the organisation would deliver better value for money for taxpayers. Alongside this process, the defence board considered the outline case for the introduction of a strategic business partner for the DIO. The case set out the potential financial and wider benefits of adopting a different business model in the DIO whereby a strategic business partner would be engaged to drive the transformation of the DIO further and deliver rationalisation and efficiency improvements.

A private sector strategic business partner will enable the DIO to make a significant contribution to departmental savings and asset realisation targets, as set out in the 2010 strategic defence and security review and will strengthen and enhance the service the DIO provides across defence. The strategic business partner will focus on improving the skills base across the DIO, enhancing commercial expertise and change management skills and will bring additional capability to the DIO, including access to market-competitive knowledge and skills via the partner’s parent organisations; better incentivisation and management of staff against performance through the introduction of a more commercial approach to the business and access to private funding for “spend-to-save” efficiency improvements.

Capita has been selected as the preferred bidder for a 10-year contract, with payment for services to be made through an incentive-based arrangement. Following contract award in spring 2014, the strategic business partner will integrate an executive management team into the DIO and assume full executive responsibility for the organisation once the mobilisation activities have been completed. For the first phase of the contract, the DIO will remain fully within the Ministry of Defence. During this period, however, the strategic business partner will help the DIO prepare to move to an incorporated model, currently assumed to occur in 2016, which will entail the creation of a Government Company (GovCo) to manage defence infrastructure. This would be a separate legal entity, 100% owned by the Secretary of State for Defence and managed by the strategic business partner under contract. Under this innovative arrangement, the MOD will oversee the activities and performance of the new company through a governing authority set up within the Department.

The selection of the preferred bidder to be the strategic business partner to the DIO, represents an important step in the fundamental reform of defence following Lord Levene’s independent review in 2011, which recommended that

“enabling services should be delivered as efficiently, effectively and professionally as possible.”

It demonstrates the Department’s continuing commitment, and ability, to bring in private sector skills, where doing so will increase efficiency by cutting costs and improving delivery.

Nuclear Submarines

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

Before I make my statement, I am sure that the House will want to join me in sending condolences to the family and friends of the sapper from 32 Engineer Regiment who sadly died while on duty in Helmand province yesterday as a result of non-battle related injuries sustained in Camp Bastion. The incident is not believed to have involved any enemy action. The serviceman’s next of kin have been informed and have requested the customary 24-hour delay before further details are released.

With permission, Mr Speaker, I wish to inform the House that I have decided to refuel the nuclear reactor in HMS Vanguard, one of the UK’s four ballistic missile submarines, during its planned deep maintenance period, which begins in 2015. It will be the second time that Vanguard’s reactor has been refuelled since it entered service in 1993. I will explain to the House now why I have reached the decision to conduct a second refuelling.

As many hon. Members will know, alongside the operational reactors on board our ballistic missile submarines, a prototype reactor of the same class has been running at the naval reactor test establishment at Dounreay in Scotland since 2002. Its purpose is to help us assess how the reactor cores within our submarines will perform over time. It has therefore been run for significantly longer periods and at a significantly higher intensity than the cores of the same type in our submarines, to allow us to identify early any age or use-related issues that may arise later in the lives of the operational reactor cores.

In January 2012, low levels of radioactivity were detected in the cooling water surrounding the prototype core. Low levels of radioactivity are a normal product of the nuclear reaction that takes place within the fuel, but they would not normally enter the cooling water. The water is contained within the sealed reactor circuit, and I can reassure the House that there has been no detectable radiation leak from that sealed circuit. The independent Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency have been kept informed.

When the coolant radioactivity was first detected, the reactor was shut down as a precaution. Following investigations and a series of trials, and with the agreement of the relevant regulator, the reactor was restarted in November 2012. It continues to operate safely. Both radiation exposure for workers at the site and discharges from the site have remained well inside the strictly prescribed limits set by the regulators. Indeed, against the International Atomic Energy Agency’s measurement scale for nuclear-related events, this issue is classed as level zero, which is described by the agency as

“below scale—no safety significance”.

The naval reactor test establishment is, and remains, a very safe and low-risk site. However, the fact that low levels of radioactivity have been detected in the coolant water clearly means that the reactor is not operating exactly as planned. As one would expect, we have conducted extensive investigations to determine how the radioactivity has entered the cooling water. We believe that it is due to a microscopic breach in a small area of the metal cladding that surrounds one fuel element within the core of the reactor. It is not yet clear why that breach has occurred. It might be related to the age of the reactor, it might be a function of the high intensity use to which we have subjected the test reactor or it might be a random event. We do not yet know.

On current plans, the Dounreay test reactor will start to be decommissioned in 2015. We are confident that the reactor can be operated safely until that date. We may decide to bring forward decommissioning if it will allow us better to understand the causes of the breach through examination of the reactor core.

This occurrence does not present any safety risk. It does, however, potentially present additional risks to future submarine availability. Consequently, I have had to consider carefully the implications for the Vanguard-class and Astute-class submarines, which use the same design of reactor core. We constantly monitor our submarine reactors. We have never detected a similar occurrence to that found in the prototype reactor. We are confident that if one did occur, we would detect it straight away.

Despite that, we now have to consider the possibility, however remote, that the useful operating life of this particular design of core may not be as long as previously expected. As a result, I have decided that, as a precautionary measure, we should refuel HMS Vanguard, the oldest SSBN class and the one with the highest mileage, as it were, on her reactor, when she enters her scheduled deep maintenance period in 2015. This is the responsible option: replacing the core on a precautionary basis at the next arising opportunity, rather than waiting to see if the core needs to be replaced at a later date, which would mean returning Vanguard for a period of unscheduled deep maintenance, potentially putting at risk the resilience of our ballistic missile submarine operations.

The refuelling will increase our confidence that Vanguard will be able to operate effectively and safely until the planned fleet of Successor submarines begins to be delivered from 2028. The refuelling will be conducted within the current planned dry dock maintenance period for Vanguard, which starts in late 2015 and will last for about three and a half years. It is therefore expected to have no impact on deterrent operations. The additional cost of refuelling Vanguard is estimated to be about £120 million over the next six years.

A decision on whether to refuel the next oldest submarine, HMS Victorious, when she enters her next planned deep maintenance period does not need to be made until 2018. It will be informed by further analysis of the data from the reactor at Dounreay and examination of the core after the reactor is decommissioned. I have decided, again on a precautionary basis, that in the meantime we will take the necessary steps to keep open the option of refuelling Victorious. That will involve investment at Devonport and at the reactor plant at Raynesway in Derby to preserve our ability to conduct nuclear refuelling. The total cost of that investment is still being scoped, but it is expected to be of the order of £150 million.

Those costs—perhaps £270 million in total—will be met from existing provision for financial risk in the submarine programme budget. They represent substantially less than 10% of that risk provision and will not impact on the more than £4 billion of contingency that we are holding in the overall defence equipment plan.

The implications for the Astute-class submarines will be the subject of further analysis, particularly once we have had the opportunity to examine the core from Dounreay. As the Astutes are only now entering service, and thus their cores have seen far less operation, a decision on whether to refuel any of them will not be needed for many years to come. These decisions do not affect our plans for the Successor submarine that will replace the Vanguard class. Refuelling HMS Vanguard does not enable us to extend further the overall life of the submarine, which is limited by a number of factors other than the age of the reactor. Neither do these decisions have any implications for our confidence in the reactor we are developing for the Successor submarine, which is based on a completely different design.

Finally, the House will understand that our naval reactor cores are a highly specialised, UK-bespoke maritime design, and there is no read-across from this occurrence to the performance of naval reactors operated by other countries, or indeed reactors operating in the UK civil nuclear sector. The safety of the UK’s naval nuclear reactor at the test establishment at Dounreay, and on our submarines, is of critical importance to us, as is the maintenance of continuous at-sea deterrence. That is why I have taken the decision to apply the precautionary principle, even though there is no evidence at this stage that the problem detected with the test reactor is likely to present in the operational reactors. We will continue to work with independent military and civil regulators to ensure the continuing safety of nuclear operations at Dounreay, Devonport, Faslane and at sea.

The Government are committed to maintaining our nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantee of the UK’s sovereignty and freedom of action against threats of nuclear aggression, wherever they may come from. Our submarine-based continuous at-sea deterrent remains the most capable and cost-effective way of doing that. The decisions I have announced today are responsible and precautionary, and will assure our ability safely to maintain the UK’s nuclear deterrent into the future. I commend this statement to the House.

[Vernon Coaker (Gedling) (Lab)]

I join the Defence Secretary in paying tribute to the soldier from the 32 Engineer Regiment. His death is a reminder of the service and sacrifice given to our country by the armed forces, and our thoughts are with his family and loved ones at this time. I thank the Secretary of State for briefing me on this statement last night, and for sight of it. These are complicated and sensitive matters, and it is in all our interests that they are debated in a calm and reasonable manner that befits the seriousness of the issue.

I will come to the specific issues raised about the reactor in Dounreay and the nuclear submarines, but I start by asking the Secretary of State why he is making this statement now, and why the House is being told about this matter only today. He says that this issue was discovered in January 2012, which is more than two years ago. Does he not think it would have been right to brief the official Opposition spokesperson on defence then? Why did that not happen, and why has it not happened at any time since then until now? Should Parliament have known earlier?

There must be public confidence in the Government to be open and transparent about such matters. A fault, however small, that develops in a nuclear reactor is something that the British people, and this Parliament, should have been told about. This is an issue of national security and national importance, and it will cause particular concern in Scotland. When did the Scottish Secretary know? Did the Defence Secretary or his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland discuss the issue with the First Minister of Scotland and the Scottish Government? It seems to me that it was incumbent on the UK Government to inform and work with the Scottish Government on this matter. I accept that the Secretary of State briefed me and other colleagues last night and this morning, and I appreciate his candour, but does he agree that it has come rather late?

Let me turn to the specific issues with the PWR2 nuclear reactor at Dounreay and the implications for the Royal Navy’s fleet submarines and ballistic missile submarines. There will inevitably be concern when the words “nuclear”, “reactor” and “fault” are used in the same sentence. Can the Secretary of State provide further assurance that there has been, and there is now, absolutely no risk to workers on site, personnel in service, or the wider public? Having discovered that there was a problem at the Vulcan naval reactor test establishment, on what basis was the decision made to continue running the reactor? We know it is now in maintenance. Will he tell the House when a decision will be made about whether to continue running the reactor? I understand that if a decision is made to stop running it, it takes three years from the point at which it shuts down to the point at which it has cooled enough to be examined. That is a long time. Has he examined the potential to look at the PWR2 currently being constructed for the later Astute-class boats, and does that provide an opportunity effectively to X-ray every aspect of the cladding to see if we can detect any faults? There will be concerns about the impact that might have on the Astute-class submarines. Will the Secretary of State outline what those are?

The decision to maintain a test reactor so that faults could be identified has proven a good one. A fault has been found, however small, in PWR2—the test reactor in Dounreay. What plans are there to ensure that we have the same security with PWR3, which will be used on the Successor-class submarines? Have there been discussions with our US counterparts to see what lessons or expertise can be borrowed? In the current international defence and security climate, many people will be asking an important question: will this affect the UK’s ability to maintain continuous at-sea deterrence? Will it be necessary to adjust the operations timetable of the continuous at-sea deterrent? Finally, can the Defence Secretary confirm the total cost envisaged and that it will have no impact on the rest of the defence programme? If the cost is met by the submarine contingency fund, will that have any impact on the existing submarine programme?

Given that there will be concern about the length of time it has taken to inform the House and the public about this issue, will the Secretary of State tell the House what plans he has to keep Parliament and the country involved and updated throughout this process? Does he agree that public confidence and trust on these issues is crucial, and that people should have been told earlier? There will rightly be anxiety about these matters. The British public must be assured that everything is being done to resolve them, and they must be confident that Britain’s defence and security is paramount and will be maintained. That is best done through openness and transparency.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and by and large we agree on the importance of these matters, but I am afraid I must start by saying that I am not particularly minded to take lectures on transparency from someone who was a member of the previous Government. The decisions we have made throughout this process from January 2012 have been carefully balanced. I have, of course, considered throughout whether it would be appropriate, sensible or helpful to make a public statement, and I remind him that the advice we have received throughout from the regulators and experts is that no safety issues are arising, and that this incident scores as a level zero event on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s scale—an event that requires no action and presents no risk.

We have kept the independent military nuclear safety regulator and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency informed of matters, as is proper, and I have no doubt that there will be people who say that the Scottish Government should have been informed. We will see when we hear from the representative of the Scottish National party in a moment whether it will approach this matter from a responsible and sensible point of view. Key Ministers within the Government were, of course, aware of these issues throughout.

The hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) asked why we decided to restart the reactor. Once it was clear that there was no safety risk and that a safety case for restarting it had been built and approved by the regulators, we continued with the operation of the test reactor to fulfil its intended purpose: to have delivered the same amount of core burn, and some more, as the most aged operational reactor will have achieved by the end of its service life.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the reactors being built for the Astute submarines, which are also core H reactors. I confirm that after this issue arose, all reactors in-build were re-examined with the best equipment available, to look for signs of anything that might give any further clue as to what has happened with the core H reactor at Dounreay.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about the decision not to have a test reactor for the successor series—the PWR3 reactor. There are several technical reasons for this. The reactor is being built to an entirely different design specification. Because of the way in which technology has evolved, the engineering tolerances will be much less challenging in the PWR3 reactor and we have access to far more advanced computer modelling techniques, which can provide an adequate substitute for prototyping. However, in view of the concerns that have been expressed about this decision, I have asked the chief scientific adviser to review again the evidence on which the decision not to operate a test reactor was based, and to report back to me on the appropriateness of that decision. I will inform the House in due course of the result of that review.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether CASD is affected. It will not be, and that is the point of taking this decision today. Refuelling Vanguard during an existing planned deep-maintenance period means that the operational rotation of the Vanguard-class submarines will not be affected. That is the reason we have taken that decision. It is not a safety-related decision; it is a submarine availability-related decision.

On the question of cost and as I have said already, we expect the total cost of the measures I have announced today to be about £270 million, all of which will come from contingency provision within the submarine programme that is currently unused. We do not expect it to have any impact on the wider defence programme. The contingency within the submarine programme is more than adequate—this amount is substantially less than 10% of the total contingency in the programme.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether I intended to make further statements. Clearly, I will of course notify the House if anything of significance happens; if we make a decision to decommission the reactor at Dounreay early; or if there are any further significant developments in respect of the reactor while it is running. I stress that we have reacted properly throughout, in consultation with the regulatory authorities, and we have dealt with this matter in the same way that any minor incident in a reactor, whether military or civil, would routinely be dealt with.

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend said that the consequences of this announcement for the Astute fleet would be the subject of further review. We all understand that the levels of radioactivity that he has announced are low, but what monitoring will be done of the cooling system in our operational Astutes to reassure the crews and all those involved that they are not in any way at risk?

[Mr Hammond]

We carry out daily sampling and analysis of the coolant water in all our nuclear submarines.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

Can I say to the Secretary of State that the fact that some people may react in an irresponsible way is a reason to be more open on this issue, not a reason to be less open—as he appeared to suggest in his reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker)?

I am grateful for the briefings that the Secretary of State has given me and others. It will take three years from the decommissioning of the test reactor to be able to examine fully that hot piece of apparatus. In the meantime, we will continue to build the same reactors for the Astute class of submarine. Is he satisfied that we will do everything we can in that interim period to make certain that we minimise any risk and that we do not elongate or widen the safety margins on the reactor during the manufacturing process or otherwise?

[Mr Hammond]

Of course, as the right hon. Gentleman might anticipate, those are questions that I have already asked of the programme managers throughout this process. There are technical factors in the design of the core that limit the scope to change aspects of the design, but now that we are aware that this microscopic breach has occurred in the test reactor, it will focus the examination of the as yet uninstalled cores that are being built for the Astute class of submarine.

The test reactor at Dounreay has been hammered. This is the nuclear equivalent of putting an engine on a test bed and running it flat out at maximum revs to see what happens. It does not mean that what happens to that engine will happen in a car that is being driven normally on the roads.

It will take approximately three years from the time of decommissioning the reactor to being able to examine it fully. We now have to make a decision about whether more will be learned by continuing to run the reactor at Dounreay until its intended decommissioning date in 2015 or by decommissioning it a year and a half early and thus being able to examine the core a year and a half earlier than we otherwise would. The balance needs to be struck on that and I will act on the best scientific advice that I receive.

[Dr Liam Fox (North Somerset) (Con)]

I commend my right hon. Friend on his decision. What we are seeing is a vindication of the safety models that have been followed by successive Governments in relation to our nuclear submarine programme, and there is certainly no excuse for scaremongering or irresponsible language. In fact, we should be proud and reassured that safety is given such a high priority even at the financial cost that he has outlined.

In order to give the House an understanding of the scale of the problem, will my right hon. Friend give us an indication of the percentage core burn of the Vulcan test reactor, and how that percentage compares with the percentage burn on the Vanguard submarine?

[Mr Hammond]

As my right hon. Friend says, Governments of both persuasions over the years have adopted a prudent and precautionary approach to the safety of our nuclear submarine fleet, and have invested money, where it is necessary to do so, on the basis that safety always takes priority. As I have said, the decisions that I am announcing today are not driven by concerns about safety. There is no safety risk identified from this incident. They are driven primarily by concerns about future submarine availability.

The information on core burn is classified, but I can reassure the House that the percentage of core burn on the reactor at Dounreay exceeds by far the percentage of core burn on any of our operational reactors.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

Continuous at-sea deterrence is of course the foundation of our deterrent policy. As the Secretary of State knows much better than I do, it requires not only the Vanguard-class submarines to be continuously at sea, but the Trafalgar and the Astute classes to be around. The worst-case scenario would be the refuelling of all Vanguard and Astute submarines. Does he have complete confidence that CASD would be maintained if that were to happen, and what additional capacity would be needed to carry out such an extensive venture?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman asks sensible questions, but he is verging into speculative matters at this stage. This is a very tiny flaw in a reactor that has been hammered at maximum output over a long time. It is premature to suggest that when we examine the core we will find some systemic need to refuel all other reactors of a similar type. That is not the expectation. However, as he would expect, we will plan for every contingency, and the measures that I have announced will allow us to preserve the option of refuelling further Vanguard and Astute submarines should that be deemed expedient in the future.

[Sir Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD)]

I thank the Defence Secretary for his statement and commend him on his actions. He has acted, rightly, on the precautionary principle—and, God willing, he is acting more cautiously than is necessary. The UK has the highest nuclear standards, but one can never be too cautious on nuclear safety. If the decision has been taken to refuel Vanguard, which had not been anticipated or expected, and possibly others, what implications will that have, not for the operation of Astute but for the timeline of its production at Barrow?

[Mr Hammond]

That is, again, a good question. I am assured that the investment I have announced today to expand capacity at Raynesway, coupled with the buffer already in the supply line—reactors for future Astute class submarines are built ahead of the need to install them in the submarines—means that we can take a core, which was built with the intention of being installed in Astute, to refuel Vanguard. We will have been able to catch up on the production of cores before we get to a point where there would be any impact on the Astute programme. End result: there will be no impact on the timeline of Astute.

[Mr Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)]

The Secretary of State should acknowledge that Scottish MPs and Scotland’s Parliament have voted against nuclear weapons and that there is opposition from the Churches, the Scottish Trades Union Congress and voluntary organisations. He has said that he will plan for every contingency. How will Scottish independence alter his plans, when weapons of mass destruction are removed from Scotland’s environment, and when did he consult Scotland’s Government?

[Mr Hammond]

This is from the man whose defence policy is based on being able to join NATO, an avowedly nuclear alliance. As I have said many times in the House, we do not expect the Scottish people to vote for independence and we are not planning for that contingency. However, as one would expect, the Royal Navy operates an extensive set of contingency plans for dealing with all sorts of contingent events that may occur.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend will be aware that the whole of the deterrent programme, both maintenance and build, is characterised by monopolies that are pretty much unavoidable. Does he agree that, notwithstanding this actually quite small hiccup, this arrangement, under Governments of all kinds, works well and offers lessons for wider consideration across procurement?

[Mr Hammond]

Our track record speaks for itself. Since 1963, the Royal Navy has operated 80-odd cores, both at sea and at shore-based test reactors. Rolls-Royce has acted as the technical authority and delivery partner, providing the design and manufacture of cores in an arrangement that has been very satisfactory. Nothing that I am announcing should in any way be taken to undermine the success of that relationship, or Rolls-Royce’s status as a world-leading provider of military reactor cores.

[Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)]

Having worked with radiation for a number of years in my own career and having followed very closely the development of the civil nuclear programme, I fully concur with the Secretary of State’s comments on the underlying science. On level zero events, similar events, such as moving waste material out of civilian sites, are subject to local communication. Why was there not a parallel situation in the case of Dounreay? Why were local stakeholders not involved? Will he ensure that the chief scientific adviser is given the maximum freedom, within the limits of classified information, to share scientific findings with the broadest possible group of nuclear experts?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman can rest assured that within the circle of nuclear experts—it is quite a small circle—there has already been discussion on these issues in the past two years. There is no requirement to notify level zero events, but we did notify the Scottish Environment Protection Agency and, of course, the military nuclear regulator. It is important to note that SEPA’s primary focus is on emissions from the site—that is, what is in the discharge from the site—and there has been no measurable change in the radiation discharge. That is the important point for people living in those communities.[Official Report, 11 March 2014, Vol. 577, c. 3MC.]

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

If the defect seen on the Vulcan test reactor at Dounreay were to be identified in one of the Astute or Vanguard-class submarines, what would the consequences be, from a safety perspective, for the crew on board those vessels? How would the removal of one or more submarine affect operational maritime capabilities?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend asks a good question. I emphasise again that there are no safety implications from this type of event—a submarine could continue to operate safely. This is a tiny amount of radiation in a coolant that is itself circulating in a closed system inside the sealed reactor shield, so there is no risk to the submarine crew. If such an event occurred, it would be detected almost immediately because of the daily sampling and analysis of coolant water. We are already looking at the operational implications, in a reactor of this type, of a very minor breach. As I have already told the House, the test reactor at Dounreay was restarted in 2012 and has subsequently run without any further problems. It is not absolutely clear that the result of such a minor event occurring in an operational reactor would necessarily mean that the reactor would have to be withdrawn from service. Clearly, we would do so on a precautionary basis while we considered a longer term course of action, but it is not yet clear that that would have to be the long-term state of affairs.

[Tom Greatrex (Rutherglen and Hamilton West) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Secretary of State has said a number of times that SEPA was kept informed. Will he inform the House at what stage it was first informed? Given that SEPA is an Executive agency of the devolved Scottish Government, were Scottish Ministers informed by SEPA and, if that was the case, why were Scottish Ministers informed but Members of this House not?

[Mr Hammond]

SEPA was informed in October 2012 and has been involved in the discussions since that point. SEPA is an Executive agency of the Scottish Government, but it deals with operators in relation to the discharge of its regulatory functions on a properly regulated statutory basis and, usually, on a confidential basis. Clearly, SEPA did not feel that this event, as a level zero event, needed to be brought to the attention of Ministers or anyone in the central Scottish Government.

[Oliver Colvile (Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend for confirming that no lives were ever endangered by this activity. What discussions has he had with Babcock to ensure that it has the skilled work force in place and is able to deliver the work? It is important to ensure that that happens.

[Mr Hammond]

Obviously, the implications for Devonport are that a line of work, which was expected to end with the completion of the current refuelling of Vengeance, will now continue at least until 2019, with the refuelling of HMS Vanguard. At this stage, we have not quantified the precise impact on jobs and other activities at Devonport, but it is likely to be modest. Most of the people employed on the refuelling programme were expected to be absorbed elsewhere in the dockyard work force. We are confident that, with the announcements I have made today, there will be the capacity to carry out the Vanguard refuelling and to retain the ability to carry out the Victorious refuelling if necessary.

[John Robertson (Glasgow North West) (Lab)]

The stupidity of both the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government knows no bounds. It is clear from the fact that the Scottish Government have known about this for nearly two years and the United Kingdom Government have known about it for more than two years that they hold the people of this country in contempt. I live very close to Faslane, and it worries me that something could happen that the people of my country and my city know nothing about. The Secretary of State must go and tell people about it, otherwise no one will believe anything he says in future about anything to do with nuclear power.

[Mr Hammond]

I am not sure about taking any lessons on stupidity. I am afraid that this is scaremongering of the worst kind. I have told the hon. Gentleman and the House that no safety issues are at stake, and all the scientific evidence supports the position that I have taken. Level zero events are not routinely made public; they are not routinely reported. That has been the practice of successive Governments, and it is the practice throughout the civil and military nuclear sector.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

The refit for HMS Vanguard will take three and a half years, and that was planned. Does not that fact, and the requirement for us to have a permanent at-sea deterrent, support the plans for a fleet of four Successor SSBNs?

[Mr Hammond]

Indeed they do. If we are to maintain our posture of continuous at-sea deterrence, we will need to begin replacing the current fleet in the late 2020s. That is not primarily to do with the lives of the reactors or the cores; it is to do with the life expectancy of other components of the submarines that cannot effectively be replaced. The final decision to replace the Vanguard-class submarines with Successors will be made in 2016.

Aircraft Carrier Alliance (Appointment)

Lord Hammond of Runnymede Excerpts

Wednesday 12th February 2014 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

On 6 November 2013, Official Report, column 251, I made a statement to the House on the renegotiation of the aircraft carrier contract and the wider decisions made by BAE Systems on the future of UK warship building capability.

In that statement, I announced changes to the management and governance of the Aircraft Carrier Alliance (ACA)—who are delivering the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers—that would better reflect the collaborative approach to project management that the revised cost-sharing arrangements will induce and to improve the delivery of the programme.

Today the ACA, with the Ministry of Defence’s agreement, will announce the appointment of Sir Peter Gershon as the new, non-executive chairman of the alliance management board, the top-level management board of the ACA. This appointment is part of the management changes mentioned last November to bring greater focus to the delivery of these iconic ships.

Sir Peter brings a wealth of experience gained in large and complex international organisations and his appointment will help to increase the coherence and co-ordination between the MOD and Industry as the programme moves forward.