Continuous At-Sea Deterrent

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Wednesday 10th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

If I recall correctly, 1,000 people in Plymouth are dependent for their jobs and livelihoods on supporting our nuclear submarines. I would very much like to add my thanks to them for the work that they do. That also demonstrates the important benefit that our nuclear deterrent provides for the whole country in jobs and skills.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

I am sure that my right hon. Friend, in this geographic tour of areas that support the at-sea deterrent, was coming on to talk about Aldermaston, in the part of west Berkshire that I represent, and the surrounding area. Thousands of people work in that centre of excellence for science and engineering, the benefits of which spread into the economy, into areas that have nothing to do with the nuclear deterrent. That has been of huge benefit to this country.

[Gavin Williamson]

It is absolutely right that my right hon. Friend mentions Aldermaston and the work that it does on our continued ability to develop our nuclear deterrent, to ensure that we remain ahead of the game. That also has an enormous benefit to the whole wider economy, and not only in the development of skills. This investment has an impact on science and technology, keeping us ahead of the game and ahead of our rivals.

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[Dr Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman is an admirable member of the Defence Committee, and we greatly value his contributions, but I do not think that that was his most stellar contribution—[Laughter.] Sometimes people say, “Well, what if the Americans wanted to have some sort of veto or to stop us using the nuclear deterrent?”—I mean using it in the sense of firing it rather than of using it in the sense that it is used all day long every day of the year to prevent nuclear conflict. The first point is that this nuclear system is totally under our own control. It would gradually wither on the vine over a long period of time only if the United States decided for some reason that it no longer wanted there to be a second centre of nuclear decision making within the NATO alliance. At any time now, as it has been for the last 50 years, it is entirely independently controlled by us.

The second point is about why an American president would ever not want there to be a second centre of nuclear decision making in NATO, because that reduces any temptation of an aggressor against NATO to think that it could pick off this country without America responding.

[Richard Benyon]

Looking forward, does my right hon. Friend agree that renewing the fleet with the new Dreadnought class is the most important decision? In doing so, we have decided that we cannot predict what is going to happen in 20, 30 or 40 years. Those who want us to get rid of the deterrent and not renew our fleet are taking a terrible gamble in a dangerous world, because we cannot foresee the enemies that we may face in the decades ahead.

[Dr Lewis]

I pay tribute to the people who work at Aldermaston in my right hon. Friend’s constituency for all that they contribute to the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent capability. Not only do I agree with him, but he has led me nicely back to the central theme of my narrative, which was to try to set out for the House the five main military arguments in favour of retaining our independent deterrent, the first of which is precisely the point that he has just made. Future military threats and conflicts will be no more predictable than those that engulfed us throughout the 20th century. That is the overriding justification for preserving armed forces in peacetime as a national insurance policy. No one knows what enemies might confront us during the next 30 to 50 years, but it is highly probable that at least some of them will be armed with mass-destruction weapons.

The second argument is that it is not the weapons themselves that we have to fear but the nature of the regimes that possess them. Whereas democracies are generally reluctant to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear dictatorships—although they did use them against Japan in 1945—the reverse is not true. Think, for example, what the situation would have been in 1982 if a non-nuclear Britain had faced an Argentina in possession of even a few tactical nuclear bombs and the means of delivering them. There would have been no question of our being able to retake the Falkland Islands in that conflict.

Veterans and Soldiers: Statute of Limitations

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 25th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Leo Docherty]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman.

This is broader than only Northern Ireland. The House will be aware of the scandalous saga of legal pursuit in recent years of veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, 3,500 cases were brought before the Iraq Historic Allegations Team at a cost of £60 million to the taxpayer, resulting in no prosecutions. All those allegations were spurious. A case in point is the experience of Major Bob Campbell, who now faces his eighth investigation, despite having been cleared of any wrongdoing on numerous occasions.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. Does he agree that this is a matter not just for veterans, for whom we rightly have concern, but for our armed forces of today and in the future? The impact that this could have, and is having, on recruitment and retention is palpable, as we know from those we know who are serving.

[Leo Docherty]

Absolutely. This is not a matter of history: it is a matter of the here and now and of future deployments.

I have two simple proposals. The first is that the Ministry of Defence legislate for a statute of limitations, perhaps for 10 years, meaning that after 10 years, unless there is significant new evidence, no case can be brought against a veteran or soldier. Soldiers and veterans do not wish or seek to be above the law—they just seek natural justice. We must allow veterans to get on with their lives without the constant fear of that knock on the door and legal pursuit.

My second proposal is that we return our armed forces to the legal jurisdiction of the law of armed conflict and the Geneva convention. The intrusion of the European convention on human rights, which was taken into British domestic law in the form of the Human Rights Act 1998, set the scene for the legal scandal that was IHAT in the case of Iraq, and Op Northmoor in the case of Afghanistan. Although the Government should be commended for the way that they closed IHAT, hundreds of cases of a similar nature remain outstanding, with private law firms, that may be brought in the near future. IHAT will happen again unless we in this place change the legal jurisdiction of our armed forces.

NATO

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh), who is a member of the United Kingdom delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and it is a great privilege to lead that delegation, whose membership includes former Cabinet Ministers. We have three former Defence Ministers, a former party leader, other former Ministers, and Members of Parliament with a real interest in—and knowledge and experience of—defence issues, including one holder of the Distinguished Service Order. My friend the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) is the deputy leader.

The assembly currently has a key role. Many Members have spoken today of the need to connect people in this country with defence and help them to understand what our relationship with our allies is all about. We have the job of holding NATO to account, informing our fellow parliamentarians—with whom we can discuss many of the issues that we raise in the various committees on which we sit—and also enabling people in this country to understand this great alliance, its values, and its vision for our security. In 2019 we will welcome hundreds of NATO parliamentarians to London, and I look forward to that.

The Royal Air Force was created 100 years ago, as a result of a new technology which had created the first new battlefield for millennia. Today we face the same scenario with the cyber threat. At a recent meeting in this building, we heard from Mark Galeotti, a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague and a renowned Russia expert. He worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Mr Seely), who produced a fascinating paper entitled “A Definition of Contemporary Russian Conflict: How Does the Kremlin Wage War?”

As others have pointed out and as we know ourselves, conventional wars are expensive in terms of both blood and treasure. We know that the cost of one missile that we fire at a building in Syria can run into seven figures, and we know that we are not alone: Russia, too, suffers from unrest as the coffins come home. Cyber is a cheap war to wage, and an effective means of attack: we saw the impact of the NotPetya attack on Ukraine. It is important for us to look at our defence posture in this day and age, and to consider how we respond to this new battlefield. We have defined our defence in sea, land and air, but we now need a very clear cyber posture as well. We should also follow the advice of Lord Hague, who, in a recent article, referred to a re-evaluation of article 5 of the NATO treaty. That might be something for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to take to the Brussels summit.

We need to look carefully at infrastructure as well. Those of us who were cold war warriors will remember that the infrastructure in West Germany was constructed around moving troops very fast, and we know how difficult it has been to establish the Enhanced Forward Presence because of simple factors such as bridges, road widths and border controls.

In the few minutes that I have I want to touch on burden sharing. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Sir Michael Fallon) made a very important point. The United States is far and away the biggest supporter of the alliance, and we must help NATO-friendly members of Congress by saying precisely as the Secretary of State said earlier: that we recognise that Europe has to step up. We have the benefit of the commitment made at the Wales summit and it is a disgrace, frankly, that some countries are not stepping up to that. My figures are that six countries now do spend over 2%, which is good, and the virtue of that certainly lies with the United States, Britain, Romania, Poland, Greece and the Baltics, but there are laggards and I am going to name them, particularly Belgium and Spain. Belgium has cut its defence spending to below 1%, and I think that is wrong.

[Mr Francois]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, given the circumstances that he has outlined so clearly, there is an even greater responsibility on us in the United Kingdom to try to up our spending to show the Americans that some of the Europeans are playing the game?

[Richard Benyon]

It is very useful that we have accepted in this debate that the 2% is a floor—not a flaw, I add to help my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax)—and that as the threats change we may have to raise it.

We must be a critical friend of NATO. In terms of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Sir Hugh Bayley’s voice is in my head when we talk about trying to hold NATO to account for its failure to produce decent, sensible audited accounts. We have a strength in that regard because we are a significant contributor to the alliance; it enables us to do that.

May I finish by paying tribute to the shadow Secretary of State and those Labour Members who are committed to defence? We must work with them on a bipartisan basis, because I do not want to go into an election in which a party that could enter government does not believe in the value of our alliance, does not believe we should keep our nuclear deterrent, and does not believe that article 5 means what it says. Article 5 is the greatest security that has been delivered to our peoples rich and poor, old and young, down the ages since the horrendous carnage of the second world war. That bipartisan nature of our defence debate is very important now, and I hope we can continue to value NATO now and in the future.

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[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

For the record, they are both great movies.

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon). She always speaks on these matters with great common sense, and her speech this afternoon is no exception.

In March 2018, the Defence Committee paid a visit to the United States of America, as part of which we held meetings in the Pentagon and the State Department, with some of our opposite numbers on the House Armed Services Committee and with the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, too. During our visit we experienced a great deal of American interest in what one might call the “Baltic states scenario.” Many of our interlocutors placed a strong emphasis on the readiness of US, European and NATO forces to respond to potential aggression against the Baltic states from a resurgent Russia. That raises the question: what might an assault on the Baltics look like? The Russian annexation of Crimea and de facto invasion of parts of eastern Ukraine provide at least some pointers towards what we might expect to see in the event of Russian adventurism and an attempt to intervene in the Baltics. If that were to come to pass, we could expect to see multiple elements of so-called “hybrid warfare” employed by Russia.

To begin with, any such assault might contain an element of maskirovka—strategic deception—perhaps by seeking to draw NATO’s attention away from the area prior to intervention, for instance, by creating a crisis in the Balkans. That might well be accompanied by the agitation of Russian minorities in the three Baltic states, where they represent approximately a quarter of the Latvian population, a quarter of the Estonian population and an eighth of the Lithuanian population respectively.

[Richard Benyon]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that this has already been trained for? There have already been cyber-attacks on countries such as Estonia, which have locked down many of their public services. So this is happening.

[Mr Francois]

My right hon. Friend is right about that, and it is no mistake that NATO’s centre of excellence on cyber-warfare is now located in Estonia.

As I was saying, such an attack would no doubt be accompanied by a considerable disinformation campaign, the widespread employment of deception and fake news, and quite possibly the appearance of large numbers of “little green men”, as we saw in both Crimea and Ukraine, perhaps under the guise of so-called “local defence units”. That would very likely be accompanied by Spetsnaz and other special forces activity, potentially backed up by airborne or air assault forces. It is worth noting that the Russian 76th guards air assault division, based at Pskov, is located only 100 km from the Estonian border.

Any such intervention would probably be covered by a wide-reaching air defence umbrella, including highly capable air defence systems, such as the S300 and S400, to help establish an anti-access area denial—or A2/AD—shield, designed specifically to prevent NATO air power from intervening. In any such scenario, speed would be of the essence, as we saw in Crimea, where the key elements of annexation were effectively carried out in a matter of days. Russia’s likely aim would be to present NATO with a fait accompli, to undermine the article 5 guarantee, which Russia would no doubt regard as a meaningful victory.

How should we best respond to this? In May, the Select Committee took evidence from the Secretary of State for Defence, who is in his place, including on our readiness in the UK to respond to a Baltic scenario. He explained that our two high readiness formations, 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade, could be deployed to the Baltics in a matter of days, although it would have to be by air and therefore assumes that air heads would still be in friendly hands. In response to questions, he further explained that it would take about 20 days to deploy a mechanised brigade, whereas to deploy a full war fighting division, as envisaged in SDSR 2015, would take about three months, by which time the conflict could very well be all over. It is obvious from those timings that we would need our NATO allies, especially US air power, to seek to hold the ring until heavier reinforcements could arrive.

What is to be done? First, NATO would have to be prepared to fight and win an intense information campaign, in which television cameras would arguably be more powerful than missiles. The Skripal case showed that in fact the west was prepared to stand together quite impressively in response to Russian misinformation, expelling more than 100 Russian diplomats. I believe that really hurt the Russians.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

The programme will mention fisheries, the high north and everything else that I am sure the hon. Gentleman would love to see in it.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

The Fishery Protection Squadron is the oldest established unit in the Royal Navy, but does my right hon. Friend agree that technology is moving on and that a combination of data analytics, satellite imaging and the protections that we are now able to deploy around the Pitcairn Islands marine protected area, for example, are the sorts of technologies that we can add to save costs?

[Gavin Williamson]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. We need to consider new technologies to assist the Royal Navy and its work. It is a large ocean and there are many threats involved in ensuring that it is properly policed, so we need to embrace new technology, working hand in hand with the Royal Navy, to ensure that our waters are safe from foreign fishermen intruding into our territory.

Historic Allegations against Veterans

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Tuesday 15th May 2018 Westminster Hall

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

I am delighted to see my right hon. Friend the Minister here—as a Defence Minister, he can reflect this issue right across the Government. As a veteran of Operation Banner who has been involved in this issue for many years, I am angry. We want to hold the NIO to account. I strongly believe that there is a cadre of officials in that Department who can think up a thousand reasons why they should not do something. Just occasionally, they should be encouraged to think about how they can solve a problem that is an affront to every decent person in this country.

I have a solution, which builds on what my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Sir Henry Bellingham) proposed. It will come before the House on 15 June. Okay, it is a ten-minute rule Bill and it has got to the bottom of the list—we all know how this place works—but the Government should pick it up and run with it. I suggest that there should be a 10-year statute of limitations for all servicemen who serve on operations. I agree entirely that there can be overrides and caveats, and I am happy to talk about the time—I am happy to talk about anything—but we must get the principle in law so that the young men and women currently training with my son in the British Army know that the system in this country will stand by them when they make the awful decision to take somebody’s life, under all the constraints we impose on them.

We are in a situation in which a 78-year-old man with kidney failure—a constituent of my hon. Friend the Member for South East Cornwall (Mrs Murray)—is being taken to court. What other country would do that? Why are we so shaming? I know that we have a devolved justice system in Northern Ireland, and that the people who take that case forward will have to be held to account for that, but we have reached the point where we as a society must ask, “Is it right to take an old man who is in poor health away from his family and put him through this?”

I believe that we have a solution. I am desperately keen that we should work constructively with all elements of the Government. If we start from the basis that it is all too difficult, nothing will happen, but we have to find solutions.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 23rd April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Guto Bebb]

I agree that the issue of Galileo is concerning. We have made representations at the highest level to both the European Union and the French Government. We believe that this is an important issue and that the UK’s contribution to the Galileo programme is significant. I think the hon. Gentleman will agree, however, that the European Commission’s comment that the UK would be a security risk is simply unacceptable.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is crucial that any synergies in terms of industrial strategy across military expenditure should be concentrated on NATO, where there is a plethora of different weapons systems and pieces of equipment? It is much more important to concentrate on the fact that Britain is remaining a key player in the NATO alliance.

[Guto Bebb]

I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend that NATO is the mainstay of our defence capabilities, and I also agree that the relationship with NATO partners is significant and important for the future. From an industrial capability perspective, however, I think that the Prime Minister made a clear commitment to our willingness to work with our European partners in the future, and I hope that they will demonstrate the same good will in return.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 5th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to highlight this increasing threat, which is why we have set out plans to spend £1.9 billion over a five-year period on making sure that our cyber-defence is right and that we develop the capabilities not just to defend against attacks but to be able to operationalise this ourselves.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

Britain’s forces are a major part of the enhanced forward presence in the Baltic states. At a recent meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, we heard of some of the malign attacks on those forces, particularly on the German deployment in Lithuania. I am not asking my right hon. Friend to give me any great detail, because that is necessarily secret, but can he assure the House that we are learning from every attack and that we are training people, down to quite a low level, to make sure that our forces are best equipped to deal with this?

[Gavin Williamson]

That is a very important point, because it is not just about the work that we do centrally; it is about training our forces to best understand the threats to which they will potentially be exposed as they operate in sometimes increasingly hostile fields. We have done that for all troops engaged in NATO operations, and more globally.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 23rd October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I have visited the Condor base, and I reassure the hon. Gentleman that, although we are looking hard at the future use of its airfield, the base itself will not be affected. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who has direct responsibility for basing matters, is happy to talk to him in more detail.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

Whether or not Britain is part of the European Union, bilateral defence co-operation with our allies is important at any time. Will the Secretary of State comment on progress on the Lancaster House agreement? That seems such a sensible arrangement to have with a country with similar defence forces and a similar world view.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 13th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

This is the year in which NATO is deploying its enhanced forward presence. I am proud that Britain is leading that deployment in Estonia. The first wave of our troops will leave for Estonia this week, and we will also be deploying in Poland and Romania. The best way to reassure our NATO allies and to deter any Russian aggression is for NATO to stand up.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

It was made clear to us in a recent meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly that NATO still has a lot of allies on the hill—on both sides of Congress. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we need to help them to continue to make their case by Europe stepping up to its commitment to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

Absolutely. We all made that commitment—the United States, ourselves and the rest of NATO—back at the Wales summit two and a half years ago. We meet the NATO spending target, and we continue to press our other allies to step up to the plate and do so, too.

Trident: Test Firing

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

We had this debate last July, when this House decided by an overwhelming majority to re-endorse the principle of the deterrent and to commit to our plan to build the four new Dreadnought submarines. I have made the Prime Minister’s position extremely clear. She has the responsibility for the nuclear deterrent and she is kept informed as to how that deterrent is maintained, including the successful return of HMS Vengeance to the operational cycle.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

Like many of my constituents, I live in the shadow of a nuclear weapons facility, and I want to be certain that these weapons, at every stage of their development, are tested to the utmost, even to the point of failure. Will my right hon. Friend confirm that those tests should be secret, and that their not being secret gives aid to only one group of people—that is, those who mean us harm?