Israel and Palestine

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Monday 8th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call Sir Alec Shelbrooke.

[Sir Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

There will not be a single person in the House today whose heart does not break for the death of innocent civilians, which is a consequence of any conflict. Are the Government having any discussions in the wider Arab region to get Hamas to move away from their stated aims of destroying Israel and to ensure that they disarm, which would allow a basis on which to bring this fighting to an end?

[Mr Mitchell]

May I offer my right hon. Friend my congratulations on his honour? He is right about the importance of ensuring that all pressure is put on Hamas to desist from these outrageous and horrendous proposals that make up part of its charter. The British Government, through a whole variety of different means, do everything we can to prosecute that case.

Israel and Hamas: Humanitarian Pause

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Monday 27th November 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Mitchell]

The hon. and learned Lady is right to talk about the deeply contentious issue of land, but what she says is, as I have understood it, absolutely in accordance with the policy of the British Government.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the pogrom that took place on 7 October, followed by the horrific levels of antisemitism that we have seen across our own country, let alone across the western world, with people feeling frightened to leave their homes for no other reason than their religion, shows why the state of Israel has a right to exist and must always be allowed to defend itself?

[Mr Mitchell]

My right hon. Friend is entirely correct. What happened on 7 October was a pogrom, and it was the worst loss of life by Jewish citizens on any single day since the holocaust and 1945.

NATO Summit: Vilnius

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Thursday 6th July 2023 Westminster Hall

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and NATO Summit 2023 in Vilnius.

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. I am very grateful for this debate, because it is important that the hard work that goes on across parties gets an airing in the House. To those watching our proceedings, I want to make the point that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is a genuine, cross-party Assembly where party politics never comes into the discussion. People seek pragmatism. As leader of the United Kingdom delegation, I have the support of the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who is the deputy leader. That will one day switch, because the Government have the leadership and the Opposition have the deputy leadership, but everybody works very closely together. I also say to those watching that it is a highly experienced delegation; it includes many former Defence Ministers, Ministers of State at the Foreign Office, Secretaries of State and, indeed, hon. and gallant Members, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Colne Valley (Jason McCartney). There is a wide spread and a lot of experience.

I should start by saying what the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is. It was established in 1955 to bring about political accountability. Above all, we are the political body of the allies. We have political discussions about how NATO should move forward, just as we have discussions about defence—most people would envisage NATO as a defence body. Overall, we contribute to several key areas of NATO policy. For instance, the Parliamentary Assembly made a large contribution to the NATO 2030 strategy, which was adopted in Madrid last year.

I chair the Defence and Security Committee, in which allied nations discuss particular defence areas. There is also the Political Committee, the Science and Technology Committee, and the Economics and Security Committee—all important Committees that look at different issues, go to various countries and deal with partner nations as well as allies. They help to form the global image of which NATO needs to be aware. From there, we can feed into and build to summits, such as that one that will take place next week.

As I said, the Parliamentary Assembly is a political body. The importance of soft power cannot be overestimated. The public will often see the high-level dealings of parliamentarians, leaders of countries and Ministers, and that is what gets reported. The leaders have civil servants with them, and everything is pre-arranged. The Assembly has, by its very nature, the advantage that we are all Back Benchers. Those Back Benchers come from all 31 allies and partner nations. That often allows us to build relationships and get into discussions about things that it may be more difficult to discuss at a higher level. For example, I have been in conversations, as have other members, about Sweden’s and Finland’s accession and Türkiye’s concerns. We were able to discuss with our colleagues from Türkiye where the concerns lay.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Does the right hon. Member agree that it was very important, post cold war, that the Assembly was able to bring in associate members from former eastern European countries, and build a political consensus in those countries to be part of the future accession to NATO?

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising that point. He illustrates the political nature of the Assembly, which helped guide those newly formed democracies, as they were starting to flourish and develop in the early days, to ensure that they did not fall off the path to freedom, democracy, free speech and the other things that we recognise as key planks of NATO membership.

We are able to have conversations in the background with colleagues from other ally nations, can feed those back to our Governments, cross-party, and help move discussions forward. It should be recognised that the Swedes made enormous strides in addressing Türkiye’s concerns. The soft power at play in the background at committees should not be underestimated.

I am sure that most Assembly colleagues would agree that the transatlantic relationship remains strong; there is strong support for NATO on Capitol Hill, but our Capitol Hill colleagues tell us that they have to constantly inform and make representations to new colleagues about the importance of NATO and what it does. It would therefore be wrong to say to America deals with that in a bubble. It is important that we show the importance of the relationship between north America and the Canadians, who I will speak more widely about later. This is truly still a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The strength of the partnership has served us well for 75 years, and that cannot be overestimated.

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

It is a privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. My right hon. Friend is making an extremely important point. Does he recognise that a live example is the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States, through which the Administration is pursuing an “America first” agenda? The challenges of that for allied nations can be pointed out to members of Congress and Senate in the United States, so that they better understand why a partnership on supply chains and investment programmes matters. They can then challenge the Administration, so that a better position can be developed, and so that when the Government seek to make trade deals, they do not undermine those efforts.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

At the transatlantic forum, which many of us with leadership positions take part in—it takes place in December, at Washington’s National Defence University—American politicians saw for the first time, at first hand, the anger that had built across many European nations about the knock-on effects that the policy might have, not least the gaps that it could lead to in defence procurement and the development of technology. All Governments will often pursue an economic policy that fits with their national agenda, and not necessarily see the impacts elsewhere. The forum is another good example of soft power, because conversations can take place and can be fed back.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The underlying reality is that the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States is recognition that they, and the rest of the west, had allowed their industrial capacity to be hollowed out and basically subverted, particularly by China, and they are rebuilding their industry. There might be discussions to be had, but should we not also recognise that industry is vital, not only for our economy but for our security? It is time for us to catch up.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I agree with much of what the right hon. Gentleman said. That is a very good example of the fact that the Assembly is not afraid of being critical of Government policy. It is not afraid to be critical of Governments of any colour. The committees have been in the building for a long time.

I was about to come to the reports produced. A report produced by Defence and Security Committee is about ensuring an industrial base for the manufacture of defence equipment and munitions. I do not think it is a state secret any more, particularly as it got leaked on the internet by somebody in America, that there is real concern about the ability to rearm. The right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar) touched on the fact that industry has not created a constant supply line. My committee recognised that we must have that constant supply line, and industry must have the confidence to invest; I suspect that the Economics and Security Committee recognised the same. That is a good example of the work that has been done, and fed to leaders in advance of discussions that they must have at the Vilnius summit.

As we are all aware, we are involved in a war. It is not a war with NATO, but allies are supporting Ukraine, and doing everything we can to let it stand up for freedom and democracy, and to let the Ukrainian people choose how they live their life and who runs them. It is an important fight; it is the fight of democracy against autocracy and dictatorship. It has, however, posed real challenges. The Assembly is not afraid to highlight those challenges and ensure they are fed into discussions.

Reports become the body of the work of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. One issue reported on was the rapid evolution of Baltic security after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It has led to another very important political point. Everybody recognises article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty, which says that an attack on one is an attack on all, but it has become apparent to many—this is being discussed in our Committees—that article 5 is not an emergency call. It is not a 999 call, or a 911 call, for those in America. It is about re-enforcement—the rapid reaction force, which takes three weeks to get there.

Article 3 says that a country must be able to defend itself first. That is why countries have moved forward with a forward defence presence; for example, there is the joint expeditionary force in the Baltic sea, and the 300,000 troops being lined up along the border, so that the tripwire is not tripped. That is a fundamental difference, because until the invasion of Crimea, NATO had shifted its perspective; it went from being a cold war defence organisation to being a political organisation. It was doing exceptionally important work, as the right hon. Member for North Durham pointed out, as countries from eastern Europe joined the path of democracy. After the invasion of Crimea, there was a switch to both roles being important. It is a tribute to NATO and its leadership that it was able to adapt to the change in geopolitical circumstances so quickly.

It is not just Members of the House of Commons who are members of the Assembly; five Members from the other place also make a great deal of effort. Lord Lancaster from the other place, who is on my Committee, had his report, “Troubled waters—how Russia’s war in Ukraine changes Black sea security”, published. Security in the Black sea region has changed immensely.

I will take this opportunity to thank our allies in Türkiye for their incredible work; sometimes they do not get the credit they deserve. They are looked at in different ways. They enforced the Montreux treaty, which has stopped huge amounts of Russian maritime capital equipment making its way into the Black sea and creating an issue. They negotiated the export of grain; they are constantly patrolling the Black sea to defuse sea mines that have become dislodged; and they are very much protecting that area. Indeed, there are a lot of NATO allies around the Black sea, and they are in a tough region, as we can see from looking at their geographical neighbours. It shows the strength of the NATO alliance that we have countries from so many different parts of the world carrying out very specific roles.

I turn to the work of the Defence and Security Committee. When I took on the chairmanship, I wanted to look at maritime security. The High North is coming ever more to the fore. We recently conducted a visit to Canada, which was very much based around its naval training, because Canada is surrounded by three oceans yet has not invested in its maritime capability in the way that we would. Its Halifax-class frigates are slightly different from ours, and are being refurbed at 30 years old; that is the same age as our Type 23s, which we are retiring, yet they are being refurbed to take another 20 years at sea. There are interesting comparisons to be draw in the alliance when it comes to procurement. We might consider what we are doing with the Royal Navy, and the modernisation and the technology that can be brought forward in the realm of the NATO maritime alliance.

Russia may not be able to control the oceans in the way that the Americans can, but it is exceptionally good in the arena that it operates in. That arena is increasingly becoming the High North, for them and for the Chinese, who are mapping the area, working out where they can push up and where they can exploit, and where the mineral resources lie. They are also investing heavily.

The Assembly has been able to identify and bring more to the fore the problems the Canadians face, not least permafrost. Permafrost is retreating in the High North, which is destroying military infrastructure, such as runways that have been relied on up to this time. NORAD—the North American Aerospace Defence Command—needs updating, and there are fuel supply depots that are not being used. We talk about the UK’s procurement struggles; we need to recognise that many allies have similar struggles. That again shows the strength of the alliance: we can come together to face what will become an ever-greater threat.

Russia has recognised that it needs to shift the ball, and there is an interesting conversation about the capability of its intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles and whether it would use them. We have the policy of counterbalance, but it now has developed the Poseidon torpedo, which could by all accounts make its way underwater for six days to the coast of North America, explode a mile offshore with a nuclear warhead and create a tsunami. That changes the counterbalance, which is why, again, this alliance is so important. It is also why it is so important that the UK renews Trident and the Dreadnought fleet, to make sure that counterbalance exists. That way, even if we do not know where the silos are, we know that there would be a response, and that would reduce the threat. If the Russians want to go down that road, let them, but they still have not got a free pass to do that, because we have the counterbalance.

More positively, NATO works on interoperability, and F-35s from the UK have been landing on Italian carriers. Such steps send out important messages to our foes—to the Russians, and to the Chinese in many ways—that NATO is not just a gathering of 31 countries with their own military equipment; it is building its interoperability. The interoperability offered by the F-35 marks a fundamental change in air support in the alliance.

I will conclude, to allow colleagues to contribute. As we approach the 75th anniversary of NATO, and talk here before the Vilnius summit, I think everyone in this Room would agree that NATO is more important than at any time. Only through these alliances and partnerships will we bring about the counterbalance needed to ensure that we can carry on living in freedom and democracy, which the people of Ukraine are fighting for with their life as we speak.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Sharma; what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship. I congratulate the right hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke) on securing the debate. May I also say a big thank you to the Members of both Houses who serve on the UK NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation? As the right hon. Gentleman said, I am the deputy leader of the delegation, and next year NATO will be 75 years of age. It was set up in the dark days after the second world war, with the inspiring leadership in the UK of individuals such as Ernie Bevin coming together to ensure that the horrors that faced us for two generations would never again be visited on Europe. Its fundamental aim was to protect the new rules-based order, democracy and the way of life that we have often come to take for granted.

In 1954, Dwight Eisenhower said:

“We do not keep security establishments merely to defend property or territory or rights abroad or at sea. We keep the security forces to defend a way of life.”

That is as relevant today as it was in 1954. The unprovoked Russian attack on the sovereign nation of Ukraine has brought that to stark attention. Some of the threats that we face are the same, with war sadly returning to the European mainland, but there are also new challenges that were not there 75 years ago, such as cyber, disinformation and new technological developments, which we need to keep ahead of to protect the way of life and democracy that the NATO nations strive to defend. Some people say that NATO is an aggressive alliance. It is not; it is a defensive alliance to protect the values that I have just outlined.

I have been a member of the Assembly since 2017. I am currently also a vice-president, and until recently chaired its Science and Technology Committee. I will attend the summit in Vilnius next week on behalf of the NATO Assembly in my position as one of its vice-presidents. What does NATO face today? Clearly, there is the current threat from Russia in Ukraine, and the defence of the democratic values that I outlined. We need to reiterate our support for Ukraine next week in terms of ensuring success in defeating the unwarranted invasion of a sovereign European nation, and we must focus, as the right hon. Gentleman said, on refreshing our own defence settlements, including the accession of new nations, and ensuring that we not only get security guarantees for Ukraine but have a pathway to it becoming part of NATO.

Next week will be difficult, as it always is, in terms of not only ensuring that we reiterate the arguments for why NATO is important, but, importantly, ensuring that its defence and deterrence capabilities are renewed, to deter those who wish to do us harm. I am very disappointed that we have not had the Command Paper from the UK Government prior to the NATO summit. It seems strange that we will make various commitments next week in Vilnius but will then have a Command Paper that, I am told, will be out towards the end of the month.

There are two aspects next week in Vilnius that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly agreed at its spring session in Luxembourg. The first is a united resolution to continue to support the people and Government of Ukraine, and to make sure that we have more integration between NATO, the EU and NATO partner nations on providing the political, military intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support for Ukraine to prevail and restore the territorial integrity it needs. It is also about how we up the ante and make sure that the military equipment the Ukrainians require is speedily delivered to them.

The other resolution that we passed and sent to the conference was about the Wagner Group—which has been in the headlines in the past few weeks—highlighting that that is a terrorist and criminal organisation. We also need to look at how we can get more integration, and not just in Europe, because the threats are now wider. How do we respond to China, for example?

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I notice that we have a Foreign Office Minister with us today. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the recalcitrance of the Foreign Office about proscribing the Wagner Group is disappointing?

[Mr Jones]

I do. The right hon. Gentleman and I went to the Foreign Office last year, and we know well the lack of interest there in the NATO PA, which is a marked contrast with every other nation represented there.

Another important resolution we have next week follows a commitment by Congressman Gerry Connolly when he was President of the NATO PA. It is about reinforcing the idea that NATO is there to protect democracy and the rules-based order. His suggestion, which was adopted last year, was that we should have a unit within NATO to make sure not only that we talk about democratic values and the rules-based order, but that we can promote them throughout our nations, similar to the way we did that during the cold war. That will be important.

For people who do not understand the Parliamentary Assembly, we have a direct say about what NATO does. I chaired the Science and Technology Committee for four years, and we have a very good relationship with the NATO chief scientist, Dr Bryan Wells, who has taken on board some issues and the reports we did on hypersonics and new technologies, and on ensuring that we can get some of the new technologies distributed across NATO. The Parliamentary Assembly is a valuable forum, because it makes the case for NATO, as well as bringing together parliamentarians from across NATO. As I said, post the cold war, when the Berlin wall came down, the PA was vital for building important relationships between parliamentarians from the former eastern European bloc, so that they could work on their accession strategy for NATO membership, and this was about underpinning the importance of democracy.

I look forward to taking part in the NATO summit in Vilnius next week and being, as we all are on the Parliamentary Assembly, the political and democratic voice of NATO. I think we need to argue more and more for why NATO is important, because it went into abeyance after the cold war. It has now been brought into sharp focus because of what has happened in Ukraine and it is in the public’s consciousness. NATO is not just a military alliance; it is underpinned by democracy. Having parliamentarians as part of that process is an important way of showing that it is a democratic organisation that not only has, at times, difficult discussions but promotes the rules-based order and democracy, against the alternatives of those who would not only do us harm but destroy the system that we have grown to love over the last 70 years.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. As we are dealing with defence matters, it is worth noting that your predecessor was the last serving member of the British Army to have served in this House.

I congratulate the leader of our delegation, the right hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke), on securing this debate. It has highlighted once again that, whereas in the popular mindset NATO is seen as a military alliance, it is fundamentally very much a political alliance, and was right at the beginning. It was created in response to political events.

When one reads Ernie Bevin’s justification for NATO, it is interesting to see that he stresses the extent to which they tried to secure political agreement with the Soviets for the management of Europe after the second world war, not just in Germany, Berlin or Austria, but across Europe. They were perpetually frustrated and eventually understood, particularly after all the political and military coups that took place across eastern Europe, that they needed collective security against the threat, and that they needed not only a military, but a political organisation. It is right that the Foreign Office leads the debate, because it leads in NATO. That, again, demonstrates the fundamentally political nature of the alliance. It is, of course, backed up by hard power and our nuclear deterrent, but it is underpinned by industrial and societal issues.

I have always taken an interest in manufacturing and defence industry matters—probably because of my previous incarnation as a national officer in a major industrial union—and, interestingly, that is now very much a mainstream debate inside the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and in the various capitals of NATO countries. There is a real role for Parliaments to get engaged, as hon. Members have mentioned. Countries will be looking at rebuilding their own industrial capacity but, even within the United States, there is recognition that no one country can do that alone.

Diversity of supply from secure and trusted suppliers is enormously important. That is true about fundamental materials—even this week, countries were finding China cutting off various materials to chip makers—but it runs right the way through. Sometimes, among the less well informed, the debate has focused on the high end, such as computer chips, but basic, fundamental industrial capacity in the form of foundries and drop forging is enormously important in maintaining capacity. The struggle in Ukraine has highlighted that importance.

There is a lot of catching up to do. Our Government are doing some of it but, to my mind, they are still being so slow. There is no point in criticising Joe Biden and the Administration in Washington for rebuilding their industrial capacity. We should work with them, and we should also work across Europe. There is a regrettable tendency within the EU bureaucracy to try to make this an exclusive EU function, more as a political operation than a defence and industrial one. It is hugely important that the UK, the EU, and the United States and Canada look at how we can best co-operate to ensure that we can supply our troops not only in normal times, but in times of crisis and emergency.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that this mindset has to be present across all Departments and all Governments at the top? There is a reason why we need warehouses full of billions of pounds’ worth of equipment, and it is not just, “Let’s get that off the accounting books.” What has been shown is just how vital it is.

[John Spellar]

I absolutely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. It is also about industrial capacity to replace that equipment. There are some real debates to be had about the associated costs and capacity, but that is much better done with proper understanding of specialisations. That should also involve our friends in Australia through the AUKUS agreement, which will be important for the UK and the role we can play with our European colleagues.

There is also the battle for hearts and minds inside Europe, which goes right the way back to the founding of NATO. Sometimes there is a misplaced focus on technology. People talk about being able to use Facebook and various parts of social media. Those skills are important, but, as Rupert Murdoch said about the entertainment industry, in the end, content is king. That is the important thing. That is where we very much need to sharpen our act, or rather recreate the capacities that we used to have. After all, in the second world war we had the Political Warfare Executive, which was probably one of the most outstanding information and disinformation operations. We seem to have moved backwards from that.

We are up against an opponent for whom politics is everything. In both Russia and China, Lenin still rules OK. Politics absolutely dominates the scene. That is where the NATO PA comes in, because we are able to bring the democratic arguments. Congressman Gerry Connolly’s work on putting the defence and advancement of democracy right at the heart of NATO was rightly referenced, but we also have to develop those capacities.

Both the EU and NATO have done some work on disinformation, but we have to up our game. We have to rediscover that. We have to create the mechanisms in Government that can co-operate with other countries in NATO, and with representatives in the NATO PA, in order to take the fight to authoritarians or their fellow travellers across the world, not to prevent the battle of machines but to win the battle of the hearts and minds. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has a crucial role to play in that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have taken part in the debate. I am extremely grateful that we were able to show the work of the NATO PA. Anybody who is observing our proceedings can see all the reports on NATO-PA.int, because we are a completely open body with open source material. The reports that we produce go on to form important lessons. It is important that the public recognise the work that goes on constantly at a political level to support and defend democracy and freedom.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and NATO Summit 2023 in Vilnius.

Integrated Review Refresh

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Monday 13th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

I will tell the hon. Gentleman why there is always money for the foundation stone of the Euro-Atlantic defence posture; it is because it is the foundation stone of the Euro-Atlantic defence posture. When he starts to talk about expenditure on the armed forces, my heart goes out to those brave men and women in our British armed forces stationed in Scotland, who pay more tax than any other members of the armed forces in the country.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

I very much welcome the review that my right hon. Friend has announced today. He spoke about the relevance of the critical minerals strategy. May I highlight something for him to take back to other Departments that work alongside his? We all recognise the lessons to be learned from our reliance on Russian minerals, and how we have had to change that, but 95% of the elements used in renewable energy—solar panels or whatever—are processed in China. We cannot escape the science, but we can ask other Departments to diversify how we do renewables. Will my right hon. Friend take back to other Departments the message that we need to look at investing in and working on things like hydrogen combustion, so that we are not entirely reliant on minerals coming out of China?

[James Cleverly]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Russia’s use of energy supplies is a tool of coercion—that is something that we have witnessed. We must ensure that we do two things. First, we must wean ourselves off our global addiction to hydrocarbon energy, for the reasons that we have seen. Secondly, we must ensure that, in doing so, we do not inadvertently create a dependency on any one other country, particularly China. Our critical minerals strategy will bear that in mind. It is clear from conversations I have had—for example with leaders of the countries in Africa from which these minerals are mined and shipped to China for processing—that it would be better for them, for us and for the world if more of that processing were done on the continent of extraction rather than on the other side of the world.

Russia’s Grand Strategy

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of Russia’s grand strategy.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate again, because I secured a debate last year about the same topic. Then, I outlined Putin’s global policy and I set out how Russia was threatening Ukraine as part of a campaign of blackmail and hybrid warfare directed at the Americans and NATO. I explained how Russia’s grand strategy was being conducted across the whole spectrum of foreign, defence, security and domestic policy. I discussed Russia’s warlike strategic headquarters at its national defence management centre at the old Russian army staff HQ on the Moskva river. Today, I make the same fundamental point as I made last year: Russia has a grand strategy, but we do not.

The idea of global Britain demands a global strategy, which means grand strategy and must be a whole-of-Government enterprise. It is fair to ask, “If Russia has an effective grand strategy, why has it not done better in Ukraine?”, because when the war started, all the assessments predicted that the Russian army would be much more successful. The answer is simple: Putin’s decision bypassed the usual strategy process and went against the views of his general staff.

This is about the difference between policy and strategy. Policy is the aim—the political objective—and strategy is the interactive process by which that policy objective might be achieved. Putin was driven by his obsession to subjugate Ukraine. He overrode the general staff’s strategy process and disregarded the limitations of the army. It could be considered odd that he did that, but he had used lethal force before with great success. In Georgia and Crimea, surprise and speed brought him a quick victory, although on those occasions the general staff were behind him; in Ukraine, they advised him against going to war.

Of course, Putin is not the first to override his general staff in pursuit of an obsessive policy; the same was Hitler’s undoing. It seemed, until a week ago, that it might also be Putin’s, but he has learned from his mistake and has rediscovered strategy. Last week’s appointment of the chief of the general staff Gerasimov as the overall commander brings the general staff back into the planning and command chain. Other commanders, warlords and private military companies will be brought under his authority. As Gerasimov gets a grip of things, I am afraid that we must expect to see Russian performance in Ukraine improve considerably.

Russia is not giving up, so Ukraine’s survival will now depend on western military and economic help being delivered a lot more rapidly and in far greater quantities than it has been so far. Unfortunately, the approach of the UK’s current foreign and defence integrated review refresh process is underpinned by an explicit but premature assumption that Russia will lose in Ukraine and will then prioritise investment in maritime, particularly sub-surface, as well as space, cyber and special forces. It argues that Russia will not invest meaningfully in land forces, but our eastern European and Nordic colleagues do not share that view.

The integrated review refresh risks over-optimism that would allow us to tilt our posture and capabilities away from the most immediate threat in Europe and, instead, towards long-term gambles on technological superiority and a focus on the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS and the tilt to the Indo-Pacific are certainly policies, but they are not backed up by any strategy process to determine if they can be achieved with the limited ways and means that we have available.

The policies of global Britain and AUKUS are admirable and, conveniently, cheaper, but they are not enough on their own. Painful though it is, we need much stronger land power as well. We must still gear up to defend the UK and to deter a war in Europe against a peer enemy. Of course, Russia will invest in sub-surface, space and cyber, but it shows no sign of dispensing with large-scale ground forces, heavy armour and artillery. If anything, the Ukraine war has convinced the general staff of the need to reinvest in their army.

The Nordics and the Poles know that Russia is a land animal. Strategic missile submarines excepted, Russia sees its navy as flank protection for a land war and its air force as the third dimension of that land war. Despite evident lack of progress and perceived weaknesses, Putin shows no signs of intending to stop, of scaling down his demands, of looking for a way out or of making serious proposals for peace. In fact, Ukraine is expecting a new all-out assault in the spring or even sooner.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

In the debate last year, I made the point that I felt that we were already in a cold war, which some disagreed with. Does my hon. Friend think that our European allies have changed their position on that or is there still a resistance to accepting that a new cold war is well and truly under way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I think that we are in denial of not just a cold war, but a hot war. The hot war that is being conducted in Ukraine is laced with rhetoric and invective about NATO being the threat and about the United States of America provoking that threat, so NATO and the United States must somehow be defeated in this war. If we do not understand that Putin is now conducting a hybrid and political war against Europe and NATO, backed by a hot war in Ukraine, we are not yet living in the real world.

If the process of reinvigorating Russia’s armed forces and preparing for a further assault on Ukraine is not derailed and Putin is successful, by 2024, the west will face a more formidable Russia that believes that it can establish its place in a future world order by force of arms. This is a long-term strategic challenge that requires a long-term strategic response from the UK Government, all European Governments and NATO.

Putin’s strategy depends on time. We all admire Ukraine’s bravery and agility, which have left the Russian army in something of a quagmire, but it would be an epic tragedy if we now allowed Russia the time to mass its forces, so that its brutal war of attrition could become overwhelming. It is crucial for the west to increase the tempo of its supply of weapons systems to Ukraine, so that Ukraine, rather than Russia, can be first to develop the mobile formations necessary to break the current battlefield deadlock. The reality is that Russia’s whole grand strategy is on a knife edge and the next few months could be crucial.

We should not be deterred by Putin’s so-called red lines. In war and crisis, red lines are political and flexible. We proved that when Russia’s build-up to the invasion last year crossed several NATO red lines, and we did nothing. Likewise, Putin’s incorporation of Donbas into the Russian Federation was intended to set up a red line of Russian territory being attacked, but when Ukraine attacked, it turned out there was no red line.

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[Sir Chris Bryant]

Yes. I do not do this very often but I was saying “Hear, hear” earlier in agreement with a point the right hon. Gentleman made. I am reluctant to be too down on the Germans, however, for the simple reason that they have had to make a very dramatic and sudden about-turn in their whole understanding of their defence policy, but they do have to get over this hurdle. Many other countries in Europe want them to and are eagerly pressing them to, and the time is long past for them to do so. Perhaps we need a European security treaty to deal with some of these issues and get that materiel to where it is most needed and in a way that it can be readily used.

I want to talk about something slightly different: how we can help Ukraine rebuild. So far, along with many other countries in Europe, we have frozen but not seized assets. On 9 September 2022 a joint statement by the World Bank, the European Commission and the Government of Ukraine estimated that the current cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine was $349 billion. That is now a four-month-old estimate and the sum will grow exponentially as the war continues. We have all seen the pictures of what has happened in Dnipro; we know of the railways, roads and bridges that will have to be reconstructed, let alone the schools, the housing and the rest. Ukraine is going to need a very substantial amount of money.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly was in Washington in the first week of December, and at that time 42% of residential properties in the whole of Ukraine—not just on the frontline—were uninhabitable. That serves to put some flesh on the hon. Gentleman’s point.

[Sir Chris Bryant]

That is very helpful and when the Foreign Affairs Committee was in Ukraine last February, just before the second round of the invasion, we were visiting villages which were being reconstructed, and we were wondering whether that was a wise policy, but of course people need homes. So there is a very significant need: Ukraine estimates Russia has caused $1 trillion-worth of damage since the start of the full-scale invasion last February and that is not allowing for the costs in Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Under international law Russia will owe Ukraine reparations at the end of this war—I hope the Minister will be able to confirm that—as was recognised by a United Nations General Assembly resolution passed on 14 November. About $350 billion-worth of Russian central bank reserves have been frozen by democratic countries around the world, and £26 billion of that is frozen in the United Kingdom. Those figures come from the central bank annual report. Based on the estimates of the World Bank, the European Commission and the Government of Ukraine, the amount that will be owed to Ukraine by Russia as reparations at the end of the war—we could argue it is already owed now—is likely to be several times greater than the central bank reserves theoretically belonging to the Russian state presently frozen worldwide. So it is safe to assume that the central bank reserves we have frozen in the UK are already owed to Ukraine under international law. I would argue that it is a question of when, not if, they will be spent on and in Ukraine. On 30 November 2022 the European Commission President confirmed plans to use €300 billion of frozen Russian central bank reserves as well as more than €19 billion of Russian oligarchs’ funds for the reconstruction of Ukraine, and I applaud that decision.

The UK has so far provided £3.8 billion in aid to Ukraine in the first eight months since the second invasion, but the central bank reserves we are holding in the UK are six times that amount. It is time that the UK Government passed legislation to repurpose frozen Russian state assets so they can be used to aid Ukraine during and after the war; if the Government do not do that, perhaps some Back-Bench MP will bring forward a ten-minute rule Bill on 7 February to do it.

On the whole I do not like Governments seizing other people’s assets; on the whole it is a bad idea, but there are situations in which we choose to do it, such as when the assets are clearly unexplained wealth that has almost certainly come from corruption. In essence, the UK can find money from three places to support Ukraine. It can come from taxpayers, but taxpayers have funded £3.8 billion already so there is not much spare cash in the bank so far as I can see. Secondly, it can come from frozen oligarch funds. There is a difficulty with that as those are the assets of private individuals and seizing them is likely to be a costly and drawn-out process. The legislation necessary to seize such private assets would necessarily involve a court supervision—because we believe in the rule of law—in order to protect the oligarchs’ rights to their property under the European convention on human rights, or for that matter under normal British law. I am sure these cases will also be defended by some of the richest, most legally savvy and deep-pocketed people on the planet, and the resources available to the Government agencies tasked with confiscating those assets would inevitably be very modest. So I think both those routes are pretty much exhausted at present.

On the other hand, seizing state assets of the Russian Federation will be quick. It is a political decision and there will be no lengthy lawsuits. Unlike oligarch assets, these are state assets, specifically the £26 billion of central bank reserves clearly belonging to Russia, a nation deemed an aggressor by the United Nations, that has been ordered by the UN General Assembly and separately by the International Court of Justice to withdraw its troops from Ukraine, and which has failed to do so and continues its aggression against Ukraine. These funds could be made immediately available to Ukraine should we adopt the legislation to do so. Canada already has similar legislation in place.

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[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) on once again bringing this important debate to the House. I also congratulate all the Members who are attending it, many of whom were here for the previous debate a year ago.

“Russia’s grand strategy” is an interesting title, which leads to the question of what constitutes the counter-strategy. As was said a year ago and as has been said by several Members today, where the current actions have come from has been laid out along the line by Putin, whose actions are pretty clear. If you are a citizen of Lithuania, probably Belarus, east Poland or the Caucasus, you will notice that you are mentioned in Putin’s essay of 20 July, and you will certainly not sleep easily if you think that we will step back and let Russia win the battle in Ukraine.

I have a concern that many have touched on which is that a certain amount of hubris is starting to develop among western nations when they say, “We will win in Ukraine.” I very much hope that that is true, and we are doing everything we can to do so, but it does not seem to take into account the way in which Russia is now regrouping, restrategising and re-energising, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex said in his opening speech. We have to take a strong look at how we are going to supply Ukraine and how it is to move forward.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) has already made the point about Leopard tanks. European defence as a whole needs to take a long, hard look at itself. There can be no excuse for countries to say, “We will supply the tanks that are needed, but we need Germany to approve it” and for Germany to say, “Well, it’s up to the US.” It really is not up to the US. It is really up to nations within Europe. What concerns me, and Putin will be well aware of this when we are looking at the grand strategy, is that he will see that article 42 of the Lisbon treaty—the permanent structured co-operation, or PESCO, commitment—and where that leads to could spell a real problem for NATO.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I reflect on the irony that one of the reasons why some of us wanted to leave the European Union was that it was insisting on having its own defence policy and armed forces, ostensibly in order to be independent of the United States, because of course it is NATO that guarantees peace in Europe and the EU would be incapable of doing so on its own. So it is a bit of an irony that Germany is now saying that it cannot send tanks to Ukraine until the US approves. It rather gives the lie to the idea that the EU is capable of even thinking independently of American defence policy.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. I do not seek to raise an EU Brexit issue here. I want to highlight where I think there is a real concern about the future of NATO, what Putin will be looking at and why it is so important that we do not allow Russia to be victorious.

The hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Richard Foord) made a good speech, and I congratulate him on researching the speeches that we all made last year in this debate. It is important to know the context. He said that the Budapest memorandum was not worth the paper it was written on. That is an important statement to make because with Putin, nothing is worth the paper it is written on. When people talk about moving towards a negotiated settlement, what does that actually mean? If we get commitments on paper from Putin, it is frankly a waste of everybody’s time. The only way this conflict will be resolved is by winning it militarily.

[Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that reaching a negotiating settlement with Putin risks his doing exactly what he did last time? He negotiated a settlement and that just gave him time to regroup and come back stronger with yet more violence.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I totally agree. I think a negotiated settlement is a form of appeasement because I just do not believe that it will work in the long run. I genuinely believe that if we say, “OK, however it may be; we will look over that section of it”, it will just give him time to regroup and rearm and decide what he is going to do next.

The war that is now taking place represents a huge threat to the European nations because, some would say, of the ambitions and ideology of article 42—PESCO— “What is wrong with that?” It says that you would procure as a whole; that there would not be replication of procurement, with countries buying the same equipment rather than focusing on where it will go.

When I talk to our American allies at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, they certainly think developing the European defence fund is a good thing that will up spending to 2%. As we are seeing now, one of the biggest risks to NATO in its history as a military alliance is that a country such as Germany—the only country that has the equipment, or that can manufacture the equipment, needed for an operation—is able to say, “Sorry, no,” or, “We are not going to do it.”

Article 42 exists and PESCO has been established, so NATO needs to work out its protocols before these issues become prevalent in a procurement generation or two—in 20 or 30 years’ time. It has to be addressed now because, fundamentally, it is Russia and Putin’s strategy to probe the strength of western military capability.

I am very worried about Germany’s attitude of waiting to see what the US does, because it is not President Biden’s core instinct to make such decisions. When he was Vice-President, he and Obama had a big falling out over the surge in Iraq. And when he was a Senator, he wanted less American intervention. Intervention is not his natural instinct. I praise the Americans for the amount of money President Biden is signing off, but a situation is developing in which other European countries are hiding behind a delaying tactic, and that delay is a problem because Putin needs time to rebuild and restrengthen.

As the hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant) rightly said, the rebuilding cost is getting bigger and bigger, probably exponentially. I have cited some of the statistics, and the cost directly reflects on our citizens. He said taxpayers have already paid about £3.2 billion, but the cost is much greater in the price inflation we have seen for energy, fertilisers, food and crops. We all know the reasons, and it will not be resolved while this continues.

Upping military capability and spending in this country, and in Europe, is vital because it will improve our taxpayers’ long-term cost of living. Drawing on my experience as a procurement Minister, industry needs a far longer commitment to armament manufacturing than the sporadic increases and decreases we have seen. Industry cannot make the commitment needed to manufacture armour, weaponry and other capital equipment on a continuing basis if it is not sure how long the contract will last. That is straightforward business sense, and it is why we have to make a long-term funding commitment, and we need to encourage Europe to do so, too.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

I agree with everything the right hon. Gentleman is saying. Unfortunately I missed last year’s debate, but this is an honest, simple question. Back in 2017-18, when I was new to this place, were we having debates about the request from Ukraine to help it arm itself? I do not know that we were. If we were not, why not?

[Alec Shelbrooke]

We were having those debates, not least in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. There was a Rose-Roth seminar of the Parliamentary Assembly in Kyiv in June 2016. The Ukrainians could not have been clearer to the allies who were there about what the invasion of Crimea meant, and it was brushed aside because there were too many vested interests in the way energy policy was going at the time and, quite frankly, because there was disbelief that anything like this would happen.

[Sir Chris Bryant]

As I understand it, when Foreign Office officials made that point to the then Foreign Secretary, who subsequently became Prime Minister, he pooh-poohed the idea of arming Ukraine.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

We can find examples from across Government over that period of time. When the invasion happened just under a year ago, many conversations took place, and still take place to this day, along the lines of, “Well, Putin is terminally ill.” “Look at Putin’s face, he has a terminal disease.” “This is the act of a dying man.” People were trying to make excuses for him to understand why he did it. They should just accept that the man is a fascist dictator who is trying to expand the Russian empire. There is the answer; it is as simple as that. But still our natural instinct says that this is so far beyond what anybody would expect that there must be another reason behind it.

The hon. Member for Rhondda is correct that people, whoever they were—in this case, it was the then Foreign Secretary—simply did not believe that this would happen. That was true among many of our European allies, but given what we now know, we must be aware that it will go beyond Ukraine. There is no point in saying that Putin would not dare to move into NATO territory. If he wins in Ukraine, then, yes, he will. It is not just Putin, but the Russian set-up—the Russian leadership. There are people beneath Putin who will carry on this war if he were to go. This involves not just one person, but a regime.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for setting the scene. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant) clearly warned this House on many occasions about the situation in Crimea, but hesitation led the day on that occasion. With this debate on Russia’s grand strategy perhaps what we are really looking at is where we are today and the strength that we have through NATO and the US all standing together. That is the positive attitude that we want to send out from this debate, so that Russia understands that, today, we will not take any more and that this is the line in the sand. Clearly, Ukraine’s battles are our battles as well.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but the point that I make is this: Putin will observe this situation today with Germany and the tanks and he will also observe the European direction in defence policy. He will then start to think, “Well, how much will they push back?” The allies will sit there and say, “He won’t dare to invade NATO territory.” But it was only a year ago when I thought that he would not invade Ukraine. I can stand here and say that; I just did not think that he would. I thought that he was probing to see how the west would react. I thought that he was seeing what our reaction would be, but that his attention was on another part. I think at the time I was saying Azerbaijan, Armenia—mineral-rich areas. I think he thought that if we did not react to Ukraine, we certainly would not react in the Caspian sea. I just did not believe that he would do this in Ukraine. Why did I not believe it? It was because, rather than looking at what was staring me right in the face, I decided not to believe it.

We must accept right now that we need to enter into solid, long-term contracts. We need to do that with support from all parts of the House. Her Majesty’s Opposition must be in lockstep with the Government in our support for Ukraine and in recognising European defence policy. The Opposition have moved on from where they were a few years ago. There is no question about NATO support now, which should be welcomed across the House. It is very important that this country, this Government and this House have the same views. Therefore, there should be no reason not to invest.

I shall be drawing my remarks to a close soon, but let me just say this before I do. We know that it is important that we do everything that we can, but let me explain why. When I was Minister for defence procurement, I went to North Yorkshire and met the troops and the Ukrainians being trained by our armed forces. I was lucky to be there on day one when a batch of people came in. They all came from different aspects—one was 65 and one 18—but what did every single one of them have in common? They all said, “I am not losing my country.” That strength of feeling for a country is worth a huge amount, but it still needs to be backed up with equipment.

Russia’s strategy is clear: it will carry on expanding beyond Ukraine. It will take no notice of any treaty that is put in place. Only military capability will stop it. Europe must know that this is not the end, and it must ensure it is moving in lockstep on manufacturing and recognising—as I said a year ago, and I was pooh-poohed—that the cold war has started. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex said, we are also in a hot war, but there is a cold war along an entire border, and that costs.

As I said last year, we must get back to spending the sums we spent at the end of the cold war, when we were spending 5% of GDP on defence. How we do that is a matter for different budgets and different questions, but the reality is that we will have to, and we will have to bring other countries along. If we are to defeat the Russian grand strategy, we need a Europe-wide strategy, and that starts with ensuring that we have the commitments in place for funding, for the military and for the equipment that others need, as well as for our own defence.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

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[Dave Doogan]

Is that it? I thought it was going to be a hard one. As he and I agree, nuclear weapons are an appalling weapons system that we hope will never be used. They are a deeply troublesome weapons system, but they do exist. In so far as they do, I am not certain that the 150-odd warheads—sorry, weapons packages—that the United Kingdom will invest in will make much difference to the polar threat of nuclear armageddon that is presented by the 3,000 warheads that Russia has and the 5,000 warheads that the United States has. These are the polar dimensions. The United Kingdom spending billions and billions of pounds in the middle is not going to change anything.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

NATO Accession: Sweden and Finland

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Vicky Ford]

While I support the hon. Gentleman’s sharing our joint approach to accession by Sweden and Finland and his approval of the fast-track process we are laying in exceptional circumstances, I do not treat our national security as a joking matter, and it is not the time to be cracking jokes when we are talking about our national security. I am very pleased that the Scottish nationalists have just said that they support NATO, although how they can say that they support our national security when they do not support our nuclear deterrent is deeply questionable.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

Of course this is a hugely welcome announcement and one of the more significant moments in the history of the NATO alliance, not least because Sweden and Finland bring a huge military contribution to the alliance, so this cannot in any way be seen as a one-way street. Does my hon. Friend agree that, as important as it is to talk about hardware—Finland and Sweden are able to supply several icebreakers, with climate change and the high north’s opening up—cyber-defence is one of the biggest issues? It is very difficult to identify where cyber-attacks come from. It would probably be quite easy to make one appear to come from this place, and who would we retaliate against? Does she agree that the offer that Finland and Sweden can make to the NATO alliance is vital, but also that the position and power we have in this country to help to stop cyber-attacks and defend those nations is equally important in this long-lasting, world-beating defence alliance?

[Vicky Ford]

I know my right hon. Friend makes an important contribution in the discussions he often has with NATO colleagues. He rightly points to one of the many reasons why it is so important that Finland and Sweden should be enabled to accede to NATO as quickly as possible. That is why the UK is going to push a faster approval process than is normal, and why we encourage our NATO allies to also ratify as quickly as possible.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The UK should be rightly proud of the support that we gave to the Ukrainian armed forces over a number of years through Operation Orbital and through the early deployment of NLAWs, or next generation light anti-tank weapons—the anti-tank missile systems that have proven so effective—and we will continue to provide support to the Ukrainians in their self-defence. The Secretary-General of NATO has made it very clear that it would be wrong for NATO to engage directly in the conflict with Russia that is the inevitable by-product of a no-fly zone. Putin is desperately trying to paint this as western aggression against Russia. We must not do anything that will allow him to perpetrate that perverse distortion of reality.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

Is my right hon. Friend having conversations about contingency plans for what will happen if, God forbid, Russian forces start to deliberately attack nuclear facilities near the western borders? Those plans would need to lead to a mass movement of the refugees already in that area. Would he also agree that that would pretty much constitute an attack on NATO allies?

[James Cleverly]

We take attacks, or the threat of attacks, against nuclear facilities very seriously. Nuclear safeguarding remains a priority for this Government. I will not be drawn on the conditions of what might be defined as an attack on NATO, but nevertheless we have made it absolutely clear that NATO is a defensive organisation. It has never expanded by force or coercion. Our support to the Ukrainians is steadfast, but there is a clear dividing line between an attack on one of our good friends—Ukraine—and an attack on a NATO member state.

Sanctions

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Monday 28th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

Like the right hon. Lady, I welcome BP’s divestment. We are working closely with the overseas territories to make sure that Putin’s oligarchs have nowhere to hide.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the sanctions regime must stay in place until every inch of Ukrainian territory is back in Ukraine’s control, including Crimea?

[Elizabeth Truss]

Yes, I completely agree with my right hon. Friend.

Russia: Sanctions

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

As I said, I am not going to talk about the individuals or entities that could be targeted, but it will be anyone who is of strategic or economic interest to the Russian state. The hon. Gentleman can imagine that that is quite a broad list of people and entities.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend will know well that Kyiv was the original capital of Rus, and was an area of fabulous wealth and education until invaded by the Khans. The Russians and the Rus called them the Tatars. Many reports have come out that tens of thousands of Tatars have disappeared from Crimea. That human rights atrocity cannot be properly investigated. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we must try to find out exactly what has been happening to the Tatar population?

Equally, for those who do not feel it is important or that we should somehow let Russia have the Russian empire, as President Putin outlined in his essay last year, that goes against every principle of freedom and democracy of standing up to fascist Governments who want to ethnically cleanse people over centuries of hatred.

[Elizabeth Truss]

My right. Friend is completely right. Let us remember that Russia signed up to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the 1994 Budapest agreement. It signed up to that, and what it is seeking to do is renege on its commitments, stoke aggression and seek to undermine Ukrainian democracy in a variety of ways, whether by false flag operations or cyber-attacks or by trying to install puppet regimes in Kyiv.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alec Shelbrooke Excerpts

Tuesday 25th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the undermining that Russia is seeking to do of European democracy, including Ukraine, and Russia’s activities through Belarus and its activities in the Balkans. That is why we have appointed Sir Stuart Peach as our envoy to the Balkans and why I hosted a meeting of all the Balkans Ministers to discuss this issue. We need all our allies to step up. The UK is providing defensive weapons to Ukraine, we are supporting Ukraine economically and we are helping to train its armed forces. We need all our allies to get behind that, because ultimately, we do not want to see a Russian incursion into Ukraine, which would lead to huge loss of life and a huge quagmire, and we need to make Russia absolutely clear about that.

[Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)]

To build on my right hon. Friend’s answer, what assessment has her Department made of Russia’s other surrounding nations and their territorial and sovereign integrity? I am thinking especially of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Are the actions going on in Ukraine being assessed in respect of whether the west would take any intervention on Russian invasion in those areas?

[Elizabeth Truss]

My right hon. Friend makes a very good point. We are working with allies and partners across the world because this is a threat not just to Europe, but to broader global stability. I was at a meeting of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in November where many of those countries were represented, and I saw very strong statements against further Russian action in the region.