Railways Bill (Seventh sitting)

Baggy Shanker Excerpts

Thursday 29th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

Just in my own region of east Anglia, Greater Anglia’s franchise renewal bid rested on a complete renewal of all rolling stock. The franchise turnover every seven or eight years—let us call it every 10 years—gave an opportunity for bids to come in that said, “We are not just carrying on with the status quo; we’re not just shaving off a bit here and adding a little bit there; this is our bold renewal programme.” That is what Greater Anglia did, and it really has transformed the passenger experience in the east of England.

[Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. I think this is an opportune moment to ask a question, as a Derby MP with Alstom in my constituency— the only place in the UK now where a train can be designed, engineered, manufactured and tested. Under the previous Government, Alstom had to make thousands of redundancies because there was just no certainty about work and there were delays on various projects. Can the hon. Member explain why the previous Government did not take any steps to come up with a rolling stock strategy?

[Jerome Mayhew]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, and for standing up for the jobs in his constituency, which is something we all need to do. I cannot speak for the actions of the Government before I was even elected as a Back-Bench MP, but we are certainly looking to improve. I would be the first person to say that the status quo ante was capable of improvement. Privatisation did bring many benefits to the railways, particularly in encouraging innovation and focus on the customer, leading to the increase in passenger numbers, which I have already spoken about in previous sittings, but was it perfect? Of course not.

As has been trailed by the Government, this is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to redesign and improve our approach to the railways, and I think that taking a long-term approach to rolling stock investment and creating this framework would be taking advantage of that opportunity to try to improve predictability for the supply sector—for Alstom, but also for Siemens and other manufacturers as well.

New clause 36 would require GBR to publish and keep under annual review a 15-year rolling stock investment framework that sets out future needs for new and existing trains. That includes—this is important—not just the replacement of trains but refurbishment, digital upgrades, decarbonisation and accessibility improvements. It would establish how private investors could finance rolling stock and related upgrades, promote energy-efficient technologies such as battery, hydrogen and hybrid traction, and set expectations for competitive, innovative and, importantly, predictable procurement. The framework must align with GBR’s business plan and control period funding, which are two very sensible requirements, and it must also provide transparency on procurement volumes and timelines, explain changes to plans and show how private investment will be used to reduce whole-life costs, improve train quality and support jobs in the UK rail supply chain.

The Government have thrown the sector into a period of uncertainty—that is inevitable with large-scale redesigns like the ones we are going through at the moment. My concern is that the way in which they have chosen to do this, through a process of drifting nationalisation before knowing the details of its replacement, has exacerbated that uncertainty and extended it over a prolonged period. As the hon. Member for Derby South has already noted, we are already seeing that uncertainty in the supply chain and the manufacturing base.

There is uncertainty—that is the problem. This is a shell Bill; it does not have the answers, and it does not give any confidence to industry that things will be better in the future. It relies on a whole raft of provisions in the 19 documents to which we have referred to time and again, but they do not exist. We do not know whether things will get better or worse, and neither does the industry. There is no supporting documentation on how GBR will function in practice. I am not sure the Government even know that yet, and they really ought to have done better than this. New clause 36 would point them in the right direction, and I certainly look forward to pressing it to a Division, should the opportunity arise.

New clause 37 would increase accountability by setting out a reporting and accountability framework for Great British Railways. The new clause states:

“Great British Railways must publish a business plan each year”,

which we have already considered, and it dictates:

“The business plan…must include…a summary of activities that Great British Railways intends to undertake during the following year”

and

“how these activities will support the delivery of the Rail Strategy”.

At the end of the year, GBR would be required to produce a second report setting out its progress against the business plan objectives, the first of which is passenger experience—we all know the Government substantially ignore passenger experience at the moment, apart from reliability in short trains, and have just brushed the other aspects under the carpet. The other objectives include

“freight growth…accessibility…passenger growth”,

which is also ignored by the Government in the Bill as drafted,

“integration with housing and local transport”

and

“the long-term infrastructure and service improvement.”

The ORR must assess GBR’s performance against the key performance indicators set out in new clause 2, which we have already debated but not yet voted on. If the ORR finds any material underperformance, it must give notice to the Secretary of State, who must publish a written response. This general approach is very business focused; it simply asks that GBR sets out what it is planning to do at the start of the year, and then having worked through the year, there is a process for GBR to mark its homework at the end of the year. Has GBR done what it said it would do? If it has not, the spotlight is on. It is also being assessed by the ORR, which retains its role as an independent expert adjudicator that is trusted by all parts of the rail sector.

Perhaps the best thing is that, in response to that, GBR must also set out what it will do to rectify any underperformance, and it must lay a report before Parliament and make a statement. The new clause would add critical levels of parliamentary and public scrutiny to GBR, allowing both to hold this new organisation to account, which we believe is paramount when such vast amounts of taxpayers’ money will be used. The current Bill is woefully short on accountability. It lacks strong incentives to encourage GBR to perform, to be held to account and to answer for its actions—or lack of action.

This all feels a little too comfortable. We have a nationalised industry reporting to officials from the Department for Transport, and it is not focusing on the experience of customers and passengers, passenger growth or all the other imperatives of rail in the future. The Minister will of course tell us that none of that is necessary. However, with the greatest respect, direct experience of running a business tells us that we need to design in strong incentives—this is crucial; it is not primarily a political point but a trying to improve this Bill point—so that GBR is inclined to focus on the right objectives, without having to respond to external direction. These new clauses would help to point GBR in the right direction. I look forward to the Minister’s support.