Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent
Main Page: Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent's debates with the Department for Work and Pensions
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberThat the Bill be now read a second time.
My Lords, I am proud to bring this Bill to your Lordships’ House with my noble friend Lady Sherlock. I am grateful for the engagement that we have had with noble Lords on the Bill so far and look forward to working with your Lordships as the Bill progresses. I also look forward to hearing the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman, which I am sure will be excellent—good luck!
There have always been people who commit fraud. Sadly, this is not a new problem, but over the past decade fraudsters have become increasingly sophisticated in the techniques that they use to steal people’s money, using data, technology and a variety of scams. Banks and similar entities have transformed their ability to spot and stop fraud and to protect their customers’ money. They have invested in new technology and changed processes, but this Government believe that the public sector has not proactively followed their lead. In 2023-24, fraud and error against the public sector reached an astonishing £55 billion. That includes: fraud against our public services, including those who abuse the tax system; fraud by dishonest companies that use deception to win public contracts; and benefit fraud by criminal gangs and individuals. In 2024-25, benefit fraud and error stood at a staggering £9.5 billion a year.
Fraud against the public sector is not a victimless crime. It takes money away from vital public services, erodes trust and harms innocent people. It is ultimately public services that suffer, and it is taxpayers who are the victims of this crime. They are rightly incensed when their money lines the pockets of criminals. It is theft from the taxpayer—from every single one of us. Delivering this Government’s plan for change is possible only if we do more to ensure that taxpayers’ money is protected and spent wisely. The Government made a manifesto commitment that they will safeguard taxpayers’ money and will not tolerate fraud or waste anywhere in public services. This Bill is part of our plan for delivery.
I turn to the detail of the legislation before us. Part 1 of the Bill contains measures that gives the Public Sector Fraud Authority—I will refer to it as the PSFA for the rest of my speech—within the Cabinet Office powers for the first time to tackle fraud across the public sector on behalf of government departments and public bodies that do not have the capability, capacity or powers to do so. Noble Lords will know that the scope of the activity of the state is vast.
Fraudsters will attack vulnerabilities wherever they can find them, and the impact is not just on the state but on real people. For example, in a case referred to the PSFA earlier this year, a firm had received £370,000 in funding to provide skills training, having, it is believed, provided false or inaccurate details to create the false impression that the criteria for the funding scheme were met when in fact they were not. Not only does the fraudster gain, but the money is diverted from people who could legitimately benefit from it. In another example, a grant of £125,000 was awarded to a youth group focusing on community activities. It did not go to the intended purpose but was, it is believed, defrauded. That money would have had a direct impact on the ground in the community, but did not, because we were defrauded, as were that community.
At the moment, however, it is difficult for public authorities that have been defrauded, or the PSFA or other authorities, to take the kinds of actions that the public expect against these and other much larger frauds that take place. It is extraordinary that they cannot get the necessary information to prove the offences and do not have the powers to take enforcement action or recover funds.
Part 1 of the Bill puts this right. It builds the foundational structure for a long-lasting change in how public authorities take action on fraud where they cannot do so now. First, the Bill will provide the PSFA with powers to obtain search warrants from the court to enter premises and seize evidence as part of fraud investigations. So in the skills case I mentioned, the PSFA would have been able to go into the so-called provider’s premises and seize payroll and enrolment records to prove whether it was entitled to the funding. These powers will be used only when approved by the courts, and the police will continue to be responsible for arresting suspects if required.
Secondly, the Bill contains measures for the PSFA to compel businesses and individuals to provide information where there is a suspicion of fraud against the public authority, and to penalise them if they do not. In the youth group case, PSFA could have required business records to be provided using these powers. Separately, the Bill also provides powers to allow the PSFA to request communications from telecom providers using the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, authorised and overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. When fraudsters conspire to attack the state, this power will enable investigators to connect to their network and show who is involved. The Bill also enables information-sharing between the PSFA and other parties in the course of a fraud investigation, which is vital in tackling multi-agency cases.
Thirdly, the Bill introduces the power to impose civil penalties on behalf of other public authorities against those who have committed or have tried to commit fraud. These penalties can be used as an alternative method of taking action against fraudsters, compared to often lengthy criminal prosecutions. The introduction of civil penalties for fraud means that there can be meaningful consequences for breaking the law, even when criminal prosecution is not appropriate or viable.
Fourthly, the Bill will introduce new debt recovery powers for the PSFA, so that we can get public money back from those who can afford to repay but refuse to do so. This includes powers to recover fraud-related or error-related debt from an individual’s earnings, using a deduction from earnings order, or directly from financial accounts using a direct deduction order. These are broadly similar to existing powers used across government, including by HMRC. I reassure your Lordships’ House that there will be strong safeguards in place for these powers, to ensure that vulnerability is considered and deductions are affordable and fair. The PSFA’s authorised investigators and officers will be highly trained, to the same standards as the police, for the criminal powers in Part 1 and will be members of the Government Counter Fraud Profession, which sets high standards of professionalism, ethics and integrity that members must meet.
Finally, to address some of the fraud we saw over the pandemic, the Bill will double from six to 12 years the time limit for civil claims to be brought in alleged cases of Covid fraud, giving public authorities more time to investigate complex cases relating to those who exploited a national emergency for personal gain. It is an affront that some people used the time of a national crisis to loot the public purse, and this Government are committed to taking action, of which this is the first step.
Part 2 is focused on addressing fraud and error in the social security system. Here, the Bill will modernise, extend and strengthen DWP’s existing counter-fraud powers, bringing it in line with other bodies such as HMRC. It introduces new powers that will improve DWP’s access to important data that can be used to find and prevent fraud and error more quickly and effectively and, crucially, improve DWP’s ability to recover money from taxpayers. Taking each of these in turn, first, there are comparable powers to those I described for the PSFA, which will allow authorised investigators in the DWP to apply for and obtain search warrants to enter premises and seize evidence relevant to fraud investigations. These powers will be used by specialist DWP serious and organised crime investigators. This will reduce DWP’s reliance on the police and, as in the PSFA’s case, these powers will be used only when approved by the courts; the police will continue to be responsible for arresting suspects.
Secondly, the Bill will update DWP’s information-gathering powers for investigating fraud. At present, DWP has the powers to require information from only a limited list of third parties. This does not include key organisations and sectors that could help to prove or disprove suspected fraud—for example, airlines, which might hold travel records that are relevant to investigations of fraud conducted overseas. To add to that, there is limited ability to require responses to requests to be sent electronically; currently, DWP cannot make someone provide this information digitally. This approach is somewhat outdated in a digital age and underlines that the changes in the Bill are long overdue. The Bill widens who the DWP can compel information from, and it will enable us to require the information to be provided digitally by default. This is comparable to the information-gathering provisions I described for the PSFA earlier.
Thirdly, the Bill makes provisions for the DWP’s new eligibility verification measure, which will enable the department to require banks and other financial institutions to provide crucial data to help identify incorrect benefit payments that people might be getting as a result of not meeting the rules for their benefit—for example, if someone has too much in savings, which could make them ineligible for a benefit, or if they are fraudulently claiming benefits while living abroad when they should be living in the UK. This data will mean that we can identify potential incorrect payments much sooner for key eligibility criteria.
We know that people lead busy lives and sometimes genuine mistakes happen. That is why this measure is so important, as it will help to identify not only potential fraudulent cases that require further investigation but errors too, ensuring that the DWP can correct errors quickly, and preventing people building up large debts that they then need to repay. In response to considerable misinformation about this measure, I want to stress to your Lordships’ House that under the eligibility verification measure, the DWP will not be able to access people’s bank accounts or look at what they are spending, nor will it be able to share any personal information with banks. Furthermore, this data will be considered without the presumption of any wrongdoing. No decision about benefit entitlement will be made from the data gathered through this measure alone; and, crucially, any final decision about someone’s benefit entitlement will always be taken by a human being. The Information Commissioner has noted that this proposal addresses many of the concerns the commissioner held about the previous Government’s proposals.
The fourth element of Part 2 is about broadening DWP’s abilities to punish fraudsters using a financial penalty as an alternative to seeking prosecutions. At the moment, DWP can give financial penalties only in cases of benefit fraud. Part 2 extends our ability to use them in the cases of fraud against any type of DWP payment. For example, if we have a future grant scheme similar to the Kickstart employment scheme, we will be able to ensure that that money could be recouped. This will ensure that more fraudsters committing a wider range of fraud can be dealt with swiftly without going to court.
Finally, the Bill contains new debt recovery powers for DWP. These powers will enable the DWP to recover money in cases where a person owes the department money but is not in receipt of a benefit or in Pay As You Earn employment, where there are existing powers. This will be used only where people repeatedly refuse to agree to affordable voluntary repayment terms with DWP. In these cases, the Bill will enable DWP to obtain from banks the bank statements of these debtors, to verify that they have sufficient funds to pay. Having considered this information, DWP debt enforcement agents will determine what is an affordable deduction, with maximum limits for regular deductions set out in the legislation. DWP can then recover the money from their bank accounts, through either a one-off lump sum or regular deductions. This will be done in a fair and manageable way, with time for the person to make any representation, and the right to appeal. No one will be pushed into hardship because of this action.
As a last resort, if someone owes DWP more than £1,000 and puts their money out of reach of our other recovery methods, DWP can apply to the court to disqualify that person from driving for up to two years. This is similar to the powers the Child Maintenance Service has been able to use for the last 25 years in cases where a parent repeatedly refuses to make payments to support their child, and it has proved somewhat effective in encouraging debtors to engage with the process. A court will not be able to make a DWP disqualification order if it considers that the person needs a driving licence for work or for another essential purpose, such as if the person is disabled or a carer. This disqualification order will always at first be suspended, and repayment terms will be set by the court. A person will be disqualified from driving by the court only if the repayment terms the court has set are not met without good reason. This measure is for people who have repeatedly refused to engage with DWP’s debt management system and have actively frustrated the process of debt recovery. It is an important power that is designed to bring debtors to the table to agree voluntary, affordable and sustainable repayment plans with the DWP.
We are clear that an individual keeping money to which they are not entitled is serious and will result in serious consequences. These powers ensure fairness in debt recovery, seeking to guarantee that those who are no longer on benefit or in paid employment are not treated more favourably and able to evade repayment of money owed to the public sector.
Parts 1 and 2 come with strong new safeguards, including provision for independent oversight and reporting. The Cabinet Office and the DWP will commission His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to undertake inspections on the use of the new investigations powers that both departments are using. The DWP will make a similar arrangement with His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland and the Independent Office for Police Conduct will handle any serious complaints that arise from the use of the new powers of entry, search and seizure for the PSFA and the DWP. The Police Investigations and Review Commissioner will deal with similar matters for the DWP in Scotland.
Separately, the Minister for the Cabinet Office will appoint an independent person to inspect the PSFA enforcement unit’s use of the powers in the Bill. Their work will complement and build on the oversight provided by the inspectorate. The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions will also appoint an independent person to oversee the use and effectiveness of the DWP’s new eligibility verification measure in line with the legislation and the code of practice. Both independent persons are required to provide reports to respective Ministers which must be published and laid in Parliament.
Codes of practice will accompany relevant parts of the Bill and, where appropriate, will be consulted on. Drafts of relevant codes will be made available to noble Lords ahead of Committee. Across the Bill, provision is made for persons subject to the powers to make representations, request reviews or appeal against decisions. These routes will be clear and provide opportunities to challenge the Government’s approach.
Many of the measures in this Bill are not novel to government. Instead, they modernise existing powers and bring the DWP and the PSFA in line with other public bodies, such as HMRC. Overall, this Bill will help deliver the biggest crackdown on public sector fraud in a generation. It is expected to save £1.5 billion over the next five years as part of wider action in the DWP’s efforts to save £9.6 billion.
The Bill delivers the biggest upgrade to the DWP’s counterfraud powers in more than 14 years. It brings in new powers to tackle fraud right across the public sector by empowering the Public Sector Fraud Authority, and not before time. Our approach is tough but fair. It is tough on criminals who cheat the system and steal from taxpayers, and tough on people who refuse to pay back money, but fair on claimants, by spotting and stopping errors earlier and helping people to avoid getting into debt. It is fair on those who play by the rules and rely on the social security system, and it is fair on taxpayers, by ensuring that every pound is spent wisely, responsibly and effectively on those who need it. I beg to move.
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent
Main Page: Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent's debates with the Department for Work and Pensions
(5 days ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, raise important considerations about procedural fairness and transparency in the implementation of the Bill. Amendment 60A, which would allow applicants to request a review into the existence or value of the payable amount, would provide a valuable safeguard, ensuring that individuals have an accessible means to challenge decisions where there might be uncertainty or dispute. This aligns well with the principle of natural justice and could help prevent errors going uncorrected.
Amendments 61A and 61B focus on the mechanisms surrounding direct deduction orders, emphasising the need for accountability and parliamentary oversight. Requiring an impact assessment to accompany any changes to the processing of these orders, as proposed in Amendment 61A, would encourage transparency about the potential costs and effects on banks’ operational capacity. Similarly, Amendment 61B’s provision that consultation outcomes must be laid before Parliament prior to implementation would ensure democratic scrutiny. Together, these amendments would contribute to a more open and considered approach, balancing the efficient recovery of public funds with the need for oversight and due process, and I support them.
My Lords, this has been a helpful and constructive debate. I shall just clarify some points that have been made and respond directly to some of the questions. I think I can answer them all; if not, I will reflect on Hansard.
Amendment 60A would enable the liable person to appeal against the existence and value of what they owe as a result of fraud or error as part of the appeal process for direct deduction orders. I remind noble Lords that direct deduction orders are used only if a liable person has opted not to come to the table and negotiate. This is not the first way in which we would have engaged; it is at the end of a process.
My Lords, I wanted to reiterate my particular support of Amendments 62A and 62B, even though they do not go as far as my amendment in relation to suspended orders. The sense of a sword of Damocles hanging over people is something that we could do with getting rid of. That would be an easy thing for the Government to accept without in any way compromising the aims of the Bill.
In relation to the other amendments, which I broadly support, I want to emphasise something that I keep thinking as I read the Bill and sit through Committee. Many aspects of the legislation can create an atmosphere of fear, uncertainty and sometimes even paranoia about what is going on if there is a sense of secrecy. This could be alleviated with the opening up of human communication to explain reasoning. These are difficult situations. We are talking, in some instances, about people who have committed wrongdoing of some sort, but it is important that liable persons have a sense of understanding the process. Very often, the way that the process gets stuck behind closed doors has created all sorts of problems in parallel situations.
I want to emphasise how, if things are left to internal processes, it can reduce them to hollow box-ticking. Civil servants or whoever knowing that they can be answerable will ensure that better work is carried out. It will also help to smooth the way for people to take this Bill seriously and not see it as some grand state surveillance conspiracy. It is important, in order to give credibility to the fraud recovery at the heart of the Bill, that the Government are seen to be as flexible as possible about all parties being held to account for what would otherwise be seen as some quite draconian powers.
My Lords, all these amendments pertain to deduction from earnings orders—or DEOs, as I shall refer to them from here. DEOs are a mechanism by which the PSFA can instruct an employer to make deductions from the liable person’s salary in order to recover the money owed as a result of fraud or error. This power can be exercised only after the amount owed has been agreed by the liable person, a court or tribunal, or if the penalty appeal period has lapsed or an appeal has been finally determined. People can avoid their employers being contacted if they simply engage with us and pay what they owe.
DEOs are an established mechanism used by the courts, the DWP, the Child Maintenance Service and some local authorities. We have sought to emulate best practice and established processes to make it straightforward for the employers that have to implement them. There are safeguards for the liable person, such as a protected earnings amount of 60% and the requirement for deductions to be affordable and fair, as set out in Clause 41.
Before an order is made, the liable person will have the opportunity to make representation on the proposed terms. Amendment 61C would create an obligation for the PSFA to provide the reasoning behind its decision to proceed with a DEO following these representations. Amendment 61D would create a similar obligation for the PSFA to demonstrate that it has taken the liable person’s wider circumstances into account when determining the level of affordable and fair deductions. Both these amendments are duplicative as the PSFA would be doing this anyway, as a matter of good public law. As I outlined previously, guidance will also be published detailing what information will be supplied to the liable person as part of the wider decision-making processes.
Amendment 61E would limit the regulation-making powers in Clause 41(7) to establishing affordability considerations. We have striven to put as much detail into the Bill as possible, but there are elements where it is valuable to have a degree of flexibility so that further conditions or restrictions can be added to the measures to reflect wider societal, economic and technological changes. This amendment would severely limit the Government’s ability to adapt to these changes and impact the efficacy of this recovery method, thus potentially reducing the money lost to fraud that could be recovered in the future.
Amendment 61F would require that the PSFA consults with employers on the level of admin costs that they can charge the liable person for implementing a DEO. There are standard charges of £1 per deduction period allowed by the courts and other organisations that use DEOs. It is not for the PSFA to set up a different regime single-handedly, as it will be following established processes already used across government. If it is felt that changes to this charge should be made, they would need to be done in conjunction with the other bodies.
Amendments 62A and 62B would prevent a suspended DEO from being restarted after 24 months. We discussed the same matter on Monday, in relation to direct deduction orders. I confirm that I am still reflecting on the points raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which also apply to DEOs, and I am having meetings with officials on them. It is important that the PSFA has discretion in how it can react to individual circumstances counterbalanced against its duty to recover money lost to fraud and error in the most appropriate way. There is a balance to be struck and I shall report back on my reflections in due course.
Finally, Amendment 62C would require that, when the PSFA revokes a DEO, it provides the reasoning to both the liable person and their employer. In practice, this would be shared with the liable person as a matter of good public law to safeguard the public law duty of fairness in decision-making for the individuals subject to the orders. However, there are serious privacy considerations that could be undermined by providing such information to the employer. Upon the establishment of a DEO, the employer is not told anything about the DEO other than what is to be deducted from the liable person’s salary. This is the only information of relevance to the employer. Any other information would be a breach of privacy.
Regarding some of the other points raised, particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I think it would be helpful to your Lordships if I assist them with some more information on safeguards. Regarding the safeguards in place for the use of DEOs, including preventing hardship, the Public Sector Fraud Authority has committed to the following safeguards: vulnerability assessments, maximum deduction amounts, opportunities for representation, reviews and appeals, and the ability to notify a change of circumstances. The PSFA will continue to utilise best practice from across government.
On the question of who determines the amount of debt owed, the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s investigation will calculate the debt owed to the Government as a result of fraud or error following an investigation into suspected fraud. The liable person will be notified of the recoverable amount. If they do not agree, a firm and final determination will be sought by a court or tribunal.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, asked what is meant by “among other things” in Clause 41. Clause 41(6) gives the Minister powers to
“make further provision about the calculation of amounts to be deducted”
in respect of DEOs. To be clear, to make further provision would not allow the Minister to qualify or change the provision, only to add specific conditions or restrictions that can be taken into account when calculating the amount to be deducted. As given as an example in Clause 41(7), the key consideration will be hardship and defining what constitutes hardship. It is important that the definition of hardship is not fixed, as what constitutes hardship today may look very different in, say, 10 years’ time.
The term “among other things” could also include other items that can be taken into account when calculating DEOs that are not so immediately obvious. For example, the regulations could be used in allowing for a different deduction rate around the Christmas period, when the liable person might have other outgoings that would not be reasonably foreseeable when the order was first given.
I hope that goes some way to assuring noble Lords about our safeguards and that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I listened to the Minister, and I listened to her the other day on the same subjects regarding DDOs. A question occurs. In many cases, the amount owed is set by the court. Why, then, does the court not decide how that amount should be repaid? Why do we have to go through all these processes and decisions by the departments rather than the court?
The noble Lord makes a very interesting point, on which I will have to reflect and come back to him, if that is okay.
I thank the Minister and look forward to her reflections. In closing, I return to the core principle running through each of the amendments in this group: public confidence in enforcement powers depends not just on the ability to cover funds but on the manner in which those powers are exercised. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, was also emphatic in this regard.
Whether they concern ensuring that decisions are properly communicated, that personal circumstances are demonstrably considered, that employers are consulted on the burdens placed on them or that enforcement is time-bound and proportionate, our amendments seek to build a framework that is seen as being as fair and accountable as it is effective.
We have not sought to unpick the intent of the Bill or to weaken the Government’s ability to recover what is owed. But we have sought to refine it responsibly and constructively, so that those affected by its provisions are treated with clarity, respect and procedural justice. We have argued, with these amendments, that decisions should be explained in writing, circumstances must be considered and shown to be considered, and powers must be bounded by purpose, not open-ended phrasing. I take the Minister’s points on “among other things”, but it is a rather clumsy way to write legislation. The fact that she introduced “among other things” and gave some examples shows that this should be more tightly drawn.
My Lords, Amendment 63A addresses the important issue of those who facilitate fraud by providing information, advice or support. It proposes that such individuals could be subject to penalties. I believe that this measure helps to close potential loopholes and hold accountable not only primary offenders but those who enable wrongdoing. From an individual’s perspective, this could strengthen the integrity of the system and act as a deterrent against abuse.
Amendment 63B seeks to prevent the Minister from unilaterally determining penalties for persons who have not received a payment, which is crucial to protecting individuals from unfair or arbitrary penalties that could cause undue financial or reputational harm.
Amendments 63D and 64A focus on transparency, accountability and procedural fairness—elements that directly affect the experiences of those subject to the Bill. Providing written reasons for decisions following a review, set out in Amendment 63D, would ensure that individuals fully understand the outcomes and the rationale behind them, enabling them to respond appropriately, or seek further recourse if necessary. Amendment 64A would remove the Minister’s sole authority to change the appeals process and would instead require independent review—we have discussed in previous sittings what “review” and “independent” mean—and parliamentary oversight. It would introduce vital protections for individuals and guarantee that any changes to how appeals are handled are thoroughly scrutinised, preserving fairness and maintaining public confidence in the system’s impartiality. On that basis, I support these amendments.
My Lords, these amendments all pertain to the scope, application and oversight of the civil penalties measures. The measures have been designed using established cross-government best practice so that the PSFA may effectively deter and recuperate money lost to fraud and include numerous safeguards for individuals and businesses.
I find myself in the unique position, so far in this Committee, of agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, although maybe not for the reasons that she set out, on Amendment 63A, which would unnecessarily extend the legislation by adding a definition of “help” to Clause 50. The Fraud Act 2006 establishes the fraud offence, which includes an individual making
“a gain for himself or another”.
The Fraud Act does not define “help” in terms of making a gain for another. This is because the Act focuses on the “dishonest intent” of a fraudulent act. Under Clause 70(1)(c), the offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud is already punishable under the Bill. Clause 70(1)(b) includes and covers Sections 6 and 7 Fraud Act offences. This allows for penalties to be issued against the fraud “influencers” we have already discussed during the Bill’s passage. The offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud is also already included in our definition of fraud. It is therefore unnecessary to define “help” in order to use either the Fraud Act or this Bill, although I was very tempted to quote Beatles lyrics—that may just be the time of day.
Amendment 63B would amend Clause 52 by replacing the Minister with the First-tier Tribunal in cases where a fraudster attempts to take public money but is stopped before they receive the payment. There is existing precedent for not using the First-tier Tribunal as the first-instance decision-maker: for example, in the Home Office for the employment of illegal workers. The legislation also includes the right to appeal a decision to the appropriate court following the receipt of a final penalty notice—I will come on to that.
Amendment 63C seeks to broaden the requirement of Clause 58(4) beyond Clause 58(2)(c) so that it may apply to Clause 58(2)(a) and Clause 58(2)(b). This is unnecessary, as Clause 58(3) already requires the Minister to give notice to an individual if the penalty is upheld. While I recognise its intent, it is unnecessary to include Amendment 63D in the Bill. While there is no obligation under common law to provide an explanation for a positive decision—that is, to amend or cancel the penalty—authorised officers will do so as part of the review process. They will also provide an explanation for a decision to amend or cancel the penalty as part of the review process. The civil penalties code of practice and further guidance will support authorised officers.
Amendment 64A would add additional unnecessary complications to the legislation. It is the intent of the legislation not that regulations may be made to reduce or abolish the appeals provisions for penalty notices but that any further regulations may improve, streamline or make the appeal process more efficient. For example, appeals for civil penalties may be heard at the same time as appeals against debt recovery notices.
I turn to the specific points raised by noble Lords. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I remind the Committee that the tribunal appeal is already in the process at a later stage, that of determining the penalty. Bringing the tribunal in earlier would add time and burden. I think that I have covered the other points in my speech, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, will remind me if I have not—she may be about to—but I hope that my explanations reassure noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will therefore withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for giving answers to most of my questions, even if they were not entirely to our satisfaction. In closing, I return to the central purpose of this group of amendments: to ensure that the enforcement powers granted under this part of the Bill are clear in scope, fair in operation and subject to meaningful oversight.
Before I continue on to the other amendments, I will address the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The Minister states that the existing law is sufficient, but there is quite a lot of evidence, and anecdotal evidence, that sickfluencers, as they are called—sick influencers—are active and busy. How many people have ever been pulled up or—
This is a point where I should say that there are two parts of the Bill. I am sure that, as Committee progresses, we will discuss sickfluencers. This part of the Bill is making sure that the PSFA has the powers to deal with similar online influencers—I do not think we can call them sickfluencers in relation to fraud—who are leading the charge. Obviously, the PSFA is seeking new powers and we hope to be able to use them. Therefore, I cannot provide the noble Baroness with the data for what prosecutions may or may not have been made up until this point. But we hope that, with new powers for the PSFA, that will be part of the work going forward.
I thank the noble Baroness. When we were seeking to introduce this definition of “help”—I take on board the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—we were trying to presage the fact that this would come up in a later part of the Bill. I deliberately, in my opening remarks, did not reference sickfluencers, but the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, obviously understood where I was going with that. I am just not convinced about how effective the law currently is in this area.
Our other amendments respond directly to the challenges posed by modern forms of fraud and the expanding reach of administrative enforcement. Whether we are seeking to define what it means to help commit fraud in an online age, requiring that penalties based on hypothetical harm are assessed by an independent tribunal or ensuring that decisions and processes are explained clearly to those affected, these are not procedural niceties; they are essential guarantees of accountability and trust. We cannot afford to leave grey areas for those who seek to exploit the system from the sidelines and we also cannot allow the exercise of significant powers, particularly those that impact people’s livelihoods, to proceed without checks, explanation or independent scrutiny.
This group of amendments does not frustrate the aims of the Bill; it strengthens the Bill. It ensures that public funds can be protected in a way that is not only effective but proportionate, just and transparent. We are asking for three simple things: definitions that are clear so that enforcement can be targeted where it is needed most; penalties subject to oversight, particularly when no actual loss is concerned; and decisions and appeals processes that are robust, explainable and open to democratic scrutiny. These are reasonable, moderate and constructive proposals. They do not undermine the Bill’s purpose; they help it to stand on firmer constitutional and ethical ground. I urge the Minister and all noble Lords to consider them seriously and to support a set of changes that would not only improve this legislation but help to secure public confidence in the integrity of its application. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, while I recognise the concerns that underpin this amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, it is both unnecessary and potentially duplicative, given the extensive scrutiny already taking place through existing and robust channels, as my noble friend Lady Coffey made clear. First and foremost, we must acknowledge that a comprehensive public inquiry is under way into the Government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic. That inquiry, established under the Inquiries Act 2005 and chaired independently, has broad terms of reference, including examination of procurement processes, ministerial decision-making and the use of public funds. The amendment risks pre-empting, duplicating or even undermining that process by imposing a parallel and more narrowly framed exercise before the formal inquiry has concluded its work.
Let us be clear: the Covid-19 pandemic presented an unprecedented national emergency. Ministers, civil servants and public bodies were called on to make swift, high-stakes decisions in the face of an unfolding crisis. They did so with little warning, under extraordinary pressure and with the primary objective of protecting lives and livelihoods. In that context, decisions were taken at pace to ensure that vital supplies were sourced, support was distributed rapidly, and services could continue to operate. Was the system perfect? No—but to assume that those who contributed to the effort to tackle Covid were doing so for malign reasons is inaccurate. However, that is not to say that we should not seek to recover money where errors were made, and it is of course right that we take steps to realise this outcome, which has been the guiding principle of all our engagements with the Bill: public money should be recovered.
We should therefore make full use of the mechanisms that already exist to assess and recover losses. The National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee and internal departmental review bodies have all examined pandemic-related spending and made a series of recommendations, many of which are already being implemented. Indeed, the Public Sector Fraud Authority continues to track and pursue recoveries on this matter. To impose an additional reporting requirement through the Bill, especially one that compels Ministers to publicly acknowledge failings before the full picture is known, would not serve the cause of accountability; rather, it risks creating a politicised and partial process, which may generate more heat than light and overlap confusingly with the broader inquiry now under way.
Let us not lose sight of the bigger picture. The Bill is about strengthening the framework to combat public sector fraud going forward; it is not the right vehicle for relitigating decisions taken in the darkest days of a national emergency. The public inquiry will give us the full breadth and depth of insight that is needed, with the benefit of time, evidence and impartial examination. In the meantime, let us not cast unfair aspersions on public servants and Ministers who, in the face of enormous uncertainty and unimaginable pressure, acted on the whole with integrity, urgency and a profound sense of duty.
I urge noble Lords to recognise that the proper process is already in place and that we must allow it to do its job without prejudging its conclusions. For these reasons, I respectfully oppose the amendment.
My Lords, I find myself agreeing with the sentiment behind the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. The Government are committed to investigating and combating cases of fraud and error in Covid-19 spending. If I touch on some of the things that the Government are already doing, perhaps he will be reassured that we are already taking this seriously.
The Bill will give the Public Sector Fraud Authority powers to conduct investigations, levy civil penalties and recover money. It also doubles the time limit for civil claims against Covid fraud from six to 12 years to ensure that we can continue to investigate. Although the proposed amendment to mandate a report on public sector fraud during the Covid-19 pandemic underscores the importance of accountability, it is unnecessary given the existing frameworks already in place. The question is whether appropriate reporting processes on Covid-19 spending have already been established—and I would argue that they have.
A dedicated Covid Counter-Fraud Commissioner has already been appointed to review losses of public money to fraud, error and underperforming contracts during the Covid-19 pandemic. Working collaboratively with departments and agencies such as the Public Sector Fraud Authority, His Majesty’s Treasury and the Department of Health and Social Care, the commissioner is focused on public funds lost to fraud, error and underperforming contracts during the Covid-19 pandemic.
The commissioner’s remit includes: assessing recovery efforts to date to determine where additional recoveries can be made and ensuring they are vigorously pursued; ensuring that maximum recovery efforts have been made and providing assurances on this to the public and Parliament; reviewing individual contracts to provide additional attention and reassurance on spending that is disputed; and, from this work, generating lessons and making recommendations for the future. By placing this responsibility with an expert dedicated commissioner who reports directly to the Chancellor and works in close co-ordination with key departments, the Government have ensured a clear and strategic approach to addressing pandemic-related fraud.
Given the breadth and focus of this work, introducing an additional ministerial reporting requirement would be duplicative and could divert resources away from ongoing recovery efforts. It risks creating unnecessary bureaucracy and delaying outcomes. We genuinely believe that the outcome the noble Lord seeks is already in place within government.
To touch on the debate, which was about the wider lessons to be learned from the Covid-19 pandemic, the Bill is specifically about fraud, but I am more than happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, to discuss resilience in the round and the work that the Government are currently doing, as I believe a private meeting would be a more appropriate forum. I hope that that these assurances reassure the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and that he therefore feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Before the Minister sits down, let me say that Tom Hayhoe, is, I think, six months through his contract. Do the Government intend to extend it beyond the fixed one year, and when does the Minister anticipate that he might share reports—he may already do that with Ministers, but when they will be shared with Parliament?
My Lords, this is what I can say currently, but if there is additional clarification, I will come back to the noble Baroness. Mr Tom Hayhoe’s appointment is a fixed one-year appointment. He will be required to provide a report to Parliament, which will present lessons and recommendations for procurement in future during a time of national crisis, so he will be reporting on his efforts outside and within the Treasury.
My Lords, I have a rearguard action on this amendment, because it seems strange to me—and it may seem strange to anybody among the public—that we can have a Bill called the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill, but we do not recognise within that Bill one of the biggest efforts of fraud that occurred in this country during Covid-19. Those still rumble on—those billions of pounds. For a Bill called the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill not to include those is a grave error.
There may be some crossover and duplication, but if there is, it does not matter, because it is in the Bill and the Government will not have to pursue things if they are being dealt with elsewhere. They may be dealt with elsewhere, but there has to be a backstop, and the backstop should be in this Bill. It will do no harm in future to have it in the Bill, even if other things may address the problems that occurred and could, sadly, occur again when another event takes place. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, these amendments are very close to my party’s heart. I warmly welcome Amendments 67 and 68, which would place an important emphasis on transparency and accountability by requiring the Minister to publish annual reports on the use of powers under Part 1 of the Bill, as well as on the estimated scale of fraud against public authorities. Too often, no one knows about the scale.
These measures represent a vital step forward in ensuring that Parliament and, by extension, the public, receives regular, detailed information about how these powers are exercised and the ongoing challenges faced in tackling fraud. Such openness is essential because it is openness that solves these problems, builds trust in the administration of public funds and allows for informed scrutiny and debate. From my party’s perspective, these amendments align closely with our long-standing commitment to open government and evidence-based policy-making. By mandating annual reporting, they would help to illuminate the practical impact of the Bill and provide the data that is necessary to assess whether these powers are effective, proportionate and fair. This ongoing oversight will be invaluable in refining approaches to fraud prevention and recovery and ensuring that public authorities are both empowered and held accountable.
I look forward to supporting these amendments as the Bill goes forward, as well as to continuing to work to strengthen transparency and public confidence in this important area.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for raising the important issue of the annual reporting of the PSFA on both the use of the powers conferred on it in the Bill and the extent of fraud against public authorities.
Under Clause 64, an independent person will be appointed through the office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments as a regulated appointment to oversee the use of the powers that this Bill conveys on the PSFA. We will appoint someone with the right skills and demonstrable independence. The independent person will proactively review the PSFA’s investigative functions and use of powers, which will culminate in regular reports being produced on an at least annual basis for the Minister for the Cabinet Office.
I know that the noble Baroness cares about ministerial oversight and accountability. The powers granted to the Minister for the Cabinet Office will be delegated to trained authorised officers; I can assure her that there will continue to be strong and regular ministerial oversight of their safe and effective use. Once the Minister has reviewed the report, it must be laid before Parliament. Reports will both provide assurance on where powers are being used appropriately and challenge where improvements could be made, ensuring that civil servants are using the powers in this Bill as intended. They will provide assurance that suspected cases of fraud are being investigated in accordance with the legislation, codes of practice and guidance; and that that is being done effectively in the pursuit of the intentions of the Bill.
The findings or summary of any and all independent oversight, including the independent person’s report, will be published on an annual basis in the interests of transparency. External oversight bodies will also report on the use of powers by the PSFA following inspections. These reports will be made publicly available. With regard to annual reporting on the extent of public sector fraud, the PSFA oversees the counterfraud performance of ministerial departments and public bodies. It already publishes a report on the extent of fraud against public authorities: the Fraud Landscape Report. I hope that that reassures noble Lords.
I want to address one point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on how the Government estimate the level of unknown fraud and error. The best available evidence suggests that the level of fraud and error in unexamined areas of government activity is between 0.5% and 5%. This is based on a Cabinet Office review of around 50 fraud and error estimates that includes every major department. Methods used across government to estimate the extent of fraud and error include statistical sampling, modelling and benchmarking. More detail can be found in the NAO report.
There are already provisions to review the use of powers the Bill conveys on PSFA and reporting relating to counterfraud activity across government. I hope that this explanation reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, will withdraw her amendment.
The noble Baroness might expect one of us to intervene. I understand where she is coming from in terms of reports, because these amendments are basically focusing on the laying of reports. However, outside the Room I have asked in the past about the current level of fraud. The noble Baroness alluded to it, but perhaps she could confirm that at the moment, the estimated level of public sector fraud stands at £55 billion. I know that I have asked for this before but it would be very helpful to have a breakdown of how much public sector fraud there is when it comes to the DWP aspects of the Bill. I think I am asking about the same issues, but it would be extremely helpful to know where we stand right now as a base, in terms of the level and quantity of fraud, and any breakdowns.
My Lords, I am more than happy to write to the noble Viscount.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. In closing this group, I return to the central theme that underpins Amendments 67 and 68: that transparency is not an optional extra in the fight against public sector fraud but an essential condition of legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. We are granting significant powers under the Bill, powers to recover, to penalise and to compel, but the exercise of those powers must not exist in a vacuum. The public, and indeed Parliament, must be able to see how those powers are being used and whether they are making a real, measurable difference.
Amendment 67 would ensure that the use of these new powers is reported on annually. It would allow us to track how these tools are deployed, where they are having an impact and where further improvement or scrutiny may be required. It would give Parliament, committees and the public a vital feedback loop, not to micromanage but to hold the system to account and ensure that it continues to serve its intended purpose.
Amendment 68 would complement that by shining a light on the scale of the challenge itself. If we are to treat fraud with the seriousness it demands, we must start by being clear-eyed about the extent of the problem. I am sure that internal estimates are already being produced within government; this amendment simply asks that they be published regularly and in good faith, so that we can judge our progress, measure impact and direct resources more intelligently.
I take the point the Minister made about the estimates ranging from 0.5% to 5%, but I am sure she will agree that, given the enormous amounts of these figures, that that 0.5% to 5% is a rather wide range of figures of billions of pounds. Would she like to expand on that and give me what the actual amounts in 0.5% to 5% might be?
It is suggested to me that the actual amount, as touched on by the noble Viscount, is at least £55 billion, but I will be writing to all members of the Committee who are present.
I thank the noble Baroness for her answer. Is that the 5% or the 0.5%? Anyway—
These amendments would not add bureaucracy for bureaucracy’s sake. They would build confidence, encourage departmental responsibility and improve operational performance. They would not be constraints on ministerial power, but a scaffolding of legitimacy around its use. Crucially, they would reflect the truth that we have heard echoed throughout the passage of the Bill, that public trust is hard won and easily lost. If we are to strengthen that trust, we must show not only that we are serious about tackling fraud but that we are equally serious about demonstrating how we are doing so and being accountable for the results.
Once again, these are reasonable, proportionate and practical amendments, and I hope the Minister will reflect on them not as additional burdens but as meaningful opportunities to improve the transparency, responsiveness and long-term success of this legislation.
I emphasise that I am not being a total nuisance in pushing on the quality of data. It is not a new phenomenon; I spent many years in the Cabinet Office tearing my hair out about the quality of data. The one thing that I learned when I was working for the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, when he was the Minister in the Cabinet Office, was that the quality of the data improves by greater transparency. I just make that point; it is not a criticism of the Government, but a criticism of the data process within government.
In conclusion, I urge noble Lords across the Committee to support the principles in these amendments and, in so doing, to support the kind of open and accountable government that underpins any effective public policy. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I am also pleased to express support for Amendments 68A, 68B and 68C, which collectively strengthen ministerial and parliamentary oversight of the powers exercised under the Bill by authorised officers on behalf of members of the Cabinet Office, as other noble Lords have said. Ensuring that robust oversight mechanisms are in place is essential to maintaining public confidence in how these significant powers are deployed. By enhancing scrutiny, these amendments help to guarantee that such powers are used appropriately and proportionately, reducing the risk of misuse or error.
Amendment 68C, which requires investigators to hold professional qualifications comparable to those of officers in the Department for Work and Pensions Fraud Investigation Service is particularly welcome. They need professional qualifications. This commitment to professionalism and expertise safeguards the integrity of investigations and reinforces trust in the system. From our perspective, it is crucial that those entrusted with such important responsibilities are properly trained and qualified, ensuring fairness and consistency in enforcement. Together, these amendments produce a more transparent—we always come back to transparency—accountable and professional framework for combating fraud within public authorities.
Let it see the light and, when it does, there is a way of controlling it. Too often, whoever are in government think they know best and ask, “Why do we have to make ourselves open to scrutiny?” But it is that scrutiny, that existence of light from beyond, that makes the legislation fit for purpose. I support these amendments.
My Lords, all the amendments in this group relate to Clause 66, which defines an authorised officer. It would be a fair assessment of the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, that she does not trust that, in her words, “junior civil servants to use these powers appropriately”. I will reassure her and the Committee that, first, it is not seniority that is key; it is professionalism and experience. The PSFA has already committed to training its authorised officers, who will utilise powers as set out in Clause 66, and authorised investigators, who will use the PACE powers in Clause 7, to predefined standards as set out by the government counterfraud profession investigator standard guidelines. This will align the PSFA with those using similar powers in other government departments such as HMRC and the DWP.
The team at the PSFA are serious people. Current members of the PSFA’s enforcement unit include former police officers and civil servants who have worked in investigatory roles across a number of government departments. They have experience of conducting counterfraud investigations and bring with them a wealth of relevant experience, skills and knowledge. I was tempted to get all their CVs to read out, but I thought that that may prolong Committee a little.
First, the powers in Clause 7 can be used only by authorised investigators specifically authorised to use the PACE powers and not authorised officers. The amendment requiring that those powers can be exercised only as provided in Clause 66 would render Clause 7 unusable.
Secondly, although the Minister will delegate the operation of these powers to authorised officers, the Minister will retain accountability and strong oversight. There will, of course, be strong ministerial interest in the effective, safe and value-for-money use of these powers. Noble Lords will know that I cannot speak for all future Ministers, but the current Minister meets individually with the chief executive of the PSFA very regularly.
Thirdly, the proposed delegation of powers in this Bill to authorise officers follows precedent elsewhere, including in HMRC and the DWP.
Fourthly, the amendment also calls for records of decision-making. In criminal investigations, the PSFA is already bound by legal obligations to record decisions and will do so through a dedicated case management system and the internal review process. The PSFA will have similar processes for civil cases.
Finally, the powers in the Bill are subject to review by an independent person as specified under Clause 64, and will be subject to inspections by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Inspection reports will be publicly available and those by the independent person will be laid before Parliament.
I think it would be helpful if I gave some additional clarity on some issues raised by noble Lords. The Civil Service grade that an authorised officer would be required to hold has been a theme of some debate in your Lordships’ Committee, so I think some clarity will be helpful. The Bill does not stipulate a grade that an authorised officer needs to hold. The grade is less critical than the training they undertake. However, the PSFA anticipates that, in practice, all authorised officers will be of at least HEO grade. This is comparable to other organisations such as HMRC and the DWP. Clause 66 does, however, stipulate that a review must be conducted by an authorised officer at least one grade senior to the officer involved in the initial decision.
My Lords, I warmly welcome Amendment 68D, which proposes a comprehensive and rigorous approach to fraud risk management for public authorities overseeing significant spending schemes. The amendment reflects a proactive commitment to safeguarding public funds by requiring authorities managing more than £100 million annually to register their schemes, conduct thorough fraud risk assessments and use robust methods to measure and report fraud. Such measures are vital to identifying vulnerabilities early and taking meaningful action to prevent loss, which aligns closely with my party’s values of transparency—which I keep coming back to—and responsible stewardship of public money.
Moreover, the role assigned to the Public Sector Fraud Authority in verifying fraud rates, publishing comparisons and enforcing corrective actions would introduce a much-needed layer of independent oversight and accountability. The requirement for independent audit and parliamentary scrutiny would further strengthen this framework in ensuring that these responsibilities are not only carried out diligently but openly reported and reviewed. The amendment offers a significant opportunity to improve fraud prevention at scale, protect taxpayers and build public trust in how government spending is managed.
I fully support this proposed step forward. I relate this to my time on Barnet London Borough Council, when I chaired the audit committee. The idea that audit can make things work better and that scrutiny and bringing things into the open will form better department management as well as better control of finances was the premise of the world I lived in when I chaired the committee for eight years. I therefore support the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn.
My Lords, tackling public sector fraud is a foremost priority for this Government. Amendment 68D raises interesting points. It seeks to put some of the work that the PSFA does with departments and public bodies to improve their management of fraud on a statutory basis, and to explicitly have it cover all government schemes or programmes over £100 million.
While we have been debating the fraud investigation activities of the Public Sector Fraud Authority, for which we believe there is a very strong case, we have understandably not given as much time to the wider responsibilities the PSFA already holds, as detailed in its published mandate—which is wonderful bedtime reading, as per my theme; I like to give bedtime reading on each day in Committee. This is not part of the Bill, but it might be useful for noble Lords if I spend a moment to update the Committee on the other work of the PSFA.
The PSFA works with departments to improve their understanding of fraud and to improve their action on the risk of fraud through a range of modern techniques. Fraud investigation is, of course, only one part of this. Alongside this, public bodies need effective capabilities to understand and reduce the risk of fraud, through tools such as fraud risk assessment and fraud measurement, which this proposed amendment covers, and also through intelligence, fraud prevention, deterrence, process design, the use of data and analytics, fraud detection and the shaping of an organisation’s culture.
I would like to set out some key principles around how the Government approach fraud risk. Accounting officers within departments are responsible for managing public sector organisations’ risks, including fraud. Each organisation faces a range of fraud risks specific to its business, from internal and external sources. Managing Public Money—also a fascinating read—already sets out that, for any new major area of spend with high fraud risk, departments shall assess the risk of and impact from fraud at the outset. This identifies the potential for fraud and the different impacts that fraud could have for the spend area.
In high-risk areas, once spending is approved, this results in the development and continued maintenance of a detailed fraud risk assessment. High-risk areas would be the highest areas of government spending where fraud measurements are not yet in place and which have been identified as high risk by a mandatory initial fraud risk assessment process. The PSFA was introduced with a published mandate that openly sets out how it will work with departments and public bodies and what is expected of all parties. Government departments and public bodies must comply with this mandate. The mandate sets out that public bodies must use initial fraud impact assessments, in line with Managing Public Money, submit quarterly data returns on the levels of fraud and error they find and report on their progress against their action plans and key metrics.
Departments and public bodies are also required to ensure that they adhere to the counterfraud functional standard. This is independently assured by the Public Sector Fraud Authority on a rolling basis. The functional standard outlines the expectations for managing counterfraud, bribery and corruption activity. It clarifies the basics that public bodies should have in place, promoting efficient, coherent and consistent management across the public sector. The PSFA’s published mandate enables it to conduct expert reviews on public bodies’ fraud work. To date, the PSFA has reviewed 31 public bodies against the counterfraud functional standard. The PSFA’s mandate also requires it to publish a report on fraud across government annually. This includes the levels of detected fraud and corruption and associated error in departments and public bodies—excluding tax and welfare, as these are published elsewhere. Fraud measurement exercises are used as a tool to understand fraud risk in the highest areas of loss.
The Government have also created a high fraud risk portfolio, in line with the PSFA’s mandate, that details the highest risk areas of government spending where there are not yet fraud measurements in place. The Government decided that schemes on this portfolio should undertake fraud measurement exercises and report these to the centre. This is currently being tested with the current schemes on the portfolio, where it is operating on a “comply or explain” model, enabling us to assess the burden and impact of this approach. The PSFA will continue encouraging and supporting departments to do more targeted measurement. Just last year, the government counterfraud profession launched its first qualification for fraud measurement practitioners.
The amendment also recommends that all the findings are reported to the National Audit Office, in the form of the Comptroller and Auditor General. The PSFA’s mandate already enables the PSFA and the NAO to work very closely to share information on public body performance in dealing with fraud:
“The PSFA will openly and regularly update on its activities and the data it holds to the National Audit Office (NAO). This will include performance data and the compliance with mandatory processes and data requests”.
In addition, this is an area that the Public Accounts Committee has paid keen attention to, and the PSFA has committed to share the high fraud risk portfolio with the committee on reading-room terms.
I hope that the collective measures I have outlined reassure noble Lords that the Amendment 68D would serve only to replicate responsibilities and duties that already exist and that the noble Baroness will therefore withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, as we close the debate on this amendment, let us return to first principles. Public money must be protected, not just recovered after it is lost. That protection starts not with more powers but with stronger systems—systems that encourage responsibility, enable scrutiny and reward transparency.
Amendment 68D would be a practical, proportionate step towards that goal. It sets out a clear set of duties for public authorities that manage major spending schemes—duties that mirror the kind of basic risk management we would expect from any serious organisation handling significant funds. It is not, as I have emphasised, about adding layers of bureaucracy but about lifting the standard of governance across government. It is about saying to departments and public authorities, “If you are entrusted with large sums of public money, you must also be prepared to demonstrate how you protect that money from fraud, and you must do so in a way that is transparent, measurable and independently verifiable”.
This amendment is not just good policy; it is good practice. It would ensure that those with front-line responsibility for major schemes understand and own their risk landscape. It would support the PSFA by creating a consistent baseline of risk information and freeing up its capacity to focus on oversight and intervention, rather than firefighting. It would give Parliament and the public a clear view of where fraud controls are working and where they are not.
The red/amber/green system offers not just transparency but motivation. It highlights good performance, surfaces areas of concern and gives departments an incentive to improve. That is how you change behaviour: not by wishful thinking or ministerial Statements but by law. If a department reports low fraud rates and the authority finds something very different, it must act. It must issue a notice, demand an action plan and ensure that changes are made. If no action is taken, the Comptroller and Auditor-General can audit compliance and report to Parliament. That is what proper fraud prevention looks like. It does not wait for the scandal; it creates a system that sees the risk before the damage is done.
Amendment 68D is not an optional refinement; it is the core of the Bill’s purpose restored. Without it, we will once again be left with false confidence, unreliable data and billions lost in plain sight. In short, this amendment is a road map for better practice—one that I believe both Parliament and the Government should support. I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, I am pleased to support these amendments, which, once again, seek to enhance the independence, transparency and accountability of the Public Sector Fraud Authority. By probing the Government’s openness to specifying that both the chair and the non-executive members of the authority should be independent—whatever that means—Amendments 68E and 68F reinforce my party’s commitment to ensuring that public bodies operate free from undue political influence. Independence at these levels is crucial for maintaining public trust and guaranteeing impartial oversight of fraud prevention and recovery efforts.
Furthermore, Amendments 69A and 71A, which seek to clarify and limit ministerial powers around appointments and eligibility criteria, would strengthen the governance framework of the authority, promoting fairness and transparency in its leadership. The requirements in Amendments 74A and 74B for timely publication of annual reports and controls on authorising authentication would help to ensure openness and proper organisational integrity.
Finally, Amendments 74C and 74D would confirm that the Minister retains responsibility for functions even when extended to the authority, which would balance operational independence with necessary political accountability. Collectively, these amendments embody my party’s values of good governance and robust oversight, which are essential to protecting public funds and enhancing the effectiveness of fraud prevention. I heartily support these amendments as part of the transparency to which we are committed.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for raising the important issues of independence, recruitment, reporting and powers should the PSFA become a statutory body. The purpose of creating a statutory body is to place individual enforcement decisions at arm’s length from Ministers, but we have been clear that, while the PSFA enforcement unit is small, creating a new statutory body is not proportionate, so the Government will not commence Schedule 2 in the immediate future.
The approach in Schedule 2 adheres to published guidance in the Public Bodies Handbook. It follows the same approach used elsewhere, such as Schedule 1 to the Victims and Prisoners Act, which established the Infected Blood Compensation Authority. Amendments 68E and 68F seek to insert “independent” before the description of the chair and non-executive directors. These are ministerial appointments, but I remind your Lordships that the Government have been clear that, should the PSFA be established as a statutory body, its enforcement decisions would be fully independent of the Minister. To ensure this, the chair and non-executives will be public appointments and will follow the Cabinet Office Governance Code on Public Appointments, which is overseen by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. This will ensure that their recruitment is transparent and includes an independent member on the recruitment panel. This is similar in approach to the Infected Blood Compensation Authority, which uses the same legislative language. Amendment 69B seeks to insert words to a similar effect in respect of the chair appointing the chief executive and executive board members, so it is linked to these amendments.
In respect of Amendments 71A and 74B, which seek to remove the Minister’s power to make regulations on the eligibility rules for members of the PSFA and to prevent the PSFA from authorising a person who is not a board member of the authority authenticating its seal, it is important to note these are common provisions in the creation of public bodies. The seal is the means by which the PSFA will be able to enter into deeds and contracts, such as leasing property, and authenticating the seal just means signing next to it to show that the deed has been approved. Although authentication would usually be done by a board member of the PSFA, we have built in a degree of flexibility so that it can be delegated, for instance to its legal officers, should the need arise. As noted, the Infected Blood Compensation Authority and other public bodies such as the independent monitoring authority, established in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, have similar provisions. They serve to improve the efficacy and administrative efficiency of such public bodies.
As to Amendments 74C and 74D, which would see the Minister retain responsibility for the exercise of functions in the Act after they have been extended to the PSFA, and Amendment 69A, which would make the chief executive and other executive members’ ministerial appointments, I refer your Lordships to my earlier point. One essential reason in setting up the PSFA as a statutory body would be to remove any perception of potential political interference. These amendments would be counter to that policy intention.
Finally, Amendment 74A would require the PSFA to publish its annual report within three months of the end of the financial year. The Bill currently stipulates, in paragraph 12 of Schedule 2, that this should be as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each financial year. That is for good reason. The accounts will need to be reviewed by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, whom we would then need to commit to this timeline. Additionally, Erskine May, our own guidance on reporting, notes that accounts, together with an NAO report, must be laid no later than the following January. A statutory PSFA would follow Erskine May, as well as His Majesty’s Treasury’s guidance on Managing Public Money and the annual Government Financial Reporting Manual, to ensure that its report follows best practice.
I turn to the specifics of the points that have been touched on. The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, asked why eligibility regulations under paragraph 6(1) of Section 2 are useful. The ability for a Minister to lay eligibility regulations in respect of a board’s membership is a common feature in setting up public bodies. They can be used, for example, to safeguard independence, ensure expertise at its inception, or improve public trust by excluding certain individuals or demanding certain attributes. Examples might include barriers against those who are currently politically active, or have conflicts of interest or criminal convictions.
With regard to powers being exercised on a Minister’s behalf and safeguarding, there are numerous safeguards built into the Bill, such as independent oversight of all the provisions by external bodies. There are also obligations to obtain the permission of the courts for debt recovery and rights of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. Furthermore, authorised officers will be civil servants, obliged to follow the Civil Service Code, which requires that they act solely according to the merits of the case.
In response to my noble friend Lord Davies, I am more than happy, especially given the circumstances with our noble friend Lord Sikka, to write to him with all the points of the speech I would have responded with, and I am happy to share that with all Members of the Committee—that pertains to group 9.
I take the opportunity to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Will any roles be outsourced? No—we are clear that they have to be authorised officers as defined in Clause 66: they have to be civil servants.
I hope that, with those reassurances, noble Lords will not press their amendments and we can move forward to the next group.
My Lords, as I emphasised at the outset, across this group our amendments have been probing in nature, and I am grateful for some of the clarity that the Minister has given. We are seeking clarity, not confrontation. We are trying to establish whether the Government see the authority as a truly independent body with the authority to challenge where needed, or simply as a well-staffed extension of the Cabinet Office. In seeking those answers, we are also pressing for a model of governance that ensures effectiveness, credibility and accountability from day 1.
At the heart of our amendments is a simple but critical question: how do we make sure that the watchdog has teeth and is not quietly tethered by ministerial influence? Amendments 68E and 68F speak to the need for independence at the top through a chair who is genuinely independent, free to challenge, credible in doing so and accountable to the Minister. We know from other public oversight bodies that institutional trust starts at the top so, if the Government truly believe in empowering the PSFA to be a fearless voice in the fight against fraud, they should have no hesitation in embracing the modest strengthening of the governance framework.
Likewise, Amendments 69A and 69B ask fair and important questions about how the PSFA’s executive leadership will be chosen. We are not seeking to strip the chair of responsibility; we are asking whether there is a clearer, more robust process that would enhance the authority’s legitimacy and avoid the risk of it becoming either too insular or too directed from above. Ensuring that executive appointments are overseen by a group of independent non-executives, rather than a single individual, is possibly an act of good governance. I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that the independent non-executive appointments will follow the guide for public appointments.
Amendment 71A, meanwhile, takes on a different but equally significant concern: the breadth of ministerial regulation-making powers over eligibility for authority membership. In a body designed to scrutinise government spending and investigate fraud, the power of a Minister to decide who is eligible to serve—and more worryingly, who is not—is a red flag. The Government may never intend to use this power in order to silence critical voices or to manipulate the composition of the authority, but the mere fact that such a power exists could undermine confidence in the PSFA’s independence. This amendment seeks simply to close that door before it becomes a problem; it should not really be necessary if the full OCPA guidance is being followed.
The final amendments in the group, Amendments 74A to 74D, reinforce the need for clarity, transparency and constitutional responsibility. Whether it is ensuring the timely publication of reports, safeguarding who may speak for the authority with the official seal or distinguishing between operational delivery and retained ministerial accountability, these changes are about shoring up the credibility of the entire framework. Together, these amendments ask the Government to take seriously the institution that they are creating.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, did not move his amendments; I am grateful for the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. I want to take the liberty, if I may, of saying that a lot of what the noble Lord said chimes with the need for public accountability and transparency, as well as with a number of the points that we have been making. Although we recognise the vital importance of oversight, we have concerns that some of the amendments might create an unnecessary, burdensome framework that might impede the PSFA’s operational effectiveness; for example, the requirement for all meetings to be open to the public could present a significant operational concern. However, we understand the purpose and principle behind what the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, is trying to do.
Turning back to this group, these amendments ask the Government to take seriously the institution that they are creating. If the Public Sector Fraud Authority is to succeed—we all want it to—it must be allowed to operate with genuine independence, proper oversight and clear lines of public accountability. That is not bureaucracy or delay; it is simply how we build a body that the public can trust and on which Parliament can rely. We offer these proposals not to frustrate the Government’s ambition but to strengthen it by ensuring that this new authority is not only operationally capable but constitutionally sound. I urge the Minister to reflect on the questions asked and to work with us to ensure that the governance of the PSFA lives up to the seriousness of its mission. I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, it does not look as though we are ending on an easy group for me. Amendments 75A and 79A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, cover the same ground in Parts 1 and 2. The amendments would add a definition of what cannot constitute “reasonable grounds” in the legislation, setting out certain factors that will not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion.
Although I understand the intention behind the amendments, I want to assure your Lordships that stereotypes and generalisations would not be considered reasonable grounds for starting an investigation or issuing an information notice. Under the information powers, an information notice may be sent only when an authorised officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant offence has been committed. An authorised officer must genuinely suspect that the fraud has been carried out by the individual, and that belief will be based on an objective assessment of facts, information and/or intelligence. “Reasonable grounds” are a standard test used by other organisations, including the police, and it is clear that they cannot be based on a hunch or the types of personal factors listed in the amendments.
The DWP has well-established safeguards to ensure that this test is applied properly in practice, with authorised officers documenting all reasoning for their decisions, including the basis for their suspicion, and through the Bill the PSFA will implement comparable safeguards. Management checks provide further internal assurance, and both the PSFA and the DWP intend to appoint His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to independently inspect the use of these powers.
Finally, DWP guidance for authorised officers is also included in the new draft code of practice, which has been made available to noble Peers as a working draft prior to consultation. The PSFA will draft guidance on the lawful use of its information powers, which will cover this issue.
I will review the specific points made, especially regarding automated processes, and will probably end up writing to noble Lords on the questions I do not cover, but I will give a flavour of the Government’s thinking. Do the PSFA or the DWP use automated processes that enable generalisations and stereotypes when gathering information about individuals? No, we do not. The DWP does not use automated processes to decide whether an information notice will be issued, and the PSFA will not do so when the power is granted. An information notice may only ever be issued by an authorised officer, who must carefully consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to do so and document their reasons.
Regarding artificial intelligence in fraud and error, given what is being debated in the Chamber, I feel that we have two AI conversations going on. The DWP has a responsibility to ensure that fraud is minimised so that the right payments are made to the right people at the right time. Fraud controls are vital to reduce waste and protect taxpayers’ money. Advanced analytics, including machine learning, will play a critical role in tackling fraud, error and debt.
There is currently one fraud error and error machine-learning model in full deployment on universal credit advances, and others are at various stages of testing and development, designed to prevent fraud in the highest areas of loss. We have been careful to implement a supervised machine-learning approach and incorporate human intervention to consider the case and make further inquiries if necessary. Our use of advanced analytics does not replace human judgment. The Bill does not introduce automated decision-making.
To improve our approach and assure Parliament and the public of our processes, we intend to develop fairness and analysis assessments, which can be published through the annual report and accounts process. We will ensure that the fairness analysis assessment sets out the rationale for why we judge the models to be reasonable and proportionate, but without divulging the detail of our fraud and error controls, which would put the department’s security at risk.
The noble Viscount will know better than me that two proofs of concept were completed by the last Government on this issue. So there is proof of concept on EVM, but we are clear, especially from the PSFA side, that we will continue with a test and learn approach to this, and will report back with any other developments. As I said, DWP decisions on fraud and error will be made by a human. I will review his other questions to see whether I need to write to him. I hope that that gives a level of reassurance to noble Lords, and that the amendment can be withdrawn.
I appreciate the answers that the Minister has given. I also appreciate that there are more answers to come, but could she add to the answer in writing about the timing for the remaining proofs of concept: when they are going to be completed? I see that as being germane to the rolling out of this process.
My Lords, I will add that to the list of things to write to noble Lords about, if that is okay.
It is very reassuring, of course, to hear the Minister, absolutely correctly, insist that individual officers will not choose who to discriminate against. When I supported this, I was not thinking that the officers of the state would necessarily be wandering around with their own prejudices and saying, “nick them” or “investigate them”. I would want to imagine that that would not be the case.
What I think we are talking about here—and this is because the use of technology is so profoundly important to what the Government want to do—is the latent biases in the training data. The connections made between data points are notoriously inaccurate and can be arbitrary, so we are seeking some reassurance here, and I will come back on this in another group. In relation to the accuracy and inaccuracy of algorithms, as I said, last year, two-thirds of the claims flagged by the DWP algorithm as high risk were legitimate in the end, so this is not a foolproof method. Consequently, I am not entirely convinced or satisfied that the Minister has quite answered what the concerns were—certainly that I was raising.
I am so sorry to have disappointed the noble Baroness, but I will be writing to all Members to answer the questions I have outlined.
My Lords, I am sorry for the Minister’s knees: I apologise in advance. But before she theoretically sits down, in her response, she said that the DWP is essentially relying on existing practices and that this is going to be a continuation of practices that exist in the DWP. In that context, it is important to raise the fact that the Equality and Human Rights Commission has opened an investigation into the treatment of disabled and chronically ill people by the DWP, which suggests that there are real issues here. I note in this context that the EHRC had been going to come to an arrangement with the department, but then decided that the situation was so serious that it had to open a formal investigation. I guess what I am asking is: can the Minister assure me that what is being proposed in the Bill is going to take into consideration previous issues and, hopefully, correct them?
The noble Baroness will be very aware that we now have several days of Committee before us on stage 2 of the Bill, and I look forward to discussing this and many issues with her as the Committee stage progresses.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short but informative debate. I seem to be getting a bit of a track record. I thought my previous record was managing to get an amendment signed by both the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I might even have surpassed that with this one. I am not sure quite what that says.
I am partially reassured by what the Minister has said, and obviously I am sure that she and her team will follow the safeguards that she has talked about. But those safeguards are not in statutes. For example, she talked about decisions being taken only by humans in relation to putting out information requests. That is not the case. The code of conduct refers only to decisions that will affect benefits, not the information request side of things, and it is only in the code of conduct, which can be changed at will. I am uncomfortable here.
We are talking, particularly with the eligibility verification process, about very large amounts of data, potentially on 9.9 million people. Who knows how many will flag up eligibility indicators? But without a shadow of doubt, the department will be using some form of algorithmic or AI tool to decide which of those are the ones the department wants to concentrate on. If that is the case, that is where the bias can creep in. If bias creeps into the algorithm or the machine learning tool and comes up to a person, it is easy to say “computer said yes” or “computer said no” and not to question the data coming to you.
I am not totally comfortable that there really are the safeguards at the moment. We are going to come to the human interaction at a later stage of the debate, so I will not go further into that. To be honest, I suspect that the Netherlands, Sweden and Australia probably had similar safeguards. They did not work. I cannot say for certain, but most departments believe that they are doing the right thing and that the safeguards are working. But they did not in those cases, and real problems were caused to vulnerable people.
I will withdraw the amendment but this is something that we will definitely come back to. Just in passing, I also welcome the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, to the right side of the fence with us. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent
Main Page: Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Labour - Life peer)(1 week ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I see the first amendment in this group as a purely probing amendment to try to clarify matters; I trust and have every hope that, in the debates on the Bill, they will be clarified.
I ask the mover of Amendment 25 and the Minister to clarify something. I wonder about the change to the end of the amendment, which says
“awarded by a court or tribunal in relation to costs”.
I would have thought that that was covered already under Clause 13(2)(b)(i), which refers to
“costs that are awarded by a court or tribunal on or in relation to a claim for a recoverable amount”;
I agree with that. Then there is sub-paragraph (ii), which is about the Minister exercising their powers. Is that not covered by paragraph (b)(i) without adding it to (b)(ii)? This is a purely technical point because I think that it is there already.
Good afternoon, my Lords. I think that we are going to be as speedy as we were last week; the Chief Whip will continue to approve.
The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, would create additional burdens for the court system. They would also challenge the future viability of the PSFA and, therefore, its central mission of tackling public sector fraud.
Before I move on, I want to respond directly to a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. I believe that what is at stake and what is really being contested here is a matter of approach. As I said in Committee last week, being invited in to investigate by a government agency ensures a collaborative approach. We are hoping that, by working with government agencies rather than imposing ourselves on them—this is what we are learning through our current test-and-learn approach—the agencies will engage with us, meaning that we will be more likely to succeed in getting the evidence base that we need to determine the fraud.
On the specifics, the powers in the Bill let the PSFA investigate fraud against the public sector. A key rationale for this must be the deterrent effect. The PSFA must, therefore, be able to recover the money lost so that it can be used for public good and ultimately show fraudsters that their ill-gotten gains will not stay theirs for long. It is only reasonable that an element of costs recovery for the PSFA is part of this process. Amendment 23 would remove the ability of the PSFA potentially to charge for its services in future. The PSFA will act on behalf of other government departments, developing the expertise and capability required effectively to investigate fraud and recover the money lost. Providing the option to keep some of the recovered funds, subject to agreement with the public bodies concerned, will help fund the development of this expertise and will provide value for money for government and the taxpayer.
I reiterate this point to provide a level of clarity on the issue highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. The PSFA would seek to recoup its costs and not necessarily to retain all the funds awarded. We will agree a portion with the public agency that we are acting on when the PSFA takes the case. That will be agreed in advance.
Amendment 25 limits how the PSFA can recoup reasonable costs incurred in exercising the Chapter 4 recovery powers, meaning that only a court or tribunal can award them. There is already scope in Clause 13 for courts and tribunals to award costs in relation to a claim brought by the PSFA, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. However, this amendment would limit the operational flexibility of the PSFA and create extra burdens on the court system if we had to keep going back to the courts for all costs. A key aim of the Bill is to minimise the burden on the courts while ensuring that there are ample safeguards and protections in place. We already stipulate in the Bill that any costs charged have to be reasonable; we will be transparent about how we work out reasonable costs in our published guidance. However, we should always remember that investigating fraud and recovering losses is an expensive business for the Government. It is not fair that these costs are shouldered by law-abiding citizens. If you have committed fraud against the state, you should pay for this.
On how the PSFA wants to charge for its services, it is important that we recognise that, regarding money between departments and the impact on value for money, it is not uncommon for departments to charge each other for their services. The impact assessment sets out how the powers in the Bill will support the PSFA to recover up to £53.7 million over 10 years under current modelling. A significant proportion of this would otherwise have been lost to government. We create value for money by bringing funds lost to fraud or error back to government so that they can be used for public good. I hope that that explanation reassures the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and that she will therefore not press her amendments.
My Lords, before I outline the amendments in this group, I will refer to government Amendments 30, 31, 104 and 105, as your Lordships will have noticed that these have been withdrawn from the Marshalled List. Together, these amendments had sought to ensure that there was no conflict between the prohibition on a bank telling an account holder that it had received a deduction order information notice from either the PSFA or the DWP in respect of the holder’s account and any possible subject access requests, and would limit how long the prohibition had effect. Unfortunately, we found that the wording of these amendments did not achieve the desired effect. For this reason, they have been withdrawn but we will retable them once they are compliant.
I turn to the amendments in question. The current drafting of clauses in Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill may inadvertently prevent the First-tier Tribunal from exercising its right to extend the amount of time a person has to make an appeal, where there is good reason to do so. Therefore, government Amendments 26, 60, 63, 64, 86, 87, 100, 101, 119, 120 and 125 seek to prevent this from occurring and to clarify drafting across the Bill.
These amendments ensure that the First-tier Tribunal maintains its ability to extend the time limit for an appeal where there is good reason to do so, at the discretion of the tribunal. These amendments do so across the provisions in the Bill where there is a route of appeal available. This will ensure the proper consideration of appeals and that the system is focused on fair judgments. I beg to move Amendment 26 in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.
My Lords, I note the Minister’s remarks about the withdrawal of some government amendments. I will not go through them all. I look forward to their redrafting. I start by making the small point that there is an element of unpreparedness to the Bill. I realise that there is quite a lot of work in progress. My understanding is that it is an unusual approach to take, to withdraw and then redraft. The Minister will probably say that I am going too far, and I therefore look to a further explanation of that point.
Putting that to one side, the amendments that the Government have tabled appear at least in principle to be sensible changes, which permit a tribunal to extend the time limit for bringing an appeal about a direct deduction order. This relates to a DDO appeal in the public sector section of the Bill but also, as I understand it, in the DWP section, as it applies to the eligibility verification notice in respect of the agreed arrangements between the banks and the DWP. Here I refer to government Amendment 87 in particular.
However, this provides me with an opportunity to do a bit of questioning. Can the Minister outline some of the situations in which the tribunal could consider it “reasonable” to grant an extension to the review period? I suspect she will say that this is up to the tribunal to decide, but it would be helpful to understand the obvious reasons—and some of the less obvious reasons—why the tribunal could offer some leniency.
I presume that the appeal process would include an appeal not just on the DDO but to delay a payment of the DDO and to seek a reduction in the amount payable per week, with the total amount payable over a longer period. Is there an expectation that a longer period has a maximum length of time applied and a cut-off? Otherwise, it could be endless.
In the process of considering and drafting this amendment, I am sure that the Government have had regard to precedent and to how this provision has been used in other Acts. I am aware that similar provision exists in other statutes and, if the Minister could share examples with us of where extensions have been granted to individuals, why and for how long, it would help and allow the Committee to understand the practical ramifications of this amendment. I hope that the circumstances are exceptional, but the wording used in the amendment is for it to be seen as
“reasonable in all the circumstances”.
I hope that that adds to my argument.
Are there parallels to be drawn and lessons learned—for example, from the child maintenance system, for which I had responsibility—where the paying parent is defaulting on DDO payments and the tribunal system is therefore involved? Can some analogies be created?
As I said earlier, there is merit in seeking to allow greater flexibility in granting an appeal. Individuals should have adequate opportunity to exercise this right, but within reason. The amendment is, to that extent, well intentioned and it is something that we support. However, we must also be alive to the risk posed by so-called bad actors. We must ensure that flexibility does not come at the cost of action. We need to make sure that this appeal system allows those with genuine concerns to be heard and recognised, while minimising opportunities for vexatious complaints that are designed to delay and clog up the system, rather than use it responsibly. For example, it could be easy for an individual to claim that he is not able to fulfil his obligations to pay his DDO because, he states, he is suffering from mental health problems or has fluctuating psychotic episodes. What is the tried and tested system for tribunals to assess these claims thoroughly and have the necessary powers to refute or rebut what may be deliberate and vexatious claims?
In seeking precedent here, what is the experience of appeals to tribunals in other sectors—on the volume of cases, the exceptions and the knock-on effect on courts’ resourcing and delays to all cases in the pipeline? It would be most welcome to have some further clarity from the Minister about the considerations that she has towards the amendment, particularly in reference to precedent, which gives us some idea of how this is going to work.
I finish by echoing the words from my noble friend Lady Finn, who said on the last group—and she is right—that fraud against the taxpayer must be confronted robustly. My arguments on this group form the basis of that.
I thank the noble Viscount for his comments, some of which, as he will appreciate, will be explored in more detail as we get to the DWP part of the Bill, Part 2. We will explore all these issues in more detail later in Committee, including some of the examples that he seeks about how all the powers in the Bill have precedent already, although I will touch on some.
However, I will start by querying the noble Viscount and pushing back a little on the suggestion that we were unprepared with this Bill. There was a genuine drafting error. Mistakes happen; human beings are known for making them occasionally. Given the late tabling of some of the amendments, a level of genuine solidarity and collaboration across your Lordships’ House, about how we work and move forward, may be better judged.
Regarding some of the points made, I will start with the specific point about what kind of circumstances would be reasonable to extend the timeframe for appealing an overpayment notice. In all circumstances, it is wholly up to the tribunal to decide what would be a reasonable extension from one month. There are recognised principles to guide the exercise of discretion to extend time periods, or not, which the tribunal will consider. A three-stage approach is applied to consideration of any extension: first, assessing the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply with the time limit; secondly, considering why the default occurred; and, thirdly, evaluating all the circumstances of the case to enable the tribunal to deal justly with the application.
I will address the point made about civil penalties and examples of how they are used from the position of the PSFA. We will address this in more detail with the DWP as we move forward. There is precedent across government for civil penalties to be issued to the civil standard by officials delegated to by Ministers, instead of penalties being issued by court. Examples include the Environment Agency and the APHA. In instances where penalties are issued in the above manner, it is also standard practice across government departments such as the Home Office, the Environment Agency and HMRC for appeals to be made to a court or tribunal as the final route of challenge should an individual feel that a penalty, including the amount, is unfair or incorrect. We are seeking to emulate those powers for the PSFA.
In instances where penalties are not issued by officials and are issued via courts, the courts have the right to extend the specified period within which an individual or business may appeal a decision. This is part of the civil procedure rules. The noble Viscount touched on the Child Maintenance Service. As we progress through Committee, I will use it in many examples regarding the powers of the PSFA and how we will seek to use the precedent already established by the CMS.
With that, I hope that noble Lords will appreciate that these amendments are important to ensure that the Bill as it stands does not interfere with the tribunal procedural rules. Those rules are in place for good reason. While it was not our intention to impact the discretion that tribunals have on appeal timeframes, we want to bring absolute clarity to this. This also creates additional protections for people who want to engage their appeal rights. I therefore hope that your Lordships will support these amendments, which I commend to the Committee.
My Lords, given the tone of the debate that we have had so far, it may be helpful if I start by giving noble Lords some clarity on some of the issues that have been discussed.
Direct deduction orders are a mechanism by which public funds lost to fraud and error can be recovered directly from a liable person’s bank account. However, DDOs will be used only if the liable party has repeatedly chosen not to engage with the investigation and to come to the table. This is not the first and only mechanism for engaging to recoup funds; that is an important principle here.
At this point, it is also important for me to clarify exactly what is being said about junior civil servants. The people who will undertake this work are trained members of the counterfraud profession, and the PACE powers have to be approved by a magistrate. The appropriate safeguards are in place. While I am at it, I reassure the Committee that no algorithms will be used by the PSFA for anything to do with financial information gathering and the powers outlined here. I remind noble Lords that the liable person will be kept informed at the outset and throughout the process of a fund recovery.
Amendments 27 and 75 would, together, restrict the use of the direct deduction power, so that it can be used only following an application to the appropriate court. We agree with the sentiment that there should be protections in place to ensure that direct deduction orders are used proportionately and appropriately. However, this would place unnecessary and avoidable additional work on the courts, and reduce the effectiveness of the power and the amount of taxpayers’ money returned to the public purse. By this stage of the process, a liable person would have already agreed that the amount is recoverable or the courts would have made a final determination that it is.
The noble Baroness mentioned a moment ago that a direct deduction order can be made only when a person has already agreed that an amount is recoverable. Could she point out where that is in the Bill? I cannot find it anywhere.
My Lords, I am assured that it is in the Bill. I ask noble Lords to bear with; as soon as that has been passed to me, I will highlight exactly where in the Bill it is.
It is in Clause 12. That was like magic.
Could the noble Baroness explain again why a garnishee order—the collection of debt from a third party—is not mentioned in the legislation at all?
My Lords, a garnishee order is used to obtain money directly from a third party. That is not the process that we are undertaking; we are regaining money directly from an individual, as opposed to a third party. I am happy to write to the noble Lord with more guidance on that, but that is my understanding.
I move on to Amendment 29, which would necessitate a “reasonable belief”, rather than a “belief”, that a bank account is held by the liable person prior to the PSFA requesting bank statements from the bank to inform decisions on direct deduction orders. In practice, the PSFA will already be operating at this level as it will already, through the course of its fraud investigation, have developed an overview of the liable person’s financial information.
In addition, having thrilled the Committee with my recitations from Managing Public Money last Wednesday, I am excited to be able to quote from another government page turner, The Judge Over Your Shoulder. All “public law powers” must be exercised with
“reasonableness or rationality—following a proper reasoning process and so coming to a reasonable conclusion”.
Making a Minister’s belief a “reasonable” belief therefore has no effect, because they are already subject to it.
In addition, Clause 19 lets the PSFA issue a general information notice to banks, which provides confirmation of the accounts that a liable person holds. The amendment is therefore not adding anything new.
Amendment 62 seeks to remove the ability to restart a deduction from earnings order once it has been suspended. For some context, a deduction from earnings order is a mechanism by which public funds lost to fraud and error can be recovered directly from a liable person who is not in PAYE employment. Having listened to the debate, I have some sympathy with noble Lords; however, it is important that the PSFA remains able to issue, vary, suspend and restart, or revoke a deduction from earnings order, for very human reasons.
We need to be able to suspend and restart a deduction from earnings order due to a temporary change in the liable person’s circumstances; for example, if they were temporarily hospitalised. People’s lives, as we know, can be messy; it is important that we have the flexibility to recognise that. Where it is more appropriate to revoke the order altogether, this is provided for in Clause 47.
The purpose of the amendment therefore overlaps with existing provision which gives the necessary flexibility while maintaining clear communication with both employers and liable persons, maintaining a fair and transparent debt recovery process. If this provision was adopted, an unfortunate consequence would be the end of such flexibility and the reluctance of anyone to suspend payments due to having to restart the process.
I hope that this explanation reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will withdraw Amendment 27.
My Lords, I have a number of points. It was very interesting that the Minister concluded in relation to one of these amendments that “people’s lives can be messy”. It is precisely for that reason that in saying that DDOs will be issued only due to a lack of engagement, without any consideration of why that lack of engagement might happen, it might well be because people’s lives are very messy, to quote the Minister. So I am not convinced by that at all.
To reassure the noble Baroness, efforts to engage with a liable person would not be just a one-off hit. There would be over a dozen attempts, under my understanding of the Act. So it is not just a one-time effort to engage with each liable person. By the time we got to the process of a direct deduction order, there would have been multiple efforts to engage with the liable person.
It is quite feasible that I have missed the multiple efforts in the reading of the Bill. Maybe it is there—it might be another bit that I have missed. But I do not think that is clear, so maybe that could be clarified.
I am sure that this is the intention—the problem is the principle. We were given the explanation that I thought we would be given: we are doing this directly and not going for judicial authorisation because the courts just have too much work on. I always worry about an explanation that says that it will cause too much work for the courts. On this basis, we may as well cut out sending anyone to a court and put them into prison—because that court process is so darned long-winded for everything, is it not? But we do not say that, because the court system sets in place safeguards to ensure that people are not unfairly treated. We do not have a direct situation where a Government of the day simply decide that the courts are dispensable with. That is the principle that I was trying to raise here, so I do not think that is a satisfactory answer.
I was also unconvinced by the argument, which I will go through, that HMRC already has powers to deduct money directly from bank accounts under Schedule 8 to the Finance (No.2) Act 2015. Actually, there are statutory safeguards, including the requirement that HMRC retains £5,000 in the debtor’s accounts, and guidance about who HMRC should deem as at a particular disadvantage. That is not in this Bill. It is part of that Bill, which was cited as a reassurance to me.
The comparison with child maintenance is also a false comparison. Child maintenance is money owed by one parent to ensure provision for their dependant who does not live with them. That differs greatly from an individual claiming money from, for example, the social security system, who potentially has been overpaid—as I keep pointing out, through no fault of their own. I do not think those two things count as equivalences at all.
I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for the amendment on stop-starting DDOs. I have some sympathy with her approach in terms of them being permanently never allowed to start again. My nervousness with it is that it feels so arbitrary. The explanation given was that people have messy lives, which is fine, but I do not want to be in a situation whereby I am nodding through a system that means that people could keep having their direct deduction orders stop and start because of the messiness of government. We are told that it is the messiness of people’s lives, but it is not clear that that would be the only reason why this would occur; it is not in the Bill.
Of course, I shall not press my amendments, but I imagine that I will return with some of them on Report.
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity presented by this group of amendments to talk about some of the safeguards in the Bill for the recovery powers. The liable person will always be provided an opportunity to voluntarily repay, as I said in the previous group. The Bill affords them rights of making representations, and review and appeal to a court or tribunal. There are set maximum regular deduction rates and we have written into the legislation that deductions must be fair and affordable. Vulnerability will be considered at every step of the way and action taken where appropriate to tailor our approach accordingly.
As the Government have developed this approach, we have had to balance necessary and proportionate safeguards against the requirement for operational flexibility to efficiently and effectively recover money that the liable person should never have had in the first place—money that could and should have been used for the public good. I firmly believe that we have struck the right balance here. Unfortunately, the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, while well intentioned, will negatively impact our recovery activity while not providing any meaningful additional protections.
Amendment 28 would limit recovery from joint accounts if the liable person had a sole account from which the full amount owed could be recovered within five years. To reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, what this amendment misses is that recovery from a joint account is already limited to the beneficial interest of the liable person. I understand her concerns about how that would be allocated but we believe we have a responsible medium here. The joint account holder is able to make representations on this matter to ensure that the funds taken into consideration are solely those of the liable person.
The amendment therefore limits the operational flexibility of the PSFA to undertake recovery action and provides no further protection to joint account holders. The time taken to recover will depend on the facts of the particular case and on the amount being recovered—five years may be suitable for some amounts but may not be where the PSFA is recovering substantially larger amounts and is seeking to do so over a longer period.
There may also be circumstances where repayment needs to take place over a longer period; for example, for those who are vulnerable or face hardship but none the less have the money to make repayments. It is important that the PSFA retains the flexibility required to recover a wide range of debts of varying amounts and to tailor repayments to the liable person’s circumstances.
Amendment 33A would require the PSFA to try to establish the joint account holder’s beneficial interest before using the formula defined in the Bill. This is duplicative and already provided for under Clause 20(3), which states that
“the presumption does not apply where the Minister has reason to believe that the liable person’s beneficial interest is different from the presumed share”;
that is, on review of the statements obtained for the account in question. As mentioned already, all joint account holders will have the opportunity to make representations as to their beneficial interest before any money leaves the account.
Amendment 34 would require the PSFA to provide the direct deduction order notice to the liable person within seven working days of it being provided to the bank. However, the current drafting already stipulates that the order must be shared
“as soon as reasonably practicable”.
I cannot foresee many circumstances where this would ever be more than seven days; after all, we want the money back. It is also important to maintain an element of flexibility to ensure that the banks have sufficient time to put in place the restrictions under Clause 26. This is to prevent the liable person from moving money out of their account and circumventing the debt recovery process.
Amendment 50 relates to applications to vary direct deduction orders and would compel the PSFA to set out its reasons behind any decision. This amendment is duplicative. The PSFA would be doing this anyway as a matter of good public law. The liable person should know why applications have been agreed or rejected, and it is necessary they know why if they are then to take up their review and appeal rights. The PSFA would also publish guidance on applications to vary, setting out its high-level approach.
Amendment 53 relates to the unfortunate circumstance where someone dies while a deduction order is in place. It would compel the PSFA to write to the next of kin or estate to confirm the cessation of the order. The Bill already stipulates that the order ceases as soon as the PSFA becomes aware of a death. This simply creates another administrative burden for the PSFA as it would be expected to hold information on next of kin or personal representatives—information that the banks themselves are unlikely to hold as it is not mandatory for this information to be given to banks by account holders.
The suggestion in Amendment 55 is an interesting one. It would prevent suspended direct deduction orders being restarted after a period of 24 months. This would impact the discretion that the PSFA could offer to those who owe money but have experienced an impactful, if temporary, change in their circumstances; for instance, through losing a job or undergoing medical treatment. It would also limit the operational flexibility of the PSFA, which would still have a duty to establish the most appropriate way of responding to such circumstances, balanced against the duty to recover money lost to fraud and error.
For example, someone may come forward to the PSFA after a DDO has been put in place and seek to negotiate because of a change in their circumstances. They may seek to engage directly and to negotiate their payments going forward but then fail to see things through. This could happen over a period of two years; we would then have to start the process all over again. Moreover, the Minister will already have the power to revoke a DDO if the liable person’s circumstances necessitate it.
I hope that these explanations reassure noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
There is one matter that occurs to me in respect of Amendment 53. In the event of somebody’s death, where the deceased has been subject to a DDO, could this be included in the “Tell Us Once” service? That is, where a next of kin registers the death with the registrar, could the DDO be highlighted as part of the “Tell Us Once” service? Of course, this would include the highlighting of that revocation.
I thank the noble Viscount for giving me the opportunity to reassure him that, yes, it can and it will.
On Amendment 55, I understand that 24 months may not be the right number, but it cannot be right that an order can stay open indefinitely so that, 10 or 15 years later, the PSFA can suddenly start taking money from the account again. There must be some sort of drop-dead point; I wonder where that should sit.
I beg the leave of the Committee to consider that; I will reflect on it and come back in due course.
I thank the Minister. I thank my noble friend for bringing up the “Tell Us Once” service. A lot of people have said that it has brought them a lot of comfort after a relative has died; if this service could be incorporated here, that would be very good indeed.
In this group of amendments, we have made the case that, although the objectives of recovering public money, tackling fraud and commanding support are not in question, as we have constantly reiterated in Committee, the mechanisms by which the Bill proposes to do so raise legitimate concerns that cannot easily be brushed aside. I emphasise that our amendments do not seek to frustrate the intent of the legislation; on the contrary, they are designed to ensure that the framework being created is legally sound and operationally effective.
We are talking about powers that will reach into people’s bank accounts and affect the relationships that they have with innocent third parties, whether they be joint account holders or dependants; I heard very clearly what the Minister said about joint bank accounts but there are still issues here that may have to be worked through or thought about. This is a significant undertaking on behalf of the Government, and it comes with a weighty responsibility to get the detail right.
Today, we have raised not theoretical issues but practical, real-life scenarios where the Bill, as it is currently drafted, could cause confusion, injustice or unnecessary distress. We have heard how a blunt formula could allow assets to be shielded or, worse, wrongly seized. We have pointed to the risk of leaving innocent third parties in the dark. We have also highlighted the critical importance of transparency when powers are exercised and challenged. I should say that, in terms of the innocent third parties in the dark, the “Tell Us Once” commitment is most welcome.
It is not enough to say that the Cabinet Office will act reasonably. The law must require the Cabinet Office to do so. It must give people the right to be informed, the right to understand decisions made about them, and the right to challenge those decisions with the benefit of clear reasoning and evidence. We are not opposing the principle of direct deduction orders. We are simply asking for a system that reflects the complexity of real people’s lives and relationships, and that recognises that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. We believe, therefore, that these amendments are proportionate, constructive and necessary. They would not weaken the Government’s ability to recover funds; they would strengthen the public’s trust in how that ability is used.
I say again: we support the aim of the Bill but, if we are to ask the public to accept a system of such reach and impact, we owe it to them to ensure that it is as fair, clear and humane as possible. I believe that our proposals today are a step towards achieving just that, and I hope the Government will give them the serious consideration they deserve. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, I did not speak at Second Reading, but the Bill has attracted my interest for the reasons a number of noble Lords have pointed out about procedure and due process. I share the concern about the risk of debanking en masse a group of individuals whom banks will view as not particularly good customers in terms of the money they deposit and as they now come with greater risks. I would also like to know what the Government’s thinking is on that issue.
Looking at this from the point of view of the bank, I am a bit concerned about the relationship between Clause 19(4) and Clause 19(10). Clause 19(4) says:
“The Minister may give an account information notice relating to an account only for the purpose of determining whether to make a direct deduction order in respect of the account”.
If the bank receives such a request for an account information notice, but for some reason considers there may be a different purpose in that request, what is the bank supposed to do? Clause 19(8) says:
“The bank must comply with a notice given under this section”.
However, Clause 19(4) puts a clear limit in terms of the lawfulness of giving an account information notice. Who is to assess whether there is any doubt as to the purpose of that account information notice?
In Clause 19(10), it says:
“Information given to the Minister in response to a notice under this section may be used by the Minister for the purpose of exercising the core functions but not for any other purpose”.
Of course, the core functions are wider than the purpose identified in Clause 19(4), which says that you can give an account information notice only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. But then, in Clause 19(10), that information may be used for wider purposes than enabling the taking of that decision.
That puts the bank in a bit of difficult position. It is told that it must comply with a notice but also that the notice must be only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. If it has any doubt, presumably it owes a duty to its customers and will have to consider how to behave in that situation. Further, it is also told that the information it will be providing may be used for wider purposes than simply the making of a direct deduction order. I would like to hear from the Government how they see the relationship between these various provisions in Clause 19, and where that leaves the bank in that kind of scenario.
My Lords, is it not always the case that you get the most difficult question just before you stand up? I am going to speak really slowly until I get a speaking note that gives me the appropriate answer.
I confirm that the Government are extremely mindful of the burdens this Bill places on business, including the banking sector. We want to ensure that it is not subject to disproportionate burdens or costs in complying with these measures. I will start by referring to the Bill’s published impact assessment, which sets out all the expected costs to businesses, including banks, of the PSFA measures. This has been green rated by the Regulatory Policy Committee and sets out the minimal expected costs to businesses where it has been possible to do so, including to banks for Part 1 of the Bill’s measures.
Throughout the development of this Bill, we have tried to strike the right balance between requiring actions from banks in a fair and proportionate way while achieving our policy intent of recouping vital public funds lost to fraud and error. This is why there has been sustained engagement with key representatives of the sector, including UK Finance, individual banks, building societies, HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority. Some of this is reflected in government amendments that we will discuss later in Committee.
We know that the sector is supportive of the Bill’s objectives from the evidence provided by UK Finance in Committee in the other place. We have benefited from the sector’s operational insights, which have led us to table a number of amendments as a direct result to ease the implementation and delivery of the recovery powers. The PSFA and the DWP will, for their relevant measures, will continue to work closely with banks on the design and implementation of relevant measures, including consulting on relevant regulations.
Can I just press the Minister a little more? I realise that, as she rightly said, we will explore these matters later in Committee—in particular, when we look at the DWP aspects of the Bill—but it would be helpful to have a bit more information on what the banks are thinking. What is their experience in terms of the work that has been undertaken so far? As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said—she is concerned about the so-called government inspectors approach taken by the banks—obviously, they are not doing this out of the good of their hearts. So it would be helpful to have a little more information, given that the work is by no means done; it is a work in progress. I have certainly been pulled up for calling this whole process a pilot scheme—I think that it is called “test and learn” or something—but some more information for the Committee at this early stage would be very helpful.
My Lords, it would be inappropriate for me to speak on behalf of the banks, and I do not think that noble Lords would want me to do so. But as far as I am aware—having said I will not speak for them, I am now going to—the banks are supportive of the approach we are taking. In terms of fraud, we are working very closely with them. The banks, however, want us to be as similar to HMRC as possible, and we are trying to do that. Given that those are regulations they currently work with in day-in, day-out, that is what we are trying to emulate. I think that is as far as I can go. The noble Viscount should be reassured that we are engaging directly with UK Finance regularly, and he might want to reflect on the evidence that it gave in Committee stage in the other place about how comfortable it was with this section of the Bill.
I think it is fair to say that UK Finance and the banks, in terms of all the evidence that I have read, are obviously happy to sit down with Ministers to try and negotiate their way through this Bill. I do not think that is entirely fairly or accurately described as them being happy with this. They are being asked to do things by coercion in this Bill. I am not saying that word to be offensive. I mean they have not chosen to do it—the Government have told them they have to do it. In many instances, banks are required to do what the Government tell them in relation to their own customers or face penalties if they do not. Consequently, they are trying to negotiate the best of a bad deal. That is not quite the same as an enthusiasm for the Bill. I think that is worth noting, as we would not want to mislead.
I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that what I actually said was that I did not want to speak on behalf of the banks. However, I find the word “coercion” a complete exaggeration and unnecessary. Just to clarify as well, the banks will not face penalties at any point in the Bill, unless I am to be corrected—and if I am wrong, I will correct the record. This is a process of trying to recoup government funds—taxpayers’ funds—to make sure that we get the money back. That is what we are trying to do and that is why this legislation is in place. We are working with the sector to make sure we can get our money back.
I think we all want to see a system that robustly tackles fraud against the public purse but that also recognises and respects the practical consequences of how it is delivered. The debate on the amendments in this group has shown that we need to be honest about the fact that in this Bill we are asking commercial banks to step beyond their core functions and dedicate staff time, infrastructure and internal resources to deliver outcomes for the state. When the public sector is asking the private sector to help to tackle public sector fraud, that is no small ask and should not be treated as such.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, have correctly highlighted the problems when you place onerous responsibilities on the banks in regard to a class of individuals. There is obviously a danger that it is going to make it less likely that vulnerable people can access services because the banks will just decide it is not worth the bother and will debank difficult or troublesome people. Those are very important areas to be worked through.
I really appreciate that the Government are still in discussions, but we are actually legislating here and now, and it is a bit uncomfortable that the discussions are obviously still ongoing while we are trying to refine the legislation. It would be good if we could keep this alive with what the banks actually want to conclude.
The amendments that we have proposed today on requiring due regard for cost, on ensuring review after implementation and on giving banks a voice in determining their recovery of the cost are all designed to introduce fairness, clarity and proportionality in what would otherwise be quite a heavily one-sided obligation. The amendments do not dilute the objective of the Bill, nor do they place unreasonable burdens on government. They recognise that the success of this policy depends on continued collaboration and good will from the financial sector, and that is something that cannot be taken for granted if banks are expected to absorb ever-growing public responsibilities without recognition or recourse.
We have heard much today about partnership in tackling fraud, but partnership requires reciprocity; it means listening, engaging and sharing responsibility—not simply offloading it. These amendments are an invitation to government to show that they understand that principle and to embed it in the Bill.
Before I finish, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for pointing the potential inconsistency in Clause 19, between subsections (4) and (10). We would be interested to hear how that will operate. This is not a question of principle—
Before the noble Baroness—I hope—withdraws her amendment, I need to clarify something, as I misunderstood the advice that I received from my Box. I need to apologise to the Committee and to make it very clear that there are penalties up to £300 a day that could be on banks —but it is more likely to be £300 under Clause 53, which is why we are working with them on guidance and why there are ongoing conversations.
I thank the Minister.
To conclude, these amendments are not on a question of principle, because we all support the purpose. It is a question of practicality and fairness and maintaining a constructive relationship between the state and the financial institutions on which it relies. I urge the Government carefully to reflect on that relationship and urge noble Lords to support the amendments in the interests of a Bill that is both effective and equitable. On that basis, I beg to withdraw.
My Lords, these amendments all relate to the determination of deduction amounts for regular direct deduction orders. Government Amendments 35, 36 and 37 amend Clause 23 to ensure that a regular direct deduction order from the Public Sector Fraud Authority must specify the amounts to be deducted. Government Amendment 43 is a consequential amendment to Clause 26.
Government Amendments 110, 111, 112 and 115 make an equivalent amendment for regular direct deduction orders issued by the DWP under Schedule 5 to ensure that the order must specify the amount to be deducted. These amendments arise from the continued engagement that we are having with representatives of the finance industry, as I said in the last group, and seek to address their concerns.
In this case, concerns were raised that the Bill potentially placed an unnecessary decision-making responsibility on banks and financial institutions—specifically, a duty that they may be required to provide or make a calculation of the amount to be deducted when receiving a regular direct deduction order. They requested that we remove these implied duties if it was the Government’s intent to always specify amounts to be deducted. As this is the intent of the PSFA and the DWP, we agree with the proposed suggestion to remove the references to calculations and make it explicit that government should always specify the deduction amount. These amendments achieve that under both parts of the Bill, address this concern and clarify the duties on the banks when making a regular direct deduction. I therefore beg to move the amendments tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.
My Lords, the government amendments in this group are in principle welcome. They sensibly seek to simplify deduction orders and ease the operational burden they place on banks—which, let us be clear, are intimately involved in enabling the exercise of the provisions in the Bill. However, the real issue here is not with the content of the amendments but with the process that led to their necessity. These changes are not minor corrections, nor are they are clarifications. They alter the way in which deduction orders function and work operationally. They exist because the Government have belatedly taken on board feedback from banks and financial institutions—institutions that clearly, and surprisingly, were not properly consulted before the Bill was introduced. As I said in the debate on the previous group, this raises serious concern about how the Bill is being developed.
My Lords, I appreciate the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, specifically her questions as to why calculations for DDOs are in the Bill in the first place and why the need for this change did not come to light earlier. Referencing calculations is established practice in the context of employers making calculations for deduction from earnings orders, hence the drafting reflected here for direct deduction orders. Continued engagement with the financial sector has covered an array of content related to the Bill. As we have moved to discuss implementation, any issues raised have been considered and, where appropriate, acted on by officials in order to smooth the implementation of the powers.
This Government have been engaging extensively with the financial sector. It requested that we remove references to banks calculating amounts to be deducted through a regular DDO. This is because the banks felt that it would create an excessive burden that gave them too much responsibility for making decisions regarding deduction amounts. Utilising the deduction order information notices, the PSFA will already have a fuller understanding than the bank of the liable person’s total financial affairs. Along with its obligation to ensure that deductions are fair and affordable, it is right that the PSFA determines what the deductions will be, and it provides another safeguard. I therefore hope that your Lordships will support these amendments. I commend them to the Committee.
My Lords, this next group of government amendments seeks to bring further clarity to the process of engaging with banks on direct deduction orders. Government Amendments 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 113, 114 and 116 seek to clarify the purpose of the previously named “first notice” by renaming it a “pre-deduction notice” for the PSFA and the DWP respectively. It is just changing the name, nothing more. These minor and technical amendments reflect that the Government are acting in response to feedback from the banking sector about the description of notices. It felt that the naming was confusing, so we have changed it. We appreciate the sector’s engagement.
Similarly, government Amendments 106, 107, 108 and 118 follow on from feedback from the sector for greater clarity on the approach to the issue and subsequent processing of the notices, and make the application of the powers easier for financial institutions to understand. They support the intention that all relevant parties impacted by the debt powers of the Bill are correctly notified of the action to be taken. I beg to move.
It is great to be having a dialogue with the noble Baroness. We welcome the Government’s amendments in this group which, taken together, amount to a series of technical clarifications and improvements to the Bill. As the noble Baroness said, they do not fundamentally alter the policy intent, but they help to tighten its operation, provide greater clarity and ensure that the provisions are more workable in practice. We broadly support these amendments and will not oppose their inclusion.
However, I note that even so-called technical amendments can have material consequences for those tasked with delivering the measures in the Bill—whether public bodies, private firms or individuals. It is important that any changes, however minor they may appear, are properly explained and fully understood by those affected.
I also take this opportunity to remind the Committee that, when a Bill is heavily reliant on secondary legislation and technical detail, as this one is, we must be especially vigilant in making sure that these fine-tuning amendments do not obscure bigger questions of transparency, proportionality and accountability. We will continue to keep a close eye on those issues as the Bill progresses. So, while we support this group of amendments, we urge the Government to maintain the spirit of openness and collaboration that they have shown so far as further changes inevitably arise, and to ensure that the cumulative impact of even minor adjustments is properly assessed. With that said, we are content to support these amendments.
I take this opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for both her engagement and support for this group of amendments and her wider engagement on the Bill.
While these amendments alone are relatively minor, together they reflect the importance of the ongoing consultation with key stakeholders, which is intrinsically linked with a desire to ensure that the legislation is as clear, precise and straightforward to implement as possible. The PSFA has consulted departments, public bodies, academics and non-public sector groups over many years of policy work to identify and resolve gaps in debt management powers across government. The PSFA has continued to work with stakeholders to consult on these powers as they go through Parliament and is committed to continuing to do so during implementation. We have listened directly to feedback raised by the financial sector and are taking the steps necessary to bring the clarity it seeks. I therefore hope that your Lordships will support these amendments.
In support of my noble friend Lady Finn and in the spirit of agreeing with what is going on, I just want to ask a probing question of the Minister that is perhaps a little unfair. As we have noticed, there are a number of government amendments here and there is work in progress. The agreement between the Government and the banks continues. Does she have any idea when this will end? In other words, as Committee progresses, should we expect further government amendments as the banks and the Government work together to nail down the detail of agreements concerning the Public Sector Fraud Authority and the Department for Work and Pensions?
I thank the noble Viscount. I feel like these may be famous last words, but I am assured that we hope not to table any more government amendments in Committee.
My Lords, we recognise that there can be extenuating and difficult circumstances where someone has to take over another’s personal and financial affairs, such as making a power of attorney. Government Amendments 46, 61 and 121 clarify the role of a legal deputy with regard to the direct deduction order provisions for the PSFA and the DWP. These amendments follow our ongoing engagement with the financial services sector, which sought clarity as to how it would carry out a direct deduction order where a legal deputy has been put in place. We have benefited from the operational insight of the banks and have tabled this amendment to ease the operationalisation of the recovery powers.
Government Amendment 61 inserts an additional clause after Clause 36 to ensure that the provisions about direct deduction orders in Part 1 operate effectively where a person acts on behalf of an account holder by virtue of a power of attorney or as a court-appointed deputy. The amendment has the effect that any direct deduction order provisions and requirements have to be carried out by any legal deputies of the liable person, ensuring that recovery action can still proceed effectively.
Government Amendment 46 is a consequential amendment to ensure that the restrictions to prevent someone frustrating the direct deduction order will also apply to a person acting on behalf of an account holder.
Government Amendment 121 makes equivalent provision for the DWP as government Amendment 61 does for the PSFA. This brings clarity to the financial institutions that have to deal with deputies. It also brings protections to the liable person, ensuring that they are not unfairly given a non-compliance penalty if it is in fact their legal deputy who is not engaging with us on repayment or attempting to frustrate a deduction order. I beg to move.
My Lords, we welcome the Government’s amendment to make provision for cases where an individual with liability under the Bill has a person with power of attorney appointed to act on their behalf. This is a pragmatic step recognising that in some circumstances an individual may not be capable of handling their own financial affairs, whether due to age, illness or incapacity, and that there must be a clear legal route for compliance and communication to proceed.
It is right that, despite these circumstances, we should continue to recover public money that has been gained through fraud, given that adequate safeguards are in check, which I and my noble friend Lord Younger will address later in Committee. We therefore support the principle behind this amendment. It brings a degree of clarity and certainty to what could otherwise be a difficult area and ensures that the processes set out in the Bill can still function effectively when a liable person is not acting for themselves.
However, we wish to raise a concern which we hope the Minister can provide reassurance on. While this amendment provides for cases where a power of attorney exists, it does not appear to make provision for what happens when no such power is in place. In reality, there will be vulnerable individuals who may not have granted a power of attorney and who may also lack the capacity to manage their affairs independently.
In such cases, how will the provisions about direct deduction orders, as set out in Part 1, continue to operate effectively? Who is to be regarded as liable under the provisions in the Bill? Who will be entitled to challenge a notice or a penalty? Without a mechanism to address this situation, there is a risk that enforcement could falter—or worse, that it could proceed inappropriately without proper safeguards in place for the individual concerned.
We would therefore welcome the Government’s thoughts on how such cases will be handled in practice and whether there are plans to issue guidance or put in place safeguards to ensure that vulnerable individuals without formal representation are not unfairly affected by the processes introduced by this Bill.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for raising those specifics and for the collegiate nature of her contribution, giving me enough time to get the appropriate reassurances from my colleagues. I also thank her because we have not yet really discussed the vulnerability protections that are in place, and this gives us an opportunity to do so. As we progress through Committee, there will be many opportunities to discuss this, but I welcome the opportunity to provide some level of reassurance now.
Existing government standards on vulnerability, such as His Majesty’s Government’s debt management vulnerability toolkit, will be utilised by the PSFA. Vulnerability assessments will be carried out at the start of each investigation. These will review any evidence of financial, social or personal vulnerability and then determine how best to engage with the personal impact and subsequent enforcement action. Vulnerability will be kept under regular review as a case progresses and the vulnerability assessment will be regularly updated. During debt resolution, the liable individual will have additional opportunities to identify vulnerabilities. Debt resolution policy will take vulnerable customers into account and there will be a range of adaptations and forbearances on offer to support them. We will publish further guidance on this issue related to vulnerabilities.
These amendments resulted from direct engagement with the finance sector. We have been keen to seek its insight on how to use these powers and to table amendments that bring clarity to its roles. However, these amendments also ensure that those who act as a legal deputy on behalf of an account holder must adhere to the terms of any deduction order put in place. They set out clear obligations for them and put protections in place for the liable person whose affairs are being looked after by such a deputy. I hope your Lordships will support these amendments.
My Lords, I turn to a group of amendments designed to remove duplication and bring greater clarity to certain parts of the debt recovery powers for the PSFA and the DWP.
Government Amendment 51 seeks to simplify drafting by removing an unnecessary requirement for the PSFA to seek representations on an application to vary a deduction order where, in order to make such a request, all account holders must have already consented. Government Amendments 52 and 117 seek to leave out redundant subsections to remove duplication. The subsections referenced outline that a bank must comply with a varied direct deduction order as per Clause 23(5) for the PSFA or new paragraph 7(5) in Schedule 5 for the DWP. However, Clause 23(5) and new paragraph 7(5) already state that a bank must comply with every direct deduction order. Government Amendments 98 and 99 remove unnecessary references to a payment or credit in Clause 85, both of which are within the relevant definition of “benefit” already as a result of Section 121DA(5) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.
These amendments will help make the Bill as clear as possible, which I trust is welcomed by your Lordships’ Committee. I beg to move Amendment 51 tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.
My Lords, I will speak very briefly on this group of government amendments which make a number of technical and definitional clarifications to the Bill. We on these Benches broadly support the changes in this group. These amendments serve an important purpose in tightening the language of the Bill and ensuring that the provisions are legally coherent, internally consistent and practically operable. We recognise the importance of ensuring that statutory language is as clear and precise as possible, not only for those who will be responsible for implementing these powers but also for those who may be subject to them.
In some cases, these amendments address minor inconsistencies in wording; in others they bring greater alignment between different parts of the Bill or between this Bill and the existing legislation. These are the kinds of technical improvements that are important to ensure that legislation operates as intended and we welcome the Government’s attention to detail in this regard. It is, of course, always preferable for such clarifications to be made earlier in the process—sorry to spoil it; it was getting too friendly—but we appreciate that, particularly in complex Bills such as this one, a certain amount of refinement is inevitable as the provisions are examined more closely by Parliament.
While there is no need to dwell at length on what are by nature technical changes, we support the amendments in this group and are pleased to see the Bill improved through their inclusion.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. I simply end by stating again that the effect of these amendments is to clarify the drafting and remove redundant drafting that is already provided for. It is important that we have clear and precise legislation to aid implementation of these powers, all of which will be used to tackle the scourge of fraud against the public sector. Therefore, I hope noble Lords will provide their support to these amendments.
My Lords, I have lots of bits of paper, and they are all written in my handwriting, which means that it will be even harder for me to read them—so bear with me.
Amendments 56, 57, 58 and 59 would establish a new body with responsibility to conduct reviews of direct deduction order decisions. Under the current drafting, internal reviews can be requested to challenge, for instance, whether a direct deduction order is the most appropriate form of repayment or whether the deduction amount is fair and affordable. Internal reviews are important, as they provide a straightforward and affordable way for the liable person to present a challenge to direct deduction order decision-making. They are an impartial element of many review processes. Indeed, if we turn to cross-government precedence, we can look at Child Maintenance Service and HMRC deduction orders. Both of these include an internal review stage without necessitating the creation of another new body.
For DDO reviews, the reviewing officer will be a trained authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision-maker. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, that is in Clause 66(3) of the Bill. They would not have been involved in this case until a review had been requested. They may decide to uphold, vary or revoke the direct deduction order. This decision will be based on an assessment of the material held and any relevant new information provided by the liable person.
To reassure the Committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, anticipated, if the liable person disagrees with their decision, there are further appeal rights through the First-tier Tribunal. We specified the First-tier Tribunal for ease of access; no costs are awarded, and there is quick access to justice. We believe that that is a responsible option.
We believe that the amendments are duplicative, as there is already the right to independent review built into the legislation. Also, the proposals outlined in the Bill would not require the extra costs or resources that the application of these amendments would. I highlight Clause 64, which already creates the role of an independent person, who will have the responsibility of reviewing how the PSFA are using the powers and whether this is being done correctly, ensuring another layer of independence and safeguard.
On some of the specific questions, Clause 35 outlines the appeal process. The liable person can make representations before the DDO and then make appeals to vary the terms throughout engagement.
The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, asked why the liable person cannot challenge the amount owed in the internal review. That was not quite his question, but this is the answer I have. All reviewing appeal options will clearly be signposted to the liable person throughout our interactions with them; the liable person will already have had opportunities to challenge the amount owed, either as a result of fraud, error or the application of a penalty, in the relevant court or tribunal proceedings. We believe that that provides more than ample opportunity to challenge.
While we want to let people present their positions, we also do not want them to be allowed to excessively frustrate the recovery process and cause unwanted delay in the return of vital funds.
Maybe I should just clarify. I am not suggesting that the Cabinet Office is full of malign people out to behave badly, and I was not suggesting that they all need to be punished. I was more suggesting that the reason why it would be useful to have an independent review body was for exactly the reasons that fellow noble Lords have pointed out—that if people wish to challenge decisions that are made, it is very important they feel they can go to a body where they will not necessarily be working directly with the people who made the original decision, as has been described. No one is suggesting that there is an evil, scheming group there.
The comparison with the Horizon scandal that I was trying to make was about the sense of intimidation and fear when someone feels that they have been wrongly treated, then when they appeal or try and go to a body to sort it out and it ends up being the same people who punished them in the first place. Maybe I misspoke before, but it is this that I am concerned about—so I would like this independent review body to exist so that those who are liable have somewhere independent to appeal to, straightforwardly.
My Lords, in response to the noble Baroness, I state that there is the First-tier Tribunal opportunity, in terms of there being an independent process to go to. That is why we have put in place the additional safeguards with regard to the independent person who will be appointed to review all cases at their discretion, not at that of the Cabinet Office, as well as HMICFRS—so there is someone who has oversight. That is also why we are making ourselves subject to the IOPC for matters of complaints, as outlined in the Bill.
The noble Baroness raises a very important point about Horizon. I assure noble Lords that the Horizon scandal and how we ensure that it is not repeated has been central to this Government’s thinking on safeguarding. In light of the seriousness of events, the Government wish to proactively ensure the highest levels of oversight in new legislation, and that is why they exist in this Bill.
With regard to one of the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on the appointment of the independent person subject to a parliamentary pre-appointment hearing, the Government cannot commit to this at this stage. Cabinet Office guidance states that it should be discussed between the relevant Secretary of State and the chair of the relevant Select Committee. The Government want to make sure that the independent person is demonstrably independent and are exploring all available routes to achieve that. I hope that we will be able to discuss that further in due course, but with these explanations I hope that I have reassured noble Lords and that therefore they will not press their amendments.
I just wanted a bit more clarity in terms of the Child Maintenance Service, which she alluded to. My understanding is that, if there is a problem with cases looked at by the CMS, they go up to a different level to ICE—the independent case examiner—and complaints are reviewed.
I am a little bit confused as to exactly what the Minister’s argument was. Backing up the argument from my noble friend Lady Finn, we are strongly looking for independence in the public sector. I was not quite sure whether the Minister was saying that it was okay because rather like the Child Maintenance Service there is an independence or if it is something else?
I apologise if I was not clear. My point was that internal reviews are already a normal process within government. HMRC, the DWP and the Child Maintenance Service already adopt them.
I thank noble Lords and thank the Minister for her response. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, may feel that this is consensual camaraderie. However, I can assure her that, while I am very grateful to the Ministers on the Bench opposite for their constructive engagement, I do not think there was very much consensual in what I said in my Second Reading speech on the powers of the Cabinet Office and various other parts of the Bill. I really did emphasise that I was very concerned about junior civil servants being granted sweeping powers, with the reviews and redress being carried out merely by a higher-grade official—the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, made that point—within the same department and not by an external body. The concern has always been that the Cabinet Office is appointed as investigator, juror, judge and debt collector. The individual affected has limited power to challenge the decisions, and then only after the damage has been done. I have been very clear, I hope, on those concerns and will be clear as we carry on going through the Bill.
This debate has laid bare a crucial flaw at the heart of the Bill, one which speaks not just of good process but to the principle of fairness, accountability and trust in government. We cannot expect the public to accept that legitimate and fair review decisions as impactful as a direct deduction order can be undertaken by the same department that made the order the first place. Our amendments in this group offer a simple, reasonable and principled solution that, when a request for a review is made, that review must be carried out by an independent person or body.
I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, in this regard that we refer to an “independent person” but in Amendment 59 we refer to establishing a body to serve as an independent reviewer, so we are probing at the moment on how that might be set up, rather than being specific. The point is the independence of the body or the person. This should not be a colleague or a coworker and not someone in the same chain of command. No system of justice can command public confidence if it allows a single team to be judge and jury in its own cause.
Let us be clear. We are not seeking to tie the Government’s hands or strip departments of their operational roles; we are proposing a balanced and proportionate framework that keeps Ministers accountable to Parliament but ensures that the initial decision is subject to meaningful independent scrutiny. That is a safeguard for the individual and for the integrity of the system itself. This matters because the consequences of these powers will be real—they are sweeping powers, as I have repeatedly said—and immediate for the people affected. If those people are to have any confidence in the fairness of the system, they must know that their right to request a review is not simply a paper exercise. It is not good enough to say that this will be a small team and the risks are manageable. In fact, the small size of the PSFA makes the case for independence even stronger. Close colleagues reviewing each other’s decisions behind closed doors is a recipe not for fairness but for suspicion and mistrust.
Our amendments, particularly Amendment 56, place a simple duty on the Minister to appoint an independent person or body when a review is requested. Amendments 57 and 58 ensure that that person can reach a clear conclusion to uphold, vary or revoke the order and that the applicant is told what the decision is. Amendment 59 provides a model for how such a reviewer might be appointed, with proper parliamentary scrutiny.
If we truly believe in the legitimacy of these powers, we must also believe in the legitimacy of the mechanisms that hold them to account. A fair and independent review process is a necessity. This is not just a procedural issue; it is a test of whether this Government are serious about wielding these powers with proportionality, care and respect for the people over whom they are exercised. The public will not trust a system that allows the Cabinet Office to mark its own homework, and nor should they.
These amendments provide a path forward—a way to deliver a fraud prevention system that is strong but just, decisive but accountable, and both effective and legitimate. I urge the Minister to accept this principle of independence and to adopt these proposals or some version of them as important measures which would improve the system of review that the Government have presented. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.