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Baroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for her persuasive introduction to the Bill and hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Griffin, is soon dancing around the Chamber again.
I start before the beginning of the Bill. The Long Title tells us that, among other things, it is to make provision
“about procedure and the administration of criminal justice”.
There is a lot going at the moment in relation to the administration of criminal justice, including the first part of Sir Brian Leveson’s review and the Government’s recent response. I have been asked—no doubt other noble Lords have as well—whether the Government might use this Bill to introduce the major reforms they are proposing. I am in no position to give any assurances, although I have said that there would be a hell of a row if this House, with all its expertise and strong views, did not have the opportunity of a Second Reading debate if the Commons, the elected Chamber, was excluded from initial debate and scrutiny. The Minister is already shaking her head—that is now in Hansard. I was going to say that I trust that she will give us an assurance on this. I raised it because if it is around as gossip, it needs answering.
There is much to welcome in the Bill, but our role as a revising Chamber does mean that many of our comments may come over as opposition or criticism. I hope not to sound too much like Scrooge. When I heard that there was to be a victims’ helpline, I was interested in what it might cover and hoped that it would be more than a signposting exercise pointing victims to where they might get help. However, it is not that. The victim contact scheme may suggest more than it is to provide. Many victims need support as witnesses. I am aware of the issue of coaching or the suggestion that a victim witness, however he or she wishes to describe themselves, has been coached. The postponement of support and treatment for some badly affected victims is another argument for dealing with delays in the courts. A victim’s experience—I hate “journey”—does not end with the verdict, so there must be support before and following a trial, often for a long period, as a survivor.
This Bill is part of a Rubik’s cube of criminal justice legislation. This Second Reading comes not just during public debate about juries but partway through the Sentencing Bill, when the issue of resources for non-custodial sentences and for purposeful activity in custody is being discussed. Resources to support victims—survivors—are needed too. The position of so many organisations in the third sector is precarious. Appreciative words are no substitute for services and funding.
As we know, too many victims and alleged offenders have a long wait for the trial. Some of the alleged offenders are not on bail but released under investigation—an alternative to bail but without set timeframes or conditions attached. It has been suggested that for the police this is a cop-out—no pun intended—as it reduces the load on them. The Leveson recommendation was to return to the pre-2017 system of conditional or unconditional bail.
What priority does the Bill have? It was introduced in the Commons in May and there has been a sort of hiatus. In this House, it is to go to Grand Committee, rather than having its Committee stage on the Floor of the House—presumably, though one should not assume anything, in time for it to be through by the end of the Session. I appreciate that timing is not a matter for the Minister, but she may wish to comment. She may not, of course.
I will turn to some specific points. I know we will spend some time on the first two clauses. While the failure of a convicted offender to appear at a sentencing hearing can cause a lot of distress to the victim, who then cannot look the offender in the eye while he or she hears victim statements, I confess to wondering whether it would be better to rely on and perhaps use more the existing powers held by custody officers, prison governors and, of course, judges—although I can see why there is a concern not to use contempt of court powers other than sparingly. There are risks associated with the sanctions and impacts on prison capacity and the Crown Court backlog. It is a difficult balance.
We will also discuss the transcripts of sentencing remarks, an issue which for some time has been pursued by my honourable friend the Member for Richmond Park, and to which my noble friend Lady Brinton has referred. At a meeting in early September of the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, I asked the then Lord Chancellor, just before she became Home Secretary, about progress in this area. She said:
“I do not believe we are far from having a tech solution that meets the test of accuracy … we are testing market solutions for speed and accuracy. Then we will need to take a view on operational viability and how quickly it could be rolled out”.
She also said:
“It is a long process, and it has a cost attached to it”,
and went on to emphasise that
“accuracy … is the problem at the moment”.
If the Minister could update the House, that would be very welcome. I appreciate this is not as straightforward as some of us would like to think, but every day in this job we are aware of how quickly the Hansard writers record and reproduce what we say. Mind you, they do tidy it up as well, which is certainly not what is wanted in the courts.
In addition, can the Minister update the House on when the prohibited steps provisions restricting parental responsibility are likely to come into force? As the noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, Section 18 of the Victims and Prisoners Act is still “prospective”. What discussion has the MoJ had with local authorities which will have to take on additional responsibilities, and will they have additional funding?
It is inevitable that I keep coming back to resources. I am sure that the Victims’ Commissioner will need to be better resourced, given her new powers and duties. Baroness Newlove would undoubtedly have taken the opportunity to make the point that she could have used much more than £150,000, whatever the agreement made. We all miss her, and we will welcome Claire Waxman to the position when she takes it up.
The length of Schedule 2, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier—it is longer than the aggregate of all the Bill’s clauses—is, I suppose, a reflection of the way our statute book develops. I do not want to sound churlish. Clause 7, “Victims’ rights to make representations and receive information etc”— et cetera is doing some heavy lifting—is important out of all proportion to the clause’s two lines, but proportionate to the schedule. How much heavy lifting can be done by
“issues of public policy of relevance to other victims or witnesses”?
We will see.
I am pleased that victims’ rights to make certain disclosures are not to be precluded by NDAs. I hope the relevant regulations will be made with as little delay as possible, so that this comes into effect. This is one of those occasions when seeing the regulations in draft during the course of the Bill would be particularly helpful, given that not all NDAs will be covered.
It is not just what is in the Bill; it is also what is not. I am, as we all are, grateful to the organisations that have briefed us on the introduction of a duty to commission victim support services: 16 major organisations coming together to urge us to urge the Government to drive change in the commissioning of specialist services for victims of exploitation and abuse, and for victims with specific needs, is not to be ignored.
I should declare an interest: many years ago, for quite a number of years, I was a trustee and chair of the domestic violence charity Refuge. Much that is in the Bill, and much else, to quote the Long Title,
“about the experience of victims within the criminal justice system; about the functions of the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses; and about procedure and the administration of criminal justice”,
lends itself—indeed, calls for—consultation with those affected and those working in the sector. But—or “and”—I know that we have a group of Ministers who understand this very well.
I have said that there is much in the Bill to welcome. What I have been saying should not detract from that, but we do want the Bill to be as good as it can be.
Baroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord is probing at this stage and I am with him in wanting to see procedures from the point of view of victims, but I simply do not know whether magistrates have the same powers as Crown Court judges. When we debated this issue before, we were told about the powers that judges have now, without the need for an extension.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, came quite close to my question. Magistrates come from a very different background. Do they currently have the same powers as the judges who will be covered by this legislation, quite apart from the powers that are given by the Bill, in dealing with recalcitrant—if that is the right word—defendants?
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the way in which he has explained these amendments. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for injecting a note of caution and to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for injecting a note of questioning about the proposed amendments.
In their explanatory statement, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, state that the amendments in this group probe
“the rationale behind restricting the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing to only the Crown Courts”.
The noble and learned Lord explained why he suggests that there is no difference, for the purpose of this power, between the Crown Courts and the magistrates’ courts.
I should make it clear that we on these Benches start from the position that defendants should be obliged to attend court for their sentencing hearings. But the fact that they are obliged to attend court does not lead to the conclusion that the courts ought to have the power to get them to court however much they wish to resist.
It is, of course, important from the victims’ point of view—this is a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made—that the defendants who have committed offences against them are in court for the occasion when they are brought to justice. It is appropriate, therefore, that in the right cases, the court should have the power to order them to do so.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out what a serious power this is. It is particularly a serious power, as I will come to say, because the use of force is sanctioned to get defendants to court. We have heard tell, in the press and in the House of Commons, from some of the wilder speeches—if I may put it that way—of, in effect, the court having the power to order that offenders be brought to court by considerable force and in chains. I am quite clear that that is not the way the Bill puts it; it puts it in terms of the use of force being reasonable, proportionate and appropriate. Nevertheless, it is a very serious power.
It is also important from the offenders’ point of view that they should come to court, first, to hear what the court says about their offences as well as what their counsel and the prosecution say about their offences. It is also important because their attending court and listening, hopefully with some care, to what goes on at their sentencing hearing may be taken as a sign of their understanding of the import of the hearing. If an order is made, the breach of such an order to attend court for a sentencing hearing is a sign of a lack of remorse on the part of the defendant. A lack of remorse will usually involve a court treating a defendant more severely than it might treat a defendant who does show remorse for the offences that they have committed and an understanding of the impact of those offences on the victims.
The scheme of this Bill is to bring in a very strong regime of compulsion with a specific incorporation of provisions about contempt of court and significantly, as I adumbrated, about the right to use force to bring defendants to court who are unwilling and refuse to attend their sentencing hearings. The conditions for the new regime, as set out in the Bill, are that the defendant has been convicted and is in custody awaiting sentencing by the Crown Court. That brings into play the kind of reservation that the noble and learned Lord spoke about. This new regime is designed to deal with serious offences. A third condition is that the offender has refused or is likely to refuse to attend the sentencing hearing.
It follows that the code for punishment for contempt should be confined to adult offenders. The amendments seek to make this procedure and all its features applicable to a wider group of offenders, and to magistrates’ courts as well as Crown Courts. I ask the Minister and the noble and learned Lord when they close how far a change to include magistrates’ courts will help victims. One can see how it is justified and might help victims in serious cases, but I question how far the use of force will ever be in the public interest. One must question the purpose of the use of force. It could be twofold. It could be to force offenders to face up to their offences and help them to avoid reoffending. It could be to help the victims by letting them see that those who have committed offences against them are being brought to justice. There may be force in that.
However, there is also a risk, which may be important, of forced attendance becoming a means for defendants to get publicity for themselves, their offences and their resistance to justice: to portray themselves as public martyrs and, in some cases, to make political gestures that could be thoroughly undesirable. If these orders became the norm, those dangers would be real. If it is to have a positive effect, this power is likely to be much more effective for serious cases in the Crown Court than it is for cases in the magistrates’ court. Of course we take the point that the scope of hearings in magistrates’ courts has been increased over what it was before the distinction was changed. Nevertheless, I will be very interested to hear the Minister’s response on the distinction. Our position at the moment is that the distinction is plainly justified.
Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington (CB)
My Lords, in general I support these amendments, particularly those put forward by my noble friend Lady Finlay. Having been in charge of some of these investigations over a long period of time, take it from me that they are very difficult, indeed nearly impossible, when the victim dies outside the jurisdiction. In a lot of cases, in the old days, talking to the DPP, some of us went out there personally to actually do the investigations. It was difficult in a way that is not necessary, and I think that what has been outlined by my noble friend is absolutely common sense. In the old days, if I might refer to them, things were a bit simpler: we dealt with the police, who were sometimes not quite up to our standards, and we tried to form some relationship. However, things have got more difficult in terms of the technical side of the law, so I make a kind of brief supplication, basically, as a practitioner over a long period of time: I really think that some of these amendments would have a massive effect on securing justice for victims, particularly in those places where we do not have any jurisdiction whatever.
My Lords, the noble Lord has just used the phrase “common sense”, and I think that that is what is expected by people who are affected, who know that they could look to consular services for help if they have lost a passport, but not in such a difficult situation as this. I simply say—and this is not addressed to the noble Baroness but possibly to some of her colleagues—that over the period that we have discussed this issue, there has almost been a sense of, “That’s the Foreign Office, it’s not us”. If we could get this into the victims’ code, it might mean a duty on the FCDO to be prepared to be more effective, and actually to be more effective.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 36 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to add agreements entered into by the National Crime Agency, the NCA, to the list of agreements in new subsection (7) that are exempt from the measure. Non-disclosure agreements, or NDAs, should not be used to silence victims or cover up crime: I think we can all agree on that. New subsections (7) and (8) of Clause 6 provide that the provision will not apply to a narrow cohort of specified agreements, in the interests of national security.
Baroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have signed all three of my noble friend Baroness Brinton’s amendments. I will not speak to them at any length. Amendment 38 prompts me to declare an interest, having been chair of the organisation Refuge for very many years. In connection with Amendments 43 and 44, it strikes me that there is quite a read-across between these and those we debated earlier on the response of a victim and how they are affected, and how an offender is prompted, under the amendments on appearance in court, to address what has happened. But it is not that read-across that I want to spend time on.
I was a member of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee and the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, has picked up one of its recommendations. Her amendment is a good deal more ambitious than the recommendation in our report, which just talked about the objective being to have victim navigators available in all cases. She is calling for rollout within six months, which strikes me as ambitious. Ambition is good.
The report was headed “evidence gathering”, and the evidence we heard was about assisting the police and getting best evidence. Through a friend who has been involved in assisting the police in a number of slavery cases, I realise how difficult this is. I will mention a couple of them. On one occasion a big police operation was set up to rescue people who were block-paving. It was almost impossible to hold any of the people who were the subject of this. They managed to keep one, despite all the preparation and all the common-sense, humane ideas, such as: do not just pull them into a room and start questioning them, but sit them down and say, “Would you like a glass of juice?” It sounds obvious, but apparently it was not entirely obvious. On another occasion, throughout the police interview a woman who was being prostituted was in touch with her “boyfriend”, who was telling her what she should be saying. How that could have got through, I do not know.
One of the things which prompted us to make this recommendation was that the then Minister who gave evidence seemed not to have heard of victim navigators. They are not the same as advisers who assist victims to cope with the process. There is obviously quite a lot of crossover, but they are very focused on the process and not just a support.
As the noble Lord has just said, and as we so often argue, a bit of investment could yield good financial results. That is one reason why victim navigators are a good idea. I believe there are only 11 at the moment. I pay tribute to Tatiana Gren-Jardan and Louise Gleich, who have been very much behind the scheme, and its success is in large part due to their own skills and input. It is also worth saying that it is not just about getting convictions; one of their achievements has been helping to repatriate victims who want safely to go back to their countries of origin. It is a great scheme, and it is up to the police to pursue it. So perhaps this is something for the MoJ and the Home Office, but I hope this debate can prompt some government support to forward the scheme.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their valuable contributions to this debate and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Goudie, for bringing forward the amendments.
Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, proposes a new clause that seeks to place a duty on relevant authorities to commission support services for caregivers of victims of domestic abuse, sexual violence or exploitation. The amendment would ensure that those with responsibility for the victims are not overlooked by the system and have access to the appropriate support. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response as to how the amendment could be delivered and might function in practice.
Amendments 43 and 44 would introduce new clauses concerning restorative justice. These build on the provisions in the Bill, better to enable victims to explain the impact of a crime to the offender and to participate meaningfully in the justice process. Some victims engage with restorative justice services, but such engagement must be voluntary. Victims should not be placed under any pressure to engage further with the offender. None the less, there are findings showing that these services reduce the likelihood of offenders reoffending and can result in other social benefits, including delivering value for money. We on this side are interested to hear from the Minister how the Government will ensure that services such as these are used where it is thought they are likely to be beneficial.
Amendment 45 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, seeks to implement the recommendation of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee that victim navigators be rolled out nationally so that they are available in all cases. In response to that recommendation, the Government stated in December 2024 that they want to build on the research of the previous Government on how best to support victims. In addition, the Government said they had met the NGOs delivering the victim navigator programme to understand its impact and to explore options for expansion. We have also heard an authoritative and persuasive speech from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, who obviously has real hands-on experience in this area. We should listen carefully to what he has to say, and I hope the Minister will speak to him and engage with him.
We look forward to hearing an update from the Minister on what further research has been undertaken and what conclusions the Government have reached since then. I reiterate my thanks to noble Lords for raising these important issues, all of which speak to the purpose of the Bill: to ensure that victims receive the support and services they deserve throughout their journey through the justice system.
My Lords, my noble friend quoted from a briefing from the Victims’ Commissioner, I think from when she was the London victims’ commissioner, about the costs that have been charged and the costs of transcripts for a whole case—which have perhaps been requested rather than actually charged, for obvious reasons. She also mentioned paperwork. I had this briefing. It refers to a form which some courts are asking bereaved families to fill out, so I had a look at that form. I am appalled. I think it is four pages. The amount of detail requested is so intrusive, and it is unclear to me why that is necessary. Why disclose for this purpose the rent you are paying on a home and all your assets, in a whole number of categories? Does it matter how many Premium Bonds you have? On expenses, there are 14 categories, ranging from council tax to TV licences and anything else you can imagine. I wanted to express that, even though it is late. I will not take longer on it.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has just talked about open justice. It seems sad if the courts we are talking about cannot go in the same direction as other courts. The Lady Chief Justice talks about the work being done to issue press releases to explain the decisions of the courts elsewhere in our justice system.
The noble and learned Lord is looking puzzled, but I am saying that I agree with him—I know that may be unusual, but on this occasion the direction of travel—a horrible phrase—suggests that we should be going much faster than a trial pilot from next spring. That brings me to my question. When is spring for this purpose? We have known that the seasons of the year are somewhat false when it comes to what Governments propose to do.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I start with Amendment 41, in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Hamwee. As your Lordships are of course aware, the Government recently announced the expansion of the provision of free transcripts of sentencing remarks to victims whose cases are heard in the Crown Court upon request. That is now contained in the recently passed Sentencing Act 2026. The detail of timeframes and processes for providing these transcripts will be set out in regulations, following a review of current operations. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, for his work with the Government during the passage of the Sentencing Bill which has brought this about.
Sentencing remarks have been chosen because the way they are structured and what they contain can give victims a real insight into what happened in the sentencing hearing. They are always structured in the same way. They start with a summary of the case and the facts, and go on to explain the background of how the plea came to be entered, if it is a plea, or how the conviction came about. They then set out why the sentence was imposed, which guidelines have been referred to and applied and, if not applied, why, and the various calculations that go on as to what the starting point was and whether it has been increased or decreased. That is all in the judge’s own words.
Bail decisions and summings-up are very different. Extending provision of free transcripts for victims to a wider range of hearing types also risks creating significant operational burdens on the court. I will deal first with bail decisions. The victims’ code sets out a victim’s right to be told the outcome of any bail hearing and any relevant conditions imposed “within five working days”. This is carried out by witness care units, which are also supposed to provide victims with other timely, tailored updates about proceedings. In that sense, we are already delivering the information the victims need in a proportionate and effective way, without the cost and risk that mandatory transcript provision would entail.
Bail decisions are rarely delivered in a structured way that would tell the victim any more than they will already have been told by the witness care unit. What happens normally is that the judge listens to both sides and then simply says that bail is refused—for instance, if there is a failure to surrender, or the prospect of the commission of further offences. Alternatively, they will say that they are prepared to grant bail subject to certain conditions, and they rattle those off. This is exactly what victims are going to be told by the witness care unit. I am not sure what more information I can offer to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton; in my experience, there is nothing more.
Baroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord seems to be suggesting that the Victims’ Commissioner does not now engage with individual cases. My understanding is that she very much does, but to feed towards her statutory role. That is quite different from getting involved in the minutiae of an individual case, supporting a victim or witness and promoting that individual’s interests.
My Lords, there is clearly a balance to be struck. I think we should, as we go forward, because we all have the same interests at heart here, look carefully at whether there will be occasions when the commissioner should look at individual cases, not so much to interfere but to draw on the information that can be gleaned from them and use them in setting policy. With that said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I entirely agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas has said. I shall add some observations. It is self-evident, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, says, that only those who are qualified and competent should be responsible for prosecutions, and no one would dispute that. However, it seems to me equally self-evident that not every criminal prosecution requires presentation by a barrister or a solicitor. There are many criminal prosecutions that others are perfectly competent to present. What matters is to ensure that whoever prosecutes in any particular case has the qualifications and experience that are necessary, and that will depend upon the nature of the case, whether it be a murder case at one extreme or a driving case at the other. I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that those factors will be, and are being, taken into account in deciding, once this reform is introduced, who prosecutes in any particular case.
The noble and learned Lord has said what I wanted to say much more sensitively and tactfully, but I will say what I was going to say.
There is a danger that lawyers of my generation— I shall just apply it to my generation and not suggest which generation other Members of the House belong to—are prejudiced against lawyers who do not have standard qualifications, if you like, or the backgrounds that many of us come from. I understand from CILEX that there are 133 members working as associate prosecutors who cannot progress or get promotion. That is a real shame. It is a much wider issue than just prosecution.
I think the noble Lord answered his own point because he was talking about members of the Bar progressing. The Minister will tell us—I cannot believe it is not the case—that no one joins the CPS and prosecutes a murder the next day. Every profession has its hierarchy, and one progresses in the hierarchy dependent on both skill and experience. The current position is out of date, so, even if it were not to solve an immediate problem, what is proposed in the Bill is a good idea. I am afraid that we cannot support the opposition to the clause.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, it is vital to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service can recruit and retain a sufficient number of qualified Crown prosecutors. We suggest that Clause 11 supports this aim by increasing the CPS’s recruitment flexibility through the removal of an unnecessary legislative barrier. In turn, this will help increase the pool of eligible candidates for appointment as Crown prosecutors. It is axiomatic that a shortage of Crown prosecutors adds to the backlog because it cannot make decisions quite as quickly about prosecutions as it could if there were more of them.
Currently, the Crown Prosecution Service is restricted in who it can appoint as Crown prosecutors due to an unnecessary legal requirement. This is set out in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which provides that Crown prosecutors and those who prosecute cases on behalf of the CPS must hold what is known as the general qualification. The general qualification is a term of art, having a very specific meaning in this context. It means that a prospective Crown prosecutor must have
“a right of audience in relation to any class of proceedings in any part of the Senior Courts, or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates’ courts”,
even though most of those rights of audience—for example, before the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—are never going to be exercised by a Crown prosecutor in a million years.
This requirement can exclude certain qualified legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners—from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—who have relevant criminal practice rights but are prohibited from becoming Crown prosecutors. These legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners, often hold the right skills and specialist qualifications required to perform the Crown prosecutor role, including having rights of audience for the courts in which they will actually appear, as opposed to rights of audience for the courts in which they will not, but they do not meet the general qualification criteria. This restriction limits the DPP’s ability to consider a wider pool of legal talent and reduces the CPS’s flexibility in managing existing and future recruitment challenges.
The purpose of this clause is to remove the requirement for the general qualification and, in doing so, give the DPP the discretion to appoint appropriately qualified legal professionals, such as CILEX practitioners, as Crown prosecutors for the CPS. I can reassure the Committee that the removal of the general qualification requirement will not in any way dilute professional standards; there are appropriate safeguards to preserve standards.
Prospective professionals eligible to be a Crown prosecutor who do not at the moment hold the general qualification must still meet the authorisation requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007—they have to be appropriately qualified, authorised and regulated, and be able to exercise rights of audience and conduct litigation, both of which are reserved legal activities under the Act. It is a criminal offence under the Act to carry out reserved legal activities unless entitled to do so.
In addition, it is important to note that the measure does not require the CPS to appoint any specific type of legal professional. Instead, it gives it the flexibility to do so where appropriate and ensures that recruitment decisions remain firmly within the DPP’s control. The DPP will retain full discretion over appointments, ensuring that only suitably qualified and experienced individuals become Crown prosecutors. Newly eligible professionals must meet the same Crown prosecutor competency standards as those who qualify through more traditional routes. I also emphasise that those appointed following this change will, like all Crown prosecutors, be subject to performance monitoring by the CPS, including case strategy quality assessments focused on the application of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
This change reflects the modern legal services landscape, spoken to powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Alternative routes to qualification are increasingly common, where professionals from non-traditional backgrounds play a growing role in the justice system. By removing this unnecessary legislative barrier, the clause may also support the recruitment of a diverse and representative cohort of Crown prosecutors.
I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has ever met any CILEX practitioners; I certainly have, and they are an amazing cohort of people. I am sure he absolutely did not intend to suggest that somehow those who have qualified through an alternative route are, by very definition, less competent than those who have gone through the traditional route. If that is the suggestion, then it is not one this Government can support. I therefore hope that the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 11 to stand part of the Bill and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his opposition to it.
My Lords, the issue of costs in private prosecutions is an extraordinarily serious one. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has spoken of the position of charities, the RSPCA being one example. One can well understand the position of a charity conducting a prosecution through a small solicitor where costs are modest. On the other hand, one must recall that for good reasons of public interest, there are private prosecutions by large corporations to protect intellectual property. The consequence of the change in the market for solicitors and barristers has produced a problem, because what the CPS pays prosecutors to prosecute is completely out of line with what a large, industrial conglomerate that wants to enforce its intellectual property rights can pay. This is a problem that has to be grappled with.
One of the reasons why the CPS cannot prosecute more than it does is the Government’s constraint; both the last Government and this one are responsible for that. There is not enough money in the system to enable the CPS to prosecute where it should be doing so. More than 10 years ago, the change in the market and the constraint on the finances of the CPS, arising out of the 2008 financial crisis, began to manifest themselves in the contrast between what happened in private prosecutions by large conglomerates, or associations of those interested to protect their economic position, and in the CPS. The courts have tried to do something about it through a number of cases, but it is an extraordinarily difficult area.
For example, in a commercial case—many of these cases go to solicitors—there did not used to be the idea that you would have to get a tender before you prosecuted, but the courts now require it. The courts have made a number of very important changes to try to bring this cost under control, because, although it cannot be shown that if you pay a large sum—several hundred thousand pounds—to defer the costs of a private prosecution it will directly come out of any bit of the overall justice budget, anyone who has had to deal with the Treasury knows that that is the case. The Treasury looks at a pot for justice and, if you take large sums out of it by paying for private prosecutions, the other part of the justice system suffers.
This is a matter that has to be grappled with, and the right people to grapple with it are the Government. It is not a very good position for judges to be in to be making these very difficult decisions because of the gross inequality between what you pay private lawyers, which many may think is far too much but that is not for me to judge, and what you pay the Crown Prosecution Service, which may not be enough—again, that is not for me to judge. The problem of what I might call public penury and private affluence is absolutely illustrated by the problem of paying for private prosecutions. It is for the Government to grapple with, and setting rates is one of the ways to do it. I think it is probably the right way, but all I am saying is we that cannot run away from this problem that has arisen because of changes in the market and the constraints on public expenditure.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has inevitably given us a very brief tour d’horizon of the problems of the costs and charges of the legal profession getting out of hand. Looking at the Bill over the weekend, I had to turn up the 1985 Act and write into it the changes that would be made by the Bill. It seems that the one to focus on is making the provisions subject to regulations, which boils down to the Lord Chancellor setting rates—at least that is how I read it. It is not much of a stretch to think that those are going to be linked to legal aid rates, and one can see the problem.
The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who explained some of the problems very clearly, mentioned consultation and rather dismissed it as being helpful, but it is important that the Committee should know what is planned by way of consultation. I hope the Minister can help us on that, because so much turns on its outcome.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, in the view of the Government, Clause 12 provides a modest enabling power for the Lord Chancellor to set through regulations the rates at which private prosecutors may recover expenses from central funds where a court has ordered that such costs be paid. To be clear at the outset, this clause does not set any rates, and it does not affect the long-established right to bring a private prosecution, which remains protected under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.
I should say at this stage that I have a great deal of experience in the area of private prosecutions, both as a state prosecutor working for the Crown Prosecution Service, where I oversaw all the private prosecutions that came to the CPS for consideration, and in private practice, where I brought a number of private prosecutions on behalf of clients and advised on many more.
The Justice Select Committee, in its 2020 report, Private Prosecutions: Safeguards, invited the Government to take a closer look at the private prosecution landscape, particularly where public funds are engaged. Taking an enabling power of this kind allows us to do precisely that in a careful and evidence-based way. The committee highlighted three key principles, which this Government agree should underpin reform: first, addressing the disparity between defence resources and those of private prosecutors; secondly, safeguarding the right of individuals to bring a private prosecution; and, thirdly, ensuring the proportionate and responsible use of public funds.
My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to Amendment 61. In doing a little background on this, I looked at the Law Society’s response to the MoJ call for evidence, which it produced last April. I wish to read two brief excerpts, because I think they are both particularly pertinent to what we are talking about. The first says:
“But given the increasing complexity of computational systems, computers should not be assumed to be operating correctly. Instead”—
this is important, because this is what other jurisdictions outside the UK systematically do—
“it should be evidenced and demonstrated through assurance, regular review, and disclosure of the technical standards applied by the system”.
That is what happens in Germany. That is what happens in France. That is what mostly happens in the United States.
Secondly, returning to the issue of artificial intelligence, the Law Society has been thinking about this and is clearly very worried about it. I quote again:
“Careful consideration needs to be given to emerging AI technologies that overlap with but go beyond the scope of this call for evidence. For AI, an additional layer of certification for meeting internationally recognised standards is important to ensure accountability and transparency, especially if they were designed and developed”—
which they mostly are—
“outside of the jurisdiction … Attention must be given to the ability for domestic regulation and requirements to be adhered to for computer systems and AI tools that are built outside of the jurisdiction”.
My Lords, it is six years since the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I were among the members of a newly formed committee that looked at—I do not think I have got the title quite right—advanced technology in the justice system. We were concerned, among other things, about the need for a human in the loop and whether it was possible to have a human in the loop. We were given very firm assurances by two Home Secretaries, which I do not think convinced the committee at all.
We were also concerned about the attitude, “X must be right because the computer says so”. Have we actually moved on from that? I do not think so. On that basis —and was it my noble friend who added facial recognition into the mix?—we support the amendment.
I am deliberately going fairly fast because I do not need to add a whole lot to what has already been said. On Amendment 62, there have been a number of occasions when I have heard a rapper and realised how very clever the work was. I really admired what I heard. Then I thought back to the occasion decades ago when my father started criticising my musical taste and calling it Simon and Godawful. Tastes change; generations move on and develop. I cannot speak to the detailed content of all rap and drill, but I think we are in danger of dismissing the importance of this music to the generation that produces it.
Baroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was very happy to put my name to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Polak, not least because he and I, every Thursday morning in the post-legislative scrutiny committee for the Domestic Abuse Act, hear from the sector exactly what is going on and, perhaps more pertinently, what is not going on.
The Minister, like me, is a great fan of the “child house” approach to treating children who have had the most appalling direct physical and sexual abuse. It demonstrates what best practice looks like. Best practice really makes an enormous difference and is incredibly efficient, is very incisive and can work very quickly. That is partly why His Majesty’s Government have thankfully decided to roll this out throughout England to a large degree; that is a great step forward.
As we take evidence, we are hearing again and again that there are examples of really good practice. I recognise that it is unrealistic to imagine that His Majesty’s Government are suddenly going to find coffers bursting with money to enable the whole panoply of support services that one would wish victims to be able to access—that is not going to happen. However, I appeal to the Government and their officials to identify those examples of really good or best practice that are making a difference, rather than taking a blanket approach and saying we need to try to cover all support services. Clearly, some are dramatically more effective than others.
My appeal to the Government is to try to strategically identify those support services that are making a huge difference. For example, two areas that make an enormous difference are the independent domestic violence advocates and the independent stalking advocates. The proof of the pudding in both those areas is that when those individuals are involved and work with the victim from very early on, first, the victim’s experience is transformed for the better, but secondly, and more pertinently from the point of view of the Ministry of Justice, there is a much higher chance of the case coming to court and there being a successful prosecution. Not only does it help the victim but it helps the Government achieve their laudable aim to reduce violence against women and girls.
I do not expect the Government to say that there is a magic wand and that Rachel Reeves is the Minister’s new best friend, but I hope that an approach to identifying services similar to the Lighthouse, which really make a performative difference, could be identified more strategically and assisted more proactively and in a more focused way.
My Lords, I will focus on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. We seem to have done a bit of mini-regrouping within the group, but I checked with my noble friend Lady Brinton and I think she will wind up the group while introducing her own amendments at the same time.
At the last stage the Minister resisted the proposal for more victim navigators on the basis that the service is already provided, but victim navigators are quite distinct in what they do from the Salvation Army and their subcontractors funded by the Home Office. As I said, I supported the amendment in Committee but I did express a reservation about the ambitious six-month period within which they could be rolled out. Victim navigators are collocated with police in the forces where they work—the term “embedded” with the police seems to be used quite often.
I was a member of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee, and the comments on victim navigators in our report were under the heading “Evidence gathering”. That describes quite a lot of what they do. I will try not to repeat what other noble Lords have said, but the link between support of the victims and the criminal justice system is their job, filling a very specific gap with access to details of cases but with the independence to build trust. They are of great value to the police—and we know how difficult it is to get convictions in this area.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I were members of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House, which was formed only in 2020. Our first inquiry and report were on the advent of new technologies in the justice system. During that work, I often asked myself—sometimes aloud—how you would feel if you were arrested, charged, convicted and imprisoned on the basis of evidence that not only did you not understand but could not be explained. We now know how people felt and feel.
That was in 2022, which was centuries ago in technical terms. I realise that the lexicon has expanded here and I hear terms that I have never heard before, but the basic issues remain. Our concerns then were about transparency and regulation, among other things, and that anyone could be affected. We were talking not just about insider trading and corporate fraud, as one witness powerfully put it, but
“high-volume data that is mostly about poor people”.
We found a lot of enthusiasm for the technology, but not a corresponding commitment to a thorough evaluation of it. These Benches support Amendment 21, which seems to have been a very constructive contribution to taking these issues forward.
At the last stage, I supported Amendment 22. I do so no less now. Sometimes we show that we are not as open as we should be to the way that society moves on or to the life experiences of people younger than almost all of us and how they wish to express them. I do not really feel qualified to say more than that.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, this has been a thoughtful debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her supporters for their work on these issues.
On Amendment 21, I reiterate the sentiments expressed in Committee and by many noble Lords across the House from all parties. In light of the appalling Post Office scandal, keeping in mind the increasing use of artificial intelligence, the need to remove the presumption of reliability for computer evidence is now clear. The noble Baroness has responded to some of the concerns expressed in Committee in bringing forward this redrafted amendment. I commend her attention to this issue.
My concern is that the Government have had long enough to look at this. Their call for evidence closed on 15 April 2025, so I look forward to hearing from the Minister where we are now, given that the call for evidence is a year old. I am sure she will be anxious to update us on that.
I understand the basis for Amendment 22, but I have some reservations about its detail. There is an issue about the objectivity of the conditions listed in subsection (2) of the proposed new clause. I would certainly be interested to hear more about how the court should consider who is suitably qualified to give evidence about
“linguistic and artistic conventions and the social and cultural context of the creative or artistic expression”.
It is an important area, but it is also a difficult one that will repay further consideration.