Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

I also support Amendment 51 in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, which has similar aims, I think, to those that I was trying to achieve in my Amendment 47, and particularly Amendment 57 on vulnerable workers and formalising the value-for-money framework. This is an important group and I hope that we will have a good discussion. I look forward to hearing other Members’ comments and the response from the Minister.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be exceedingly brief. I may participate on an occasional basis on this Bill, despite the fact that it is very important. However, we have many people with exceptional expertise in the Room, for which I am extraordinarily grateful.

I have Amendment 167 in a later group on its own, which has relevance to one of the issues raised by my noble friend Lady Bowles in Amendment 46A, in which she introduces the concept that value-for-money regulations must take account of certain factors. Proposed new paragraph (c) particularly interests me, on

“the characteristics of the members of the scheme”.

In all the discussions that I have heard in the Mansion House compact and in the Bill, very little attention is paid to the characteristics of the members of the schemes, because they differ widely. I am particularly concerned that people on low salaries, whose primary savings for pensions and then investment is through auto-enrolment and default funds, have a very different risk profile from those of many people who otherwise engage in pension savings.

This is a group for whom the downside has far more serious consequences than for other groups. Many of us can afford to take a chance with parts of our pensions: if we lose some money, we are still going to be in relative comfort. That is essentially not true for this group. The upside benefit of taking risk and doing well from that risk is nice, but the consequences of taking risk and losing because of that risk are far more serious. I want to draw the Committee’s attention to that issue. As I said, I will pick it up again in Amendment 167, because to me it has been overlooked.

It is key that, when we devise pension arrangements, we recognise the very different risk profiles of members, so that what they are required to do—auto-enrolment and default schemes are in effect a requirement—matches their risk profile. I hope that we will begin to start to shift some of our thinking. There are amendments, in this group and in others, that could help very much with that issue.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

This group of amendments is quite interesting in starting to sketch out what is important in the value-for-money approach that is being adopted through the Bill. I did not know when the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, would speak to Amendment 49 and I will be interested to hear what he has to say on this, because the only other form of occupational pension is, in effect, the defined benefit, where you know what you are getting. I was a bit surprised that he felt that that would need to go further, because that is a direct relationship between somebody and their employer. Nevertheless, I am sure he will explain further.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, has tabled Amendments 55 and 56 to Clause 12, which are sensible, but one thing that concerns me at the start of that clause is the word “may”. We should be beyond that at this stage, which is why I also support my noble friends on the Front Bench in opposing Clause 13 standing part of the Bill. There are just too many ifs, buts and maybes, but when it comes to Clause 13 there is nothing at all. It is just a blank cheque for the future. I am conscious that things can vary over time, but we should be in a position where we are getting some clarity on what will be in these value-for-money assessments so that people can make choices. We should be getting that clarity now. If necessary, we can put down regulations for affirmative procedures but, candidly, I do not think it is good enough that we have this sort of approach to defining what is there for the future.

I say to the Minister that I appreciate that this is a real step forward and I welcome that. People put their money in, they are not exactly sure what return they are getting and they might look every now and again at where it is coming out. I appreciate that there is a whole journey to go on in pensions education, as well as for the trustees, in terms of what is really happening with their advisers who continue to do low-risk, low-reward. I encourage the Minister, however, to come back on Report with a much stronger sketching out of what will be in these assessments, as required by Clause 13. For example, instead of just having the word “may”, have some “must” in there and then open up the power later to adjust as necessary. It is also valuable to be able to repeal.

Amendment 74 concerns the “Duty to formalise the Value for Money framework”; I know that my Front Bench will speak to that shortly. It is a useful exercise to check whether it is working. There are other amendments which basically make comparisons with other pension providers. That gets trickier if it is done at such a detailed level because, again, people might want some basic information on what is happening with their money. To pick at random, they might want their money with Standard Life instead of Scottish Life; if there is some variation, they might want to make a change. It is those sorts of things that I encourage the Minister to have more detail on by the time we reach Report.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

167: After Clause 41, insert the following new Clause—
“Pension value protection for default arrangements investing in qualifying assets(1) This section applies to a Master Trust scheme or a group personal pension scheme where—(a) an individual’s rights have been accrued wholly or partly through automatic enrolment, and(b) all or part of those rights have been invested in a default arrangement which includes qualifying assets in accordance with any agreement or policy statement made by the Government concerning minimum or expected allocations to such assets.(2) Upon the individual becoming entitled to receive retirement benefits under the scheme, the trustees or managers must obtain an actuarial assessment of—(a) the net investment return attributable to the qualifying assets held within the default arrangement over the period during which the individual’s rights were so invested, and(b) the net investment return that would have been achieved over the same period had those assets instead been invested in a prescribed benchmark fund.(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b), “prescribed benchmark fund” means a diversified, low-cost equity index fund of a description specified in regulations.(4) Where the actuarial assessment shows that the return attributable to the qualifying assets is lower than the return of the prescribed benchmark fund, the Secretary of State must, in accordance with regulations, secure that a payment is made by the Department for Work and Pensions to the individual equal to the difference, within a timeframe determined by regulations.(5) Regulations under this section may make provision about—(a) the form and content of actuarial assessments,(b) the appointment and qualifications of actuaries,(c) the methodology for attributing returns to qualifying assets,(d) the manner and timing of any payment under subsection (4),(e) cases in which no payment is required, including where differences are de minimis, and(f) the recovery of costs from prescribed pension schemes or prescribed persons.(6) The Secretary of State must publish guidance about the operation of this section, including guidance on the protection of members who remain invested in default arrangements throughout their working lives.(7) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the Secretary of State to make provision for paying the difference (if any) between returns on investments into qualifying assets held within default arrangements and returns on the same investment, had they been invested in a “prescribed benchmark fund”, meaning a diversified, low-cost equity index fund.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sharkey sends his apologies; he is at a funeral and will read Hansard with great attention. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for supporting me on Amendment 167. I think it is the first time in 15 years that I have degrouped an amendment to stand by itself, but I can see no other way to ensure a clear answer from the Government: will they put their money where their mouth is?

The Committee has discussed qualified assets and, while I do not intend to repeat the discussion, I hope that everyone understands how high risk a portfolio of such assets is. The Financial Services Regulation Committee, in January, titled its look at the private equity markets as Private Markets: Unknown Unknowns. Some 75% of firms invested in by venture capital fail. Complex infrastructure is both high risk and illiquid; we can think HS2, the Elizabeth Line—four years delayed and £4 billion over budget—and Hinkley Point, which seems to run out of money time after time. If someone with a substantial pension wants to invest in such assets, that is fine with me, but the Mansion House Compact —or accord, I do not care which terminology is used—covers only auto-enrolment default fund pension schemes. These are vehicles for those with the narrowest shoulders, with low incomes, small pensions and little financial knowledge. The downside risk for them means poverty.

The Government have assured us, and those pension savers with the narrowest shoulders, that under the Mansion House Compact, and by putting 10% of their pensions into qualified assets, they will be winners—to quote the Minister on the first day in Committee:

“with an average earner potentially gaining up to £29,000 more by retirement”.—[Official Report, 12/1/26; col. GC 205.]

No warning of the downside was mentioned and clearly, to the Minister, the downside does not seriously exist. I challenge that. I am always very wary of promises of low-risk, high-return investments.

The Government have argued that the Mansion House Compact, combined with the provisions in this Bill, brings great benefits because risk can in effect be eliminated by the structures that have been introduced and the use of large providers. I want to challenge some of those shibboleths. Large providers have explained to me that they can enhance pensions and use qualified assets safely through lifestyle investing, where more is invested into high-risk assets early in the life of the pension, switching later to low-risk investments. If I lose £100 in the first year that I save in a pension, the loss is compounded through the life of the pension and I will have thousands less to get me through retirement. If I lose £100 the day before my pension matures, I lose £100. Early losses are never made up by later gains because they in no way enhance the performance of other assets in the portfolio. If you lose on A, there is no sudden guarantee that you will gain on B. Lifestyle investment is a marketing tool to sell schemes to the financially anxious.

The Government and the Minister argue that the risks in qualified assets can be mitigated away through diversification. For a fund fully invested in good-quality assets, such as the FTSE 100 or the S&P 500, I see the argument for diversification to manage risk, but diversification loses its effectiveness in high-risk portfolios, as everyone should have learned from the collateralised debt obligation scandal that triggered the financial crisis in 2008. Let me illustrate with an extreme example. I go to the casino, maybe several casinos. I play the slot machine, roulette and blackjack. I am beautifully diversified. But we all know that I will still lose my money.

The Government’s case that pensioners with the narrowest shoulders should be 10% invested in qualified assets really depends on assumptions that it makes about asset allocation. The argument is that the pension companies involved would employ the best experts to pick winners among those qualified assets. Some experts are better than others, though I note that they all will find statistics and present them to show that they have the Midas touch.

I note the analysis of the Government Actuary’s Department, which shows that over time and on average—that is a key word—virtually every model portfolio tested delivers similar results. But there is a catch, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, pointed out last week—the GAD’s conclusion underscored its uncertainty. It said that

“there is considerable uncertainty, particularly with the assumptions for projected future investment returns”.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, also quoted from the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, which made the point even more forcefully. I could not work out what the mean looked like when I looked at that work done by the government department. Obviously, the mean really matters because an average can be made up of a few big winners and a lot of small losers. It is the losers in the high stakes game of qualified assets that worry me.

I am not attempting to stop the Mansion House Compact and the Government’s plan to put 10% of the assets of auto-enrolment default funds into qualified assets even though they are unlisted, opaque, high-risk and illiquid. My amendment would simply require the Government to provide a safety net for those who are in no position to live with the downside in these investments.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, last week said that

“the inevitable corollary of mandation”,

which is where he was focused,

“is responsibility for the outcome”.—[Official Report, 26/1/26; col. GC 284.]

But I regard the Mansion House Compact as very much a government-driven agreement designed by the industry to head off even more coercive action and so I think that the same principle applies: “responsibility for the outcome”.

My amendment is simple:

“Upon the individual becoming entitled to receive retirement benefits under the scheme, the trustees or managers must obtain an actuarial assessment of—


(a) the net investment return attributable to the qualifying assets held within the default arrangement over the period during which the individual’s rights were so invested, and


(b) the net investment return that would have been achieved over the same period had those assets instead been invested in a prescribed benchmark fund”.


In the amendment, benchmark fund

“means a diversified, low-cost equity index fund of a description specified in regulations”.

If the benchmark fund would have performed better, the Government make up the difference to the pensioner. The calculation, despite what the Minister said, is very simple, requires no new data and can be crafted straightforwardly. Pension schemes would just code it into their normal reporting.

If the Minister and the Government are right, and investment in qualified assets, as structured under the Mansion House Compact and in this Bill, benefits and does not harm pensioners in auto-enrolment default schemes—those people I described at the beginning with the narrowest shoulders and least able to take risk—it costs the Government absolutely nothing to sign up to this protection provision. If the Government believe their own words, accepting my amendment means taking no risk at all for the Government or taxpayer. My amendment only costs the Government money if they are wrong in the promises that they are making. The amendment would certainly give peace of mind to the poorest pensioners and strengthen their confidence to save and to invest.

We all want auto-enrolment to better serve low earners, but that requires shaping policy around the capacity of low earners to take risk. I ask the Government to put their money where their mouth is and provide the pension value protection described in my amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not being able to be here last week for Amendment 142. I am grateful that the Minister responded to it regardless of that. I have added my name to Amendment 167. I will try to be very brief because the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has explained it with her usual clarity, and the amendment covers some of the same ground that we debated in the last group—although it attacks the problem from the other direction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

The Bill as a whole is trying to pursue scale and is trying to mirror what the Mansion House Accord did. I have been through that argument many times. We are seeking solely a reserve power to act as a backstop to an industry-led decision. The industry itself has decided to go in this direction. It is a simply a reserve power, and the reason why we are using it is that we know that there remains a risk that people will not all follow through on it because of the excessive focus on cost and the competitive advantage that may come from backsliding on that. I fully accept that the noble Baroness does not agree, but those are the Government’s arguments. I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, it has been such an excellent debate that I will be extremely brief. I am troubled by two things. One is that the Minister does not seem to realise that this is not voluntary action by the pension industry. It is because it sees it as the only way to avoid actual mandation, not because people have sat down and said, “All these years we have been getting it wrong; now we have had a conversation with the Government and we’re going to get it right”. That is not what is going on here.

Secondly, I am troubled that the Minister does not understand the consequences of the level of risk that is embedded in these qualified assets. She is perfectly satisfied that, if they go wrong, the damage falls on the people with the narrowest shoulders. To me, that is seriously incomprehensible because, for those people, the consequence is frequently going to be poverty.

I ask her to sit back and think about this. The Government are right to encourage people to save for pensions, but they also need to understand that, when people have narrow shoulders, low incomes and limited financial knowledge, they are not in a position to take the kind of risks that she is, in essence, saying that they should be taking and, if they take them, they are guaranteed winners. If she believes that they are guaranteed winners, then simply step in and provide the protection that I am talking about, which would cost the taxpayer nothing. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 167 withdrawn.