Victims and Courts Bill

Baroness Sater Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Sater]

68: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Dealing with offenders for crimes committed as childrenWhere a court is dealing with an offender for a crime committed before the age of 18 but at the time of the first court appearance the offender is older than 17 but younger than 21, the offender must be dealt with by a youth court and sentenced according to the sentencing guidelines which apply in a youth court.”

[Baroness Sater (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 68 is in my name and those of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and my friend the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and I thank them for their ongoing support.

This amendment revisits an issue I previously raised during the passage of the Sentencing Bill. I return to it because I feel so strongly that this anomaly in our criminal justice system is one that must be resolved and merits further and careful consideration by this Committee. It concerns children who commit offences while under the age of 18 but who, through delay in proceedings entirely outside their control, are first brought before the court only after their 18th birthday. Under the current system, they will be sentenced as adults, losing access to youth-specific disposals, including referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders and the support of youth justice services, even though their offending behaviour occurred during childhood.

As I previously said, this can only be described as a postcode lottery in sentencing outcomes. If two young people commit the exact same offence at the exact same age in similar circumstances, and one happens to live in an area where their case reaches court before their 18th birthday and the other does not, the first will get all the support from the youth court process, while the second defendant, not because of the seriousness of the offence or their maturity, will end up in the adult court. The consequences of not being part of the youth justice process and the subsequent treatment of criminal record disclosures can affect a young person well into adulthood, including their future employment prospects. The Bill provides an opportunity to look at this issue, correct an unfair anomaly and ensure consistency in sentencing.

As I have said previously, the youth justice system exists for a reason. Those of us who have worked in youth justice know how the youth court has specifically trained magistrates who emphasise welfare, education and rehabilitation and can turn young lives around and reduce reoffending. Without this support, their future could be bleak. In the passage of the Sentencing Bill, my friend the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier spoke in support of addressing this anomaly, and I am grateful once again for their support today. I was encouraged by the support of the Minister. While he stated that youth sentencing lay largely outside the scope of the Sentencing Bill, he made it clear that the Government had a great deal of sympathy with the issue. He also indicated that there may be merit in looking at this issue further, while understandably pointing to the need to consider the wider implications across the justice system. I took that as a constructive response. It is in the same spirit that I bring the matter back today.

This amendment simply seeks to ensure that, where offending behaviour took place during childhood, it is assessed and addressed through the correct lens—one that reflects age, maturity and culpability at the time of the offence, rather than being determined by administrative delay entirely outside an offender’s control. I return to this issue today because I feel so strongly that we must address this clear anomaly. I hope that the Government will be willing to take a second look at this and consider how it might be resolved. I beg to move.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to be able to support my noble friend Lady Sater’s amendment. I have heard her express these views before, I heard her express them just now, and there is nothing more to be said. I urge this Committee to get on and agree with her.

--- Later in debate ---

That means that if someone breaches a domestic violence protection order, which is a civil breach rather than a criminal offence, and, let us say, assaults their partner, the presumption would not apply and judges would retain full discretion to impose a short, immediate prison sentence. We are also introducing a new judicial finding of domestic abuse at sentencing, so that it would provide a flag on the system and these offenders are better identified and monitored through the system. For all these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Sater (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her very positive response. I welcome and appreciate her offer to meet. I know it is difficult and complex, but I appreciate the further conversation with her. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 68 withdrawn.