Subsidy Control Bill (Eighth sitting)
Bill Esterson Excerpts(2 years, 6 months ago)
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Kirsty Blackman
I am baffled by this Government amendment. It seems to be directly opposite to what the Opposition moved. The Opposition were concerned that one of the principles was mentioned in the post-award referrals clause, but the others were not. With amendment 5, the Minister concedes that one of the principles should not be mentioned and is therefore asking for it to be taken out of clause 62 but not of the post-award referrals clause. To clause 60, he argued, I think, that it was okay to include one of the principles, but not the others. I am confused about why he made one argument at one point in the debate but is now arguing the opposite—for the removal of one of those principles.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
It is good to see you back in the Chair, Mr Sharma. The hon. Member for Aberdeen North makes a good point, which we reiterate, about amendment 5, which we will come to because of its relation to our amendments to clause 64.
Paul Scully
On the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, in the previous sitting we talked about UK competition and investment. It simply emphasises the point about UK competition and investment. It does not have any significant effect, because it is already captured in the guiding principles. We want to make sure that there is absolute clarity for businesses and public authorities with clause 62.
The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Michael Tomlinson)
Very good.
Bill Esterson
I say to the hon. Member who spoke from a sedentary position that it was not very good. As we have said throughout the—
Bill Esterson
I think he is trying to intervene. I would not take an intervention from him anyway, because he does not wear a mask.
I rise to reiterate our concern about the lack of transparency throughout the Bill and how subsidies cannot be called in when they are under schemes. That is a continuous thread. The real concern is that potential abuses can be missed as a result of that approach. The clause exempts subsidies under schemes from a review, from post-award referrals and from voluntary referrals. We agree that schemes provide a quicker and easier route to provide subsidies, but that should not mean that subsidies awarded under those schemes should escape due scrutiny. If there is not a problem with a subsidy, there is nothing to be concerned about, but if there is a problem with a subsidy awarded under a scheme, there needs to be a mechanism, and I hope the Minister will explain what that mechanism will be, because I do not think we have heard during our deliberations about the scrutiny of potential problems with subsidies awarded under schemes.
There is the potential for a back door of free, unscrutinised public cash being opened up. We have seen problems throughout the pandemic where scrutiny was removed. I will not go over them in too much detail. We have heard about them already, such as the Health Secretary’s pub landlord, advisers to the Board of Trade, and the problems of Randox and the now former right hon. Member for North Shropshire (Mr Paterson)—I understand, hot off the press, that he has resigned. Some £3.5 billion-worth of covid-19 contracts were awarded to firms with links to the Conservative party, according to Government procurement data. That is an example of why we need adequate scrutiny.
Bill Esterson
There is a monumental lack of scrutiny in the clause that should not be allowed to continue, so we will oppose it.
Kirsty Blackman
I have a few questions. Are there any circumstances in which a subsidy given under a subsidy scheme could be considered of interest or of particular interest where the scheme itself is not considered of interest or particular interest? If that is the case, is it possible to ensure that a subsidy scheme in which any of the potential subsidies are considered as possibly of interest or particular interest is subject to the mandatory or voluntary referral, rather than the subsidies given under those schemes not being subject to any referral, despite the fact that some of them might tick the boxes and some will not? Does the Minister see what I mean?
I understand that the question is complicated but, specifically, I am concerned about the lack of ability to refer individual subsidies. Only subsidy schemes may be referred to the mandatory or voluntary referral process; the subsidies made under those schemes may not be referred. However, if we had a scheme that seems to tick all the normal boxes to make it acceptable as a subsidy scheme—it is given under clause 10 and all makes sense—but one of the subsidies given under that scheme is something that is of interest or particular interest, will the Minister confirm that that scheme will therefore be subject to mandatory referral, even if only one of the subsidies given under the scheme is of interest or particular interest?
Even from reading clause 10, I am not sure quite how tight “subsidy scheme” is drawn. Subsidy schemes—given the schemes we have seen in relation to covid, for example—can be incredibly wide and apply to a significant number of industries, whereas the Secretary of State might have made it clear that any subsidies given under agriculture, for example, are considered as particular interest. A scheme could apply to everything in a certain area—widely drawn—but might not be challengeable in its own right.
Paul Scully
If a scheme can contain a subsidy of interest or particular interest, that scheme becomes a scheme of interest or particular interest, depending on the circumstances. That is therefore very much the case.
In answer to some of the points made by the hon. Member for Sefton Central on hiding subsidies and distorted payments, we have the basic level of how to treat public money—the statutory obligations on those public authorities that we discussed earlier—but the schemes themselves do not provide a back door for potentially multiple subsidies; public authorities have to consider the principles of the scheme, in the same way as they would for individual subsidies. They must not make a scheme if they judge that any subsidy within that scheme conflicts with any of the principles.
The decision to make the scheme has exactly the same risk-based scrutiny of the potential challenges as the decision to award a subsidy—especially those schemes of particular interest, which are called in by the Secretary of State and must be referred to the subsidy advice unit.
Bill Esterson
I want to tease out some information from the Minister. He used the phrase “risk-based scrutiny”, but I get no sense of what, if there is abuse of a scheme, the mechanism is to ensure that the subsidies within the schemes are not applied in a distorted way or in a way that misuses public money. That is the bit that I do not get.
Paul Scully
The scheme itself will be challengeable.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 59, in clause 64, page 36, line 11, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b).
This amendment removes the exemptions in relation to the CMA’s referrals and functions, for streamlined subsidy schemes and minimal financial assistance.
We are all having fun changing our minds this afternoon—well, maybe the Government are not changing theirs too much. We have tabled amendments 59 and 60, and the combined effect of those amendments would be to remove
“the exemptions in relation to the CMA’s referrals and functions, for streamlined subsidy schemes and minimal financial assistance.”
We understand that it may well be appropriate to exempt certain subsidies from review. During a natural disaster or a national or global economic emergency, it makes sense that subsidies designed to alleviate those emergencies should be exempt from the regulations. The same goes for a national security emergency; matters related to Bank of England monetary policy; legacy and withdrawal agreement subsidies; tax measures; special public economic interest assistance; and large cross- border or international co-operation projects. However, Government amendment 5 acknowledges that it would not be appropriate for subsidies in relation to nuclear energy to be exempt from due scrutiny, so this is about being consistent. That goes to the point that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has made a number of times today alone, about whether subsidies awarded in unexceptional circumstances—namely, streamlined subsidy schemes and minimal financial assistance—should be free from appropriate transparency and scrutiny. We are being consistent by continuing that point.
During the debate on clause 63 stand part, I did not get an answer to my question about why the Minister believes that those subsidy schemes should be exempt from regulations. I go back to what Professor Rickard told us in Committee:
“The benefits of transparency, and more of it, outweigh the costs…I would encourage Members to think carefully about the ways in which we could further increase the transparency to ensure that the UK was a world leader in transparency in subsidies and so as to help to provide consistency and certainty for business and accountability to taxpayers.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 19, Q22.]
The Minister—and, from memory, the Secretary of State on Second Reading—talked about this domestic subsidy scheme being an opportunity to demonstrate a new way of operating a state aid regime, having left the EU system behind us. Indeed, some of the questions that hon. Members asked during the evidence session were of a similar nature: they were about what we could learn and what we could do in order to have the best possible system and lead the world. That is what the spirit of this amendment is about: improving transparency to deliver the best quality of regime possible. As Thomas Pope said when summed up his evidence:
“My view is that there is a benefit to more transparency.”—[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 20, Q24.]
We have made the point multiple times about the importance of transparency in public expenditure and what a good thing it is, because without it, there is a danger of public finances being spent recklessly without consideration of value for money. Our amendments would ensure that when a subsidy is awarded in unexceptional circumstances, there is adequate transparency. Again, I have to ask the Minister why he is so resistant to increased transparency in this part of the Bill.
Kirsty Blackman
I have a quick question for the Minister, which he does not have to answer now. I would appreciate it if he could consider when a streamlined subsidy scheme is being published and set before Parliament. He has made it clear that a number of people will be consulted and that it will be drawn up in parallel with thinking from experts and potential recipients of the subsidy scheme. That is fine, but when we are assessing those streamlined subsidy schemes, it would be helpful for Parliament to have that information, and particularly to have a view from the SAU, or from the CMA more generally, about the streamlined subsidy scheme. Even if the SAU just says, “We think this looks good,” that is at least more information for Parliament. It would give me more comfort to know that the scheme fulfils the principles, or at least that the SAU thinks the scheme fulfils the principles as they are laid out. Therefore, it would be much more reasonable for clause 64(1)(a) to be included if we were given that level of comfort.
Bill Esterson
Again, we just are not getting from the Minister certainty about the creation of the regime, and this is a common problem all the way through. We are waiting and it is uncertain exactly how this will operate, which makes it very difficult for us to judge whether what we will end up with will provide a degree of scrutiny and transparency in the use of public funds. That applies both to streamlined subsidy schemes and to minimal financial assistance. Although I think the Minister is right about the broad point that smaller payments are unlikely to have the potential to distort in economic terms, they can still be misused. As part of the regime, we are still missing an adequate way to scrutinise, and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North gave some good pointers on how that might be addressed. For those reasons, we will push the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Paul Scully
Clause 64 provides for a limited number of exemptions from some or all of the provisions on the referral of subsidies and schemes to the subsidy advice unit. Subsections (1) and (2) exempt from the provisions of chapter 1 of part 4 various subsidies or schemes where either the subsidy control principles, prohibitions and conditions do not apply or it would otherwise be inappropriate for the provisions on referrals to apply. Subsection (3) confers a reserve power on the Secretary of State to exempt subsidies or schemes from the mandatory referral requirements where there are urgent and certain exceptional circumstances that mean that it is in the public interest that the scheme or subsidy can be given without the delay that would result from a referral. The power does not exempt the subsidy or scheme from the subsidy control requirements under part 2 of the Bill. It will still be necessary for the public authority to comply with the duty to apply the principles and other requirements.
Bill Esterson
We have debated the amendment and the need for the change to this clause. We have tested the will of the Committee already and will not oppose clause stand part.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 64, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Michael Tomlinson.)
Subsidy Control Bill (Seventh sitting)
Bill Esterson Excerpts(2 years, 6 months ago)
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Seema Malhotra
We have no further comments other than the issues we have raised already. We support clause stand part.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 54, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55
Call-in direction
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 52, in clause 55, page 30, line 29, after “Secretary of State” insert
“, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland”.
This amendment extends the call in powers under this section to the Devolved Administrations.
It is great to see you back in the Chair, Ms Nokes, bright and early this time.
The amendment addresses the call-in powers as they relate to the devolved Administrations. We think that the power to call in is a good power to have in the Bill, but it needs to be consistent and apply to the devolved Administrations, not just to the Secretary of State.
Clause 55 allows the Secretary of State to request an assessment of a subsidy or subsidy scheme if the Secretary of State believes it could be breaking regulations or having negative effects on competition and investment in the United Kingdom. As we have said a number of times, it is important that the First Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department responsible have those same powers. It makes no sense that the Secretary of State should be empowered to call in Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish subsidies that may damage English interests, but the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish leaders cannot call in subsidies that may damage the interests of their own nations. That is what we heard in the evidence sessions.
I start with the evidence from Thomas Pope, deputy chief economist at the Institute for Government, who told us that subsidy control
“affects devolved competence and the operation of policy in all four nations of the UK. I therefore think it is appropriate that there be better devolved representation.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 31, Q43.]
Simon Baynes
In the previous discussions on this issue, the opinion of the Bill Committee seemed to be that these matters were the responsibilities of the Secretary of State. It therefore makes no sense to me to devolve those responsibilities to the devolved Administrations. In some of their comments, Opposition Members have fully accepted that these matters are the responsibility of the Secretary of State, because it is a reserved power.
Bill Esterson
Just because the Government keep winning the votes, which they always will do because they have a majority in Parliament and therefore on the Committee, that is not a reason for us to not make valid arguments. This is a slightly different point on our concerns about the failure to reflect the devolution settlement in the Bill. Call-in is a slightly different aspect of the powers needed for a functioning subsidy regime, and it is right that we are raising it at this stage of the deliberations.
Robin Millar
Is it not precisely the point that this does reflect the devolved agreement, because the Secretary of State has those reserved powers?
Bill Esterson
I think the hon. Gentleman missed the point I was making, but there we go. It is entirely appropriate, given that the regime is a four-nation regime, that the four nations have the powers of call-in to the CMA in the way that our amendment sets out.
Robin Millar
This is an important point, so I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way again so soon. There is no four nations concept within our constitution. We have one United Kingdom Government and three devolved Administrations. Four nations is something reserved for rugby matches and the vernacular—[Interruption.] Indeed, the rugby is six. It is not something within our constitution. He has referred to the four nations on several occasions, and on this occasion I feel it is important and relevant to make that point.
Bill Esterson
I suspect that more than one party would be very interested in repeating those remarks multiple times, certainly in two of the nations of this country. They are called nations within the devolved settlement; we have a devolution settlement that has “four nations” within it. It will be interesting to see how many times the hon. Gentleman is quoted saying that.
I will quote what George Peretz told us about why it matters that there should be a call-in power for all four nations:
“In a situation where an English local authority, the Secretary of State or another UK Government body acting as an English Department does something that is designed to benefit England but causes serious concern in Scotland or Wales, why should the Welsh or Scottish Ministers not be able to do the same thing if the concern is with competition or investment within the United Kingdom? I find it slightly hard to see what the argument against that is.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 44, Q63.]
I have not heard from either the hon. Member for Clwyd South or the hon. Member for Aberconwy an argument against what he told us last week.
Rachel Merelie, senior director for the Office for the Internal Market at the CMA, noted:
“It is really important that all granting authorities are treated fairly and equitably, regardless of whether they are in the devolved nations or in England.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 69, Q98.]
I am not the only one talking about the devolved nations by any means; we have it from the CMA.
Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Bill Esterson
The hon. Gentleman does not have a mask on, so I will not. He will be able to make a speech afterwards, as I think one of his colleagues said.
The devolved nations of the United Kingdom cannot be treated as second class when it comes to economic matters that could have potentially monumental impacts on the proper functioning of their markets. The devolved Administrations must have equitable powers with the Secretary of State to call in subsidies where they could be damaging to their own economies.
Paul Scully
I think I get the general gist of where the hon. Lady is going with that point. That is why, rather than trying to define them as not complying, we are trying to define them specifically at the outset, hence the regulations that we will be putting forward, but there is plenty of opportunity to have that discussion.
Bill Esterson
The hon. Member for Aberdeen North correctly made the point that the amendment asks for a limited set of powers. I set that out using the evidence. We should follow the evidence of people who are experts on these subjects. We had a range of very good witnesses, who set out why there should be the sorts of powers that we are proposing. I cannot help think that there will be occasions when the Secretary of State is making awards. If he, as it says in the Bill, is making those awards, is there not a potential conflict of interest if there is not another way of providing that call-in if there is perceived damage in the other three nations? The Minister might want to respond to that point.
The amendment makes a limited request. The Minister talked about requests to the Secretary of State for a call-in, but a request is not the same as a power. Unless there is that power—potentially in the case of a conflict of interest where the Secretary of State is the awarder—there is a limit to the way the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Administrations can ensure there is a fair application of the system in terms of call-ins. I would be grateful if the Minister could come back on this point about the potential conflict of interest where the Secretary of State is the awarder in relation to the use of call-in powers.
Paul Scully
As I say, the Secretary of State will be acting on behalf of the UK Government. Subsidy control is a reserved power, as we established in the debate for the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 that we had at length at the end of last year. None the less, there is no special treatment for the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. There was plenty of opportunity through the publication of the advice and the reason for call-ins, and any enforcement that may need to be done through the Competition Appeal Tribunal to highlight that potential. None the less I think there were enough checks within the structure to avoid that. I hope the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.
Bill Esterson
I do not think that we got an answer to my question. There is still the concern that if the Secretary of State says no and there are legitimate concerns in the three nations, there needs to be the additional limited opportunity of call-ins. We will push the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Kirsty Blackman
I was going to ask a question about this clause, and the Minister has managed to make me even more confused. Subsection (1) states:
“A public authority may request a report from the CMA before giving a subsidy, or making a subsidy scheme, of interest.”
It does not state that, additionally, any other subsidy may be referred to the CMA under a voluntary referral. It might elsewhere in the legislation, but it does not at this point.
My concern was that it relates only to subsidies “of interest”—subsidies of particular interest are covered by mandatory referral, and that is fine—but for subsidies that fall outside the category of interest, perhaps because interest is narrowly drawn by the regulations when interest is set, there seems to be no way for those public authorities to refer them voluntarily to the CMA, as the legislation is drafted. It would be good if they could.
Let us say that “particular interests” and “interests” are defined by the Government, that goes through the affirmative procedure, we have a discussion, and the definitions are agreed. Accidentally, however, something is left out of the category of interest—because we do not think of everything—and a local or public authority discovers the anomaly and thinks to itself, “Do you know what, I should refer this to the CMA voluntarily, because I think it probably should be included in the schemes of interest, but in the way that the legislation is written, it does not fall under that”, so it tries to make a voluntary referral. It cannot, however, because it may make a voluntary referral only in the case of something that is of interest.
There is a bit of a gap. Authorities should be able to make that voluntary referral, whether it is a scheme of interest or not. There is a concern. As to what the Minister said, absolutely, if the Secretary of State has a concern additional to the interest section, that would be fair enough and make a difference, or if the authority itself decides that it should be referred to the CMA. I do not think that that will be a huge amount of extra work. Authorities will not refer themselves to the CMA for fun; they will do so when they feel that there is a reasonable chance that what they are considering doing is contentious.
I will not vote against the clause, because voluntary referrals are a good thing, but I do not think that it goes as far as the Minister suggested it goes—unless I have missed something.
Bill Esterson
I was not entirely clear which clause the hon. Member for Aberdeen North was speaking to. We are still on clause 55 stand part—but it was a very good speech on the next clause, so we now know what she will say.
We expressed our concerns in the debate on our amendment. I hope that the Minister will reflect on those concerns and consider whether greater strength is needed in this clause and, similarly, I suspect, in clause 56—when we get to that debate.
Seema Malhotra
We agree that in such cases, the subsidy or scheme in question should be treated as if it were part of a mandatory referral to the CMA. We have no issues with this clause, and will vote for it to stand part.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 58 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 59
CMA report following mandatory or voluntary referral
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 59, page 33, line 13, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment removes the power for the Secretary of State to amend this section by regulation.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 54, in clause 59, page 33, line 17, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment is a consequential amendment linked to Amendment 53.
Bill Esterson
We have concerns about the way the clause allows the Secretary of State to use regulations to affect the content and form of CMA reports. This is a question of the CMA’s independence. On the Competition and Markets Authority website, it describes itself as
“an independent non-ministerial department”.
The CMA’s work
“is overseen by a Board, and led by the Chief Executive and senior team. Decisions in…investigations are made by independent members of a CMA panel.”
In contrast, the clause would empower the Secretary of State to amend, by using regulations, the content of the CMA’s reports. It is very hard to see how this is anything other than a direct contradiction of the principle of independence, baked into the CMA’s set-up.
The timing of the change, given the shameful proceedings in the Commons Chamber yesterday, leaves the suspicion that it is, again, about removing the principle of independence from the heart of the CMA’s role. We saw this with the Prime Minister’s own adviser on ministerial standards, Sir Alex Allan, resigning because of the breach of the ministerial code, and we saw it yesterday with members of the ruling party scrapping the rules or attempting to scrap the rules on MPs’ conduct because one of their own was found guilty of what the Standards Committee described as an “egregious” breach and then wanting to scrap the role of the independent standards commissioner.
The Chair
Order. May I remind hon. Members to stay within the scope of the Subsidy Control Bill?
Bill Esterson
Thank you, Ms Nokes. On that basis, it will probably not be wise to take the interventions. I am using these things as an example of the ruling party’s attempts to remove independence. The CMA is also supposed to be independent. We have seen a desire to break the rules and then just remake the rules in the main Commons Chamber, and I fear that now we may be seeing something similar—we need to ensure that we do not see something similar—when it comes to the independence of the CMA in its role with regard to the subsidy control regime.
Without amendment, the clause will allow the Government to rewrite the contents of an independent report if there is any warning that it will say something that they do not like. That is not how independence works, and it is not good government. Our amendments would remove the power for the Secretary of State to do that. It would remove the power to edit reports published by the CMA, and it would ensure that the independence of the CMA stays as it is.
Kirsty Blackman
I have just a brief question. This clause lays out things that reports following mandatory or voluntary referrals “must” include and some things that the reports “may” include. Can the Minister confirm that the reports may also include things not mentioned here and that the additional things that would be included would be at the discretion of the CMA? If it can include only the musts and the mays in the clause, it will not be able to include anything else that the CMA considers would be relevant in the report. Given that the Minister has stressed the independence and expertise of the CMA, it would be sensible to confirm that it can include matters that it feels are relevant, whether or not they are explicitly mentioned in the Bill.
Paul Scully
The CMA is independent and will use its expertise. I think that we have crossed wires here, because actually the clause allows the Secretary of State to talk about the content of the report but not to textually amend an independent report. That is not what we are talking about here, which is what is within scope of the report—to ensure that it can actually do it. This is to be able to give additional transparency and scrutiny in the regime itself. The clause allows him to make provision about the content and form of the report, but, as I said, not to change the text of an independent report.
Any changes to the content of the report must be made by the affirmative procedure. That is core to the subsidy control regime, because if the Government believe that the process needs to be refined, it is only right to have parliamentary scrutiny of it. By contrast, any specification as to the form of the report would be a technical regulation, for which the negative procedure is appropriate. Amendments 53 and 54 remove that possibility, except by future primary legislation.
As I say, removing the mechanism for amending or enhancing the baseline for SAU reporting that is set out in clause 59 would unnecessarily tie the hands of the SAU and future Governments seeking to improve the referral process based on the experience and expertise that is gathered over time through the functioning of the new regime. As set out in clause 67, the power to change the content of the report may be exercised only for a period of one year following the publication of SAU’s first report under clause 65.
As I have set out, however, changing the form of the report is a technical matter, so it is appropriate for the regulations to be subject to the negative procedure. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Sefton Central withdraws the amendments.
Bill Esterson
Clause 59(4)(a) uses the phrase
“amend subsection (1), (2) or (3) to make provision about the content of the CMA’s report”.
The Minister used the terms “text” and “content” interchangeably, which highlights our concern. Using secondary legislation, the Secretary of State is able to give himself the power to amend CMA reports. That is the problem—that is what overturns the power.
Kirsty Blackman
The Minister did not answer my question about additional information that the CMA may include in a report that is outwith the scope of the Bill. It does not fall under part 2; it falls under something else that the CMA thinks is relevant and should be in the report. Does the hon. Gentleman agree?
Bill Esterson
The Minister did not answer the hon. Lady’s question, so maybe he can do that after I finish my summing up, which will not take much longer.
We will push the amendment to a vote, because the Minister did not address our concerns about removing the independence of the CMA.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Subsidy Control Bill (Sixth sitting)
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Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Nokes. We have no objections to the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41
Subsidy database: exemption for SPEI assistance
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
Services of public economic interest are vital services that without Government subsidy would not be supplied in the appropriate way by the market, or in some cases would not be supplied at all. It is important that public authorities can support the delivery of vital public services using those subsidies. The clause exempts certain services of public economic interest subsidies from the transparency requirement in clause 33 to upload the subsidy on to the database. There are two categories of exemption.
First, clause 41(1)(a) provides that a subsidy for a service of public economic interest of less than £14.5 million is exempt from the obligation to upload. Secondly, even where the subsidy for a service of public economic interest is £14.5 million or more, it is exempted from transparency obligations if it has been given for certain activities listed in the clause, including hospital care, social housing or airports with fewer than 200,000 passengers annually. Subsection (2) details that, when calculating the value of the subsidy, the gross cash amount should be used, or, if the subsidy is not provided in cash, the gross cash equivalent.
Bill Esterson
We do not believe that the clause should stand part. That is consistent with our approach to the problems with the lack of content on the database and the lack of transparency. The clause outlines that subsidies of less than £14.5 million given to SPEIs are exempt from having to be published on the database. As my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston laid out in her comments on clause 38, we understand that the subsidies to services of public economic interest should not have to obey the subsidy control requirements, but we cannot see why they should not be published on the database. I also do not think I heard the Minister explain why the £725,000 threshold applies in clause 38. Perhaps he could answer that in his response.
The bigger question on the clause is why the Government have chosen to exclude payments to services of public economic interest from the database at all. The Minister talked about transparency. Why is there no transparency for these payments? The Government’s recent track record is—as the Public Accounts Committee put it—one of enormous sums of money being given with no apparent return in the case of Test and Trace, and hundreds and millions of pounds-worth of contracts going to people with connections to Government Ministers or other connections to Government. In the case of Andrew Mills, who was an adviser to the Board of Trade, a company that he set up last year assisted in the awarding of a £252 million contract to Ayanda Capital, but a significant proportion of the personal protective equipment that it supplied turned out to be unusable. That was very wasteful and inefficient, but the process was very lucrative for individuals with such connections.
That is why transparency is so important. Recent history has given the country the impression that the Government are reluctant to engage in proper transparency. That is not a place in which anybody on this Committee should want to be. It feels at times that the Government fail to grasp that subsidises are financed by public money and that they should therefore be subject to appropriate transparency and scrutiny. We have discussed that a number of times. Subsidies to SPEI enterprises are no exception. Although they may go towards enterprises that differ from other subsidy recipients, they are still financed by public funds and should therefore still be subject to transparency, and the public should still be able to access information about them. These are much larger sums of money.
If that does not happen, subsidies given to SPEIs risk being abused and given to inappropriate recipients—including, as we have seen over the past year and a half, those with connections to the Conservative party. During last week’s evidence session, Professor Rickard told us:
“Through transparency, we can get better compliance and better value for money”.––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 21, Q24.]
Does the Minister disagree with that analysis? Can he tell us what drawbacks he sees to subjecting subsidies given to SPEI enterprises to more transparency?
We agree with Professor Rickard that better transparency reduces corruption, reduces cronyism and leads to better value for money. The clause unnecessarily reduces the transparency for subsidies that could amount to tens of millions of pounds—perhaps more in some cases. As such, the clause should not stand part of the Bill and we will vote against it.
Paul Scully
For the sake of completeness, and with your indulgence, Ms Nokes, I go back to the question about why the threshold in clause 38 is set at £725,000. As part of the consultation response, the Government set out that we would convert the special drawing rights sums in the trade and co-operation agreement to a fixed value in pounds. Setting that exemption threshold at a fixed sterling amount is simpler than having a moving SDR threshold affected by currency fluctuations, and so it was fixed to give certainty for public authorities and recipients.
We have discussed that subsidies granted for public services are unlikely to be unduly distorted. The very reason they are needed is that other providers are unable or unwilling to provide a necessary service—for example, ferry links between Scottish islands, and bus services in rural areas—at a reasonable cost. The lower risk of distortion justifies a higher transparency threshold, which has been set at £14.5 million. SPEI subsidies for less than that amount are unlikely to be distorted.
We are striking a balance between minimising administrative burdens and requiring an appropriate level of transparency. Such services were also exempt from transparency rules under the EU state aid system. We are seeking to minimise administrative burdens where possible, and it would not be appropriate to impose new, unnecessary transparency requirements. Does that mean that they are not transparent? No, it does not. They must be awarded in a transparent manner, as clause 29 stipulates, which means that the subsidy is given through
“a written contract or other legally enforceable arrangement”.
Public authorities would normally publish those contracts, and it is good practice to do so. Indeed, the examples that the hon. Gentleman gave earlier about accusations of and concerns about the perception of cronyism were available because the spending decisions had been made public at a point in time. Spending decisions by councils, including Labour ones, up and down the country, above £500, are available on spreadsheets, which people can go to and drill down.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 42, page 23, line 43, at end insert—
“(1A) Before making regulations under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.
(1B) If consent to the making of the regulations under subsection 11(A) is not given by any of those authorities listed in subsection (1A) within the period of one month beginning with the day on which it is sought from that authority, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without that consent.
(1C) If regulations are made in reliance on subsection 1(6B5), the Secretary of State must make a statement to the House of Commons explaining why the Secretary of State decided to make the regulations without the consent of the authority or authorities concerned.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to seek the consent of the Devolved Administrations before making regulations under this section. Where such consent is not given within one month beginning on the day in which it is sought, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without that consent, but must publish a statement explaining their decision.
So much confusion today, in so many ways, in dealing with the Bill and in some of what is going on in the Bill, Ms Nokes, but there we are. It is all set to make the afternoon go by in a more entertaining fashion.
As with many aspects of the Bill, the clause fails to take into consideration the important role that the devolved Administrations have in state aid governance. The ability to impose regulations unilaterally by secondary legislation, without seeking the consent of the devolved Administrations, is inconsistent with the approach that Labour has sought to instil in Committee—to consider the devolved Administrations as public authorities equal in responsibility for state aid to the responsibilities of the Secretary of State.
Devolved Administrations are on balance more likely to understand what subsidies will be most beneficial for their respective nations than the Secretary of State. That includes such matters as setting the value thresholds for the minimal financial assistance and services of public economic interest assistance exemptions, as well as the transparency exemption for SPEI assistance. Last week, Daniel Greenberg told us in evidence that
‘throughout the Bill, you see “Secretary of State, Secretary of State, Secretary of State”—all powers of HMG—and you think, “Hold on, the devolved institutions are also public authorities. They appear in the list of public authorities in clause 6, so why is it that they do not also share Secretary of State powers?”’––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 61, Q80.]
We of course understand the role of the Westminster Government in the creation and operation of the UK subsidy regime, but preventing the devolved Administrations from creating streamlined schemes undermines their important role in our democratic infrastructure, as well as their responsibilities for their respective nations. We therefore seek to amend clause 42 to allow Welsh Ministers, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department to require the Secretary of State to seek the consent of the devolved Administrations before making regulations under the clause. Where such consent is not given within one month, beginning on the day on which it is sought, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without it but must publish a statement explaining the decision. We believe that the amendment would help to increase the effectiveness of subsidies across the UK and respects the role of the devolved Administrations.
Paul Scully
The Government welcome the ongoing interest that the devolved Administrations have in the Bill, and that the Opposition have in this area. We understand how important it is to set the right thresholds for minimal financial assistance and services of public economic interest assistance, and to set the right reporting threshold for SPEI subsidies. Setting the appropriate thresholds for those categories of subsidy is key to balancing the administrative burden on public authorities, ensuring that proportionate levels of transparency are met and that we remain in line with our international obligations.
The hon. Member for Sefton Central will be aware that in the Government’s response to the consultation on subsidy control we committed to considering whether the threshold at which agricultural subsidies should be classed as minimal financial assistance should be different from that for other subsidies. That decision will be taken after further consideration, before the Bill comes into force. It is right that the regulations under the clause are scrutinised. The Bill provides for that by requiring that they will be subject to the affirmative procedure and will be debated and approved by both Houses in draft before they can be made. The UK Parliament is the right place to scrutinise any regulations made under the clause.
To reassure Members present, I reiterate that we have had numerous discussions with Ministers and officials in the Scottish Government, the Welsh Senedd and the Northern Ireland Executive while drafting the Bill, and since its introduction. We are committed to engaging regularly with the devolved Administrations, taking account of their views, as the Bill progresses through Parliament and in the run-up to its implementation. That includes engagement on the thresholds for those categories of subsidy, both in the round and on a sector-specific basis, so I ask that the hon. Member withdraw the amendment.
Bill Esterson
I have to pick the Minister up on this: he thanks Members for our ongoing interest in the Committee’s deliberations, and the devolved Administrations for their interest. Come on. We are supposed to have a four-nation system. I think it is a bit more than just showing ongoing interest. Perhaps he can tell us the result of the discussions and the consultation feedback on the clause. What was the devolved Administrations’ response? Did they say that they were happy with the clause, or did they want to be in a position to give their consent before the implementation of its provisions? Certainly from what I have seen, they would want the ability to give consent, notwithstanding the importance of the UK-wide system that is in place and the Westminster Government’s role. I would be interested in his response.
Paul Scully
I think we have established that subsidy control is a reserved matter. It will be subject to debate, but none the less it is a reserved matter, and it is therefore right that subsidy control policy is made and voted for here in Parliament, which is why I talked about the scrutiny. Parliament is the place to do this. We have engaged on a number of occasions on various aspects of the Bill—34 times at official level and 10 at ministerial level. On top of that, in response to the consultation the different devolved Administrations came up with different views on a number of issues. There was no one consistent view in a number of areas. There are provisions in the Bill that engage the legislative consent motion process, and we hope that the devolved Administrations will not only agree that the Bill is important, but give it their legislative consent.
The Chair
Perhaps we could have some clarity as to whether the amendment is to be withdrawn or pushed to a vote.
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North have made some powerful points about why it is so important to get this right. I did not get a satisfactory answer from the Minister. He mentioned engagement having taken place 34 times, but he could not tell me what was said about the point addressed by the amendment, and neither did he answer the points made by Daniel Greenberg last week about why the devolved institutions do not share the Secretary of State’s powers.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon has quite rightly said, we are not saying anything different about the role of the UK Government in setting up the subsidy regime. What we are saying is that it would make perfect sense to include and engage properly with the devolved Administrations, not least because they have a much better idea of how to apply subsidies in their areas. We even recognise that there will be times when that would not be possible, which is why we suggest that after a month it would fall to the Secretary of State to make a statement as to why consent had not been sought.
We have done our best to give the Government a way to meet the consultation results and show that they really are serious about a four-nation approach to the new regime. It is a shame that the Minister has not taken that on board, and we will push our amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Paul Scully
Clause 42 allows the Government to make certain amendments to the total value thresholds for the exemptions in chapter 2 of part 3, which have been set at the conversion rate between special drawing rights, International Monetary Fund reserved currency, and the pound. The UK-EU trade and co-operation agreement, the TCA, sets the threshold for minimal financial assistance, SPEI assistance, SPEI transparency exemptions and the total value thresholds of SPEI. That means that if the exchange rate changes significantly, the Government may need to amend the thresholds of the Bill to remain compliant with the TCA.
In addition, the EU and the UK may agree to change the special drawing rights amounts set out in the TCA, so the Government must retain the ability to amend the exemption total value thresholds. The Government must have the ability to lower the total value thresholds in response to any new international agreements. Clause 42 also provides a power to specify a lower threshold for minimal SPEI assistance and SPEI transparency exemptions for categories of subsidies. Essentially, these international obligations are why the previous debate is superfluous. Ultimately, the UK Parliament is the right place to discuss changes to thresholds to make sure that we continue to meet our international obligations. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Natural disasters and other exceptional circumstances
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 43, page 25, line 16, at end insert—
“(3A) The Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and a Northern Ireland department may request the Secretary of State to declare a natural disaster or another exceptional circumstance in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
(3B) If the Secretary of State refuses a request made under section (3A), he must make a statement in the House of Commons outlining the reasons for his refusal.”
This amendment allows the devolved administrations to ask the Secretary of State to declare a natural disaster or exceptional circumstances, so that the exemptions listed in Clause 43(1) applying to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland may apply. If the Secretary of State refuses a request for exemption, this amendment requires him to make a statement to the House of Commons.
Amendment 46 allows the devolved Administrations to ask the Secretary of State to declare a natural disaster or exceptional circumstances so that exemptions listed in clause 43(1) applying to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland may apply. If the Secretary of State refuses a request for exemption, the amendment requires them to make a statement to the House of Commons. To reiterate the point I made in the last debate, we are determined to ensure that the role for the devolved Administrations in the administration of their own nations is respected and considered. Of course, we agree that the subsidy regime sits with the Westminster Government, because it is a UK-wide system, but on matters as important as states of natural disaster, devolved Administrations should always be consulted.
Members will appreciate that natural disasters are not political by nature. A natural disaster does not discriminate who it targets and where it affects. By that logic, devolved Administrations, which are just as likely as anywhere else to experience natural disaster, should be granted powers to request that the Secretary of State declares a natural disaster or exceptional circumstance so that the exemptions listed in clause 43(1) may apply. We believe the amendment would respect the role of devolved Administrations in managing their response to disasters effectively, while still ensuring the Secretary of State has the final say.
Kirsty Blackman
The very nature of natural disasters is that they do not occur across the entirety of the UK in one go. Let us hope a natural disaster does not occur across the whole of the UK in one go! Generally, they are regionally specific; they will happen in a relatively confined geographical area. Whether it be flooding, an earthquake or something of that sort, not everywhere will be affected. Therefore, thinking about how this provision could apply, it makes a huge amount of sense for there to be an actual mechanism through which the devolved Administrations can request for the Secretary of State to declare a natural disaster. I would hope that the Secretary of State would be doing so anyway, and would recognise that a disaster in Wales—
Paul Scully
Natural disasters such as floods, fires and other exceptional circumstances can arise that require subsidies to be given at pace, to compensate for the damages caused. The clause allows the Secretary of State to publish a notice to declare that exemptions from the subsidy control requirements apply in respect of a natural disaster or other exceptional occurrence. That will allow public authorities to give subsidies that compensate for the damage in a timely manner.
The hon. Member for Aberdeen North is right that not all such emergencies would apply across the whole of the United Kingdom. In many cases, the natural disaster in question would be localised to a specific place or region. Although it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to declare that the exemption applies, subsidies using the exemption may be given by different public authorities, such as UK Government Departments, local authorities, agencies and, of course, the devolved Administrations. Public authorities are empowered to design subsidies in the most appropriate way to address the damage caused for their specific local needs. The Secretary of State does not need to approve the subsidies given under the exemption, once the natural disaster or other exceptional occurrence has been declared. The existing processes in the Bill already ensure that this type of subsidy can be given across the UK, by the devolved Administrations or other devolved authorities.
If a natural disaster or other exceptional circumstance occurred within the area of any of the devolved Administrations, it would of course be open to that Administration to request that the Secretary of State trigger the exemption, if the Secretary of State has not already done so. If the conditions for the exemption were fulfilled, the Secretary of State could then seek to publish a notice as soon as possible.
The clause is limited to very narrow circumstances to avoid creating an over-broad exemption to the domestic subsidy control regime that could damage UK competition and investment, and our ability to fulfil our international obligations. It is therefore appropriate that the Secretary of State has sole responsibility for determining when the criteria for triggering the exemption have been met. The Secretary of State must publish and lay in Parliament a notice to trigger the use of the exemption. That will ensure that the Secretary of State exercises the power in a transparent and accountable way. I request that the hon. Member for Sefton Central withdraws the amendment.
Bill Esterson
I should point out that the amendment does not seek to give the devolved Administrations the power to declare a state of emergency, which I think was implicit in the Minister’s remarks. They would ask the Secretary of State to use his or her power to do so, not have the power themselves. The hon. Member for Aberdeen North made the point about transparency well. I am satisfied that the point has been made satisfactorily and that the Minister has taken it on board, and I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
Clause 43 enables public authorities to award subsidies to compensate for the damage caused by a specified natural disaster or other exceptional occurrence without having to apply the majority of the subsidy control requirements. The subsidies awarded under the clause would be exempt from the principles, prohibitions and requirements, but the transparency requirements would still apply. Before the exemption can be used, the Secretary of State must publish a notice declaring that a natural disaster or other exceptional occurrence has happened and that this exemption applies, and that notice must be laid in Parliament.
Kirsty Blackman
It would be useful to know how widely national security is defined. Are we talking about subsidies specifically relating to, for example, new military equipment, or to much more tangential things, such as for an organisation that provides server capacity for one of the security services? How tangential can something be in order to be covered by the clause? If the Minister cannot answer, I would be grateful for an answer at some point, in writing or through the method of interpretive dance, if that is what he prefers, because it would be helpful for us to understand this. This is a brief clause, but I am concerned that that definition could be drawn too widely. I just do not know because I do not have enough information.
Bill Esterson
The clause makes it clear that subsidies given to safeguard national security are not subject to the subsidy control regime. This is an important principle that must be interpreted without prejudice in the light of our international commitments; I am sure the Minister agrees with that. We are pleased to see it in the Bill.
Paul Scully
Amendment 1 clarifies that the transparency requirements in chapter 3 of part 2 of the Bill will apply to subsidy awards that are given after the Bill comes into force, but that are provided under legacy schemes. The transparency requirements for this class of subsidy are consistent with those for other in-scheme subsidy awards—that is, there is an obligation on public authorities to upload the details of awards given under published schemes that are of more than £500,000 in value.
The amendment provides legal certainty around the transparency obligations on public authorities, which are set out in the guidance on the UK’s international subsidy control commitments. It will impose no transparency requirements on subsidies given under legacy schemes to those sectors that are excluded from the relevant chapter of the trade and co-operation agreement. Those fall under three categories: agricultural subsidies in the scope of the World Trade Organisation agreement on agriculture, subsidies in relation to the trade of fish and fish products, and subsidies to the audio-visual sector.
Amendment 2 sets out a full definition for the agreement on agriculture, which is referred to in amendment 1. That ensures a clear exemption for subsidies subject to the relevant provision in the agreement on agriculture, which is consistent with the UK’s obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 48, page 27, line 6, at end insert—
“(2A) On the date on which the Act is passed, the Secretary of State must make a statement to the House of Commons regarding the applicability of Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol to subsidies given and schemes made by public authorities in each part of the United Kingdom.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make a statement to the House of Commons regarding the applicability of Article 10 of the NI Protocol on the date on which the Act is passed.
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to make a statement to the House of Commons on the applicability of article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol on the date on which the Act is passed. Clause 48 provides that the requirements of the subsidy control regime do not apply to subsidy schemes that are subject to the Northern Ireland protocol. The Minister will suggest, I imagine, that this gives comfort to public authorities and avoids the double jeopardy of both regimes applying to a subsidy scheme—I take that from what he and the Secretary of State said on Second Reading.
If the Minister were to say that, he would be assuming that there is clarity on which subsidies and schemes are subject to the protocol. On this vital question that public authorities will need to interpret, there is no agreement between the UK Government and the European Commission. There is significant uncertainty about the extent of the reach back—that is, where EU state aid rules will continue to apply across the UK. Where a subsidy is applied in Wales, Scotland or England has consequences in Northern Ireland. George Peretz told us in last Tuesday’s evidence session,
“if I am advising a client such as a local authority or a subsidy recipient, my immediate problem is that I have to look at two sets of guidance—one issued by the European Commission and one by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy—that in some important respects tell me very different things.”—[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 46, Q64.]
His final assessment was:
“It is all a bit of a mess.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 48, Q67.]
We should all note that the European Union published proposals to address problems with the Northern Ireland protocol a fortnight ago. That is a step in the right direction, although the proposals it put forward do not address the state aid subsidy issue. In contrast, on Second Reading on 22 September, the Secretary of State suggested
“we have proposed the change to the Northern Ireland protocol to bring all subsidies within scope of the domestic regime.”—[Official Report, 22 September 2021; Vol. 701, c. 338.]
Here we are six weeks later, and we are no clearer about the status of the negotiations with the EU. I hope the Minister will set my mind at ease and tell us what the UK proposals are to solve the problem that George Peretz set out so well in evidence last week.
Let us remind ourselves: the Government negotiated the Northern Ireland protocol and signed it, so they now have a duty to make the protocol work, just as they have a duty to make Brexit work. It is no good threatening to rip up an agreement that the Prime Minister himself signed just two years ago, and certainly not without something to put in its place. Perhaps the Minister can confirm when he last discussed these issues with his European counterparts, and the timeline on which he expects there to be clarity on article 10 of the protocol and its impact on the Bill.
The purpose of the amendment is to require the Secretary of State to provide a statement on
“the applicability of Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol to subsidies given and schemes made by public authorities in each part of the United Kingdom.”
Public authorities and recipients need and deserve certainty on this issue.
Kirsty Blackman
The hon. Member for Sefton Central used the quote I was going to use from the Secretary of State, who was really pretty clear that the new subsidy control regime that we are discussing is the one that will apply across the United Kingdom. That was the point the Secretary of State was making—that this is the only subsidy control regime that will apply across the United Kingdom. That seems pretty factually incorrect, not least for Northern Ireland but, as the Opposition Front Bench spokesperson pointed out, for other parts of the UK where that trade will end up going to the EU.
The very least the Government could do is to ensure that a formal statement is made, because if we are relying on what Government Ministers have said in the course of either debates in the House or statements, we do not know the answer. We have been told a number of different conflicting things. I get that this is a movable feast and that there is no final decision on exactly how it will work. That is why the amendment is so reasonable. It specifically says that the applicability statement will need to be made on
“the date on which the Act is passed”.
Presumably, by the date on which the Act is passed we will have some idea of which regimes will apply in Northern Ireland. We have spoken very little about Northern Ireland specifically during the course of this Committee but, when the Minister talks about giving certainty to enterprises and public authorities, it seems to me that Northern Ireland is in a unique position where there is no certainty at all. People literally do not know which regime will apply.
It is all well and good to say, “We will consult with people and ensure that they see the guidelines in advance of having to put them in the subsidy control database,” but the fundamental issue of which regime they are complying with has not yet been answered in a way that would stand up to any kind of scrutiny. The amendment is completely reasonable and, if the Minister does not want to accept it, he should be clear with us and with the organisations concerned, particularly in Northern Ireland, about how he and the Secretary of State will explain to them which regime they will be operating under.
The Chair
Before I call the shadow Minister, I remind hon. Members that your phones should be on silent, please.
Bill Esterson
I think the pings you just heard were all the different legal opinions on the application of the subsidy control regime on EU state aid, Ms Nokes. The Minister found a number of different ways of phrasing the same problem: it all depends, it is one or the other, or he cannot give individual examples. I am afraid that is what it all boils down to.
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon uses the word shambles. It is hard to disagree given the Minister’s answer. Until that is addressed, it undermines the operation of the regime, which risks legal challenge.
On the point about individual examples, businesses face the potential of legal challenge if they do not get this right. They are not going to know which regime. We were starting to get an answer there, in that if the subsidy is under the terms of the Northern Ireland protocol, it is state aid. However, even there the Minister could not be entirely clear. It goes back to my initial question: what proposals are the Government putting forward to address this? What is in the Secretary of State’s words on Second Reading, where he was extremely confident that the matter would be addressed, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North and I both said in our opening remarks? What do the Government think is going to work? What is it from their discussions with their EU counterparts that suggests a way forward? We still have not had that from the Minister and that underlines exactly why the amendment is so important in giving the Government until the day on which the Bill passes into law to address exactly how the operation will apply.
To go back to the words of George Peretz, there are two sets of guidance and two sets of legal opinion. He, as a lawyer, could advise on the same situation, with the awarding body on the one hand and the business on the other, on which regime might apply. Until that is addressed, we have a real problem with the legislation and the existence of the two different subsidy regimes will cause a real problem for the effective use of subsidies to support businesses in the regions and nations of our country.
Bill Esterson
I will press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Bill Esterson
We have heard spectacularly from the Minister the failure of the Government to explain how the regime will operate or to come forward with answers to questions asked during the debate on our amendments. There is little to add to what has been said already.
Stephen Kinnock
Briefly, for the record, I am deeply uncomfortable with this part of the legislation. It leaves businesses across the length and breadth of the country in a total state of confusion about which parts of the provisions apply to them and which are under article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol. I genuinely think it would be a dereliction of duty by the Committee to allow the clause as drafted to stand part of the Bill. Whether we press it to a vote does not matter—we lose the votes all anyway—but I want to put it on the record that that would be a dereliction of duty.
Bill Esterson
I reassure my hon. Friend that we will indeed be pressing clause stand part to a vote. He is right: businesses need certainty. We are coming out of a once-in-100-year global pandemic, and they need all the support that they can get. This regime should give that support, but it cannot do so if there is that massive uncertainty at the heart of it, whether this regime or a different one should apply. The Government have not addressed that and they need to get on and address it—
The Chair
Order. If Members wish to intervene on the shadow Minister, they may do so, but we will not have chuntering.
Bill Esterson
We gave the Government every opportunity with our amendment, but they chose to vote it down. They have left us with what my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon called a dereliction of duty, which is a good way of putting it. The clause does not do justice to businesses, awarding bodies, communities or our constituents. Those are good reasons why we should vote it down.
Kirsty Blackman
I have not had a chance to think about exactly how not having the clause as part of the Bill would affect the Bill as a whole. I share the concerns, that there are major issues with the clause, but at this point I will abstain on any vote.
Bill Esterson
I understand the hon. Lady’s concerns, but there is such a big problem with what is set out, it is right for us to register our objection by voting against the clause.
Paul Scully
All I can say is that we were asked to go through a whole load of examples, which would not be helpful in giving that certainty. What will be helpful is the negotiations that are continuing at the moment. As it happens, the subsidy control framework before us works within either system: the one that we wish to negotiate, the result that we wish to have, or the situation we have at the moment. Subsidies that fall within the scope of the Northern Ireland protocol of the withdrawal agreement and which affect Northern Ireland-EU trade, such as on goods and wholesale electricity markets, will need to comply with EU state aid rules, including on services, otherwise they come under the domestic subsidy control regime. That is about as clear as we can be, but negotiations are happening at the moment.
Bill Esterson
The Minister had the opportunity to accept our amendment, which would have addressed the concern that he has just set out about needing negotiations, because it would have given him time for them. It is regrettable that he did not accept our amendment, but he is now in the position of having to come forward with the answers, and as the responsible Minister, it is up to him to do so.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Bill Esterson
I am interested in the answer to that question as well, given that in the last 11 years of Conservative Government we have not seen the investment in new nuclear that was needed to meet our climate obligations.
Bill Esterson
Indeed. The role of China in our nuclear industry is a point well made by my hon. Friend. I hope that we will see significant investment in new nuclear as a result of the regulations, if that is what the Government intend. Perhaps the Minister will give an indication of their intentions, because without investment, we will not hit our obligations. Nuclear is, of course, a longer-term project because it takes so long to get going. I remind Members that we have significant targets to hit by 2030, and unless we are talking about small modular reactors, nuclear reaches beyond that timeframe. Can the Minister enlighten us on any plans?
Paul Scully
Subsidies or subsidy schemes for nuclear energy will be required to assess against the main subsidy control principles in schedule 1. Removing the clause would require those projects to be assessed against the additional energy and environmental subsidy control principles. The clause is in line with our various international obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union.
I do not want to start speculating on what will happen with future nuclear investment, but we have legislation coming forward tomorrow.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned—(Michael Tomlinson.)
Subsidy Control Bill (Third sitting)
Bill Esterson Excerpts(2 years, 6 months ago)
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Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair for these sittings, Mr Sharma.
I completely agree with everything the hon. Member for Aberdeen North says and with what my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston said in moving the amendment. What is needed from Government is the commitment to hit net zero and the mechanisms to do so. That needs to go right across Government, in everything we do.
I take on board the point the Minister has already made in today’s deliberations that not everything is in the Bill; I understand that and I accept it. However, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North argued extremely well, there is a strong—we would say an essential—case for net zero to be at the heart of the regime put in place by this legislation.
Schedule 2 does not mention transport, agriculture or housing insulation, to name just three examples, so it is not comprehensive as currently drafted. That is why we need to go much further to meet the scale of the challenge in the subsidy control regime that we are debating putting in place. The Budget yesterday did not address net zero, and it is frankly extremely worrying that it did not, especially in the run-up to COP26.
I am afraid the announcements last week did not constitute a plan and were nowhere near meeting the requirement to hit the net zero targets this country is committed to in the timely fashion that is needed, especially in terms of the front-loading we all now understand is essential in all areas except the energy industry. It is needed in transport, in building insulation and in agriculture; it is needed across industry. Unless this is in the Bill, setting out the requirement for net zero to be at the heart of the subsidy regime, I am afraid we as a country, and this Government as a Government, will not be doing what is needed.
Alexander Stafford (Rother Valley) (Con)
Do we need to put net zero down on the subsidy as it is? If the hon. Gentleman remembers our Paris agreement only a few years ago, he knows we agreed to get to net zero by later this century. Now we have moved it forward to 2050, and I hope—I am sure the Government hope—that we will move our net zero agreement even further forward as time progresses. Will this proposal not make the Bill a bit out of date in a few decades’ time, when it should stand for longer?
Bill Esterson
The amendment, because of the way it is phrased, envisages those changes and the increasing urgency. Let us remind ourselves that, on our present track, we are looking at a temperature rise of more than 1.5 °C through the existing commitments and policy decisions not just of this country but of Governments around the world. It is important to acknowledge that we cannot do it on our own, as we are responsible for only 1% of emissions, but when we are trying to show world leadership with the presidency of COP26, it is incumbent on us to show that leadership in everything we do, and we, as Members on this Committee, have an opportunity right here, right now to support making that commitment and putting it into legislation.
Given the way the amendment is crafted, the wording,
“the United Kingdom reaching its net-zero commitments”,
does stand the test of time as and when things change. The challenge the hon. Member for Rother Valley makes is another reminder that we need to bring things further forward and that it has become important to do that over time. At the moment, we have interim dates to hit, with ambitions in 2030, and the Government have made some progress there, but by no means enough to do what is necessary to keep us to 1.5°.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
The hon. Gentleman is making some salient points in response to the hon. Member for Rother Valley. However, once the Government eventually hit their net zero targets, will they not want to maintain those targets and not reverse that journey? In such case, the remarks of the hon. Member for Rother Valley would be completely irrelevant.
Bill Esterson
That is a good point. The hon. Gentleman is right that this does not end when we reach net zero—that is the first point. The second point is that if we need a change, we can amend the legislation later. Right now, however, this is the crucial change that the country and the world need to make. I reiterate that we as Members of the UK House of Commons—those of us here today—have an opportunity to make a statement and a commitment and to put this change on the face of the Bill.
Kirsty Blackman
I got so carried away with my attempts to convince the Government to get to net zero as soon as possible that I forgot to ask questions when I stood up previously. It would be useful if the Minister could clarify why there are two schedules. Why does the treatment differ between the two areas? There is a difference in the treatment of subsidies in relation to energy and the environment compared with subsidies relating to any other area, and I do not quite understand the logic of having two different things. One set of principles could have covered everything, including moving toward net zero. If the Minister will explain why there are two separate schedules and why the two areas are being treated differently, that would be incredibly helpful.
Subsidy Control Bill (Fourth sitting)
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Paul Scully
I said that the clause does not prevent local authorities from offering subsidies to support regeneration. None the less, we will supply more support through guidance, because we want to give public authorities the confidence to apply subsidies in that scenario and similar ones.
The purpose of the clause overall is to prohibit wasteful subsidies that serve only to poach economic activity from one area to another. I must say, the ears of the good people of Guildford must be burning after their third mention in a couple of days—
Paul Scully
As Minister for London, I do not think that this is aimed at the good people of Mayfair.
We do not want to prevent levelling-up subsidies that attract investment to disadvantaged areas. The clause achieves that by prohibiting subsidies that explicitly require enterprises to relocate existing economic activities from one area of the UK to another, where that relocation would not have occurred without the subsidy. We have said that. The amendment, however, risks delaying the commencement of the clause, which might allow subsidies to be granted that could poach economic activity from disadvantaged areas.
Paul Scully
That is exactly right. Look at subsidy control regimes around the world. Witnesses in the evidence sessions focused on America and the subsidy race between various states, which is exactly what we are trying to avoid through this sensible and proportionate measure. Accordingly, we believe that requiring the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on clause 18’s consistency with the Government’s strategic priorities to do with supporting deprived areas and freeports is not necessary. The new UK domestic regime is designed to ensure that disadvantaged areas have maximum freedom and reassurance to receive levelling-up subsidies that best suit the characteristics of the area. I request that the amendment be withdrawn.
Bill Esterson
It is great to see you back in the Chair, Ms Nokes.
Clause 18 is crystal clear about preventing the use of subsidies to enable businesses to move from one location within the UK to another. The example of the high street is crystal clear, as is the example of the freeports. I will come back to the point about promoting new investment in freeports shortly.
The Minister talked about issuing guidance to go with the provision. That is the way the legislation has been crafted, which I think we can all understand. However, guidance will always be open to interpretation, and what takes priority? Is it the primary legislation—the very clear statement set out in clause 18 that a subsidy is prohibited if
“the relocation of those activities would not occur but for the giving of the subsidy”?
How is that overcome by the guidance? That is the point that all Opposition Members who have spoken have tried to get to, whether with the example of the regeneration of high streets or that of freeports.
The Minister talked about the justification for freeports and the support that the Government have given. My hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston made the point that freeports were not part of the consultation for the legislation, and they are ruled out by the clause. It could not be much clearer.
On the point about freeports being just about new investment, the evidence base—the report published by the UK Trade Policy Observatory, and the commentary by Adam Marshall when he was director general of the British Chambers of Commerce—shows all too clearly that they are exactly about relocation and displacement, and all the things that the Minister said that they should not be about. His point that they do not deliver displacement from one deprived area to another is undermined by the evidence base provided by the UKTPO and the British Chambers of Commerce.
I am afraid that we have not had an adequate answer from the Minister on how all those circles will be squared, and how the primary legislation of clause 18, which he wants to go through unamended, will not override attempts to use subsidies to support local areas in the examples that we have given him and that he says we should not worry about. I am afraid it comes back to a point that we have made a number of times, and will continue to make, I suspect, through the Committee’s deliberations: specific statements need to be added to the Bill to provide reassurance and to make the framework a much more workable system of subsidy.
Without that, things will be left wide open. As much as the Minister defends the Government’s freeport policy, notwithstanding the analysis that I have given from those experts, and claims that local authorities will be able to sort their high streets, and despite his response to my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon about supporting more deprived areas otherwise, I am afraid that without additional content going in at this stage, or on Report, or in the House of Lords, we will be left in a position where the framework will leave awarding bodies open to judicial review because of the uncertainty and the contradiction that will almost inevitably be left in place between the primary legislation of clause 18 and whatever he puts in guidance.
Seema Malhotra
I listened to the Minister’s response and the contributions to the debate. I remain concerned that the clause is worryingly worded in terms of what could be permissible under it and what might not be. In the light of that, it is important that we press what is a very measured amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Seema Malhotra
I thank the Minister for his comments. He has our concerns on the record. We will not oppose the clause, but I think this is an important area. Perhaps I will write to the Minister about this, which I hope will help to make sure the provision is as positive as it can be for the purposes of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Rescuing
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 19, page 10, line 29, after “exceptional circumstances” insert
“including the protection of critical national infrastructure and industries of strategic national importance,”.
This amendment clarifies that protecting critical national infrastructure and industries of strategic national importance may constitute exceptional circumstances.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 15, in clause 20, page 11, line 15, after “exceptional circumstances” insert
“including the protection of national security and industries of strategic national importance”.
This amendment clarifies that protecting critical national infrastructure and industries of strategic national importance may constitute exceptional circumstances.
Bill Esterson
We broadly support the measures in clause 19 on rescue subsidies, and we want to strengthen the measures by adding, with amendments 14 and 15, the important areas of critical national infrastructure and security.
Clause 19 prohibits subsidies from being given to ailing and insolvent enterprises unless the subsidy would prevent social hardship or severe market failure. In these cases, the subsidy should act only as “temporary liquidity support” to provide the enterprise with time to prepare a restructuring plan. That is exactly the right way to phrase the clause thus far, because we recognise that public money should not be used to prop up failing businesses. We are pleased that the Government are in the right place here.
However, we recognise that the Government have a poor track record on protecting and supporting industries of national importance. I am afraid that the case of the steel industry a few months ago is a prime example. Until 5 pm on the day before the trade remedies were due to expire, the Government had not intervened to overturn the recommendations of the then trade remedies investigation directorate, which right at the end came into operation as the Trade Remedies Authority. Its recommendations were to drop steel safeguards, and it took significant lobbying from the steel sector, individual businesses, trade unions, the Trades Union Congress and Labour Front Benchers to push the Government to realise what a catastrophic mistake it would have been had those safeguards been dropped at that time.
The steel industry outlined how the industry was then lurching from crisis to crisis, and to a degree it still is. Over a number of years, the laissez-faire approach to the production of steel has been at the heart of that. Steel is a crucial national industry: it is critical to our national security and it is critical, or it should be, to our infrastructure production. We should be supporting that industry. That is what our amendments are about, and steel is a very important example. There are other examples of the Conservatives’ reluctance to show an interest in nationally significant businesses, such as the takeover of Morrisons by Clayton, Dubilier & Rice just recently—another business of great importance to national infrastructure.
Bill Esterson
Morrisons, as one of the big four supermarkets, is crucial to our national economy. The problem is that the Government do not show enough interest in businesses of such strategic importance.
Andrew Bowie
I thank the hon. Member; he is too kind. The decision to allow Morrisons to be taken over, in the way that it was, was made because it was deemed that that would be good value for shareholders, but also good for the company in general—it would be able to reinvest in its infrastructure here, in the United Kingdom. The decision was actually supporting one of the big four supermarkets to provide jobs and employment for this country. To try to define it in this way and say that the Government should step in when businesses like that are under threat of takeover—even when those takeovers could be to the advantage of that company and to the British people—would be, I think, a retrograde step.
Bill Esterson
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for intervening. I think he is rather missing the point, which I tried to explain the first time around. I am making the point that the Government showed no interest in what was going on with Morrisons, nor the merits of what was happening.
Coming back to steel, the Government have belatedly woken up. Before I was intervened on, I was actually going to say that perhaps there are signs of improvement on this front. The Government have shown some interest in improving things, because there are amendments in the Budget that would give the Secretary of State for International Trade powers to overrule the recommendations of the Trade Remedies Authority. I am therefore mildly hopeful that we are seeing an improvement in policy and approach from the Government on that measure alone.
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend is making some very important points. We have clearly sparked a debate about what constitutes critical national infrastructure and what constitutes businesses that are vital to our national security and our national interest. We can certainly have a debate about businesses operating at the consumer end of the spectrum, but there are other examples. The steel industry is an obvious one, but look at the issues around AstraZeneca and the attempted hostile takeover by Pfizer; look at Arm, or at the way in which private equity is taking over our defence industry. Our country has become the capital of the world for hostile foreign takeovers. We have more than any country in the OECD, and we face a world in which aggressive Chinese-backed investment vehicles and businesses are looking to take over businesses that are potentially coming out of the pandemic distressed and vulnerable.
Bill Esterson
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for adding some extremely important examples to my point.
Bill Esterson
Not yet; let me answer my hon. Friend first before I take what I am sure will be an incredibly important and insightful intervention, as always—it does not mean he is right. It is extremely important that we take nationally significant businesses seriously, that we have a regime that enables us to support them when appropriate, and that we take on board what is in the national interest. That is the purpose of our amendment. I will take the intervention from the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton, even though he is not wearing a mask today—he did partly on Tuesday.
Kevin Hollinrake
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point about national infrastructure and inward investment, but would he and the hon. Member for Aberavon not concede that Tata’s investment in the UK steel industry is important? Investments in Jaguar Land Rover, which was a failing business before it was taken over, were important for the UK and they protected and effectively created lots of jobs. If the hon. Member for Sefton Central thinks that foreign direct investment in the UK is bad—I know Morrisons is an important company in Yorkshire—is it also bad that our UK-based private equity businesses invest in other countries?
Bill Esterson
No, not at all. I have no idea at all why the hon. Member thinks that is where my or my hon. Friend’s arguments were going. We are very much in favour of foreign direct investment to this country and investing overseas as well. Indeed, the success of foreign direct investment in the north-east of England under the Thatcher Government has been put at risk by the attitude of this Government towards the Japanese and the rather strained relations, which hopefully are beginning to repair since the UK-Japan deal. However, let us not underestimate the reputational damage that was done by the way some of that was handled.
Alexander Stafford (Rother Valley) (Con)
Conservative Members appreciate what you are trying to say, but the fact that there is a lot of confusion and concern about how you are saying it shows me that the amendment should not stand. Rather than just saying “exceptional”, which covers what we need it to do, we have this definition. Even under “critical national infrastructure”, 13 industries are officially defined by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, none of which is steel. We can argue for steel, but it is not actually listed in the official categories. It just creates confusion. That is why I do not think the amendment works.
The Chair
I remind Members that interventions need to be short, and can we lose the yous, please?
Bill Esterson
Thank you, Ms Nokes. That intervention rather makes the point that I was making in the previous debate about the need for definition in the Bill around what we mean by various terms and the need to avoid leaving things open to chance in guidance and interpretation. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but this is why we need a bit more clarity in primary legislation.
Continuing with the steel industry, not least because we took evidence from UK Steel, if some support is not given in the short term to the UK steel sector to support its decarbonisation and reduce the massive energy costs associated with the industry, we could soon see steel, which is a vital strategic industry for the UK, facing imminent threat. I do not think anybody disagrees on the strategic importance of the steel industry at a national level.
In the evidence sessions, Richard Warren spoke about the costs of renewables and carbon taxes in relation to electricity prices:
“The UK steel sector pays between 80% and 100% more for its electricity than its counterparts in the EU. Those exemptions have reduced our electricity prices. There is a still a big gap, but they are really important to improving competitiveness in the UK.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 50, Q72.]
He made the point that it was in the national interest to support the industry. He said:
“Net zero or low-carbon forms of steel production will add anything from 30% to 50% to the costs of steel production”.
On the cost of steel production, he said:
“If other countries are not moving at precisely the same speed or putting the same constraints on their industries, you will need some sort of intervention to correct that market failure.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 57, Q77.]
That is why we think there is a very strong case for putting this provision into primary legislation.
More widely on the issue of net zero, this point is backed up by the written evidence from the Institute for Government, which says that it is
“sensible to require some additional process to ensure that the subsidy is designed well.”
That was in relation to major infrastructure that could contribute towards net zero. That is what our amendments are trying to achieve, and it is why we think they are so important.
Anything that is in the national interest or the interests of national security demands an additional level of support and attention, including attention to the way it is worded. Again, I am afraid we come back to the point that not having this set out in primary legislation creates weaknesses, and leaves the prospect of challenge and of the regime not operating as well as it should.
Paul Scully
As we have heard, amendment 14 relates to clause 19. The Bill provides that in order to give either a rescuing or a restructuring subsidy, the public authority giving that subsidy must be satisfied either that it contributes to the objective of the public interest by
“avoiding social hardship or preventing a severe market failure”,
or that there are
“exceptional circumstances that justify the subsidy”
despite that test not being met. The amendments would specify that those exceptional circumstances would include the protection of critical national infrastructure, industries of strategic national importance and, in the case of amendment 15, national security.
I fully agree that public authorities should be allowed to grant necessary and appropriate rescue and restructuring subsidies in order to protect critical national infrastructure, national security, and industries of strategic national importance. I am therefore pleased to be able to provide reassurance to the hon. Member that, as it stands, the Bill does so. The reasons are twofold: first, clause 45 contains a general exemption from all subsidy control requirements for the giving of a subsidy with the purpose of national security. Secondly, the conditions set out in clauses 19 and 20 will allow for rescue and restructure subsidies in order to protect critical national infrastructure and industries of strategic national importance. In my view, many hypothetical rescue and restructure subsidies for those purposes could in principle meet the first test in clause 19(4)(a) and clause 20(5)(a) of being in the public interest by
“avoiding social hardship or preventing a severe market failure”.
Where that condition is not met on the facts, but there are other exceptional circumstances in play, clauses 19(4)(b) and 20(5)(b) already provide for exactly that situation, so it is not necessary to attempt an exhaustive list of potential exceptional circumstances that could be relevant to the clause. That would risk unduly influencing public authority behaviour. On the one hand, it risks encouraging inappropriate rescue and restructure subsidies in circumstances that are not genuinely exceptional on the facts, and where they could have excessive harmful effects on domestic competition. On the other hand, it could discourage the use of rescue and restructure subsidies in circumstances that are genuinely exceptional and merit such interventions, but are not specifically listed in the Bill.
The purpose of clauses 19 and 20 is to prevent aimless bail-outs of failing enterprises, while allowing public authorities to provide temporary rescue support for enterprises that it is in the public interest to rescue and restructure. Those subsidies should not be undertaken lightly, in order to maintain a competitive free-market economy and facilitate compliance with our international obligations, including those in the TCA with the EU. As such, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Bill Esterson
I am grateful to the Minister for drawing the Committee’s attention to where the points covered by our amendments exist elsewhere in the Bill. I have reservations about the strength of those clauses, which I explained in my speech and will not revisit, but there is reference to the protection of national security in the Bill. Whether it is adequate, time will tell. I know that the Minister or a member of his team will bring these measures forward in secondary legislation. We think they are better in primary legislation and that there should be more detail at this stage, but we accept the assurances the Minister has given, and we will not push the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Paul Scully
The clause prohibits restructuring subsidies to ailing or insolvent enterprises unless four specific conditions are met. This clause does not apply to deposit takers or insurance companies. Again, the enterprise must have prepared a restructuring plan and, unless there are exceptional circumstances, a restructuring subsidy must only be offered if it is in the public interest. Restructuring subsidies can only be given to enterprises that are small or medium-sized, and they must also be contingent on an enterprise’s not having received a restructuring subsidy before, or five years having passed since it did, although there are exceptions to that.
Bill Esterson
The Opposition do not oppose this clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Restructuring deposit takers or insurance companies
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
The clause sets out specific conditions for subsidies for the purpose of restructuring ailing or insolvent deposit takers or insurance companies.
Bill Esterson
The fact that subsidies should not be given to ailing or insolvent banks, insurance companies or other deposit takers unless certain conditions are met, such as that the subsidy is given on the basis of a restructuring plan that is likely to restore long-term viability, is an eminently sensible measure that we are content to see in the Bill. We also recognise that such companies should receive subsidies only when they have contributed to their restructuring costs from their own resources. We are pleased to see the clause included in the Bill. There are some concerns relating to this clause that I will come to in clause 24, but I think they are better dealt with there.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Liquidating deposit takers or insurance companies
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
The clause prohibits subsidies for insolvent deposit takers or insurance companies that are unable to demonstrate credibly that they can be restored to long-term viability, unless they are able to satisfy specific conditions.
Bill Esterson
We are happy to support clause 22.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Liquidity provision for deposit takers or insurance companies
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
The clause sets out specific conditions for subsidies that are for the purpose of supporting liquidity provisions to ailing or insolvent deposit takers or insurance companies.
Bill Esterson
We support clause 23.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Meaning of “ailing or insolvent”
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
The clause defines “ailing or insolvent” in relation to the giving of rescue and recovery subsidies to deposit takers, insurance companies and enterprises. The definition of ailing or insolvent in this Bill incorporates both domestic and international terminology. It combines the existing concept of insolvency in UK law with the wider concept of ailing or insolvent agreed in the TCA. The definition is compliant with our international commitments and has a strong basis in British law. Subsections (1)(b) and (c) use the existing insolvency test in the Insolvency Act 1986. Subsection 1(a) uses the TCA definition of “ailing or insolvent”. An enterprise being unable to pay its debts or the value of its assets being less than its liabilities are British tests for declaring an enterprise “insolvent”. Subsection 1(a) builds on this by extending the tests to include enterprises that are “ailing or insolvent”—those which would go out of business in the short to medium term without subsidies.
Subsection (2) allows the Secretary of State to make regulations on what is meant by
“would almost certainly go out of business in the short to medium term without subsidies”.
While the definition of “insolvency” reflects existing domestic law, “ailing” has no such domestic definition. A narrow power such as this allows the Secretary of State to make further provision on the meaning of ailing, should that be necessary.
Bill Esterson
We recognise the importance of clauses 21 to 27. We have some questions about the definitions of “ailing” and “insolvent”. The definitions of those terms in the Bill are arguably more demanding than those under EU state aid rules, which require an enterprise to be almost certain to go out of business in the short or medium term, and to be unable to pay its debts as they fall due; also, the value of its assets must be less than the amount of its liabilities. Why have the Government chosen broader definitions for ailing and insolvent enterprises than those in the regime that is being replaced?
Alexander Rose from DWF raised concerns that these broader definitions risk harming tech and research-and-development heavy start-ups because they require significant expenditure before they start making profits. As I am sure many Members will know, that can be months, if not years. Can the Minister explain what consideration has been given to these broader definitions where they relate to start-ups that are capital-intensive for significant periods before profits are made? What are the Government going to do with the regime to ensure that start-ups are not harmed by the legislation? I am sure that the Minister agrees that it is sensible to support our innovators and to allow them to take the time to become profitable. It will be interesting to see how he intends to do it. We need to be competitive internationally, which is crucial for an export-led recovery.
The same point applies to scale-ups, a point Rolls-Royce made in its written evidence. It has that concern about start-ups, and quoted some case law from the Supreme Court saying that courts should be careful not to leap to conclusions when asked to apply the test about insolvency, and that allowance should be made for debts when the maturity date is some time in the distance. Is the difference between liabilities that are due in the short term and long-term liabilities and debts picked up in the primary legislation? How is the Minister planning to ensure that a distinction is made between short-term and long-term liabilities?
Interestingly, Rolls-Royce made the point about national security, going back to our earlier debate. In addition to mentioning what we raised before, it asked about dual use. What is the Government’s plan on subsidies where dual use includes national security investment and non-national security investment, which is common in areas such as aerospace?
Paul Scully
The Bill is clear that an ailing or insolvent enterprise is one that would almost go out of business in the short to medium term without subsidies. Importantly, this definition applies only to the giving of rescue and recovery subsidies. I hope my opening remarks help the hon. Gentleman’s understanding of where we go in some of the definitions. Just to repeat: subsection (2) allows the Secretary of State to make regulations on what is meant by
“would almost certainly go out of business in the short to medium term without subsidies”.
While the definition of insolvency reflects existing domestic law, “ailing” has no such domestic definition. Therefore, there is allowance for the Secretary of State to make further provision on the meaning of “ailing”, should that be necessary. We went down that route because the EU’s “undertaking in difficulty” test is disliked by stakeholders, is highly prescriptive and in some cases prevented the giving of subsidies to viable businesses with a longer route to market and profitability. These were businesses such as medical technology firms and start-ups. The definition that we are using has a much more restricted application, but where it does apply it provides greater flexibility while also preventing the use of subsidies to bail out unsustainable companies.
The hon. Gentleman talked about national security exemptions as well. We are going to get on to—
Bill Esterson
Before the Minister moves on, I want to tie down the difference between short-term and long-term liabilities. From my dim and distant accountancy past, there seems to me to be quite a good definition for this from insolvency legislation—from memory. We may have other accountants with us who can confirm or deny that. Does the hon. Gentleman know that that is the kind of distinction that the Secretary of State is likely to make in regulation?
Paul Scully
The clause establishes conditions on subsidies granted to air carriers for the operation of routes. Subsidies not meeting one of those conditions are prohibited by the clause.
Bill Esterson
We recognise that subsidies to an air carrier for the operation of a route should be prohibited unless certain conditions are met, and those conditions are listed. I cannot help noting the irony of the reduction in taxes on travel for short-haul flights, and the fact that one can get a ticket from London to Glasgow for COP26 for £45 on the railway and it is about £145 to fly. That is possibly going slightly beyond the scope, other than to say that again this is not consistent with what the Minister said earlier about the intention of travel, so to speak, on moving towards net zero.
Seema Malhotra
My hon. Friend may be aware that it is part of the application, if someone is going to COP26, to show how they are—
Bill Esterson
I think I understood my hon. Friend’s excellent intervention. She was correcting me: actually, one can get a ticket for £25 from London to Glasgow, not £45.
Seema Malhotra
The Government requires that delegates state their method of travel.
Bill Esterson
Yes, there is the irony that the Government are requiring delegates to COP26 to show their method of travel to the conference. I hope that we will see subsidies supporting rail travel. In my constituency, I have been long campaigning for a rail link from the port of Liverpool rather than a new road, and in the run-up to COP26 that would make sense, rather than concentrating on air travel. There is a serious point that we need to use the subsidies to support rail and low-carbon transport, and reduce the reliance on, and support that the Budget gave for, air travel.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29
Services of public economic interest
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
The clause sets out the requirements for giving subsidies for services of public economic interest.
Subsidy Control Bill (Second sitting)
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Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
Q
Secondly, we know that historically the UK’s spend when it comes to state aid, as it is more commonly known, has fallen well below that of European partners. Do you think the Bill will change that in any way, shape or form? Is there any indication in the Bill as it stands that it will change, certainly from a business perspective?
Dr Barker: I do think that more clarity is needed around a number of the concepts in the Bill. The need for more detail increases with the number of public bodies that are being empowered to grant subsidies. To give some examples, there is uncertainty around what would constitute a subsidy of particular interest, which is a subsidy that requires much more detailed pre-assessment by the CMA. Will that apply to a significant proportion of potential subsidies, or will that be done just on an exceptional basis? The answer will affect the nature of the entire system. At the other end of the spectrum, I think we still lack detail about the streamlined subsidies that can benefit from fast-track approval.
Another area that is important, particularly for IoD members, is the extent to which this regime can facilitate the support of start-ups, particularly those companies that do not have a long-standing financial track record and are still some way from generating profit or even revenue. I think that the proposed regime in this respect is preferable to the previous European Union regime, which had a prohibition over supporting undertakings in difficulties, which really ruled out start-ups. Within this measure, the only thing that is ruled out is the support of ailing or insolvent companies, which increases the scope of what can be supported. However, we still need clarity about what kind of going-concern assessments will be conducted to ensure that a potential recipient is eligible.
To answer your first question, there is still some way to go to provide all the interested parties with more clarity about how the system will operate. With your regard to your second question—do I think that this framework indicates that we will have more state support of business?—in itself, the answer is no. As I said before, it provides a framework in which that kind of policy could be pursued, but there is nothing about it that necessarily implies that it will be pursued. As I have said previously, in certain sectors there is a need for a changed approach to match those of our key competitors. That is really how the IoD is viewing it—is it going to be useful for that purpose? The answer is that it could be.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
Q
Dr Barker: Yes. To address your first point, the factors that will ultimately make this most predictable include, first, guidance on the principles under which subsidies will be granted. It is a tricky balance between providing guidance that is too prescriptive, which becomes difficult to penetrate and understand, and, on the other hand, principles and advice that are too sparse and which try to be nimble but leave too much uncertainty on the table in specific instances. It is about finding the balance.
Secondly, it is about the subsidy advice unit operating effectively and being really useful, informative and timely in being able to assist the various parties and point them in the right direction. The third part of the process is the tribunal. One would hope that the number of cases coming to tribunal is minimised, but at least it provides timely, transparent and understandable rulings that assist parties in future in how they assess their ability to give subsidy. Those are my answers to that question.
Bill Esterson
Q
Dr Barker: I think that that is reasonable. It will need to evolve. As it evolves, hopefully confidence in the system will grow, along with predictability based on past rulings and decisions. That is the key thing that we are trying to get to—a degree of predictability so that everyone concerned knows how it is going to work and whether or not it is going to work without having to resort to a more legal framework.
On your second question, yes, we do need to learn the lessons of other major countries that seem to be doing a better job than the UK in terms of building technology companies and science-intensive-type enterprises. What is it that they are doing that we are not? I do not think they have achieved their success entirely by business acting alone and Governments simply stepping out of the way. A lot of the industries of the future are those that require very close collaboration between business and Government. Certainly, the green industrial revolution that we are all seeking to work towards in order to achieve net zero is also something that will require a lot of partnership between business and Government, so for me, an effective subsidy system can be part of that.
Bill Esterson
Q
Dr Barker: Certainly in the United States, which on the face of it is a free market-oriented economy, there is still a significant degree of public subsidy going into sectors such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, for example. The EU is subsidising to a high degree the development of semiconductor manufacturing capability, and of course Asian countries also provide many examples.
Bill Esterson
Q
Dr Barker: That is right. The CMA is increasingly playing a central role in many aspects of our economic life, and we are asking it to do more and more, not least in the digital space. It would be incredibly beneficial to this new regime if the CMA and its advice unit had the capacity to really assist the process.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
Dr Barker: They are aware of this issue in each of the devolved nations. The IoD as a whole does not take a view, for example, on whether the subsidy regime should be a devolved matter or a reserved matter for the UK central Government, but they certainly are concerned to ensure that that does not get in the way of a levelling-up agenda that could be very needed in, and very beneficial to, a country such as Wales.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
“Subsidies may be granted for the development of disadvantaged or deprived areas or regions. When
determining the amount of subsidy, the following may be taken into account: the socio-economic situation of the disadvantaged area concerned; the size of the beneficiary; and the size of the investment project.”
I would be interested in your view as to whether that constitutes an actual obligation to have an assisted area map, or some way of defining disadvantaged areas based on the terms of the TCA?
My other question was around article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol; I am sure you will not be surprised to hear that, we have discussed it many times. What is your sense now of the state of play around article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol? To what extent could it be interpreted so broadly as to effectively drive a coach and horses through this legislation?
George Peretz: I will deal with the regional aid map first. The schedule to the TCA is permissive. It allows the parties to do things: it does not require them to do anything. If the UK Government just did not think that regional aid was appropriate at all, they are entirely free not to do it—ditto the EU. There is also a bit of a danger in holding on to old state aid law thinking. The position of regional aid maps in the state aid law regime was there because there was a basic prohibition on state aid unless it went through the process of going to the Commission and getting cleared, unless it fell within block exemptions. Regional aid maps played their role within the block exemptions. They meant that if you were giving a grant that fell within the conditions of regional aid in certain areas, you could give grants in an area that benefited from assisted area status that you would not be allowed to give, for example, in Guildford without going through the process of notification and clearance. If you did it in an assisted area, you could just do it without going through that process.
Structurally, that does not really fit into the new regime, because it does not have that basic prohibition element in it. Instead, it requires all public authorities to think about the principles, which will inevitably apply in a somewhat different way. They are bound to be affected by the region in which they are given. For example, the principle in paragraph A(b) of schedule 1—
“address an equity rationale (such as social difficulties or distributional concerns)”—
will apply very differently in the Welsh valleys than in Guildford, because the social difficulties and distributional concerns are different.
One possibility that could arise under the structure of the Bill is that the Government might well issue streamlined schemes that make reference to the areas concerned—something that a streamlined scheme could certainly do. They could say, “This scheme applies,” and effectively there is automatically no risk of the CMA having to look at it, and you do not have to go through the process of thinking about the application of the subsidy control principles for grants in Pontypridd, as you would were you making the grant in Guildford. That is where something like the regional aid map might come back in, but it is not in the Bill; it will depend on what the Government decide to do about streamlined subsidy schemes.
I have probably written far too much on article 10. The current state of play is that, if I am advising a client such as a local authority or a subsidy recipient, my immediate problem is that I have to look at two sets of guidance—one issued by the European Commission and one by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy—that in some important respects tell me very different things. If I am advising a client who is the prospective recipient of a grant from an English local authority, but my client sells a significant quantity of goods in Northern Ireland, the Commission guidance essentially tells me that article 10 is likely to apply. The BEIS guidance tells me that it is unlikely to apply. I am capable of making up my own mind about that, but I would obviously have to draw my client’s attention to the different guidance, and if it ever got to court the court would be entertained with the different guidance and would have to decide what to do, so there is a difficulty.
The fundamental problem is the effect on trade test. Assuming that it is meant to mean the same sort of thing as it means in the EU state aid law rules, which is probably, though not certainly, right, it catches an awful lot of things. It famously caught the question of whether taxi cabs in London could drive in bus lanes, according to the European Court, even though one might struggle to see quite why that affected trade between member states.
The real problem is that the European Court has consistently upheld reasoning on effect of trade, which is extremely thin, based on assumptions, and it does not really include much of what any economist would recognise as economics. An effect on trade has been deduced and that makes it a bit difficult. The boundary line is therefore just obscure. The Bill effectively says that anything that falls under that regime is excluded from the Bill, but you do have the problem that the boundary line is not very clear.
Bill Esterson
Q
George Peretz: We have touched on a couple of the main issues. The devolution issue that we have discussed is quite important. There is an issue with enforcement, particularly in relation to measures that are not regarded by the public authority as being subsidies, but are just a grey area—and that view could simply be wrong—and how those are dealt with. The Bill does not really address on its face how those will be dealt with. One can sort of work out how they are likely to be dealt with but it would be better if that situation was more expressly catered for and dealt with.
There is an enforcement problem in that, ultimately, unless the Secretary of State decides to refer things to the Competition and Markets Authority—of course, there will be cases where things have to go to the CMA—the mechanism does very much rely on private enforcement by, at the moment, interested parties, who are going to be commercial operators and probably not public interest ones or local authorities. You cannot always rely on commercial operators to enforce things like this. There are all sorts of reasons why they may not. Quite a lot of commercial operators are hoping for the same subsidy themselves, so they will keep quiet, or they get the same subsidy themselves and will therefore be quiet, whereas actually there is a real public interest problem.
You will get situations with quite small companies who are concerned about subsidies being given to a much bigger competitor. They will understandably be reluctant to annoy both the granting authority, probably, and the bigger competitor. There are also the inevitable costs and risks of litigation. In a new regime, those costs and risks are greater, because various points have to be sorted out and decided in the first few cases until you get some case law on it. So inevitably the risks and costs are greater. There is more chance that you will end up in the Court of Appeal on a point than there would be once the regime has bedded in.
All of those will be quite off-putting to a lot of private enforcement. Ultimately, that is the keystone on which the whole enforcement mechanism depends, because if nobody brings challenges to this, public authorities will often get away with pretty sloppy reasoning and genuflection to the principles rather than serious engagement with them. I think that is a concern.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
George Peretz: That is absolutely a fair point. If the subsidy measure comes from central Government or even if it is BEIS that is the granter, is it realistic to expect the Secretary of State to call it in or make a post-award referral? You are obviously going to be concerned, from a Scottish perspective, with the possibility that you have a BEIS decision—there is serious concern about this in Scotland—that has an adverse effect on the Scottish economy in some way or another. That is the point I was making. It does seem to me right, as matter of principle, that in those circumstances the Scottish Ministers at least—and potentially other people—would have the right to send the matter off to the CMA to consider.
Bear in mind that the CMA report is not binding, so in a situation where the Secretary of State wanted to say, “Well, I hear what the CMA says, but I just disagree: I still think that this measure is wholly compliant with the principles and the CMA has just got it wrong in suggesting that I change it”, he can go ahead. It is then a risk of litigation—it might be better if the Scottish Ministers had a clear right to bring that litigation too, but that is the current position.
Kevin Hollinrake
Q
Jonathan Branton: I think probably yes. In terms of the small amounts of financial assistance, it is basically double what the EU’s de minimis has been. The feedback I have had so far across the piece is that the doubling has been a sensible, long overdue move. Frankly, that has been set by reference to what the TCA sets anyway, so we do not have a lot of flexibility to play around with that. Setting it at a fixed, sterling level is immediately sensible. There can be no debate about that.
In terms of the transparency, yes, you have to draw the line somewhere and the £500,000 seems like a sensible, rounded figure. I certainly do not have a strong view that it should be put at a different level—not yet, anyway.
Alexander Rose: The £500,000 is for schemes. I think that the question ultimately is that if you amend clause 70(2) in order to address this gap in terms of, essentially, accountability, you will need some level of incentive to use schemes. It appears that transparency has been chosen as that route.
Personally, I think that the £500,000 seems quite high, but you do need some kind of incentive; otherwise, people will not go down the route of using schemes, when clearly a decision has been made that that is a good idea.
Bill Esterson
Q
Looking at the other things you have said, rather than saying in general terms that the reporting period should be less than six months, do you have a particular figure in mind? Similarly, do you have a figure in mind to replace the one-month opportunity to appeal?
Jonathan Branton: I will take those questions in reverse order. There is the clearest possible case for extending as soon as possible the period in which someone can appeal—but not to more than three months, which is the standard time limit for judicial review. I think that is relatively clear.
On the six months, I have yet to hear a really persuasive case for why you need that long to publish the fact that you have made a award. Why do you need six months to get yourself together to publish that something has been done? I would think that that could possibly be as much as halved.
Bill Esterson
Two lots of three months, then.
Jonathan Branton: Yes—without compromising anything, it seems to me.
In terms of other bits of the Bill that ought to be in primary legislation, that gives rise to the question: what would the streamlined subsidy schemes be? There is certainly a case for making a number of different ones. The obvious thing is to go down the path of the old block exemption—the general block exemption regulation, or GBER—which made non-controversial interventions easy. That was the good thing about that regime: you knew that if you were well within those limits, you could just get on and do it and you were not blocked from anything. If anything has been lost in the new regime, it is that those easy interventions now seem more difficult and require more thought and more risk, in the sense that nobody is quite sure if they have ever hit the mark or not.
You could go into some quick and easy streamlined subsidy schemes. I am thinking of areas like arts and culture. Regional aid and levelling up is possibly more complicated and will require a bit more thought, but something like arts and culture is easy and obvious. Research and development is easy and obvious—I think everybody agrees that that is a priority. Employment, training and skills are also the sorts of areas in which you might do it. I do not see why we would need to wait around and overthink those. The key with a streamlined subsidy scheme is to make it quick, easy and simple.
Alexander Rose: I completely agree with what Jonathan has said. On the elements where it would be useful for there to be greater clarification, presumably in primary legislation, I think there is a gap in terms of the interested party. It would be useful for public bodies to be able to challenge. If, for example, employment in their area is going to be significantly affected by an unlawful subsidy, it feels right that they should have the ability to challenge in that scenario. It would be good to address that.
Another element is the issue in clause 55 whereby only the Secretary of State can call in these subsidies. At the moment, that seems to be rather strangely limited to prospective subsidies, which does not seem particularly sensible. You could almost end up in a cat-and-mouse game whereby subsidies are issued quickly, so that no one can be called in. That does not seem like a good idea.
Likewise, however, it does not seem particularly sensible to limit the ability to call in the subsidy to the largest awarder of subsidies in the country. Therefore, it would seem that we need some kind of alternative—
The Chair
Order. I am sorry to have to cut you off, but that brings us to the end of the time allotted for this panel. I am sorry to those Members who did not get to ask questions. I thank the panel for their evidence, and we will move on to the next witness.
Examination of Witness
Daniel Greenberg gave evidence.
Bill Esterson
Q
Rachel Merelie: Sorry—I did not quite understand. Did you ask what we will do with information that we get when our monitoring role identifies things that we are doing right?
Bill Esterson
If things are not working, or you identify a problem, what will you do with the information?
Rachel Merelie: Well, in our monitoring role, we will be producing a report on a five-yearly basis, which will be published. That will give information about our understanding of how the regime is working. It will then be for Government to decide whether they want to make any adjustment—for example, to the definitions of the subsidies of interest or particular intertest, or to the streamlined groups, or any other mechanism—based on both what we identify in our monitoring report and, of course, other information that they may also choose to look at.
Bill Esterson
Q
Rachel Merelie: There are also the enforcement mechanisms that will be in place for subsidies to be challenged in the tribunal. That will be a more immediate way of looking at the impact of individual subsidies. If we are asked by the Secretary of State to provide insights sooner than that, we can do that too, so I think the opportunity to offer advice more quickly than that is there. Again, we are the disposal of BEIS, if you like, on that.
Bill Esterson
Q
Rachel Merelie: There are two parts to our process. First, there is the review mechanism on the individual subsidies, on these particular subsidies of interest and particular interest. On that one, we will be assessing the assessments carried out by the public authority against the subsidy principles and, where relevant, against the environmental and energy principles. On those ones, there is a rapid, 30-day process that we have to operate. We have to publish a report within that timescale on the specific subsidy of concern. That is the sort of short-term mechanism—
Bill Esterson
Q
Rachel Merelie: Absolutely right.
Bill Esterson
Q
Rachel Merelie: I do understand that concern. I think what you are saying is that at the moment we do not have any powers to look at specific subsidies under our own initiative where there might be an issue, other than through that broader monitoring role.
Bill Esterson
Q
Rachel Merelie: The figure that I think we have publicly is that there is around £20 million for the three new functions in ’21-22. Obviously the majority of that is not for the subsidy advice unit, because we are only just setting that up now. I think it will be more relevant to look at the numbers that we get through the spending review, which will be agreed tomorrow.
Bill Esterson
Q
Rachel Merelie: It is a very good question. As you say, it is difficult to get a reliable estimate of the workload. The BEIS impact assessment has so far estimated that if the current definitions of subsidies of interest or particular interest were applied to the last few years’ worth of data, we would be looking at, I think, between five and 20 in each of those categories. However, it is quite difficult to know the extent to which subsidy giving will change under the new, more flexible, faster and more agile regime that is being put in place, so that is one question.
Also, there may be a tendency for public authorities to choose to send subsidies of interest to us, even though those are not mandated. In the early days they might be cautious about awarding subsidies without going through the advisory process with us. There are therefore quite a few uncertainties about our likely workload, but we have modelled our requirements based on the upper end of each of those—so assuming that we might get around 40 references a year. With the recruitment plans that we are putting in place, we think that we will be able to service those, alongside performing our longer-term monitoring role.
Bill Esterson
Q
Rachel Merelie: On the second one, it was BEIS carrying out the consultation. We have not actually been in the frontline of engagement with stakeholders yet, partly because we are at this quite early stage of the Bill’s passage through Parliament. We will obviously be engaging with public authorities much more actively post Royal Assent, and perhaps in the run-up to Royal Assent as well. We do not yet have that information; BEIS may be able to answer that question.
On the question about how long an investigation would take, we have a very tight deadline for the reviews that we are undertaking of subsidies of particular interest. We are being asked to do those in 30 days, so there will be a bit of a run-in period—a pre-notification, to make sure that we have all the relevant information. Once we have published, I think there is a five-day cooling-off period and then the ability for the public authorities to implement their subsidies. They are quite tight timescales. You could imagine a team having a maximum of a couple of months on a particular review, then moving on to another one.
Simon Baynes
Q
Rachel Merelie: Thank you for the question. It is really important that all granting authorities are treated fairly and equitably, regardless of whether they are in the devolved nations or in England. Yes, certainly the spreading of the load across the different granting authorities, and the ability for the subsidy advice unit to engage with each of those on an equal footing, is very important.
Subsidy Control Bill (First sitting)
Bill Esterson Excerpts(2 years, 6 months ago)
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Seema Malhotra
Q
Dr Pazos-Vidal: You are absolutely right. Ideally, the Bill should be the framework of how this engagement should be done. Under clause 79, the Secretary of State should consult anybody whom they consider it appropriate to consult before issuing statutory guidance. In our view, that is too general and not reflective of the territorial constitution of the UK as it stands. There should be a provision that the Secretary of State must consult the devolved Administrations in a dedicated system that should also involve local law. There should be a duty to make sure that different parts of the UK have full ownership of the final outcome—it is true that the Secretary of State will issue the guidance—but also the intelligence and the local know-how about these ideas. It is very easy to see things in a certain way in Westminster, but when you are in different parts of the UK, they do not look like that.
On the call-in powers, it is true that UK Ministers have responsibilities only for England on some issues, whereas other Ministers across the UK have responsibilities on the same issue in other parts of the UK. It makes sense that whenever the competent authority is in a devolved part of the UK, the same consultation mechanism should be provided, mutatis mutandis, before the Secretary of State decides to call in a subsidy. That seems to be quite inclusive. I have to say that the intergovernmental review, which was updated in March this year, tends to go in the other direction, but as the supporting document suggests, we cannot wait for the intergovernmental review to happen, because it will take its time.
Subsidy control is potentially a sensitive constitutional and political issue. We are already introducing provisions to make sure that the mechanism of consultation happens. It is quite consistent with the direction of travel in which we should be going. As I say, the intergovernmental review really goes in that direction, but that is a wider piece of work, and I think we should introduce those social provisions in the Bill.
Likewise, because the Government committed to a consultation mechanism with local government a couple of years ago, there should be some provisions for that. That is what we had when the European Commission used to draft the guidelines. The member states had a special legislative committee, and there were specific procedures for local government. There was even a statutory procedure through the European Committee of the Regions. There was a whole infrastructure to help the Commission design the rules. We do not have to replicate exactly the same things, but at the very least we should have the same level of ownership as we had during our EU membership—or more. That is only right and proper if we are to ensure that the system works in the long term.
Equally, the new subsidy control unit in the CMA could benefit from the work of the devolved state aid units, which are not mentioned in the Bill or the supporting documents, but naturally these teams have a lot of experience working with local authorities, sorting out the practicalities of how to assign a subsidy. It would be a shame if all this knowledge was not properly used to design the system and rules that will emerge from the Bill.
Professor Fothergill: May I amplify my remarks on the consultation and the involvement of the devolved Administrations? The crucial thing is to include a commitment to consultation and to their involvement in the drawing up of the detailed guidance, because the guidance really matters. Let me illustrate how this might work in the context of an assisted area map, if we are to have such a map; I know from personal involvement that an assisted area map has been drawn up the last three times round, and a full consultation process has been undertaken. Indeed, there was a two-stage consultation process, in which the principles underlining the map were out for consultation first, because the map was largely drawn here in the UK, though parts of it were set by Europe, and then the draft map went out to consultation.
I am also aware that the devolved Administrations largely drove the detailed drawing of that assisted area map within their own patch. There needs to be a commitment to undertake a similar sort of procedure.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
Q
Professor Fothergill: I think that we can draw a map better this time if it is simply drawn here in the UK. Last time, the way that the system worked was that certain areas under EU rules automatically qualified for assistance, such as west Wales and the valleys, the highlands and islands, and Cornwall. There was also a particular deal over Northern Ireland, which meant that the whole of Northern Ireland automatically qualified. The rest of the map beyond those limited areas was drawn within the UK, but it was drawn within an overall population envelope, in terms of population coverage, that was set by Brussels, so it was a question of, “We have so much coverage to allocate. Where do we allocate it?”.
The Government went through a very difficult procedure to try to target the areas that were most in need, as well as places within or close to those areas where there were genuine opportunities to promote jobs and support businesses. In a sense, it is no good putting a line around a residential area and saying, “That is eligible for business support”, because there are not businesses in most residential areas; it is the big areas of trading estates and so on that need to be targeted.
Obviously, within a fixed population envelope, not everywhere that perhaps deserved coverage was able to get coverage. If we are drawing a map here in the United Kingdom under our own rules, we can increase the population coverage of that assisted area map to better reflect the true extent of economic disadvantage in the United Kingdom. Under the old EU rules, only about a quarter of the entire UK population was on the map. That really does not accurately reflect the extent of areas that need levelling up in the United Kingdom.
The Chair
Q
Dr Pazos-Vidal: Just briefly, as a complement. My earlier point about consultation at EU level was about all the guidance, not just the regional aid guidance for assisted areas, which is what has been mentioned. Of course we would like to replicate the system and improve on it. On this issue I think—
Simon Baynes
Q
Thomas Pope: As I say, I do not think that there is one that has a domestic regime. We are charting our own course here.
Bill Esterson
Q
Professor Rickard: That is an excellent question. Some of the things that could help would be lengthening the time available to challenge—extending it beyond a month would be helpful—and clarifying, and potentially expanding, the definition of interested parties who could potentially challenge a subsidy if they are concerned.
Clause 71(3) has this really interesting phrase. It says that the relevant date you can challenge from is the date on which the subsidy has been published to the database or
“the date on which the interested party first knew or ought to have known”
about the subsidy decision in question. That is difficult. What is the date that a potential challenger ought to have known about the subsidy? That is one particular phrase that jumped out at me, and I am curious to think more about it. We should think about extending the time that you can challenge and defining more clearly and broadly who potential challengers may be, but also about how we will learn about a subsidy if it has not been notified and if we do not have publicly available information about it.
Potential challengers can ask the granting authority for information, and the Bill provides a duty on the granting authorities to provide that information. However, it is difficult to know, particularly within this short timeframe, how I will learn of this subsidy. How will I learn that there is a subsidy that is disadvantaging me and that I think is not complying with the principles? How can I learn that in this very short timeframe? Those are some concrete examples of changes that could be made to increase the ability of interested parties, competitors, businesses and others to scrutinise the subsidies that are being provided.
Bill Esterson
Q
Professor Rickard: The database set up by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy is excellent, but I would make sure that more subsidies were notified into that database and that it fully encompasses all the information—not linking to other pages, but putting all relevant information into that database. I would also require granting authorities to put that information into the database in a timely fashion—quicker than six months—and make sure that more subsidies have to be notified, not allowing those exemptions for subsidies under £350,000 or £500,000 within a scheme.
Bill Esterson
Q
Thomas Pope: I will answer the first question first. I agree with many of the suggestions outlined by Professor Rickard. My real concern is that, as that 28-day period is so short, there is a risk that a subsidy or scheme that is concerning is missed by potential interested parties. The issue could be that they do not qualify as interested parties, so you could expand that, or that the time is too short.
I would propose one solution. At the moment, the CMA has a reactive role in the system—deliberately so. It issues reports on subsidies of interest and particular interest before they have been offered, if those public bodies offer the subsidies to the CMA for review. In special cases, where the Secretary of State is concerned about a subsidy, it can issue a post-award referral, and after a subsidy has been awarded, the CMA can issue a report. I think that the CMA should have the ability to do that investigation off its own bat. That would not mean giving it a standing a court, or anything like that, but that it could keep an eye on potentially problematic subsidies. If the CMA reports on a subsidy and raises a concern—there would not be ratings—it is much more likely that interested parties would be aware of that. I would possibly go even further and allow the CMA to have standing in court, but I understand that that is quite a departure from the system and it probably will not be a goer. However, at the very least, the CMA could have the proactive ability to investigate and issue reports ex-post.
The six-month challenge deadline is clearly something that has been brought in from the TCA, and that is the maximum we are allowed. I am afraid that I do not have a very strong view on the right amount. I have not spent enough time actually writing the reports. The public authorities have to be very strong on that.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Thomas Pope: We could make it shorter within our own legislation if we wanted to.
Supporting Small Business
Bill Esterson Excerpts(2 years, 6 months ago)
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Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
Both the Minister and the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Huw Merriman) have said that they really want to do something about business rates, and they have—[Interruption.] I know the hon. Member said he wanted to do it. They are challenging us to come up with a way of replacing the revenue, but they cannot come up with one themselves. I want to know what their plan is as an alternative. Perhaps the Minister or his colleague, depending on who is winding up the debate, will tell us the Government’s plan for doing so. As the shadow Chancellor, my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) said, this has been going on for a very long time. The Government have been talking about reviewing business rates for a very long time.
I ran a business for many years. Twenty years ago, I took a lease out on a commercial premises, and I was staggered by how much the business rates were. In fact, many in this Chamber pay business rates on their constituency premises. I had to pay for that, whether or not I had any income coming in the door. That fixed cost of doing business is the challenge. We face inequity in the system of business taxation, which is why it is so out of date and needs to be replaced when set against the competition from the online giants, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West rightly said earlier.
More than 450 businesses in the borough of Sefton alone face going out of business as a result of problems that have been exacerbated during the covid crisis. They need action on business rates for the longer term, not just now. They need the kind of support that the Welsh Government are giving, as we have heard, to be extended by the Government now. They need longer-term reform and, in the end, the scrapping of the business rates system if they are to thrive.
The Minister made much of international comparisons. I wanted to intervene on him; it is a shame he did not let me. He named a number of countries that have significantly lower business property taxes than this country, so any business in this country that wants to compete with them faces an immediate competitive disadvantage. In Germany, business property taxes are four times lower than they are in this country. For our manufacturers to compete with that is very difficult, so they face a significant disadvantage.
On the question of how that would be paid for, I ask the Minister how other countries can raise business taxes with much lower property taxes. What can we learn from them? We are so far behind because we have the highest business taxes of any major country in the world, according to the OECD. That has to be addressed.
It is absolutely right that my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West has brought this debate forward today, especially as businesses face huge debts as a result of covid. The last thing they need is a business rates bill dropping through their door and adding to that pressure. I will give a couple of constituency examples. MSP is in the events and creative sector and is owned by my constituent Lisa Richards, who makes the point that she now has huge debts. The problem is that the support during covid was simply not enough to avoid those debts going up—it is a story being told again and again. Businesses such as MSP need ongoing support. I hope that we will hear something next week to deal with that in the immediate term, but they need longer-term support too, which is why the overhaul of business rates is such an important part of the picture. Unless they get that support, they will struggle to play their part in the recovery.
There are high street businesses such as Coulson Flooring, which is run by another constituent who has to pay his business rates whether he is making any money or not. It is a thriving business that was hit hard by covid, just like everybody else on the high street. He needs that longer-term support too. That is the case for all those 450-plus businesses in my borough alone and for businesses in all our constituencies up and down the country, so I am delighted that we are taking the issue forward as a party.
Frankly, to those Conservative Members who say that their party still has the mantle of the party of business, I say that I think every business in the country knows the Prime Minister’s attitude, which was summed up by one short four-letter word. That is a topic he has returned to again and again. They collectively need to take a close look at themselves, the behaviour of the man who leads them and his attitude towards business and towards supporting our entrepreneurs, our wealth creators and those people who provide employment for so many of our constituents.
It is essential that an alternative system is found. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West has come forward with some credible alternatives for an interim approach that uses an increase in the digital services tax as a windfall and, in the long term, looks at the international approach to corporation tax and an overhaul of that. To answer the question of how we replace the £30 billion that the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) mentioned, we have to work with the business community and the trade unions. We have to work in partnership to find alternatives that are workable in this country and internationally. That has to be the way forward.
At the moment, we have a curb on investment as a number of business groups have made clear. It is something that Mike Hawes of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders has pointed out. He has said that the current arrangements are “overdue an overhaul” and that
“anyone wanting to invest in new equipment—especially green technologies”,
which are crucial to the car industry—
“sees their business rates rise”
which
“is a perverse disincentive to investment and productivity improvement”.
He puts it so well. It is true in manufacturing, and it is true in retail and in our high streets, which face competition from the out-of-town and online giants.
It is essential, if we are to recover for those high streets, businesses and communities, that we see this turned around. Such an approach has the support of the trade unions. With the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, as the union representing shop workers, in exactly the same place as the shop owners, we potentially have a partnership. The only part of that partnership missing at the moment is for the Government to step up.
We have shown the way forward, and the CBI has shown the way forward. Tony Danker of the CBI has now said:
“More than half of business investment is subject to business rates; this unfair, uncompetitive system has become a tax on investment that simply isn’t fit for purpose.”
He has also said:
“The Labour Party should be applauded for grasping the nettle and putting forward a pro-growth, pro-investment package of reforms that will reflect our green ambitions, spur the economic recovery”.
That is the right way forward.
We have business looking at us and saying that we were the party that came out of the conference season—and this is the word of the Federation of Small Businesses, not mine—with a “pro-business” agenda and proposals that would help the economy, not the Conservatives. I want to see from the Chancellor next week some concrete details about the package the Minister talked about very nicely in his speech, otherwise it is our approach to which the business community is increasingly going to look. It is our approach that people will be voting on in the next general election, and unless this Government act, we will when we come in.
UK Steel Sector: Supply Chains
Bill Esterson Excerpts(2 years, 11 months ago)
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Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab) [V]
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) on securing this debate and on his excellent analysis of the challenges facing the steel industry. He, the hon. Member for Scunthorpe (Holly Mumby-Croft) and my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) referred to the problems of trade defence measures, and that is what I will concentrate my remarks on.
Last month, the Trade Remedies Investigations Directorate published a draft recommendation to withdraw half of all trade remedies on steel. If that happens, the consequences could be disastrous. During the Committee stage of the Trade Act 2021, I argued that there should be an independent body to make recommendations on trade remedies, which would also take into account domestic economic considerations, but the recent recommendations by TRID show that the regulations that were set out in its mandate, which now also govern the newly established Trade Remedies Authority, are simply not fit for purpose.
Steel manufacturing is a critical national asset. Steel produced in Britain is used to make ships for the Royal Navy and wind turbines to meet our climate obligations. The construction of a nuclear power station at Hinkley Point C is using Welsh steel, and 1.3 million tonnes of steel are required for the construction of High Speed 2. The sector directly employs more than 30,000 people, supports a further 41,100 jobs in high-value supply chains, makes a £2.8 billion direct contribution to UK GDP and supports a further £3.6 billion in its supply chains. Steel is a vital asset—we must protect it in the national interest. However, in making its draft recommendation, TRID failed to take into account the reality of the steel supply chain.
The full spectrum of measures is designed to protect the viability of steel as a whole, not just individual production lines. Removing safeguards would mean that the manufacture of steel sections, tubes, wire rods and plates in the UK becomes unviable. It seems almost certain that the European Union will retain its section 232 tariffs beyond 30 June, meaning that any global overproduction of steel will likely flood the UK, crush domestic supply and have potentially catastrophic consequences for the industry and communities here in Britain.
That existential threat to the industry is a strong argument for maintaining all existing trade defence measures for steel, but TRID, and now the TRA, is forced to prioritise the unimpeded functioning of a global market because that is what it says in the regulations which direct their decision making. The regulations do not envisage the maintenance of the safeguards that domestic producers should be able to expect from their Government—these take second place for our trade remedies body. Hence the recommendation by them for the removal of some safeguards. The economic tests which TRID and the TRA must apply, according to their own regulations, do not provide the Secretary of State for International Trade with the ability to take into account wider factors of strategic national interest when deciding whether or not to reject a recommendation from them. The Business Secretary said he was
“committed to a strategic presence of steel in the UK.”—[Official Report, 25 May 2021; Vol. 696, c. 233.]
The International Trade Secretary said that she will do
“whatever it takes to protect our steel industry.”
The two Secretaries of State must keep their promises and allow the safeguards to remain beyond 30 June while the weaknesses and trade remedies regulations are fixed—they promised to do this. Members on all sides will work with the Government to support jobs and communities. The existential threat of lifting half of the safeguards means there may be just 21 days to save British steel.
Vauxhall at Ellesmere Port and Battery Manufacturing Strategy
Bill Esterson Excerpts(3 years, 2 months ago)
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Kwasi Kwarteng
I would be happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss the potential siting of a gigafactory. He will appreciate that through the getting building fund the Government have already committed to supporting a lithium extraction pilot plant in Cornwall, and our Faraday battery challenge already supports work to find and use lithium across the United Kingdom. This is a critical issue. We fully understand the importance of the security of the supply chain, and I would be happy to discuss that, and more specific Cornwall-related issues, with my hon. Friend at a time convenient to us both.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab) [V]
The Secretary of State mentioned his 10-point plan a number of times, but that will not mean much unless the Government support existing manufacturing, including Vauxhall at Ellesmere Port. Will he do whatever it takes for Cheshire and Merseyside, and Vauxhall in particular, rather than just talking about it, so that low-carbon vehicles really can be made in Britain?
Kwasi Kwarteng
We are talking about it—we are talking with the company directly to secure vital investment. We want those jobs, and we have said time and again that we are 100% committed to the energy transition and to having world-class automotive manufacturing in the UK.