Technology Sovereignty

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Tuesday 10th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered technology sovereignty.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Vaz. We are four years into the Ukraine war and 10 days into the latest Iran-Israel-US conflict. At the start of this year, the US seized the President of Venezuela. A few weeks later, President Trump was demanding Greenland from Denmark. The world has never felt more insecure and unsecure.

For the first time since I was elected as an MP, global insecurity is an issue on the doorstep in Newcastle. As if that were not enough, we are also undergoing two technology revolutions: one in data and the other in AI automation. Add to that the geopolitical restructuring across different dimensions—Europe and the US, the global south and Russia/China, Europe and Russia, and Iran and the Gulf states—and a green industrial revolution that is driving competition for knowledge, resources, land and people. Is it any wonder that people are feeling insecure?

In the face of those challenges, we must be honest with our constituents about what we can and cannot control, and about the implications for our industrial, civil and defence policy. Technology sovereignty is a key part of that and a placeholder for larger fears. Too often, people feel that big tech is controlling, not empowering, their lives. Techno-feudalism and techno-serfdom may not be commonly discussed in the pubs and playgrounds of Newcastle, but they are a fear that many have.

The previous Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hove and Portslade (Peter Kyle), said that big tech needs to be treated as a state, not as companies. If so, who are their citizens? Us? We certainly did not elect them, so are we just their serfs? What should the relationship be between those companies and states?

Technology sovereignty matters, but what is it? The current Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology told the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee:

“Sovereign capability is about ensuring the UK has what it needs to become a global leader in AI.”

The Digital Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray), told the Committee:

“Sovereignty is a huge issue that we always discuss. Security, safety and resilience are all parts of that, and the digital spending controls that DSIT puts in on behalf of Government, which examines individual contracts on that basis, very much examines these issues as well.”

He also said:

“It is about building those capabilities and supply chains here.”

[Will Stone (Swindon North) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend has advanced a very powerful vision of the global events affecting the country right now. When I talk to defence tech companies, I see that they reach the point of scaling up, but they are unable to access finance. Does my hon. Friend agree that this Government should support defence tech companies to scale up, so that we can have true sovereign capability, as opposed to letting them fly off to America?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I very much agree with my hon. Friend. He is absolutely right, and that support should take the form of access to investment, but also procurement and procurement decisions, which I will discuss in more detail.

The Digital Minister also told the Committee:

“There is no single internationally recognised definition of digital sovereignty”

and:

“DSIT is working to develop a comprehensive definition that can be used across the UK”.

We have not received an update, but yesterday, the Government launched the AI sovereignty unit with £500 million, so it is to be hoped that we know what we are spending our money on.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I cannot help but give way to the hon. Member.

[Jim Shannon]

The hon. Lady is terribly kind and it is always a pleasure to come to a debate that she has secured. Recent studies indicate that AI-powered tools have already been used in phishing, ransomware, and social engineering attacks, making breaches faster, more targeted and harder to detect. The National Cyber Security Centre has repeatedly warned that the sophistication and scale of cyber-threats are increasing, and that AI could amplify those risks exponentially. Does the hon. Lady therefore agree that we have a critical gap in investment, expertise and the co-ordinated strategy in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to defend against AI-enabled attacks? The Government must focus on being able to combat those in future—does she agree?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I certainly agree that we need to be able to defend ourselves against AI attacks.

[Martin Wrigley (Newton Abbot) (LD)]

I thank the hon. Lady and Chair of my Select Committee for giving way. Does she agree that a definition of sovereign tech is something that a foreign power could not switch off, so that the systems on which we rely could not be pulled out from under our feet, much as the Microsoft ones were for the International Criminal Court?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

My fellow member of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee makes a very important point about the definition of sovereignty. I do not want to get too bogged down in the actual definition, but I agree that control matters, and I will say a little more about that.

I will raise the definition of digital sovereignty cited in the House of Commons Library briefing, which accompanies this debate, which is

“the agency and capacity of any organisation to make intelligent, informed choices to shape its digital future by design.”

On that basis, choosing between Amazon Web Services and Microsoft for our data centre is technology sovereignty. I also think that if British sovereignty depends on our leaders’ ability to make intelligent choices, they spent a lot of our history not having sovereignty.

The Library definition came from a global consultancy called Public Digital. Emily Middleton, the interim director for digital transformation in DSIT, was previously a partner at Public Digital. It rules out digital independence and says that our goal should be intelligent dependence. Can the Minister say whether he is aiming for intelligent dependence?

The definition I like best, however, is that sovereignty is whatever a sovereign power says it is—that is what sovereignty means. The UK has extraordinary technological human capital resources, particularly in AI, where we are probably third in the world, but also in clean energy, quantum synthetic biology and much more. Our human capital means that we are not just any mid-sized country; we can aim higher than intelligent dependence. Elon Musk chose to turn off Ukraine’s Starlink capacity at a critical time in Ukraine’s defence of its sovereignty against Putin’s illegal aggression. None of us wants the UK to be in such a position of dependence.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

The hon. Lady mentions Britain’s extraordinary human capital. In my role as my party’s Europe spokesperson, of late I have been speaking to very large international defence firms, which thrive in the UK intellectual environment. They have great links with universities, but they say to me that they are increasingly looking to move some of the start-ups that have been created in the UK into Europe, so that they can assemble rapidly the kinds of teams that they need to take those initial ideas and scale them up. Does she agree that having a closer working relationship with our European partners and colleagues, allowing that freedom of movement to return, could be an enormous benefit—counterintuitively perhaps—to our sovereign capacity?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

The level of interest shows just what an important issue this is. I will come on to discuss some aspects of collaboration as it relates to sovereignty, but I observe that the last time our sovereignty as a mid-sized power was seriously debated was during Brexit, and the slogan “Take back control” reflected the sense that too much sovereignty had been ceded to the European Union without an honest debate with the British people. As a member of the Labour party, I know that we are stronger together and that that can require some loss of autonomy to deliver results, which actually make people more secure, but that must not be done without an honest debate.

Let us look at the four specific sovereignty challenges, the first of which is critical infrastructure and cloud data dependency. The Competition and Markets Authority found that cloud services in Britain are dominated by AWS at 40% to 50%, and Microsoft at 30%. Crown Hosting is meant to be our sovereign hosting capability, but it only hosts 4% of Government legacy services. Both Amazon Web Services and Oracle claim to offer a sovereign cloud—they do say to deal with the difficult part in the title!

The second issue I want to look at is the hot topic of AI. There is no Brit large language model but there is the ambition to transform our public services and industry through AI. The AI opportunities action plan repeatedly references sovereign AI and sovereign compute without defining them. The major AI companies Google, Anthropic, OpenEye, Microsoft and DeepSeek are all headquartered abroad. DeepMind formed Google’s AI capability and was founded right here in the UK before being bought. What capability does the UK now have in AI? What minimum capability does the Minister think we need? How do we respond to the EU Cloud and AI Development Act, which may exclude UK companies?

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

My hon. Friend is making an important point. When it comes to AI, an enormous amount of investment is needed. There are many discussions at the moment about the impact of that huge investment in AI. It is very difficult for a smaller country such as the UK to compete in that regard. Does she agree that we need to work with like-minded countries on these issues, including those in the EU? Does she agree that we need to make sure that this is one of the key topics when President Macron visits the UK later this year?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I agree with my right hon. Friend that we certainly need to work with like-minded countries.

The third area is cyber-security and data governance. Some argue that we are already at war in the cyber-sphere. Last year’s strategic defence review emphasised cyber and electromagnetic domains, and established a new UK cyber and electromagnetic command to enhance that, with £1 billion in new funding for homeland air missile defence and cyber-security initiatives. Should these be British suppliers? Should they be European? Should they be exclusively NATO suppliers?

On data governance, the foreign direct product rule allows the United States to restrict access to advanced computing chips and AI-related software. By adding UK companies to the entity list, the US can immediately cut them off from cloud services, software and AI tools, while the Cloud and Patriot Acts expand data access powers to compel US companies to hand over data even if held overseas—that is, in the UK. Has the Minister discussed those powers with Microsoft, AWS and Palantir?

Fourthly and finally, we have the UK’s reliance on global supply chains. Critical minerals are an obvious example, but because I am a bit of a geek I want to mention the common information models that enable the things in the internet of things to talk to each other. By 2030, there will be 6 billion CIM connections globally. China controls 70% of the market, creating a huge possibility for the disruption of everything from traffic systems to energy grid operations.

That is a really quick canter through just a few of the technology sovereignty issues. I want to look at two specific examples in more detail. First, the NHS has the largest and most comprehensive longitudinal and structured patient level datasets in the world. I support the push for digital integration as we transition the NHS from analogue to digital, with interoperability and standardisation bringing faster access and better analytics, yet a growing share of NHS data flows through US companies.

The federated data platform contract places core NHS data operations on Palantir’s proprietary systems. Why? There have been numerous reports of irregularities in the way the contract was awarded. In addition—this, for me, is a key point of sovereignty—Palantir’s founder and controlling stakeholder, Peter Thiel, has a political worldview which is at odds with British values. The same is true of Elon Musk. It does our constituents’ sense of agency no good to see their Government so dependent on these companies. Nearly half of adults say that they would opt out of NHS data sharing if the platform was operated by a private foreign provider.

The second example is also to do with Palantir. Its recent defence contract also raised many questions. The strategic defence review emphasised AI as a core enabler of military capability. Reports suggest that Palantir serves primarily as a vehicle for integrating Anthropic’s AI models. The US has just declared Anthropic a supply chain risk for US companies, so will Palantir break UK workflows that are using Anthropic? I am certain that President Trump would not allow British companies to control US defence datasets, so why are we allowing American ones to control ours?

I could go on about civil nuclear, telecoms infrastructure, subsea cables, quantum, space and drones, but I will stop there, and finish by looking at possible solutions. Technology sovereignty was a big theme at the Munich security conference, and the US-Europe trust gap was a yawning chasm following the shock realisation that we could not always count on the US as an ally. Technology sovereignty solutions that focus on technological leadership, such as in the Secretary of State’s definition, reflect the basic idea that if the UK leads on, say, protein folding then Google may be less inclined to switch off ChatGPT if we side with Denmark when the US tries to seize Greenland.

Whether I agree with that approach or not, it certainly resonates with the evidence that the Committee heard from witnesses in so many domains regarding how important it is for the science and business community to understand where the Government are seeking to lead, so that resources can be focused and skills built there. Can the Minister say whether the Government plan to decide which aspects of AI, quantum, space or bioengineering we will seek to lead in? AI is often thought of as having three layers: infrastructure, data and applications. Can the Minister tell us where in the AI stack we are aiming for control, leadership, sovereignty or whatever we want to call it? Also, does he agree that weak competition in the AI and digital sectors, caused by giant incumbents, reduces our ability to lead?

Open source is often cited as at least part of the solution to sovereignty. I am a huge advocate for open source, open interfaces, transparent code and standard protocols, which can reduce or minimise dependence. Despite the policy ambitions, three quarters of NHS trusts’ development teams do not use open source approaches. None of the AI models currently being deployed within the public sector is an open ecosystem; all are proprietary in nature. The Minister’s Department has sign-off on all significant IT procurement. Is open source a requirement of it?

Finally, can science diplomacy help us to negotiate technology sovereignty? A number of Members have raised the issue of collaboration. Can we build on our human capital strengths by collaborating and working with partners who have respect for our values, take collaborative approaches, and can share with us the financial capital needed to make our sovereign objectives a reality? Are we happy to share leadership, and perhaps sovereignty, with our allies?

[Gordon McKee (Glasgow South) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making an important speech on an important topic. She is right to talk about how the US and China dominate on technological sovereignty, and part of the reason it is very difficult for the UK to compete with them is, of course, the scale of those countries. Does she agree that the way we can compete is by co-operating with reform in Europe, and that we should view our strategy not in terms of how the UK can outcompete Europe but in terms of how Europe, with the UK at its heart, can outcompete the US and China?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

It is an important question. I am not in a position to choose our allies, but I agree in principle that we should be working with the European Union. I do not think it should be a choice between the European Union and the US, though they may make that the choice. I certainly think that we should be working with our European allies in order to form a large market for secure and ethical technology, which is in the interests of everyone.

Finally, we need to monitor the future sovereignty implications of current research, so that that can influence our investment and mergers and acquisitions policy, and so that key technologies and companies are not easily allowed to go abroad.

This debate has attracted a large amount of interest, so I have tried to be as brief as possible. I have asked the Minister many questions; if he cannot answer them all, he can write to me. In summary, we need to understand what we can own, control or lead on ourselves, what we can access that is in the hands of allies we trust, and how we can manage the things we must get from those we do not trust. We must always remember that how we develop and deploy our human capital will be critical to our ability to achieve any kind of technological sovereignty. I urge the Minister to be honest about where we are. We do not want to sleepwalk into technological serfdom and/or some kind of techxit—a technology Brexit.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

It is such a pleasure to serve under you in the Chair, Ms Vaz. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, for securing this debate and bringing to it her deep expertise across engineering, policymaking and leadership in the House on the question of tech sovereignty. I also thank all hon. Members for making very thoughtful points and bringing to the debate a range of experiences—as well as swiftness of speech, given the constraints imposed by time today.

I have long felt that the central question in our politics and for our country is the future of technology in this country. It will be the major driver of prosperity and dignity for people, and the central question is whether Britain gets to shape it or is shaped by it. In Westminster, we sometimes talk about technology sovereignty as an abstract geopolitical goal, but we have to keep in mind that, ultimately, it is the basis for our NHS radiologists to have access to the best tools for detecting cancer, with data here in the UK; for British founders and builders to be able to train and deploy models, rather than depending on foreign APIs and pricing; and for people in their homes and workplaces across the country to know that their everyday AI systems are governed transparently and democratically here in the UK.

My view is that technology sovereignty is a state’s ability to have strategic leverage when it comes to a technology, such that it can ensure ongoing access to critical inputs and ongoing assurance that its wider economic and national security objectives can be met more broadly. It is to take the best tools the world has to offer today, but also to shape the rest, and ultimately to make that which is critical here in Britain.

As I think of it, that strategic leverage is obtained by three steps on a ladder. The first is just to have enough of the critical inputs. Taking AI as an example, we have to have enough chips today to be able to do anything with AI in the first instance. With that in mind, the Government have always been very keen to secure the level of capital investment that means that Britain is at least at the table with critical inputs.

Once we are at the table, the second part of sovereignty is to make sure that we have some diversification in who we procure critical inputs from so that we can bargain effectively. We are the party of labour; we understand that who has power matters as much as what the powers are. In that context, one of the first things I did in my role was to engage with a series of companies in every part of the stack so that we were able to build more diversity into the landscape.

The third rung of the ladder is, ultimately, to build British in order to make sure that we have the full-fat version of sovereign capability here in critical parts of the stack.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for setting out his sovereignty stack. Just as an example, is an LLM a critical input or another level in the stack—and does it need to be British?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I valued my hon. Friend’s earlier point that sovereignty has to be seen in the round. We cannot make everything here; we have to look at the entire bundle that we have to offer. In the context of LLMs, there is some uncertainty as to whether all the capability will ultimately accrue in closed proprietary models, or whether open-source, open-weight models might be part of it. To me, as things stand today, it is a pretty important part of the stack. The question then is whether we have enough of it to be able to make the most of it by adopting it for economic and national security usage here, or whether there are aspects in which, at least from a distillation or small-model point of view, we need to develop some capabilities here as well. I do not think there is a binary answer to the overarching question; the answer is much more nuanced. I am happy to discuss that further if it is of interest.

As I said, the third rung of the ladder is, ultimately, to build British and focus on areas in which we can develop our strengths. I have to point out that we made sure that Nscale, one of our neocloud hyperscale providers, was an important part of the supply chain for AI growth zones. I noticed that yesterday Nscale raised the largest ever series-C funding in Europe, in part as a result of the Government’s support and convening in that context. Arm, the leading chip design company globally, is still headquartered in Cambridge, and we have fantastic companies in the AI inference chip part of the stack, Fractile and Olix being two of them. It is an area that I spend a lot of my time on.

When it comes to models, we have huge strengths, not just because a number of the Gemini teams and researchers continue to sit in King’s Cross at DeepMind, but because companies developing foundation models in AI for science and autonomous vehicles, embodied AI, and aspects of world models and computer vision reside here in the UK. Wayve raised £1.5 billion just this year, the largest funding round in Europe to date for that stage. It is a fantastic company that looks in particular at embodied AI and vision. I am proud of those companies. It is right that the Government are supporting them through the lens of tech sovereignty, as that is what both Britain’s and the companies’ best interests dictate.

The sovereign AI unit will be crucial to that. I am glad to see the level of interest in that across the House. It will concentrate efforts on priority areas. There was interest in my specifying those areas. The four areas that are of interest at the outset are novel compute, in particular focusing on the inference chip part of the stack; novel model architecture; AI for science—I point hon. Members to the AI for science strategy published by the Department three or four months ago, which set out particular areas of focus and priority—and embodied AI.

To give a concrete example of early action that the sovereign AI unit has taken, we have already invested £8 million in the OpenBind consortium to accelerate AI-driven drug discovery, and £5 million in the Encode: AI for Science fellowship to support the next generation of world-class talent. The focus of the unit will be on both capital and compute, to incrementally anchor more and more British companies here, but I know that the unit will only be part of the solution. We have a role to look at innovation and market support much more broadly across the tech landscape.

In November, we also announced a significant advance market commitment—a deeply innovative procurement shift—which meant that up to £100 million in Government funding was available to buy products from promising UK chip companies once they reach a high-performance benchmark. That presents UK start-ups with an exciting opportunity to grow and compete right here, building for the world.

AI is of course just one area of Britain’s flourishing tech ecosystem. I point out to my hon. Friends the Members for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington) and for Lichfield (Dave Robertson), who made important points about quantum, that the Government have doubled the rate of investment in quantum, with about £1 billion committed over the next four years. The points on helium made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield have very much been taken into account. The Government are looking at the developing situation on helium supply in the middle east, which is of concern.

Through our national programme, we broadly want to anchor development and access to technological capabilities that are most important to economic growth and national security. That means, in the context of quantum, more companies starting, growing and staying here and, in the context of AI, not just developing capabilities in particular parts of the stack, but in part looking upstream for skills as well.

In that context, I agree totally with my hon. Friends the Members for Cambridge (Daniel Zeichner) and for Southend East and Rochford (Mr Alaba) that the quality and scale of our talent and skills in our universities and schools is the single biggest determinant of where we end up. I am happy to write to my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge about the UKRI changes that we are making. In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Southend East and Rochford, IP capitalisation is a deeply important part of what I focus on with the Intellectual Property Office, and I am happy to engage him on the question of Essex University in particular.