Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 16th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins). I would like to start by making two relevant declarations of interest. I worked for the Office of Communications before entering Parliament and I am currently a fellow of the Institution of Engineering and Technology. Madam Deputy Speaker, you might have heard me mention on occasion that I was an engineer before coming into Parliament. As such, in 2010, I was desperate for issues around technology to come up in Parliament, as it was a subject I actually knew something about, but they rarely did. In the intervening 16 years, however, things have changed, and technology issues such as online safety, wi-fi on trains, sovereign technology and infowars are now raised regularly.

I welcome the increasing role of technology in all our constituents’ lives, but this must go hand in hand with rigorous cyber-security to protect against threats from state and non-state actors. As I highlighted in my speech on Second Reading, the UK’s only cross-cutting cyber-security legislation is currently that inherited from the European Union. The previous Conservative Government failed to update these regulations, leaving us working under an outdated framework. I therefore really welcome this Bill, which seeks to expand the scope of existing cyber-security regulations to new sectors, strengthen the role of regulators and grant the Government new powers to respond to the threats posed by cyber-security breaches.

We are only as secure as our weakest link, but I am afraid we still have a number of weak links left. Cyber-attacks are having a real financial impact on the UK and are happening at an increasing rate. According to the Institution of Engineering and Technology, cyber-attacks cost UK businesses an estimated £64 billion annually, with £37 billion in direct costs and £26 billion in indirect costs. Last year we also saw the well-documented cyber-attack that hit Marks & Spencer, leaving shoppers unable to buy online from the company for months. The company’s profits were almost wiped out, down from £390 million to £3 million for the first half of 2025. As a Sparks card holder myself, I was unable to use my card for six months and I fear I may have contributed to those figures.

This brings me to my first amendment, new clause 20, which seeks to designate retail businesses as an essential activity, bringing them within scope of part 3 of the Bill. Retail is the UK’s largest private sector employer. It holds large amounts of consumer data but often relies on dated IT systems. Yet, as I noted on Second Reading, the existing scope of the Bill would not have prevented or even had an impact on the attacks on Marks & Spencer or Jaguar Land Rover, despite the significant disruption they caused to our constituents and our economic activity. Indeed, in November, the Bank of England cited the cyber-attack on JLR as a factor in its decision to hold interest rates.

The Government’s plan to promote the new cyber governance code of practice to improve pre-operative preparedness in sectors such as retail is welcome, but voluntary measures alone will not deliver the consistent adoption of good cyber governance across economically significant sectors such as retail. According to the Government’s figures, only 9,680 Cyber Essentials Plus certificates were issued to small and medium-sized businesses between November 2023 and October 2024. There are an estimated 6 million small and medium-sized enterprises in the UK, so this is not going to address that challenge at the rate at which it needs to be addressed.

I welcome the Opposition amendments that would bring retail businesses within the Bill’s scope, but I am concerned that they might be too extensive in bringing small and medium-sized businesses into its remit and placing a disproportionate burden on them. The revenue threshold of £12 billion in my new clause 20 provides the necessary specificity to ensure that only large retail businesses, including Marks & Spencer and Jaguar Land Rover, would fall under the expanded Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018. This would lead to faster incident-reporting responses and customer notification, alongside stronger powers, including those to deal with non-compliance.

Turning to my new clause 18, we have already heard that the concentration of the UK’s public sector data within a small number of US-owned providers—Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure specifically—presents a structural risk to national resilience. Combined, AWS and Microsoft account for 70% to 80% of the public cloud market, according to the Competition and Markets Authority. Part of the issue is that that figure is an estimate. I have put down a series of written parliamentary questions over the last seven years to find out just how dependent the Government are on AWS and Microsoft. This data is not tracked across Government. Can the Minister say how he intends to assess a threat that the Government are not measuring?

As set out in my Committee’s report entitled “Rewiring the state: Delivering digital government”, our national resilience is put at risk by the strategic lock-in that these companies have in many of our public services and Administrations. Major Departments, including His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the NHS, are under multi-year agreements that further entrench these cloud infrastructures within the Whitehall ecosystem. Included in my Committee’s report was evidence we heard from the Open Cloud Coalition, who suggested that the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should consider a period of over-correction, including the mandatory re-competition of high-risk or large-scale contracts, to break cycles of vendor lock-in.

The Government are rightly seeking to co-ordinate cloud contracting, but I believe that this should be done in a way that would ensure more, not less, competition. We would like to see the detail of how the all-of-Government cloud contract will prevent vendor lock-in, and I would like the Minister to outline his engagement with the CMA on the contract’s development. Not only does our reliance on these two cloud services raise practical issues—as seen with the AWS outage in October—but there are questions around data protection. Under the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act and the Patriot Act, the US Government can compel US companies, including AWS and Microsoft, to hand over data if held overseas—that is, in the UK.

I am aware that the Minister might reference our sovereign hosting capability, Crown Hosting, but it hosts only 4% of Government legacy services. Will he please outline how the Government intend to ensure protection so that the public sector makes better use of the services provided by Crown Hosting? Could he also set out how he will ensure that the Government’s digital transformation ambitions cannot be derailed at any time by decisions based on the narrow interests of a foreign, commercial or state actor? He might choose to argue that this is highly unlikely, but I would point him to the recent decision of the US Government to withdraw foreign nationals’ access to Anthropic’s Fable 5 model.

Finally, my new clause 19 calls on the Secretary of State to conduct a review into the risks posed by foreign state ownership or control of providers of cellular internet-of-things modules. I always like to mention that I was the first Member of Parliament to speak about the internet of things, in my debate back in 2011. Having worked in technology as an engineer, the threat posed by cyber-attacks on the internet of things was very real to me from the start of my parliamentary career. Indeed, in 2017 I wrote an article highlighting the threat of cyber-attacks on sex toys, in a vain attempt to raise the profile of the issue.

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

The hon. Lady was very prescient then, and it has got worse since. There was lots of talk under the previous Administration about Downing Street cars being searched for IOTs. We know about the huge imports from bad actors, such as China and other countries—that is really what we should be worried about. Many of them contain kill switches, which would devastate some of our industry, such as energy. That would be a disaster. She is right to have raised the issue and to continue to raise it.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

The right hon. Member does well to remind us that the impact of hostile action using CIMs, such as by turning on a kill switch, would be devastating across multiple sectors, including potentially the consumer sector, as well as security, automotive, transport and finance. That is why it is so important to consider this.

I particularly draw the Minister’s attention to the list provided by the US Federal Communications Commission—the equivalent of Ofcom—of equipment and services covered by section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act. The list dictates what technology is legally permitted to be authorised for import and sale in the US, and many companies on the list are owned or controlled by the Chinese state. I thank the Minister in the other place for meeting me and my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie), whose amendment I also support, and hearing our concerns about the supply of IOT devices. It was unfortunate that the Minister did not see the need for action, particularly given that the US has taken action against Chinese-made goods and that, during a trip of the British-American Parliamentary Group to the US just last week, we heard that further action is likely to be taken against cellular IOT modules specifically. That could mean UK products being banned from import into the US if they contain such CIMs.

We have seen a rapid growth of those devices across transport, as we have mentioned, as well as energy and, importantly, water and health. I am concerned about the ability of our domestic British businesses to export into the US given those restrictions, as well as the impact on our security. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could set out whether he is looking into that concern.

As was eloquently emphasised in the personal statements made by the recently resigned Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), and Armed Forces Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), the first duty of Government is the security of their citizens. That is true when it comes to our armed forces and our defence in the real world, and it is also true when it comes to our security in the virtual world. Those two overlap so much more than in the past.

I welcome the Bill, but I have real concerns about the need to bring retail businesses such as M&S within its scope, the concentration of the UK’s public sector data in a small number of US-owned providers, the implications for technology sovereignty that that raises, and the risks posed by foreign state ownership of providers of cellular internet-of-things modules. I hope that the Minister will address those concerns and deliver the cyber-security and resilience that our constituents deserve.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

It is always a great honour to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), who talks common sense most of the time she gets up, which may be one of the reasons why she is still on the Back Benches. If we listened more to those who know something about things, rather than talking as though we know things, and saying things that are invariably wrong, we in Parliament would obviously be better off.

The greatest threat we face is that bad actors out there are using this level of technology to get across to countries such as the UK. This is not a party political point, because both Governments have failed to face up to it to the degree that they should have—that is why this Bill is welcome, but it is not everything, as the hon. Lady says—but we think that we can treat the bad actors as though they were normal actors in a commercial sense. However, China is using slave labour to undercut markets and regularly puts IOTs into cars. It gets away with it because we think that we need China more than it needs us. That is the big problem. The hon. Lady is right to raise it, and I congratulate her for again making an excellent speech.

I will in due course beg to move my amendment on anti-refoulement, because although this is a good Bill, some bits are missing and others have been skated over. This is one area about which we will come, again and again, to regret that we had not done more. The issue is British citizens abroad ending up under the rule of Governments that do not believe in the concept of freedom before the law, in a fair trial as part of that process, or in habeas corpus, which is an English common law right that has gone around the world.

The amendment seeks to prohibit data sharing with jurisdictions that cannot guarantee a fair trial. It maintains the current legal approach, which generally restricts the sharing of sensitive information outside the EU. Currently, information sharing of a type enabled by proposed new regulation 6, which is in clause 18, is prohibited outside the EU. The proposed new regulation is therefore weaker than what is going on in the European Union. Sadly, it paves the way for such sharing, rather than restricting it.

The amendment therefore seeks to prohibit information sharing with places where the Secretary of State believes that a fair trial simply cannot be obtained. It would require the Secretary of State to consult civil society and human rights experts to identify jurisdictions—this would apply universally and not just to China, although China is a big player in this—where the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed, with all decisions subject to mandatory annual reports to Parliament. That is important: Parliament should be part of this and make decisions about whether it agrees with the Government.

Beijing is a good example. It has frequently used seemingly legitimate criminal complaints to target dissidents. Proposed new regulation 6, if unamended, therefore raises transnational repression risks rather than solving them. The amendment is necessary to close that loophole in the Bill, which currently fails to anticipate politically motivated requests from such totalitarian states. I often say that we should stop speaking about countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as authoritarian states. They are not authoritarian states; they are totalitarian states. Why do I say that? Because everything in those countries is owned and run by the state. Authoritarian states are often dictatorships, but they are not the same thing as totalitarian states. They are brutal and nasty, but totalitarianism is a complete system. This is about totalitarian states.

Proposed new regulation 6 is predicated upon helping other Governments obtain justice. The argument of my amendment 3 is that—quite apart from the transnational repression risks—justice as we understand it cannot be served in a country where essentially there is no rule of law, no right to a fair trial, and a judicial system that serves the party. As I often say, it is a matter of pride that perhaps the greatest gift this country has given to the world is the concept of freedom in the face of the law. That is the point I made earlier: habeas corpus came from English common law and dominates so much of the free world’s thinking. It was not until the 1970s that some countries in Europe actually practised habeas corpus, so it was not just the case that it was produced by Britain; it was also owned by many other countries. That is what is at risk here, and we should be the greatest defenders of that right to a fair trial anywhere in the world.

Let us take a few of these countries as examples for why amendment 3 is needed. Let us look at China. Requests were made by authoritarian states—totalitarian states in this case—regarding Interpol notices, as has been the recent pattern, and this happens a lot. The People’s Republic of China and other countries have a troubling recent history of very significant transnational repression, hounding dissidents in the UK and cloaking their political persecution in superficially legitimate criminal charges. The PRC is not alone in requesting information on political opponents in the UK, and it does it a lot. We can confidently speculate that China will make requests of the UK almost immediately should the Bill be passed.

Let me look at the single biggest case that confronts us in China at the moment: that of Jimmy Lai. He is a British citizen. I cannot tell you, Madam Deputy Speaker, how endlessly in debates, even under the previous Administration, we had to fight to get the Government to state that he is a British citizen, not a dual nationality citizen. He is a British citizen, is proud to be British, has been British all his life and has only ever owned a British passport—he has never been a Chinese citizen with a Chinese passport.

The special rapporteur on torture, Alice Jill Edwards, in her 2024 and 2025 reports, specifically flagged concerns that evidence obtained through torture is still widely admitted in Chinese courts. She also expressed concerns in late 2024 regarding the case of Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, noting that evidence allegedly secured through torture in mainland China was and is being used in the trial. On 15 November 2024, the United Nations working group on arbitrary detention published its opinion that Jimmy Lai is “unlawfully and arbitrarily detained” and called for his immediate release. The proposed new regulation will not go far enough and therefore does not deal with this, and that is what my amendment 3 is all about.

On the risk of extradition to China from safe third countries, currently the UK does not have a bilateral extradition treaty with the People’s Republic of China, and it has suspended its bilateral extradition treaty with Hong Kong—something that many of us were calling out for at the time in 2020. In 2025, proposed changes to the Extradition Act 2003 would allow co-operation between UK and Hong Kong authorities on a

“case-by-case ad hoc basis”.

The trouble with that is that it begins to open the door. The risk of sharing NIS data is not confined to the physical removal of individuals; it also poses a profound threat to national security and the safety of the diaspora within the UK—how often have we heard about that?

These totalitarian states not only seek to extradite dissidents, they seek to silence them through transnational repression and to compromise the UK’s own digital resilience. Sharing NIS data with an adversarial jurisdiction is akin to providing a road map for a state-sponsored cyber-attack. For dissidents and human rights defenders living in the UK, NIS data can be used to demonise and de-anonymise their activity. This information is frequently used to identify and harass family members remaining in their home country, to conduct targeted phishing and surveillance against the individual’s private devices, and to coerce the individual into becoming an informant under the threat of criminal charges based on the shared technical data.

Let me deal with another case: that of Ryan Cornelius in the United Arab Emirates. Ryan Cornelius is a British citizen who has been arbitrarily detained in Dubai for 18 years, despite well-documented evidence of an unfair trial and inhuman treatment. Ryan’s detention has been found to be arbitrary by the UN working group on arbitrary detention. His case arose from a high-profile financial dispute involving loans connected to a major Dubai development project. Although he and his associates had reportedly complied with restructuring agreements with Dubai Islamic Bank, he was arrested without warning, transferred by plain-clothed officers to a police facility, where he was held incommunicado, denied access to a lawyer and subjected to aggressive interrogation. During this time, he was coerced into signing documents in Arabic—a language he does not understand—under the false premise that this would give him his release.

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[Graeme Downie]

That proves why we need more awareness of the threat that we face. It is not necessarily a case of banning certain components or technologies, but we must be more aware and ensure that the Government have the powers they need to respond where possible.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

My hon. Friend is right to say in his eloquent speech that raising awareness and having a debate about this issue is important, but the problems may not necessarily be the result of hostile actors. If the providers of the modules were to stop providing software updates, the modules would be more likely to fail and then become the subject of hostile attacks. So not only could the technology be killed by a hostile actor, but an increased dependency on software updates puts us at risk.

[Graeme Downie]

As ever, my hon. Friend is correct. How many of us have had some bit of technology break because the firmware is no longer allowed to be updated, meaning that something no longer works, it is no longer supported and it breaks down immediately?

To add to that, by its nature, something that is not regularly updated becomes more vulnerable to attack by hackers. They may not be state sponsored, but they may take advantage of a weaker part of a technology. That was pointed out to me on a recent visit to Taiwan. Its semiconductor industry is incredibly strong, but it builds the more high-tech elements of semiconductors. I was told that it would not bother to commit to manufacturing other types of technology because they were too cheap and simple to make and could be mass produced. On that note, I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests about the trip to Taiwan. I did not intend to raise it during my speech, but there was an opportunity to do so.

The third element of risk is data extraction, as was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). Under the Chinese national intelligence law, companies and organisations are legally required to assist state intelligence agencies and to hand over data upon request, creating a systemic risk in the UK that any data accessible through a cellular internet-of-things module could ultimately be accessible to the Chinese state.

Modern vehicles, especially electric and autonomous vehicles, are effectively computers on wheels, continuously collecting data on drivers, surroundings and infrastructure. The US Select Committee on China recently warned that Chinese EVs are “rolling data collection devices” and argued that restricting Chinese-made components is a national security imperative. The US Department of Commerce has now moved to limit the deployment of software and communications equipment sourced from adversary Governments in connected vehicles. Those who are worried about China’s reaction to such measures should be aware that it has already taken precisely these steps against the west. Tesla cars have been banned not just from entering Chinese defence, bases but from various Government agencies and authorities.

In the meeting mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), I was concerned that there was a suggestion by one of the officials that there was no need to concern ourselves about the threat of Chinese internet-of-things modules because the threat was merely “theoretical”. As I and others have shown today, these examples are not just theoretical. Frankly, most threats are theoretical until they are not theoretical. This is happening now across critical sectors and national infrastructure. Other countries, such as the US, Australia and those in the EU, are all moving to toughen up their legislation specifically on cellular internet-of-things modules, and I believe that the UK must take action as well.

My amendments would ensure that the Bill explicitly covers these risks and gives Ministers the clarity and authority to act when necessary. If this Bill is to truly strengthen the UK’s cyber-resilience, it must not leave one of the most serious threats to our modern and increasingly digital world outside its scope. I ask the Government to work with me to address the threat of cellular IOT modules.

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[Kanishka Narayan]

I am happy to the write to the Chair of the Select Committee about comparisons with the EU, but the broad thrust is that we have undertaken a specific analysis of whether the burdens of the Bill should apply in a systematic, proportionate and coherent way to sectors. The analysis suggests that food supply is not in scope for the reasons I mentioned—primarily diversity of supply—but I would be delighted to engage with him on the question of why Europe took a different decision. We have based our decision on our analysis here.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

Will the Minister give way?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I am going to make some progress but will try to come back to the Chair of the Select Committee shortly.

The Government’s cyber action plan is the overarching strategy to raise public sector standards across Government, including local government. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has taken action to strengthen local authorities’ cyber-resilience, backed by £29 million of cyber grant funding, technical support and the adoption of the cyber assessment framework for local government. In that spirit, I take particularly seriously the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon) on supporting capacity even further with centralised capacity support from the Government Digital Service and other parts of cyber-capability in central Government.

The joint election security and preparedness unit, also raised by Members, works to protect UK elections and referendums, co-ordinating across Government on response to threats, including cyber-risks. JESP works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre, producing guidance for organisations involved in delivering elections and electoral infrastructure, particularly local authorities. JESP and NCSC regularly engage with political-party representatives as well.

The question of a register of foreign powers has been raised in relation to new clauses 14 and 15, tabled by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). New clause 14 would require the creation of a register of foreign states that pose a risk to the UK, based on GCHQ advice, for the purpose of exercising powers under part 4 of the Bill. I assure the shadow Minister, as I did in Committee, that the use of those powers will always be underpinned by robust intelligence. That includes, where relevant, information about state actors involved in cyber-threats. As a result, it is unclear what additional support the register would provide to the Secretary of State.

New clause 15 would require the Government to report annually on risks posed by foreign powers. Drafting a report of vulnerabilities would simply duplicate existing assessments and risk distracting the Government from more effective measures to protect the UK from hostile foreign actors. The shadow Minister also proposes that information that cannot be included in the report for national security reasons is sent to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I have made it clear to him, both in Committee and more broadly, that the Government value the independent and robust oversight that the Intelligence and Security Committee provides on behalf of Parliament. However, we do not consider that the report described in the new clause sits within the ISC’s current oversight remit, as outlined in the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Committee’s memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister. The Government are actively reviewing the Committee’s existing memorandum of understanding and will update the House in due course.

New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted, would require the Government to assess how many entities regulated by the NIS regime are owned, in part or in full, by foreign states, and the risks that they pose. Publishing a review identifying national security risks caused by foreign state ownership would provide valuable insight for our adversaries. Furthermore, conducting an assessment of the ownership structure of every in-scope entity within six months would be disproportionately resource intensive, and would distract the Government from more effective measures to protect our services.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

Let me take the Minister back to the question of bringing the retail sector into the provisions of the Bill. He seems to be saying that cyber-security and resilience require Government intervention only when there is an immediate threat to life. Will he clarify whether that is what he is saying? My understanding is that we need to keep our economy and citizens secure in all circumstances. On the question of proportionality, my new clause 20 seeks to bring in only very large businesses, so that the requirements of cyber-security on them are proportionate. We know that such businesses are not taking the measures to keep cyber-secure, as we have seen recently with Marks & Spencer, Jaguar Land Rover and others.

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[Kanishka Narayan]

As I say, I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis. Let me state in more detail the reasons for objecting on the mechanism. First, the provisions for information sharing are deeply discretionary for UK regulators. Secondly, the subjects in which they can pursue that information sharing are restricted to significant matters of national security and domestic crime prevention in the UK. Thirdly, the way that the amendment is drafted risks creating undue uncertainty in law. If this is the only regime where there is a specific and explicit reference to fair trial in the legislation, it calls into question how other information-sharing regimes are interpreted, such as under section 114 of the Online Safety Act 2023. In other words, drafted as it is, the amendment could invite legal challenge where a regulator exercises its discretion not to disclose this in other regimes, as there is no explicit exclusion. For those reasons, while I totally agree with the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis and his objective, I am afraid that the amendment in question risks undermining the objective.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

Will the Minister give way?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I will not, because I am testing the patience of Madam Deputy Speaker—[Interruption.] With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will give way.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for generously giving way again. I have no desire to test the House by pushing my amendments to a vote, and I will be happy if I can receive his assurance. I take his points on not having technology-specific regulation where possible, but can I have an assurance that the Minister will work with me, my Committee and other hon. Members to look at the need to safeguard where there are technology-specific risks?

[Kanishka Narayan]

As ever, I would be delighted to work with the Chair of the Select Committee on a range of technology questions, including this one.

I am delighted with the support that this House has shown for the intention and principles of the Bill, and I am grateful for Members’ consistent, principled scrutiny.

Technology Sovereignty

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Tuesday 10th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered technology sovereignty.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Vaz. We are four years into the Ukraine war and 10 days into the latest Iran-Israel-US conflict. At the start of this year, the US seized the President of Venezuela. A few weeks later, President Trump was demanding Greenland from Denmark. The world has never felt more insecure and unsecure.

For the first time since I was elected as an MP, global insecurity is an issue on the doorstep in Newcastle. As if that were not enough, we are also undergoing two technology revolutions: one in data and the other in AI automation. Add to that the geopolitical restructuring across different dimensions—Europe and the US, the global south and Russia/China, Europe and Russia, and Iran and the Gulf states—and a green industrial revolution that is driving competition for knowledge, resources, land and people. Is it any wonder that people are feeling insecure?

In the face of those challenges, we must be honest with our constituents about what we can and cannot control, and about the implications for our industrial, civil and defence policy. Technology sovereignty is a key part of that and a placeholder for larger fears. Too often, people feel that big tech is controlling, not empowering, their lives. Techno-feudalism and techno-serfdom may not be commonly discussed in the pubs and playgrounds of Newcastle, but they are a fear that many have.

The previous Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hove and Portslade (Peter Kyle), said that big tech needs to be treated as a state, not as companies. If so, who are their citizens? Us? We certainly did not elect them, so are we just their serfs? What should the relationship be between those companies and states?

Technology sovereignty matters, but what is it? The current Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology told the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee:

“Sovereign capability is about ensuring the UK has what it needs to become a global leader in AI.”

The Digital Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray), told the Committee:

“Sovereignty is a huge issue that we always discuss. Security, safety and resilience are all parts of that, and the digital spending controls that DSIT puts in on behalf of Government, which examines individual contracts on that basis, very much examines these issues as well.”

He also said:

“It is about building those capabilities and supply chains here.”

[Will Stone (Swindon North) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend has advanced a very powerful vision of the global events affecting the country right now. When I talk to defence tech companies, I see that they reach the point of scaling up, but they are unable to access finance. Does my hon. Friend agree that this Government should support defence tech companies to scale up, so that we can have true sovereign capability, as opposed to letting them fly off to America?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I very much agree with my hon. Friend. He is absolutely right, and that support should take the form of access to investment, but also procurement and procurement decisions, which I will discuss in more detail.

The Digital Minister also told the Committee:

“There is no single internationally recognised definition of digital sovereignty”

and:

“DSIT is working to develop a comprehensive definition that can be used across the UK”.

We have not received an update, but yesterday, the Government launched the AI sovereignty unit with £500 million, so it is to be hoped that we know what we are spending our money on.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I cannot help but give way to the hon. Member.

[Jim Shannon]

The hon. Lady is terribly kind and it is always a pleasure to come to a debate that she has secured. Recent studies indicate that AI-powered tools have already been used in phishing, ransomware, and social engineering attacks, making breaches faster, more targeted and harder to detect. The National Cyber Security Centre has repeatedly warned that the sophistication and scale of cyber-threats are increasing, and that AI could amplify those risks exponentially. Does the hon. Lady therefore agree that we have a critical gap in investment, expertise and the co-ordinated strategy in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to defend against AI-enabled attacks? The Government must focus on being able to combat those in future—does she agree?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I certainly agree that we need to be able to defend ourselves against AI attacks.

[Martin Wrigley (Newton Abbot) (LD)]

I thank the hon. Lady and Chair of my Select Committee for giving way. Does she agree that a definition of sovereign tech is something that a foreign power could not switch off, so that the systems on which we rely could not be pulled out from under our feet, much as the Microsoft ones were for the International Criminal Court?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

My fellow member of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee makes a very important point about the definition of sovereignty. I do not want to get too bogged down in the actual definition, but I agree that control matters, and I will say a little more about that.

I will raise the definition of digital sovereignty cited in the House of Commons Library briefing, which accompanies this debate, which is

“the agency and capacity of any organisation to make intelligent, informed choices to shape its digital future by design.”

On that basis, choosing between Amazon Web Services and Microsoft for our data centre is technology sovereignty. I also think that if British sovereignty depends on our leaders’ ability to make intelligent choices, they spent a lot of our history not having sovereignty.

The Library definition came from a global consultancy called Public Digital. Emily Middleton, the interim director for digital transformation in DSIT, was previously a partner at Public Digital. It rules out digital independence and says that our goal should be intelligent dependence. Can the Minister say whether he is aiming for intelligent dependence?

The definition I like best, however, is that sovereignty is whatever a sovereign power says it is—that is what sovereignty means. The UK has extraordinary technological human capital resources, particularly in AI, where we are probably third in the world, but also in clean energy, quantum synthetic biology and much more. Our human capital means that we are not just any mid-sized country; we can aim higher than intelligent dependence. Elon Musk chose to turn off Ukraine’s Starlink capacity at a critical time in Ukraine’s defence of its sovereignty against Putin’s illegal aggression. None of us wants the UK to be in such a position of dependence.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

The hon. Lady mentions Britain’s extraordinary human capital. In my role as my party’s Europe spokesperson, of late I have been speaking to very large international defence firms, which thrive in the UK intellectual environment. They have great links with universities, but they say to me that they are increasingly looking to move some of the start-ups that have been created in the UK into Europe, so that they can assemble rapidly the kinds of teams that they need to take those initial ideas and scale them up. Does she agree that having a closer working relationship with our European partners and colleagues, allowing that freedom of movement to return, could be an enormous benefit—counterintuitively perhaps—to our sovereign capacity?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

The level of interest shows just what an important issue this is. I will come on to discuss some aspects of collaboration as it relates to sovereignty, but I observe that the last time our sovereignty as a mid-sized power was seriously debated was during Brexit, and the slogan “Take back control” reflected the sense that too much sovereignty had been ceded to the European Union without an honest debate with the British people. As a member of the Labour party, I know that we are stronger together and that that can require some loss of autonomy to deliver results, which actually make people more secure, but that must not be done without an honest debate.

Let us look at the four specific sovereignty challenges, the first of which is critical infrastructure and cloud data dependency. The Competition and Markets Authority found that cloud services in Britain are dominated by AWS at 40% to 50%, and Microsoft at 30%. Crown Hosting is meant to be our sovereign hosting capability, but it only hosts 4% of Government legacy services. Both Amazon Web Services and Oracle claim to offer a sovereign cloud—they do say to deal with the difficult part in the title!

The second issue I want to look at is the hot topic of AI. There is no Brit large language model but there is the ambition to transform our public services and industry through AI. The AI opportunities action plan repeatedly references sovereign AI and sovereign compute without defining them. The major AI companies Google, Anthropic, OpenEye, Microsoft and DeepSeek are all headquartered abroad. DeepMind formed Google’s AI capability and was founded right here in the UK before being bought. What capability does the UK now have in AI? What minimum capability does the Minister think we need? How do we respond to the EU Cloud and AI Development Act, which may exclude UK companies?

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

My hon. Friend is making an important point. When it comes to AI, an enormous amount of investment is needed. There are many discussions at the moment about the impact of that huge investment in AI. It is very difficult for a smaller country such as the UK to compete in that regard. Does she agree that we need to work with like-minded countries on these issues, including those in the EU? Does she agree that we need to make sure that this is one of the key topics when President Macron visits the UK later this year?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I agree with my right hon. Friend that we certainly need to work with like-minded countries.

The third area is cyber-security and data governance. Some argue that we are already at war in the cyber-sphere. Last year’s strategic defence review emphasised cyber and electromagnetic domains, and established a new UK cyber and electromagnetic command to enhance that, with £1 billion in new funding for homeland air missile defence and cyber-security initiatives. Should these be British suppliers? Should they be European? Should they be exclusively NATO suppliers?

On data governance, the foreign direct product rule allows the United States to restrict access to advanced computing chips and AI-related software. By adding UK companies to the entity list, the US can immediately cut them off from cloud services, software and AI tools, while the Cloud and Patriot Acts expand data access powers to compel US companies to hand over data even if held overseas—that is, in the UK. Has the Minister discussed those powers with Microsoft, AWS and Palantir?

Fourthly and finally, we have the UK’s reliance on global supply chains. Critical minerals are an obvious example, but because I am a bit of a geek I want to mention the common information models that enable the things in the internet of things to talk to each other. By 2030, there will be 6 billion CIM connections globally. China controls 70% of the market, creating a huge possibility for the disruption of everything from traffic systems to energy grid operations.

That is a really quick canter through just a few of the technology sovereignty issues. I want to look at two specific examples in more detail. First, the NHS has the largest and most comprehensive longitudinal and structured patient level datasets in the world. I support the push for digital integration as we transition the NHS from analogue to digital, with interoperability and standardisation bringing faster access and better analytics, yet a growing share of NHS data flows through US companies.

The federated data platform contract places core NHS data operations on Palantir’s proprietary systems. Why? There have been numerous reports of irregularities in the way the contract was awarded. In addition—this, for me, is a key point of sovereignty—Palantir’s founder and controlling stakeholder, Peter Thiel, has a political worldview which is at odds with British values. The same is true of Elon Musk. It does our constituents’ sense of agency no good to see their Government so dependent on these companies. Nearly half of adults say that they would opt out of NHS data sharing if the platform was operated by a private foreign provider.

The second example is also to do with Palantir. Its recent defence contract also raised many questions. The strategic defence review emphasised AI as a core enabler of military capability. Reports suggest that Palantir serves primarily as a vehicle for integrating Anthropic’s AI models. The US has just declared Anthropic a supply chain risk for US companies, so will Palantir break UK workflows that are using Anthropic? I am certain that President Trump would not allow British companies to control US defence datasets, so why are we allowing American ones to control ours?

I could go on about civil nuclear, telecoms infrastructure, subsea cables, quantum, space and drones, but I will stop there, and finish by looking at possible solutions. Technology sovereignty was a big theme at the Munich security conference, and the US-Europe trust gap was a yawning chasm following the shock realisation that we could not always count on the US as an ally. Technology sovereignty solutions that focus on technological leadership, such as in the Secretary of State’s definition, reflect the basic idea that if the UK leads on, say, protein folding then Google may be less inclined to switch off ChatGPT if we side with Denmark when the US tries to seize Greenland.

Whether I agree with that approach or not, it certainly resonates with the evidence that the Committee heard from witnesses in so many domains regarding how important it is for the science and business community to understand where the Government are seeking to lead, so that resources can be focused and skills built there. Can the Minister say whether the Government plan to decide which aspects of AI, quantum, space or bioengineering we will seek to lead in? AI is often thought of as having three layers: infrastructure, data and applications. Can the Minister tell us where in the AI stack we are aiming for control, leadership, sovereignty or whatever we want to call it? Also, does he agree that weak competition in the AI and digital sectors, caused by giant incumbents, reduces our ability to lead?

Open source is often cited as at least part of the solution to sovereignty. I am a huge advocate for open source, open interfaces, transparent code and standard protocols, which can reduce or minimise dependence. Despite the policy ambitions, three quarters of NHS trusts’ development teams do not use open source approaches. None of the AI models currently being deployed within the public sector is an open ecosystem; all are proprietary in nature. The Minister’s Department has sign-off on all significant IT procurement. Is open source a requirement of it?

Finally, can science diplomacy help us to negotiate technology sovereignty? A number of Members have raised the issue of collaboration. Can we build on our human capital strengths by collaborating and working with partners who have respect for our values, take collaborative approaches, and can share with us the financial capital needed to make our sovereign objectives a reality? Are we happy to share leadership, and perhaps sovereignty, with our allies?

[Gordon McKee (Glasgow South) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making an important speech on an important topic. She is right to talk about how the US and China dominate on technological sovereignty, and part of the reason it is very difficult for the UK to compete with them is, of course, the scale of those countries. Does she agree that the way we can compete is by co-operating with reform in Europe, and that we should view our strategy not in terms of how the UK can outcompete Europe but in terms of how Europe, with the UK at its heart, can outcompete the US and China?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

It is an important question. I am not in a position to choose our allies, but I agree in principle that we should be working with the European Union. I do not think it should be a choice between the European Union and the US, though they may make that the choice. I certainly think that we should be working with our European allies in order to form a large market for secure and ethical technology, which is in the interests of everyone.

Finally, we need to monitor the future sovereignty implications of current research, so that that can influence our investment and mergers and acquisitions policy, and so that key technologies and companies are not easily allowed to go abroad.

This debate has attracted a large amount of interest, so I have tried to be as brief as possible. I have asked the Minister many questions; if he cannot answer them all, he can write to me. In summary, we need to understand what we can own, control or lead on ourselves, what we can access that is in the hands of allies we trust, and how we can manage the things we must get from those we do not trust. We must always remember that how we develop and deploy our human capital will be critical to our ability to achieve any kind of technological sovereignty. I urge the Minister to be honest about where we are. We do not want to sleepwalk into technological serfdom and/or some kind of techxit—a technology Brexit.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)]

It is such a pleasure to serve under you in the Chair, Ms Vaz. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, for securing this debate and bringing to it her deep expertise across engineering, policymaking and leadership in the House on the question of tech sovereignty. I also thank all hon. Members for making very thoughtful points and bringing to the debate a range of experiences—as well as swiftness of speech, given the constraints imposed by time today.

I have long felt that the central question in our politics and for our country is the future of technology in this country. It will be the major driver of prosperity and dignity for people, and the central question is whether Britain gets to shape it or is shaped by it. In Westminster, we sometimes talk about technology sovereignty as an abstract geopolitical goal, but we have to keep in mind that, ultimately, it is the basis for our NHS radiologists to have access to the best tools for detecting cancer, with data here in the UK; for British founders and builders to be able to train and deploy models, rather than depending on foreign APIs and pricing; and for people in their homes and workplaces across the country to know that their everyday AI systems are governed transparently and democratically here in the UK.

My view is that technology sovereignty is a state’s ability to have strategic leverage when it comes to a technology, such that it can ensure ongoing access to critical inputs and ongoing assurance that its wider economic and national security objectives can be met more broadly. It is to take the best tools the world has to offer today, but also to shape the rest, and ultimately to make that which is critical here in Britain.

As I think of it, that strategic leverage is obtained by three steps on a ladder. The first is just to have enough of the critical inputs. Taking AI as an example, we have to have enough chips today to be able to do anything with AI in the first instance. With that in mind, the Government have always been very keen to secure the level of capital investment that means that Britain is at least at the table with critical inputs.

Once we are at the table, the second part of sovereignty is to make sure that we have some diversification in who we procure critical inputs from so that we can bargain effectively. We are the party of labour; we understand that who has power matters as much as what the powers are. In that context, one of the first things I did in my role was to engage with a series of companies in every part of the stack so that we were able to build more diversity into the landscape.

The third rung of the ladder is, ultimately, to build British in order to make sure that we have the full-fat version of sovereign capability here in critical parts of the stack.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for setting out his sovereignty stack. Just as an example, is an LLM a critical input or another level in the stack—and does it need to be British?

[Kanishka Narayan]

I valued my hon. Friend’s earlier point that sovereignty has to be seen in the round. We cannot make everything here; we have to look at the entire bundle that we have to offer. In the context of LLMs, there is some uncertainty as to whether all the capability will ultimately accrue in closed proprietary models, or whether open-source, open-weight models might be part of it. To me, as things stand today, it is a pretty important part of the stack. The question then is whether we have enough of it to be able to make the most of it by adopting it for economic and national security usage here, or whether there are aspects in which, at least from a distillation or small-model point of view, we need to develop some capabilities here as well. I do not think there is a binary answer to the overarching question; the answer is much more nuanced. I am happy to discuss that further if it is of interest.

As I said, the third rung of the ladder is, ultimately, to build British and focus on areas in which we can develop our strengths. I have to point out that we made sure that Nscale, one of our neocloud hyperscale providers, was an important part of the supply chain for AI growth zones. I noticed that yesterday Nscale raised the largest ever series-C funding in Europe, in part as a result of the Government’s support and convening in that context. Arm, the leading chip design company globally, is still headquartered in Cambridge, and we have fantastic companies in the AI inference chip part of the stack, Fractile and Olix being two of them. It is an area that I spend a lot of my time on.

When it comes to models, we have huge strengths, not just because a number of the Gemini teams and researchers continue to sit in King’s Cross at DeepMind, but because companies developing foundation models in AI for science and autonomous vehicles, embodied AI, and aspects of world models and computer vision reside here in the UK. Wayve raised £1.5 billion just this year, the largest funding round in Europe to date for that stage. It is a fantastic company that looks in particular at embodied AI and vision. I am proud of those companies. It is right that the Government are supporting them through the lens of tech sovereignty, as that is what both Britain’s and the companies’ best interests dictate.

The sovereign AI unit will be crucial to that. I am glad to see the level of interest in that across the House. It will concentrate efforts on priority areas. There was interest in my specifying those areas. The four areas that are of interest at the outset are novel compute, in particular focusing on the inference chip part of the stack; novel model architecture; AI for science—I point hon. Members to the AI for science strategy published by the Department three or four months ago, which set out particular areas of focus and priority—and embodied AI.

To give a concrete example of early action that the sovereign AI unit has taken, we have already invested £8 million in the OpenBind consortium to accelerate AI-driven drug discovery, and £5 million in the Encode: AI for Science fellowship to support the next generation of world-class talent. The focus of the unit will be on both capital and compute, to incrementally anchor more and more British companies here, but I know that the unit will only be part of the solution. We have a role to look at innovation and market support much more broadly across the tech landscape.

In November, we also announced a significant advance market commitment—a deeply innovative procurement shift—which meant that up to £100 million in Government funding was available to buy products from promising UK chip companies once they reach a high-performance benchmark. That presents UK start-ups with an exciting opportunity to grow and compete right here, building for the world.

AI is of course just one area of Britain’s flourishing tech ecosystem. I point out to my hon. Friends the Members for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington) and for Lichfield (Dave Robertson), who made important points about quantum, that the Government have doubled the rate of investment in quantum, with about £1 billion committed over the next four years. The points on helium made by my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield have very much been taken into account. The Government are looking at the developing situation on helium supply in the middle east, which is of concern.

Through our national programme, we broadly want to anchor development and access to technological capabilities that are most important to economic growth and national security. That means, in the context of quantum, more companies starting, growing and staying here and, in the context of AI, not just developing capabilities in particular parts of the stack, but in part looking upstream for skills as well.

In that context, I agree totally with my hon. Friends the Members for Cambridge (Daniel Zeichner) and for Southend East and Rochford (Mr Alaba) that the quality and scale of our talent and skills in our universities and schools is the single biggest determinant of where we end up. I am happy to write to my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge about the UKRI changes that we are making. In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Southend East and Rochford, IP capitalisation is a deeply important part of what I focus on with the Intellectual Property Office, and I am happy to engage him on the question of Essex University in particular.

Online Harm: Child Protection

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Tuesday 24th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I thank the hon. Member for his point of order. The motion on the Order Paper is perfectly orderly, so Members will be invited to vote on that, not on the substance of any Bill that might come on 9 March. I think it is important that the House is clear on that.

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. How can I assess what is orderly for my contribution to the debate given that the substance of the motion is about process? To be frank, I do not want to speak about process; I want to speak about protections for children.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

The motion is to give consideration to a Bill on the specific matter which has been outlined clearly on the Order Paper: “Protections for children from online harms”. I reassure the hon. Lady that any contribution she chooses to make on that matter would be in order.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Liberal Democrats for bringing forward this debate on protecting children from online harms, although I remain uncertain as to the measures they are proposing. This debate is happening up and down the country, in homes and at school gates—indeed, wherever people gather—so it is right that we debate it here. If the Conservatives had done something during their critical 14 years of power, our children would be better protected now, but they did not, so it falls to us to take action.

I am going to speak about three things: online platforms, their history and approach; the work of my Select Committee, the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, on algorithms; and the work of the Committee on digital childhood, all within the context of protecting children from online harms.

The key online players range in age from pre-teen—TikTok was founded in 2016—to their late 20s, as Google was founded in 1998. In human terms, these platforms are just entering or leaving adolescence, and it shows.

As hon. Members across the House may have heard me mention, I am an engineer—chartered, as it happens; thanks for asking—and my last job before entering this place was head of telecoms technology for Ofcom. I remember meeting people from a US platform, which shall remain nameless, around 2005. The company executive commented that they had come to the UK from silicon valley on a six-month contract to sort out Government affairs, and they could not understand why, two years later, discussions were still ongoing. Did we not realise that Government had no role in what they did?

I say that to illustrate that tech platforms have their origins in a libertarian, small/no-government tech bro bubble that has spread globally. TikTok, as a Chinese company, has a different background, but public accountability is not necessarily part of it. Unfortunately for all of us, the Conservative-Lib Dem Government of 2010 and their successors shared the view that Government should not be a part of it, which is how we arrived in 2024—20 years later—without online harms regulation, while at the same time the use of social media and life online has exploded. That is why I consider the Tory position in this debate to be a superb example of hypocrisy.

[Monica Harding (Esher and Walton) (LD)]

The hon. Lady is making a powerful speech about the evolution of social media platforms. I have four children; the first was born in 2004 and the last was born in 2011, so their births have spanned that evolution. Facebook began in 2004; TikTok began in 2016. If that evolution was the industrial revolution, we would be around the spinning jenny stage, with AI chatbots the next destination. Those chatbots are terribly dangerous for our children, and we need to regulate them now. That should be within the Online Safety Act.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I agree that AI chatbots are a further evolution, and I think we should learn from the lack of effective regulation under the Conservatives during that critical period in the evolution of the internet in how we approach AI. I agree with the hon. Lady that AI chatbots should be brought into the regulatory environment of the Online Safety Act.

[Matt Rodda (Reading Central) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee is making an excellent speech. Her background in this area is really showing in the detail with which she is exploring these issues. Part of the challenge here is that we as parents are struggling to catch up with this revolution, which is gaining speed all the time. Perhaps my hon. Friend would highlight some of the challenges that parents face. For me, part of the importance of the consultation is to allow parents to think more deeply about this difficult issue; there are often different opinions from campaigners who have had the most painful experiences.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. It is for that exact reason that I support a consultation: this is part of a debate, and we all need to improve our understanding of the impacts of this technology. Parents are in a difficult position. I do not believe parents should have to be technology experts in order to give their children the best start in life, but unfortunately there is so much pressure in the online world that that seems to be the case right now, and that is why it is right that Government take action and consult on the action they take.

Let us think about the evolution of these technologies. I remember that when I joined Facebook in 2005 I had to use my university email address to join—that meant I had to be over 18. Some 20 years later, 13-year-olds and younger are having their lives and brains formed by almost uninhibited access to social media. In the UK, the number of social media users has gone from practically zero to four fifths of the population. I have worked with the Molly Rose Foundation, a charity established by the Russell family after their daughter Molly took her own life at the age of 14 following exposure to self-harm content online; I have spoken to the bereaved parents of children bullied to death online; and I have spoken to the Internet Watch Foundation about the horrendous images its staff see of child exploitation. The fact that the Conservatives did nothing in all those years in government is, in my view, a form of political negligence of the highest order.

As part of my Committee’s inquiry into social media and algorithms, Google, Meta, TikTok and X told us that they accepted their responsibility to be accountable to the British people through Parliament, which I thought was quite a step forward from previous utterances, and ongoing utterances, by some tech billionaires who shall remain nameless. Our inquiry found that our online safety regime should be based on principles that remain sound in the face of technological development. Social media has many important and positive contributions, including helping to democratise access to a public voice and to connect people far and wide, but it also has significant risks—and those risks can evolve with the technology. We spoke about AI as an evolution, and one of the main failings of the Online Safety Act is that it regulates particular services rather than establishing principles that remain true and can be part of a social consensus as technology evolves.

[Bobby Dean]

The hon. Lady is making an excellent speech. Should one of those principles be related not only to content but to the addictive nature of these platforms? One of the changes I have witnessed on social media over time is algorithmic addiction. The greatest minds in the world are now working out the circuitry of our brains and driving content towards us so that we look at our screens for longer so that they can sell more ads. Does she agree with that point?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I really thank the hon. Member for that intervention, because that is exactly one of the recommendations of the Committee’s inquiry. As he says, the advertisement-based business models of most social media companies mean that they promote addictive content regardless of authenticity. This spills out across the entire internet via the unclear, under-regulated digital advertising market, incentivising the creation of content that will perform well on social media, as we saw during the 2024 unrest following the horrendous Southport attacks.

This is not just a social media problem, though. It is a systemic issue that promotes harmful content and undermines public trust. The Committee identified five key principles that we believe are crucial for building public trust. The first is public safety. Public safety matters; I hope it is not necessary to debate that. The second is free and safe expression, which is also very important. The third is responsibility on the part of the platforms. Right now, they have no legal responsibility for the content they amplify; they just have to follow their own processes in certain specific cases. Our fourth principle involves control, and the fifth and final principle is transparency. We made detailed recommendations on regulating the advertising-based business model so that amplification would not be incentivised in the way that was outlined by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Bobby Dean). We also recommended a right to reset—the right of a person to remove their data from any algorithm.

Our report came out not long before the Minister took up his position. The Government accepted all our conclusions but none of our recommendations. I urge them to look again at our recommendations and to consider implementing them, or at least to respond and tell me why they are still not to be implemented. I welcome the Government’s recent actions and interventions and their readiness to intervene. As I said, the consultation is critical. I welcome the desire to promote a consensus and to take measures to ensure swift delivery of the consultation conclusions through the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill. The consideration of the inclusion of AI chatbots is important, as is addressing the risky features in certain models, as well as providing support for bereaved parents. The Committee looks forward to working with the Government to try to achieve their aims. We need evidence to drive policy and regulation based on principles that the public can have confidence in.

[Natasha Irons]

I wanted to intervene on the point about principles, content and responsibility. I worked for Channel 4 before I came to this place, and we were regulated by Ofcom. Channel 4 did not create its own content, but was responsible for the editorialisation of that content. It was beholden to certain standards. Does she agree that we should be holding these media companies—they are not now “new media” companies, but legacy media companies—just as responsible for the content they put out on their platforms as any broadcaster?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

My hon. Friend makes an important point; the insight she brings from her career in the media is critical. For many years, while the platforms were just that—platforms on which other people placed content—there was an argument that they should not be regulated and that they did not have a responsibility for the content on them, but they are at the very least active curators of that content now. Algorithms effectively form digital twins of individuals and then drive individualised content at them. That requires a responsibility. The time is right, as our Committee recommended, to ensure that platforms have responsibility for their content.

The Science, Innovation and Technology Committee will be holding a one-off session on social media age restrictions on 11 March to feed into the Government’s consultation on measures to keep children safe online and to hear from social media companies on their progress in the last year. We will also gauge the strength of the evidence for and against an age-based ban on social media, as well as any evidence relating to proposed alternatives to a ban. In doing so, we will hear from experts and representatives of those with direct experience of harms. We want to hear from both sides of the debate in the UK and will be seeking evidence from Australia on the first few months of the ban that is already in force there. We will be hearing from major social media and technology companies in a follow-up to our algorithms and misinformation inquiry, and we will ask for their views on the proposed age limits.

Finally, the work on social media age restrictions will feed into a larger inquiry on the neuroscience of digital childhood, which we will launch in the coming weeks. We want to find out how young people spending their formative years online affects their brains and what the Government should do to protect them from any negative impact. That could cover the impact of social media and other screentime on brain development, behaviour, and physical and mental health, whether positive or negative. It could also cover the physiological impact on eye development, the impact on socialisation and what actions Governments should take. There is a consensus on the need to do something, but not on what needs to be done. That is why we are seeking to provide evidence.

I always say to the platform companies that the opposite of regulation is not no regulation, but bad regulation. More regulation is coming. Several US states, such as California, have brought in new regulation on big tech. The Spanish Prime Minister has called social media a

“failed state where laws are ignored and crimes are tolerated”.

There is also the increasingly significant issue of technology sovereignty and whether we are too dependent on foreign companies for our online environment. I call myself a tech evangelist, and I am, but I also know how much an engineer costs. The starting salary of an AI engineer—if companies can find one—is well over £100,000 a year. Tech companies are not going to put them to work on protecting and keeping our children safe unless the House puts the right incentives in place. With all due respect to the Minister and the Online Safety Act, which he inherited, they are not in place now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Murray]

I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention. [Interruption.] I am sorry to upset my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell). The Government are acting at pace, but we want to act in the right way. We must act in the right way because this is such a complex and serious issue. It is important for children to be able to seize the opportunities that being online can offer. We have heard about iPad-only schools. Parents must be confident that their children are safe—that is key. If we do not want to exclude children from age-appropriate services that benefit their wellbeing, we must act on the evidence and ensure that we strike the right balance between protecting children’s safety and wellbeing, and enabling them to use technology in positive and empowering ways.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

Does my right hon. Friend share my disappointment that, in this debate on protecting children from some of the most obscene abuse, not one Reform Member is present?

Mobile Phones and Social Media: Use by Children

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Select Committee.

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

I welcome the consultation. We know that technology has changed childhood, we believe that it has changed child socialisation and we think that it may have changed brain development, perhaps even motor neurone skills, but there is little concrete evidence beyond the individual terrible stories and, of course, the profits of the big tech platforms. That is why my Committee will soon be launching a digital childhood inquiry to examine these issues, hopefully in time to respond to the consultation.

May I, however, urge the Secretary of State not to assume that a ban will be the answer to the challenges that technology poses? We need to make tech work for all of us now. May I ask her to review her Department’s refusal to accept the recommendations of my Committee’s inquiry into social media and algorithms, particularly with regard to platform responsibility, user control, digital advertising and social media business models?

[Liz Kendall]

I thank my hon. Friend for that powerful and sensible question, and I welcome her Committee’s review, because those are hugely important matters. We should see this as being not only about social media, but about the use of phones and the issues affecting children in the digital world in which we now live. She will know, because I gave evidence to her Committee, that I am constantly reviewing our position on all the important points that she and the Committee raised in its last report, and that, in particular, the Minister for Digital Government and Data, who is also the Minister for Creative Industries, Media and Arts, is looking into the impact that advertising, social media and digital platforms can have. That is a firm commitment from the Government.

Science and Discovery Centres

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Steve Witherden]

I am in full agreement. As the hon. Member will see, one of my key asks is that we look at the funding for SDCs moving forward.

As a teacher, nothing matters more to me than ensuring that people have access to opportunity. As a drama teacher, STEM was never my strongest suit, but the importance of fostering curiosity—and, most importantly, ensuring that everyone can access it—has always been central to why I became a teacher and an MP.

SDCs operate in all four nations of the UK, reaching more than 5.2 million schoolchildren, families and communities through science and technology in the last year alone. Over the past two years, these organisations have worked with more than 37% of all UK schools. Fifty-five per cent of all visitors identify as women and girls, and many centres provide visits completely free of charge, enabling over 450,000 people from communities traditionally under-represented in STEM to participate in science, research and innovation each year. They are among the few places where broad and inclusive community engagement, the development of essential STEM skills among future generations, and cutting-edge scientific research all come together under one roof.

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this really important debate, and on his excellent and inspirational speech. The Centre for Life in Newcastle celebrated its 25th birthday last year. I have been inspired by its openness and how it supports young people from all backgrounds and different areas of the north-east to engage with life sciences. As an engineer from an impoverished background, knowing that the Centre for Life in Newcastle is opening up the huge universe of science and scientific curiosity is so reassuring.

[Steve Witherden]

It is lovely to hear that my hon. Friend is just as passionate about the SDC in her patch as I am about the one in mine.

--- Later in debate ---

[Steve Witherden]

I have a confession to make: after CAT, Xplore!, in my hon. Friend’s constituency, is my second favourite SDC—I have visited it many times. I am in full agreement with him, as the House would expect.

Solefield school has brought pupils to the CAT for 40 years. Its head of science, Kevin Farmery, said:

“I can teach them all this in the science lab, but here they see it come to life. That makes a real impact.”

Dr Dai Morgan, who is now at the University of Cambridge, first visited the CAT as a child. That experience inspired him to study sustainable engineering, and he brings postgraduate students from Cambridge to the centre annually to encourage global action.

Our constituency may lack a university, but we have something better in the CAT. With its unique history, it continues to offer outstanding degree and postgraduate courses in partnership with Liverpool John Moores University and the University of East London. Currently, 700 postgraduate students are enrolled in programmes covering renewable energy, sustainable food and land use, sustainable architecture, green building, ecology and behaviour change.

The CAT’s influence extends beyond education. Its legacy includes the growth of over 50 sustainable businesses and organisations via its postgraduate students, inspired volunteers or research experiments that take place directly on site. Such organisations include Dulas, Aber Instruments, Adaptavate and IndiNature. Dulas, established at the CAT in 1982, invented a solar fridge that preserves vaccines and saves lives worldwide. IndiNature, founded by the CAT graduate Scott Simpson, was named manufacturer of the year by the UK Green Business Awards in 2025. The CAT is not just a centre; it is a catalyst for change locally, nationally and globally.

However, like many SDCs across the UK, the CAT is facing significant challenges. Unlike museums, art galleries, theatres and libraries, which can access Government and national lottery funding for their infrastructure needs, SDCs have historically been excluded from public funding. Like other publicly accessible cultural spaces, SDCs’ costs have risen significantly in recent years due to factors such as the cost of living crisis and energy prices. Unfortunately, these centres’ ability to grow revenues from their core audience to offset the increased costs is limited. They need to keep entry prices low and offer subsidised or free access to deliver their charitable mission and maintain access for underserved groups and communities.

As we have heard, most SDCs were built 25 years ago or more. Their buildings are reaching the end of their design life and need urgent repairs. Roofs are leaking, heating and cooling systems are outdated, and glazing no longer meets modern standards. At the same time, rising sustainability and health and safety requirements mean that repairs are far more expensive. These challenges are compounded by the fact that no central Government Department takes responsibility for the sector. Recent parliamentary questions have confirmed that the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Department for Education do not see SDCs as falling within their remits, leaving these centres at a loss.

The Association for Science and Discovery Centres has identified urgent infrastructure projects across its member organisations. Nearly £20 million is required to deliver these works, many of which must be completed within the next 12 to 18 months. Importantly, these projects would be match funded by the centres themselves, demonstrating both commitment and value for money. A December 2025 report made it clear that without that investment, many centres will be forced to close or to operate more commercially, scaling back STEM learning, outreach, and free or subsidised access for marginalised and minority groups. That would be a real loss, not only to communities but to the UK’s future skills pipeline.

The CAT faces similar pressures. Although it continues to welcome school groups, such as those from Solefield, it had to close its visitor centre to day visitors, and future Dai Morgans currently are not able to visit with their families. The visitor centre has seen no significant capital investment for over 25 years and is in desperate need of redevelopment. Unlike universities and many charities in Wales, the CAT receives no statutory core revenue funding.

An urgent example of the work that needs to be done is the “leaky roof” project. As anyone who has visited the area knows, it rains a lot in mid-Wales. The CAT requires £500,000 to keep open the Wales Institute for Sustainable Education building—an education centre that has grown graduate courses and the innovation lab, supporting councils, communities and other organisations to take action on the climate and nature emergencies. If it is forced to close, the CAT’s entire operating model would be undermined, threatening its unique hands-on climate and sustainability education programmes.

The project is not about patching roofs simply to keep buildings open; it is about preserving the science, engagement and learning that happens beneath those roofs. SDCs are powerful but undervalued. They are beacons of sustainability, education and innovation. With recognition and investment, they can flourish, supporting national climate goals, inspiring future scientists and engineers, and ensuring that science remains accessible to all.

Given that SDCs are uniquely positioned to help unlock the full potential of UK science and technology, in order to drive growth, create jobs and ensure that all citizens live healthy, secure and sustainable lives, thereby delivering on DSIT’s science and technology framework, does the Minister accept that, although the work of the centres touches on the agendas of DSIT, DCMS and the DFE, DSIT should become the lead Department responsible for this area? That is not to suggest that all funding should come from DSIT, or that cross-departmental responsibilities should be relinquished; rather, it is to suggest that his Department should take the lead in developing shared solutions.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I thank my hon. Friend for the passionate points that he is making. I want to support him by pointing out that the answer to a parliamentary question of mine in October stated that the Minister for Science, Lord Vallance, was following up

“with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport to explore a coordinated approach to supporting these centres.”

Just before Christmas, the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology wrote to me to say that

“officials from across departments with an interest in SDCs are meeting to discuss options for sustainable support.”

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is time we had an answer to the question of where sustainable support—which, as he said, DSIT should lead—would come from?

[Steve Witherden]

Yes, I do. I do not think that DCMS and DFE should be completely absent from the equation, but I agree that DSIT should lead.

What meaningful action does the Minister intend to take to address the funding and infrastructure challenges currently faced by science centres? Will he respond to the request from the Association for Science and Discovery Centres, supported by more than 3,100 leading scientists, academics, business leaders and educators in an open letter to the Prime Minister and the Department late last year, for £19.5 million of public funding, match funded by £19.5 million from the centres themselves, which is essential to address immediate infrastructure risks?

Does the Minister also agree that it is essential to formally recognise science centres as part of the UK’s scientific and cultural ecosystem, whether by expanding eligibility for existing funding streams or by creating a dedicated science engagement fund? Does he agree that it is unfair for SDCs to be excluded from public infrastructure funds that are available to comparable organisations, including museums and libraries?

I urge the Minister to meet the Association for Science and Discovery Centres and its members, and work with them and MPs representing science centres to find a solution to these issues. Will he collaborate with colleagues in DCMS, the DFE, English mayoral combined authorities and the devolved Governments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to ensure that SDCs and their work are adequately recognised and supported? Solutions must work across all four nations.

Social Media: Non-consensual Sexual Deepfakes

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the Chair of the Select Committee, Chi Onwurah.

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

Unlike her shadow, the Secretary of State was rightly passionate when calling out these sexually abusive images. The libertarian tech bro lobby has to accept that consent counts online, too. In her letter to me today, the Secretary of State said that the Online Safety Act was designed to deal with this, but she is being overly generous to the previous Government. The Act was designed, or fudged, to give adults some protection from illegal content on certain services, and to protect children from harmful content more generally, but not including generative AI, and without making platforms responsible for content that they share. Will my right hon. Friend now accept my Committee’s recommendations. and do more to explicitly plug the gaps in the Act, particularly regarding generative AI, as well as tackling the social media business models that incentivise the content that we are talking about?

[Liz Kendall]

I am genuinely grateful to my hon. Friend for all the work she and her Committee have done on this issue. I have read its work in detail since coming into post. She will know that I have already said on the issue of AI chatbots, for example, that some are covered by the Act—if they do live searches or share user-to-user content—but I have asked my officials to see where there are gaps. They have said that there are gaps, and I have said that I want to plug them, including by legislating, if that is necessary.

This is a fast-moving area. With the Online Safety Act, plus the additional measures we have taken in the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and that we will take in the Crime and Policing Bill, we have quite a comprehensive suite of powers here, but I know this is developing quickly, particularly around generative AI. I am always prepared to look to the facts and the evidence and go where that leads me, and if I need to take further action, I will.

AI Safety

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Wednesday 10th December 2025 Westminster Hall

[Iqbal Mohamed]

I completely agree. We have to consider the functionality available in these tools and the way they are used—wherever regulations exist for that service in our society, the same regulations should be applied to automated tools providing that service. Clearly, controlling an automated system will be more difficult than training healthcare professionals and auditing their effectiveness.

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Member on securing this really important debate. It is certainly the case that UK law applies to AI, just as it applies online. The question is whether AI requires new regulation specifically to address the threats and concerns surrounding AI. We refrained from regulating the internet—and I should declare an interest, having worked for Ofcom at the time—in order to support innovation. Under consecutive Conservative Governments, there was a desire not to intervene in the market. The internet has largely been taken over by large consolidated companies and does not have the diversity of innovation and creativity or the safety that we might want to see.

[Iqbal Mohamed]

The enforcement processes that we have for existing regulations where human beings are providing that service are auditable. We do not have enforcement mechanisms for this kind of regulated service or information being provided by the internet or AI tools. There is a need to extend the scope of regulation but also the way in which we enforce that regulation for automated tools.

I am a fan of innovation, growth and progress in society. However, we cannot move forward with progress at any cost. AI poses such a significant risk that if we do not regulate at the right time, we will not have a chance to get it back under control—it might be too late. Now is the time to start looking at this seriously and supporting the AI industry so that it is a force for good in society, not a future force of destruction.

We are all facing a climate and nature emergency. AI is driving unprecedented growth in energy demand. According to the International Energy Agency, global data-centre electricity consumption will become slightly more than Japan’s total electricity consumption today. A House of Commons Library research briefing found that UK data centres currently consume 2.5% of the country’s electricity, with the sector’s consumption expected to rise fourfold by 2030. The increased demand strains the grid, slows transition to renewables and contributes to emissions that drive climate change. This issue must go hand in hand with our climate change obligations.

Members have probably heard and read about AI’s impact on the job market. One of the clearest harms we are already seeing is the loss of jobs. That is not a future worry; it is happening now. Independent analysis shows that up to 8 million UK jobs are at risk from AI automation, with admin, customer service and junior professional roles being the most exposed. Another harm that we are already facing is the explosion of AI-driven scams. Generative AI-enabled scams have risen more than 450% in a single year, alongside a major surge in breached personal data and AI-generated phishing attempts. Deepfake-related fraud has increased by thousands of per cent, and one in every 20 identity-verification failures is now linked to AI manipulation.

I move on to the ugly: the threat to the world. The idea that AI developers may lose control of the AI systems they create is not science fiction; it is the stated concern of the scientists who build this technology—the godfathers of AI, as we call them. One of them, Yoshua Bengio, has said:

“If we build AIs that are smarter than us and are not aligned with us and compete with us, then we’re basically cooked”.

Geoffrey Hinton, another godfather of AI and a winner of the Nobel prize in physics, said:

“I actually think the risk is more than 50% of the existential threat”.

Stuart Russell, the author of the standard AI textbook, says that if we pursue our current approach

“then we will eventually lose control over the machines.”

In May 2023, hundreds of AI researchers and industry leaders signed a statement declaring:

“Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war”.

That is not scaremongering; these are professional experts who are warning us to make sure that this technology does not get out of control.

[Iqbal Mohamed]

The hon. Member touches on a broader point: any area with experts and specialist requirements for end users or for the use of that tool for an audience or demographic must directly involve those people and experts in the development, testing, verification and follow-up auditing of the effectiveness of those tools.

AI companies are racing to build increasingly capable AI with the explicit end goal of creating AI that is equal to or able to exceed the most capable human intellectual ability across all domains. AI companies are also pursuing AI that can be used to accelerate their own AI developments, so it is a self-developing, self-perpetuating technology. For that reason, many experts, some of whom I have quoted, say that this will lead to artificial super-intelligence soon after. ASI is an AI system that significantly exceeds the upper limit of human intellectual ability across all domains. The concerns, risks and dangers of AI are current and will only get worse. We are already seeing systems behave in ways that no one designed, deceiving users, manipulating their environments and showing the beginnings of self-preserving strategies: exactly the behaviours that researchers predicted if AI developed without restraint.

There are documented examples of deception, where AI asked a human to approve something by lying, claiming to be a human with visual impairment contacting them. An example of manipulation can be found in Meta’s CICERO, an AI trained to play the game of “Diplomacy”, which achieved human-level performance by negotiating, forming alliances and then breaking them when it benefited. Researchers noted that language was used strategically to mislead other players and deceive them. That was not a glitch; it was the system discovering manipulation as an effective strategy. It taught itself how to deceive others to achieve an outcome.

Even more concerning are cases where models behave in ways to resemble self-preservation. In recent tests on the DeepSeek R1 model, researchers found that it concealed its intentions, produced dangerously misleading advice and attempted to hack its reward signals when placed under pressure—behaviours it was never trained to exhibit. Those are early signs of systems acting beyond our instructions.

More advanced systems are on the horizon. Artificial general intelligence and even artificial superintelligence are no longer confined to speculative fiction. As lawmakers, we must understand their potential impacts and ensure we establish the rules, standards and safeguards necessary to protect our economy, environment and society, if things go wrong. The potential risks, including extreme risks, posed by AI cannot be dismissed. This may be existential and cause the end of our species. The potential extinction risks from advanced AI, particularly through the emergence of superintelligence, will be the capacity to process vast amounts of data, demonstrate superior reasoning across domains and constantly seek to improve itself, ultimately outpacing humans in our ability to stop it in its tracks.

The dangers of AI are rising. As I have said, AI is already displacing jobs, increasing inequalities, amplifying existing social and economic inequalities and threatening civil liberties. At the extreme, unregulated progress may create national security vulnerabilities with implications for the long-term survival of the human species. Empirical research in 2024 showed OpenAI occasionally displayed strategic deception in controlled environments. In one case, AI was found to bypass its own testing containment through a back door it created. Having been developed in environments that are allegedly ringfenced and disconnected from the wider world, AI is intelligent enough to find ways out.

Right now, there is a significant lack of legislative measures to counter those developments, despite top AI engineers asking us for that. We currently have a laissez-faire system where a sandwich has more regulation than AI companies, or even that of the rigorous safety standards placed on pharmaceuticals or aviation companies, which protect public health. The UK cannot afford to fall behind on this.

I do not want to dwell on doom and gloom; there is hope. The European Union, California and New York are leading the way on strong AI governance. The EU AI Act establishes a risk-based comprehensive regulatory framework. California is advancing detailed standards on system evaluations and algorithmic accountability, and New York has pioneered transparency and bias-audit rules for automated decision making. Those approaches show that democratic nations can take bold, responsible action to protect their citizens while fostering innovation.

We in the UK are fortunate to have a world-leading ecosystem of AI safety researchers. The UK AI Security Institute conducts essential work testing frontier models for dangerous capabilities, but it currently relies on companies’ good will to provide deployment action.

We stand at a threshold of an era defined by AI. Our responsibility as legislators is clear: we cannot afford complacency, nor can we allow the UK to drift into a position in where safety, transparency and accountability are afterthoughts, rather than foundational principles. The risk posed by advanced AI systems to our economy, our security and our very autonomy are real, escalating and well documented by the world’s leading experts. The United Kingdom has the scientific talent, the industrial capacity and the democratic mandate to lead in safe and trustworthy AI, but we lack the legislative framework to match that ambition. I urge the Government to urgently bring forward an AI Bill as a cross-party endeavour, and perhaps even set up a dedicated Select Committee for AI, given how serious the issue is.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I thank the hon. Gentleman—a fellow engineer—for allowing this intervention. As the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee—a number of fantastic Committee members are here—I would like to say that we have already looked at some of the challenges that AI presents to our regulatory infrastructure and our Government. Last week, we heard from the Secretary of State, who assured us that where there is a legislative need, she will bring forward legislation to address the threats posed by AI, although she did not commit to an AI Bill. We are determined to continue to hold her to account on that commitment.

[Iqbal Mohamed]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, and I am grateful for the work that her Select Committee is doing, but I gently suggest that we need representatives from all the other affected Select Committees, covering environment, defence and the Treasury, because AI will affect every single function of Government, and we need to work together to protect ourselves from the overall, holistic threat.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

Each of the Select Committees is looking at AI, including the Defence Committee, which has looked at AI in defence. AI impacts every single Department and security on cross-governmental issues. Although we are not talking about the process of scrutiny, we all agree that scrutiny is important.

[Iqbal Mohamed]

I am glad to hear that.

If the United States and China race to build the strongest systems, let Britain be the nation that ensures the technology remains safe, accountable and under human control. That is a form of leadership every bit as important as engineering, and it is one that our nation is uniquely placed to deliver. This moment will not come again. We can choose to shape the future of AI, or we can wait for it to shape us. I believe that this country still has the courage, clarity and moral confidence to lead, and I invite the Government to take on that leadership role.

Life Sciences Innovative Manufacturing Fund

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is a great pleasure to speak to you on this occasion to welcome the ambition behind the life sciences innovation manufacturing fund and, indeed, the Government’s positive support for life sciences, with their belief that Government can act to support industry in general; it is not simply a matter of getting out of the way. That is in sharp contrast to the last Conservative Government’s approach to industry, allowing a gentle decline and deindustrialisation in our nation. To be fair, the series of Conservative Governments chopped and changed their approach to industrial strategy so often it was difficult to know exactly where they stood. Unlike them, Labour is committed to the life sciences sector.

Labour published its plan for life sciences in opposition, which included 10-year funding commitments for key research bodies aimed at putting an end to the short-termism that undermines economic growth and scientific success. Now in government, I welcome Labour’s commitment to the life sciences sector plan—developed in close co-ordination with the Government’s 10-year health plan—which aims to support cutting-edge research and turn that into real-world results, with new treatments, faster diagnoses and more lives saved. It is about making sure that breakthroughs happen here in this country, creating jobs, improving lives in every part of the country and driving growth.

As the Minister said, the life sciences are a strength of our country—they are often described as a jewel in the crown of the British economy—and we all know that success in life sciences leads to positive, wide-reaching benefits across the country for the economy and our health.

[Sorcha Eastwood (Lagan Valley) (Alliance)]

You mentioned the sector’s relevance and benefit to the whole of the United Kingdom. Would you agree that Northern Ireland has a rich manufacturing and life sciences heritage and that we have a huge role to play?

[Sorcha Eastwood]

I apologise.

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

Let me thank the hon. Member for that intervention, which pre-empts something I will say in a few minutes. She is absolutely right: Northern Ireland already plays an important role in the life sciences sector and life sciences manufacturing, and it will have an important role to play in the future.

It is an incredibly exciting time to be involved in life sciences. I often think that if I were a young engineer now—I studied electrical engineering—I would be fascinated by the life sciences and, in particular, synthetic biology, which offers so many potential opportunities for growth and wellbeing. It is an enabling technology across so many different sectors.

In Newcastle, including in my constituency of Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West, the life sciences contribute £1.7 billion and employ over 8,000 people across more than 200 companies. We are home to the National Innovation Centre for Ageing, Newcastle Helix and The Biosphere. Our city is one star in a constellation of excellent life sciences clusters across the north of England.

I really welcome the ambition of the innovation manufacturing fund. I ask the Minister in his response for more clarity in three particular areas. First, in regard to the size of the fund, in the face of increased competition, and as the shadow Secretary of State described—this will be in less sensationalist terms—we are seeing some reduction in investment in the UK. Is £520 million enough to ensure that the UK is an attractive prospect for internationally mobile businesses? By contrast, a manufacturing plant such as Moderna’s recently opened vaccine centre in Oxfordshire might cost in the region of £150 million to £200 million. Is the fund the right size?

Secondly, the Select Committee recently held a one-off session on life sciences investment, which was of such interest that we have decided to hold another one-off session next week on the same subject. We heard evidence from the pharma sector, including significant support for the life sciences sector plan and for the Government’s approach, but I think it is fair to say that we were told that, although NHS pricing is not the only factor in investment decisions, it is a significant one. We heard evidence that the UK spends less proportionately on medicines than other comparable countries and that that reduces the pull-through for innovative medicines. It would clearly be a difficult decision to spend more on medicines, as that would mean spending less elsewhere in our NHS.

Does the Minister see the manufacturing fund as support in some way for investment decisions in the absence of progress on the NHS pricing discussions? Could he tell us whether the Secretary of State is involved in discussions between the Health Secretary and the pharma sector with regard to NHS pricing? I understand that discussions are ongoing, and I see the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West (Dr Ahmed), conferring with him. Perhaps he can confirm that those discussions are ongoing.

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

When the Committee held its one-off session on investment in life sciences, did it unearth the reasons why Sanofi, Eli Lilly and Merck have recently chosen to disinvest in life sciences in the UK?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. The Committee’s work is fascinating, so I certainly recommend he read the transcript. To summarise, we were looking specifically at the reasons for investment being pulled and, as I said, we asked the question in a number of different ways. The message that came back was significant support for the life sciences sector plan and the Government approach, but lack of certainty and clarity over NHS pricing and dismay about some aspects of NHS pricing and National Institute for Health and Care Excellence decisions. The hon. Gentleman is therefore right to point out that there was concern over the current and likely future pricing of innovative medicines, but that was not the only factor in those investment decisions. I ask the Minister to give us an update on those negotiations to the extent that he is able to do so, and to say whether this manufacturing fund is seen as potential compensation for investment in medicines and pricing as part of the NHS future plan.

[Matt Rodda (Reading Central) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making some interesting points about investment decisions. Has her Committee also investigated why some decisions have been made to bring investment into the UK, such as the recent decision about investment in Oxfordshire? As part of that, is there a parallel need to explore where more could be done to attract further investment through perhaps greater supply of trained workers, better transport, better access to land for development, and so on?

[Dame Chi Onwurah]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. My Committee has looked at some of the reasons for investments, such as those he sets out, and it is worth emphasising the strengths of the UK, some of which I have mentioned. We have a really strong life sciences sector, and specifically skills at every stage in the UK life sciences ecosystem, together with R&D tax credits, which is another point of incentivisation, and the fact that our NHS offers a fantastic opportunity to test and trial new medicines with a population that is heterogeneous and with population data records that are second to none. So there are many reasons why pharma and life sciences companies are continuing to invest in our country, and we have a fantastic ecosystem of life sciences start-ups and scale-ups.

That brings me to the final question I want to put to the Minister, which is on the regional impact of the fund. The Minister mentioned on a number of occasions that the fund will drive investment and growth across our country. As part of the Committee’s inquiry into innovation and regional growth, we heard of significant disparities in investment, particularly in access to capital and research funding from UK Research and Innovation and in funding and investment between the regions of our country and the greater south-east, otherwise known as the golden triangle. Manufacturing is well distributed across the United Kingdom; we heard earlier about the opportunities in Northern Ireland. Can the Minister tell me whether there will be a regional dimension to how the funds are disbursed? I hope that the extent to which the funds are regionally distributed will be monitored, but does he expect that this funding will be distributed across the country to drive growth in every corner of the country as he said, and that it will not perpetuate existing regional inequalities?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

Digital ID

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call the Select Committee Chair.

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State is absolutely right to champion access to a consistent, trusted digital ID. All of us online have digital IDs aplenty already—Facebook, TikTok, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Tesco—so she is right to bring the benefits of one digital ID to my constituents. But making digital ID mandatory for everyone seeking work is poking a stick in the eye of all those with security, privacy and/or Government capacity concerns, which my Committee will be examining as part of our work on digital government. For now, though, can she first confirm that people will be in control of their digital ID data and who accesses it? Secondly, will she say whether it will be procured externally from the private sector or developed in-house by Government digital services?

[Liz Kendall]

My hon. Friend is right to raise the important issues of security—people are rightly concerned about the security of their data, and that is why that will be at the heart of our consultation. In answer to her specific questions: yes, people will control who sees and accesses their data, and we absolutely expect this system to be designed and built within Government, building on the One Login.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Wednesday 25th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee.

[Dame Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

AI is already prevalent in the workplace and in the education system, and we need to equip the next generation to be able to use AI tools productively and securely while also delivering on their unique potential as human beings. How is the Minister working with the Department for Education to ensure that the AI tools that are used in our education system support this kind of learning? Specifically, what advice has she given to the Department with regard to the procurement of edtech tools, which are widely available? Some are free and some need to be paid for, so how are schools to decide which to use?

[Feryal Clark]

As I have said, I work very closely with my counterparts in the Department for Education. Earlier this year, we launched safe standards for the sector and provided guidance on how to safely develop AI tools for education. The DFE has also provided guidance to schools on how to safely use AI in schools. That work is ongoing. As I have said, we are working both with the sector and with educators to make sure that we get this right.