Russia (Sanctions) (EU-Exit) Regulations 2019

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2019 General Committees

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 855).

Hon. Members will be aware—not least following our recent discussions about other sanctions regulations—of the importance of sanctions to our foreign policy and national security, and of the Government’s commitment to maintaining our sanctions capabilities and leadership role after we leave the EU. I therefore do not intend to rehearse the same arguments today, although I am happy to do so if hon. Members wish.

Colleagues will also be aware that statutory instruments such as the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations are necessary to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within the framework of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. As required under the Act, a report on the purposes of the regulations and the penalties in them is available in the Vote Office in case hon. Members have an interest.

Under regulation 1(3), the provisions to allow designation decisions to be taken commenced on 11 April, the day after the regulations were made. The regulations were laid before Parliament at midday on 11 April; since the time at which they would come into force was not specified, there was a period on that day when the regulations were in force but had not been laid. Regrettably, owing to an administrative oversight compounded by the Easter break, we did not meet the procedural and legal requirement to notify the Speaker and the Lord Speaker of that pre-laying commencement until eight working days after the regulations were laid.

I have written to Mr Speaker, the Lord Speaker, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. A copy of my letter has been placed in the Library. We have reviewed our processes and taken steps to ensure that this will not happen again.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I recall that barely an hour ago, when the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs asked the Minister why the regulations had been laid before Parliament so late, he chose not to mention any of this. Why not?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I thought that it would be much more appropriate to mention it to this Committee, out of respect for the House more widely—something that the hon. Gentleman and I always take pains to display. Once again, I thank the JCSI for its close and helpful scrutiny over recent months of so many statutory instruments relating to sanctions.

The regulations provide for the transfer into UK law of the three existing EU sanctions regimes against Russia in respect of Russian actions in Ukraine. They seek to deliver substantially the same policy effect as the measures in the corresponding EU regimes—to deliver a cost to Russia for its actions, to press it to change its Ukraine policy and to end its illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. The measures include asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities; sectoral measures to restrict parts of Russia’s finance, energy and defence industry; and restrictions on trade and investment relating to Crimea.

The continuation of sanctions since 2014 sends a strong, unified international message that Russia’s actions in Ukraine will not be tolerated. Approving the regulations will ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions in respect of Russia from the date of EU exit. During the period of our membership of the EU, or the implementation period in the event of a deal, EU sanctions would continue to apply and the regulations would not immediately be needed. In those circumstances, we would seek to use powers in the 2018 Act to the fullest possible extent, but there would be some limitations on the measures that we could impose autonomously during that period.

I know that in the light of the Russian Magnitsky case, many hon. Members are keen for the UK to develop our own independent human rights sanctions regime, so they may query why we are simply transferring existing EU sanctions regimes into UK law. That is because this statutory instrument has been laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. As such, our priority has necessarily been to ensure the transfer of existing EU measures. I assure everyone that the 2018 Act does indeed give the necessary powers in UK law to allow us to develop our own regime. However, it is important to recognise that that cannot be done immediately. It would be the first UK national sanctions regime, so the legal and policy risks must be carefully scrutinised, and the correct processes must be put in place to ensure that it delivers the desired effect, while avoiding any unintended consequences.

This statutory instrument provides for the transfer into UK law of well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. It encourages respect for the rule of law, for the rules-based international order and for security and stability. Approving this statutory instrument will allow the UK to continue to implement sanctions against Russia from the moment we leave the EU. It will send a strong signal of our intention to continue to play a leading role in the development of sanctions in the future. I welcome the opportunity to discuss it further. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

It is a delight to sit under your chairmanship, Mr Hosie, even though we are in the gloomiest of Committee Rooms in the building. Just a minor point: one of the problems for disabled access in this building is that many people who are partially sighted find it very difficult to read papers in such a room. I hope one day we will be able to sort that out.

I wholly support the sanctions, as the Minister suggested. Indeed, I want to praise the Government of the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) for having been such an ardent advocate of sanctions on Russia. Several people from other countries who have been to Foreign Affairs Councils during her time have told me that had it not been for her strong argument at those meetings in favour of maintaining sanctions, they would have been dropped by now. I am not sure whether it is because of her experience as a former Home Secretary that she is particularly conscious of the pernicious influence that sometimes Russian foreign policy can have elsewhere in the world, and in particular in the UK, or whether it is for some other reason, but I do want to laud the role that the Government have played in that.

I have an anxiety for the future, that if Brexit does ever happen, when we are no longer sitting at the table it will be more difficult for the UK Government to secure the kind of sanctions regime for France, Germany and other members of the European Union that we would want them to advocate, and we may find ourselves standing rather alone. That may well be a worrying situation for us in the future.

It is undoubtedly true that the Russian state’s deliberate annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol from Ukraine—I do not think there is any doubt that that was done deliberately by the Russian state; although they pretended to be independent forces of some kind, they were to all intents and purposes operating under Russian military command—was an illegal annexation and would not have happened had it not been for Ukraine’s surrendering its nuclear weapons as a result of the Budapest accord, of which the UK was a signatory, and of which Putin himself was a signatory, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

However, I have some anxieties about the way that this statutory instrument has come forward. First, it was laid on 11 April. This SI was meant to meet the problem, had we fallen out of the EU on 29 March without having a new sanctions regime in place because there was no deal. It seems odd that it should not have been laid until 11 April, even though it was meant to meet a need for 29 March. I know there was a second deadline, which was 12 April, and I presume that is what led to the rather strange rush at the final moment. Now we are having another rush, because presumably the Government expect that at any moment something will transpire in the Brexit negotiations that will lead to some change in the situation governing our being kept permanently in aspic or in suspended animation in the House.

It feels as though these mistakes in timing are a result of a lack of capacity in the sanctions section of the Foreign Office. As I understand it, the sanctions team consists of 40 people at the Foreign Office. Reading between the lines from the note that has been sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee, I suspect that that is insufficient to be able to do the job properly. Ministers have said several times—I do not doubt the sincerity of the Minister with us today—that it is a bit difficult to get a new sanctions regime all lined up and put together, because there is so much other business to be got through. I see sanctions policy as an absolutely vital part of our foreign policy. It is one of the key parts of our toolbox—alongside diplomacy, defence and other soft power measures—in trying to secure our foreign policy aims. I hope the Minister can respond on whether there is sufficient capacity and whether that led to the hiccup.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland said, the key question is whether we can have an independent, autonomous sanctions regime while we are a member of the European Union or during a transition period—if the withdrawal agreement is ever agreed. My hon. Friend referred to the advice by two QCs that makes it very clear that, in their opinion, it is perfectly possible for us to have an independent sanctions regime; if we wanted to, we could draw up anything we wanted while we are still a member, or during a transition period.

As I understand it, the Government’s policy is that that is not the case. The Minister said that an autonomous and independent sanctions regime cannot be introduced immediately and can only happen once we have left the European Union. I presume that is the meaning of paragraph 6.1 of the explanatory memorandum, which says:

“The UK’s implementation of UN and other multilateral sanctions currently relies largely on the European Communities Act 1972.”

The Government’s argument seems to be that we cannot implement any form of sanctions policy.

I believe the Government are wrong, but it seems that they are in doubt as to whether that is the case. If I am right and the Government are wrong, I do not understand why the sanctions measures before us today do not include the Magnitsky measures to enforce sanctions against human rights abusers in other countries in the world.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland rightly states, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 does not refer to an implementation date of Brexit day, and the Government have to report by the end of this month on the Magnitsky provisions in that Act. Since they have to report to Parliament, that means they have to do so before we rise next Thursday, 23 May. At the moment they have not done anything about those provisions, so I presume that the Government will present a sort of nil return. Will the Minister confirm what he said previously in the Foreign Affairs Committee on that?

I would prefer us to be implementing far more substantial measures. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have a list of 49 people who have sanctions against them under the Magnitsky provisions in their nation states. I do not understand why we cannot simply do the same.

Finally, the Government will be reporting annually on each of the sanctions regimes such as this one that they are starting. What form will those reports take? Will there be an opportunity for debate when they are tabled?

I very much hope that the Government will make it as clear as possible that, while they may feel legally constrained, they would none the less like to implement further sanctions regimes as soon as possible.

[The Chair]

Before I call the Minister to sum up, I would tell the Committee, in response to the question from the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland earlier, that should this question be called to a Division, and should the noes have it, that would simply confirm that the Committee has not considered that which we are now considering, but it would not stop the ability of this matter to be put as a question on the Floor of the House later this evening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Procedurally, the hon. Lady is right. If it were to be voted down there would remain a danger that there could be a lacuna or a hiatus in which there were no extant Russian sanctions. She mentioned Magnitsky: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have Magnitsky-lite, as it were. Their regimes only include travel bans, whereas the provisions in the primary legislation passed by us—with great cross-party approval—would allow for much more, once the Magnitsky provisions are put in place. We intend to do that. The hon. Member for Rhondda has pointed out—fairly—that our sanctions team are working very hard. Indeed they are. They are an excellent team and I am glad to take this opportunity to say so and put it on the record. But they have a massive rush of SIs. It is not just the number of them going through this House; it is the enormous body of work that goes on beneath the bits of paper we then end up with here. It totally absorbs the 40 people in the team who work so hard. When they do it, we will bring forward a Magnitsky SI.

[Chris Bryant]

I am glad to hear that. On the travel ban issue, I do not understand why, in the UK, we cannot simply state that anybody involved in the murder of Sergei Magnitsky or the corruption unveiled by him is not welcome in this country and will be banned from entry. That is what the three Baltic countries have done. Why can we not do that?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

It is not for me to speak on behalf of the Home Office. There may well be provisions in law for them to be able to do that, should they so wish. Again, that is a broader Home Office issue rather than a Foreign Office matter for this Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

The Minister says that the immigration and travel ban situation is not a matter for him. In his own sanctions, it states in section 20 of part 4, “Immigration”, that a person

“who is designated under regulation 5 for the purposes of this regulation is an excluded person for the purposes of section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971”.

His own sanctions regime includes provisions around travel bans, but not in relation to Magnitsky.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Yes, but the instrument transposes existing EU sanctions regimes; it does not add to or amend them. The process has been to transpose as identically as possible the EU regimes into what will be our law when we leave.

It is clear that the sanctions have been working in broad ways. There are massive economic pressures on Russia, and we should not think that they are not causing concern among those who govern that country. Sanctions are an integral part of our response to some of the most important foreign policy challenges that we face.

We must be ready to deliver sanctions independently as soon as we leave the EU. That is why the SI is so important. Transposing EU sanctions regimes in this way puts the UK on a solid footing to continue to protect our interests, defend our values and maintain the position of leadership that we have built on sanctions since 2014. Once again, I commend the regulations to the Committee.

Question put.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2019 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

As the hon. Gentleman knows, that has never been the UK Government’s position. In fact, the Chagos archipelago has been under continuous British sovereignty since 1814. But he can deduce from my earlier answer that conversations are ongoing and that we are making strong representations. The whole world benefits from the security provided by having this base in the Indian ocean.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Whatever the outcome of the sovereignty situation, another issue is that the marine preservation zone has made it possible to protect fish stocks for large parts of the eastern coast of Africa. Wherever we end up, we must preserve the marine preservation zone.

[Harriett Baldwin]

We are proud of the UK’s record in creating not just that zone, but others around the world. They are incredibly important for the world’s oceans and demonstrate the importance of working together both globally and through the Commonwealth to preserve oceans and fish stocks.

Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2019 General Committees

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 855).

Hon. Members will be aware—not least following our recent discussions about other sanctions regulations—of the importance of sanctions to our foreign policy and national security, and of the Government’s commitment to maintaining our sanctions capabilities and leadership role after we leave the EU. I therefore do not intend to rehearse the same arguments today, although I am happy to do so if hon. Members wish.

Colleagues will also be aware that statutory instruments such as the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations are necessary to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within the framework of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. As required under the Act, a report on the purposes of the regulations and the penalties in them is available in the Vote Office in case hon. Members have an interest.

Under regulation 1(3), the provisions to allow designation decisions to be taken commenced on 11 April, the day after the regulations were made. The regulations were laid before Parliament at midday on 11 April; since the time at which they would come into force was not specified, there was a period on that day when the regulations were in force but had not been laid. Regrettably, owing to an administrative oversight compounded by the Easter break, we did not meet the procedural and legal requirement to notify the Speaker and the Lord Speaker of that pre-laying commencement until eight working days after the regulations were laid.

I have written to Mr Speaker, the Lord Speaker, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. A copy of my letter has been placed in the Library. We have reviewed our processes and taken steps to ensure that this will not happen again.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I recall that barely an hour ago, when the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs asked the Minister why the regulations had been laid before Parliament so late, he chose not to mention any of this. Why not?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I thought that it would be much more appropriate to mention it to this Committee, out of respect for the House more widely—something that the hon. Gentleman and I always take pains to display. Once again, I thank the JCSI for its close and helpful scrutiny over recent months of so many statutory instruments relating to sanctions.

The regulations provide for the transfer into UK law of the three existing EU sanctions regimes against Russia in respect of Russian actions in Ukraine. They seek to deliver substantially the same policy effect as the measures in the corresponding EU regimes—to deliver a cost to Russia for its actions, to press it to change its Ukraine policy and to end its illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. The measures include asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities; sectoral measures to restrict parts of Russia’s finance, energy and defence industry; and restrictions on trade and investment relating to Crimea.

The continuation of sanctions since 2014 sends a strong, unified international message that Russia’s actions in Ukraine will not be tolerated. Approving the regulations will ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions in respect of Russia from the date of EU exit. During the period of our membership of the EU, or the implementation period in the event of a deal, EU sanctions would continue to apply and the regulations would not immediately be needed. In those circumstances, we would seek to use powers in the 2018 Act to the fullest possible extent, but there would be some limitations on the measures that we could impose autonomously during that period.

I know that in the light of the Russian Magnitsky case, many hon. Members are keen for the UK to develop our own independent human rights sanctions regime, so they may query why we are simply transferring existing EU sanctions regimes into UK law. That is because this statutory instrument has been laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. As such, our priority has necessarily been to ensure the transfer of existing EU measures. I assure everyone that the 2018 Act does indeed give the necessary powers in UK law to allow us to develop our own regime. However, it is important to recognise that that cannot be done immediately. It would be the first UK national sanctions regime, so the legal and policy risks must be carefully scrutinised, and the correct processes must be put in place to ensure that it delivers the desired effect, while avoiding any unintended consequences.

This statutory instrument provides for the transfer into UK law of well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. It encourages respect for the rule of law, for the rules-based international order and for security and stability. Approving this statutory instrument will allow the UK to continue to implement sanctions against Russia from the moment we leave the EU. It will send a strong signal of our intention to continue to play a leading role in the development of sanctions in the future. I welcome the opportunity to discuss it further. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

It is a delight to sit under your chairmanship, Mr Hosie, even though we are in the gloomiest of Committee Rooms in the building. Just a minor point: one of the problems for disabled access in this building is that many people who are partially sighted find it very difficult to read papers in such a room. I hope one day we will be able to sort that out.

I wholly support the sanctions, as the Minister suggested. Indeed, I want to praise the Government of the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) for having been such an ardent advocate of sanctions on Russia. Several people from other countries who have been to Foreign Affairs Councils during her time have told me that had it not been for her strong argument at those meetings in favour of maintaining sanctions, they would have been dropped by now. I am not sure whether it is because of her experience as a former Home Secretary that she is particularly conscious of the pernicious influence that sometimes Russian foreign policy can have elsewhere in the world, and in particular in the UK, or whether it is for some other reason, but I do want to laud the role that the Government have played in that.

I have an anxiety for the future, that if Brexit does ever happen, when we are no longer sitting at the table it will be more difficult for the UK Government to secure the kind of sanctions regime for France, Germany and other members of the European Union that we would want them to advocate, and we may find ourselves standing rather alone. That may well be a worrying situation for us in the future.

It is undoubtedly true that the Russian state’s deliberate annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol from Ukraine—I do not think there is any doubt that that was done deliberately by the Russian state; although they pretended to be independent forces of some kind, they were to all intents and purposes operating under Russian military command—was an illegal annexation and would not have happened had it not been for Ukraine’s surrendering its nuclear weapons as a result of the Budapest accord, of which the UK was a signatory, and of which Putin himself was a signatory, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

However, I have some anxieties about the way that this statutory instrument has come forward. First, it was laid on 11 April. This SI was meant to meet the problem, had we fallen out of the EU on 29 March without having a new sanctions regime in place because there was no deal. It seems odd that it should not have been laid until 11 April, even though it was meant to meet a need for 29 March. I know there was a second deadline, which was 12 April, and I presume that is what led to the rather strange rush at the final moment. Now we are having another rush, because presumably the Government expect that at any moment something will transpire in the Brexit negotiations that will lead to some change in the situation governing our being kept permanently in aspic or in suspended animation in the House.

It feels as though these mistakes in timing are a result of a lack of capacity in the sanctions section of the Foreign Office. As I understand it, the sanctions team consists of 40 people at the Foreign Office. Reading between the lines from the note that has been sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee, I suspect that that is insufficient to be able to do the job properly. Ministers have said several times—I do not doubt the sincerity of the Minister with us today—that it is a bit difficult to get a new sanctions regime all lined up and put together, because there is so much other business to be got through. I see sanctions policy as an absolutely vital part of our foreign policy. It is one of the key parts of our toolbox—alongside diplomacy, defence and other soft power measures—in trying to secure our foreign policy aims. I hope the Minister can respond on whether there is sufficient capacity and whether that led to the hiccup.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland said, the key question is whether we can have an independent, autonomous sanctions regime while we are a member of the European Union or during a transition period—if the withdrawal agreement is ever agreed. My hon. Friend referred to the advice by two QCs that makes it very clear that, in their opinion, it is perfectly possible for us to have an independent sanctions regime; if we wanted to, we could draw up anything we wanted while we are still a member, or during a transition period.

As I understand it, the Government’s policy is that that is not the case. The Minister said that an autonomous and independent sanctions regime cannot be introduced immediately and can only happen once we have left the European Union. I presume that is the meaning of paragraph 6.1 of the explanatory memorandum, which says:

“The UK’s implementation of UN and other multilateral sanctions currently relies largely on the European Communities Act 1972.”

The Government’s argument seems to be that we cannot implement any form of sanctions policy.

I believe the Government are wrong, but it seems that they are in doubt as to whether that is the case. If I am right and the Government are wrong, I do not understand why the sanctions measures before us today do not include the Magnitsky measures to enforce sanctions against human rights abusers in other countries in the world.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland rightly states, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 does not refer to an implementation date of Brexit day, and the Government have to report by the end of this month on the Magnitsky provisions in that Act. Since they have to report to Parliament, that means they have to do so before we rise next Thursday, 23 May. At the moment they have not done anything about those provisions, so I presume that the Government will present a sort of nil return. Will the Minister confirm what he said previously in the Foreign Affairs Committee on that?

I would prefer us to be implementing far more substantial measures. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have a list of 49 people who have sanctions against them under the Magnitsky provisions in their nation states. I do not understand why we cannot simply do the same.

Finally, the Government will be reporting annually on each of the sanctions regimes such as this one that they are starting. What form will those reports take? Will there be an opportunity for debate when they are tabled?

I very much hope that the Government will make it as clear as possible that, while they may feel legally constrained, they would none the less like to implement further sanctions regimes as soon as possible.

[The Chair]

Before I call the Minister to sum up, I would tell the Committee, in response to the question from the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland earlier, that should this question be called to a Division, and should the noes have it, that would simply confirm that the Committee has not considered that which we are now considering, but it would not stop the ability of this matter to be put as a question on the Floor of the House later this evening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Procedurally, the hon. Lady is right. If it were to be voted down there would remain a danger that there could be a lacuna or a hiatus in which there were no extant Russian sanctions. She mentioned Magnitsky: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have Magnitsky-lite, as it were. Their regimes only include travel bans, whereas the provisions in the primary legislation passed by us—with great cross-party approval—would allow for much more, once the Magnitsky provisions are put in place. We intend to do that. The hon. Member for Rhondda has pointed out—fairly—that our sanctions team are working very hard. Indeed they are. They are an excellent team and I am glad to take this opportunity to say so and put it on the record. But they have a massive rush of SIs. It is not just the number of them going through this House; it is the enormous body of work that goes on beneath the bits of paper we then end up with here. It totally absorbs the 40 people in the team who work so hard. When they do it, we will bring forward a Magnitsky SI.

[Chris Bryant]

I am glad to hear that. On the travel ban issue, I do not understand why, in the UK, we cannot simply state that anybody involved in the murder of Sergei Magnitsky or the corruption unveiled by him is not welcome in this country and will be banned from entry. That is what the three Baltic countries have done. Why can we not do that?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

It is not for me to speak on behalf of the Home Office. There may well be provisions in law for them to be able to do that, should they so wish. Again, that is a broader Home Office issue rather than a Foreign Office matter for this Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

The Minister says that the immigration and travel ban situation is not a matter for him. In his own sanctions, it states in section 20 of part 4, “Immigration”, that a person

“who is designated under regulation 5 for the purposes of this regulation is an excluded person for the purposes of section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971”.

His own sanctions regime includes provisions around travel bans, but not in relation to Magnitsky.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Yes, but the instrument transposes existing EU sanctions regimes; it does not add to or amend them. The process has been to transpose as identically as possible the EU regimes into what will be our law when we leave.

It is clear that the sanctions have been working in broad ways. There are massive economic pressures on Russia, and we should not think that they are not causing concern among those who govern that country. Sanctions are an integral part of our response to some of the most important foreign policy challenges that we face.

We must be ready to deliver sanctions independently as soon as we leave the EU. That is why the SI is so important. Transposing EU sanctions regimes in this way puts the UK on a solid footing to continue to protect our interests, defend our values and maintain the position of leadership that we have built on sanctions since 2014. Once again, I commend the regulations to the Committee.

Question put.

Russian Annexation of Crimea

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2019 Westminster Hall

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Thank you very much, Mr Davies. I warmly commend the hon. Member for Henley (John Howell) for introducing the debate, which is both timely and important. I gather that a joke is going round in Moscow these days: President Putin is asking General Secretary Stalin for advice on what he should do politically, and Stalin says, “You should execute all members of the Government and paint the Kremlin blue.” Putin replies, “Why blue?” and Stalin says, “I thought that was the only part you would query.” Perhaps there is some exaggeration in the joke, but perhaps there is some truth as well.

The point that the hon. Member for Henley, and others who have been on the delegation with him, made very clearly, and which I am sure the right hon. Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale), who is a known expert on the subject of Ukraine, will make as well, is that the annexation was illegal, full stop—end of story, in a sense. That is, of course, contested by the Russian Federation, but under any judgment of international law, it is clear that the annexation of Crimea was illegal.

As the hon. Member for Henley said, it followed on from other annexations, attempted annexations or invasions that were also illegal. I warmly commended David Cameron for going to Georgia, as one of his first acts as Conservative leader, to stand with the Georgian people and say that the invasions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were illegal acts. Unfortunately, the agreement that was subsequently signed with President Sarkozy has still not been implemented. There are still Russian troops in Georgia and, as has been laid out today, the problems in relation to Crimea grow day by day.

The truth of the matter is that the annexation would not have happened had the Russian Federation not signed up to the Budapest memorandum, because Ukraine would have had nuclear weapons. In that accord, the Russian Federation guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including Crimea as part of Ukraine, so there is understandable cynicism and scepticism. I do not know what the highest level of cynicism and scepticism that one can have is, but that is what the international community shares regarding any international treaties signed by the Russian Federation under President Putin.

Many have drawn comparisons with the situation in the 1930s. Such comparisons are important to bear in mind, though it would be wrong to make a direct comparison between Putin and Hitler, because their ideologies were fundamentally different. However, their nationalism and deliberate attempts to use violence to secure their aims probably amounted to the same.

In 1938, the German Chancellor was determined to persuade the international community that he would seize only the Sudetenland—the part of Czechoslovakia that, in his words, was dominated by German-speaking German nationals. In fact, by seizing the Sudetenland he undermined the whole of the rest of Czechoslovakia and made it impossible for it to survive as a nation state. I think that is exactly the intention of the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine. In the 1930s, British politicians did not really care; they thought that Hitler sort of had a point. Politicians in the UK have also said that President Putin sort of has a point about Crimea, because a lot of the people in Crimea are Russian and identify as Russian speakers. However, that is wholly to miss the point that there has been a deliberate process of political destabilisation in Ukraine that went on for a considerable number of years. As the hon. Member for Henley said, it included a fake referendum that was deliberately engineered. The results were falsely counted, and an incorrect version of them was given out.

[Mrs Moon]

One of the most important things that we must focus on is the softening-up period before invasion takes place. There is a deliberate disinformation campaign targeted at the Russian-speaking populations, not just in Georgia and Ukraine but on a daily basis in the Baltic states. Such disinformation prepares an expectation among the Russian-speaking population that change is coming, and that they should support it. Is that something to which we should also pay attention?

[Chris Bryant]

I commend my hon. Friend. She is right, and that is one of the reasons why I am particularly anxious that we, as a political class in this country, have seemingly decided that we are not all that interested in Russian interference in our elections and electoral processes. I think that we will rue the day in the end. We need to be extremely careful, because we have seen what the Russian Federation has managed to do through cyber-warfare in other countries around the world, and continues to do in Ukraine, because it wants to soften up the rest of the country.

The process of misinformation continues. The latest version of that is the Russian Federation maintaining that Crimea lost 1.5 trillion roubles during the 25 years that it was part of Ukraine. Many would argue that the loss to Crimea is from being taken out of Ukraine. Russian spokespeople do not half have a cheek sometimes.

There is another clear aspect to the annexation. In 1938, Hitler wanted to seize the Skoda factory, which was one of the most productive factories in Europe, and turn it into an arms manufacturer; it was soon making Panzers for the Wehrmacht. Just so, Putin has had his eye for a considerable period on not only the natural resources in Crimea but the ports, which are vital to any future military intentions that he may have. It is all part of a pattern; President Putin always has a tendency to resort to violent options when they are available to him.

Putin was, of course, in political trouble in his own country when the annexation commenced, and it was extremely popular, re-enhancing that nationalist sense in Russian politics. In large measure, one can see the reinvention of Putin as a nationalist hero, in Russian terms, on the back of the annexation of Crimea. There is a sense of political doldrums in the Russian Federation, because Putin clearly has no idea who his successor should be or where the future should lie. He is kind of bored with governing Russia, which potentially makes for a very dangerous time for the international community.

The Government need to be careful about key issues of UK policy. We have referred already to sanctions policy. As I have said to the Minister many times, I fear that the Government are still dragging their heels—he will say that they are not—on implementing a full set of secure sanctions in relation to individuals who have committed human rights abuses in the Russian Federation and Crimea. I think that the Russians have noticed that that has not yet happened, and that other countries have moved faster. It is time that we proceeded faster. I am sure that the Minister will say that the Government are doing their best, and that it will all happen in the fullness of time, but I am not convinced.

Secondly, there was a time when the UK led within the European Union on trying to bind Ukraine into the international community, and on standing up for it in international affairs. That will be more difficult in the future when/if we are no longer a member of the European Union. I wish to know how we will achieve that in the future. I hope that the UK has made strong representations to the United States of America that one cannot oppose annexation in Crimea and support it in the Golan Heights. Annexation is annexation. One cannot simply turn a blind eye because it involves a big ally on one side of the Atlantic, rather than a country that one wants to criticise on the other.

Finally, we of course wish Mr Zelensky, who has been elected, well. It is difficult to see exactly how things will play out. I very much hope that the UK will want to extend a warm hand, to ensure that he ends up on the right side of the argument.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) for initiating this debate, and for setting out the arguments so clearly and in such a well-informed manner—as did all hon. Members who contributed.

At the outset, I want to comment on the outcome of Ukraine’s presidential election. With the vast majority of votes counted, Volodymyr Zelensky won Sunday’s second round run-off with just over 73% of the vote. It is a testament to the development of Ukraine’s democracy that the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights judged the second round to be peaceful and competitive. Its representative stated that the process respected fundamental freedoms.

I also pay tribute to President Poroshenko, who led Ukraine over the past five years in the face of unprecedented security and foreign policy challenges. He has accepted the choice of the Ukrainian people with great dignity and has offered to work with the President-elect. Our Prime Minister spoke to President-elect Zelensky yesterday. She congratulated him on his clear victory and assured him of the UK’s ongoing support. That important commitment is at the heart of today’s topic. We will debate one aspect of Ukraine’s territorial integrity: Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. The Government’s position is absolutely clear: Crimea and Sevastopol are part of Ukraine. Russia’s illegal annexation and its continuing destabilisation of Ukraine is reprehensible. This Government will never recognise or legitimise Russia’s status in Crimea.

It is now five years since Russia illegally annexed 10,000 square miles of sovereign Ukrainian territory. Russia’s military intervention and subsequent unlawful referendum violated not only the Ukrainian constitution, but international law. As my hon. Friend the Member for Henley clearly outlined, Russia is now using a whole range of strategies to maintain its hold on Ukrainian territory and undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. It uses political manipulation and disinformation to fuel the conflict and interfere with elections; it forcibly moves Ukrainian citizens out of Crimea and moves Russian citizens in, in violation of the Geneva convention; and it persistently fails to meet its commitments under the Minsk agreements. It should withdraw its forces from all of Ukraine.

As we have heard, in November, Russia attacked and seized Ukrainian vessels and 24 servicemen as they sought to enter the sea of Azov through the Kerch strait, as they have every right to do. Those servicemen continue to be detained in Moscow. I call on Russia to release these servicemen immediately and return the vessels to Ukraine.

Russian authorities have overseen the militarisation and the systematic restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms in Crimea, including freedom of expression, of movement and of religion, as well as the right to peaceful assembly. Despite repeated calls in UN General Assembly resolutions, Russia has not permitted the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit to make a full independent assessment of the human rights situation. Even without such an assessment, the weight of evidence is damning. Minority groups, such as Crimean Tatars, face clear and increasing levels of persecution. Twenty-three Tatars were unlawfully detained following raids on their homes on 27 March, for example. Russia continues to ban the Tatars’ representative institution, the Mejlis. That violates a 2017 International Court of Justice order.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has also documented a catalogue of abuses against political opponents and minorities in Crimea. Those abuses include arbitrary detentions and arrests, enforced disappearances and torture. Those who refuse to recognise Russian-based legislation applicable to Crimea are denied their basic human rights. Ukrainians face pressure to renounce their citizenship in favour of Russian citizenship; if they refuse, they are denied access to basic services. Crimeans are being forcibly conscripted into the Russian military—nearly 15,000 have been conscripted since 2015.

The UK is instrumental in ensuring a robust international response to Russia’s actions. Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia was suspended from the G8. The EU, the US, and partners including Canada and Australia, imposed a robust package of sanctions targeting key sectors of Russia’s economy, and we continue to co-ordinate our response to Russia’s actions.

[Chris Bryant]

I bring the Minister back to my earlier point about the Golan Heights. Would it not undermine our position if we opposed annexation in Crimea but endorsed the US position on the annexation of the Golan Heights?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I hope that everyone in this Chamber is in favour of the consistent application of such rules across the world, be it with Israel or with Russia. That consistent application is essential if we are to defend what is widely known as the rules-based international order.

Many of those responsible for the annexation have been sanctioned. We have imposed stringent restrictions on doing business in Crimea, for instance. Importing goods from Crimea is illegal and exports to key sectors are banned. We will not legitimise the annexation by making it easy to do business there.

Following the visit to Odesa in December by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, the UK also extended and deepened our military assistance to Ukraine through the Operation Orbital training mission. NATO measures to enhance allies’ capability and presence in the Black sea will also contribute to an increased regional deterrent.

LGBT Rights: Brunei

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Wednesday 10th April 2019 Westminster Hall

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Of course all right-thinking people will condemn what has been introduced in Brunei in recent weeks. We would condemn the stoning of anybody, whether they were lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or whatever. It is a positively inhumane way of undertaking what they pretend is a form of justice.

However, we in the United Kingdom have a share of the blame for what has happened in the Commonwealth and around the world. The countries with some of the worst records on LGBT rights once owed their allegiance to the Crown here. Sometimes we exported the most draconian laws that any country has ever had on male homosexuality, in particular between 1922 and 1967.

Some people point the finger at religion. Sometimes that is right, but sometimes it is wrong. Interestingly, when the House of Commons tried to legislate to ban lesbianism in 1922 the best speech given in Parliament to strike the law down was from the Archbishop of Canterbury, who said that it was a pile of nonsense. He was quite right. When it came to the partial decriminalisation of homosexuality in this country in 1967, Michael Ramsey, the Archbishop of Canterbury, was one of the best proponents for a humane and sensible approach to those matters.

My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) is right that it often feels as if we are taking steps backwards. We have taken so many strides forwards in this country in recent years, with civil partnerships, gay marriage and all the rest, that it is all too easy to forget that the most liberal city in the world in the last 150 years was probably Berlin in 1930. In 1934, Hitler killed all the gay Nazis, and went on to put thousands of people in concentration camps and kill them.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Rutherglen and Hamilton West (Ged Killen) said earlier, we have to put our own house in order in Northern Ireland and the British Overseas Territories, as do so many countries with which we do business. It is ironic that the Sultan of Brunei owns the Dorchester, because that was where Victor Cazalet—a gay man who was a Member of this House in the 1930s, and director of the Dorchester—used to interview everybody for his almost entirely gay, queer or nearly queer searchlight battery in the second world war. I have also been to many dinners at the Dorchester that were hosted by Stonewall.

I am absolutely delighted that people—particularly young people—are taking action, because they want to see that the campaigns of yesteryear are not forgotten and because human rights are a seamless garment that have to be fought for by every single generation. In truth, the laws in Brunei will not stop anyone from being homosexual. They will not stop anybody from loving another person of the same gender. All that they will do is condemn them to a life of loneliness, sadness, lying and hypocrisy.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Exiting the European Union (Sanctions)

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Tuesday 9th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

First, I say to my hon. Friend that this is not just against Russians. If people have violated human rights anywhere in the world, they could come within the scope of the Magnitsky clause I have been describing. I say again that the reason why we have not yet applied the Magnitsky elements of the sanctions Act is that the statutory instrument making it a bespoke part of that Act within UK autonomous law has not yet been made, and it that was done too rapidly—he will appreciate that we have had about 3,000 statutory instruments to get through this House because of EU exit—there would be a high risk of constant legal challenge, which we would like to avoid.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I am a bit confused about the Government’s attitude. The permanent under-secretary gave one reason why we could not have these sanctions in place already, the Foreign Secretary has given three different versions of why it could not happen and now the Minister has given yet another version of why it could not happen thus far. Part of it seems to be that the Government are not yet ready, which feels a bit like foot dragging to me, because I remember that the Government did not want this amendment in the first place, but the House insisted on it. The Government still seem to be arguing that we cannot do this because we are still a member of the European Union. In fact, Estonia and Lithuania have exactly those provisions, and nobody has thought to strike them down. There are 49 Russians listed in both those countries. Why can we not do it?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

What the hon. Gentleman says is not consistent with our legal advice. We have to make sure that any application of the Magnitsky legislation fits legally and properly within any implementation period that might exist. It would be easier and quicker, as it happens in this case, if we were to leave with no deal—that is perhaps the only advantage of so doing that I can think of straight off the top of my head, but we will not go down that route.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As I said earlier, it is possible that, in exceptional circumstances, a person or an entity might not be transferred, but we do not expect that to be the case often, if at all. The intention is, wherever possible, to transfer the operation of the existing regime into our own autonomous legislation.

[Chris Bryant]

I think the Minister is saying that one reason why it will not be possible is that there are so many SIs that it is difficult to get the SI in place to deal with Magnitsky. I just wonder when he hopes the provisions will be available to the House and be able to be implemented.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

All I can say is that the timeline of many things at the moment is difficult to forecast, so I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not attempt to say exactly.

[Chris Bryant]

Just say when.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As soon as we are practically able to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I would be delighted to put that obligation on him—it causes me no difficulty whatever. Of course I will do that. In Foreign Office questions and in Westminster Hall, we have many discussions about issues of that sort—indeed, I encourage them, and we like to participate in them by giving as much information as we possibly can in response to any motion moved.

[Chris Bryant]

In relation to the situation in Venezuela, there has obviously been massive concern on both sides of the House about the massive number of people fleeing from Venezuela to other countries in Latin America. How does the Minister feel that the sanctions regime is working now, and is it likely to produce significant change?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The answer is that we wish there was clearer evidence that they are working. I was at the meeting of European Foreign Ministers yesterday in Luxembourg, where Venezuela was the main topic over lunch. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that 3.6 million people have fled Venezuela. The latest forecast is that the collapse in Venezuela’s economy will exceed that of Zimbabwe’s economic collapse all that time ago and that it will collapse by over 25% this year. We are being very careful to make sure that we target individuals around President Maduro and President Maduro himself, rather than the people who are suffering enough. He will appreciate, as I think the whole House does, that it is a massive challenge to design sanctions that hit the right people and do not hit the wrong people, who are, as I say, suffering enough. Any brilliant ideas he has would be willingly received, but we are working very closely with the EU and the Lima Group to ensure that any properly targeted sanctions we can possibly apply will be applied at the earliest opportunity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Goodman]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. One of the general problems has been that we were so pleased to see some reform in the country that we were not tough enough and sharp enough about what was going on.

On Venezuela, too, we agree that it is right to roll over the EU sanctions. The record of the Maduro Government since the collapse of the oil price has been one of significant and serious human rights abuses. As the Minister said, the fact that 3.6 million people have left the country and that we have starvation and medicine shortages is extremely serious. It is shocking to see that food aid has been blocked at the Colombian border. The first speech that I made when I was given this portfolio was in September 2017, and I condemned then the closing down of the legitimate National Assembly and the setting up of the fake constitutional Assembly. The elections in May 2018 were not free or fair. Political opponents have been jailed. There are reports that people who are in prison are being tortured. The National Assembly leader, Juan Guaidó, has been stripped of political immunity. We believe that 40 people have been killed in protests since the beginning of this year. All of that is unacceptable and reasonable justification for the continuation of sanctions.

[Chris Bryant]

I agree with everything that my hon. Friend just said. Is there not a further reason why this is not just a matter of Venezuela putting its own house in order? The truth is that the Colombian peace process will manage to move forward only if it does not have 1.5 million or 2 million people crossing the border and destabilising a process on which it was already difficult to get traction.

[Helen Goodman]

That is true as well. I was going to go on to say what, more positively, we would like to see. We would like to see free elections. We support the position of the Lima group of neighbouring countries, and we want to see dialogue between the parties who are in conflict in the country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

The main issue that we are considering this afternoon is what our independent system of sanctions will be like if and when we leave the European Union. That is the key point. I must confess that I am somewhat sceptical about the value of having an independent sanctions regime, because the whole point of sanctions is that when we work in concert with our closest allies, we are far more likely to achieve success than if we simply try to go it alone. This is nowhere writ more large than in relation to Russia.

For many years, individual countries of the European Union resisted adopting a shared sanctions regime in relation to Russia because some countries wanted to continue to take gas and oil from Russia, some wanted a strong political relationship with it, and Mr Berlusconi in Italy wanted to go to parties with President Putin. It was difficult for us to achieve a shared sanctions regime in relation to Russia. Indeed, it was only when Russia started using gas and oil as a means of oppressing Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia that the European Union decided to act in concert. The UK then went to European Council meetings where Prime Minister Cameron and then our present Prime Minister repeatedly said, “It’s been great, we’ve been able to persuade the European Union to adopt the sanctions that we wanted.” As a united body in Europe, we have been able to achieve far more than the United Kingdom will be able to if we go it alone.

I welcome the Minister’s comments that in the future we will, in the main, adopt the same kind of measures that the European Union adopts. My anxiety is that it might be difficult for us outside the European Union, unless there is some manner of working with the EU, to persuade it to adopt the kind of sanctions regime that we are interested in.

[Mr Duncan Smith]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. It is always worth hearing him on these subjects. I would simply point out that it is not all sweetness and light. For example, the Germans’ behaviour over Nord Stream 2 is going to break the whole sanctions regime, yet nothing seems to happen from the Commission.

[Chris Bryant]

The right hon. Gentleman has virtually stolen the words out of my mouth. He is absolutely right, but my anxiety is that when we are no longer in that room, it is going to be much more difficult for the UK to secure the outcome that we want in relation to Nord Stream 2. I hope that the Government will manage to find some means of establishing a strong relationship with the European Union in that regard.

I also worry about the Magnitsky process. I hear what the Minister is saying, but I have heard two Ministers speak on this subject since the House unanimously passed measures that the Government did not really want to include in the legislation—[Interruption.] I know that the Minister put them in in the end, but I am not sure that he was the most enthusiastic Member to adopt them. He can puff out his chest as much as he wants, but he is still not going to persuade me that he was quite there with the rest of us. The point is that we still do not have those measures in place. As he has referred to the Magnitsky process, I hope that we will now manage to sort this out very quickly, not least because Bill Browder has today been told that the Russians intend to press a seventh charge with Interpol—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I did say that we could open the envelope, but I did not mean that we had to open every page of what was inside. Today’s debate is not about Russia. I have allowed a little bit of movement, but we need to get a lot more speakers in.

[Chris Bryant]

You are quite right, Mr Deputy Speaker, and I am very close to finishing.

In making my last point, about Venezuela, I want to defend my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman). The hon. Member for Fylde (Mark Menzies) and I agree on nearly every aspect of our relationship with many different countries in Latin America, including Venezuela. That country is perpetuating poverty for its people and its politicians have completely let the people down. They are also risking civil war and war across the whole Andean region, which is dangerous. However, in all honesty, my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland was agreeing with the hon. Gentleman, not disagreeing with him, so I very much hope that they will kiss and make up later. With that, I shall finish.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Thursday 4th April 2019 Westminster Hall

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

It is a particular pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Mr Gapes. Your contribution to the Foreign Affairs Committee over the past 20 years has been truly exemplary, and indeed, your contribution to this report is one of the reasons why it was such a success. I am very glad that you are chairing this hearing.

Today, the Foreign Affairs Committee published its report on China and the rules-based international system. We worked on this inquiry for more than a year, including a trip to China to understand how the UK was seen from a Chinese perspective. As ever, we are very grateful to many people who submitted evidence to us, and especially to those who gave oral evidence, including the former Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd.

China is seeking a role in the world commensurate with its growing economic power, and the UK should welcome its desire to take part in global governance. We do not believe that China wants to jeopardise the benefits that it has reaped from a stable, rules-based international system. However, it has consolidated power in the hands of the Communist party under President Xi, and the UK’s China strategy needs to reflect that. On many issues, China is a viable partner for the United Kingdom. The threat that environmental degradation, for example, poses to the Communist party’s legitimacy has led China to join international efforts on climate change and sustainability.

However, on other issues that China perceives as challenging its domestic control, such as global initiatives on human rights and free societies, it has opposed international approaches. It is appropriate that this statement follows one from the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, given how many of the concerns we considered overlap with that Committee’s work.

Indeed, in the area of human rights, the evidence suggests that China does not intend to reform the rules-based international system. Rather, it intends to subvert it by promoting an alternative version of human rights that stresses economic development at the cost of the universality of individual civil and political freedoms. In our report, we urge the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to increase its efforts to hold China to account for its human rights violations by using UN mechanisms, public statements and private diplomacy.

During the inquiry, we also heard troubling allegations of Chinese attempts to interfere in the UK’s domestic affairs. The openness of the UK’s political system and society is a fundamental source of our strength. However, in the face of an autocratic state seeking to increase its influence abroad, that openness can also be a source of vulnerability. The UK needs to decide how to draw the line between legitimate attempts to exercise influence and illegitimate attempts at interference. It is a topic that we on the Foreign Affairs Committee will be looking at further in our new inquiry into autocracies and UK foreign policy.

The Committee also noted its concern about the Chinese Government’s approach to Hong Kong. The Sino-British joint declaration on Hong Kong is a legally binding international treaty registered at the UN. It is of great importance to UK national interests and the health of the rules-based international system. China’s adherence to the letter and spirit of the declaration is a key test of the sincerity of its commitment to global governance. We were therefore deeply concerned by evidence that Hong Kong’s autonomy is at risk, especially in the area of the rule of law. We are concerned that the Chinese Government are moving away from an approach of “one country, two systems” towards “one country, one system”. We therefore urge the UK Government to continue to raise concerns about Hong Kong publicly and privately with the Hong Kong authorities.

We support the Government’s efforts to increase the UK’s presence in the Indo-Pacific—including its military presence—in line with its capacity and other defence commitments. The region is vital for global trade and home to a number of UK partners and allies. Communication about those efforts is crucial. Poorly communicated military deployments in the Indo-Pacific could be perceived or depicted by China as a crude attempt to contain the expansion of its influence.

The UK should focus instead on core principles, including freedom of navigation, the rights of states—including China’s neighbours—to form and maintain alliances of their choosing, and the importance of a balanced and consensual regional security order. We urge the Government to ensure that initiatives to expand the UK’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific are explained with reference to those principles.

China’s belt and road initiative—perhaps the most famous and well-known aspect of its foreign policy—is likely to have geopolitical effects that are as important as, and potentially more important than its economic impact. That Chinese-led investment in foreign countries, and in developing countries in particular, need not conflict with British interests. Asia’s infrastructure gap is real, and exporting the fruits of China’s spectacular growth could be a way to close that gap while addressing China’s own economic needs. The UK should help China with that. It can gain economic benefits from doing so, including by focusing on areas in which the UK has particular value to offer, such as legal and financial services.

However, in its current form, the belt and road initiative raises concerns in relation to UK interests. There is a risk that Chinese investment could encourage countries to strike deals that undermine international standards or that leave countries with unsustainable debt that undermines their political stability. The Government should take a strictly case-by-case approach to assessing belt and road projects and refrain from expressing a view on the initiative as a whole.

For the UK to come up with a comprehensive strategy to guide its relationship with China, it will need to answer some key questions. What are the drivers of Chinese foreign policy? What are the major goals of UK policy towards China? What is the bottom line of UK interests, values and national security considerations on which we are not prepared to compromise?

The UK’s approach to China reflects an unwillingness to face the reality of China’s strategic direction. Building a deeper partnership with China is still desirable, but we must recognise that there are hard limits to what co-operation can achieve and that the values and interests of the Chinese Communist party, and therefore the Chinese state, are often very different from those of the United Kingdom. In the report, we call for the Government to produce a single public document that defines its China strategy, crafted through a cross-Government process directed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. That chimes with findings emerging from all the substantial inquiries we have undertaken.

The FCO has a diminished grip on our Government’s international strategy. It needs to reassert itself as the focal point for that strategy and regain some of its self-confidence and authority. Without a comprehensive approach, the UK risks prioritising economic considerations over its other interests, its values and national security. A constructive, positive UK relationship with China is possible and desirable, but it will require strategy, rigour and unity in place of hope and muddling through.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I, too, think it is a delight that you are in the Chair, Mr Gapes, although in a way it would be better if you were sitting down here, because I think your contribution would be useful. I commend the Committee on which I sit on our wonderful report. I think the Chairman has outlined the issues very well. How concerned is he that the British Government are a bit mealy mouthed sometimes when it comes to issues such as the Uighurs? More than 1 million people are in probably the largest concentration camp in the world, effectively being reschooled or re-educated—whatever we want to call it. Also, how worried is he by Italy’s recent deal with China? With that, we are beginning to see all the possible dangers of the belt and road initiative that he pointed to coming into the European Union.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his points. His contribution to the report was extremely important, as he knows. He raises two points that we looked at in various different ways. The Italian question came up at the end of the report process. On the question of the Uighurs, one of the things that came out strongly is that it is not simply a Chinese domestic issue. The repression of Muslim communities in western China will almost certainly have repercussions on other areas, including the UK and our allies in the region, as radicalism is likely to increase and further violence may follow from that.

As the hon. Gentleman will have heard, this is one of those moments when one must remember that one is looking at various forms of China. We are seeing the Chinese security state experimenting with its powers, particularly in Xinjiang. In some ways, one could say that modern China is an experiment. The challenge to which we do not know the answer is whether old men with tech can beat young people with ideas. So far, we do not know.

Italy’s deal with China is part of a long pattern that we have seen in Chinese foreign policy, which is to divide alliances and seek to break up groups. In this case, that is to split Italy from the rest of the European Union. It is interesting that when President Macron met President Xi only a few days after that deal was signed, he insisted on having Chancellor Merkel and President Tusk in the room at the same time to make the point that the European Union was still a united entity when dealing with Chinese trade. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that the Italian decision to go on its own poses some important questions, not only for the European Union but for the United Kingdom.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Tuesday 26th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Any and every decent person in this House utterly condemns the barring of much needed humanitarian aid from getting into Venezuela. We all stand together in condemning those who are preventing that much needed source of supplies.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Several British overseas territories are still refusing to implement full transparency and to have public registers of ownership. Why are the Government refusing to obey the command of this House, which was to introduce legislation swiftly? Why are they refusing to do it until 2023?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

We are fully adhering to the obligations and requirements of the Act that was passed. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that 2023 is the date by which we hope every requirement will be met in respect of public registers.

Venezuela

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Monday 28th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Put it in the Library, if it is not there already. [Interruption.] Very good.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

When I visited Venezuela in 2009, I was shown around a theoretically brand-new hospital, which was meant to be fully operational. Those showing me around must have thought I was a complete and utter idiot because every ward I went into had exactly the same patients—they were scurrying around from one ward to another. The truth is that the Venezuelan Government have lied for years and years to their people and to the outside world, particularly Russia and China, and the people who are feeling the damage are the poor children on the streets and the parents who are unable to feed their children because there is nothing in the shops.

My biggest fear is what this may do to Colombia, however, because the peace process is very tender and Iván Duque’s election is not necessarily moving towards restabilising it. Could the Foreign Office in this country perform a very useful function in working with the Spanish Government to try to bring security and stability to Colombia, which is facing such an enormous influx from Venezuela?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. One of the reasons why the United Nations is interested is that this is not a domestic issue for Venezuela; it has regional and therefore international implications. One of those implications, as I said in my opening response, is that Venezuela is harbouring some of the elements who would undermine the peace process in Colombia. He is absolutely right, and he has a long-standing interest in and has supported the Colombian peace process. We need to understand that process fully and to realise that these matters are linked. Therefore, solving the problem in Venezuela can significantly help with the challenges, which are increasing, in Colombia.

Institute for Statecraft: Integrity Initiative

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Wednesday 12th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am very happy to say yes. I can assure my hon. Friend and the House that when it comes to challenging officials on any issue, I do so very robustly, to establish the highest standards of activity in everything the Foreign Office does. Therefore, in response to this situation, I have certainly been grilling officials to find out exactly what is happening. I have asked them to engage with the Institute for Statecraft to look at its editorial policy to ensure that there is, and will remain, an absolutely clear division between its domestic activity under its charitable rules and any overseas activity that we fund and is subject to the contract we have.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I completely support any attempts to deal with misinformation campaigns, whether they originate from Russia, Saudi Arabia, the hard right in the United States of America or Syria—or, for that matter, in Catalonia last year. I want to make sure that a project such as this really works, but it will not have the confidence of the whole nation unless we are able to see some changes in the way in which it operates in this case. I would have more confidence if the Government were to engage in the kind of investigation that is ongoing in the United States of America into Russian involvement in democratic process in this country. Why can we not have that investigation?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Again, that is an area where there is an enormous amount of work going on in the Government. I share the hon. Gentleman’s concerns. We have seen all sorts of social media activity and we have seen completely verified activity of Russian intervention in democratic processes, such as the election in Montenegro and perhaps the referendum in Catalonia. That is in addition to the full spectrum of activity that we are specifically discussing in this urgent question.