Dan Byles
Main Page: Dan Byles (Conservative - North Warwickshire)Department Debates - View all Dan Byles's debates with the Cabinet Office
(13 years, 3 months ago)
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Nick Boles
The hon. Gentleman also makes a strong argument and has much greater historical knowledge than I do. I would say only that if the Bill becomes law, it will become a clear part of our constitutional arrangements that the expectation, the desire and the will of the people is that we have fixed-term Parliaments lasting five years. Therefore, should there be an interruption that led to a vote of no confidence in a Government and the Prime Minister came to the sovereign asking for her to prorogue Parliament, it would be clear to the sovereign, who would also receive advice from her advisers, that there was a danger of frustrating the constitution and frustrating the will of the people for us to have elections every five years.
Given that the Prime Minister would have lost a vote of confidence in this House—in the old days that would normally have automatically led to their no longer having a right to govern—I do not think it would be classified as the sovereign “meddling” in politics were she then to say that she would invite alternatives if the Prime Minister could not tell her that he or she could form a stable Government without going to the people in an election. If the Prime Minister could not give her that reassurance, it would be entirely proper for the sovereign—her advisers would tell her this—to see whether the Parliament that had not run its full course did not contain an alternative stable Government who could be formed and for her to invite the relevant leader of any such Government to kiss hands, become Prime Minister and resummon Parliament to see whether they could win a vote of confidence. That is why the fear of the hon. Member for Rhondda is not justified. In fact, a reverse fear is involved.
Dan Byles (North Warwickshire) (Con)
Is not the very purpose behind the Bill and the cooling-off period after a vote of no confidence precisely to allow that to happen? The expectation would not be that Her Majesty or His Majesty would interfere in the political process. Under the Bill, such a situation would throw the game open to see whether a Government who can command the confidence of this House can be formed. People elect MPs and then, to a certain extent, they expect us to get on and govern; they do not expect us to squabble, throw our toys out of the pram and have another election because it suits us.
Nick Boles
My hon. Friend puts it far more succinctly and better than I could. The key point is that there is nothing to stop that process happening just because Parliament is prorogued. We do not stop existing or being able to have conversations with each other, with Her Majesty’s advisers or with senior members of the civil service because Parliament is prorogued. We would still exist, we would still be MPs and we would still be able to go through that process.
Nick Boles
My hon. Friend is right. There were moments in the previous Parliament when we all might have wished that the party in government had taken that route rather than imposing on us the rather long, drawn-out demise that we all witnessed.
Nick Boles
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend—may I call him that? I feel as though we are friends even though we sit on opposite sides. I am always nervous about the customs of this place: I wanted to say thank God; I meant thank God; and frankly the stars have absolutely nothing to do with it. I am happy to be corrected.
Returning to the tidiness of the amendment of the hon. Member for Rhondda, he has not demonstrated, or even provided a shred of evidence to explain why the current point at which Parliament is recalled after an election is a problem or causes any difficulties. We should reject his amendment.
The hon. Gentleman has tabled another amendment to regulate the timetable for elections and he has again made a superficially appealing argument about lining up the different election timetables for different tiers of government, but it will not have escaped the attention of Government Members that he has, as ever, lined up with the longer figure. That betrays the deep belief of the Labour party, of which the hon. Gentleman provides a good example, that what the country needs are more politics, longer election campaigns, more leaflets going through doors and more people knocking on one’s door just when EastEnders is on or when a good game has started.
Dan Byles
The House has faced a big problem with fundraising and the increasing cost of democracy. Would not longer election campaigns lead to more expense and a greater requirement for parties to raise funds? We all know that parties get into trouble however they try to raise funds, so is this not the wrong direction to go in?
Mark Durkan
I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point, but let us remember that the Speaker can issue two types of certificate—under clause 2(2), which relates to confidence motions, and under clause 2(1), in respect of a resolution passed by two thirds of Members—and my amendments deal only with those circumstances. If we legislate for a resolution to be passed by two thirds of Members and for the Speaker to certify certain things about that, it would be a gross oversight not to provide for hon. Members, in so voting in such a Division, to specify a date if they wished to do so, rather than to leave that up to the Prime Minister.
I do not wish to go into the constitutional twilight zone that the hon. Member for Rhondda took us into about some of the wily vagaries of prorogation powers, but if we simply leave it to a Minister, even the Prime Minister, to set a date and make no provision for the House to specify a date, we leave ourselves open to possible uncertainties and, indeed, abuses. I remind the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) that we have served in an Assembly where a Secretary of State had certain powers and obligations for setting election dates. There have been court cases about whether or not the Secretary of State had duly exercised those powers and whether he had chosen not to see things and then said that he had exercised the power to set a date by simply setting the same date that had been suggested. People have used the different devices that the law allowed.
I am simply saying that if we charge the House with the possibility of setting a different election date for its own good reasons—I assume that they would need to be good reasons if the motion was supported by two thirds of Members—we should at least allow the House to specify the date as well if we are to hold to the spirit of the Prime Minister giving up powers.
Like other hon. Members, I have serious reservations about Speaker’s certificates. My amendments would not suspend any of the qualifications that I and many other hon. Members have on that subject—the worries about the implications in terms of courts and so on—but the more that we charge the House with powers and controls in relation to the issue, the more content I would be with the Bill.
Dan Byles
I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to this important discussion. The entire issue of fixed-term Parliaments, sadly, is in danger of becoming yet another political football to be kicked around the House, as Members seek to manufacture objections to reform, and to posture and grandstand. I fear that the new clause and amendments for the most part would not add to the Bill in any meaningful way. The issue is really very simple. I believe that the Bill will strengthen the power of the House over a key constitutional issue and diminish the Prime Minister’s power.
Before coming to the detail of the new clause and amendments, let us remember exactly what this historic Bill is about. Previously, the Prime Minister had the power to ask for an early Dissolution of Parliament at any time. Historically, that extraordinary degree of power has been used solely to the political advantage of the party in power.
Mr Charles Walker
Does my hon. Friend not agree that we have had a fairly settled democracy for the past 350 years? So there are aspects of the system that he can recommend to the House as well.
Dan Byles
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for alluding to an argument that I have heard time and again, when people suggest, “If it isn’t broke, don’t fix it,” but I shall come to the problems with the current situation in a moment. He also alludes to the interesting idea that we have a democratic system that works, so we should not amend or tinker with it. I have heard Opposition Members support that idea before. I have heard it suggested that, somehow, the Bill is undemocratic. With the greatest respect to my hon. Friends, I find that an extraordinary argument. That line of reasoning seems to suggest that the only truly democratic system is the one that has evolved in this country—the one that we currently use. Such reasoning suggests that it is not possible to amend our system without somehow making it less democratic, even though it concentrates power in the Prime Minister’s hands. The Bill will devolve the power to call a general election to the House, which is surely where it belongs.
If one were to follow that line of reasoning to its absurd conclusion, it would suggest that other western nations are somehow less democratic than ours, simply because they have democratic systems different from the one that we enjoy. In the United States Congressmen and women serve a two-year fixed term. The President serves a four-year fixed term. Senators serve six-year fixed terms. Clearly, that does not make the United States less democratic than we are simply because its system is different from ours. In France Members of the National Assembly are elected for five-year terms—the period that the Bill recommends. The President is also elected for a five-year term. The Senate is selected for a six-year term.
Chris Bryant
I am sorry, but Members of the Assemblée Nationale are elected for terms of up to five years, not fixed terms.
Dan Byles
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for correcting me. That was not my understanding, but I will bow to his superior knowledge. The French model has an interesting lesson to teach us about leaving the power to dissolve Parliament with the Executive, as opposed to the system that we are now considering. The President of France has the power to force Dissolution early, but that is not supposed to be the norm; it is supposed to be used only in an emergency. It has been used only twice in an emergency, in 1962 and 1968, but it has been used three times for political advantage—in 1981, 1988 and 1997—thus clearly demonstrating that if we leave such a power in the hands of the Executive, it will inevitably be used for party political advantage.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
The Bill still seems to allow the Executive to do that, because they can force a vote of no confidence in themselves. Therefore, what we are achieving is simply changing the rules by which an early election can be called, not making any fundamental change to the constitution.
Dan Byles
I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s typically pithy and interesting contribution. The point has been made by hon. Members on both sides of the House, and while my hon. Friend is technically correct, I find it hard to imagine that a Government who wished to call an early general election for their own political advantage would engineer a vote of no confidence that they would then lose on the Floor of the House, because that would be a disastrous start to a general election campaign.
Kelvin Hopkins
When I first heard the suggestion, I thought that the electorate might consider that such a Government had behaved irresponsibly and therefore should not receive its support, but if the vote was a simple device for calling an early election that took only a few hours, the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) has a point, in that the mechanism would just be another way of calling an early election, and the position would not be very different from where we are now.
Dan Byles
I will have to agree to disagree with hon. Members about this, but I do not think that a Government going into a general election would want to see headlines on the front pages of The Sun and other tabloids screaming, “Government falls after losing confidence vote in the House”.
Mr Charles Walker
Surely any legislation could be avoided if Prime Ministers were to say at the start of their term whether they intended to run a five-year Parliament. If they backed out of that arrangement with the electorate after two and a half years, they would be judged accordingly, so why on earth do we need legislation?
Thomas Docherty
At the risk of rushing to the hon. Gentleman’s rescue, I suspect that Labour Members tried that approach in the previous Parliament, and I do not recall it ending particularly well for the former Prime Minister.
Ian Lucas (Wrexham) (Lab)
Returning to the question of party political advantage, why does the hon. Gentleman think that the Government have chosen to specify a term of five years, rather than four, in the Bill?
Dan Byles
I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman raises that question, because I would like to address that issue, which is one of the “straw man” arguments that opponents of the Bill regularly cite. Some who oppose the Bill argue against the whole principle of fixed-term Parliaments, while others claim to support that principle, but tackle the issue of whether the term should be five years or four.
What should we make of the term set out in the Bill? I think that I am safe in saying that the term length is a key sticking point for Labour Members who accept the principle of fixed-term Parliaments yet still cannot bring themselves to support the Bill. Many of them hang their hat on the fact that five-year, rather than four-year, terms are proposed.
If we are to consider that point in detail, it is important that we understand where we are and how we came to be here. At present the maximum length of a Parliament is five years—let us make no bones about that—and I do not recall any recent cries of anguish from Labour Members that the historical five-year Parliament is wrong. Indeed, that maximum limit was established under the Parliament Act 1911, so Labour Members have had a long time to express their opposition to five-year Parliaments. The 1911 Act reduced the maximum length of a Parliament to five years from seven years by amending the Septennial Act 1715.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
May I remind my hon. Friend that the reduction from seven to five years took place because the House of Lords was no longer able to block legislation, and it was therefore thought right that things should be referred to the electorate within a reasonable time? In 1911 Members thought that that period was five years, and what they thought in 1911 is a jolly good thing to think in 2011.
Chris Bryant
But when our forefathers reached that view, they pointed out that although the maximum length of a Parliament would be five years, in practice the length would nearly always be four years.
Dan Byles
The hon. Gentleman has advanced that argument before, but I am aware that another interpretation is that if a Parliament lasts five years, only about four years’ work gets done in practice, because Governments find it harder to get their business through in the final year as people are looking ahead to the next general election: in effect, the election campaign starts.
Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)
As the House knows, three of the past five Parliaments have run for five years, so it is not unreasonable to use five years as a guide.
Dan Byles
My hon. Friend makes a valid point.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) likes to cite a figure of 3.7 years as the average length of a Parliament since 1945—he does not need to jump up and do so again now—but we need to tackle that statistic head on, because it is quite disingenuous. The statistic includes the three occasions on which a Parliament lasted for less than two years. No one would suggest that Parliaments of less than two years should be the norm—they occur in unusual circumstances—so it is misleading to include them in statistics to show the average length of a Parliament since 1945.
Kelvin Hopkins
Is not the great advantage of our present system that if a Government do not get a particularly big majority—such as in 1964 and February 1974—the arrangements are sufficiently flexible to allow us to hold another general election fairly soon afterwards so that one party or another can get a reasonable majority?
Dan Byles
The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting argument, because he seems to suggest that any Government of the day should have such a strong majority that they can bash their legislation through. I believe that Labour Members referred to that arrangement as an elective dictatorship when they were on the wrong side of such figures in the 1980s. In this day and age, if a Government need to be a bit more consensual and cleverer about getting their business through the House, it is considered to be a good thing. Do we really want to say that whenever a Government do not have a huge thumping majority we should have another election?
Dan Byles
I genuinely do not believe that that is the reason.
My hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins) pointed out that three of the past five Parliaments lasted five years, and I was developing a point about the average length of post-1945 Parliaments. If the three failed Parliaments lasting less than two years are stripped out, the average length of a Parliament since 1945 has been more than four years. Since 1974 the lengths have been even greater, so there is a clear trend that Parliaments are lasting longer.
Thomas Docherty
I am fascinated by the hon. Gentleman’s logic, but does he accept that, with the exception of the Parliament between 1987 and 1992, every Parliament since the 1950s that has lasted longer than four years has ended with the defeat of the governing party at a general election? Frankly, if the Prime Ministers in those Parliaments could have gone on longer they would have done, just to avoid the electorate.
Dan Byles
If the hon. Gentleman is arguing that Parliaments that last for five years are more likely to end with the defeat of the Government, he should be wholeheartedly embracing the coalition’s plans to make this Parliament last for five years.
If there is something so constitutionally or democratically wrong with five-year Parliaments, why on earth did we have to endure the previous Government from 2005 until 2010? If five-year Parliaments are wrong in principle, as several Labour Members seem to suggest, why did not the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown)—I apologise if I have not pronounced the right hon. Gentleman’s constituency correctly, but as I have heard him speak in the House so rarely, I am not sure how to pronounce it—do the entire country a favour and call an election in 2009? We then could have started clearing up the mess of the worst financial deficit that this country has faced since the second world war a year earlier.
John Hemming (Birmingham, Yardley) (LD)
Obviously there is a debate about whether the figure should be four years or five—although nobody has proposed a fixed-term Parliament of 3.7 years. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that while there is not necessarily a massive difference between four years and five years, given the total and absolute mess that the country is in, having a term long enough to enable us to get out of that mess is a good idea?
Dan Byles
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend’s comments. One problem sometimes cited in relation to a democratic system such as ours is the tendency for Governments to take the short-term approach to fixing problems. If five years became the norm, that would help to create slightly more stable government, because Governments could look to the longer term when considering some of the difficult decisions that they might have to make, and not always be worried that they were only a few years from a general election.
It seems that five-year Parliaments are not a problem for Labour Members when it is their party that is clinging to power in the dying days of a Government, as was the case in 2009 and 2010. True to form, their principles changed the moment they found themselves in opposition. Now, sadly, they stand as obstacles to reform.
May I conclude the point about whether the term should be four years or five, and move on with my speech?
Mr Charles Walker
Is my hon. Friend not concerned about the prorogation of Parliament? Will he address that matter when he has finished his opening remarks?
Dan Byles
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. I am extremely concerned about that point, and very eager to get on to the part of my speech in which I shall address it. However, I want to conclude the point, which I was pulled on to by interventions, about whether the term should be fixed at four years or five. I turn again to the conclusions and recommendations in the report on the Bill produced by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, which has already been quoted today by Labour Members. Recommendation 5 clearly states:
“Precedent gives no clear answer as to whether Parliaments should last four years or five.”
In recommendation 6 the report acknowledges the views expressed by some witnesses that four years might be better than five. Nevertheless, the recommendation clearly states that that
“is an important point, but not one that we would wish to see obstruct the passage of the Bill through the House.”
That is important, and I hope that Labour Members will take note of it.
Before moving on to the subject of the amendments before the House, I would like briefly to—
Thomas Docherty
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. My understanding of the procedures of the House is that Members need to refer directly to the proposals on the amendment paper, not rehash or rehearse a debate that took place previously, and at some length.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
First, it is for me to decide whether a Member is straying out of line. I would say to Mr Byles that he has to keep in order on new clause 4. He has drifted a little, but he keeps coming back to the matter of four years or five. I am sure that he has taken those remarks on board, and that we can continue.
Dan Byles
I am grateful to you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I have almost come to the end of my scene-setting remarks and will get into considerably more detail on the amendments very shortly. Before I do, I want to refer to confidence votes and thresholds, which have already been mentioned this afternoon, including by Labour Members.
Although we are moving to a system of fixed-term Parliaments, it would clearly be unusual and wrong to put in place a system that did not allow for early elections, in one of two scenarios: if the confidence of the House could not be held by a party leader, or if there were an emergency of some sort, or another exceptional circumstance that required an early election in the national interest. I believe that the Bill as it stands, unamended—
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. The hon. Gentleman should be relating his remarks to new clause 4 and the amendments grouped with it. We do not need to drift back to other subjects; we have gone beyond them. I remind him that we need to stick to the subject in hand.
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. I say to those on the two Front Benches, can we please continue?
Dan Byles
Thank you very much, Mr Deputy Speaker.
I shall move on to new clause 4, which sets out new rules for the Prorogation—I have as much trouble as the hon. Member for Rhondda with that word—of Parliament. It would repeal the Prorogation Act 1867, which provides the power for Her Majesty to issue a proclamation for the Prorogation of Parliament. I think I got that right.
As the House is aware, Prorogation marks the end of a parliamentary Session and is the formal name given to the period between the end of one Session of Parliament and the state opening of Parliament, which begins the next Session. The parliamentary Session may also be prorogued before Parliament is dissolved and a general election called.
It is worth reminding ourselves that the term “prorogation” is derived from the Roman concept of prorogatio. In the constitution of ancient Rome, prorogatio was the extension of a commander’s imperium beyond the one-year term of his magistracy. Prorogatio developed as a legal procedure in response to Roman expansionism and militarisation.
In the context of the Westminster system, Prorogation or Dissolution of Parliament on the final day of the Session originally, according to the House of Lords Library, comprised four principal elements. First, the Speaker made a speech mainly concerned with the Subsidy Bill, which he had brought up from the Commons. This was followed by a speech from the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper replying to the points made by the Speaker and expressing thanks for the Subsidy Bill. Royal Assent was then given to the Bills passed by both Houses. Finally, the Lord Chancellor, in obedience to the sovereign’s instructions, either prorogued or dissolved Parliament. The sovereign was customarily present on those occasions, and from the 17th century onwards, usually made the speech before Prorogation or Dissolution.
Hon. Members will, I am sure, be fascinated to learn from the Library’s excellent note that
“In the early nineteenth century the prorogation was still accompanied with considerable ceremony. Thus in 1815 the Prince Regent rode in the State Coach with a cavalry escort through St James’s Park to the Palace of Westminster, and on his arrival was announced with a salute of cannon.”
Mr Walker
A lot of Labour Members are muttering at the history lesson that my hon. Friend is giving us, but is he not demonstrating how important it is in this matter to set the scene in an historical context, bearing in mind the fact that we are overturning 350 years of constitutional precedent?
Dan Byles
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. That is exactly the point that I would have made.
The Bill is truly historic. That fact has been mentioned by numerous Members on both sides of the House, and to consider it in isolation—what it means to us now, rather than its place within the sweep of the history of our nation—would be wrong.
Chris Bryant
I agree that historical precedent is important, but I think the last time the monarch was involved directly in a speech made before Prorogation was 1851 or 1854, so we are going back some time. Since then there has been quite a transformation of the Prorogation system.
Jacob Rees-Mogg
It may interest the House to know that in the 1830s King William IV was going to come in person to prorogue Parliament, because that would bring all business to a stop and the Government did not like the business that was going on. I believe that, in the end, that turned out not to be necessary.
Chris Bryant
In 1831 the row about Dissolution and Prorogation, which was all about the proposed Great Reform Act, led to a phenomenal row in this House between the Conservatives and the Whig Government, precisely on the basis of whose decision it should be that Prorogation should proceed.
Dan Byles
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for joining our discussion of the history pertaining to Prorogation. I am glad that he has recognised that understanding the history of how we have got to where we are today is relevant to the discussion at hand. However, as the House is clearly not in the mood to discuss history today, and as I am aware that time is pressing, I want to move on and make a final point about amendment 9 before bringing my remarks to a conclusion.
Clause 3 states:
“Once Parliament dissolves, Her Majesty may issue the proclamation summoning the new Parliament which may…
(a) appoint the day for the first meeting of the new Parliament”.
Amendment 9 would add:
“within 15 working days of the polling day”.
The issue has already been discussed, but I am concerned that the amendment remains a little woolly. I question its purpose. What does a working day mean? Does that take into account religious holidays? There has already been a discussion about whether “working day” or “days” should be used. If that is an issue that the Opposition are concerned about, the term “working days” remains vague. Are bank holidays in other parts of the United Kingdom to be taken into account?
Is it not difficult to add “within 15 working days” in such specific terms, when “working days” could mean something entirely different in another part of the United Kingdom? In particular, why is Labour adamant about 15 working days? Is there any rationale or logic behind this number? Why not 14 days or 16 days? If we believe in evidence-based policy making in this place—[Interruption.] I detect some chuckling. Perhaps that is a dangerous thought. Evidence is not always welcome in this place. I have discovered that in previous debates. Perhaps when he sums up, the hon. Member for Rhondda will explain to us why 15 days is the magic number, not 14 or 16.
The House has indulged me enough. Time is pressing and there may be others who wish to speak. I thank the House for its attention.
Thomas Docherty
I shall keep my remarks brief as I understand that the Prime Minister might be rushing back to make a statement to the House about the commercialisation of Downing street following the revelations from the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Nick Boles) earlier this evening. I understand that the Liberal Democrats have a large campaign debt to pay off from Oldham East and Saddleworth.
May I gently tease colleagues on the Government Benches about the importance of referring to the United Kingdom when speaking about our nation state? I am sure all colleagues are aware that we are not just England or Britain; we are the United Kingdom.
My hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) helpfully referred to an earlier edition of “Erskine May” with reference to the shouting of the phrase “Shame!” from a sedentary position. It might help the House if I clarify that that applied up to the 19th edition of “Erskine May”. Since then, I am advised, the term has been removed from “Erskine May” and is therefore, I imagine, legitimate.
Addressing new clause 4 and the associated amendments which, as “Erskine May” says, is the purpose of the debate, I shall tackle head-on the question whether the Opposition support the principle of a fixed-term Parliament. It is well known that we did not oppose Second Reading because we support the principle of a fixed-term Parliament. Our specific objections have been not just to the length—four or five years—but to some of the technical issues, which is why my hon. Friends the Members for Rhondda and for Foyle (Mark Durkan) and others have tabled a series of tidying-up amendments, as we would describe them, although I understand that not every hon. Member supports that principle.