Afghan Relocations: Special Forces

David Davis Excerpts

Thursday 1st February 2024 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

I know that the hon. Gentleman, who has been advocating for some cases and is as passionate about the matter as anybody, will feel aggrieved, as will many colleagues around the House. The responsibility of any Minister is to own any failure of process that happens in their Department, and I accept that responsibility.

The reality is that these are very difficult decisions to make. The hon. Gentleman said that the Triples were funded by the UK Government. That is not entirely accurate; they were funded as a donor alongside many other donors, into the Government of Afghanistan, who funded the units. As he will well know from colleagues on his own Benches who commanded units that worked closely with the Triples, top-up payments were made in order to generate loyalty and, frankly, to avoid the Triples being poached by other coalition partners, which had similar forces of their own.

The records of those top-up payments were very ad hoc. I take my responsibilities for accuracy to the House seriously, and I can tell the hon. Gentleman in all seriousness that we have looked for employment records and none of those ad hoc records of additional payments is available to us. We have spoken to colleagues who have experience of these matters in the House and beyond, to ask for any records that they have, but even then a lot of the records produced are those that are put together by charities advocating for the Triples, rather than contemporary records of those top-up payments.

The reality is that whatever the challenges have been, some decisions were made in an inconsistent way. That is why they must be reviewed. We will aim to get the review done as quickly as possible—we anticipate that it will take around 12 weeks. Before that, we need to put in place the people who will do the review, who will be independent of everything that has gone before. In the first instance, it will be a review of the robustness of the decisions themselves, and where it finds that decisions were not robust, we will, of course, seek new information both from the applicant and from colleagues in the House who have advocated for them.

The shadow Minister makes some good points about what this means for people who are in Pakistan. It is impossible to say who, of those who were not already in the pipeline as approved applicants, has been deported. We do not track that, so I cannot answer his specific question but, of course, we will alert the Government of Pakistan to those who are included within the review, so that they can enjoy the same protection from deportation as those who have already been approved and are awaiting their onward move to the UK.

The shadow Minister necessarily points to the politics and the alleged disagreement among Conservative Members —that is the nature of his role—but I am simply not motivated by such things. The reality is that we are trying our best to bring as many people to the UK from Afghanistan as possible. Some decisions are relatively straightforward, because we hold the employment records, but others are far more complicated. Although there have undoubtedly been some decisions that are not robust and need to be reviewed, I put on record that the people involved in making those decisions, across the MOD, have been working their hardest and doing their best. I stand up for their service and for what they have done, and I take responsibility for their shortcomings.

[Sir David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I have been approached by people who were involved in training these soldiers—333, 444 and BOST 170—and they tell me that they are the most loyal, bravest and most effective soldiers who were operating in Afghanistan. As a result, they are the soldiers the Taliban feared the most, which I guess is why the Taliban have been executing them in front of their families whenever they catch them.

The Minister rightly says that we owe them a debt of gratitude, but this is more than that. It is a debt of honour. Can we ensure that, both in our administration and in our relationship with Pakistan, we do everything to deliver on that debt of honour as quickly as possible?

[James Heappey]

We certainly will. It is important to mention that the Government of Pakistan have often been the subject of questions in relation to ARAP over the past year or so. In my experience, they have been incredibly co-operative. We are hugely grateful to them for that.

The limit on the speed of flow is not any problem with the Government of Pakistan, but the challenge of getting people out of Afghanistan. The reality is that, no matter how many decisions we review and no matter how many additional people we add as eligible for the scheme, there is a limit to how fast we can move people over the border into Pakistan. That will take time.

Oral Answers to Questions

David Davis Excerpts

Monday 30th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

That is because the Type 32 frigate will not come in until after 2030 or 2031, because it will come after the Type 31s, which are being constructed in Rosyth as we speak. What the Type 32s are going to be, how they will be designed and who will build them is obviously a matter for between now and towards the centre of the decade. Even if the hon. Gentleman gets into government, no Treasury will give a budget for seven years forward, so it is important to make sure that we do not sign on the dotted line before we have the budget in line. It is absolutely the intention of the Royal Navy to have more frigates and destroyers, including the Type 32.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

6. What steps his Department is taking to improve military procurement standards.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Ben Wallace)]

Defence procurement is some of the most complex in government, but our defence and security industrial strategy represents a step change that will see industry, Government and academia working closer together, while fundamentally reforming regulations to improve the speed of acquisition and to incentivise innovation and productivity. Our acquisition reforms will drive pace and agility into procurement to improve delivery.

[Mr Davis]

I very much agree with the Secretary of State on the need for increased defence expenditure if we are to remain a tier 1 power. Nevertheless, in every one of the past 21 years, the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee have criticised the MOD’s procurement of equipment, poor identification of military needs, poor quality of equipment, slow delivery of projects, an inability to control costs and a corporate culture too traditional and resistant to change. Those are just some of the criticisms. Does he agree that we need to put those issues right if we are to be a tier 1 power?

[Mr Wallace]

I absolutely agree. First, that is why for the second year in a row, and nearly for a third, under my stewardship the Ministry of Defence will come in on budget or under budget—the first time in decades—to make sure that we live within our means. Secondly, it is also important to point out that it is always a challenge for any Secretary of State for Defence that the Treasury likes to deal in one, two, three or four years. Some of the programmes we are talking about, such as the Type 31 or the future solid support ship, are decades-long, and in that long process of complexity, threat changes, technology changes and inflation changes, and indeed there are all the challenges around. If we are going to have Governments investing in long-term infrastructure, whether civil or military, it is important to understand that long-term investment has a different risk profile. If we do everything year by year, we will always end up in a similar position.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Defence Procurement (Alex Chalk)]

I will write to my hon. Friend on that important question.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

The Secretary of State referred to the allegations in the weekend press about 77th Brigade. I know him well enough to know that when he told us that he gave clear instructions and guidelines to the brigade, which operates only against foreign powers and extremists, he was telling the exact truth. However, will he review the issue and ensure that his guidelines have been followed in all cases?

[Mr Wallace]

I thank my right hon. Friend for the compliment. I have already instructed that we not only look into the story but check that the instructions that I issued after a visit were carried out.

Oral Answers to Questions

David Davis Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I have listened to the Minister’s answers, and he intimated that we are replacing quantity with quality. Much of this problem goes back to the Capita contract for recruiting soldiers, sailors and airmen, which was massively criticised in a Public Accounts Committee report earlier this year in terms of both quantity and quality. Today, 10% of our troops are incapable of deployment abroad for medical reasons. What can he do to fix those problems?

[Mark Lancaster]

Let us be clear: the House is absolutely right to scrutinise this Government over recruiting into our armed forces. I welcome that, because it enables me to put pressure on our service chiefs. While there were, without doubt, challenges with that Capita contract, I have explained today how we have already reached 70% of our target within the first six months of this year. That contract is now performing in a way that it was not before. My right hon. Friend is right about medical standards, which is why there is a series of reviews at the moment of how we can prevent those injuries from happening in the first place.

Use of Torture Overseas

David Davis Excerpts

Monday 20th May 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if she will make a statement on the Ministry of Defence’s policy on co-operating with the use of torture overseas.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Penny Mordaunt)]

The UK Government stand firmly against torture and do not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment for any purpose. Our policy and activities in this area are in accordance with domestic and international law. The Ministry of Defence’s policy is aligned with the Government’s policy on sharing and receiving intelligence, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has been satisfied with our activities and has not identified issues of concern. However, the Prime Minister has asked the commissioner to review the Government’s consolidated guidance and submit proposals on how it could be improved. Once it has done so and the Government have had the chance to consider them—I anticipate that this will be a matter of weeks—the MOD will review its internal guidance as necessary in the light of any updated guidance that is published.

[Mr Davis]

I thank the Secretary of State for that answer. Our most senior living soldier, Field Marshal Lord Guthrie, said 10 years ago:

“Torture is illegal. It is a crime in both peace and war that no exceptional circumstances can permit…We need to distinguish ourselves from our enemies. We must not, in the false name of moral equivalence, degrade ourselves to their level.”

He was right. The prohibition of torture is one of our few absolute incontrovertible rights. There can never be a reason or justification for torture; what is more, it does not work. It leads to bad intelligence and bad decisions. The decision to undertake the Iraq war, which led to hundreds of thousands of deaths, the destruction of the stability of the region and the destruction of the reputation of the west, was based on so-called evidence obtained on the basis of torture.

We cannot ignore the morality or the law. Paragraph 15.9 of the Ministry of Defence’s policy document states that information sharing should not proceed

“unless ministers agree that the potential benefits justify accepting the risk and the legal consequences that may follow”.

The fundamental problem with paragraph 15.9 is that it presumes that Ministers can overrule the law, even international law, including that on absolute rights such as the prohibition of torture: they cannot, they must not, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will ensure that they do not.

Given the Ministry of Defence’s claim that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, the investigatory powers oversight body, approves of this, will she publish the documents showing that? It seems to me that the IPCO might have approved the overall approach but not the precise policy document that I refer to, which I understand was published after the consultation. Will she ensure that that document, which appears to give Ministers the right to overrule the law, is published along with any commentary on it?

Oral Answers to Questions

David Davis Excerpts

Monday 25th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that a complex programme was announced through the better defence estate strategy. On the specific issue he raises, I am told that the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), intends to visit shortly.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

The chief executive officer of Capita says that it will lose a lot of money on its recruitment contract on behalf of the MOD. In that case, I presume that the Government have a strong legal case for simply terminating the contract without compensation and taking it back in-house and doing it properly.

[Mark Lancaster]

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has certainly made it clear that he has not ruled out the option of terminating the contract. However, in recent months we have seen dramatic improvements in the performance of that contract, partly because of the money that Capita has put in—its own money—to ensure that that is the case.

Armed Drones

David Davis Excerpts

Tuesday 1st December 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the rules of engagement and the use of armed drones.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. In all my time in the House of Commons, this is the first time that I have proposed a motion in Westminster Hall, so I beg your indulgence for any errors of procedure that I make.

The issue before us is hugely topical, particularly given the debate on Syria in the House tomorrow. Armed drones, unmanned aerial vehicles or unmanned combat aerial vehicles have been described by some as just another weapon system—a modern version of the rifle or the missile—and by others as offering unparalleled operational potential, but with associated strategic risks.

In the recently published strategic defence and security review, the Government proposed 20 new Protector armed drones to

“enhance our…global strike capability”,

by which I assume the Government mean inside and outside war zones. That distinction will come up time and again in what I have to say and, I hope, in the Minister’s response.

Reconnaissance drones—I will deal with these for a second without going into the armed element—give troops enormous advantages. They are an unblinking eye in the sky for 24 hours a day, with a very wide angle of view and great precision. They are enormously valuable to special forces and in counter-insurgency operations, let alone in conventional warfare. They are reliable, give real-time intelligence, and are able to replay events quickly so that troops can know what has just happened.

Last week, the all-party parliamentary group on drones and the Royal United Services Institute had a conference on drones, at which we were addressed by probably the greatest warrior of modern times, General Stanley McChrystal, and his English counterpart, Graeme Lamb, both of whom devised and operated the strategy against al-Qaeda in Iraq and destroyed that organisation. In doing so, one of the primary tactics involved using a drone to backtrack any suicide bomb attack on the green zone, signals intelligence to follow up on the origin of it, and special forces to arrest and stop the instigators. That allowed us pretty much completely to eradicate al-Qaeda in Iraq, so it was an incredibly important element of our operation there.

McChrystal talked about the use of drones as a force multiplier. For example, if 20 people were sent in to make an attack, 80 or 100 force protection soldiers were needed. Those are no longer needed because of the reconnaissance sight capability, so drones are an incredibly important weapon system, even just as a reconnaissance system. They are also incredibly precise strike weapons. They are apparently largely riskless, with very little chance of loss of human lives on our side, and have pinpoint-accurate strike capability. The use of drones can therefore provide a never-ending threat inside and outside war zones. I will come back to the difference between the never-ending threats in those two categorisations in a moment.

Drones consist of relatively accessible technologies. As a result, we might take it that proliferation is inevitable. That is one of the strategic risks that I want the Government to consider. Beyond that, there are other genuine concerns. The first was made clear by General McChrystal last week: on one hand, drones lower the threshold for and make it easier to enter into armed conflict, and appear to remove the risk to our personnel and to render warfare almost like a video game; on the other hand, there is an illusion of precision. For those reasons, drones make the propensity to go to war far greater for countries that are worried about, say, their casualties. Most countries will concern themselves about casualties. Casualties are the political price paid for going to war and, as we will see with the Chilcot inquiry shortly, they create a great back pressure against war. As I said, there is an illusion of precision. One forgets that many of the reasons for imprecise targeting are not the drones or the weapon system, but the intelligence on which the targeting is based. Very often there is a precise weapon system, but it is not more precise than the intelligence can make it.

The other point made by General McChrystal that is worth considering is that the use of drones may make accidental conflict more likely. He cited the example of the Turkish air force shooting down a Russian aircraft a week or so ago, and said that had the incursions by the Russians into Turkish airspace been made by drones, they would have been shot down much earlier because the price of the action would have been smaller. That may lead to a lower threshold for an aerial conflict, so there are other ways that the use of drones can reduce the threshold. As such, one of the strategic risks of the use of armed drones is an increased risk of armed conflict.

The second point that came up, which is not really a strategic risk but is a matter of concern, was the effects on drone pilots. There was a great deal of concern about the fact that drone pilots, as it were, go home to their families each night with no time to decompress after effectively being in the war zone all day. They witness the violence, whereas most people who are involved in a war are distanced, at least to some extent, from the people who suffer from their weapon system. The sheer fidelity of the drone systems makes the witnessing very close and personal, in some senses. The sheer number of kills that some armed drone squadrons achieve increases the stress. One squadron was attributed with 1,626 kills, which is far more than any normal aircraft squadron would carry out. There is a long-distance version of post-traumatic stress disorder.

However, one other element worried me even more than that. It comes back to the legalities, to which I will return in a minute in putting a question to the Minister. If we undertake drone attacks outside a defined war zone, the location from which those attacks are operated may become part of a war zone, and we may legitimise a counter-attack on that area. Since many of those places are in rear areas, that has real issues for the operation of our RAF bases, such as RAF Waddington.

The big strategic risk that was raised by a number of people, particularly McChrystal, at the RUSI conference was the damaging impact on hearts and minds in battle. For those suffering drone attacks, there is an inability to strike back, a fear of constant danger, and a never-ending threat that is always there. There is strong evidence that this syndrome radicalises and militarises civilians, and unites militants. Drones can act as a recruiting sergeant. The most obvious example is the American drone operation in Pakistan, which, although it has taken out a lot of Taliban leaders, has also acted to recruit a number of others to their cause. Again, I suspect that will manifest itself in the battle against ISIL, because such organisations recruit worldwide. Last year, ISIL’s estimated recruitment was 30,000, having climbed from 15,000 during the course of the American attacks in Syria. That is an incredibly serious element of the strategic risk of using drones. From that point of view, drones are perhaps the biggest risk that we undertake.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

Was there any discussion at the conference of how soon it will be before terrorist organisations are able to organise attacks using drone technology, or at least a modified version of it?

[Mr Davis]

No, not particularly. There was a reference to it, but it was a throwaway line, and I cannot tell you the originator of the reference because of Chatham House rules. As I said earlier, plainly the nature of the technology involved in drones is awfully straightforward: the aerodynamics are straightforward; the motive power is straightforward; and the guidance systems are straightforward. Of course, lots of commercial drones are now available. Making an attack drone would take more than that, but it is pretty straightforward to achieve almost every element of building a drone—perhaps not a terribly sophisticated Predator or Reaper drone, or whatever, but a drone that might be used for a single-shot attack, or that could get to a location that is otherwise well protected against terrorist attack. It is absolutely clear that, if that is not possible now, it will be possible in the extremely close future. Drones are an element of proliferation that I suspect is already out of the bag. There is not much that we can do about it except plan our defences against drone attacks. That is too big a story for this debate, but the hon. Gentleman makes a good point.

I now come to the nub of this debate. The legal framework we create for drones has implications for strategic risk, for the way drones are used, and for whether their use acts as a recruiting sergeant. All the elements that I have talked about can be affected by the legal framework, which needs clarity to maintain the UK’s international standing and to protect the pilots and the armed forces from prosecution. It is not fair to ask our soldiers to carry out tasks without absolute legal certainty. Most of us do not know the exact background of some of the recent drone strikes—I am sure the Minister knows, but I do not. After the Khan strike, a headline in The Sunday Times stated “Army chief demanded legal cover for killing”. The article claimed that the director of special forces asked for specific legal advice on the strike. I do not know whether that is true, but it highlights one of the issues for me, which is that when we are going into a controversial military technology, we must absolutely ensure that the officers who use it are properly protected and clearly understand the limits of its use and where they might cross the rules of war, international law and so on. That is one of the major drivers of my argument.

When Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin were targeted in Syria by a UK drone on 21 August 2015, the Government claimed:

“This airstrike was a necessary and proportionate exercise of the individual right of self-defence of the United Kingdom.”

The Government also said that there was “clear evidence” that these individuals were planning and directing armed attacks against the United Kingdom. There was a lot of debate about that at the time, and there were questions about how imminent the attack might be, and how it was possible for there to be an imminent attack when these individuals were in Syria and the attack was cited as being in the UK. Some of the events that were cited happened in advance of the air strike, so it is not obvious how they could have been prevented by it. There was a series of arguments, but the basic argument was imminent self-defence.

In a letter to the United Nations, the Government cited the collective self-defence of Iraq as the second argument for the strike. I am not a lawyer, but it seems self-evident that this is a little like someone turning up in court to face an assault charge and saying, “I wasn’t there, but if I was there, he started it.” One argument undermines the other. The presentation of two arguments to the United Nations weakens, rather than enhances, the claim. I do not know why that was done, but again it highlights why we need absolute clarity on such matters. This is not an area in which we can risk having doubt—in the interests of our officers, let alone in the interest of our national reputation—about whether we have done the right thing.

As it stands, an armed attack must already have been launched, or at least be imminent, in order for states to resort to force in individual or collective self-defence; that is one element. Action against past attacks, if not done during the course of a war, risks being categorised as reprisal, which is unlawful in peacetime. Action against future attacks, which might be considered pre-emptive or preventive, is also considered unlawful. There is quite a narrow gap for strikes, which must be necessary and proportionate.

The concern raised by the Khan attack, and indeed by the subsequent attack by the Americans, relates to what we might call “targeted killing”—some have used the phrase “extrajudicial killing.” The concern, which again was raised by General McChrystal, among others, was that that could be seen as an easier alternative to arrest or prosecution when dealing with terrorists. We had that argument in Northern Ireland 30 years ago, when we were accused of hard arrests, as it were. We do not want to revisit that argument, because it was pretty unedifying at the time. If we give in to temptation and such strikes happen, it may be morally right in the case of the individuals concerned, but it would be legally dubious. At the very least, it would amount to a significant change in the Government’s stance on what is legal and what is not, and it therefore requires careful consideration.

Those concerns are amplified by the recent change in the ministerial code relating to international law. I happen not to think that the change has any legal standing but, from a political point of view, it raises concerns that, again, could be used against us by our opponents. I have argued time and again that one of our strongest counter-terrorism weapons is the fact that we abide by a high moral standard. If we do not abide by a high moral standard, we lose one battle to our opponents straightaway.

I am driving towards the relationship between the rules of engagement and the legalities I have just mentioned. This is my direct question to the Minister; I understand that she may not be able to answer it today, but hopefully she will be able to indicate where she is going towards on this question. If the rules of engagement are properly drawn up, they must be within the law, within declared Government policy and within any parliamentary limits that have been set. The Syria debate will address the limits set by Parliament, but action must fit within all three areas. I would normally assume that to be the case but, after our conference last week, I got a memo from somebody who does not want to be identified, so forgive me if I do not identify him. The memo encapsulates the problem about which I am worrying:

“Following the conference last week, I came away with the distinct impression that the MoD is using a different lexicon to the APPG and academe resulting in us talking at cross purposes. Where the APPG and Human Rights Select Committee…are talking about war zones and so forth the MoD have very carefully couched their wording in terms of RoE and operational areas.

Typically RoE have an opening preamble covering the legitimacy of the operation involved…The wording for this will be sanctioned by the MoD legal advisers and endorsed by the law officers’ staff. The RoE then set out the area of operations and it was clear to me from the comments at the conference that this area included parts of Syria—hence everything being done (including 21 Aug) was within the RoE. Typically the MoD and lower formations take the law officers’ confirmation of legitimacy as gospel. They also then seek to make the rules as flexible as possible to allow commanders the greatest possible latitude.”

Essentially, he is saying that the MOD is using a set of language to explain the rules of engagement and the area of operation that is not the same as the law officers’ definition of what is and is not a war zone and the like. That seems important.

The relationship between the rules of engagement, international and national law and policy is the point where the rubber meets the road. One can expect soldiers and airmen to operate on the basis of the rules of engagement only, and nothing else. We must be very clear in this area.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has begun an inquiry on the legality of the drones policy. There are three pages of questions—I will not read them out—that crystallise the inquiry. They are all good questions, but I finish on the point that drones are not just another weapons system; they are an incredibly effective weapons system subject to legal and technical proliferation, and to change in the behaviour patterns of both politicians and senior commanders. There is a great risk of acting in a way that is tactically incredibly successful but strategically dangerous. It seems to me that we need a clear and unambiguous legal policy, in the interests of our soldiers, our citizens and our allies.

[Kirsten Oswald (East Renfrewshire) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I am pleased that the Backbench Business Committee agreed that this was an important debate to have, and I thank them for that. I also thank the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) for his contribution. He made highly relevant and pertinent points, some of which I might repeat. I make no apology for that, because we are discussing a serious matter. I also hope to consider the use of drones from the human perspective, including that of our service personnel.

I echo the sentiments of the right hon. Gentleman, who raised significant concerns about the operational parameters, thresholds and legal framework for the use of drones. Like him, I note the killing of UK citizens by British drones in Raqqa earlier this year. The UK Government have a clear desire at the moment to engage in a campaign of air strikes, which reinforces the importance of having debates such as this fully at the appropriate time. We need proper and clearly understood parameters and a legal basis for any military action that we take. Those parameters are most appropriately discussed and agreed before and not after we ask our service personnel to undertake action.

It is vital that we take the time in this debate to consider and assess the use of armed and unarmed drones and the legal and structural frameworks within which they are used. Because we are responsible for their use, we must also consider the impact upon the people against whom such weapons are used and understand that sometimes they are not the desired or intended target. We must also consider the impact on those whose job involves operating drones.

Clearly, technology is moving fast. Not only are military drones available to our armed forces and those of other nations, but the technology is becoming more accessible and advanced all the time. I understand that companies such as DHL and Amazon are beginning to research the deployment of commercial delivery drones for business purposes. We must assume that such technology will be available not only to our friends but, as the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) noted, to those who wish us ill. We must consider that. I know that technology to counter such a situation is under development too.

We must consider those whom we ask to operate drones. It is our duty to look after military personnel operating within a conflict zone; that is equally relevant whether crews are miles away or have not moved from their desks during their deployment because they are engaging in the conflict by operating a drone. Clearly, a key decision-making factor will be the fact that the use of drones does not directly endanger our service personnel, which is important. The ability to control drones remotely means that our personnel can operate effectively out of harm’s way, and we must see the positive in that. However, Chris Cole of Drone Wars UK strikes a cautionary note:

“Drones swing the balance away from engaging in the often difficult and long-term work of solving the root causes of conflicts through diplomatic and political means, towards a quick, short-term ‘fix’ of ‘taking out the bad guys’.”

However, it may not be the bad guys who end up on the receiving end of drone strikes, which is surely a cause for concern and another reason to consider legality. Studies on US targets have revealed a number of flaws in how targets are identified, including during a number of strikes resulting from electronic communications that officials subsequently acknowledged as unreliable.

David Cortright, the policy director of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, also raises ethical questions about drone use as a means of combating terrorism. He cautions that after 10 years of combat in Afghanistan and given the current high levels of threat from terrorist attacks, of which we are all aware, we ought to know better. We may need to consider that point. Additionally, former Pentagon adviser David Kilcullen has testified that drone strikes arouse anger, which coalesces populations around extremists. As we have heard, recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan are seen as a direct response to drone attacks. Reports from the federally administered tribal areas in Pakistan suggest that it is a matter of honour under the tribal code for the families of drone attack victims to seek revenge. The US drone programme, operating largely in declared war zones, counts nearly 90% of people killed in recent drone strikes in Afghanistan as not the intended targets of those attacks.

From a legal perspective, such statistics and reports cause concern. Yasmine Ahmed, director of Rights Watch UK, told the Joint Committee on Human Rights that clarity is required about the framework on which the UK Government rely in their use of targeted drone strikes, and I agree. Although the UK Attorney General suggested in September this year that UK Government actions on targeted drone killings complied with humanitarian law, serious questions still remain, including on the definition of a combatant and the assessment of those killings as militarily necessary.

In 2010, Sir Gus O’Donnell presented the parliamentary convention on when the UK Government are expected to provide Parliament with the opportunity to debate decisions to use military force. Except in an emergency, approval in advance is required. It is therefore concerning that the unprecedented use of a drone strike to kill a UK citizen in Syria outside the context of war was not notified to Parliament in advance. The facts of the incident have not yet emerged into the public domain, leaving the parameters within which the Government are working unclear to us.

The use of drones must also be considered in relation to those whom we deploy to operate them. I am pleased that we have discussed mental health provision for service personnel in this House recently; the issue deserves scrutiny, understanding and resource. In such discussions, it is imperative that we also fully consider the impact on mental health of being a drone operator.

In 2013, the US Armed Forces Health Surveillance Centre published a report noting that operators of unmanned drones can suffer the same psychological problems as operators of manned drones and similar problems to aircrew. In addition, it said that the negative psychological impacts do not present themselves only as post-traumatic stress disorder. Because of the level of emotional distance between operators and the reality of the human targets that they are pursuing, there are concerns that it might remove the human aspect of their work.

Last month, The Guardian published an article in which a number of former air force drone operators and technicians had come to the paper to discuss their opposition to the ongoing reliance on unmanned drones. One ex-operator described his experience this way:

“Ever step on ants and never give it another thought? That’s what you are made to think of the targets—as just black blobs on a screen. You start to do these psychological gymnastics to make it easier to do what you have to do—they deserved it, they chose their side. You had to kill part of your conscience to keep doing your job every day—and ignore those voices telling you this wasn’t right.”

Questions have been raised about the psychological effects of the very real distance between operator and target, which has sometimes been described as encouraging a PlayStation mentality amongst drone operators. That is a danger in having to remotely control the aircraft separately from the events on screen, as operators can disconnect from the reality of their control over the drones. The UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions raised the concept of a videogame mentality in a 2010 report to the UN Human Rights Council.

Recently, the BBC also highlighted the impact of the job upon the mental wellbeing of drone operators. It reported on the RAF’s 13 Squadron, which operates drones from an aircraft hangar in Lincolnshire. The operators there, who are all qualified and experienced military pilots, work in shifts, controlling aircraft thousands of miles away. The preparation and processes that they undergo are exactly the same as those required for flying a conventional aircraft, and once the door to the workspace is closed the pilots report that it puts them psychologically in that airspace, with all the emotions and thought processes being exactly the same as on manned planes.

One RAF crew member is reported as saying that the potential for psychological and emotional impact on drone operators was

“far greater than it ever was with a manned cockpit”.

He explained that the impressive resolution of drones such as Reaper means that operators know exactly what is on the other end of their crosshairs, and that this immediacy of targeting is also magnified by the fact that the drone crews are “airborne” for hours and hours. Also, unlike conventional crews, they do not have four-month tours but a year-round job, with a proportionately greater risk of suffering post-traumatic stress disorder.

Similar issues are being reported in the USA, with concerns regarding the psychological impact of drone crew experience, and difficulties with crew retention and recruitment. These difficulties are becoming a significant issue, with drone crew members keen to transfer to conventional crews, and consideration now being given to financial incentives to persuade pilots to remain on drone crews, where numbers are becoming critical because three times more pilots are aiming to leave drone crews than conventional crews. Studies have also indicated a concern about psychological numbing, which is attributed to crew seeing the very clear, direct video feed.

[Mr David Davis]

The hon. Lady is very eloquently laying out one of the major areas of concern about the use of this weapons system. Does she think that if the drone operators know unequivocally that what they are doing is legal, it would make their job easier and their chance of suffering stress lower?

[Kirsten Oswald]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention; he makes a very important point. If we expect our service personnel to go into any conflict situation, whether they are in a conventional aircraft or operating a drone, it is our responsibility to make sure that there is a legal basis for that action.

There is an ethical dilemma when drone operators are faced with their targets. In the USA, it is being considered whether it might be better to replace the images that crew members see with modified interfaces. It is possible to do that, but of course the concern then arises that it would potentially introduce an unethical level of emotional distance, which could lead to a lack of recognition of those affected by strikes as people, dehumanising them. I note that the right hon. Gentleman had heard General McChrystal express similar concerns.

That disconnect has also been reported as causing operators challenges in coming to terms with the effects of their actions on both combatants and civilians, and their working environment can contribute to that. After their shift, operators head home in their cars, thousands of miles from the results of their day’s work and—crucially—remote from the opportunity to assimilate their experiences with those of colleagues, as would be the case in a more conventional setting.

Looking to the future, it was recently disclosed that the United States military are using civilian operators to fly drones that are tracking suspected militants and other targets across the globe. This is part of a privatisation of job roles that were previously exclusively undertaken by military personnel. The Los Angeles Times reports that civilian pilots operate combat air patrols that daily fly through areas where military operations are taking place. These civilian operators provide video and collect sensitive information for the United States air force. Although they are not permitted to pinpoint targets or fire missiles at them, they are clearly operating military drones, which is prompting questions, because they are now part of what the USAF refers to as the “kill chain”, which starts with surveillance and ends with the launching of missiles.

That is not the situation that we are faced with now in the UK, but we are faced with a situation in which the thresholds of operation—the legalities and the parameters— are unclear. It is also a situation where, notwithstanding the potential for use of drones, unintended consequences reign supreme. For these reasons, I call upon the Government to debate this issue further, and I would be delighted to hear further information from the Minister about the points that I have made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) for securing the debate. As ever, he made a thoughtful and insightful contribution. He is also a man of boundless optimism—after all, he suggested that we would hear from the Chilcot inquiry “shortly”.

Unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have undoubtedly proved devastatingly effective. Militarily, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, their use has assisted in expelling al-Qaeda from large tracts of Pakistan—albeit not without some cost, and I agree precisely with what he and General McChrystal had to say—and from Yemen. Politically, drones have allowed the US in particular to pursue strategic objectives without needing to put boots on the ground in an era when, as we all know, there is very little appetite among western electorates for their countries to engage in further overseas military adventures.

Without doubt, the development of drone technology will continue apace in the years ahead. Drones will assuredly be an essential part of the furniture of international warfare and, as a consequence, their use will require a thorough overhaul of international law and regulation. That overhaul is still to come.

In the euphoria that surrounds the decisive deployment of drones to eliminate terrorist leaders from afar, it is also worth reflecting—as the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) did earlier—that before the world is too much older our enemies will also enjoy access to this technology, with potentially calamitous effect. Terrorists and even criminal extortion gangs will soon be able to operate hardware of this sort, the cost and capability of which is rapidly coming within their range.

The use of drones by the UK military was first avowed as recently as September, when the Prime Minister announced the extrajudicial killings of two UK citizens, Reyaad Khan and Junaid Hussain, who had joined ISIL in Syria and featured prominently in a propaganda video that promoted and encouraged terrorist attacks on UK soil. Of course, the UK Government wished to place those deaths on the record lest details seeped out via a freedom of information inquiry, as happened in July regarding joint US-UK air strikes over Syrian airspace. Moreover, the US policy of routine avowal of fatal drone attacks created the risk that eagle-eyed observers might notice that the two operations resulting in the deaths of Khan and Hussain had not been similarly gazetted. It is better to take the initiative rather than allow lurid conclusions to be drawn. In November, Mohammed Emwazi—alias “Jihadi John”—was similarly dispatched in co-operation with the US military.

For as long as such ISIL-supporting British terrorists were at large on Syrian soil, it would evidently have been impossible to bring them to trial. To be fair, there is a distinction between the situation today and that in Ulster some 40 years ago. Of course there were ungoverned spaces in parts of Londonderry and Belfast, but there are massive tracts within Syria that make it impossible to bring people to trial. None the less, their terrorist activity was designed to cause mayhem on UK soil. We are de facto at war with the so-called Islamic State, and as a consequence Khan and Hussain might properly be regarded as combatants. However, the strong inclination in the post-Iraq war era to provide watertight legal cover for all military operations led, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden said, to the drone raid being classed as “self-defence” under article 51 of the UN charter.

That has opened up a series of contentious issues. For example, were the primary subjects of the drone attack “directing an attack”, and was such an attack “imminent”? As a consequence, our intelligence agencies will need to show after each drone strike that they have carefully considered the operation of article 51, unless we have the change in law that I will come on to. We need to keep the terms of such drone operations under regular, if not constant, review.

[Mr David Davis]

My right hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. One of the difficulties with such a legal basis is the requirement of imminence, which gives us an evidential problem. Presumably there was some sort of terrorist cell in this country that was about to carry out a terrorist action, and the Government have failed or refused to answer questions about whether there have been any arrests in the follow-up to that strike. That gives us a problem. The Government may have good reason for not giving us the information, but when drone strikes are carried out they will have to be ready to provide an evidential chain of some sort to show that what they did was correct.

[Mark Field]

I very much agree with my right hon. Friend’s comments. It seems to me that we need to keep the terms of drone use under regular, if not constant, review, and that before seeking ministerial authorisation the intelligence agencies would have needed to conclude that the individuals posed an imminent and clear threat to national security. It is also essential that our security services satisfy themselves that a drone strike, rather than any attempt at apprehension, is both necessary and proportionate. The issue of collateral damage—the impact of a strike upon innocent civilians in the vicinity—has been incredibly controversial, especially in Pakistan and Yemen, where it has often been recognised that US strikes have necessitated discreet co-operation with host Governments.

In truth, the increasingly sophisticated monitoring of mobile phones, other telephony and emails has enhanced the ability to target suspects with virtually pinpoint accuracy—it was notable that the only other fatalities in the two UK strikes this summer were associates. That is a good thing; we should try as far as possible to minimise collateral damage.

Nevertheless, I agree with other contributors to the debate that there is now an urgent, and possibly unanswerable, case for updated legislation to govern the use of—not to mention the continued reliance upon—new drone technology. That would allow the Prime Minister and the Government of the day to act with the timing and precision required to wage effective operations, without first having to consider how to navigate the complex labyrinth of precedent, law and parliamentary approval that currently blunts us. The US War Powers Act goes some way to providing a template in that regard, bestowing on the Executive branch the ability to give the green light to action without congressional approval, while maintaining a series of vital checks, safeguards and balances.

It is worth recalling that US legal justification in relation to the use of drones on overseas targets has historically been markedly less strenuous. That has arguably caused difficulties in the ungoverned parts of the world where “Five Eyes” co-operation is often strongest—Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and, more recently, parts of Syria. The UK security services’ knowledge that intelligence passed to their US counterparts is used to launch drone strikes without, for example, any clear imminent threat to national security, potentially places the UK military, and our own workers, in a legal quagmire.

Although a common protocol among western allies would be ideal, that would necessitate an open political debate about the desirability of adopting the hit list approach that the US military have for selecting drone targets. For the Obama Administration, that approach has essentially involved a rolling update of named individuals, with the list being refreshed whenever there is a successful drone attack involving the assassination of terrorist targets. Needless to say, such an approach is far removed from the necessity for the prior legal approval of each and every step under British law as it currently stands.

Thank you, Mr Stringer, for allowing me to speak for rather longer than my requisite minutes, but I did take some interventions. I very much look forward to the Minister’s response to the debate, and to her recognising that we need new legislation and some genuine thought about the matter, not just in the context of what is happening in Syria but, I suspect, for many years to come.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Brennan]

I will give way to the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis).

[Mr David Davis]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, which impinges on the speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field). One of the most worrying things for me about American policy is the idea that the President approves a kill list every Thursday morning, or whenever it is. That is the kind of area in which I do not think we want to go in the direction of the Americans. Politicians should not have the right to strike someone from the face of the earth, no matter what the logic. Does the hon. Gentleman agree?

[Kevin Brennan]

I do agree.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Penny Mordaunt)]

I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) for securing this important and extremely interesting debate, and I thank all the other Members who spoke and attended. I also thank my right hon. Friend for recognising that this new technology has great potential to keep our armed forces safe and reduce civilian casualties. He and other Members spoke about its capacity to be a decisive tool and a force multiplier, about its precision, and about its role in keeping our armed forces safe. An important point that has not been touched on is that because the crews who operate armed drones are not themselves in a combat zone—although there are unique stresses, which I will address later in my speech—and may build up many hours of experience in operating and flying missions, they might actually make better judgments.

I shall first try to answer some of the technical legal questions that my right hon. Friend focused on, after which I will address the other points that Members have made. Our doctrine and rules of engagement are compliant with international law—including international humanitarian law—and underpinned by the principles of distinction, humanity, proportionality and military necessity. We are confident that the existing provisions in international law are sufficient to regulate the new weapons systems.

Our rules of engagement—as opposed to our static doctrine—are tailored to specific missions and will include policy, legal and operational guidance. They are typically given in a series of permissions and prohibitions that must be followed during a particular operation. We do not put the rules of engagement in the public domain, because it would give our opponents a considerable advantage if they understood that aspect of our operations.

A lot of what my right hon. Friend was driving at and a lot of the assurances he wants are contained in our doctrine. In 2011, the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre produced a joint doctrine note on our approach to unmanned air systems, to capture some of the issues we knew about at the time. Although it was a thorough piece of work, it was meant to be only a temporary document. There has clearly been a huge evolution in our understanding of unmanned air systems and the related issues, some of which were touched on earlier. That document initiated a debate about a whole range of legal and ethical issues. The original note was agreed by a wide stakeholder group in 2011, and the next version, to be called the UK air power doctrine, is anticipated towards the end of next year. It will develop the concepts and framework that will underpin our rules of engagement and policy development, and will be the receptacle for a lot of the issues raised by my right hon. Friend.

This whole subject area is clearly complicated by the current wider debates about international humanitarian law, where it applies and in what situations. We are used to dealing with state-on-state conflicts, but we are moving into very different territory these days, and that is becoming the norm. I devote a large proportion of my time to the subject, and one of the first meetings I had as Armed Forces Minister was with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to look at how we secure the primacy of international humanitarian law and deal with the questions around non-state conflicts.

[Mr David Davis]

Will the Minister give an undertaking that the MOD will co-operate fully with the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which will hopefully provide information about exactly that issue?

[Penny Mordaunt]

Yes, I can give my right hon. Friend that assurance. If we have been tardy in responding to the Committee, I apologise, and I am very happy to follow that up. The Secretary of State is due to speak to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) shortly, and I will follow that up after the debate. We certainly wish to co-operate, because putting more information into the public domain about the seriousness with which we take such issues will reassure hon. Members.

We have focused on air systems, but there are all sorts of other systems. We are investing massively in underwater systems, for which there is another set of legal requirements. My right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden referred to operational areas and war zones. Clearly, we might have to use these systems and others to respond to a range of situations, including hostage situations and so forth. The picture is complex, but we take it extremely seriously. An enormous amount of time is going into developing the doctrine as the technology develops. We want to operate in a good framework with best practice, and we want our allies to do the same. There is wide international consultation, and we will be playing a full role in helping others to raise their game.

Let me turn to some of the other points that hon. Members have made. The particular weapon or platform type that we use has no bearing on our decision about whether to use force. I assure the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) that the targeting boards and processes are identical for these and other weapon systems.

Several hon. Members focused on the effect on pilots. That issue is often framed in terms of the emotional effect of taking a life on the pilots conducting the strike activity, whether they become detached from the situation and whether they have access to the same support—decompression and so forth—that people on more conventional operations can access. It is often about not what people do, but what they see. I have spoken to pilots who have said that most distressing and frustrating thing is to see something take place that they are unable to prevent, in part because of the strict restrictions placed on them, which cause stress. Of course, the health and wellbeing of our armed forces personnel is of the utmost importance, and we are mindful of the pressure and stresses that such operations cause. The personnel involved are carefully monitored and, where appropriate, have access to the highest levels of military physical and mental healthcare. Looking after them is key, and that is one of the main roles that our front-line commanders are tasked with.

The RAF stress management and resilience training team has delivered stress awareness briefs to units operating these systems, to make personnel aware of the subject and of the range of assistance and support that is available to them. We recognise the unique nature of such operations, and we have embedded TRIM—trauma risk management—providers in RAF Reaper squadrons. As hon. Members know, TRIM provides a model of peer group mentoring and support for use in the aftermath of traumatic events.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) and the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin John Docherty) asked about others having access to such systems and our ability to combat that. I assure all hon. Members that that was a key strand of our recent strategic defence and security review, and there will be ongoing work to ensure that the right defensive systems and practices are in place to prevent such technology from being used against us.

Hon. Members spoke about the effect on hearts and minds. We understand that whatever means we use to deliver precision weapons in conflict zones—air strikes, operations on the ground or remotely piloted air systems—there will be a negative effect on the civilian populations in the vicinity. However, we do not take the decision to conduct strikes lightly, and we take every step to minimise the impact on civilian populations, including using precision-guided munitions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David Davis]

Thank you very much for chairing this debate, Mr Stringer. It has been a privilege to serve under your chairmanship. I thank the Backbench Business Committee, and I hope we have justified its decision to give us this debate.

Let me quickly pick up a couple of points. I thank the Minister, who answered many of our questions well. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) argued that we need a new law. Given that the UK air power doctrine will be published in 2016, what we really need more immediately is a robust and clear public application of the current law. That would be the most important outcome of this debate.

Some hon. Members argued that this is a new system, but it is operated in the same way as existing systems. The principle is the same, but the practicalities are different. To put it in physical terms, a Tornado can cross the length of a football field in one third of a second, but a drone can watch the same football field in orbit for eight hours. Clearly, there are differences in precision.

The rules of war were built around the fog of war and the doubt that it creates, so we have an opportunity to make them more precise and humane. However, as the hon. Members for West Dunbartonshire (Martin John Docherty) and for East Renfrewshire (Kirsten Oswald) said, in American strikes, each kill of a terrorist is claimed three times. That implies that at least two innocent people die as a result of failures of intelligence, so there are areas of concern.

That brings me to the most important aspect of this debate, which is the blurring of the area between war and peace. Drone operations in war zones worry me much less than drone operations outside war zones. That is where Governments will be tempted to do things that are beyond what we normally expect of a civilised western Government. I will look very carefully at the 2016 UK air power doctrine for an answer to that issue.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the rules of engagement and the use of armed drones.

BAE Systems

David Davis Excerpts

Thursday 24th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House urges BAE Systems to act to preserve the UK’s defence production skills base and, as a recipient of enormous resources over many years from the UK taxpayer, to deploy those resources in such a way as to protect the nation’s manufacturing capability.

On 27 September, BAE Systems, which is Britain’s biggest engineering employer, delivered an agonising shock to its work force. It announced that it intended to lay off 3,000 employees in its plants across the country. In this process it will be closing the production plant at Brough in my constituency, thereby terminating the jobs of almost 900 skilled workers and staff. That was a shock, but not a surprise because the previous weekend the newspapers had published a leak about those plans, which were in breach of all BAE’s codes of corporate responsibility. This cruel treatment of a loyal, decent and hard-working work force was, frankly, a disgrace. As I shall point out, that was not the only disgraceful aspect of this decision.

The symbolism of this retrenchment could hardly be starker. Both aerospace and defence are massively important businesses for the United Kingdom. BAE is by far the biggest company in either industry in Britain. The size of the cutback is grievous and grimly symptomatic of the decline in manufacturing in this country—so far, so bad—but there is a risk in this storm of statistics and grand economic strategy that we lose sight of what really matters. What matters most is the misery that the decision visits on individuals, families and communities: the destruction of their hopes and the blighting of their lives.

In Brough—a community that thinks of itself as the home of the Hawk, centred on a factory that has been building military aircraft since 1916—the shock was visible. It is one of those factories where grandfathers, fathers and sons all work, thus maintaining a proud tradition of skilled work through the generations. A number of married couples who work there met there. Therefore, after Christmas this year, whole families will be looking for work, and what a time and place to look for work. Many of them live in a part of Hull that has more unemployed people chasing every job than anywhere else in the country. In the past four years, the city and area have lost 7,500 manufacturing jobs—a quarter of all the manufacturing jobs now left there.

Brough’s closure is not only an industrial tragedy, but a human tragedy—all so painful, and all so unnecessary. While Brough was announcing job losses across Yorkshire and Lancashire, Airbus was opening a £400 million factory, which increased jobs by 650 and underpinned 6,000 other jobs. That factory makes Airbus wings. In past years, Brough and other parts of the BAE empire have made the struts, spans and other parts of wings for Airbus.

Until about five years ago, BAE maintained a stake in Airbus. The close relationship meant that Airbus components of all sorts were made by the BAE work force. That was a smart strategy. Although civil and military aviation operate on different business and economic cycles and different demands at any time, the manufacturing skills and requirements are interchangeable to a large extent. Until then, the company could switch resources backwards and forwards to whichever sector had the demand.

Despite the counter-cyclical nature of those businesses, profits were stabilised—as, of course, was employment—but five years ago, before the banking crash and the sudden constraints on public spending, defence sales looked lucrative and profitable, and civil aviation looked just a bit too competitive. Now, all is reversed of course: defence sales are hard to come by anywhere in the world, and commercial aviation is booming.

In 2006, in what must count as an astonishing piece of strategic myopia, the company made a hideously short-term decision and disposed of its stake in Airbus and withdrew from civil aviation. Britain is the country that created the first jet airliner. We now own no production capacity for civil airliners. That is not the only strategy error to hit the work force.

Over the years, BAE and its predecessor companies have had a symbiotic relationship with the Government that is all too characteristic of defence industries. In the largely cost-plus environment of defence procurement, the British taxpayer funds the development and production of weapons and aircraft. British test pilots risk their lives testing, proving and improving those aircraft. In exchange, the nation receives the aircraft, equipment and weapons necessary to defend our shores and interests, but it also obtains a defence industrial capacity that supports us in time of war.

In addition, the Government go in for defence sales support, specifically to maintain the viability of that domestic capacity. That is the theory. It seems to me that what has been happening is almost the opposite. Let us take, for example, the Harrier, perhaps the most iconic post-war British aircraft. Without it, we might have lost the Falklands war. It was developed with British taxpayers’ money and tested by British test pilots. Today, it is an American aircraft. As far as I can tell, the Americans paid little if anything for the transfer of intellectual property in the most innovative aircraft since the war, yet they now manufacture that aircraft: British money; British skill; American jobs and capability. Sadly, that appears to be happening again.

If we win the potentially huge American order for the T-X aircraft, between 350 and 1,000 advanced Hawks will be manufactured not in Britain, but in Texas. What that means is demonstrated by what has been happening with the sales of the Hawk to India. In the past decade, about 150 Hawks have been sold to the Indian air force. The vast majority of them—all except the first 24, I think—have been built in Bangalore. BAE will tell anyone, as they told the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Alan Johnson) and me at the time, that it was a necessary offset and that it did not mean that it was moving Hawk production abroad.

I looked in the Indian papers and the defence journals that cover both sides of the story to see what is happening on that project. Ashok Nayak, the chief executive of Hindustan Aviation, which builds the Hawk in India, said this year:

“Last year, while negotiating the contract for 57 Hawks, BAE Systems wanted to give HAL”—

Hindustan Aviation—

“additional work in building Hawks in the future. HAL is looking for a large role in that build. What exactly, is still being discussed.”

That was quoted in the Indian newspaper, Business Standard, but such things are said in not just one paper. The journal Defence Now said much the same thing:

“BAE was discussing moving more production to Hindustan Aviation”,

effectively to create export sales out of India. Separately, reporting at the Paris air show earlier this year, the journalist David Donald said in another journal:

“BAE Systems envisions no problems in maintaining the Hawk’s production status for many years, with the production line in India now driving and sustaining the all-important supply chain.”

It is plain to see that, whether by accident or design, BAE is effectively moving to a position where the emblematic British aircraft, the Hawk—the Red Arrows aircraft—will be made abroad. That is where a serious part of our jobs are going now. What happened to the Harrier yesterday and what is happening to the Hawk today, if we are not careful, will happen to other aircraft in the future. In summary, successive British Governments have maintained a policy to keep a cost-effective British defence industry on British soil. BAE Systems has gained from that strategy, with the effect that we have exported those jobs and capability to foreign soil.

It gets worse. Since the 1960s, to maintain a viable defence industry, successive British Governments of all parties have operated under a set of rules, known as the yellow book, that determine which costs the company meets and which costs the taxpayer meets. It transpires that when BAE lays off 3,000 workers, the BAE shareholder will not meet the cost, as is reported on the front page of the Hull Daily Mail today: “Taxpayers face £100m BAE bill”. Given how the system works, between £60 million and £110 million—we do not yet have the total—will be paid by the taxpayer, not by BAE, to lay off 3,000 people and destroy their jobs. That is outrageous.

A policy designed to defend our defence capability is being used to make us subsidise the destruction of that capability. A policy designed to defend and protect British jobs is being used to destroy British jobs. If I were the Minister, I would not pay BAE a penny. I would tell BAE, “This is your decision. This is the outcome of your strategy. If you don’t like it, I’ll see you in court.”

I should tell the Minister that I have spoken to the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee about this matter, and she has agreed to have a National Audit Office investigation. I hope that that helps to stiffen the Ministry of Defence’s spine. I have also discovered that BAE has already benefited to the tune of hundreds of millions of pounds from such yellow book subsidies for failure. I will ask the PAC to investigate that, too.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I have been following the thread of my right hon. Friend’s argument, but I point out that the issue is not entirely one-sided for BAE Systems. The previous Government signed a number of contracts based on the work throughput in a location. No matter what Her Majesty’s Government ordered, BAE Systems was guaranteed to deliver work, through the Clyde, Woodford and other sites around the United Kingdom. If the Government cancelled orders, BAE Systems had to pick up the bill, because it was a sort of Stalinist tractor factory contract that the previous Government put in place.

[Mr Davis]

Frankly, I will resist making this a Labour versus Tory argument, for a simple reason. For the past 10 years, when it comes to BAE Systems and employment in our constituencies, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle and I have studiously aimed solely at protecting jobs, sometimes demurring from scoring political points. My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace) makes a good general point, that there is a central planning approach—a bad one—but the raw truth is that it was designed to ensure that our defence capability and defence employment were stable, and would be there in time of war. That has been turned, and it has effectively been used to destroy those jobs and that defence capability.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

Mr Deputy Speaker— who represents Ribble Valley, in which Samlesbury sits—together with many other colleagues, regardless of party, and I have sought to adopt the same bipartisan approach in our pursuit of BAE interests on our side of the Pennines. We are in full support of what the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Alan Johnson) are seeking to do. It would be terrible and hopeless if we turned this into a 2011 contest across the Pennines.

[Mr Davis]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right on both counts. It would suit the people whose minds we are trying to change very well if we fought against ourselves on party political or geographical grounds. Much as I look back with amusement and fondness on past cricketing experiences in the wars of the roses, those wars need not be repeated here and now.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend makes a powerful argument, much of which I agree with, but in the interests of balance, will he concede that there is another side to the coin? The Apache helicopter, which we purchased, made by Boeing, was built in the UK, not by the American work force. We also make kit that is exported: the empennage—the rear section—of the F-35, designed for an American market, is made here, and the M777 Howitzer is made in this country and exported. There is another side to the coin.

[Mr Davis]

There is another side to the coin, but since my hon. Friend draws me on that point, I am afraid that on one side there is a pound, and on the other there is a ha’penny. I was the Public Accounts Committee Chairman for five years, and I looked at the issue in close detail, and I have to tell him that the Americans are far more aggressive and effective than we are when it comes to protection of their intellectual property.

The proposals have all sorts of strategic implications. One of the things that we looked at 10 years ago—I am probably not breaking too many secrets—was the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile. We were not even allowed technological knowledge of AMRAAM because of the Americans’ defences, and that made it less effective for us. This is quite an area of battle. Indeed, the previous Defence Secretary made quite an issue of this, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) will know, and will understand only too well. We have not fought our corner very well, and I am afraid that BAE Systems is culpable, as part of that. It has been very poor in terms of its strategic decisions on civil and military aviation, and when it comes to protecting our intellectual property.

[Mr Greg Knight (East Yorkshire) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Davis]

I shall give way for the last time, because many Members want to speak.

[Mr Knight]

I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way; he is being very generous. He posed the question of whether what was happening was the result of accident or design. Has he not now answered that question? The answer is design—it is the deliberate decision of the management.

[Mr Davis]

It is certainly the consequence of deliberate decisions. Whether the management intended this outcome at the beginning, or whether it is sheer crass misjudgment, I will leave the House to judge. What I am trying to do is lay out the facts as starkly as I can, because it was long ago time to open up the process to public scrutiny.

That brings me to the decision today. The company is in the middle of a 90-day consultation period. From the start, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle and I, and a number of colleagues—probably every Member of Parliament involved in the process—told the company that we would hold it to its legal responsibilities on a 90-day process. Those legal responsibilities involve being transparent and open, and looking in good faith at all proposals put to it. I repeat that: looking in good faith at all proposals put to it. Unfortunately I have to tell the House that, based on the company’s behaviour to date, it seems to me entirely possible that it has broken its legal responsibilities. It has not looked in good faith at all the options available to it, but I will leave it to my right hon. Friend—I beg his pardon, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle; he is my friend—to say more on that later.

I certainly expect the company to demonstrate why it turned down the options that it was looking at before it made the decision. As far as I can see, it has not even done that. Secondly, I expect it to give proper consideration to the plan drawn up by its management to preserve employment at Brough in my constituency, albeit at lower levels. Again, I think that the right hon. Gentleman will touch on that point.

The work force at Hull are the best, in terms of attitude, productivity and skill, I saw in my 20 years in business before I came to the House, and BAE Systems senior management agree. The work force’s attitude is positive, their productivity is high, and the right hon. Gentleman and I have always been told that they are competitive on cost and quality. They deserve a proper chance.

If the company does a proper, open-minded review, and the figures do not add up—I accept that is possible—its responsibilities do not end there. We have been fortunate: the Civitas think-tank has invested £50,000 in looking at the Brough site to see what it can be used for, how the skills can be deployed, and what we can do without destroying the skills base. For that, I thank it warmly. The chairman of the Government’s skill retention taskforce came to see us yesterday, and it is at work, looking for alternatives. The Government acted within two weeks and put in place two enterprise zones, one on each side of the Pennines, to help us in all this, but if we cannot come up with an alternative, we will again lose a critical mass of skilled workers that will not be replaced once it is dissipated. That is the nub of the matter.

The job losses in Brough and on the other side of the Pennines are, to a large extent, a direct consequence of the company’s strategy over the years. The company’s profits come, to a very large extent, from taxpayer support.

[Andrew Percy (Brigg and Goole) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend makes a powerful point. On the legacy issue, does he agree that it is not good enough for BAE Systems to say, “We will do everything that we can to find people alternative work”? It has to make sure that that legacy remains in east Yorkshire, and that the site remains a site of employment in manufacturing for our constituents.

[Mr Davis]

My hon. Friend, who has been very active in this campaign, brings me to the nub of the issue. It is precisely because the company had, until five years ago, experience in civil aviation; precisely because it is the biggest employer of engineers in the country; and because of its knowledge, access, contacts and understanding of the markets, that it is best equipped to find an alternative use for Brough—full stop. That is what I—and others, I am sure—demand. It is not just Brough; I keep saying Brough because it is closest to my heart, but the company must find alternative employment and use for the assets and the work force across the country. That is what it is best equipped to do. Frankly, as far as I can see, so far it has not lifted a finger in that direction.

There has been a lot of criticism in recent weeks of high levels of executive pay. Recently, the statistic came out that, over 30 years, senior executives have had a 4,000% increase in pay. Despite severe criticism of senior management by investors and others over the years, the pay of BAE’s chief executive grew by 8,000% over the same period, double the national average. I am not one of those who believe that people should not be paid large sums of money, but I expect them to earn it. They could perhaps justify their salaries—the chief executive’s is £2.4 million—by doing a better job not only for shareholders, but for employees and the country.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Luff]

I know the decision to which the hon. Gentleman refers, and it will of course please other parts of the country, because BAE Systems will do the work elsewhere in the UK, but I shall happily talk to him about it privately afterwards if he would find that helpful.

I do not want to labour the point, but we all know how important defence is as an integral part of advanced manufacturing in this country. It sustains about 300,000 jobs, many of which are highly skilled, in thousands of companies of all sizes. Those employed are at the pinnacle of manufacturing and engineering ability, and they do a significant job in helping to keep our country secure. The industry is a key sponsor of manufacturing apprenticeships and training, the quality of which is acknowledged by employers across a range of industries, and intensive research and development programmes also mark out the defence sector as a source of innovation and intellectual property.

The House will also be aware—this was at the heart of the two speeches that we have heard—that defence is a major contributor to export revenues. UK industry has an outstanding record of export success, second only to the US as an exporter of defence equipment and services. Despite the challenging market conditions experienced by many sectors of the wider manufacturing base, the UK has in the last year won almost £6 billion in new defence exports business. That represents an increase in our share of the global defence market from 18% to 22%, and we are committed to continuing that trend with strong support for future defence export campaigns, including the products mentioned by the Members who have spoken.

Within that vital and dynamic sector of the UK economy, BAE Systems has a significant role. It has been the MOD’s largest defence supplier for some time; it is the fourth largest supplier to the US Department of Defence, which accounts for 50% of its revenue; and it is, indeed, the world’s second largest defence company. I should like to pay a tribute to BAE Systems: its speed and adaptability in updating software for the Typhoon aircraft’s radar and defensive aids systems was one of the keys to the success of the recent action in Libya, and we owe all its staff a great debt of gratitude for that.

BAE Systems’ wider involvement, beyond Typhoon, extends to many of the MOD’s largest programmes, including the Astute submarine, the Type 45 destroyer, the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier, the joint combat aircraft, general munitions and support for the armoured fighting vehicle fleet. Overall in 2010, BAE Systems’ revenue from the UK amounted to just over £4 billion, representing 20% of the company’s total revenue. So hon. Members should be in no doubt about the importance that the Government attach to the contribution of the UK defence industry in general and BAE Systems specifically to a rebalanced economy and export-led growth.

Let me turn to the specific programmes that are relevant to today’s debate. In the air, Typhoon, a triumph of European engineering, has really come of age. It is a first-class aircraft and the envy of discerning nations throughout the world. Already in service with six air forces—in the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria and Saudi Arabia—and at the forefront of the world’s media coverage following its recent exemplary operational deployment in the skies above Libya, the prospects for expanding Typhoon’s user community have never been better, and Ministers are working hard to ensure that we crystallise those opportunities.

Those export prospects meant that some changes were needed to the Typhoon programme. In May 2010, a request was made by the Eurofighter GmbH industrial consortium—I emphasise industry, not Government—to slow down the rate of Typhoon aircraft production in order to free up and sustain sufficient industrial capacity in the Eurofighter partner companies, comprising Alenia, BAE Systems and Cassidian, and to service export orders.

The UK, along with the other partner nation Governments, agreed to the industry’s proposal in July 2011—on the basis that it would not adversely affect the build-up of our own Typhoon fleet. As a result, there is now the prospect of Typhoons being made over a longer time frame, with the production lines open to 2018 rather than closing in 2015 as previously planned.

[Mr David Davis]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Peter Luff]

In just a second.

The letter that BAE Systems sent to Members ahead of this debate does not accurately explain the reasons for the slow-down, which in turn is responsible for many of the redundancies in Warton and Samlesbury.

[Mr Davis]

The Minister has answered my question.

[Peter Luff]

I will return on several occasions to that letter, which was disingenuous in several respects, and am grateful to my right hon. Friend.

The MOD has also invested £190 million in shaping a potential future unmanned combat air vehicle programme. BAE Systems has been our partner in that, and it led an industry team formed of Rolls-Royce, QinetiQ and GE Aviation. An unmanned combat air system programme could form part of a cost-effective solution in air-to-air and ground-to-air combat roles. That work includes the Taranis technology demonstrator, which is a world-class project and a testament to the UK’s advanced design, engineering and technology talents. It exhibits UK manufacturing capability at its very best.

We recognise and welcome the investment that the industry is making in technologies for unmanned air systems and encourage it to continue, so that it will have products that meet our needs and those of export customers. I have to say once again that the letter sent by BAE Systems to hon. Members does not appear to do justice to the partnership nature of the programme, because BAE Systems seems to take all the credit for it. The letter refers to the significant funding BAE Systems put in, but it does not emphasise the Government’s funding or the other three partner companies involved in the project. BAE Systems should be a little more modest from time to time in the claims it makes on behalf of the company.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Luff]

The short answer to that question is yes. I have obviously discussed the future of the sector with the company, but I have not done so in specific detail about Brough—in general terms, yes, but not specifically about Brough. If the hon. Lady wishes to make a suggestion to me, I will happily take it forward.

The Government need an efficient defence industry, and I make no apology for saying that. Another line in the letter to hon. Members seems to suggest that we are in some sense to blame for wanting BAE Systems to be more efficient. We want it to be more efficient for the sake of taxpayers and also for the sake of export opportunities. I make no apology for demanding that efficiency of our suppliers.

Although using open competition on the global market is the MOD’s preferred option and its default position for purchasing defence capabilities—I listened carefully to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden said in that respect—in certain situations, the MOD has had to enter into single-source procurement for some of the capabilities we must have in the UK. In these situations, we use the yellow book—it is called that because it is yellow—or “Government Profit Formula and Associated Arrangements” to give its full title. The yellow book covers the pricing arrangements to be used in single-source, non-competitive procurement. That can include reasonable rationalisation and redundancy costs, provided they are associated with a reduction in work related to single-source procurement.

The yellow book arrangements have remained largely unchanged for more than 40 years, which is why in January this year I commissioned Lord Currie of Marylebone to undertake a root-and-branch independent review of it. The MOD is currently undertaking a consultation, which runs until the new year, on Lord Currie’s proposals. No decisions will be made on his proposals until the consultation has been completed.

[Mr David Davis]

The Minister is making a very courteous and informative speech that is very helpful to us. Will he ensure that the response of the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office to my request that they investigate some of the yellow book operations is taken on board in that consultation?

[Peter Luff]

Yes. In fact, there has already been discussion with the National Audit Office about aspects of the single-source regulations. My right hon. Friend makes a very important point and I welcome what he said about that in his speech. It is very helpful indeed to have those remarks on the record.

The scope of Lord Currie’s review covers not just rationalisation and redundancy costs but a whole range of other issues associated with the process. He made his views clear on that in the document he produced, which states:

“We do not recommend moving away from the requirement that the MOD should bear the redundancy and restructuring costs associated with programme curtailment or cancellation. The alternative, whereby the contract bears such costs, would be appreciably more expensive. Faced with the possibility of bearing such costs, the contractor would necessarily need to price in a significant, possibly prohibitive, risk premium into contracts against that eventuality, over which it has little or no influence.”

Let us put those observations on liabilities in a BAE Systems context. The Brough site has historically been used for a variety of purposes, including the manufacture of the Hawk advanced jet trainers. It also has a structural testing facility used for a number of different airframes, and has been involved in the manufacture of some Nimrod MRA4 and Typhoon parts.

Some of those projects were procured on a single- source basis, but many of them were not. In the course of normal business, BAE Systems has approached us to begin discussions on payment for a share of its rationalisation and redundancy costs at Brough. We will ascertain what proportion, if any, of those costs we should be liable for under the yellow book framework. I can assure the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle and my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden that our negotiations will be robust in defence of taxpayers’ interests. I am very grateful for their support in that process.

We also recognise that the Government’s procurement decisions directly impact inward investment and exportability. Our involvement as the only level 1 partner in the joint strike fighter programme has brought significant high-end work into BAE System’s Samlesbury facility and, indeed, to UK industry more widely. That site manufactures the joint strike fighter rear fuselage for Lockheed Martin, in respect not only of the UK order but of orders from the US and other international clients. That production run should continue until at least 2035 and, on current plans, supply 3,000 aircraft. Following that, the UK should be very well placed to win additional competitively placed work within the JSF production support programme, potentially valued at £30 billion. Similarly, Government investment in the assessment phase of the electronically scanned radar for Typhoon will enable a capability leap for the Typhoon fleet. That not only benefits UK armed forces well into the 21st century, but improves Typhoon’s chances of success in the highly competitive, fast-jet market.

One issue that has not been raised is the fact that the letter from BAE Systems to hon. Members alludes to the withdrawal of the Harrier aircraft, but it does not provide the context and detail for that decision. In the bipartisan spirit of today, I shall simply say that we had a very challenging financial situation at the MOD and leave it at that. It is also true that the previous Government took the decision to delete the Sea Harrier in 2006, which is the air defence aircraft. In 2009, they took a subsequent decision to reduce the size of the remaining Harrier fleet, which meant it was not large enough to achieve sustained operations in Afghanistan and maintain an adequate contingent capability for the unexpected on its own. A combined fleet of Tornado and Harrier would not be cost-effective, because retiring an aircraft type delivers significantly greater savings than running two smaller fleets.

Although the withdrawal of the Harrier was a decision we took with regret, it was effectively forced upon us. Despite that sorry affair, we have worked hard to make the most of the situation. I can tell the House today that we have agreed the sale of the final 72 Harrier aircraft frames and associated parts, which will be used as a major source of spares to support the US Marine Corps Harrier AV-8B fleet of aircraft. The value of the sale is $180 million—some £110 million—and represents a good deal for UK taxpayers and the US Government. Added to the savings made from retiring the Harrier fleet from service, that sale takes the total estimated receipts and savings to the Ministry of Defence to around £1 billion. That will enable investment in a more modern and capable mixed fast jet fleet, including the state-of-the-art joint strike fighter, and therefore be good for British jobs.

The Harrier was a marvellous piece of technology and demonstrates the UK’s significant contribution to the development of fixed-wing aviation. I pay tribute to all those who contributed to its design and manufacture, as well as to our service personnel who flew and supported them. Accordingly, I am pleased to announce that we plan to offer two Harrier aircraft to museums in order to preserve the UK’s aviation heritage.

On the points made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden about the overseas production of British aircraft, conditions in the international marketplace do influence commercial choices and outcomes —it is not just a matter of what the Government say. It is increasingly unavoidably the case that export customers are demanding that their orders be satisfied mostly or wholly by means of local production and technology transfer. There is often a need to satisfy that critical condition in order to secure an order. That is certainly a feature of many of the potential Typhoon and Hawk export orders. My right hon. Friend regrets it—I may regret it, too—but it is a fact of life. If we want to win business, this is the way we have to do business.

The insistence on local involvement by the customer becomes even more likely and significant with larger export orders. The choice is to offer that condition or not to compete for the contract at all. That would reduce the viability of the businesses themselves and would be bad for UK employment. Last year’s deal to sell 57 Hawk to India was worth several hundred millions of pounds for UK companies, even though the final assembly was in India itself, so it is good for both sides of a vital strategic partnership for this country.

However, we also fully recognise our responsibility to those whose livelihoods are threatened by changes in the market. Work will continue for some time at Brough and the Skills and Jobs Retention Group and the Jobcentre Plus rapid response service will assist skilled workers there and at the other sites in finding new roles.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David Davis]

I think everybody takes the point that, in the modern defence market, there will be offset. Everybody has offset; we have offset. As has been made clear, offset arrangements do occur. It is problem when those offset arrangements become the permanent new manufacturing base for the aircraft, which is effectively what has happened with Harrier and seems at least to have been discussed with the head of Hindustan Aviation with BAE.

[Peter Luff]

I agree that when overseas production becomes a source of rival manufacture for export purposes, there is an issue for us. We have to accept, however, that the success of the Typhoon contract in India will depend on significant participation by Indian aerospace industries in the manufacture and upgrading of the aircraft. That is the price for winning the contract, and it is a price that we have to be prepared to pay.

Additionally on the subject of support for those who are sadly affected by these decisions, last month the Chancellor invited strong and viable proposals for enterprise zones in the areas surrounding the sites, with a view to enabling those zones to be up and running by April next year. As the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle said, attracting new industry to these existing manufacturing hubs could soften the impact of BAE’s change in structure without undermining the lives of these highly skilled workers.

Oral Answers to Questions

David Davis Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Howarth]

BAE Systems did not actually cite exports as being one of the problems. What it cited was the fact that it is a multinational company operating in a number of markets where there is pressure on the budgets—its principal market is the United States of America. It may have escaped the hon. Gentleman’s attention, but the US is looking to make defence cuts of $1,000 billion over the next 10 years, and that is affecting us all. However, the good news is that the fact that the US has to make savings means that it may well be more receptive to the sort of products made in his constituency and in others across the United Kingdom.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

The Minister is doing an excellent job of promoting British defence exports. The purpose of a defence export Minister is to promote exports so that our industry will be reinforced and strengthened, thereby helping to defend the country. He will know that, as part of its strategy, BAE Systems intends to sell 350 to 500 Hawks to the USA, not one of which will be built in Britain, and that the company is, at the same time, closing a factory in my constituency, costing 900 jobs. Does he think that that is consistent with the Government’s strategy of trying to defend the British defence industry?

[Mr Howarth]

I was very grateful to my right hon. Friend for bringing the trade unionists representing workers at both Brough and Warton to see me at the Conservative party conference in Manchester the other day. I will tell the House what I told them, which is that we believe that the Hawk is a fantastic, proven training aircraft—I have had the privilege of flying it recently. As he knows, the new T2 has the most sophisticated onboard air-combat simulator. The company and I are working very hard, along with my ministerial colleagues, to impress on the United States that it already operates the T-45 Goshawk, much of which came from Brough, and I hope that it will be able to buy the Hawk. Although the aircraft is unlikely, in serial numbers, to be built in the United Kingdom, the company hopes that there will be real prospects along the whole supply chain for British industry.

Defence Responsibilities

David Davis Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

The Secretary of State said that this issue will not be resolved in this House. Nevertheless, in coming to the House and presenting his apology to it, he has acted both properly and honourably. Let us put this issue in context. He has been attacked and criticised today by members, or previous members, and supporters of the Blair and Brown Governments, for whom a single meeting without officials or a record was not an issue; they made it a whole system of sofa government. Furthermore, in some cases they took very large sums from the attendance of that and changed public policy. Can the Secretary of State confirm to this House that he neither gained financially, either personally or politically, nor changed public policy in any way as a result of these meetings?

[Dr Fox]

I know exactly what my right hon. Friend is referring to, but I want to get back to the point that where there are serious allegations we do have to treat them seriously. I go back to the point I made earlier, which was that my contacts with Mr Werritty were neither for his financial gain in any of the issues I have mentioned, nor for my financial gain. However, I do think that in terms of making sure that there is total transparency, we have to make every effort not only to behave properly, but to be seen to behave properly.

Mull of Kintyre Review

David Davis Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. As I look for a single-sentence question, I feel sure that the test will be met by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis).

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I am not sure that I can meet that expectation, Mr Speaker, but I will do my best. Part of the problem arises from the clash between the demands for justice and for a solution that prevents an accident from happening again. The Secretary of State appears to have solved the justice problem for the future with a change to the rules on the attribution of blame. One of the problems was that there was no black box in this aircraft. Will he ensure that all RAF aircraft will in future have black boxes so that we will know the cause of any crash?

[Dr Fox]

Yes. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his support and long-standing campaigning on this issue. I have checked that we are now fitting black boxes routinely on all Chinooks. I can confirm that to my right hon. Friend.