Separation Centres Review

David Lammy Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Written Statements

[The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Mr David Lammy)]

I wish to inform the House of the publication of Jonathan Hall KC’s independent review of separation centres and the Government’s response to his findings.

On 12 April 2025, convicted terrorist Hashem Abedi launched a horrific attack on prison officers in the separation centre at HMP Frankland.

Separation centres are specialised, high-security units within a prison that are designed to house the most dangerous and influential extremist or terrorist prisoners, preventing them from radicalising or influencing others in the mainstream prison population.

Following this incident, on 15 May 2025, the then Lord Chancellor appointed Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, to consider the circumstances of the attack at HMP Frankland and lead an independent review into whether separation centres remain fit for purpose. Mr Hall was tasked with providing recommendations that could be implemented to reduce the likelihood of any such incident occurring again.

Before the review concluded, this Government took immediate steps to strengthen staff safety. The Prison Service commissioned a review to assess whether protective body armour—also known as stab-proof vests—should be rolled out to staff. On 3 June, the Government confirmed that stab-proof vests would be made mandatory for officers working in separation centres as well as close supervision centres, where the most violent and disruptive prisoners are placed. Staff in separation centres already have access to a range of protective equipment, including helmets, arm and leg protection, gloves, batons, shields, body-worn video cameras and PAVA pepper spray for use as required.

Over the past decade, around 230 recommendations have been made through independent reviews and inspections into how we manage the threat posed by terrorism in prisons and probation. Our assessment is that the vast majority have been effectively implemented and those that remain outstanding do so for clear and justified reasons with each kept under active and ongoing consideration.

The Government have now received Mr Hall’s most recent review, and we will take forward his further recommendations as part of our ongoing programme to strengthen the management of terrorist risk within our prisons.

I want to place on record the Government’s thanks for his careful, forensic, and thorough work.

Mr Hall has found that the principle of using small units such as separation centres to separate certain prisoners from the main population remains a sound one. However, he has identified various areas for improvement, and his report sets out 13 recommendations aimed at simplifying and strengthening the operation of the separation centre regime.

The Government are supportive of the report’s recommendations, accepting all 13 and in some areas committing to going further. Mr Hall’s report and the full Government response provide comprehensive information on these recommendations. By way of summary, Mr Hall’s recommendations are grouped within the Government response under four key themes.

The first theme addresses staff safety and risk management and covers recommendations 1, 9, 10 and 11. Collectively, these recommendations aim to create a safer, more resilient environment for both staff and prisoners. The Government recognise that some of the most dangerous terrorist offenders will seek to exploit vulnerabilities, making it essential that staff are equipped to identify and disrupt threats proactively. We will continue to invest in the tools, training, and support necessary to enable staff to manage terrorist risk confidently and safely. The Government remain unequivocal in their commitment to protecting prison staff and have already taken decisive steps to address these risks. We are delivering a comprehensive review of separation centre staff training, led by operational and clinical experts and supported by specialist learning and development teams. This review will ensure that all separation centre staff receive bespoke, evidence-based training tailored to the unique risks and challenges of managing terrorist offenders in high-security environments.

The second theme addresses system design and leadership and covers recommendations 2, 3 and 5. Mr Hall’s review identifies a clear opportunity to transform the way separation centres are governed and operated. The Government agree that the current model must evolve. To achieve this, we will implement a comprehensive redesign programme, developing a tiered separation centre system allowing movement between tiers based on rigorous new risk assessments. We are also committed to improving the quality of referrals for separation centre placement, including through developing a dedicated team with the required drafting and analytical expertise to produce high-quality, defensible referrals. This redesign programme will mark a step change in how separation centres are governed, ensuring stronger leadership, clearer accountability and more consistent delivery across the estate.

The third theme addresses the policy and legislative framework of separation centres and covers recommendations 4, 6, 7 and 8. Mr Hall’s review highlights the need for significant modernisation, noting that procedural and legislative requirements have constrained flexibility and exposed the system to litigation. The Government are committed to ensuring policy frameworks support, rather than hinder, effective risk management. We have already made significant progress in improving the defensibility and clarity of our separation centre policy framework and will go further to ensure it is robust and responsive to operational realities. This Government remain committed to the European convention on human rights, however, commitment does not mean complacency. We recognise the challenges highlighted by Mr Hall that article 8 can pose for separation centre decision making. We are therefore strengthening our internal processes, so they are clear and resilient to challenge, allowing staff to focus on managing risk and protecting the public. In parallel, we will consider whether new legislation is required to better protect decisions taken by experienced staff in separation centres from litigation on article 8 grounds, exploring the full range of options to deliver this, while being clear of the need to remain compliant with our obligations under the ECHR.

The fourth theme focuses on improving the collection and use of intelligence in separation centres and covers recommendations 12 and 13. Mr Hall’s review identifies a timely opportunity to enhance this function, noting that current intelligence collection practices are overly bureaucratic and insufficiently focused. The Government have already taken significant steps to improve how intelligence is gathered, analysed, and used across the prison estate. The launch of the new counter-terrorism training package in April 2025 marked a significant milestone and aims to equip staff with the skills to identify and report terrorist behaviours more effectively. The training package is already helping staff to recognise and report relevant behaviours. We are committed to reviewing and improving intelligence collection practices, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and ensuring that intelligence reporting is purposeful and directly supports operational decisions. These changes will help create a more agile and responsive intelligence environment within separation centres.

Taken together, these four themes, and the action we will take in response to them, form the basis of Mr Hall’s report and the Government’s response. I will place a copy of Mr Hall’s report in the Library of the House, and the full Government response will be laid before Parliament today.

This Government remain steadfast in their commitment to protecting the public and ensuring our prisons are equipped to manage the most dangerous offenders. The steps we are taking in response to this review, as set out in this statement, will strengthen security, protect staff, and reinforce the resilience of our counter-terrorism infrastructure within the prison estate.

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