European Union (Withdrawal) Act

David Lidington Excerpts

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I can deal with that because, as Members know, I have been talking to the EU and the EU27 for quite a long time now, not to undermine the Government’s position—it was actually facilitated by the first Brexit Secretary of State in some respects—but to explore what other options are possible. At present the customs union operates on the basis that the Council sets the mandate for the Commission, the Commission does the negotiating, and Parliament then has a role. So if we want a customs union that replicates the benefits of the current customs union and we want the UK to have a say in that we must find something that is similar to that, but obviously not the same as it, and the central question I have been addressing is whether the EU would be interested in a discussion about what that sort of working customs union would look like. [Interruption.] I actually had the discussion. [Interruption.] It is very easy for Members on the Treasury Bench to chunter, but I have been responsible and actually gone and had the conversation asking whether there is a basis for a discussion about a customs union that would work in that way. I have been very clear that if it ended up as something akin to the Turkey customs union—which works for Turkey—that really would not be good enough.

As for a single market deal, my own view is that there are advantages in what we call the Norway model but that there are also disadvantages in that, and therefore it must be possible—again, I have had discussions—to explore a close economic relationship that keeps alignment, with, of course, oversight and enforcement mechanisms to go with it, but which is not simply the EEA.

I say all that in some detail in order to reassure the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) that when we talk about a close economic relationship, a customs union with a say, and a close single market deal, we are talking about concepts that I have surfaced only after I have had discussions with EU27 countries and the EU about their possibility. I am not going to stand here and pretend that that will be easy; rather, I am standing here saying that we have been pressing for at least 12 or 18 months to have that. One of the major problems—this is at the heart of the debate and the fractiousness about it—is that the Prime Minister and the Government have pushed Parliament away. They had a choice—

[The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office (Mr David Lidington)]

rose—

[Keir Starmer]

I will give way in a moment, but I want to make this point because it is very important.

I campaigned to remain; I wanted to remain.

I agonised over whether we should trigger article 50, but I worked out that, having accepted the result of the referendum, it was not open to me to stop the Prime Minister starting the negotiations. What I wanted is for this House to have a proper role—by consensus, or at least by majority, if possible—in finding a way forward.

It was obvious that the sorts of arguments that are happening in the House, particularly among Conservative Members, if I may say so—I do not think that is controversial—would break out. It was obvious because for 30 years there has been a discussion, for want of a better word, in the Conservative party about not just the relationship with Europe but the vision for our country. That argument was always going to break out, and it was always going to divide Conservative Members. That is obvious, and it is not just an Opposition point. In those circumstances, a different Prime Minister might have said, “I can see what is going to happen down the line, and I need to bring Parliament into this.” That has been refused at every twist and turn.

Let us be honest that we are having a vote on Tuesday only because we fought to have it. I coined the phrase “meaningful vote”, and, working across parties, we got the amendment, which was resisted by the Government. They went through the Lobby to say no. We said, “You have to publish a plan,” and the only reason we got a plan was that we won an Opposition day motion—the Government were going to oppose that motion. We said that we wanted to know what the impact would be, and the Government said, “You can’t.” We had to get it via a Humble Address. We have seen the Supreme Court and the idea of even voting on article 50 in the first place, and then the Attorney General’s advice. The Government have persistently voted down every motion. The one thing I remember the first Brexit Secretary saying to me, over and again, on the article 50 Bill was that he wanted a clean Bill: “I want a clean Bill, and I will make sure that every amendment is voted down.” That was his avowed aim.

[Mr Lidington]

I completely accept the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s central point, which is that there is space for completely honourable debate within and between political parties in this House about the outcome of the negotiations on the future permanent relationship between this country and the EU27, and the various options, from Norway to Canada and every variation in between, have their champions in this place. But from his conversations with the EU institutions and with members of the 27 Governments, surely he will have accepted that the essential and unavoidable gateway to any such destination of a final agreement has to be the withdrawal agreement, which covers citizens’ rights, the Irish border and the financial settlement, which is the key document that we are being asked to endorse and ratify. What is his objection to that document?

[Keir Starmer]

I accept that there has to be a withdrawal agreement, and I accept that it has to cover citizens’ rights and that there are payments. I have on more than one occasion stood here and said that the progress on citizens’ rights under the withdrawal agreement is a step in the right direction, although it does not go far enough—we have quibbled about that, but there will always be an argument about whether we have gone far enough.

I have also stood here and said that we will have to fulfil our financial obligations, for the very reason the Brexit Secretary said, which is that we will not get very far in trying to reach trade agreements, or any agreements, with anybody else on the international plane if, at the same time, we are walking away from the international agreements or obligations that we have.

That does not mean I do not have concerns about the withdrawal agreement, and about the backstop in particular. The backstop has become the central issue for two reasons: first, the lack of progress on the future relationship, and I will develop that point in just a moment; and, secondly, the avowed aim of some Conservative Members to diverge as far as possible from EU alignment. It is that fear that has driven the debate on the backstop, and it could have been avoided months ago.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office (Mr David Lidington)]

As the hon. Member for Rochdale (Tony Lloyd) said, this has been a genuinely interesting debate. It has been good to hear voices from all four nations of the United Kingdom. I have been struck by the fact that, from the opening remarks of the shadow Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), the tone has been moderate. Even when there have been some profound differences—as inevitably there would be in a debate on this issue—for pretty well the entire period of this debate, those differences have been expressed in a spirit of mutual respect and readiness to listen, if not to agree, with what an opponent has said. To take up the final comments of the hon. Member for Rochdale, I hope that that is a harbinger of how this House might proceed for the rest of this debate and in the decisions that will face us in the days, weeks and months to come.

Many contributions so far have focused less on the withdrawal agreement than on the nature of the future relationship. When kicking off the debate, the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras said that his preference was for a customs union with the European Union and close future regulatory alignment. Those points of view have been expressed elsewhere in the debate, and we heard hon. Members from Scotland and Wales reflecting the views expressed in the resolutions passed recently by the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly to that effect.

The key decision that faces this Parliament next week is not over what the new relationship should be in the long term. That can only be negotiated, in terms of the European treaties, once we have left membership and become a third country. What we need to do is to take a decision about the terms of the withdrawal agreement. The withdrawal agreement is the unavoidable gateway whether to a Canadian, a Norwegian or a Chequers destination, or to wherever on the spectrum of a future relationship any particular right hon. or hon. Member wishes to end up.

Nor do I believe that it is going to help to argue, as some hon. Members have advocated today, that the way forward is to conclude that these problems are too difficult and there is insufficient consensus, and therefore we simply postpone the article 50 deadline. The policy dilemmas, choices and trade-offs that face us as a Parliament and as a country are not going to go away in that time. Nor are the EU27 and the European Commission going to suddenly start to open detailed negotiations about the nature of the future partnership between us and them until we have actually taken the step of leaving, because while we are a member, we are subject to the obligations of, and have all the rights of, every other member state of the European Union. The treaties, yes, allow and encourage the EU to make trade and political co-operation agreements with third countries, but only with third countries—it cannot conclude or, indeed, negotiate such an agreement with one of its own members.

As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said earlier, the House has to confront the fact that the default position both in United Kingdom law and in European law is that we leave on 29 March this year whether or not a deal has been agreed and ratified, and if the House wants to reject no deal, the House has to vote by a majority for a withdrawal agreement that provides for a smooth and orderly exit.

[Mr Leslie]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Lidington]

I will, and then I want to make some progress, particularly to respond to some of the points made by the hon. Gentleman’s Front Benchers.

[Mr Leslie]

Will the Minister elaborate on something? It is not just about voting for the Prime Minister’s deal; it would also potentially be about requesting an extension of article 50. He will acknowledge, will he not, that that facility is permitted under article 50?

[Mr Lidington]

An extension of article 50 is permitted under that article of the treaty—the hon. Gentleman is right to that extent. But of course such an extension has to be by unanimous consent of both the departing member state and all existing member states. What I am quite clear about in my own mind is that regardless of what opinions were expressed here, or by this or any other British Government, the EU27 are not interested in some sort of extension of article 50. They want this process brought to an orderly conclusion because they have other things, like a future budgetary process, that they need to get on with and think about after the United Kingdom’s departure.

[Stephen Gethins]

rose—

[Mr Lidington]

I will give way once more and then I want to make progress.

[Stephen Gethins]

I respect the way the Minister is going about this, and his generosity. On the article 50 extension—which is critical, regardless of what he thinks—achieving what we all want to achieve by 29 March, and having a proper discussion and getting solutions in place, will be very, very difficult. Has he at least explored the possibility of an article 50 extension with the 27 member states?

[Mr Lidington]

I have had no discussions with the Commission or with the Council about that. The Prime Minister has made the Government’s position very clear on this particular point.

[Stephen Kerr]

What would any extension of article 50 mean in relation to the European elections? Surely we would not be fielding candidates for the European Parliament—that does not seem to add up.

[Mr Lidington]

There are certainly no plans to hold elections in this country to the European Parliament. In any hypothetical extension of article 50, that would be an important point for the EU27, because there could be a question mark about the legality of actions by a European Parliament in the future if not every member state had members of that European Parliament who had been properly elected. That is yet another reason why it would not be sensible for Members of this House who advocate an extension of article 50 simply to assume that the EU27 would happily be prepared to accept that. I do not believe that that is the case at all.

I will now turn to some of the points made. Like the hon. Member for Rochdale, I want to spend a lot of the time I have speaking about the Northern Ireland question, which came up not only in the extremely moving and compelling speech from the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), but in speeches from Members in different parts of the House.

First, the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras challenged the Government over the paper that we published earlier today and said that he did not think there was any new commitment in it. There are two things that are completely new. On the other matters, we have put greater flesh on commitments that had already been given at a high political level. But we have not previously committed to requiring Stormont agreement to any new laws that the EU proposed to add to the backstop, and we have not previously committed to giving a restored Northern Ireland Executive a seat at the table at the committee overseeing the Northern Ireland backstop.

I accept, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State did, that the paper we have published today will not be sufficient to meet all the concerns that the hon. Member for Belfast East and his colleagues have expressed, but it marks a genuine step forward in giving expression to our wish to make it very clear that we see Northern Ireland’s place in not only the political union of the United Kingdom but the single economic internal market of the United Kingdom now and into the future.

The hon. Member for Rochdale said that his personal test was that there should be no regulatory divergence between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Of course, as he will know, there are some sectors where there is such regulatory divergence at the moment—notably on animal health and trading in livestock—for good practical reasons that are long established. One element of today’s package is greater clarity than we have given before that Northern Ireland goods under all circumstances would have full access to customers and markets in Great Britain, and that in the event of a backstop ever coming into operation, we would seek to align regulations in Great Britain with those that applied in Northern Ireland for the duration of the backstop.

[Tony Lloyd]

This is a serious point, not a polemical one. We now have a situation where the rest of the UK will follow Northern Ireland. If that is the case, why was that not the base case written into the protocol?

[Mr Lidington]

Because these things are about the sovereign constitutional order of the United Kingdom. They involve decisions that we in this House make and that, in respect of certain devolved matters, we would need to make in partnership and consultation with the Governments in the three devolved areas of the United Kingdom. That is why these are things that we are expressing unilaterally.

[Tony Lloyd]

This comes to the nub of things, and it is the point that the hon. Member for Belfast East made. If I disagree with the Government proposing any form of regulatory change that affects my constituents in Rochdale, I can vote in this House. The hon. Member for Belfast East does not have that same facility, and that is what is different about this agreement.

[Mr Lidington]

I want to come on to talk more generally about the backstop. I am not going to hide the fact—the Prime Minister has said it openly—that this is something we find uncomfortable as a Government, but we do not believe it poses the risks to the Union that are expressed by its critics.

I want to take up the point about the Belfast agreement. The question has been raised in this debate and previously, including by the hon. Member for Belfast East, as to whether the protocol breaches the integrity of the three-stranded approach that is embodied in the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. It is clear to me that the text of the protocol says in terms that it protects the 1998 agreement “in all its parts”. That is on page 303 of the document that is on the table. The protocol also refers to the scope for possible new arrangements for north-south co-operation but then goes on to define those as being in accordance with the 1998 agreement.

The Government’s own legal position is clear that article 13 of the protocol does not alter the remit of the North-South Ministerial Council or the north-south implementation bodies; nor does it alter strand two in any way. However, to avoid any doubt on this matter, in the paper today we have again given a commitment to legislate to provide explicitly that

“no recommendations made under Article 13(2) of the Protocol will be capable of altering the scope of…the North-South Ministerial Council, nor establishing new implementation bodies or altering the arrangements set out in the Belfast Agreement in any way.”

[Gavin Robinson]

The right hon. Gentleman is touching on a fundamental point. The protocol makes reference to compliance with the Good Friday agreement “in all its parts”, but as has been mentioned, paragraph 12 of strand two specifically requires not consultation or involvement but the approval and consent not only of the Northern Ireland Assembly but of the Oireachtas. When we consider new regulations and new engagement with the Irish Republic, that will impinge on north-south co-operation.

[Mr Lidington]

As I have just said, the Government’s own legal position does not pose the threat that the hon. Gentleman has expressed. Probably the best way for me to respond is, having consulted the Attorney General—who supervised the compilation and publication of the Government’s legal position—to write directly to the hon. Gentleman to set out our case in greater detail.

I oppose a no-deal exit not just because of the economic harm but because I actually believe that a no-deal exit would cause profound and possibly irreversible damage to the Union of the United Kingdom. The tensions in Northern Ireland and in Scotland resulting from such an outcome would be severe. The hon. Member for Belfast East was right to say that there was no express provision in the 1998 agreement for open trade across the border. It is also true that there was provision in the Belfast agreement for the removal of border infrastructure related to security matters.

The hon. Member for Rochdale was also right to point out that at the time of the 1998 negotiations and agreement, this country and the Republic of Ireland had been members of the European Union for many years. The single market had been established, and the assumption that everybody made at that time was that that economic order was going to continue. The question of whether border issues would arise in the event of the hypothetical departure of either state from the European Union was just not considered at the time. It was not a live issue. Indeed, the completely frictionless, seamless traffic of individuals and freight across the border has been one of the elements that has helped to support the peace-building process. We should take note of the Chief Constable’s concerns about security tensions that could arise from a no-deal exit, and we should also be aware of the symbolism of any kind of infrastructure on the border.

I want us to remain in a situation in which people living in Northern Ireland who identify themselves as Irish but have fairly moderate political views continue to support the Union with the United Kingdom. I see opinion polls and I have conversations with people from that tradition in Northern Ireland. Members can aim off opinion polls or aim off anecdotal experience, but I am hearing from moderate people on the nationalist side who have been content with the Union that they are becoming more anxious, more hard-line and more questioning of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Their consent, to use the key term, to the Union seems to me to be hugely important to preserving the Union, which I passionately want to do. I completely respect the argument the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Nigel Dodds) put to me and to the House, but I differ from him on the implications of the backstop.

[Mr McFadden]

The Minister is making an important point, because the Good Friday agreement says that people in Northern Ireland can choose to be British, Irish or both, and that “both” is hugely valuable. Is not the danger of Brexit that it upsets the equilibrium that allows people to choose to be both?

[Mr Lidington]

I do think that that is one of the downsides. I am not going to refight a campaign that I fought and lost, along with the right hon. Gentleman, in 2016. As the hon. Member for Rochdale was kind enough to say, I did actually go to Northern Ireland and campaign on the remain side there. We are where we are. It seems to me that the duty we have as a Parliament, confronted with how the people of the United Kingdom voted, is to do our utmost to find a way that delivers on that democratic verdict while, in the context of this particular debate, minimising to the extent possible the rise in the kind of tensions that the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) has described.

The backstop is an insurance policy designed to guarantee that we can in all circumstances meet our commitments, as a Government and as a country, to avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland. I think it also has the advantage of acting as a safety net for Northern Ireland’s economy. It does of course still take Northern Ireland, along with the rest of the UK, out of the common fisheries and agricultural policies. As I have said before, I do not think we are shying away from the fact that this is an uncomfortable solution for the UK, but it is an uncomfortable solution for the European Union as well. Both the United Kingdom and the EU have a mutual interest in ensuring the backstop is never needed, and if it ever were, it would be only a temporary arrangement.

[Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

I have listened with great patience to what the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has had to say, and I respect the way in which he has put his arguments. However, I have to confess to a slight degree of frustration, because these arguments and some of the issues he has raised were all put in a previous debate; after three days, the Prime Minister came to the House and said that it was clear that her deal would be voted down by a substantial margin, because of the concerns that had been expressed, and that she would go away and get legally binding assurances. I have listened to what the Minister has said, and there is nothing new there; I do not think he will persuade anybody who has not already been persuaded. Where is the delivery of the changes promised by the Prime Minister? What has changed since these arguments were advanced previously?

I hope at some point in this debate, on another day, to deal in detail with all the issues the right hon. Gentleman has raised—all the anecdotal stuff he has talked about and what he has heard—because really what he is arguing in terms of Brexit, nationalism and the future of Northern Ireland is that we should just forget about Brexit. That is the logic of what he is saying. What I would like to hear from him is this: what is new, as far as what the Prime Minister promised is concerned? That is what we are waiting to hear.

[Mr Lidington]

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Prime Minister will respond to the debate in the final speech next Tuesday. She has been talking to a number of European leaders in the weeks since this debate was postponed. She will obviously want to respond to the questions that the right hon. Gentleman fairly puts, either during her speech in that debate, or possibly earlier. That is the most I can commit to on behalf of my right hon. Friend this evening. I also say to the right hon. Member for Belfast North and his colleagues that there is certainly a recognition—indeed, an understanding—on the part of the Government of the concerns that they have expressed. We continue to discuss with him and his colleagues how we can seek to provide the necessary assurances about the Union that he is asking us to provide. I will make sure that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is aware of his wish to have a more detailed response to the points he has raised this evening.

I think it is worth the House reminding itself that the EU has an interest, just as we do, in bringing the backstop to an end quickly, should it ever be needed at all. Of course, the fear is often expressed, here and outside, that despite the legal obligation in the withdrawal agreement for the backstop to be temporary; despite the explicit provision in the withdrawal agreement for technology or other measures to be deployed to make the backstop superfluous; despite the duty to replace it as rapidly as possible; and despite, for that matter, frequent public statements by the Taoiseach, the European Commission and other leaders that they have no wish or interest in having the backstop as anything more than an insurance policy, we will still be trapped in it for many years, or even indefinitely. Ultimately, this boils down to a lack of trust within the United Kingdom in the good intentions of the European Commission and some member state Governments.

The irony is that there is a lack of trust of the United Kingdom on the other side of the table, too. One of the most striking developments since the withdrawal agreement was finalised and published has been the fierce criticism levelled at Michel Barnier by Governments in some EU member states. For them, the backstop, should it ever be used, would allow goods from the entire United Kingdom, including agricultural produce, to access the whole of the EU single market, without tariffs, quotas or rules of origin requirements, and that would be granted without the UK paying a penny into the EU budget, without the UK accepting the free movement of people, and with the UK accepting a much less onerous set of level playing field requirements than those demanded of EU member states.

[Alex Chalk]

Is it not a fact that what from our point of view might be considered a backstop is, from the European Union’s point of view, a back door? Does that not express the EU’s concern that we would be paying not a penny piece for something that would provide a material advantage—an unfair advantage, as some would see it—in terms of access to the single market?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend is right. Indeed, that fear reinforces the concern that the EU has about the important legal principle that a free trade agreement or association agreement with a third country cannot be based on an article 50 withdrawal agreement, which was intended by the treaty to cover the necessary legal arrangements for a member state’s departure from the Union. The Commission knows that for exactly the reason my hon. Friend gives, the longer any backstop were to last, the greater legal risk it would face of challenge in the European courts from aggrieved businesses, whether in the Republic of Ireland, France, Belgium or elsewhere, complaining that that principle was being breached to their commercial disadvantage.

We should not underestimate the importance of the guarantee of no hard border on the island of Ireland and no customs border in the Irish sea. It is no coincidence that the Northern Ireland business community is overwhelmingly and vocally supportive of this deal. However, there are aspects of the backstop that are and will remain uncomfortable. If it were needed, it would mean that a portion of EU law would apply in Northern Ireland for the duration of the backstop—about 40 pages of the 1,100 pages of single market acquis legislation.

The Government, as I said earlier, are mindful of the fact that we already have some regulatory differences between Northern Ireland and the rest of the country. We have sought, both in previous statements and in the package we put forward today, to identify ways in which the practical impact of any such requirements can be minimised, so that ordinary businesses and customers in Northern Ireland or Great Britain see as little change as possible.

[Nigel Dodds]

I promise not to intervene again, because I will deal with these points at a future date. The Minister has mentioned for the second time that there are already regulatory differences. He knows that they are extremely small in number, and that they were instituted with the democratic will of the Northern Ireland Assembly under the previous regime in Northern Ireland. They were democratically agreed, and they are for the purpose of controlling animal health effectively. They are not part of a regulatory difference because we are under a different regime for goods or agri-food, so it is entirely spurious and wrong of him to build that argument on the basis that there are already regulatory differences. Having rules about a large part of our economy set by people not in this House and not in the Assembly is a gross offence to democracy in this country.

[Mr Lidington]

Of course, the arrangements come into force only if this House gives assent to them. This House has a say in what is proposed. Any future additions to areas of law that are covered would require the agreement of both the European Union and the United Kingdom. We have said again today that as far as the United Kingdom’s decision was concerned, we would have a legal obligation on UK Ministers to seek agreement from the Northern Ireland institutions before agreeing to any such additions.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

The Minister mentions the issue of trust between the EU, the UK Government and Parliament. I say very, very gently to the Minister that there is also an element of trust between the Government and the Democratic Unionist party. There is trust in what the Government are trying to put forward as a solution, but the solution in relation to the backstop is not acceptable. That has to be addressed.

[Mr Speaker]

That that was an intervention of intoxicating significance I do not doubt for one moment, but may I just say to the hon. Gentleman that as a result of his intervention, he has helped the Minister to double the ration allocated to the shadow Minister? These are important matters, but I think the Minister is approaching his peroration.

[Mr Lidington]

I do want to make progress. I will just say in response to the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) that, as I have said to his hon. Friends, we accept and understand their concerns, and we will continue conversations with them to try to seek agreement.

All businesses in our country want certainty. Since the deal was announced, organisations in every part of the United Kingdom—large and small, manufacturing, farming and fisheries—have said they want to get on and see a deal sorted, so they can plan for the future. They are aware, too, of the risks that no deal would carry: 40% tariffs for Scottish beef and Welsh lamb exports, 10% tariffs for cars from Sunderland, Swindon and the west midlands, and the inspections, regulations and form-filling that will go with such arrangements under WTO terms.

I believe that what we have now is an outcome that both those who supported leave and those who supported remain should be able to accept. Let us not forget that people who voted to leave the European Union were a significant minority in some parts of the UK, and in some demographic groups in the population, in which the majority in 2016 voted to remain. The deal gives the certainty of leaving the European Union. It removes this country from the political structures of the EU and any commitment to an ever closer union. It ends the automatic freedom of movement under European law, leaving it to Governments and Parliaments in the UK to decide how generous or restrictive our policies should be, and it ends the jurisdiction of the European courts in this country.

For those who voted to remain in the European Union—again, they were a significant minority in those places where most people voted to leave—the deal offers a deep and special future partnership between the UK and the EU, reflecting the reality of our deep-rooted ties of history, geography, culture and democratic commitment, and reflecting, too, the fact that, for as far ahead as any of us can see, the EU is likely to remain this country’s single most important trading partner.

I believe that compromise in politics is not an insult. The deal that we have on the table, endorsed not just by the British Prime Minister and Cabinet but by the 27 other Governments of the European Union, is one that has been the product of compromise. It has meant difficult negotiations and give and take on both sides. Like most things in politics and in life, it is not perfect, but I believe that it provides a good foundation for us to move forward from the divisions and the agonies of the last two years, towards a future in which the United Kingdom and the European Union can work as close neighbours, friends, allies and trusted trading partners for many years into the future.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Amanda Milling.)

Debate to be resumed tomorrow (Order, this day.)