Digital Economy Bill

Earl of Erroll Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 13th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the Bill because it has some very useful stuff in it—but, like everything else, it might benefit from some tweaking. Many other speakers mentioned the tweaks that need to be made, and if that happens I think that we may end up with quite a good Bill.

I will concentrate on age verification because I have been working on this issue with a group for about a year and three-quarters. We spotted that its profile was going to be raised because so many people were worried about it. We were the first group to bring together the people who run adult content websites—porn websites—with those who want to protect children. The interesting thing to come out quite quickly from the meetings was that, believe it or not, the people who run porn sites are not interested in corrupting children because they want to make money. What they want are adult, middle-aged people, with credit cards from whom they can extract money, preferably on a subscription basis or whatever. The stuff that children are getting access to is what are called teaser adverts. They are designed to draw people in to the harder stuff inside, you might say. The providers would be delighted to offer age verification right up front so long as all the others have to comply as well—otherwise they will get all the traffic. Children use up bandwidth. It costs the providers money and wastes their time, so they are very happy to go along with it. They will even help police it, for the simple reason that it will block the opposition. It is one of the few times I approve of the larger companies getting a competitive advantage in helping to police the smaller sites that try not to comply.

One of the things that became apparent early on was that we will not be able to do anything about foreign sites. They will not answer mail or do anything, so blocking is probably the only thing that will work. We are delighted that the Government have gone for that at this stage. Things need to get blocked fast or sites will get around it. So it is a case of block first, appeal later, and we will need a simple appeals system. I am sure that the BBFC will do a fine job, but we need something just in case.

Another thing that came back from the ISPs is that they want more clarity about what should be blocked, how it will be done and what they will have to do. There also needs to be indemnity. When the ISPs block something for intellectual property and copyright reasons, they are indemnified. They would need to have it for this as well, or there will be a great deal of reluctance, which will cause problems.

The next thing that came up was censorship. The whole point of this is we want to enforce online what is already illegal offline. We are not trying to increase censorship or censor new material. If it is illegal offline, it should be illegal online and we should be able to do something about it. This is about children viewing adult material and pornography online. I am afraid this is where I slightly disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. We should decide what should be blocked elsewhere; we should not use the Bill to block other content that adults probably should not be watching either. It is a separate issue. The Bill is about protecting children. The challenge is that the Obscene Publications Act has some definitions and there is ATVOD stuff as well. They are supposed to be involved with time. CPS guidelines are out of step with current case law as a result of one of the quite recent cases—so there is a bit of a mess that needs clearing up. This is not the Bill to do it. We probably need to address it quite soon and keep the pressure on; that is the next step. But this Bill is about keeping children away from such material.

The noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, made a very good point about social platforms. They are commercial. There are loopholes that will get exploited. It is probably unrealistic to block the whole of Twitter—it would make us look like idiots. On the other hand, there are other things we can do. This brings me to the point that other noble Lords made about ancillary service complaints. If we start to make the payment-service providers comply and help, they will make it less easy for those sites to make money. They will not be able to do certain things. I do not know what enforcement is possible. All these sites have to sign up to terms and conditions. Big retail websites such as Amazon sell films that would certainly come under this category. They should put an age check in front of the webpage. It is not difficult to do; they could easily comply.

We will probably need an enforcer as well. The BBFC is happy to be a regulator, and I think it is also happy to inform ISPs which sites should be blocked, but other enforcement stuff might need to be done. There is provision for it in the Bill. The Government may need to start looking for an enforcer.

Another point that has come up is about anonymity and privacy, which is paramount. Imagine the fallout if some hacker found a list of senior politicians who had had to go through an age-verification process on one of these websites, which would mean they had accessed them. They could bring down the Government or the Opposition overnight. Noble Lords could all go to the MindGeek website and look at the statistics, where there is a breakdown of which age groups and genders are accessing these websites. I have not dared to do so because it will show I have been to that website, which I am sure would show up somewhere on one of these investigatory powers web searches and could be dangerous.

One of the things the Digital Policy Alliance, which I chair, has done is sponsor a publicly available specification, which the BSI is behind as well. There is a lot of privacy-enforcing stuff in that. It is not totally obvious; it is not finished yet, and it is being highlighted a bit more. One thing we came up with is that websites should not store the identity of the people whom they age-check. In fact, in most cases, they will bounce straight off the website and be sent to someone called an attribute provider, who will check the age. They will probably know who the person is, but they will send back to the website only an encrypted token which says, “We’ve checked this person that you sent to us. Store this token. This person is over 18”—or under 18, or whatever age they have asked to be confirmed. On their side, they will just keep a record of the token but will not say to which website they have issued it—they will not store that, either. The link is the token, so if a regulator or social service had to track it down, they could physically take the token from the porn site to where it came from, the attribute provider, and say, “Can you check this person’s really over 18, because we think someone breached the security? What went wrong with your procedures?”. They can then reverse it and find out who the person was—but they could still perhaps not be told by the regulator which site it was. So there should be a security cut-out in there. A lot of work went into this because we all knew the danger.

This is where I agree entirely with the Open Rights Group, which thinks that such a measure should be mandated. Although the publicly available specification, which is almost like a British standard, says that privacy should be mandated under general data protection regulation out of Europe, which we all subscribe to, I am not sure that that is enough. It is a guideline at the end of the day and it depends on how much emphasis the BBFC decides to put on it. I am not sure that we should not just put something in the Bill to mandate that a website cannot keep a person’s identity. If the person after they have proved that they are 18 then decides to subscribe to the website freely and to give it credit card details and stuff like that, that is a different problem—I am not worried about that. That is something else. That should be kept extremely securely and I personally would not give my ID to such a site—but at the age-verification end, it must be private.

There are some other funny things behind the scenes that I have been briefed on, such as the EU VAT reporting requirements under the VAT Mini One Stop Shop, which requires sites to keep some information which might make a person identifiable. That could apply if someone was using one of the attribute providers that uses a credit card to provide that check or if the website itself was doing that. There may be some things that people will have to be careful of. There are some perfectly good age-checking providers out there who can do it without you having to give your details. So it is a good idea; I think that it will help. Let us then worry about the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made so well about what goes where.

The universal service obligation should be territorial; it has to cover the country and not just everyone’s homes. With the internet of things coming along—which I am also involved in because I am chair of the Hypercat Alliance, which is about resource discovery over the internet of things—one of the big problems is that we are going to need it everywhere: to do traffic monitoring, people flows and all the useful things we need. We cannot have little not-spots, or the Government will not be able to get the information on which to run all sorts of helpful control systems. The noble Lord, Lord Gordon of Strathblane, referred to mast sharing. The problem with it is that they then do not put masts in the not-spots; they just keep the money and work off just one mast—you still get the not-spots. If someone shares a mast, they should be forced to have a mast somewhere else, which they then share as well.

On broadband take-up, people say, “Oh, well, people aren’t asking for it”. It is chicken and egg: until it is there, you do not know what it is good for. Once it is there and suddenly it is all useful, the applications will flow. We have to look to the future; we have to have some vision. Let us get the egg out there and the chicken will follow—I cannot remember which way round it is.

I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, that the problem with Openreach is that it will always be controlled by its holding company, which takes the investment, redirects it and decides where the money goes. That is the challenge with having it overseeing.

I do not want to waste much time, because I know that it is getting late-ish. On jobs, a huge number of jobs were created in earlier days in installing and maintaining internet of things sensors all over the place—that will change. On the gigabit stuff, it will save travel, energy and all sorts of things—we might even do remote-control hip operations, so you send the device and the surgeon then does it remotely, once we get super-duper superfast broadband.

I want to say one thing about IP. The Open Rights Group raised having thresholds of seriousness. It is quite important that we do not start prosecuting people on charges with 10-year sentences for trivial things. But it is also sad how interesting documentaries can disappear terribly quickly. The catch-up services cover only a month or so and if you are interested, it is quite nice being able to find these things out there on the internet a year or two later. There should somehow be a publicly available archive for all the people who produce interesting documentaries. I do not know whether they should make a small charge for it, but it should be out there.

The Open Rights Group also highlighted the bulk sharing of data. Some of the stuff will be very useful—the briefing on free school meals is interesting—but if you are the only person who really knows what might be leaked, it is very dangerous. If someone were to beat you up, an ordinary register could leak your address across without realising that at that point you are about to go into witness protection. There can be lots of problems with bulk data sharing, so be careful; that is why the insurance database was killed off a few years ago. Apart from that, I thank your Lordships for listening and say that, in general, this is a good effort.

Digital Economy Bill

Earl of Erroll Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 2nd February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Byford (Con)]

My Lords, I spoke at Second Reading on this aspect of the Bill. I was one of the people who said very clearly that I should much prefer not to have pornography of any sort on any website, because the world would be much better without it. The previous speaker is quite right. The influence that modern communication has on young people is devastating. In some families, it really has been disruptive and led to unfortunate consequences within them.

I welcome the Minister’s statement that they will take this away, think about it and come back again. I reiterate my dismay that again we have another very important Bill from the Commons that really has not been dealt with in the proper manner. I hope that in future the Commons will be allowed more time or will organise itself so that it can do the job it should and can do, and not leave it to this House to be the one saying, “Hang on”.

If you look at the number of amendments tabled to this one Bill, it reinforces the whole position that my noble friend the Minister must deal with, which in many cases should have been dealt with before. I am an old hand here and still feel strongly about this. I do not complain that my right honourable friends at the other end have not had the opportunity to do this—that is how the system works. However, we go on, year after year, saying the same thing and it is high time we got to grips with this. I would like to push a little further on the Minister’s response earlier that the Government will look at this: it is hugely important that they do.

I have slight concerns about Ofcom being perhaps one of those who should undertake this. In some ways, Ofcom is not always as robust as I would like it to be, which is perhaps unfair. Secondly, we certainly need to identify in the Bill before it leaves our House exactly what is to happen: who the enforcer is where there are dual splits within what we seek to do in the Bill. The Bill is hugely important and I hope that the Government will, as they have already indicated, take it away after Committee and think seriously about it. I would hate to think that some of the final detail will come through in secondary legislation, which we cannot alter. We need to get this into primary legislation. I support the comments made by other noble Lords and look forward to the Minister responding and, I hope, being able to take it away and come back, even if that means it happens a little later. It is much better to get it right later than to leave it in its current form.

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I will make some brief points. First, on this set of amendments I am afraid I disagree with the noble Baroness: we must get on with this. It will not be perfect on day one but the sooner we get moving the better. We have talked about this for a very long time. That is why I am not really pro these amendments.

On Amendment 55, I agree entirely with my noble friend Lady Howe. She is absolutely right to spot this lacuna: the BBFC will look at this stuff and age verification, but who will enforce it? That is a problem and I was going to raise it later anyway. She was absolutely spot on there. My noble friend Lady Kidron was also absolutely spot on about these sites. Twitter could be classified as commercial because it takes money from pornography sites to promote them. I can get evidence of that. It would be difficult for it to say that it does not promote them.

Very quickly on what the Minister said, I was going to raise under the group starting with Amendment 57 the issue of including prohibited material with the age verification stuff. We should separate protecting children from protecting adults or it will confuse things. The big danger is that if we start using this to protect adults from stuff that they should not see—in other words, some of the adult prohibited material, of which there is quite a lot out there—we run the risk of challenges in court. Everything that the BBFC does not classify because it falls into certain categories is automatically prohibited material. It is not allowed to classify certain acts. I should probably not tell noble Lords about those now as they are pretty unpleasant but they are fairly prevalent in the hardcore pornography out there. If the pornography sites are blocked from supplying adults with what they want, they will just move offshore and get round this. If they do that, there will be no point in doing age verification and we will not protect our children. That will create the first major loophole in the entire thing.

I have this from the pornographers themselves. They know what they are doing. However, they are very happy—and would like—to protect children. If we leave them alone and argue through the Obscene Publications Act and other such things as to what they must stop adults seeing, they will help block children. They are very keen on that. Children just waste their time as they do not have money to spend. At the end of the day, the pornographers want to extract money from people.

I am advised that the real problem is that prohibited material includes content that would be refused a BBFC R18 certificate. The Crown Prosecution Service charging practice is apparently out of sync with recent obscenity case law in the courts. Most non-UK producers and distributors work on common global compliance standards based on Visa and Mastercard’s brand-protection guidelines. Maybe we should start to align with that. We should deal with that separately under the Obscene Publications Act. It will be very easy for the BBFC, the regulator or the enforcer to tell what does not have age verification on the front. That is yes/no—it is very simple. The trouble is that if we get into prohibited material, it will end up before the courts. We will have to go through court procedures and it will take much longer to block the sites. I would remove that from here. I shall leave my other comments to a later stage.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I am grateful for those contributions. They address some very important issues, some of which we will deal with now and some of which we will deal with later during the progress of the Bill. To start at the end, the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, made some interesting points regarding the statement that I made. We absolutely acknowledge some of them. I have listened to his suggestions. Our focus here is to protect children. That is what this Bill is for. That is what our manifesto commitment was. When he sees our suggestions, I hope that he will be able to contribute to the debate on Report—but I have noted everything he said.

The introduction of a new law requiring appropriate age verification measures for online pornography is a bold new step. It represents the first stage of ensuring that commercial providers of online pornographic material are rightly held responsible for what they provide and profit from.

Amendment 54B would require the regulator to publish guidance about the overarching duty of care on internet service providers and ancillary service providers, and their responsibility to ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to ensure the safety of a child or young person involved in activities or interaction for which the service provider is responsible. The purpose of our measures is to protect children from pornographic material. Seeking to stretch the framework further to regulate companies on a different basis risks the delivery of our aim. However, that is not to say that we want to ignore the issue. We take the issue of child safety online seriously and engage intensively with the industry through the UK Council for Child Internet Safety to ensure that robust protections are in place.

The Government expect industry to play a leading role in internet safety provisions, as it is best placed to offer safety and protection to children and young people. We know that it is already doing this and has default protections for under-18s, including the use of parental controls and tools to allow users to flag content, protect user privacy as well as educate users on staying safe with information and advice. We will have further opportunities to discuss the role of the industry, including social media and internet service provider filters, later in Committee.

Amendment 54D seeks to introduce a new clause with the requirement that the Secretary of State must consult on the role of the age verification regulator. The clause further seeks that the Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a report on the results of the consultation and the Secretary of State’s conclusions, with any appointments to be subject to approval in each House. The introduction of the measures requiring appropriate age verification for online pornography follows public consultation. We asked about the powers that a regulator should have and there was strong support for a number of responsibilities that we have introduced. The passage of this Bill has provided an important opportunity for debate on this and we have seen the introduction of an important new blocking power for the regulator, which we shall discuss later.

We are grateful to the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee for their reports, which a number of noble Lords mentioned. They made a number of recommendations about the designation of the regulator and how the regulator should fulfil its role. We are carefully considering those and will publish our response before Report.

Amendment 55, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, would specify that the Secretary of State is to designate the British Board of Film Classification as the age verification regulator. As the Committee will know, Clauses 17 and 18 provide for the designation of the regulator and we intend to designate the BBFC to carry out most—as the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, reminded us—of the functions of the regulator. Indeed, some noble Lords may have seen the BBFC’s recent presentation to the Children’s Media and the Arts APPG.

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[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I put my name down to one of these amendments because I wanted to talk about appeals. The reason for that is very simple and comes back to what I said earlier. I do not think there should be any question about there being no age verification. That should be almost an absolute offence: if there is no age verification, a site can be blocked, just like that. If the relevant people want to make an appeal, they can do so later and make it as complicated as they like. The main issue has already been raised and I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, that Clause 23 is ideal. I entirely agree with the point about the foreign sites. They are not going to do anything if we do not block them. They will just mess around and children will get access to adult pornography for goodness knows how long. We need to be able to block immediately sites that do not have age verification.

I refer to appeals as we are muddling up the question of what is pornography with that of what is material that adults are not permitted to view. We need an appeals mechanism as we are going to get wrapped up in the lacunae and the mismatches between the Obscene Publications Act, the court cases and everything else, as I said earlier. We can see a Lady Chatterley-style case going through and taking years. In the meantime, all the non-age verified sites have to do is to keep appealing or whatever. That is not going to work. If we are going to include what is permitted for adults to view in this part of the Bill, we need an appeals process for that, but not an appeals process if the relevant sites do not have age verification in relation to potentially pornographic material. I will talk about that when we discuss the group of amendments commencing with Amendment 57.

Digital Economy Bill

Earl of Erroll Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Thursday 2nd February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Maxton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very reluctant to take part in this debate, because I was not available to speak at Second Reading, which always restrains noble Lords from speaking in Committee. However, I will make three points.

First, I confess openly that I have indulged in sexual activity—I will not say when, as that might be unfair. But I have never fired a gun or a revolver in anger, or taken part in a fight with a knife, or indeed taken part in a fight at all. Yet we are not banning scenes of violence, even on the news, which are seen by children all the time, whereas we are involved in banning scenes of sexual activity. That may be right, but we ought to be looking at other areas of life as well, because they can damage children just as much as sexual activity can.

Secondly, this law as it stands—many noble Lords who have moved or spoken to amendments have admitted this—is almost inoperable. It cannot be enforced—or can be enforced only on rare occasions. That is rather like speeding in your motor car, which is an analogy I have used before. Everybody breaks the law by speeding—or most people do—because they know that they will not get caught. That is rather like this law, as it stands at present. The problem with unenforceable or rarely enforced laws is that they bring the law into disrepute—and that is the danger of this part of the Bill as it stands. We are in danger of bringing in something that is not enforceable and, by doing so, we are bringing the law itself into disrepute.

Lastly, I will give my solution to all of that. The aim of this part of the Bill is not to stop pornography sites but to stop children watching them. There is a simple answer to that—but, unfortunately, it is an answer that the Liberal party do not support and which the Tory Government got rid of when we introduced the voluntary part of it. It is an identity card. If you introduce a mechanism whereby you can get into pornography sites on any device only by using your fingerprint or via eye recognition, or whatever it might be, of course that can stop it. On my iPad I already have a device by which I can save my passwords and which will show them to me when I want to use them. But I can get into it only by using my fingerprint; I cannot do it any other way. I cannot even use my normal four-digit pass code; I can do it only with my fingerprint. Why not do that sort of thing for pornography sites as well? Only adults will be able to get into them; children will be barred by the introduction of an ID card mechanism, so that you can get into it only by that means. Unfortunately I have hospital appointments during the next sitting of Committee, but I hope that on Report I will be able to introduce amendments to that effect.

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I have one amendment in this group. I very much support Amendment 65, but there is no point adding anything to what the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, said. He covered it in great detail and for all the right reasons. I will add only for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that a lot of the payment service providers—this is the key to it—such as Mastercard, Visa, and so on, are international. If there is a duty on them, they are very good at trying to stick to the law. That would close quite a few holes and make life a bit difficult for sites—so as a deterrent, it would really help.

Sadly, this whole approach to cutting off the ancillary service providers years ago was enough to kill off pirate radio in the 1960s—which I was very sad about. But this time I approve of being able to do it, because I approve of the motive behind it: trying to stop children accessing pornography.

Amendment 68B, in my name, questions what a “large number” of children is. I realise that it is obvious that you have to prioritise, because 80% of the sites are over a certain size and they will definitely come under this. They handle 80% or so of the traffic, or whatever, so I can see that you should check up on them first. But they are also the ones that will comply, because many of them are onside anyway. However, let us say that there are 10% of sites left. That is an awful lot of children, if you do the maths in your head. You knock one nought off the end of however many children there are, but you still leave an awful lot. I therefore do not understand why we are leaving in a “large number” as a constant target. There must come a point when it is worth moving on to the smaller numbers as well. I therefore do not understand the purpose of the clause. It is self-evident that they will have to prioritise. If they do not, they are idiots—and I know perfectly well that the members of the BBFC are not. Therefore I cannot understand the purpose of it.

Amendment 69A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has some merit in it. As the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, said, there is a lot of non-commercial stuff out there. The purpose of this is to stop children viewing pornography. It does not matter whether it is commercial or not. If you put in something like this, there are clever ways in which people will try to define their sites as non-commercial. In particular, if they can start appealing against this—this is where having a complicated appeals process would become so dangerous—I can see loopholes opening up. So we need to start including non-commercial pornography—and it is okay if it takes a year.

I also support Amendment 237, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin. We need to have a deadline. It is something that all sites can work towards. We should say that, on whatever date, if sites are not compliant—we suggest that it ought to be a bit like a speed limit, where you ought to slow down before you hit the 30 miles per hour limit—we will issue notices to the ISPs to block them. Something might happen, because you have a level playing field, everything happens on the same date, and under the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, they will have a year to do it in. That is probably enough to get your regulations in place and so on. It is a very good idea.

[Lord Browne of Belmont (DUP)]

My Lords, I am pleased to be able to support Part 3 of the Bill, and Amendments 58 and 65, in their objective of increasing child safety. However, I am concerned that the Government’s proposal in Clause 22 currently leaves many questions unanswered. I am raising these points in the context of the Government stating in the impact assessment for the Bill, published last May, that the regulatory system to be set up under Clause 22 would merely,

“nudge porn providers to comply and put age verification in place”.

That is not consistent with the much bolder manifesto commitment simply to,

“stop children’s exposure to harmful sexualised content online by requiring age verification for access to all sites containing pornographic material”.

Since then the Government have set out a robust position on IP blocking, which leaves websites little room for doubt as to what might happen if they do not comply with Part 3. The enforcement action is clear: the age verification regulator can issue a notice and internet service providers have a duty to respond. In this regard, and alluding back to the previous debate, I think it is vital that Clause 23 should remain as it is—unamended.

However, there has been no upgrading of Clause 22 in parallel with the introduction of Clause 23, so we are left with the notion of “nudging” websites—which gives me little reassurance that this is a robust approach to enforcement. Under Clause 22(1) the age verification regulator may give a notice to a payment provider or an ancillary service provider, but it is not clear when or if the regulator would inform the service provider that such a contravention was happening. Would it be after a fine was not paid or after a letter had been sent—and, if so, how long would a website have to respond before a notice would be given? I hope that the Minister will set out the Government’s intentions.

I support Amendment 58, tabled in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. It would require the regulator to issue a notice under Clause 22(1). The noble Baroness deserves much credit for her persistence in bringing this issue before your Lordships’ House over many years. My bigger concern is that, having set out clearly that internet service providers must act in response to a notice from the regulator, there is no transparent statutory expectation on payment providers or ancillary service providers. How do the Government expect enforcement to take place without this power? Others have set out their case on this point in detail and I will not take up the time of the Committee by repeating it, but I am left feeling concerned that there is no power to require service providers to take any action after receiving a notice from the regulator. Furthermore, such a lack of teeth undermines the Government’s manifesto commitment to prevent children accessing all pornographic websites.

I fully support Amendment 65 in the group, which would make it a duty for payment providers and ancillary service providers to act by removing their services from contravening websites, and makes that duty enforceable. I hope that the Government will agree.

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[Lord Gordon of Strathblane (Lab)]

My Lords, time is somewhat against us this afternoon. I will be extremely brief. I pass no judgment on where the line should be drawn. I say simply that it is an unassailable argument that it should be drawn in the same place offline and online. Well before the internet of things arrives, the internet is already regarded as a method of distribution of DVDs, CDs and books, so it would be entirely illogical to have one rule offline and not implement it online.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, first I thank the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for supporting my amendment in the last group about proportionality and the order in which websites should be tackled. Moving on to this group, I spoke to this set of amendments when we addressed this issue in the group starting with Amendment 54B—so I can abbreviate my speech and be quick. I support the noble Lord, Lord Browne, on the point made in the part of the briefing he was reading about the Obscene Publications Act and the Crown Prosecution Service advice et cetera being out of step with each other and out of step with enough members of the public for it to matter—that is the real trouble. I had thought to mention one or two of the unsavoury practices that you might find that will not be classified under the current ruling in Clause 23, but I think I have been trumped by the newspapers.

Some in the BBFC probably see this as an opportunity to clean up the internet. But it is not going to work; it will have the reverse effect. This whole issue of what is prohibited material needs to be tackled in another Bill, with a different regulator or enforcer, so it does not get confused with the business of protecting children, which is the purpose of this Bill. It will not protect children anyway, as this material ought to be behind the age verification firewall in any event. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Browne, pointed out why it might not be: you have a possible lacuna in the Bill. If you say that the material is stuff that the BBFC has classified, the really nasty stuff is not included, because it is not able to be classified—so suddenly Clause 23 might not apply to it. He is absolutely right there. This is one of the dangers, which is why they are having to try and draw in the idea of prohibited material. It would be much easier to remove prohibited material altogether.

It has been suggested to me that the easiest thing would be to alter Clause 16, which deals with the definition of pornography. Instead of having this very limited scope, it would be much easier just to have the one simple definition which is already in Clause 16(1)(e)(i), but with the wording slightly expanded to say, “Without prejudice to the application of the Obscene Publications Act 1959, any material produced solely or principally for the purposes of sexual arousal”. You could leave it at that, and then you would protect children from anything unsavoury that we do not want them to see. That is a much simpler solution than getting into this terribly complicated debate about what is prohibited material.

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote]

My Lords, I very much share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, about this set of amendments and prohibited material. As they stand, the amendments would have the effect of causing the Bill to place 18 and R18 material behind age verification checks, which Clause 16 limits to 18 and R18 material, while prohibited material would be freely available without any such protection. This would be pretty irresponsible and would show no regard for child protection. Even if the Bill was amended so that prohibited material was only legal online if placed behind age verification checks, we should not forget that the important strategy of targeting the biggest 50 pornography sites will not create a world in which children are free from accessing prohibited material, so that adults can relax and access it without concern. Even if the material was made legal online and given a BBFC classification, this would give a measure of respectability in the context of which it would no doubt become more widely available, and thus the chances of children seeing it would be further exacerbated.

Moreover, the crucial point is that we cannot make prohibited material legal in an online environment at the same time as maintaining the category of prohibited material offline. The former would inevitably result in the latter. Mindful of this, and of the fact that the category of prohibited material is long established, it would be wholly inappropriate for the House or indeed the Government to simply end the category of prohibited material online without a major public consultation. I very much hope that the Minister will completely reject these amendments and stand by what he said on this matter at Second Reading.

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[Lord Paddick]

The amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch. I have to say that it is only because we were quicker on the draw that I am leading on this amendment rather than the noble Baroness.

As I have previously alluded to, we believe that age verification is not sufficient protection for children on the internet. It can easily be circumvented, and it would be very difficult to place age verification on such platforms as Twitter and Tumblr. In relying on this mechanism, there is a danger of diverting attention away from other important and effective methods of addressing the issue of children accessing adult material online. Despite our misgivings, we believe that everything should be done to protect the privacy of those who have their age verified to enable them to access adult material on the internet. I am grateful to the Open Rights Group for its briefing and suggested amendment on this issue, which is the wording we have used for our amendment.

Age verification systems almost inevitably involve creating databases of those who are accessing adult material. It is completely lawful for those who wish to look at adult material to access these websites, but it is a sensitive area and many will be wary about or even deterred from accessing completely legal websites as a result. Security experts agree that unauthorised hacking of databases is almost inevitable, and the advice to organisations is to prepare contingency plans for when rather than if their databases are accessed by those without authority to do so. The consequences of breaching databases containing sensitive personal data can perhaps be most starkly illustrated by the public exposé of the personal details of those who were members of Ashley Madison, which reportedly resulted in two suicides. The risk to privacy can be reduced if the age verification regulator approves minimum standards for age verification providers. These are set out in the amendment.

The amendment suggests that the age verification regulator publish a code of practice, approved by the Secretary of State and laid before Parliament. The code of practice should ensure that everything possible is done to protect the privacy of users and to allow them to choose which age verification system they trust with their sensitive personal information. For example, some websites provide a service that enables users to prove their identity online, including their age, for purposes unconnected with access to adult material but which could also be used for that purpose. The full extent of the provisions are set out in the amendment, and the evidence in support of the amendment is set out in the Open Rights Group’s updated briefing on the Bill.

The Constitution Committee addressed this issue in its 7th report of 2016-17:

“We are concerned that the extent to which the Bill leaves the details of the age-verification regime to guidance and guidelines to be published by the as yet-to-be-designated regulator adversely affects the ability of the House effectively to scrutinise this legislation. Our concern is exacerbated by the fact that, as the Bill currently stands, the guidance and guidelines will come into effect without any parliamentary scrutiny at all. The House may wish to consider whether it would be appropriate for a greater degree of detail to be included on the face of the bill”.


That is exactly what this amendment attempts to do. I beg to move.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I want to say a few words because I have been working on the issue of age verification for a long time. I became interested in it when it became apparent a couple of years ago that it was going to come to the top of the agenda. For the last year or so, the Digital Policy Alliance, which I chair, has been working with the British Standards Institution to produce a publicly available specification—PAS 1296—exactly on this issue. Its whole point is to enable anonymised verification of the attribute of your age. People have said that you would have to give the information to the adult content site, the porn site, but you do not necessarily need to.

There are two stages: when the child, or the adult, first arrives at the site; and, if they are allowed into the site, what they then do. At the point when they come to the front page of the site, where they should be asked to prove their age, there should be an option—and this is the point about anonymity—that allows them to bounce off, with a token, to an age verifier. I have on my smartphone, for instance, one from Yoti. I can identify myself to Yoti; it knows about me and can send an encrypted token back to the website, which does not contain any identity information at all—purely the fact that I am over 18. If the regulator later needs to unravel the token because it appears that rules have been breached, it is possible to present the token and start unravelling it—but only with proper powers. The point is that a hacker cannot find out who presented that token. So it is possible now to do what is necessary.

That answers the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Maxton. The problem with an identity card is that it will identify you. If you gave your identity to one of these websites and it happened to be hacked, like Ashley Madison, and if you were a Cabinet Minister—or even like most of us here, actually—your career would probably be in ruins. So I think it is essential that people be permitted anonymity. That is why, I am afraid, I am not in favour of the identity card method. There are other similar ways of doing the same thing—

[Lord Maxton]

I would, maybe, accept the noble Earl’s point in this particular context, but the ID card has, of course, a variety of different uses—particularly if it is a smartcard—rather than just this one.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Absolutely; I know what the noble Lord means. I simply meant that this is not necessarily an ID application—except, maybe, to identify yourself to the site which then gives your attribute to the other website.

I am thoroughly in favour of the amendment, and so is the industry. We hope to publish a standard on this in the not-too-distant future, which may help the regulator determine who is a fit and proper person to carry it out.

There is just one other thing I want to say. Once you have done your age verification and then go on to the website, if you then choose to subscribe, and give it your credit card number and everything else, that is up to you. I hope and trust that the sites—I know that they are pretty careful about this—will encrypt properly and guard the information with their lives, if not yours.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

I do not want to overload the Front-Bench contributions from this side, or to turn this into a mutual admiration society, but I want to say that the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, has played a blinder in educating many of us in this House about the possibilities and the technologies being developed on anonymised age verification. As the Minister probably knows, we had a very useful session with many of those developing new apps for this precise purpose. Yoti was one, VeriMe was another—one could go on. There are different types of age verification, which can be chosen by the consumer. The most recent, which is now virtually available for general use, is Yoti, which the noble Earl mentioned. These methods are now available for use; this is not a question of pie in the sky, or of things not being available for a year or so. That makes the amendment highly practical, and, as my noble friend said, it is absolutely essential for the protection of personal privacy.

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[Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve (CB)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak on this point, but this may be relevant evidence. Last year, I went to a meeting with a parliamentary group that was looking at hate speech issues, and a representative of Facebook was there. She said—one may say that this did not show quite a correct view of freedom of expression—that Facebook takes down whatever its customers find offensive. A member of the public said, “Actually, when you have had 20 independent complaints, you take it down and it is immediately put up again”. That second step is where the remedies are not working at present. It does not get taken down. This was mainly about anti-Semitic hate speech of a vile sort that would have been well known in certain quarters in the 1930s. This is an urgent matter, which we need some remedy for.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, it has been suggested to me that this group of amendments could also be used in the code of practice and the safety responsibilities could also be drawn up to include non-age-verified pornography.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, the Government take the harm caused by online abuse and harassment very seriously, and we will continue to invest in law enforcement capabilities to ensure that all online crime is dealt with properly.

Amendment 70 would require the Government to carry out a review of online abuse and lay a report before Parliament within six months of Royal Assent. We do not believe that it is necessary to include provision for a review in primary legislation. As part of the ending violence against women and girls strategy, we have established an official government working group to map out the current issues, prevalence, initiatives and barriers to addressing gendered online abuse and to produce an action plan.

We are absolutely clear that abusive and threatening behaviour is totally unacceptable in any form, either offline or online. As the Committee will be aware, any action that is illegal when committed offline is also illegal if committed online. Current legislation, some of which was passed before the digital age, has shown itself to be flexible and capable of catching and punishing offenders, whether their crimes were committed by digital means or otherwise. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was amended to introduce two new stalking offences to cover conduct that takes place online as well as offline. In addition, the Government will be introducing a new civil stalking protection order to protect victims further.

We will continue to take action where we find gaps in the legislation, just as we did with cyberstalking, harassment and the perpetrators of grossly offensive, obscene or menacing behaviour, and of course we introduced a new law making the fast-growing incidence of revenge porn a specific criminal offence.

The Law Commission recently consulted on including a review of the law covering online abuse as part of its 13th programme of law reform, which will launch later this year. It is expected to confirm with Ministers shortly which projects it proposes should be included.

We are also working to tackle online abuse in schools and have invested £1.6 million to fund a number of anti-bullying organisations.

In addition, we are working to improve the enforcement response to online abuse and harassment so that it can respond to changing technologies. The Home Office has also allocated £4.6 million for a digital transformation programme to equip forces with the tools to police the digital age effectively and to protect the victims of digital crime, including online abuse and harassment. Police and prosecutors evidence offences carried out digitally, non-digitally or both. The CPS Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving Communications Sent via Social Media makes clear the range of criminal law which can be brought to bear on offences committed through social media. Moreover, from April 2015, police forces have been recording online instances of crimes, including stalking and harassment.

I shall talk about the next three amendments together, as they all cover the duties of social media sites. Amendment 71AA seeks to make it a requirement for all social media sites to carry out a safety impact assessment. Amendment 71AB seeks to require Ministers to issue a code of practice to ensure that commercial social media platform providers make a consistent and robust response to online abuse on their sites by identifying and assessing online abuse. Amendment 233A seeks to impose a duty on social media services to respond to reports posted on their sites of material which passes the criminal test—that is, that the content would, if published by other means or communicated in person, cause a criminal offence to be committed.

The Government expect social media and interactive services to have robust processes in place that can quickly address inappropriate content and abusive behaviour on their sites. On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, it is incumbent on all social media companies to provide an effective means for users to report content and perform the actions that they say they will take to deal with this. We believe a statutory code of practice is unworkable because there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Dealing properly with inappropriate content and abuse will vary by service and incident. Technological considerations might differ by platform and as innovation develops. Users will benefit most if companies develop their own bespoke approach for reporting tools and in-house processes.

Social media companies take down content that is violent or incites violence if it breaches their terms and conditions. We expect them to inform the police where they identify significant threats or illegal activity happening on their sites. It is, however, extremely difficult to identify where the threat has come from and whether it is serious. We work closely with companies to flag terrorist-related content and have so far secured the voluntary removal of over 250,000 pieces of content since 2010.

I can assure the Committee that we share the sentiments expressed in these amendments. At the moment, though, they are not practical or necessary, so I hope on that basis noble Lords will not press their amendments.

Digital Economy Bill

Earl of Erroll Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 8th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 214. We all know that Ofcom has a great interest in traditional media. As we can see, not least from Clauses 70 and 71, we are happy to give Ofcom a panoptic role when this is required. My amendment is designed to give Ofcom a panoptic role in new media.

We are all familiar with algorithms, particularly in such contexts as a Google search. It is just a set of rules and procedures that gets us to where we want to go from wherever we happen to be. I do not know of any great harm currently being done by any algorithms, but we ought to be aware of the power these procedures have in our lives. They govern the choice of what people see on the internet. The potential for this to interfere with news flow is obvious. If you type something into Google, it decides what you get to see. In the context of a referendum or an election, the potential for altering the result is clear. It also has an effect when you are just looking round to see what is there. Google has had trouble recently with its response to people typing in “are Jews”; it was autocompleting that with the word “evil”. This has now ceased, but it shows what influence algorithms can have in directing people to particular sources of information—in this case, with particularly nasty implications.

The function of an algorithm is to discriminate, but how are algorithms discriminating? What do we know about what they are doing in terms of fairness, when it comes to race or gender, in the context of job offers, accommodation or access? Referring again—I am sure unfairly—to Google, there was an episode last year when, if you put “three black teenagers” into the Google image search, you got mug shots of prisoners; but if you put in “three white teenagers” you did not. How do we know the effects of these things on our lives? If people start trying to correct them, what effect will these corrections have?

Most of these algorithms—or at least the big ones—are run by large, dominant, international organisations. Who controls them? We think we have some idea but there is no predictability; there does not seem to be any effective system of governance, least of all by government or institutions. They are a law unto themselves and they will continue to be so, unless something fantastic changes.

Under these circumstances, we ought to know what is going on. We ought to have the ability to take a look and make sure that it is fair and as we wish it to be, as we do in similar areas of the old media and of life. I hope my amendment will enable Ofcom to do just that. I beg to move.

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment. There is a huge amount of power in the hands of search engines regarding the way they influence how people think. This could be used as a form of propaganda, as we have seen with the recent rows about fake news. From the point of view of protecting Britain, there could even be some security implications because of the way they could affect how people think. So it is quite a sensible power to have, just in case.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the amendment. I thank the noble Lord for his explanation of what an algorithm is. I always found BBC Bitesize’s explanation rather helpful—a set of rules to solve a problem—along with its corresponding explanation of how an algorithm can go wrong: a set of rules designed for getting dressed that insists on your coat going on before your jumper. This would lead to a great many children arriving at school in sartorial disarray. It helpfully indicates that a set of rules is not benign—it has a purpose and a process, both of which are man or woman-made.

It is not possible to exaggerate the importance of an algorithm. I recently read Weapons of Math Destruction, by Cathy O’Neil, a Harvard PhD and Wall Street quantitative analyst. It goes step by step through the ways in which algorithms—apparently neutral and benign—have the capacity to change lives in huge ways and in an ever-increasing list of scenarios. If wrongly attributed or designed, they can have devastating effects on job prospects, education, financial outcomes or the reputation of an individual, with very little possibility of appeal, correction or compensation.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for putting down this amendment. Indeed, this amendment has many good aspects to it, but I will adopt a phrase which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, used the other day, which is, “It doesn’t go nearly far enough”. It really highlights—and I declare an interest as the co-chair of the new All-Party Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence—some of the issues that this Bill simply does not deal with. This does need huge consideration: all the ethics involved not only with artificial intelligence, but with the internet of things and the great many regulatory issues which spring from the new technologies. Algorithms are a part of it, of course they are, but we need further consideration.

I agree with those who have said that perhaps Ofcom is not necessarily the best regulator for this—I do not know—and it may be that we need to construct a purpose-built regulator for the world of artificial intelligence and the internet of things in ethical terms. I am not quite sure that Ofcom has got the necessary tools in terms of the ethics aspect of it.

I am very much in spirit with the noble Lord and I am delighted that he has raised it, but we are at the very beginning of a really important debate on a lot of these areas. The essence of all this is trust. We had a continuous debate through Part 5 about the government sharing of data. This is about the private sector and its use of a lot of our data and the way it sorts them and places them in the search engines. Trust is the overwhelming issue of our age, and we are not there yet. If we are going to reassure people who want to use these new technologies, we really do need to come up with a proper regulatory system. I do not think that this new clause quite provides it.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Before the noble Lord sits down, may I just ask him: is it not dangerous to make perfection the enemy of better? In other words, the amendment may not be perfect, but it is moving in the right direction, and to say, “Do nothing”, because it is not perfect is surely very unwise, given all the other stuff that he has said.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, I know that the noble Earl himself is perfect in almost every way, so I would very much hesitate to argue with him. Still, I feel we need something rather broader than this proposal would provide.

Digital Economy Bill

Earl of Erroll Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 20th March 2017 Lords Chamber

When the Government use their powers to restrict access to something for the public good it sends an important message, and when they choose not to use those powers it sends another message—that the practice is neutral or even positive. Neither are the case. By the time we had irrevocable evidence that smoking was harmful, about 85% of the population smoked. However, the Government acted in the teeth of vested interests and public practice. This Government should also act in this area. If they are intent on passing their amendments in order to get their age verification legislation through, then shame on the Opposition for exacting so high a price. The amendment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, will at least ensure we revisit this issue in a timely fashion.

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Farmer, is right about the huge dangers in viewing much of this pornography online but I do not think this Bill is the right place to deal with it—that is the challenge—because we are confusing two issues. This Bill is about protecting children—that is what was originally intended—and the idea is to have age verification to stop children watching any sexually explicit material online regardless of how bad or innocent it is. If it is sexually explicit, it has got to be hidden behind age verification.

The challenge is that we have now introduced into the Bill the concept of protecting adults. However, there is other legislation that already does that. If it is not working properly, we should cure that legislation. I agree that we should bring the CPS guidelines into line with what is going on and probably review the Obscene Publications Act. The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act also deals with issues around this problem. It is covered in lots of places.

However, inserting a blanket cover in the Bill is dangerous because suddenly the BBFC will act on its own initiative to close down websites, which will then be appealed against and cause chaos to the system while the law courts are possibly doing something else. Once it is appealed to the law courts you will have a problem because two sets of measures will be fighting each other. We need to keep it consistent. Yes, we should have protection for adults, but let us do it properly and in the right place.

I support the Government on these amendments for that reason because it brings the Bill back to where we can protect children against watching anything unsuitable. The government amendments align what is in the Bill with the Visa and MasterCard standards, which helps with the enforcement measures in the Bill. They will apply internationally and this will help the ASPs—the ancillary service providers—to comply with the Bill and help to enforce measures against websites that do not have age verification in place. They will align the Bill with the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act as well, which, again, will mean that there are no other loopholes by using one Act against the other. I have already spoken about the CPS guidance.

I understand that the topical Fifty Shades of Grey—I do not know anything about it because I have never read the book nor seen the film—involves bondage, pain and S&M. Should that book be allowed or should it have been banned? Should the film have been allowed for general release or not? It is those kinds of issues that cause confusion and we need to realise that.

The Bill does not legitimise what is behind the age verification. That is for other Bills to do. This Bill seeks to make sure that children cannot get at anything that is sexualised. Let us not cause confusion. Let us stick to one thing in one place and one thing in another place. I support the Government on this.

[Lord Elton (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot support the noble Earl. I follow most of his argument, but when we are considering legislation in one area we have to take into account its effect in other areas. What we have here is a proposal to narrow a definition of maximum control and to place anything that is not within that narrow definition in an area of less control where a larger population is affected by it.

I do not apologise for coming to this very late because Her Majesty’s Government are doing the same. In 1985 I was in the unfortunate position of taking through this House the Bill to abolish the GLC. After it had gone through the Commons and just before the Report stage here, the then Leader of the House, Willie Whitelaw, said, “My friends down the Corridor want me to abolish the Inner London Education Authority as well”. Noble Lords can see what political dynamite that was. To bring forward proposals at the second stage in the second House without wide consultation with those concerned seems to me pretty late in the day, so we are right to look at this closely.

I view it in a simple way. Powerful arguments have been put by the noble and learned Baroness and others in favour of her amendment, which I warmly support. The central issue is a simple one. If you take the least harmful of a bunch of very harmful material out of control, you may make the control of the remainder more effective but you also release more harmful material to less strict control. That must be wrong. Other noble Lords have spoken much more academically and legalistically than I am able to do. I merely wish to say that I have listened with my heart and my head and I stand entirely behind the noble and learned Baroness’s amendment.

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[Lord Paddick]

Forgive me if I misunderstood the noble Lord. I thought he was using that as an argument for why that sort of activity should not be allowed to be seen by anyone, but I could be wrong.

[The Earl of Erroll]

This may assist the noble Lord and the rest of the House—

[Baroness Buscombe (Con)]

I remind noble Lords that this is Report.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Very quickly, for clarification, the problem is that some material is regulated by ATVOD, some by the BBFC and some by Ofcom. That is where the noble Lord’s problems are coming from when he talks about “prohibited material”.

[Lord Paddick]

I am grateful for the noble Earl’s intervention, but for clarity I will stick to what I was saying. The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, talked about the harm test that was introduced in 1994. I challenge anyone to suggest that some of the things that are not allowed in R18 videos cause harm to anyone. They might be unpleasant or, in some people’s eyes, morally reprehensible, but certainly there are things that are not allowed because of the definition of prohibited material but cause harm to no one. That is an illustration, without going into specific gory details about what is and what is not allowed. That is why we are in the mess that we are in.

Clearly the question of what is and is not acceptable pornography needs to be reviewed, and my understanding is that that is what the Minister has said will happen as part of an online safety review. Were the House to divide, we on these Benches would prefer Amendment 25YW from the Labour Front Bench, under which a review would take place but without specifying what the outcome of that review should be—that is, a reversion to the discredited definition of prohibited material.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and I have Amendment 25N in this group. It is a probing amendment to test whether a “sufficiently independent” appeal mechanism against a decision of the age verification regulator is good enough. Government Amendment 25M, regarding appeals against a decision of the age verification regulator, describes the arrangements as “sufficiently” independent of the age verification regulator. Our amendment would remove the word “sufficiently” so that the amendment read: “any person hearing an appeal under those arrangements will be independent of the age-verification regulator”.

The British Board of Film Classification currently operates its own appeal mechanism against its decisions either to classify a film or DVD with a particular age classification or to refuse to grant a classification at all. That appeal mechanism is operated by the BBFC but by a panel that is independent of those who made the initial classification. To that extent, it is not wholly independent of the BBFC but it is arguably sufficiently independent to command the confidence of those seeking classification for their films and DVDs—that is, the industry can have confidence in the process.

Although this works well in practice with the proposed age regulation regulator, what if that regulator changes? This “sufficiently” independent arrangement appears to be designed around the proposed age verification regulator, the British Board of Film Classification, in a counterintuitive way—that is, not having an appeal mechanism that is totally or completely independent seems counterintuitive—because of the reputation that the BBFC has, which might not be the case were the age verification regulator to change. The wording “sufficiently independent” appears to be BBFC-specific in a way that might not be acceptable were any other regulator to be chosen. Perhaps the Minister can reassure the House on that point.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I want to comment on Amendment 25D and to thank the Government for proposing new subsection (2B). One thing that worried those of us who had been thinking about how to make age verification work was the definition of “commercial basis”, which was a potential loophole for some websites to get round the provision. This proposed new subsection seems to close that loophole in that, even if material is free, it can still be provided on a commercial basis. Therefore, I congratulate the Government and support this amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the thinking behind these many amendments. I have read them and think that I understand them but I am sure that he will correct me if my interpretation is wrong. They underline the considerable amount of additional work that is still to be done if we are to get a comprehensive age verification scheme properly up and running.

The Minister will know that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was of the view that many of the details should be spelled out on the face of the Bill. For example, it expected details such as the definition of “commercial basis” and the identity of the regulator or regulators to be specified at this stage. However, the provision of this information, like many other details, has been put off by the Government to a later date, to be included in the guidelines to which the noble Lord has referred and to be discussed in further debates that will be taken under their auspices.

The DPRRC also requested that guidelines on how the financial penalties should operate should be brought before this House as an affirmative resolution. I remind the House of a particularly stark criticism that it wrote at the time. It said:

“We consider it objectionable as a matter of principle that a regulator, who is to be clothed with extensive powers to impose fines and take other enforcement action, should itself be able to specify how key concepts used in clause 15(1) are to be interpreted”.


I would be grateful if the Minister could justify why what seems to be a rather straightforward piece of advice from that committee has once again been rejected. As I understand the noble Lord’s amendment, it is the offer of a negative procedure that is now being put before us, which of course does not carry the same weight.

The amendments deal also with the provision for appeals, which again were debated at length in Committee. The Minister will know that the DPRRC recommended that a statutory right of appeal should be placed in the Bill. Again this advice seems to have been rejected by the Government and, instead, they are relying on a new formulation of words specifying that those hearing any appeal should be “sufficiently independent” of the age verification regulator. As we have heard, the detail of this “sufficiently independent” regime is spelled out in the draft guidance.

I have to say that we share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this really is not good enough. The guidelines specify that the independent appeals panel will effectively be appointed and funded by the regulator. However, we have tabled a separate amendment—Amendment 25P, which will come up in a later group—that specifies our belief that the appeals process should indeed be fully independent of the regulator. We believe that our amendment is more appropriate than that of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain why the DPRRC’s advice on this matter has been rejected.

I return now to the overall package of government amendments in the group. As I have said, they seem to flag up a great deal of further work that will need to carry on outside the Bill. As it is worded, the Secretary of State will issue guidance to the regulator and the regulator will, in turn, issue guidance for approval to the Secretary of State. That seems a rather cosy arrangement of swapping guidelines back and forth, but it is not quite clear to me at what point Parliament will have the final say in all these matters.

Some of the outcomes will come before the House in the form of affirmative regulations but others will not. We do not yet know who the regulators will be, how the age verification regime will work, how the privacy checks will work, what the definition of “commercial activities” will be, how ancillary services will be defined and, crucially, we do not know how the internet service blocking system will work or what kind of fines will be imposed on those who fail to comply. Without wishing to overlay this, it all feels like a rather unsatisfactory piece of legislation. The amendments before us today and the guidelines that have recently been issued do little to reassure us that the Government really have got the detail of this in hand.

Regrettably, we feel that the Government are in danger of delegating far too many powers to the as yet unspecified regulator. This is an issue that we will return to in the next group of amendments. In the meantime, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on the points I have raised.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I shared some of the concerns that the noble Baroness has just articulated about the role of the BBFC as both the group that will reach these decisions and the one to enforce them. However, having met with representatives of the BBFC, I have to say that I do not agree with the noble Baroness about heavy resource commitments. The BBFC is content that it should be able to carry out these roles with a minimal increase in resources. Also, bearing in mind the confidence that the industry currently has in the BBFC around classification and the awarding of certificates for films and DVDs, we are confident that were the BBFC to become the regulator, it could carry out both roles.

At the end of the day, the BBFC is not at all confident about how effective the financial penalty elements of the Bill will be, bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of pornographic websites are hosted in other countries. In its view, the enforcement of financial penalties will be almost impossible, but it is confident that it could quickly and easily ask internet service providers to block websites that fail to provide adequate age verification. In these circumstances, we do not believe that we can support the amendments.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, this is an important point. Without enforcement, nothing will work. If you do not enforce age verification, no one will bother with it. For exactly the same reasons as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave, I think that the notice and take-down—the blocking—is the only thing that will work. Fines will not work; it is probably a waste of time even trying them. The only thing that might work is to ask the credit card companies not to take payments for those sites, because they like to observe the law. I am concerned that the BBFC will not have resources to do this properly, but even if it goes elsewhere the BBFC should still be able to notify ISPs to block sites. That bit must certainly be enforced.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has spoken in this brief debate. The introduction of a new law requiring appropriate age verification measures for online pornography will help protect young people and children from potential harms from online pornography. It will also rightly hold commercial providers of online pornography responsible for the material they provide and profit from.

The Government of course take the protection of children and young people very seriously. To provide effective protection it is important that we have a robust regulatory system in place. These amendments seek to limit the scope of the regulatory functions that may be fulfilled by the BBFC by seeking the requirement that the same regulator must not be responsible for both identifying a non-compliant site and taking enforcement action against it. I shall first explain why, in identifying the BBFC as the preferred regulator, we think we have made the right choice.

The Government’s intention is that, subject to parliamentary approval, the BBFC will be the regulator responsible for identifying websites that do not have adequate age verification or are hosting extreme pornography, and then to give notice to the appropriate persons, be they payment service providers, ancillary service providers or ISPs. It is not intended that the BBFC will be designated as the regulator responsible for issuing financial penalties. That will be a role for a separate body, yet to be determined, but which will be approved by Parliament.

We are pleased to be working with the British Board of Film Classification as the intended age verification regulator, again subject to parliamentary approval. To respond to the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on structure, the BBFC is an independent, not-for-profit company that has a proven track record of interpreting and implementing legislation as the statutory authority for age rating videos under the Video Recordings Act. It has unparalleled expertise in classifying content and it is committed to delivering the aims of age verification. It is the expert on editorial judgments over pornographic and other content.

The BBFC has been classifying cinema films since it was set up in 1912 and videos and DVDs since the Video Recordings Act was passed in 1984. It continuously has to make judgments on classification, openly and transparently. These decisions relate to a multimillion-pound industry and are subject to challenge. The BBFC’s work with mobile network operators on the self-regulatory regime for mobile content is a good example of where it successfully sets content standards, implements them and adjudicates transparently and accountably.

The BBFC will not operate without oversight. It must have regard to the statutory guidance from the Secretary of State to the regulator. This will provide a further opportunity to ensure that the regulator fulfils its duties in the way Parliament sees fit. As I said earlier, we are seeking views on this guidance before a final version is laid. Ultimately, the regulator’s decision-making process will be subject to oversight by the courts as there is the possibility of challenge by way of judicial review. This prevents it acting arbitrarily.

In our view, these amendments are unnecessary for the following reasons. First, Clause 17 already enables the Government to designate a person, or any two persons or more jointly, as age verification regulators. The importance of getting this measure right means that the Government remain open-minded and retain flexibility as to how best to respond to changing circumstances. If the BBFC is proven to be unable to deliver certain regulatory functions the legislation has the flexibility to overcome these problems.

Secondly, splitting the regulatory functions in the Bill so that the same regulator cannot identify non-compliant sites and enforce against them unnecessarily creates a middleman in the process. The BBFC will have to give notice to a second regulator, which will then pass that notice on to an ISP or other appropriate body. This is just red tape for no benefit. It makes sense that the body that makes the original determination should also be responsible for notifying relevant parties affected by that determination and for ensuring that that notification action is effective in achieving compliance.

Thirdly, our ambition is to have the age verification regime in place by spring 2018. We are determined to stick to that timetable. The NSPCC has set out the scale of the problem we face and we need to get on with protecting children as quickly as we can. If we need to invent an additional regulator that can only delay the result.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I will say a few words on this very quickly. I thoroughly approve of the premise of the amendment, which is to ensure that some websites do not try to cheat; in fact it would not be a bad idea to put it in the Bill.

I ought to declare an interest: I have been chairing a steering group working on British Standards Institute Publicly Available Specification 1296 on age checking. The whole idea is that this could be used in order to test the procedures and organisations doing age checking. One of the things that it mandates is privacy; it mandates that age checking must be general data protection regulation compliant. The real purpose behind this is that at the point when someone thinks of visiting a pornographic website there should be no requirement for that person to identify themselves to that website. It is perfectly possible at that point to bounce off the website with a token from that website to someone outside who may know about the person and can check their age, and then they can send back an encrypted token that can be stored saying, “This person, whose name I am not going to reveal to you, is over 18”. That is all it does. That can then be data checked and unwound by someone with proper judicial authorisation, if something goes wrong. However, it could be that some websites will try to get around that. That is why the amendment is good: they would have to comply. I do not know whether that is somewhere else in the regulations, but having it in the Bill would be a good thing.

Some people say, “How can you stay anonymous?”. The simple answer is that if you then wish to subscribe to the website and buy some of its product, and you freely give up your credit card, I am afraid that you will not be anonymous. However, that is your choice once you are in. The initial stage of just wanting to view the site should be anonymous, and we should reinforce that.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

My Lords, I echo many of the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We added our name to a similar amendment in Committee and there was a broad degree of support for the principles that were expressed. The amendment returns to the essential need to protect the identity of those who are over 18 and legitimately want to access pornographic sites without having their personal details compromised in the age verification process.

The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, has been very helpful in explaining how the privacy systems would work, using a two-stage process to prove someone’s age and then giving them an encrypted token to use on adult sites. We agree with this model and would like to see it widely adopted. It assumes that age verification would be carried out by a separate age verification provider who has the specific technical skills to carry out these checks securely. However, we also agree that technology is moving on apace and that it would be a mistake to be too prescriptive. We believe that a code of practice, as set out in the amendment, would deliver the protections while allowing that to happen.

That brings us to the draft guidance on the regulator, which the Government published last week and which addresses the issue of privacy. We believe that of all the parts of the draft guidance, the section on privacy is indeed a step forward. It puts the onus on the regulator to work with the Information Commissioner’s Office to ensure that systems are in place to check a user’s privacy while having regard to the Data Protection Act. While we welcome that, we would also like it to address the need for users to have a choice of provider. Again, that is something that we debated at an earlier stage.

In addition, we have a continuing concern that the only provision for data protection breaches is for the ICO to be informed, rather than necessarily for it to act. I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us that, if there are such breaches, they will indeed be followed up by action.

I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us on these points. However, we feel that progress is being made on this subject. Depending on what the Minister is able to say in response, it may well be that we will ask the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, not to press the issue at this time.

Digital Economy Bill

Earl of Erroll Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 5th April 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I add my great thanks to the Minister, on behalf of all the people I was talking to, for his intelligent and sensitive handling of the rather difficult, tortuous, twisting turns which were confusing what we saw as the perceived prime purpose of Part 3. I think we got there and have something that is going to be workable. I just hope that the regulator, when it gets operational, will find that what is coming out of the British Standards Institution PAS 1296 will be helpful in trying to make sure that age verification works in protecting children from accessing all the adult content online, which was the only bit that I was dealing with. Thank you very much indeed.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I suspect that this is au revoir and not adieu to the Bill, if one is still allowed to use French in this House. I thank the Minister for putting up with endless conversations with me about statutory underpinning or something instead. I thank him for arranging for me to see the Culture Secretary, which I look forward to doing if she is free to do so before the Bill comes back. I make it clear that I am agnostic about how to achieve the protection of the BBC’s independence and viability—whether in the charter, in statutory underpinning or in undertakings given by Ministers. My difficulty at the moment is that we have still not had those undertakings, but I look forward to future debates.