Courts and Tribunals Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sarah Sackman]

I was glad to meet the hon. Member to discuss the situation at Taunton, which I know has been a deep source of frustration. Nothing could more exemplify the years of neglect of our justice system than our crumbling court estate that was presided over by the Conservatives. This Government are investing in the fabric of our court estate. That is not just in the bricks and mortar, but in the digital upgrades that are so important, and I will speak to those now.

We have the technology for remote hearings; we need to be deploying it. This Government will develop a pilot of virtual remand hearings, so that we do not need as many prisoner transfers as before. We will work with our judiciary to develop a new pioneering national video model. The model will allow suitable cases to be allocated to available judges across different locations. It might be that a judge in Cardiff is hearing a matter based down in London, helping to alleviate the pressures there, to make much more effective use of capacity and to target those areas facing the greatest backlogs.

We are also adopting a new national listing tool, harnessing the capacity of AI to schedule cases more efficiently. We will have case progression officers in every single Crown court, making the more complex cases progress further and faster. We are working with the judiciary to set up short trial courts, which hear similar cases together over concentrated periods so that they can be dealt with more quickly. We are also expanding a scheme already used in Manchester, Bristol and Nottingham to allow prison vans to use bus lanes. I agree entirely with those who say we need to make the system more efficient, and we are stretching and straining every sinew to do exactly that, with the investment to go with it. We welcome in particular the judiciary’s reforms to prioritise rape and serious sexual offences and to end the unacceptable practice of floating trials for such cases, giving victims greater certainty about when their case will be heard.

Lord Leveson’s review was clear that investment and modernisation can only take us so far. No single lever can fix a crisis that has been years in the making. We have had decades of under-investment in a system that has simply not kept pace with the 21st century, where cases now take twice as long as they did 25 years ago. So our third lever is pragmatic, principled structural reform to ease the pressure on the Crown court and ensure that its time is concentrated on the most serious cases, and that is precisely what the Bill delivers.

The case for reform remains as strong as ever, but good government requires us to listen, and this place exists to scrutinise and improve legislation. When concerns are raised, it is right that the Government reflect and react. When the Prime Minister took office he committed himself to looking at these proposals again, and that is why over recent months the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor and I have listened carefully to stakeholders, to Members on both sides of the House, and to people who work within the system. We have heard that strength of feeling, and we have acted. I can confirm today that the Government have tabled an amendment to remove clause 3, relating to the bench division. The effect will be that all defendants facing a trial in the Crown court will be heard with a jury. That decision does not change the destination or the ambition of the Bill, which has always remained the same: swifter justice for victims.

Simplifying our approach and avoiding some of the operational reforms that would have come with a new division in the Crown court gives us the opportunity to move faster in implementing the changes set out in the Bill. Implementing those changes more efficiently will free up court capacity and make better use of court time, helping us to bring about fast, fair justice for victims. We remain confident that the guts of the Bill—the package of reforms backed by the record financial investment that I have described, along with our ambitious programme of modernisation—will be sufficient to free up Crown court time to turn the tide on the backlog within the current Parliament. This is the right decision for victims, and it is the right decision for the justice system.

I know that the Opposition have tabled amendments to remove the remaining clauses relating to Lord Leveson’s review, but I am afraid that doing so would be to bury one’s head in the sand. We are proceeding with other structural reforms in the Bill, including the removal of defendants’ right to choose whether their cases are heard in the magistrates court or the Crown court when they involve an either-way offence. The reform that we have always proposed is that, as in Scotland, it should be the court rather than the defendant that triages cases. This has a double effect. Not only is it more efficient, ensuring that when the prosecution and the court decide that a case can be heard in the magistrates court, that is where it is heard; it is also fairer. It is about putting the power in the hands of the court rather than those of the defendant and giving a far greater say to victims whose voice can be heard through the prosecution, which puts its case as to what venue the case should be heard in, as well as hearing from the defence. It means that cases will be heard on the basis of their seriousness and not simply the preference of the defendant, as is the case in Scotland.

This is exactly the right thing to do. These measures will not only reduce the demand on the Crown court, but will prevent defendants from gaming the system, electing for a jury trial in the simple hope that delays will drag on and the case will fall apart when the victims or witnesses withdraw. Our reforms are not only pragmatic but principled. For instance, giving magistrates courts greater sentencing powers means that more cases can be dealt with more quickly. The magistrates court is an efficient jurisdiction. It currently deals with triable either way cases about four times faster than the Crown court.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and Tavistock) (Con)]

Is the hon. and learned Lady as concerned as I am about the backlog in the magistrates court, which is four times larger than that in the Crown court and growing at 16% a year, whereas the Crown court backlog is stabilised? If this really is a reform in the interests of efficiency, should she not be sparing the magistrates court at a time when their backlog is growing so fast?

[Sarah Sackman]

I do not accept the premise of that question. I do not accept that we have a backlog in our magistrates court. What we have is a substantial caseload. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will know that the magistrates court hear more than 1.5 million cases a year, and it is coping well. What I do acknowledge is that we need to increase their capacity, which is why we are increasing the number of sitting days. In 2025 there were 114,000 sitting days, and we will increase that to 130,000 by 2028-29.

The other thing we are doing is increasing the number of magistrates. Under the previous Government, the number of magistrates in this country halved. We are going to restore the magistracy to its former glory. The changes that we have made to the application process, and the investment that we are putting into recruitment—quadrupling the budget—are already reaping the rewards, and we are on course to meet the 21,000 target. The right hon. and learned Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) is right to say that we need to grow capacity as we see a more expanded role for the magistracy, but I believe that we can do it and we are on track to do so.

We are reforming the automatic right of appeal. It is vital that there is a right of appeal, but it is also reasonable to ask a defence to identify grounds for appeal. By introducing a permission to filter out cases without merit, we will avoid a situation in which victims are needlessly put through unnecessary re-hearings where the appeal totally lacks merit. As I said, these reforms must be matched by the capacity to deliver them. That is why we are investing in our courts and in the people who make justice possible, and we remain on track to reach our target of 21,000 magistrates by 2028-29. We are also strengthening judicial capacity by boosting the number of district judges and legal advisers, who need to see better pay and career progression.

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[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order. I will be introducing a five-minute time limit after the next speaker.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I draw your attention, Madam Deputy Speaker, and the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

It has been a peculiar pleasure to listen to the two speeches made so far by Labour Back Benchers. Both the speech of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) and that of the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson), have been treats to listen to, and I feel I can do no better than to say, “Listen to both of them.” However, it would be wrong of me to say that I oppose the Bill in its entirety. The truth is that some of its provisions contain very useful and reasonable directions of travel. Personally, I do not have the profoundest objection to grounds needing to be given for an appeal to the Crown court. I think that would be a reasonable thing to require, provided that the Chairman of the Select Committee’s warnings are heeded and those who have to fill out that appeal are given the opportunity of advice. As has been said, I think by Opposition Members, the problem is that there is a lack of legal advisers in the magistrates court—what we used to call magistrates court clerks.

That brings me to another way in which I should commend the Minister and the Government. The initiative to enhance the resources of the magistrates court can only be a good thing, although I must warn the Minister that the recruitment of more magistrates is something that we looked at years ago, when I sat in the position that she now sits in. It is social and economic factors that are effecting the diminution in the number of those willing and able to put themselves forward for this onerous type of public service, so that diminution is not going to be remediable just by brave words and advertisements. It is going to have to be a sustained campaign, and it will not happen even in the term that she will serve as Minister—long may that continue. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] That was not a wish—it was an observation—but nevertheless, it was heartfelt.

With those cautious commendations given, though, I have to return to the very focus and centre of this Bill. It is a bit like asking us to be grateful to the crocodile who leaves us with our head after it has taken our legs. The reality is that the right of election of trial by jury is at the very heart of the right itself. Since the 17th century, Governments of all colours that have come and gone have continued to respect that as a right, not as a concession or a privilege afforded by the state to a defendant. It is perfectly true that in Scotland it is the court that decides whether or not the defendant should enjoy the right of trial by jury, but in England, it has always been a right—a right given, broadly speaking, to anybody accused of an offence serious enough to warrant more than 12 months’ imprisonment.

For the first time in English legal and political history, a Government have decided to breach that right, and to make the decision reside with the representatives of the state. That places the decision out of the hands of a powerless defendant—some of the most powerless in our society. Some of them may very well be guilty. Many of them may very well be guilty, but the system we have adopted over the centuries does not legislate so much for the guilty, but for the innocent caught up in the system. So many examples in history have shown how the innocent can be caught up in this system, and it is for the innocent that the criminal justice system is ultimately designed. It is designed for their vindication, requiring against them the level, burden and standard of proof that the criminal justice system enforces, with the presumption of innocence.

[Jess Phillips]

rose—

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Because time is short, I will give way to the hon. Lady, but only she.

[Jess Phillips]

What the right hon. and learned Member is saying about the system being designed for the innocent is compelling, but the system is absolutely not designed for the person who is absolutely innocent in the system, and that is the victim. No part of the system asks them to elect where the trial might go. No part of the system asks them if they think it should be appealed. The real innocent—the definitely innocent—gets no say.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

That invites a long answer, which I do not have time now to give, but any defendant who appears before a court enjoys the presumption of innocence, and it is upon that basis that any system has to proceed. In England, the right has been accorded to those who enjoy this presumption of innocence to decide where they should be tried. Any abrogation of that right, such as for an offence that carries a sentence of more than 12 months’ imprisonment, removes the power from the individual and hands it to the state. In England—peculiarly in England—it has always been regarded as the right of a defendant. Make no mistake, this is an historic Bill for that reason.

To remove and abrogate the right of a litigant to trial by a jury of their peers has exactly the effect that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East has said. A person of good character, a professional person or an employee in the workplace accused of theft from his employer—all of these would have had the right to say, “No, I wish to have the careful and meticulous process that the Crown court provides, not the swift and summary justice that the magistrates court provides.” That person may suffer for the remaining years of their life the most profound impact upon their history. A Member of this House accused could be tried before the magistrates court, despite the impact and consequences that that might produce. In the magistrates court, the only criteria will be whether it might receive more than two years’ imprisonment. Many such offences would not. That is broadly the criteria that is applied by the magistrates.

If this egregious act is to be taken by this House, I strongly support that the Chairman of the Select Committee’s recommendation be taken on board by the Minister, because unless the magistrates have the express ability to consider whether someone is of good character, whether they have a profession, whether it would mean that they would be disqualified forever from whatever profession they are in, or expelled from their employment—with massive implications for the rest of their life—how can it be fair or proper to impose upon that person a system of summary justice that cannot, at its heart, achieve the levels of fairness of a Crown court trial? That is not only because legal aid is available in the Crown court, but because of the forensic scrutiny that the allegation is placed under. The automatic right of appeal has always been provided in the magistrates court, even where the sentence would be less than 12 months, because it has always been acknowledged that the kind of justice distributed in the magistrates court is necessarily swift and necessarily summary.

There are not provisions for the disclosure of unused material in the magistrates court. What is to be done about those, if offences are now going to be tried that might carry a two-year imprisonment? None of these things have yet been thought through within this Bill. There has simply been a transference from the Crown court to the magistrates court, in breach of a provision and a right that has been respected in this country for 300 years.

I therefore say that Members should listen to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East and to the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Derby North. They spoke the milk of human wisdom, and I suspect the fact that it came from them is not wholly unrelated to the fact that each of them have years of experience in professional practice in the courts. Heed them.

I urge the Minister—even if she is to take the step that I profoundly oppose and regard as an historic mistake: the abrogation and dilution of the right to trial by jury, making it, in fact, no longer a right but a concession made by the state to the individual—to listen, please, to the comments, the recommendations and the warnings given by those on her own side. For someone of good character to come before a court for the first time, facing a two-year sentence of imprisonment, and for the magistrate to be unable to consider such a factor would, in many cases, constitute the profoundest injustice. The risk is that over the coming years there will be all the appalling, wearisome, grievous experiences of realising that injustice has actually been done, although the whole system that we have devised over the centuries was designed to avoid that at all costs.

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and Tavistock) (Con)]

I should declare an interest at the beginning. I am a member of the Bar—that is not uncommonly known—I still practise at the Bar, and I have the honour to be a criminal barrister and a member of the Criminal Bar Association. I have spent 44 years at the Bar. I have defended and prosecuted in some of the largest criminal trials that this country has ever seen—and some of the longest.

I have been experienced in seeing how juries react to circumstances of adversity and circumstances that challenge and test the very boundaries of humanity in the appalling nature of the crimes they are forced to adjudicate upon. Without exception, they have responded in a manner that I think generally gives rise to the hugest admiration, not to say awe, from those who are otherwise engaged in the administration of justice.

There is something about the gathering of 12 ordinary citizens, chosen at random and brought together into the crucible that a criminal trial produces, that strips away ideological and racial prejudice or preconception, and that causes them to focus upon a single question: is the allegation true, or is it not; and can we be sure, or is there any doubt?

Again and again, throughout our legal history, the wisdom and capacity of juries have been repeatedly vindicated every time they have been analysed, tested or sought to be examined by those who research these matters.

[Pam Cox]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Not just now, but I will come back to the hon. Member.

We in this House are engaged in ideological strife. Every day of our lives we are engaged in a political battle, and frankly, sometimes we do not always live up to the highest standards that even our own parties have set. In the course of my legal career, I have been led—when I say “led”, I mean that I was a junior in the courts—by some distinguished Labour Members of Parliament who continued to practise in the criminal courts and regarded it is a noble honour to do so. Peter Archer, the former Solicitor General, led me in the early 1980s; John Morris led me just eight weeks before the ’97 election, when the Blair landslide swept in—oh, halcyon days to those across the aisle, or some of them, anyway; and Bob Marshall-Andrews led me right up to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. What remarkable men they were.

Those men would never have countenanced—not for a single second—the compromise of principle that Government and Opposition Members are now being asked to make. I knew these people, and I knew them well. John Morris would never have countenanced it. Peter Archer would never have countenanced it. Bob Marshall-Andrews would never have countenanced it.

[Pam Cox]

Will he give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Not now—later. I will.

I want to appeal to Labour Members. We are engaged in ideological strife. But in the Venn diagram that any society depends upon for the sustaining of sufficient points of common ground to keep a society together, jury trial is one of those that appear in a point of intersection between the vast numbers of this House and outside it.

[Catherine Atkinson (Derby North) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I will give way to the hon. Member for Colchester (Pam Cox) first, if she can give me just two seconds. I want to develop this theme, because it is very important to me.

There are some things that have to be above politics. If there are not, we have no society to defend. Jury trial is one of those institutions that have been defended by those across the aisle from me, on the opposite extreme of the political spectrum, and by those on our side of the House, out to the furthest waters of the right. Why is that? Because the administration of justice must be a non-ideological space. Jury trial unites us all for a simple reason: it is the most powerful instrument and engine of social justice that this country has ever invented. It is a safeguard against oppression. It is a built-in defence against establishment and administrative power.

[Catherine Atkinson]

On that point—

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I will give way to the hon. Member for Colchester first.

[Pam Cox]

We could think of this exchange as Cox v. Cox. The right hon. and learned Gentleman mentions legal history. I have more than a passing interest in that and am minded to think of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, which moved a lot of cases from a jury system into the magistrates system. The architect of that was Disraeli, a former Conservative Prime Minister. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman not agree that many politicians across this House have acted to shape jury trials over time?

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[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

There has always been a summary jurisdiction—invariably never for offences of dishonesty, and invariably never for offences that might lead to the destruction of the reputation of those who are facing it.

If one Member of this House, who must be disqualified if there is a sentence of imprisonment of more than 12 months, after the passage of this Bill is arraigned before a court on a case that might involve 12 months and one day, he or she will lose the right to a trial by jury, despite the fact that that might be an offence of protest. It might well be an offence where the Member of the House has felt so powerfully that they must breach the law that they are arrested and arraigned on a potential sentence of up to three years. Three years is a long time. As that could easily be an offence of protest, are we therefore saying that those who seek to go to jail, such as the suffragettes, should lose their right to trial by jury—a jury that is not obliged to follow the diktats or directions of a judge on the law; a jury that is entitled to reach its decision on its judgment about what is fair? I say—

[Catherine Atkinson]

Will he give way?

[Andrew Cooper]

Will he give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Not just now.

I say to the House, in all conscience, that jury trial is precious. Why? It is precious because it unites all parts of the political spectrum. It is precious because it allows the people of this country to be directly engaged in the adjudication of guilt or innocence in thousands of cases across the country.

At a time, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) pointed out when he rose to intervene, when our institutions are under unprecedented attack, is now the time to transfer a massive chunk of the administration of criminal justice and the decisions on the guilt or innocence of a fellow citizen to a representative who unquestionably will be seen as a representative of the state? It is the jury that protects us from the allegation that the state is deciding upon that citizen’s future. That is what protects, preserves and enhances the reputation of the administration of justice.

[Karl Turner]

It was telling when Jo Hamilton OBE wrote to the Justice Secretary—I think it was yesterday—to respectfully remind him that, as a victim of the Post Office Horizon scandal, under the legislation proposed, not one of the 900 sub-postmasters who were convicted would have been entitled to a trial before their peers. What does the right hon. and learned Gentleman say to that?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman. Postmasters, postmistresses, postmen—those whose honesty and integrity are integral to their employment and who, for a breach of trust, would not receive three years’ imprisonment—would all be deprived of their jury trial, and at a time when the sharks and the vultures are circling around the institutions of this country. We are now on the brink of undermining—I believe irredeemably—one of the most precious of those institutions, which commands almost universal assent. Let me say why.

[Catherine Atkinson]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

No, I am not giving way. I am mindful of time and I must complete what I have to say.

This is a time when not just this House but the judiciary and the courts are under attack. The unprecedented attacks upon the judiciary and the legal profession are deplorable. Institutional trust is under siege, and now is not the time—[Interruption.] I am trying to make a speech that is non-partisan—[Interruption.] It really is not. I remember vividly when I sat where the Lord Chancellor now sits and he was on this side of the House. I remember the fire that breathed from his soul as he spoke about justice. I can hear him now, in my mind’s eye, speaking on this subject, and I know that he would have been saying the direct polar opposite of what he is advancing today in the House. I would say that he was his wiser self in those days. He was his best self then, because at that time he was motivated by those who were oppressed, who were poor and who faced the full phalanx of the state reined against them. It was this Secretary of State in a different guise who was their champion and their voice.

A jury trial is the most potent weapon and instrument against oppression and injustice. It serves not just those who are wealthy but those who are poor, and not just those who have a voice but those who do not. It is the 12 members of a jury who will give a hearing to people who otherwise have no hearing—

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I will not take interventions now, and certainly not if they are of the quality that we have had up till now.

The reality is that jury trial is the cornerstone of our justice system. Do away with it and we are in trouble. Let us look at the way in which this Bill operates. It automatically presumes jury trial for everything that will have a likely sentence of three years, and those will involve some grave offences. However, in relation to serious, complex or lengthy cases, it could cover any allegation, so long as a judge concludes that it is appropriate that it should be dealt with without a jury. Apart from the excluded offences, which I accept exist, it is not just fraud trials but all kinds of trials that will be tried without a jury if a judge concludes that is appropriate.

The moment we make jury trials subject to the individual view of a judge as to whether that is appropriate or not, we drive a hole through the fundamental, accepted right that all of us on both sides of the House have accepted over so many years, which is that if someone is accused of a serious crime that could destroy their reputation, disqualify them from the House of Commons, wreck their professional reputation or result in the loss of their employment—as with the postmasters and postmistresses—they should be able to be judged by 12 people.

There is a reason why summary justice is called “summary”. There is a reason that summary justice was always subject to a complete rehearing. It has been suggested that there is no right to a jury trial. Of course there is no written right, but there has always been an accepted consensus, on both sides of this House and throughout the system of this country, that jury trials are precious for those kinds of cases, particularly those involving allegations of dishonesty. The right to elect is crucial. That is what this Bill is undermining. That is what is so dangerous about it. And undermining it on what basis? Arbitrary rules and arbitrary divisions. Why three years? Why not next year four or five? Why not extend it gradually, little by little, until we reduce—

[Catherine Atkinson]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

No, I am not giving way. Let me make that clear now. I want to finish in a moment.

The reality is that jury trial is too precious a thing to lose. We are faced with a question of principle here. The savings that the Government claim will be made are contested by many expert analyses from the profession, the Institute for Government and others. They are based on questionable assumptions. Are those savings sufficient for us to abrogate a fundamental principle that attracts almost universal assent across the political spectrum, which is so rare in our institutional and political life? Are they sufficient for us to take this highly unprecedented and questionable step? I would submit that they are not.

I would submit to the House that we should pause long and hard before we encroach upon this fundamental principle. I have seen it work in practice over 40 years and, as I have said, I have never failed to be awe-inspired by the sheer quality of attention and fairness that a jury brings to its deliberations. Summary justice can never replicate that. We are about to take a step that will irretrievably damage the quality of justice in this country.

I do not watch television much, but sometimes I watch something called “Digging for Britain”. It is apparent from that programme that we can tell when a civilisation starts to degrade when the quality of its architectural constructions changes; they start to look cheaper, and there is less attention to detail. If we take this step, we will be degrading our system of justice. A summary justice trial is summary—the clue is in the name—but that has always been corrected by the power to have a full rehearing in the court above: the Crown court. The Bill is even taking that away. We are ensuring that many thousands of people will be dealt with summarily in cases of great importance to their life and reputation.

I can only appeal to the House—ineffectually, perhaps; and I regret that I have attracted comments from Labour Members suggesting that my comments are controversial. They come from the heart, and from my 44 years’ experience of a system and a profession that I love. If I have attracted the ire of Labour Members, I apologise for that; I was hoping to induce reflection on the sheer importance of the institution about which we are to take this important decision.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

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[Sir Edward Leigh]

I hope my hon. Friend will forgive me, but Madam Deputy Speaker wants me to proceed.

The backlog did not arise because juries exist; it arose because the system itself has been placed under strain for many years. Opposition Members, like others, have a responsibility here. If the courts are struggling, the answer is to repair the system rather than weaken the principle. Many sensible proposals have been suggested, such as restoring bigger and longer court sitting patterns, opening additional courtrooms, and treating the backlog as a genuine national crisis that requires urgent resources.

Many people have pointed out the flaws in the Lord Chancellor’s plan. Several senior legal figures have written to The Times explaining that the proposals are “unworkable”. Perhaps there is one possible compromise: to at least preserve the absolute right of those of good character to a jury trial. If a person of good character—perhaps a Member of Parliament—is accused of something such as shoplifting, which would be quite a minor case, it can have a devastating impact on their career and life.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

The other logical absurdity is that, under the Government’s proposed reforms, somebody with a previous conviction may well go above the three-year threshold, so those who have a string of previous convictions will get a right to jury trial, but a person of good character will not.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

That is a very fair point.

I ask Members to look to their conscience. If they, a Member of Parliament—a person of good character—were accused of shoplifting, what would they choose? They would choose trial by jury, would they not? They would not choose to be tried by a magistrate. The task before us is to solve this practical problem without undermining our constitutional safeguards. The danger that we face is the temptation to sacrifice a long-standing liberty for the sake of short-term administrative convenience.

The Lord Chancellor is a friend of mine and a good man. He is not a villain; he approaches things with the best of intentions—I say that without doubt. The problem is that we may not always have individuals as good natured and well intentioned as him. We accept that he is genuinely trying to solve a problem, but I fear that he is doing it with the wrong mindset. Constitutional safeguards are not designed for moments when power is exercised by good men; they exist precisely because future holders of power may not always be so wise or so restrained. We have become so used to our state of freedom that we are in danger of imagining that it is the natural state of mankind. History teaches us that it is not. We have reached our advanced state of structured freedom, responsible government and parliamentary democracy through centuries of slow, organic growth. They grew through the common law, through Magna Carta, through Parliament and through the principle that the community—the people—participate in justice.