Sentencing Bill

Graham Stuart Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Commons Chamber

New clause 21 provides an opportunity for the current legislation for recall to be reviewed prior to the new legislation being rolled out to ensure that it is effective and adequately protects the public.

[Graham Stuart (Beverley and Holderness) (Con)]

On another form of recall, does the hon. Member have any sympathy with new clause 62, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tatton (Esther McVey), and the idea that there should be a sunset on this provision? However we look at the contents of this Bill, it is a bit of an experiment, so we should make sure that two years on we examine it and, if the circumstances require, renew it.

[Andy Slaughter]

We have to do something about recall and do it now. The number of prisoners on recall has more than doubled over the seven-year period from March 2018 to 2025. It was 6,000 then and it is now 13,500. That is a significant part of the prison population.

[Graham Stuart]

rose—

[Andy Slaughter]

I am not going to give way again, because I am taking too much time. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that this is a difficult process to manage. That is why this Bill was presented on the same day that fixed-term recall 48 came into operation. FTR 48 is the recent provision mandating fixed-term recalls of 28 days in determinate cases of less than 48 months. The new 56-day recall model recommended in the Bill replicates FTR 48, with the exception that the default recall period is extended from 28 to 56 days. Prior to this new provision being laid, there has been no opportunity for the efficacy and impact of this model to be evaluated. New clause 21 would allow that evaluation to take place. I think I am trying to do the same as what he is saying, which is to ensure we look carefully and evaluate the effect. We are into new territory here, and there may be unintended consequences.

The sentencing review received numerous reports that offenders are recalled for breaches, such as their tag running out of power or a failure to keep in touch, and that breach and recall processes are overly punitive and often felt to be unfair. As the Bill stands, the legal test for recall remains unchanged. As more offenders will be released at an earlier date and the use of electronic tagging will increase, there is a greater risk that people may be recalled when there are minor problems with the tag or housing issues. Tightening the legal test for recalls would confine their use to instances where there is evidence of consistent non-compliance, or a specific and imminent risk of harm, as recommended by the review. Without amendment, there is a real risk that the prison capacity crisis will not be adequately addressed, and we could even see an increase in recalls, albeit for shorter periods. A tighter test would guard against unintended consequences from the overuse of 56-day recalls.

Amendment 34 to clause 24 introduces the right for those being made subject to licence conditions to make representations as to their necessity and proportionality. That could be an important safeguard, given the suite of new conditions in the Bill that enable a wide range of restrictions to be imposed in the community. Without safeguards, the use of these conditions could lead to increased recalls and increased pressure on the probation and prison systems. Giving offenders an entitlement to make representations about licensing conditions would assist in alerting the authorities to any unintended consequences, such as where conditions might impact on resettlement or other outcomes, including access to employment or healthcare.

I am coming towards the end, but not just yet. The last of my amendments is amendment 35 to clause 24, which concerns restriction zones. Amendment 35 would introduce a requirement for the Parole Board to have oversight of new restriction zones for offenders on licence. A restriction zone is, by its nature, highly restrictive and could impact on almost every aspect of an offender’s life, including their ability to work, receive medical care and see family. Any application to leave the zone places an administrative burden on the authorities. The amendment would introduce judicial oversight by the Parole Board of the extension of restriction zones. That oversight could act as an important safeguard before such restrictions are imposed, and may also provide an opportunity for victims to have a voice in setting out the potential impact on them before an independent body.

This is the first time that provision has been made to restrict offenders to a certain geographical area when released on licence without a requirement for judicial oversight or due process. The proposed restriction is akin to control orders, now replaced with terrorist prevention and investigation measures, but without the requirement for a gateway offence or judicial oversight.

Finally, I have put my name to amendment 36, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Pam Cox). It would provide an important clarification of the powers of the court to impose a community sentence as an alternative to a suspended prison sentence, in circumstances where that may offer a more effective prospect of avoiding future offending or breach of licence conditions. It would likely be especially beneficial in keeping women out of prison.

To conclude, I repeat my support for the Bill and the Government’s approach to sentencing, which are the biggest changes in 30 years. I thank the organisations working with IPP prisoners, many of whom are relatives and friends of those incarcerated, including United Group for Reform of IPP and the IPP Committee in Action. I also thank the justice unions parliamentary group, the Prison Reform Trust, the Law Society and Justice, among others, for their briefing and assistance with proposing changes to the Bill. I hope the Minister will consider the amendments that we have tabled as ways to improve the Bill’s content and bring clarity where it is needed. I hope that he will respond to them in winding up and may even agree to adopt some of them. We survive on hope.

--- Later in debate ---

As the law stands, the UK has limited powers to prevent foreign nationals convicted of stalking from continuing to harass their victims after being deported. My new clause aims to rectify that.

[Graham Stuart]

As we move to an ever more digital world, the capacity for people to stalk and perpetrate this kind of oppressive action on people will only grow. I just want to say how delighted I am that the hon. Lady has tabled this new clause, and I hope we will hear from the Minister that he will look at this matter carefully, because this will be a growing issue—although, as the hon. Lady has shown with Sophie, it is already horrific in its impact.

[Emma Lewell]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention and support.

Simply put, I want no one else to go through what Sophie is going through. She has to live her life in constant fear and has been through absolute hell. I hope that the Minister will give my new clause proper consideration.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

The hon. Member makes a valid point. My amendment seeks to remove the chance that those people will reoffend further down the track. The custodial element remains unchanged, so there will still be the possibility of rehabilitation through the prison system to reduce the rate of recidivism. The issue here, as the hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) also pointed out, is about giving families closure and the knowledge that those who are guilty of committing these crimes will not be able to go on to reoffend.

New clause 6 proposes a lifetime driving ban for death by dangerous or careless driving and related offences—those I covered at the beginning of my speech. Having spoken to Mike’s widow Hazel and his daughter Kim, I can say that it is sobering to listen to somebody recount the story of the day that they had to attend the scene where their husband or father had just been killed. Selfishly, it is sobering to think about how easily it could have been me. I ride the same roads as Mike did. It was not an error, or avoidable on his part. The driver alone was at fault; it was his casual negligence that caused Mike’s death.

Mike’s daughter Kim recounts:

“On 27 June 2025, the driver, Dennis Roberts, aged 74, pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving. He was banned from driving with immediate effect, given a one-year sentence, suspended for two years, a two-year driving ban, 250 hours unpaid work and has to pay court charges of around £200. The sentence is within the guidelines of the law, but does the law fit the crime? He has lived his life like normal for 18 months, while we have lost our dad, husband, friend, grandad, and lived the last 18 months encompassed in a whirlwind of grief. Even after sentencing he continues to live his life, just with a small inconvenience of not being able to drive and giving up a few hours to work unpaid. How is that justice? In two years’ time he will be able to drive again. Would you give someone who used a gun carelessly and someone was killed their gun licence back after two years? I doubt it. They would most likely have a custodial sentence too.”

I would ask all Members in the Chamber to think how they might feel if they were to get a phone call today informing them that their partner, parent or child had been killed in a road traffic accident.

[Graham Stuart]

My hon. Friend is giving a powerful speech. Like him I am a cyclist and have been subject to dangerous driving, but I am also a driver, and I am sure that few of us would say that we had not driven carelessly at some point. Has he given thought to whether a lifetime ban would be appropriate in all circumstances, for anybody who has ever caused death through carelessness? I am not yet convinced.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

My right hon. Friend makes a valid point. I will talk later about whether it is too draconian. The issue here is one of finality. I am sure we have all had close shaves while driving a car, but the fact of the matter is that if a driver has killed somebody—no matter how unlucky that may have been—that is final. The grief of the families I have spoken to and the stories I have heard from other hon. Members show that we cannot overstate how much of an impact that has on not just the lives of the family but on friends and colleagues. There are opportunities that those people will never, ever have.

Beyond that unimaginable pain, think how a family might be left feeling if they find that, far from the accident having been unavoidable, the death was caused by the reckless action of somebody who was playing with their phone, speeding, driving like a boy-racer or drunk. Think of the feeling of injustice when the driver is sentenced and receives little more than a slap on the wrist.

The driver who killed Mike was given a two-year driving ban. Hazel will never get to see Mike again. They will never have the opportunity to live out the rest of their lives together. Kim said:

“The long-term impact on our family is huge. Although my mum has returned to her job at the hospital she is unable to fulfil her role on a rota and shift system and is unable to reduce her working hours. She has therefore been forced into taking early retirement from a job she has been at for nearly 42 years. We never want my dad to be a statistic, and to never be forgotten.”

I tabled new clause 6 because of Mike, because of conversations with Hazel and Kim, and because victims like him need justice, which, as things stand, they will not receive. How can we put such an incredibly low tariff on being directly responsible for someone’s death? The option to ban a driver for life is at the court’s disposal, yet it appears not to be the preference of judges. That leniency suggests that life is cheap and that, far from being a tragedy, a death at the hands of someone careless or dangerous elicits little more than a shrug of the shoulders. In the event that somebody with a licensed shotgun killed somebody because they were careless—or, worse still, because they were dangerous—would we allow them to regain their shotgun licence? Why do we so readily return people’s driving licences after they have taken a life?

There is an argument that a lifetime ban is too draconian, does not leave room for rehabilitation and will not work as a deterrent. The new clause is not supposed to be a deterrent; it is for the courts to decide whether a conviction should result in a custodial sentence and thus what degree of rehabilitation, and therefore recidivism, should occur thereafter. The new clause is not too draconian; it is robust. It would take drivers who have killed permanently off our roads and mean that those who have already proved themselves to be fatally unsafe behind the wheel would never again be in a position to take another life or destroy any further lives.