Ajax Programme

Graham Stuart Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank my hon. Friend again, and I absolutely concur. With the delays to Ajax, we can no longer afford to fail to upgrade Challenger 2 to Challenger 3. The fact that the timeline of that has slipped to indefinite is a serious concern for our armoured capability.

A successful export programme would fuel development of the platform and allow it to improve over multiple iterations. It would enhance our own capability, and allow us to benefit from the first-mover advantage of adopting a common vehicle platform that can be expanded with the addition of an IFV and a mortar variant, putting us in the vanguard of armoured development in the drone age. But that cannot happen without the vehicle proving its capability—first with the soldiers, then with our allies. In a crowded field, that should be a top priority.

In “The Iliad”, Ajax loses a competition to Odysseus and, distraught by the result and conquered by his own grief, plunges his sword into his own chest, killing himself out of shame at his own failure. The irony should not be lost on any of us. Fix Ajax, and fix it quickly. There is a war coming.

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to be called. We are looking at around three and a half minutes each.

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[Gerald Jones]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend’s comment. It is important that we have certainty for those jobs and sustain and increase such jobs across south Wales, because that is integral to this Government’s growth agenda in communities in Wales and across the UK.

Merthyr Tydfil has a long, proud and historical association with the defence of our country. Merthyr was the largest iron-producing town in the world at the time of the industrial revolution, producing cannons and cannonballs for the Royal Navy, leading to a visit from Admiral Nelson himself in 1802 to the Cyfarthfa ironworks. Our area is keen to renew that role in the 21st century and play a part in creating quality defence capabilities with our dedicated and committed workforce.

As I mentioned earlier, currently more than 700 people are employed at the site and those skilled and long-term employment opportunities are vital to the ongoing regeneration of the valleys—an area where heavy industry, such as coal mining and steel, has now ceased, and new industry and employment opportunities are so important to creating hope and growth in our communities. In addition, as a proud supporter of the Union of the United Kingdom, it is hugely important that people across the whole of the UK feel included in the defence sector and ongoing Government investment in the defence capability should benefit communities in the UK and particularly the south Wales valleys.

In closing, I ask the Minister to address a few points. While I fully appreciate that the investigation has to take its course, does he have any indication of what timescale is in place for the investigations to be concluded? The longer the uncertainty goes on, the more impact it will have on the morale of the workforce in Merthyr Tydfil.

Finally, while I appreciate that the Minister is responding on behalf of the MOD, in the Chamber last month, I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry if he would meet staff and trade unions at General Dynamics as soon as possible to provide them with as much reassurance as possible, something he committed to doing. Today I ask the Minister if he will undertake to raise with the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry the importance of that visit taking place at the earliest opportunity. In the event that the investigations take longer than expected, will he commit in the meantime to asking the MOD to find a way to provide regular updates to the staff and workforce until more certainty can be provided?

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

I will be bringing in the Front Bench speakers at 10.28 am.

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[Dame Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)]

The Minister will be fully aware that an enormous amount of expertise, investment and effort has gone into the development of the Ajax vehicle, producing a vehicle of significant and unique capabilities. I absolutely understand that we want to ensure high-quality performance and safety, and there has been extensive testing of the vehicle over thousands of kilometres, with noise and vibration limits well within acceptable levels.

I understand that the latest testing will be completed shortly, so my ask of the Minister is simple: once the latest testing results are available for ministerial consideration, we need Ministers to give absolute priority to the analysis and consideration of those results and to ensure that decisions on next steps are made without delay. Time is of the essence, and we need clarity on Ajax as soon as possible. It would be unforgivable if the latest tests vindicated the quality and viability of the Ajax project, but ministerial schedules and the machinery of government then caused delays, compounding the problems and losing us valuable opportunities.

Uncertainty is a pervasive killer. Any delay will sow the seeds of doubt in the minds of potential customers. There has been huge investment in Ajax, and if it is to pay its way and justify the investment in such an advanced capability, we need to attract orders from abroad. There is an important opportunity to showcase Ajax in early February, and it would be crazy if that opportunity is lost through poor prioritisation of the Procurement Minister’s priorities.

Then there is the workforce. For them, uncertainty—the fear of losing their job—is devastating. We have a very loyal workforce in Merthyr, who have gone above and beyond to deliver on Ajax. They not only want jobs now, but to see a future for young people, and that is dependent on securing orders for Ajax. There are also all those who work in the supply chain.

Ministers may decide that further work is needed. If so, I again stress that it needs to be done as nimbly as it can be. Decisions on Ajax will have a ripple effect on wider industry. I support our industrial strategy and our determination to rebuild our industrial base to make sure we have the capabilities to develop the likes of Ajax. For too long, procurement procedures have looked only at headline price and failed to give due consideration to the huge benefits of securing jobs here in the UK—good jobs, tax revenue, social cohesion and, as brought home more vividly through covid and the Ukraine conflict, our resilience and security.

When we look at the current Ajax situation, we can see why some might ask, “Why invest? Why bother with the risk? Wouldn’t it just be easier to buy off the peg and let another nation take the risk?” Apart from the fact that we may end up with a substandard product, with the problems emerging only after purchase, what happens when, as we saw in covid, other nations prioritise their own needs or supply routes are otherwise sabotaged?

No one factory exists in isolation, and if we need further proof of our interdependence, the Jaguar Land Rover cyber-attack brought it home starkly. If the JLR crisis had led to one local company—for example, a supplier of a specific part for JLR—going bust, there would have been contagion, because that would have had an immediate effect on the other car companies it supplied. Conversely, if we implement our industrial strategy by supporting foundation industries such as steel and developing advanced technologies such as semiconductors, and we make the UK a vibrant hub of new high-tech industries, they will feed off each other. That creates an attractive environment for investment and aspirational workers. Ajax is an important part of this ecosystem.

To sum up, I urge the Minister and his colleagues to ensure that the necessary analysis is undertaken as soon as they are provided with the testing information and data, and that they make their decision without delay. Any delay would undermine confidence among potential purchasers of Ajax, lead to us missing vital opportunities in the purchasing timetables of key potential customers, further demoralise the workforce and undermine broader investor confidence in our industrial strategy. A lot depends on how the Minister handles this issue.

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

I thank colleagues and congratulate them on their discipline. Last but not least, Chris Evans.

[Chris Evans (Caerphilly) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It would be easy to blame the last Conservative Government for the operational difficulties burdening the Ministry of Defence, General Dynamics and the British Army from the outset of the Ajax programme, but I could not do that with the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) sitting in front of me. He was often a critic when he sat on the Government Benches, and I have lost count of the number of times he said that heads should roll at Abbey Wood—it is a shame nobody listened to him at the time.

When we stood here three years ago, 37 of 39 projects were marked as either red or amber by the National Audit Office. That is unacceptable. Criticisms of the Ajax project included realistic targets not being set for the vehicle’s bespoke capability, and its complex requirements being largely ignored. As we have heard, whistleblowers were not listened to, resulting in the Ajax demonstration and manufacturing phases overlapping, which posed acute technical safety risks.

Progress reports were also often vague or overly optimistic, as we experienced in November. Ministers were assured that Ajax had achieved initial operating capability and was prepared for the Salisbury exercise. We have to ask why that was the case. A gross overestimation put the health of 30 soldiers at risk, and that is the nub of the problem. This is not simply economics; as the Minister knows, when we send someone into theatres with obsolete equipment, we are putting their lives at risk. If they lose their life, it is their family we have to be accountable to. That is what we have to remember. It is not about the defence companies or the equipment; it is about the soldier we are sending into theatre, and we should never lose sight of that.

We also have to look at the cultural issue at the MOD, which the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford constantly spoke about. Between 2011 and 2023, the Ministry of Defence welcomed five project managers, and each served for approximately two to three years. The job was unsustainable due to the complexity and breadth of its portfolio, which did not allow for effective oversight.

I will now turn to the Morpheus project, which was unfortunately delivered by General Dynamics land division. It was intended to supply the computing system for Ajax, but the system fell short of its requirements, even though the same company developed it. Ajax was expected to be the Army’s first set of vehicles based on one fully digitised platform, which was to include advanced sensors and enhanced communication systems, allowing vehicles to gather and immediately share information with other units. In stark contrast, Morpheus incurred significant costs and a delay of three years, during which time Ajax’s ability to exchange information was severely limited. The platform had the potential to significantly improve the British Army’s digital capabilities, and this country could have been a world leader in that sector. Its failure was nothing short of unacceptable.

There is no doubt that the MOD has been and is a uniquely failing Department. In opposition, Labour called for the MOD to be the first Department subject to the new Office for Value for Money, with a commitment to commission the NAO to conduct an across-the-board survey of the MOD’s wants and needs.

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

Order. I call James MacCleary, the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

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[James MacCleary]

My hon. Friend is a committed advocate for his constituents in Yeovil and has raised this on a number of occasions. I absolutely agree: we run a real risk of not only losing the ability to build our own—

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

Order. We will stay focused Ajax, notwithstanding the intervention.

[James MacCleary]

Indeed.

Let me be clear from the outset: the possible collapse of this multi-decade, £6.2 billion programme is deeply alarming. It demands answers, it demands accountability and, most importantly, it demands urgent action. The facts are stark and troubling. Just weeks ago on Salisbury plain, during what should have been a routine training exercise, more than 30 of our soldiers fell ill. They were not injured in combat or facing down an enemy on some distant battlefield; they were training on British soil in British vehicles built with British taxpayers’ money. They were vomiting, and they were shaking uncontrollably. Some spent 10 to 15 hours in these vehicles and emerged requiring urgent medical care.

That is not the first time we have heard such reports. Indeed, the Ajax programme has been plagued by issues of noise and vibration since mid-2020. A stop notice was issued in June 2021 and all dynamic movement was halted. The programme underwent what was termed “a significant reset”. Training resumed in 2023, only to be paused again in 2025. Astonishingly, this programme has been on pause for 20% of its entire life—20%.

What was the response from those in charge? In November, just before the latest incident, we were told that Ajax had achieved “Initial Operating Capability”. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry visited the General Dynamics factory in south Wales and declared that the issues were “firmly in the past.” He told us that he had been

“reassured from the top of the Army”

that the vehicle was safe. Indeed, the programme was apparently so successful that the MOD announced in November that it had just won an international award for mega-project of the year.

Three weeks later, the Minister had to return to the House to confess that he had been misled—misled by the Chief of the General Staff and the then acting National Armaments Director. These are not junior officials; they are the most senior figures in our defence establishment providing assurances about safety that have proven to be utterly unfounded.

I must ask, what kind of system allows this to happen? What kind of institutional culture permits such a fundamental failure of honesty and accountability? What does it say about the state of our armed forces that senior officials and officers declared initial operating capability when long-standing problems had merely been mitigated with new seats and earplugs in some cases, rather than actually fixed?

The Minister must now be absolutely clear about what the Government’s contingency plans are if Ajax is deemed unsafe. Moreover, he must explain what the impact will be on our NATO commitments if Ajax is further delayed due to required upgrades or scrapped altogether. Our allies are watching, and our adversaries are watching, and what they see is chaos.

This is not simply about one troubled programme, catastrophic though Ajax’s failures have been; this programme illustrates the deep-seated problems with defence procurement that have plagued our armed forces for years. They deserve better than the endless delays, cost overruns and capability gaps that have become the hallmark of how we equip those who defend us.

Let us consider the litany of failures. Ajax was ordered in 2014. It was supposed to be fully in service by 2019. Here we are in 2026, and not only is it not in service, but we are now investigating whether it is fundamentally unsafe. The vehicle was originally designed for weights of up to 26 tonnes. Through what defence analysts politely call “scope creep”—the Army loading the programme with 1,200 separate capability requirements—the weight ballooned to over 43 tonnes.

A single vehicle can now cost well over £10 million in its most expensive form, and what have we got for this money? We have vehicles that make our soldiers sick. We have a programme that has consumed vast resources and delivered nothing but embarrassment. We have General Dynamics winning awards for project controls while producing vehicles that cannot be safely operated. I note with interest that when asked whether performance bonuses relating to Ajax had been paid to officials over the last three years, the Ministry responded:

“This information is not held centrally and therefore can not be provided without incurring disproportionate costs.”