Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Ministry of Justice:
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, when he plans to launch a public consultation on reform of wedding law in England and Wales.
Answered by Alex Davies-Jones - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice)
The Government announced on 2 October that we intend to reform weddings law when parliamentary time allows. The reforms reflect a commitment to making marriage law fairer, simpler and more modern while also protecting the solemnity and dignity of marriage. The next step is to undertake a consultation on reform of wedding law in England and Wales early into this year.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, following Google DeepMind's provision of pre-deployment access to the UK AI Security Institute for safety testing of Gemini 3, whether the Institute received equivalent pre-deployment access to the most recent frontier AI models developed by (a) OpenAI, (b) Anthropic, (c) xAI, and (d) Meta prior to their public release.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Government does not give a running commentary on models being tested or which models we have been granted access to due to commercial and security sensitivities. Where possible, given these sensitivities, the AI Security Institute aims to publish results.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether the Government has established a defined threshold of dangerous capability in frontier AI models, including capabilities relating to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, which would trigger Government action.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) has policy responsibility for promoting responsible AI innovation and uptake. Risks related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (and other dangerous weapons), including defining thresholds for harm in these domains, are managed by a combination of the Home Office, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Cabinet Office, and the Ministry of Defence. DSIT does not set thresholds for dangerous capabilities in risk domains owned by other departments.
The AI Security Institute (AISI), as part of DSIT, focuses on researching emerging AI risks with serious security implications, such as the potential for AI to help users develop chemical and biological weapons. AISI works with a broad range of experts and leading AI companies to understand the capabilities of advanced AI and advise on technical mitigations. AISI’s research supports other government departments in taking evidence-based action to mitigate risks whilst ensuring AI delivers on its potential for growth. AISI’s Frontier AI Trends Report, published in December 2025, outlines how frontier AI risks are expected to develop in the future.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether the Government has established thresholds for dangerous weapons-related capabilities in frontier AI models.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) has policy responsibility for promoting responsible AI innovation and uptake. Risks related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (and other dangerous weapons), including defining thresholds for harm in these domains, are managed by a combination of the Home Office, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Cabinet Office, and the Ministry of Defence. DSIT does not set thresholds for dangerous capabilities in risk domains owned by other departments.
The AI Security Institute (AISI), as part of DSIT, focuses on researching emerging AI risks with serious security implications, such as the potential for AI to help users develop chemical and biological weapons. AISI works with a broad range of experts and leading AI companies to understand the capabilities of advanced AI and advise on technical mitigations. AISI’s research supports other government departments in taking evidence-based action to mitigate risks whilst ensuring AI delivers on its potential for growth. AISI’s Frontier AI Trends Report, published in December 2025, outlines how frontier AI risks are expected to develop in the future.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what steps the Government is able to take to delay or prohibit the public release of a frontier AI model in instances when the UK AI Security Institute assesses that model as posing a serious risk of assisting users in developing chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
We are optimistic about how AI will transform the lives of British people for the better, but advanced AI could also lead to serious security risks.
The Government believes that AI should be regulated at the point of use, and takes a context-based approach. Sectoral laws give powers to take steps where there are serious risks - for example the Procurement Act 2023 can prevent risky suppliers (including those of AI) from being used in public sector contexts, whilst a range of legislation offers protections against high-risk chemical and biological incidents.
This approach is complemented by the work of the AI Security Institute, which works in partnership with AI labs to understand the capabilities and impacts of advanced AI, and develop and test risk mitigations.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether the Secretary of State or Ministers in the Department has received representations from AI companies regarding the content or timing of the proposed AI Bill.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Government engages with a wide range of stakeholders on its approach to regulating Artificial Intelligence, including AI companies, academics, and civil society groups.
Details of Ministerial meetings with external organisations are published in the quarterly transparency returns.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what recent conversations he has had with the Indian Government on the release of Jagtar Singh Johal from detention.
Answered by Seema Malhotra - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
We remain committed to pushing the Government of India for faster progress in resolving Jagtar Singh Johal's case. The UK Government has raised Mr Johal's case on multiple occasions with the Government of India, including regarding Mr Johal's allegations of torture. The Foreign Secretary raised Mr Johal's case with her Indian counterpart on 11 November, and the Prime Minister raised Mr Johal's case with Prime Minister Modi on 9 October. Consular staff regularly visit Mr Johal to check on his welfare, most recently on 21 November.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, when her Department will respond to the letter from the hon. Member for Dewsbury and Batley dated 1 October 2025.
Answered by Seema Malhotra - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
I apologise to the Hon member for the delay. I can confirm that a response will be returned in the coming days.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, when his Department will respond to the letter from the hon. Member for Dewsbury and Batley dated 17 September 2025.
Answered by Stephen Kinnock - Minister of State (Department of Health and Social Care)
I replied to the Hon. Member’s correspondence on 19 November.
Asked by: Iqbal Mohamed (Independent - Dewsbury and Batley)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, what assessment his Department has made of potential alternative suppliers to Palantir for the Federated Data Platform contract; and whether that assessment included consideration of levels of alignment with NHS principles of (a) universality, (b) transparency and (c) patient trust.
Answered by Zubir Ahmed - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
NHS England ran a rigorous independent and transparent procurement exercise for the NHS Federated Data Platform (NHS FDP), in line with public contract regulations.
The selection was made by multiple assessors against clear criteria following an open tender process where any supplier could respond with their solution. Potential suppliers were required to demonstrate their financial, commercial, security, and technical capability to meet contractual requirements.
The plans for an NHS FDP followed a consultation with trusts and integrated care boards to gather insight in order to understand what their common issues and challenges were in relation to data. The programme is supported by a Data Governance Group, made up of information governance professionals. The programme is also supported by the Health and Social Care Data Public Panel, a group consisting of patient, public, and professional representatives with an interest in patient data, including the Office of the National Data Guardian.
Privacy by design is a core principle of the NHS FDP, with robust security measures to safeguard patient information. Access to data must have an explicit aim to benefit patients and/or the NHS in England.
Palantir provides the software platform, Foundry, that underpins the NHS FDP. NHS England remains the data controller at all times for the national instance. Each NHS organisation is the data controller for their local NHS FDP instance and decides how their local data is used.
Palantir operates strictly under the instruction of the NHS. They do not own or control NHS data.
The NHS FDP is built with robust security and privacy controls, including Privacy Enhancing Technologies procured separately from Palantir. Data access is tightly governed. Only authorised users can access data for approved purposes, and all access is logged and auditable.