Economic Policy

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Monday 25th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

We are very clear that if we lost control of the country’s credibility in the international markets, as Labour would, interest rates would go up and families would pay more. The truth is that because of the credibility of our economic policy, interest rates are low and have stayed low today.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I wonder whether I may remind the Chancellor that Standard & Poor’s is facing proceedings from the United States Government for fraud and that Moody’s is likely to follow? Moody’s has just downgraded a country whose debt is all denominated in its own currency, which is a fiat currency. That is absolutely nonsensical. Will he therefore join me in citing Lord Chesterfield and telling them that they are foolish people who do not even know their own foolish business?

[Mr Osborne]

I think that it was Lord Chesterfield who provided advice to his son in that famous book, and I am sure that the advice included, “Don’t spend more than you’ve got.”

Banking Union and Economic and Monetary Union

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

No pressure there, then, Mr Deputy Speaker.

I have a lot of sympathy with the Minister today. Let us hope that he is a little luckier than he was last Wednesday, although of course the curse of Tunbridge Wells will have its way. In a way, as he explained, banking union is a natural downstream consequence of monetary union. It would be wrong to resist it for the eurozone, as the eurozone crisis has exposed a series of risks to economic stability, not least of which is the relationship between sovereign debt and banking debt and the need to find credible ways to prevent private banking losses from dragging down sovereign fiscal positions. The UK has its own banking union and our monetary policy sovereignty has given us a measure of protection during the sovereign and bank debt crises that have engulfed the eurozone.

I thought the Minister was perhaps labouring under the impression that his plucky Members of Parliament kept us out of the euro between 1997 and 2010—that is too funny, as of course that was the decision of the previous Labour Administration. It was the right decision.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

rose—

[Chris Leslie]

I will not give way yet, as I am conscious of the time.

We were right, too, to bail out the banks in 2008, but that came at a high cost for the taxpayer and for the country’s economic prospects. UK public debt was adversely affected by the purchase of banking assets and the subsequent loss of revenues from financial services. These issues are now affecting countries around the world, especially in the EU. Monetary policy sovereignty has allowed the UK to adopt an active interest rate policy to counteract those economic headwinds—something less available to those in the eurozone.

To save the euro, the eurozone has looked at new rules to grip the fiscal policies of its member states. Fiscal union in the EU is now widely recognised as dependent on banking union. Germany initially insisted on that, and it has asked that the single supervisory mechanism—the eurozone nation state regulators and Governments—be completed before banks can access the European stability mechanism and the European Central Bank’s outright monetary transactions programme, hence the imperative to agree these matters. In recent weeks, however, Germany is rumoured to have lost some enthusiasm for that tougher banking union and its consequences, especially as some of its smaller banks face major regulatory upheaval.

It is right that the ECB’s role in supervisory policy should be triggered, by unanimity if necessary, as required in the Maastricht treaty. Central banks are increasingly in the driving seat in financial regulation, as is the case in the UK, and it is necessary for the ECB to have a clear capability in its role overseeing the operation of the eurozone. The ECB is a full treaty institution, and it must be governed by treaty rules and member state unanimity, as we heard from the Minister. In that process, the rights of non-eurozone members, particularly the UK, must be safeguarded in several ways. We should not be party to any deposit guarantee mechanisms or pre-fund recovery or resolution mechanisms. The UK has undertaken its own measures in that respect, and there are no proposals on the table that would affect our taxpayers directly.

The rules for the single market, including a single rule book for the financial services sector in the EU, should involve all 27 member states. The European Banking Authority—as well as other European supervisory authorities—is the vehicle for preserving the integrity of the single market. The Commission says in its documentation that

“it is proposed that voting arrangements within the EBA should be adapted to ensure EBA decision-making structures continue to be balanced and effective and preserve fully the integrity of the Single Market”.

That is absolutely crucial, but we need far more details about how that will work. The 17 eurozone countries will act en bloc through the ECB in their seats on the EBA, which could represent a permanent majority on all issues, as the Minister explained. The EBA has rule-making powers under qualified majority voting decisions, it mediates between supervisory institutions, and it shares supervisory best practice. There is a real risk of the ECB bloc acting as a permanent caucus to overrule the 10 non-eurozone nation states.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

I do not want to get too much into the history of these things. We could go back to the Maastricht treaty, the formation of the eurozone and the inexorable logic of how we have got to where we are today. All I know is that it is important that we try our best and redouble our efforts to ensure that we have a negotiating strategy that secures the best deal possible for the UK.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Leslie]

I should like to make a little progress if I may.

I know that hon. Members will say, “How can we manage to secure these particular arrangements? What should our stratagem be?” Government Members will recall Lady Thatcher’s invocation of the Luxembourg compromise—a quiz question for hon. Members who recall that device. It has not been in use in recent times, but it was a way, in certain circumstances for qualified majority voting arrangements, to ensure that there was a capability of promoting vital national interest. There was at one point a recognised device for ensuring that one could stay in the room. If vital national interests were affected, then certain levels of protection were possible. I do not in any way deny that that is a difficult position, but that is the sort of scale of proposition that the Government should be more actively asserting. The Government need to negotiate a clearer and more distinct set of rules that protect our status outside the eurozone while ensuring that we have an ongoing role in how new rules develop across the whole EU. In our view, that must be the Prime Minister’s negotiating objective.

We have other concerns and questions about the SSM. How can it connect with the wider public and be subject to democratic accountability? That is an important point, because the bodies at the heart of the SSM will need to be more transparent. I am not clear whether they will publish their minutes in the same way as the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve, but we need to start addressing some of those transparency questions. Furthermore, what will be the relationship between the ECB’s monetary policy stance and its approach to decisions on financial supervision?

The composition of the SSM is complex and lines of accountability are extremely confused. For example, the European Central Bank is a superior treaty institution, yet the EBA will in theory sit on a junior institution. It is extremely difficult to see lines of accountability and how the legal issues raised in the amendment will be resolved. What will happen in the intervening months and potentially years before this complex constitutional wiring is settled? What if new market pressures force banking crises that require the stability mechanism or outright monetary transactions to be triggered, and what if there is no SSM in place?

How do we prevent City of London institutions and firms, which contribute about one sixth of Britain’s GDP, from changing their opinion about London in the long run as the right place to locate, when there is a risk that we will be marginalised in the decision-making forum for EU banking rules? They will worry about the prospects of operating under a different set of rules from those on the continent. Our vital national and economic interests are at stake, so we need to ensure that we keep involved, do not get pushed out and avoid being marginalised, while of course reserving our rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clappison]

The proposals are here in black and white. I hope very much that the hon. Gentleman will join us in supporting the Government to take every measure, up to and including a veto if necessary, to preserve our position and to stand up for our interests in the European Banking Authority. We simply cannot have a sham.

It is no use pretending that by talking nicely, going into the room, being at the top table and all the rest of it is going to be the solution. We have heard those warm sentiments so many times in the past. We are discussing a matter of negotiation to protect our interests, and we have to be prepared to take decisions that are unpalatable.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Further to the point made by our hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood), is it not the case that every member state of the European Union, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Denmark, is obliged to join the euro at some stage? When 25 out of 27 EU members are members of the euro, they will have a majority whatever voting system is cooked up.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend pre-empts my next point. I am drawing attention to the voting arrangements laid down as a matter of European law in a regulation that gives the eurozone the whip hand, as matters stand. But of course he is absolutely right that other non-members of the eurozone have the ambition to join the euro and that, along with Denmark, we do not have to join it as a result of the opt-out.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) said, even without the legal obligations we could expect members of the eurozone to cohere together to be a majority, and we can see that it will be a growing majority.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I have a feeling that Christmas has come particularly early this year, because I had the opportunity to speak in a European debate just three hours ago, and to speak twice on Europe in one day is almost as joyful as 25 December.

The Government have a problem and I am sympathetic to them. The report of the European Scrutiny Committee—its Chairman, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), spoke brilliantly, as always, and has tabled a sensible amendment—shows that the Government’s problem is that, of the two decisions that they face, the one that they support requires unanimity and the one that they oppose will be decided by qualified majority voting. I have quite an easy solution for them— I think they are looking for a solution—namely that they should use the threat of not supporting what they support to get leverage on the decision that they do not support. As we have heard from the Minister, there is widespread agreement across the House on the things that the Government do not support and on concerns about the European Banking Authority, particularly on voting and caucusing in the voting, and the nature of the European Central Bank, as against other central banks, in relation to the European Banking Authority.

When it comes to caucusing, getting a particular voting arrangement in the European Banking Authority will be no good at all. It will be a temporary palliative, because unless a voting system is devised that gives the UK a permanent veto, which personally I would be all in favour of, but which seems unlikely, then as soon as other member states begin to join the euro—which they are under a treaty obligation to do, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Denmark, as I said earlier— the non-euro member states will be easily outvoted. Therefore, we need to look, with the veto we have got, at the whole system of financial regulation and how it affects the United Kingdom. I understand that total renegotiation of the treaties is not currently being considered. I appreciate that in a coalition with the Liberal Democrats—which includes my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood), who loves the European Union and everything that comes from it—it is difficult to get a renegotiation that would satisfy Conservatives.

[Martin Horwood]

Just to put the record straight for the benefit of Hansard, I do not love everything that comes out of the European Union. I simply regard it as another level of authority with which we must negotiate gently and carefully, rather than necessarily taking the rather Gaullist approach that the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are taking today.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am enormously grateful to my hon. Friend, who gives me an extra minute every time.

This is an important and good opportunity for the Government to get back powers that should never have been given away. It was a great folly to give away financial regulation to the power of the European Union, because as my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) so wisely said, we have much more financial services in this country—I think she gave the figure of 36% for wholesale financial markets in the whole of the European Union that are in the UK. Therefore, we ought to regulate our own affairs and we ought not have delegated that to the European Union. We need to be careful about what is being proposed when it comes to the regulation of what are substantial international banks based in the United Kingdom in their business—which may be subsidiary business—with eurozone countries, because there is obviously a risk that they will find themselves under the auspices of a European regulator when they ought more appropriately to be under the auspices of a British regulator.

I think the Government’s position is quite strong, and I think the amendment is extremely sensible. It is interesting that we learn only through the Financial Times that the proposals that have come forth from the Commission are illegal. We do not learn it from the Government or the Commission; we learn it from an underhand leak, which comes via a newspaper to inform our debates, which is a pity. It would be nice if we could get such information directly to a sovereign Parliament, so that we knew what was or was not legal. Perhaps the Government will consider releasing the legal advice that will guide them—or perhaps ought to guide them—in their approach to this debate.

I would encourage the Government to accept the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. I listened very carefully to the Minister—I always do: he is a great Minister, who is much admired on this side of the House, and I imagine in other parts too. There was nothing he said which in essence contradicted my hon. Friend’s amendment, so I ended up thinking that what we were really debating was which way up an egg should be eaten—whether it should be the big side or the little side up. We are united as egg eaters in this context, and we think it would be “egg-cellent”—if I may carry on with this theme—to support my hon. Friend’s amendment, to which I was pleased to add my name, because it provides us with a solution in our negotiations in Europe and a clear way forward.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Multiannual Financial Framework

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Wednesday 31st October 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Greg Clark)]

I beg to move,

That this House takes note of European Union Documents No. 16844/11, No. 16845/11, No. 16846/11, No. 16847/11, No. 16848/11, No. 6708/12 and Addenda 1–3, No. 9007/12, No. 12356/12, and No. 13620/12, relating to the Commission’s proposal on the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), 2014–2020; agrees with the Government that at a time of ongoing economic fragility in Europe and tight constraints on domestic public spending, the Commission’s proposal for substantial spending increases compared with current spend is unacceptable, unrealistic, too large and incompatible with the tough decisions being taken in the UK and in countries across Europe to bring deficits under control and stimulate economic growth; notes that UK contributions to the European Union budget have also risen in recent years due to the 2005 decision to give away parts of the UK rebate; agrees that the next MFF must see significant improvements in the financial management of EU resources by the Commission and by Member States and significant improvements in the value for money of spend; further agrees that the proposed changes to the UK abatement and proposals for new taxes to fund the EU budget are completely unacceptable and an unwelcome distraction from the pressing issues that the EU needs to address; and calls on the Government to seek significant savings to the Commission’s seven year framework, as set out in the Prime Minister’s joint letter with France, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland of 18 December 2010, which stated that ‘payment appropriations should increase, at most, by no more than inflation over the next financial perspectives’.

The Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Great Yarmouth (Brandon Lewis), is making a rapid getaway, but if he wants to deal with the motion, I shall not stand in his way.

It is a pleasure to have been sprung from the sometimes stormy world of planning policy into the calm and genteel discussions that characterise such European issues. The debate is, if nothing else, timely, given the forthcoming negotiations on the EU’s annual budget for 2013 and on the multiannual financial framework, which sets out budget ceilings for the seven years between 2014 and 2020.

When I became Financial Secretary last month, hon. Members can imagine the delight I felt to find that the EU negotiations were at the top of my in-tray. However, now that I have had a few weeks to immerse myself in the budgetary demands that have been made by not only the institutions of the EU but several member states, I have to report that my normally cheerful mood has soured. Frankly, the sheer lack of shame displayed by those demanding more of our money is extraordinary. They want more at a time when the International Monetary Fund predicts that Government spending across the EU will fall by more than 8% between 2010 and 2017. They want more at a time when Mr Barroso, the European Commission’s President, has said:

“public finances must be consolidated”

and

“sound public finances are needed to restore confidence that is so essential for growth”.

They are asking for more at a time when the Commission itself is forcing deep public spending cuts on member states that have the misfortune to be locked into a debt crisis. At just such a time, the European Commission has thought it reasonable to propose an increase in what the EU spends of more than €100 billion, which is 10% more than it spends already.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

In light of what my right hon. Friend is saying, he might have noticed that I tried to give Her Majesty’s Government a nudge in the direction of a veto on anything that would be more than a freeze or a reduction, as well as a refusal to accept the financial transactions tax. Does it follow from his comments that the Government agree with my proposal?

[Greg Clark]

I normally agree with my hon. Friend, who is one of the House’s sages, and I can say that I agree in every respect with the amendment that he tabled.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jenkin]

I believe that the Labour party is picking up the anger of the British people about the idea of spending more money on European policies when we are having to cut back on policies of our own.

There is something rather chilling about the exchanges between those on the Front Benches, which tacitly suggest that a veto is a defeat and that it could lead to a worse budgetary outcome for the United Kingdom than could a negotiated settlement. That seemed to be the burden of the argument put by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie). I should just like to point out to him what that says about the relationship that we now have with the European institutions. Those institutions are so overpowering and so powerful that even the veto of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom cannot stop the European train on its way to its destination. The British people feel that something has gone wrong with that relationship. This was not the basis on which we were sold membership of the institution, and it was not the basis on which all the assurances were given by successive Governments that each treaty represented no substantial change and was just a “tidying-up exercise”.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that the veto does not really work. Ought we not therefore to be looking to amend the European Communities Act 1972, while recognising that this motion is dealing with the system as it is?

[Mr Jenkin]

I would just point out that we should not try to make ourselves too important in this debate. This is a take-note motion. I have spoken in many debates on such motions. The amendment expresses an opinion on whether the Prime Minister should adopt this little bit of body language or that little bit of body language. It will not make a blind bit of difference to what he does when he goes to the Council of Ministers. The amendment is simply a cry of despair from the British people who want their elected representatives to say something to the Front Benchers of both parties, who have betrayed the British people on the question of our relationship with our European partners throughout the 20 years I have been in Parliament.

The problem in this country is that the governing class is now so out of line with our people’s aspirations for the relationship with our European partners that they are putting the United Kingdom in the worst of all possible worlds. It cannot deliver the engagement of the British state with our European partners on the terms set down in the treaties, and it is not trying to deliver the different terms of agreement with our European partners that the British people would prefer, that our country needs, and that are in the national interest. So wide is this gulf that even the Labour party is picking up the vibrations and is beginning to respond.

Draft European Union Budget

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Thursday 12th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

I have to say that I always thought it was appropriate to obey the law, even in circumstances where we would perhaps rather not do so. We need to take our obligations seriously, but that does not in any way weaken our resolve to get the best possible deal for British taxpayers.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I am sure that the Minister has as much backbone as Margaret Thatcher had. She went along to European Councils and said, “Give us back our money.” I think that is the line he should take.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is, as ever, in his place.

If people realised how weak the Government were being in their negotiating stance, they would be totally appalled.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The hon. Gentleman is very reasonable in all these matters and of course he wants answers from the Government, but in that spirit of frankness, does he personally regret the loss of £10 billion to the UK Government by giving away the rebate? I know he was not personally responsible for that.

[Chris Leslie]

The hon. Gentleman has to realise that the European Union was going through a totally different era of accession countries and enlargement. Now, we are in a post-financial crisis era, in which it is absolutely clear that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) said, serious spending cuts are taking place in our domestic economy and budget. Many of our constituents want pro-job, pro-growth and pro-stimulus measures to be priorities here in the UK, and they feel aggrieved that some administrative budgets in the EU will continue to roll forward without the UK Government showing the restraint that they ought to show while they are at the height of their potential negotiating powers—hence the amendment that we have tabled.

Despite the Financial Secretary to the Treasury’s sudden animation when I asked him what exactly the Government are doing, the motion does not set out clearly the view, which ought to be and would be shared by all hon. Members, that the budget and the multi-annual financial framework should be reduced in real terms. It is a simple statement that would help the Government in their negotiations, and that is why the House should support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Yes, indeed.

I am very keen that the Government get their principles in line and their priorities straight. I want to explain why the amendment tabled by the Opposition is complete rubbish and to give the Minister a feel for why many Conservative Members think that we need to be doing slightly more, in a slightly stronger way, to achieve the aims that I think we all agree on, given that the European budget is way too high.

This year is important in budgetary terms because 2013 is the last year of the current multi-annual financial framework. The work that is done now on the 2013 budget will hold firm for next multi-annual financial framework, within which the Commission is bidding for a lot more money. That is significant for the United Kingdom.

The Commission raises this money in a number of ways: direct payments from national Governments based on each country’s gross national income, a levy on each national Government that takes a slice of their VAT income, customs duties on various imports from outside the EU, and levies on sugar production. That accounts for about 99% of the budgeted income of the European Commission. To put that into scale, in 2010 the UK’s gross contribution to the EU budget was €14.66 billion and we received back €6.75 billion, equating to a net contribution of €7.91 billion.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My hon. Friend mentioned the repatriation of funds to the UK. The net figure that he cites assumes that the European Union spends money in the UK in a way that we would like, but that is not a fair assumption.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

That is a correct assumption. A number of those projects would not have been financed by this Government or by previous Governments, so the money is being diverted into different things. That is why the last Prime Minister, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, mooted the idea of repatriating those moneys.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), although I note that we are all glad that he is Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee rather than the Select Committee on the Treasury, because 13 minus six is certainly not three. None the less, it was a great pleasure to listen to what he had to say.

I want first to deal with the hypocrisy of the European Union. It seems to me outrageous that the European Union is saying to the peripheral nations—the nations in trouble—that they must cut, be austere and have reduced budgets forced on them while it builds up its own empire and takes more money for itself, so that it can enjoy the fleshpots of Brussels while the people in Greece can hardly afford to eat. This is deeply shameful and another reason for being suspicious of the European Union and the way it operates.

On the other hand, I support the Government because they have been valiant, in extremely difficult circumstances, in trying to keep the budget under control. As my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) pointed out, it is almost impossible to get a qualified majority to keep the budget down when so many people benefit from an increased budget. However, the Government have done incredibly well in getting allies and in working with other member states whose interests are aligned to ours to keep the increase down to just a little above inflation. Of course I would like to see more; I would like a cash decrease in the budget and a remarkably small EU budget in general, but, given the difficult circumstances that the Government face, they have done extraordinarily well.

The Government have a bigger challenge ahead of them, however, because this arrangement is just for 2013 and they will have to negotiate the multi-annual financial framework. They hold one crucial card in that respect, which is unanimity—the veto. I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether the starting point for the multi-annual financial framework will be the budget for 2013 as agreed or the limit for the 2013 budget as agreed under the last multi-annual financial framework, because I believe that there is a difference of €11 billion between the two. If we are starting from the much higher level, we might find ourselves being told that the reduction has been a great success when in fact there has been an overall increase. That technical point is important.

I also want to issue a warning to the Government, and here I am going to sound like a Treasury stooge—a position that I hope to achieve at some point—who supports the Treasury line on everything. I support it in this regard, however, because I believe in austerity, and in cutting public spending and getting it under control. I am very worried about the partial general approach that is being taken to the multi-annual financial framework. I am worried that other Ministries are agreeing to programmes that will require funding, and that they will subsequently present the Treasury with a fait accompli.

[Mr Hoban]

I can assure my hon. Friend that that is certainly not going to be the case.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am reassured by that, but I note that some of the documents that we have seen in the European Scrutiny Committee make it seem as though it would be difficult to un-agree some of the things that have been agreed. I am reassured, however, that the Minister is going to watch the situation carefully.

I should like to finish by thanking the Opposition for their marvellous amendment. It has without doubt achieved one thing, which is to unify the Conservative party in ridiculing an amendment that could hardly be sillier, more foolish, more erroneous, more wrong-headed or more potty—I hope that that word counts as parliamentary. Let us look at it. It states that

“the UK’s ability to negotiate a satisfactory European Union budget deal has been weakened by the Prime Minister’s failure to secure allies”,

yet the Prime Minister has secured allies right, left and centre. He did it for this year’s budget, and he has done it again for next year’s. It was one of his great European negotiating triumphs over the mendicant nations that get more money out of the European Union than they pay into it.

The Opposition also have the brass neck to state in their amendment that they want a real-terms reduction in the multi-annual financial framework, and that the Government will not answer their questions. I asked the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) a simple question about the £10 billion that we lost, whether he regretted it in any way. I phrased my question as gently as I could, acknowledging that he had not been in Parliament at the time—a sad loss to the nation—but did he answer me? Did he say that it had been a great humiliation and a great shame that the last socialist Government had lost £10 billion of hard-earned British taxpayers’ money? Not a bit of it. He wandered on, and he meandered around, but he said nothing helpful of that kind. He therefore unites the Tory party in chortling at the effrontery of the socialists in coming here, when they spent money as if it was going out of fashion, and expecting us to do a job that even Hercules would probably have found beyond him.

I urge the Government—I beseech them—to cut the spending of the European Union. I am with my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry in saying that we should say to the EU: “For those 17 years of not having your accounts written off, we are deducting £1.7 billion from our contribution.” That has a nice symmetry. Let the EU take us to the Court—the Court that, as we discovered earlier, is gummed up with cases—and let it see whether it could bring a case against us to show that the law was on its side. I doubt that it would be.

Bank of England (Appointment of Governor) Bill

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Friday 6th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Hammond]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

The Bill is supported by large numbers of Members from both sides of the House, including many right hon. and hon. Friends whose judgment and intellect I respect and admire. However, let me start by setting out the four points on which there are internal contradictions in the hon. Gentleman’s argument or where there are reasons to oppose the Bill. First, the role is unique, and its extension increases that uniqueness. Secondly, the Government are already putting safeguards in place through the Financial Services Bill. Thirdly, despite what the hon. Gentleman has argued, a lot of people would accept that what he proposes is a fairly major constitutional change. Moreover, an underlying point he made is that this Bill somehow fits with the principle “for the people, by the people” so that anything other than that would be unacceptable.

I recently participated in a transport debate and gave what I thought was a fairly good detailed speech; indeed, one or two people were kind enough to say it was useful. I was pleased to note that my hon. Friend the Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire (Stephen Crabb) who was the duty Whip at the time, said something like, “That was one of the dullest speeches I have ever heard; more time limits, please”! I hope the Whips will find my speech today to be equally dull; perhaps there is a case for time limits in debates such as this.

It might bring a little colour to the debate as well as a sense of purpose if we look at one or two of the Governors of the Bank of England over the last century who have been extremely powerful figures on the economy and powerful figures in respect of their independence from Government. We could reflect on how their appointments were made. Montagu Norman, for example, the Governor of the Bank of England from 1920 to 1944 was described by many as more of a bohemian artist than a banker. He liked to wear Sherlock Holmes-type clothing, was prone to nervous breakdown, regarded politicians as asses and openly said so. I just wonder what the Treasury Select Committee might have said to him when he was appointed.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

When Montagu Norman was Governor of the Bank of England it was a private company, so I do not think it would have been right, prior to nationalisation, for a Select Committee to have had any involvement in the appointment.

[Stephen Hammond]

Indeed. We could have a long discourse about the fact that Montagu Norman was the initiator of sound monetary policy, but in view of the strictures set out by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington, I shall not go down that course today.

It might be worth referring to two more modern Governors. Lord Kingsdown, who was Robin Leigh-Pemberton at the time he was Governor, was in some ways a classic figure. He had been a lawyer for many years and had no banking experience. He was appointed chairman of Nat West bank and was then invited to become Governor of the Bank of England. I am sure we could envisage the Treasury Committee saying, “But you are a lawyer, and we want a banker or someone with financial services experience”. The current Governor’s predecessor, Baron George, went from Cambridge to the Bank of England and never left it. Again, can we not hear the Treasury Committee saying, “But you are an insider in the Bank of England. You have no experience anywhere else. How on earth”—

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Hammond]

I bow, of course, to my hon. Friend’s greater knowledge of this matter. My key point was that the Bank of England and its family, cousins and outside friends will now have a much greater role at the centre of the regulation of our financial system and, indeed, of our overall economy.

It is in some ways understandable that the immediate drive of the Bill before us is to increase the powers of parliamentary accountability, but I think there is some confusion between accountability and independence. Parliament will gain further powers of control, scrutiny and accountability under the Financial Services Bill. The exact powers are clearly defined, with reference made to the new financial stability objective, to the position of the deputy governor and the Financial Policy Committee, to the Governor’s appointment for eight years and to the fact that the Treasury Committee and, indeed, Parliament can hold the Bank of England to account. That being so, it is not necessarily the case that giving the Treasury Committee the power of veto over the appointment of the Governor would enhance that accountability, although it might impede the Governor’s independence. It is right for Parliament to have greater accountability and greater scrutiny, but we need to be clear that the Governor, who is at the centre of the operation of macro-economic policy and macro-financial and prudential control, must be independent.

The Bill before us contains not only a power of veto but a power of appointment, which could be seen as a step backwards in the whole argument about independent policy making. The Bank of England Act 1998 took a momentous step forward in respect of the independence of the Bank and the Governor by giving the power of decision over interest rates to the Monetary Policy Committee. That was, and will remain, the historic achievement of the Labour Government. It followed from and was a continuation of what the previous Governor had introduced, in tandem with the then Chancellor, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), with the publication of the minutes of the interest rate-setting committee.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Does my hon. Friend believe that the conduct of monetary policy from 1998 to 2008 was any better than it was when the Bank of England was not independent and when previous Conservative Governments from 1979 onwards were interfering in monetary policy very considerably?

[Stephen Hammond]

Again, my hon. Friend presents me with a tempting line of debate. It is reasonable to suggest that the period between May 1993 and May 1997 will be regarded as one of the golden eras of the operation of monetary policy. It was the period that drove the first 12 quarters of growth before 1997, and it was the period during which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe and Baron George—who, as I said earlier, might not even have been appointed by a Treasury Committee—operated monetary policy. I am sure that my hon. Friend and I could enjoy a happy morning discussing monetary policy, but, as I have said, I will not go down that line.

The protections and requirements introduced by the Financial Services Bill seem to me to be exactly the same as those introduced by the Bank of England in terms of independence. What concerns me is that if the Treasury Committee can hold the Bank responsible for its actions in the past as well as its immediate decisions, it does not necessarily need a power of veto over the Governor’s appointment. It has the power of accountability and of scrutiny.

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[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Historically, there was a much better check on appointments to the Executive, because its members had to resign their seats and stand in a by-election. The public scrutinised appointments to the Cabinet, which was a fantastic system.

[Richard Harrington]

For once in my political career, I am completely speechless. I cannot claim before I scrutinise Hansard tomorrow that I fully understand my hon. Friend’s point, but I am sure that, being the person he is, he is absolutely right.

A further extension of the role of the Select Committee would make a fundamental difference to our system. It is not just a question of extent, as is the spreading practice of giving various Committees different scrutiny roles. Select Committees getting involved in hearings on major executive posts would be a fundamental change, and Parliament should discuss it if Members believe it is the right thing to do. That would an interesting and significant debate.

I would oppose the change. We have all seen the hearings that take place in America on the appointments of judges, Secretaries of State and so on, which are watched live all over the world. Although I do not feel that such hearings add anything to the democratic process, a valid argument can be made for them. However, they should not be introduced on a one-off basis in the case of the Governor of the Bank of England, because that would represent a fundamental change to our system. I do not think many people in this country would support judges being publicly appointed, and the same is true of many other roles including, I believe, the Governor of the Bank of England.

Select Committees are very good for scrutiny—that is their role. The Standing Orders, which I probably do not read enough, state that a Select Committee is

“appointed to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the principal government departments”.

However, the control of executive appointments is quite different. The importance of that point should not be underestimated.

In 2000, in the report “Shifting the Balance”, the Labour Government stated:

“Any indication that a Ministerial appointment relied upon the approval of a Select Committee or was open to a Select Committee veto would break the clear lines of accountability by which Ministers are answerable to Committees for the actions of the executive”.

That is true. I ask the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington to consider the fact that the Treasury Committee having a veto over the Governor of the Bank of England might allow a Chancellor or Prime Minister to say, “Well, it wasn’t my doing. That wasn’t the candidate I wanted”. That would give them an excuse, whereas now there is direct and clear accountability to Parliament.

I hope that no one, least of all the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington himself, thinks I am saying that he has introduced the Bill with anything other than the best intentions, but the point about accountability should be considered. I believe in direct accountability, not in our senior elected politicians—or indeed junior ones such as myself—having an excuse to blame somebody else. I fear that that could be an unintended consequence of the Bill.

I believe in extra accountability and in making Select Committees strong, but I cannot support the Bill, because it goes totally against our current system. It is that system itself that Parliament should discuss and debate at length.

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[Mike Freer]

I never fail to be surprised at the ability of hon. Friends and hon. Members to vote for what they do not really believe in, as we might see next Tuesday. [Laughter.] The Whips do not need to write that down.

Before I read the substance of the Bill, I thought I would look at the history of the Bank of England. I promise not to go too far back, but I glanced to see whether there was a precedent for Parliament’s being involved in the appointment of the Governor. The Bank of England was formed to raise money for the Government of the day, who could not raise the princely sum of £1.2 million themselves because they were not credit worthy, even though they had sought to attract money by offering 8% interest rates—an eerie echo of the problems of the Greek and Spanish Governments 318 years later. It is not the time, while we are dealing with sovereign debt crises, to discuss whether Parliament should appoint the Governor of the Bank of England, and I will talk later about what would happen if we had to appoint someone in the middle of a crisis.

The Bank was originally a private bank paid for by private subscriptions. I read through its book of subscriptions from 1694—in fact, I have a copy of it with me. I was tempted to read it all out. I have the scars on my back from introducing the London Local Authorities Bill. I am pleased to see my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) here, because he taught me that the way to prolong a debate was to read out, in detail, the coat of arms of all the London boroughs, so it was tempting to read out the list of original subscribers.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am delighted to note that the time spent debating that Bill was not wasted.

[Mike Freer]

I can assure my hon. Friend that I learned a huge amount from the painful experience of taking that Bill through the House.

I wanted to find out whether anything could be learned from seeing who were the original subscribers to the Bank. One of them was the Receiver of Their Majesty’s Customs. I thought it was rather odd that a tax collector—a modern day Treasury Minister—was a founder of the Bank of England. Under the column headed “Quality” are listed merchants, widows, haberdashers, scriveners, grocers and apothecaries. Even clerks were allowed to subscribe to the original Bank of England.

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[Joseph Johnson]

Yes, I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. Like other Members who I will not mention again, I think that it would be far preferable for the Treasury Committee, if it is to have a formal role in any appointment of the Governor of the Bank of England, to be a statutory consultee. I do not believe that it would be remotely appropriate, however, for it to be given powers of decision over any such appointments.

In my view, moving towards the system of making the Select Committee a consultee, perhaps through a tweak to the Financial Services Bill as it goes through the other place, would be a more sensible system that would not cloud lines of accountability and would, in my view, avoid putting the Treasury Committee in the position in effect of having to mark its own homework. That would inevitably be the case if it were given veto rights over a candidate that it had itself jointly chosen in a binding pre-appointment hearing. From Parliament’s perspective, I believe that it would be better and preferable to stick with the status quo, whereby the appointment of the Governor is a matter for the Crown on the advice of the Chancellor and the Prime Minister. That enables the Treasury Committee to do its job of holding the Bank to account regularly and effectively in hearings with policy committee members.

In support of calls for a parliamentary veto of the appointment of the next Governor of the Bank of England, much has been made of the supposed precedents set by the Treasury Committee’s veto in the appointment of the head of the Office for Budget Responsibility. Reference has also been made to the rather more long-standing role of the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee in the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor General. The CAG is an officer of Parliament but until 1983 was appointed by the Executive. Since the passage of the National Audit Act 1983, the CAG has been appointed following a vote in the Commons on a motion proposed by the Prime Minister with the agreement of the Chair of the PAC. The selection process preceding that is run by an unusual partnership between Parliament and the Government, with the Chair of the PAC sitting on the selection panel with representatives of the Executive.

I happen to think that the comparisons are rather misleading and unhelpful. The role and responsibilities of the Governor in economic and financial policy making are completely different from the role of the Chair and members of the OBR, who are responsible collectively for producing forecasts and other analyses twice a year. In the case of the OBR, a parliamentary veto of the appointment can make sense in terms of providing assurance about the independence of the role of the OBR. The role and responsibility of the Governor are completely different. Whereas the OBR performs an important function in providing an independent and unbiased forecast on which Government policy can be based, the Governor carries out Executive functions on behalf of the state and has responsibilities delegated to him for key areas of economic policy.

A further important difference already touched on by my hon. Friend the Member for Great Yarmouth is that the appointment of a prospective Governor is clearly market-sensitive in a way that appointments to the OBR or National Audit Office in the case of the Comptroller and Auditor General clearly are not. Once an appointment is announced, his or her perceived policy leanings—whether or not, for example, the next Governor is perceived to be a hawk or a dove—can be duly factored into asset prices in an orderly way. Pre-appointment hearings of a sort that give MPs on the Treasury Committee a potential veto could quite easily cause anxiety and costly volatility in financial markets, for little obvious benefit—a point also made by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng).

To reiterate the central point, rather than giving the Treasury Committee a veto, a better option would be to upgrade and modernise consultation arrangements, potentially to include not just the Chair of the Treasury Committee—a point that I made earlier—but the chairman of the court of the Bank of England. It is important that we upgrade and modernise the court of the Bank of England so that it can perform its oversight function more effectively than it traditionally has done and so that it feels properly empowered to use the rights that it already has under the Bank of England Act 1998, which are to manage the Bank’s affairs, other than the formulation of monetary policy. That means much more than simply addressing what many have described as an excessively deferential culture at the “court of King Mervyn”, as the Financial Times cheekily described it some time ago. It means more than changing the court’s somewhat archaic name, or removing a little of the flummery—the men in pink coats deferentially bearing silver platters around the Bank, and so on.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

It would be a tragedy to change some of the historic appurtenances of the Bank of England that remind us of the great rich tapestry of our history.

[Joseph Johnson]

My hon. Friend is right. It is important to focus on the substance of what needs to change at the court, rather than on the men in pink coats and the silver platters. That means ensuring that members of the court, or the supervisory board, as the Treasury Committee would prefer it to be called, have the ability and willingness to take a tough and challenging line, with a chairman who is prepared to take on a rather more effective and higher profile role than has, perhaps, been the case in the past.

Logically, if anyone should be given a right to consent to the appointment or removal of the Governor of the Bank of England, it should be the chairman of the court of the Bank of England, rather than the Treasury Committee as a whole. That avoids many of the constitutional difficulties to which many of my hon. Friends have referred.

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[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Does my hon. Friend agree with me that 10 days is a negligible amount of time to debate so important a constitutional change and that for a constitutional change of that magnitude, we would need the whole Session?

[Matthew Hancock]

I agree with my hon. Friend in one respect, which is that changing the separation between the Executive and the legislature that scrutinises them would have great constitutional implications. I ask Members to draw their own conclusions on the contrast between that and merely changing the form of appointment to one of the two Houses of the legislature. That is a matter simply within the legislature, rather than to do with the role of the Crown in Parliament, which is the basis of our constitutional monarchy.

Let me bring the debate down to more practical considerations. If the Treasury Committee were to reject the Government’s preferred choice of Governor, a small number of MPs would effectively have vetoed a Crown appointment. The whole House would not have made that rejection; a small number of MPs would have done so. I do not think that there is any precedent for such a challenge, whereby a small number of MPs who are not Ministers challenge, through the power vested in them, the authority of our Executive—at least not since the days of Charles I, and we all know how that turned out.

Where would the Bill leave the royal prerogative? That question needs to be addressed. What would it mean for the role of the Crown in Parliament? In this jubilee year, as we celebrate 60 glorious years of Her Majesty, these are questions to which we need answers. It is perhaps no coincidence that the original proponent of this broad constitutional change was himself an avowed republican, with a history of great hostility to the Crown’s role in government: Tony Benn. Indeed, I understand the heartfelt and strongly held republican position of the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington. He does not contradict me, so I presume that is his position. The Bill directly challenges that question of parliamentary accountability.

The Governor of the Bank is already accountable to the Treasury Committee for his or her decisions on monetary policy and financial stability, but I turn to the question of the increasing role of the Bank, because there is no doubt that under the Financial Services Bill it will have a bigger role than hitherto. The separation of bank regulation from monetary policy is a flaw and a mistake that has had grievous consequences, not least because the banking system is the conduit for monetary policy’s impact on the real economy.

I therefore strongly and passionately support the relevant change in the Financial Services Bill, but it does not follow directly that, under it, the position of the Governor is stronger than hitherto, because up until and including today in matters of financial stability the Governor has been imperial within the Bank of England. Executive powers over the areas of financial stability for which the Bank is responsible are the sole responsibility of the Governor in person, accountable to the court of the Bank and to the Treasury Committee.

Under the new proposals, the Governor will chair the Financial Policy Committee, and it is in that committee, rather than in the individual, that powers over financial stability will be vested. So on matters of financial stability not only will there be accountability externally, but decision making will be conferred on a committee that the Governor chairs, rather than on the person of the Governor himself.

[Matthew Hancock]

I am grateful to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury for making that clear, and I agree wholeheartedly. In the debate about accountability under the Financial Services Bill, one fact often overlooked is that, whereas previously a power vested in the Bank of England involved a decision by the Governor alone, for which the Bank’s deputy governors would take collective responsibility, it will now formally involve a decision by a committee, of which the Governor will be chair. That is an important distinction. Despite concerns about increased power going to one individual, in fact the increased power goes to an institution, but the internal arrangements at the institution are being changed in order to reflect that increased power. That is why I strongly support the Financial Services Bill not only in principle but in the design of the system that we are discussing.

To whom would the Treasury Committee be accountable if it had this Executive power? In the words of Juvenal, “Who watches the watchmen?” Under this proposed amendment to the Bank of England Act 1998, the Treasury Committee could stall or reject the appointment of a perfectly qualified candidate for whatever reason it chose— perhaps, heaven forfend, even in order to raise the personal profile of a member of the Committee. Given the powerful investigations by Select Committees over recent months—for instance, into phone hacking—I am sure that we would all be sceptical about the idea that any member of a Select Committee could possibly try to change the way in which an inquiry went forward in order to raise their own personal profile. I am absolutely certain that that does not happen.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

In those circumstances, a Government who commanded a majority in the House of Commons would be able to overturn the Select Committee’s decision or replace its members so as to arrive at a different decision. If the Select Committee were wholly irrational, it could be fired by the rest of the House.

[Matthew Hancock]

I have a great deal of respect for the intellectual integrity of the supporters of the Bill, but they cannot have it both ways. They cannot argue both that the Bill would have no impact because a Government with a majority could force their decision through the House of Commons and that it would be very important in changing how things operate. If the Treasury Committee vetoed a proposed Governor and that decision was then overturned by a Government vote on the Floor of the House, in practice the direct consequence would be that the position of that proposed Governor would be completely undermined.

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[Matthew Hancock]

Of course. The Government must command support for their programme from a majority of the House of Commons, but the Treasury Committee is voted for by Back Benchers, and as the two electorates are different we would not necessarily get the same result from both. The argument put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset—most of Somerset—(Jacob Rees-Mogg) is an argument for deadlock because it could lead to the Treasury Committee pushing one point of view and—because it is elected by a different electorate from those who support a Government—ending up with a contravening view being expressed on the Floor of the House. That is because the Bill would apply to the Treasury Select Committee or its successor body should its name be changed or its powers be passed to somebody else.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

If a Government command a majority in this House, they are in control of the Standing Orders, and therefore if a Select Committee made a wholly irrational decision, it would be completely open to them to find a way to change that Committee. It must always be true that the Floor of the House—the whole House—has command of any and every Committee of the House, but it would be an extreme circumstance for a Government to try to push through such a scheme.

[Matthew Hancock]

The argument appears to be that we should give the Treasury Committee a power of veto, unless the whole House disagrees with that veto. However, the majority in the House support the Government and it is the Government who initially propose who should be Governor, so the Government could never be overruled in extremis. To support a Bill in which the ultimate safeguard is the abolition of the Select Committee system is a little extreme.

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[Matthew Hancock]

I agree strongly. We need to be vigilant and—dare I say it—humble about how little we know about the future, instead of making grand assertions that because something has not been a problem in the past, it will not be a problem in the future.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I agree with my hon. Friend that there have been many occasions in history—a few of which I may quote later—when Governors have shown themselves to be hostile to Government policy, but I wonder whether that is an argument against independence of central banks, rather than against the ratification of the appointment of central bankers.

[Matthew Hancock]

My argument is in favour of the operational independence of central banks—“freedom in a framework”, if I may put it that way, or “constrained discretion”, as economists inelegantly call it. The argument is that the broad strategy should be agreed on and put in place. Within that strategy and agreed framework, independence allows the Bank of England—or the institution making operational decisions—to look past shorter-term considerations and the impact of their decisions on Twitter and the next day’s headlines, and thereby take the political cycle out of the political economy of a decision affecting the country over a long period.

My analysis of the past tells us something important about central banks now. The point is that they should never be forced to do the Government’s bidding in the areas delegated to them. As we saw in Weimar Germany and Zimbabwe, removing operational independence has significant risks. Although I respect the view of my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that the so-called Ken and Eddie show resulted in a more effective monetary policy than that which was pursued after operational independence was granted in 1997, I do not agree that the previous structure was better, because the ability to look past the political cycle is of value.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I wonder whether we sometimes try to perfect structures as against what actually works. The period of monetary policy from 1998 through, really, to 2010 was disastrous, and was responsible for some of the problems from which we are still suffering.

[Matthew Hancock]

I agree with my hon. Friend that money was too loose. In fact, the growth of bank balance sheets—and, therefore, the money supply—was running at up to 25% a year for several of the years leading up to the crisis. The problem of over-leverage and too rapid growth in broad money is one of the things we are now dealing with as banks try to deleverage. Mistakes were made, but I would not put that down to the independence of the Bank, not least because, in whatever structure, the appointment of the right person and a system to appoint them is crucial, and this debate is directly relevant to the Bill.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I wonder whether one can draw any conclusions from appointments during this period, because Sir Alan Greenspan—with his honorary knighthood—in the United States, whose appointment was ratified by the Senate again and again, was probably one of the worst central bankers in history, and I need not tell my hon. Friend how central bankers were appointed in the United Kingdom.

[Matthew Hancock]

My hon. Friend anticipates a couple of the points I shall go into in more detail later.

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[Matthew Hancock]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, although I am slightly embarrassed by her eloquence. As she said in her speech, it matters to people that we get the management of the economy right. When it goes wrong, as it has in the past, that has a massive impact on our postbags. It is therefore right and proper for us who debate these issues in the House to devote a great deal of scrutiny to them.

The funding for lending scheme, which was announced last month, is a good example of how this works in practice. When interest rates are near zero, the connection between monetary and fiscal policy becomes even tighter. The ability to get low interest rates out into the real economy can depend on the use of the Government’s own balance sheet. The funding for lending scheme and the liquidity scheme, which I think is one of the most vital elements of our economic recovery, are a joint matter involving use of the Treasury’s balance sheet and the indemnity for the Bank of England, and Bank of England action in the markets, both between banks and in the context of the wider availability of debt. That is a clear indication of the requirement for not just operational independence, but a common strategy between the Governor of the Bank and the Government of the day.

Allowing banks to borrow from the Bank of England in order to lend directly into the real economy means having to ensure that the high rates paid by one bank to another because of the insecurity of, ultimately, their creditworthiness and the difficulty of accessing liquidity are not passed on to people who pay for mortgages or businesses that need to borrow to finance investment. Many businesses that have taken advantage of opportunities, and many mortgagees who have bought houses, are capable of repaying a loan directly at a decent interest rate that is worth while to them, but a margin is added because the banks cannot lend to each other at decent rates that are almost free of risk.

The involvement of the Government in liquidity is nothing new. It has not happened for about 15 years, but for several centuries before that, the Bank of England intervened in the provision of liquidity in the City through the discounted bill market. Liquidity was available to ordinary businesses, and indeed to people wanting to buy their homes, when it was supported by the Bank of England, normally as the “third name” on a bill, in order precisely to ensure that the monetary policy of the central Bank—whether independent or not—got into the real economy and did not end up stuck in the banking system, as happens too often today.

As the current Governor of the Bank of England said in his Mansion House speech,

“the long term nature of the lending and its pricing mean that the Bank could conduct such an operation only with the approval of the Government, as offered by the Chancellor…such a scheme would be a joint effort between Bank and Treasury.”

If, as set out in the Bill, the Treasury Committee could veto somebody who had a strategic agreement with the Government, and in their place ensure that only somebody who agreed with its strategy, and not the Government’s, went into the job, that would undermine this potential for joint working.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am very sympathetic to what my hon. Friend is saying, but if there were a recalcitrant, stubborn Governor who was not approved by a Select Committee, but was appointed directly by the Executive, and he dragged his heels and was very reluctant to allow an easing of monetary policy, how would a Government deal with that?

[Matthew Hancock]

That would be an example of where monetary policy and the wider economic policies of the Government were not working in tandem. The Minister explained the procedures for the removal of a Governor, and they require the proposal of the court—I think the strengthening of the court is important. There are procedures in place, therefore. It might be thought that a wider discussion of this point would not be in order, but the Bill is about getting rid of the Governor as well as the appointment of the Governor. My hon. Friend might therefore want to touch on that point in more detail later. I had not considered it, but it is important and it should be scrutinised properly and at length by somebody who has considered it more closely than I have.

As for the counter-factual, or what happens when the views of the central bank are at variance with those of the Government, the problem in the years running up to the crisis was not that the leadership of the Bank was too close to the Government, but that the voice of the Bank was being ignored by the Government for political reasons, hence the fact that the growth of the money supply was too fast and the subsequent difficulties in handling the crisis. This was pointed out by the Bank, and Sir Andrew Large made a speech making clear the problems of over-rapid growth of the money supply in 2004. He pointed to the dangers of supposedly benevolent innovations such as the rise of securitisation, and he asked whether that was causing problems that our Government should be addressing. There was no response from the Government of the day.

In May 2006, the current Governor warned that

“a potentially large social problem, with many households getting into difficulty with their debts, is materialising.”

He was in a position to know, because he had received in the post a piece of junk mail—a credit card application from a bank—and the literature said:

“We have the solution, Mervyn, for your bankruptcy.”

The bank in question did not realise that Sir Mervyn King was not bankrupt—and I certainly hope he would never be bankrupt. Indeed, there was a worse problem: one bank—RBS—sent a credit card to a—

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[Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I know that he has been on his feet for close to an hour now, so he will not be aware that a Member from his own side, the hon. Member for Clacton (Mr Carswell), is saying on the Twittersphere that what is going on here is a Government ploy to talk out an attempt to make the Bank of England more democratically accountable. What does the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Matthew Hancock) say to that member of his own party?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. Is it really a proper proceeding if hon. Gentlemen do not come to the House to make their points but make them via Twitter? My hon. Friend the Member for Clacton (Mr Carswell) can come to this House and speak, rather than electronically communicating with us.

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[Matthew Hancock]

My hon. Friend makes the point well so I will not dwell on it. No doubt all Members who have a serious interest in the impact of the Bill are in the House. Those who do not want to come to the House to discuss it are perfectly at liberty not to do so; that demonstrates the amount of interest they have in the consideration of the matters before the House.

Given the scale of the change proposed in the Bill, it is vital that we look at what has happened in the rest of the world. I hope hon. Members will indulge me a moment as I do that. About one tenth of major countries involve their legislatures in the appointment of central bank governors. The United States has been mentioned. Japan, Croatia, Latvia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Macedonia, Lithuania and the Ukraine are also examples of countries where the decision and the veto power are vested in the legislature. Nine out of 10 countries have broadly the set-up that we have. Of that list of countries, only two have financial systems of the same size and sophistication as the UK. They are the USA and Japan. The US system, which is comparable to the proposition in the Bill, has already been discussed.

When I looked a little more closely at the US system, I was surprised to find that in the entire history of the Federal Reserve since it was founded in 1913, not a single presidential nominee for the chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve has ever been rejected by the Senate. We heard the argument earlier from the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr Love), a member of the Treasury Committee, that we should not worry, as the veto will never be used. It that is an argument for a change of constitutional significance, I do not know of a weaker one. The argument that we should change something of great importance because it is never used would not find much support.

The US Senate’s record in vetting all presidential nominations shows little evidence that elected representatives are any better than the Executive at rooting out views on economic policy. One of the people who was most frequently re-vetted and given a warm send-off by the Senate was Alan Greenspan, who served as chairman of the Fed from 1987 to 2006. He was reconfirmed five times, yet his final tenure at the Fed resulted in some of the most disastrous economic policy decisions in central banking history. He got it wrong on derivatives when he argued in 2005 that

“sophisticated approaches to measuring and managing risk are key factors underpinning the greater resilience of our largest financial institutions”.

He was wrong in thinking that the price that investors are prepared to pay is the only valid valuation of an asset. He was dogmatically opposed to action against financial bubbles, saying:

“Bubbles generally are perceptible only after the fact.”

He went on to admit that he got these things wrong when he told a congressional hearing in 2008, after the bubble had burst,

“I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organizations, specifically banks . . . were such that they were . . . capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms . . . I have found a flaw. . . I have been very distressed by that fact”.

The Senate failed in its job of vetoing people who would make great and grave economic policy mistakes. That stands as a great question that the Bill’s proponents need to answer. Why would the Treasury Committee be better than the Senate at rooting out people whose economic policy propositions are mistaken? I also use the other counter-factual, which is that the Senate has vetoed people who have a wide reputation for being excellent in their field. For instance, last year the Senate vetoed Patrick Diamond—who I am assured is no relation—a Nobel prize winner in economics. He was vetoed by the Republican Senators in retaliation for the Democrats refusing to reappoint a Bush nominee in 2008. Such political tit for tat, which led to a Nobel prize-winning economist not being allowed on to the Federal Reserve board, is a strong argument for rejecting the Bill.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Is my hon. Friend saying that all Nobel prize-winning economists should be revered? Do not some of them disagree with the policy of Her Majesty’s Government?

[Matthew Hancock]

I am merely saying that Mr Patrick Diamond was a good candidate for that role. I am particularly concerned about the tit for tat political retaliation, which we do not want to bring into this system.

In Japan, in March 2008, the opposition party had a majority of seats in the upper house—this ties closely with the debate that we will be having in this very Chamber on Monday and Tuesday next week—and it rejected proposals by the Government to appoint a former Finance Minister as the Bank of Japan governor. That led to a 20-day period, at the height of the financial crisis, when Japan had no Governor of the central bank. It subsequently took two years to fill all the vacancies on the Bank of Japan policy board. That is evidence of what happens when there is a parliamentary veto. The argument that that would lead to more effective policy making has been roundly dismissed, but the argument that it would bring risks into policy making, and the risk of having no Governor at all, is strengthened by evidence in the US and Japan, the two biggest economies that have a similar process.

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[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I do not think I really need to comment on the hon. Gentleman’s statement.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Further to that point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. This is completely proper parliamentary procedure. Otherwise, you and your predecessors in the Chair would have ruled it out of order. It is absolutely proper that things are debated and it is up to Members to decide whether to be here or in their constituencies on any day of the week. It is quite wrong to criticise Members for debating things fully; that is what we are here for.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

I am extremely grateful to you, Mr Rees-Mogg, for doing my job and responding to the point of order that I had decided not to respond to.

Finance Bill

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Rachel Reeves]

The Government are borrowing £150 billion more. That is the cost of the Government’s failed economic policies. The reality is that with more people out of work claiming benefits and fewer people in work paying taxes, Government borrowing is higher and not lower.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way, but there is a little problem with her maths. She is accusing Her Majesty’s Government of spending £150 billion more and then wants to spend umpteen billions on top of that on a VAT cut. There is absolutely no sense in that.

[Rachel Reeves]

We have seen that this Government’s plan has failed, as unemployment remains far too high, with a million young people out of work. It has failed, and the economy is back in recession—we are one of only two countries in the G20 that are in recession—and the Government are borrowing more. In fact, in the first two quarters of this financial year, the Government are borrowing £4 billion more than they were last year. Their plan has failed and it is time to try an alternative that gets the economy moving again and that gets people back to work and paying taxes so that the economy can grow and the deficit can be brought down sustainably.

We have proposed a bank bonus tax because we think that it is right that those people with the broadest shoulders should pay a little more. On the day that Bob Diamond has resigned after taking £100 million of bonuses in just a few years, would it not have been far better tonight if we had supported the bank bonus tax and used that money to fund a programme of youth jobs to get our economy working again?

We could have used the Budget and the Government could have used the Finance Bill properly to accelerate infrastructure investment to help the struggling construction industry and to create much needed jobs in our economy. Instead, we have a Bill that will go down in history as a monument to this Government’s incompetence, complacency and inability to grasp that what the current economic situation demands is a Government who stand up for ordinary working people. The Bill fails on fairness and asks millions to pay more so that millionaires can pay less. It fails to address the real challenges that this country faces—a recession made in Downing street and a Government with no plan to get us out of it.

Finance Bill

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Monday 2nd July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Charlie Elphicke]

As I said, I think the Laffer curve is an interesting principle, but I prefer empirical curves and empirical results from experiments. We know from the ’80s that if the rate is cut, it increases the take. For me, the uncertainty is not about whether reducing the rate from 50p to 45p will cost the Exchequer £100 million, but about whether it will add £100 million or £200 million to the Exchequer as fewer people seek to avoid tax.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend think that cutting the rate to 40p or even 35p might have raised even more money? Would not that be a very good thing for the Government to do?

[Charlie Elphicke]

My hon. Friend tempts me, as ever. He knows that my view is that one should reduce the rate and clamp down heavily on tax avoidance. I respect the fact that he does not always share my views on tackling tax avoidance—I recall that in Committee he said that I was going to paint the cliffs of Dover red, so passionate was I that people should pay their fair share—but I do think that if we have lower, simpler taxes and a simple tax system, it will incentivise investment and encourage more economic growth. The argument for reducing the higher rate of tax, which was only a temporary increase in the first place—the Labour party seems to have forgotten that—was to get more investment in our economy and to encourage the entrepreneurs and wealth creators.

--- Later in debate ---

Let us follow the logic of the argument made by the hon. Member for Dover. He was ably supported by the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), his colleague on the far, far end of the Benches, who said, “Why stop at 40%? Why not go to 30% or 20%?”

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Hear, hear!

[Barry Gardiner]

From a more-than-sedentary, almost recumbent position, he says, “Hear, hear! Let’s go to 20%!” Does he really think that there is not a limiting point at which the argument tips? Does he really think that there is not a point below which, instead of more revenue coming into the Exchequer, there is a dramatic loss of revenue? Of course there is.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I do indeed think that there is a point at which revenue would drop off, if rates got low, and the Laffer curve shows such a point. However, as a general point, I think that the lower the rates are, consistent with raising the revenue that is needed, the better, and that we have not tested the argument properly to see how low we could go.

[Barry Gardiner]

Well, there we are: the Great British public are being treated to an experiment. “We want to test how far the Laffer curve theory can go.” Is that really the Government’s policy? Is it really their policy to see how low they can get tax before the economy collapses?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way once again. Sadly, I am not Her Majesty’s Government. He must address his comments to those on the Treasury Bench, rather than to me.

[Barry Gardiner]

I am sure that it is only a matter of time. In so far as the hon. Gentleman seeks to speak for his party—

--- Later in debate ---

[Thomas Docherty]

I suspect the best and fastest way to answer my hon. Friend’s question would be to attend the next Conservative party fundraising drinks event, where I am sure many of those millionaires will be buying the Minister a rather hearty round.

Much has been made of the quad’s all-night drinking session. I am sure they were drinking fine Scotch malts—indeed, no fine malts are made outside Scotland—but they should have spent more time looking at the detail of those two decisions. In direct contrast to the hon. Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke), I would argue that pensioners on an income of £10,000 a year are not among the wealthiest pensioners in the country. If Conservative Members believe pensioner households struggling to get by on £10,000 are wealthy, it goes to show how staggeringly out of touch they are.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way and am enjoying his wanderings through the drinking habits of certain Members of the House, which I am not sure are directly relevant. Why is it fair that pensioners should have this benefit but not families who have a £10,000 allowance who are struggling with children? Why is it fair that the benefit should be age-related?

[Thomas Docherty]

I always give way to the hon. Gentleman, who knows more about age than anyone in the House. He needs no history lesson, but the measure goes back to the end of the second world war, and the concept of the greatest generations—those who have given a lifetime of sacrifice. It is worth noting that, just last week, we unveiled a long-overdue memorial to some of that greatest generation. I am sure he would recognise their sacrifice.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The measure was introduced earlier, I believe by Winston Churchill; indeed, an hon. Member asked earlier how we could overturn what the great man had done. The wartime generation are having the benefit frozen; they are not losing it. The people who are not getting it were not born when the war was going on.

[Thomas Docherty]

I cannot believe the hon. Gentleman’s hearing is going. I began by saying that a cash freeze is a real-terms cut. I am sure he would agree with that.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The Government’s wonderful policies are very successfully bringing down inflation; there has been a substantial fall. In addition, oil prices are coming down and there is a cut in fuel duty. That amazing combination means everything is working very well.

[Thomas Docherty]

With an intervention like that, it will not be long before the hon. Gentleman is sitting on the Front Bench speaking for the Government on Treasury matters. Perhaps I can help him on another matter, though, because several references were made to Take That. For his benefit, let me say that they are a popular beat combo who can often be found on the wireless. He might enjoy listening to them.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

rose—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We do not need to worry about Take That and radios for today. I think that the circus has carried on long enough.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sheila Gilmore]

As I think the hon. Gentleman knows fairly well, the increase in inequality began far earlier than that. The point in the history of the post-war United Kingdom when the equality gap was narrowest was 1979, which, interestingly, marked the end of a 20-year period during which Labour Governments had predominated. After 1979, the widening of the gap began and accelerated.

I would not suggest for a moment that the party of which I am a member did as much as I should have liked it to do when it was in government, but we did a great deal for pensioners and the least well-off workers in society by, for instance, getting single parents back to work and introducing the minimum wage. It is simply not true that we were not aware of the issues, or that we did nothing to tackle them. The hon. Gentleman may want to return to the heady days of 1979, and perhaps we should all want to do that. Now, however, inequality is breeding a society that poses many dangers, and we want to reduce that inequality, but I do not believe that the Budget does anything to reduce it. We know that the Budget will increase child poverty, and I believe that in three or four years the inequality gap will have widened even more.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

It is a real pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore), who made such an enormous contribution to the Public Bill Committee. She enlivened it regularly with her thoughts, with which I have almost invariably disagreed—and today is no exception.

We are now dealing with the best part of the Budget: the heart, soul and even the guts of it. We are doing some big and bold and important things, with which I shall deal in turn. One of them is tough and brave and noble. It is the proper aim of Government to take on difficult things which, although difficult, are right. But I shall start, instead—

[Ian Lavery]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Of course I will.

[Ian Lavery]

Is it bold and tough to rob the pensioners of £3 billion and give the millionaires a £3 billion tax cut?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The pensioners are not being robbed. The pensioners have been extraordinarily well looked after by this Government, and rightly so. I agree in many respects with the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty), who talked earlier about how important the elderly were to our society. He called them the golden generation. I thought that, out of respect to Her Majesty, we ought to call them the diamond generation, as they are all over 60.

Of course we owe a great deal to the elderly. That is why it is right that they have kept their bus passes—which they are pleased to have, although there are not many buses in North East Somerset—and their winter fuel allowances. If they are over 75, they will also retain their free television licences so they can watch the BBC free of charge. I think that many of them prefer Sky nowadays, but that is a separate issue. The Conservative party, in alliance with our Liberal Democrat friends, has looked after the pensioners.

As for the thresholds, it is absolutely right that they should be evened out. Let us consider the people who are paying tax across the country. How is it fair for those who have retired to be given an automatic tax break, rather than those who are working hard and perhaps bringing up children? They need the income just as much as the pensioners, and in some cases more. That, I think, was bold and brave of the Government, and right.

I want to begin, however, by discussing the easiest step to defend—the one that was so startlingly obvious that it is surprising that the Government did not take it earlier and go further. I am talking about the reduction in the 50p tax rate to 45p. We know well that high taxes drive out enterprise and people, and drive down tax revenues. That is not because of evil schemes of tax avoidance; it is because people simply decide that if they are not going to get paid, they will not work. They remove their labour. Our socialist friends—

[Thomas Docherty]

rose—

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I give way to my socialist friend.

[Thomas Docherty]

Does the hon. Gentleman really believe our society is enhanced by these pop stars and premiership footballers?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

It has to be said that I am not the world’s greatest expert on pop stars and footballers, but none the less I think they bring a richness to our national life that enlivens many people in my constituency, and even in Scotland. They want to watch the highest quality football being played.

This is relevant, Mr Deputy Speaker, in case you think I am going off on a tangent. I have thought that it would be a good idea to remove the limit on overseas players in cricket, because that limit has been removed in association football and it has led to our having in this country the highest quality league football, and in English cricket—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are drifting away from the topic under discussion—and as somebody who follows cricket and feels that it is to the benefit of the England team that there are not too many overseas players in the county game, I do not want to go any further into this debate.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, but the reduction of tax is what encourages them to be here and why they do not decide to work in other countries instead.

[Thomas Docherty]

I am pretty sure, Mr Deputy Speaker, that the England cricket team is very good and the England football team is not very good.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

But my concern was about Somerset county cricket club. Football teams such as Manchester United do very well through having more foreign players. Somerset, however, has yet to win the county championship, but this lower level of tax and greater freedom in employing overseas players may lead to its achieving that.

Returning to the question of the 45p tax rate, we have had a discussion about avoidance in that context, and I want to defend tax avoidance. I know this is not the most popular cause to espouse, but I do so because I believe in the rule of law, and I do not believe the rule of law is best maintained by Parliament being arbitrary in its taxation.

We have the power, through our votes this evening, to set rates of tax as we choose—to set schemes that allow people to be charged tax, or not to be charged tax, as we choose. If we in this House are too incompetent to draw up the tax law properly, is it reasonable to say to the taxpayer, “You must work out what Parliament may have wanted. This is not what is said, but Parliament may have wanted you to pay this extra amount on top”? Should we then also say that to people who put money into their individual savings accounts? Should we retrospectively say that they ought to have paid more tax on their ISA sums, or on their pension funds?

[Ian Lavery]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is a moral obligation on people to pay taxes, as well as a legal obligation?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

No, I do not. I do not believe that taxation is a matter of morality. I believe the law is a matter of morality and it is immoral to break the law, and therefore I divide very firmly between tax evasion and tax avoidance, which is the historical position of this Parliament—and, indeed, of English law. Tax evasion is criminal and should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. I think the scheme used by a comedian, whose name momentarily escapes me but who is quite famous, was almost certainly unlawful, and that scheme should be prosecuted.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I know the hon. Gentleman lives in a rarefied world, but does he not understand the anger felt not only by low-paid workers, but middle-earners, who pay their tax through pay-as-you-earn and have no opportunity to avoid tax, unlike the footballers to whom he referred? This situation cannot be fair in any society.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

It is very important, once again, to differentiate between avoidance and evasion. If we have passed laws that allow people, for example footballers, to sell the rights to their name and corporatise that, we can change the law, and the fact that this Parliament has not changed the law means that people are entitled to do it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Heaton-Harris (Daventry) (Con)]

rose—

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I give way to my hon. Friend.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. It is worth answering that one first.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am getting so many interventions, and I am always happy to take them all; allcomers are welcome. I do not think that there is this anger; I think that people are very supportive of high earners who earn their money.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Does that not make the point? If there was this anger, thousands of people would not queue in lines to get their season ticket for Manchester United at the beginning of each season and millions of people would not be watching on television, because the strength of anger that Labour Members seem to want to articulate would mean that people would boycott these disgraceful sports and pursuits.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right and he has hit the nail on the head.

[Ian Mearns]

The hon. Gentlemen have got it quite wrong. The tribal nature of football is that people idolise their own team’s players and despise the activities of the players from other teams. The bottom line is that the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) would prefer that there was no tax at all.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The hon. Gentleman is wrong on that last point; I recognise that there is a need for taxation, though slightly beyond the clauses we are immediately discussing. However, I will answer the important point that he has raised on the tribal nature of football and why people are willing to see these high salaries paid. It is because they recognise that those salaries get them the best quality players and they want to see the best quality players playing for the team that they so ardently and passionately support—it is an ardent passion that I do not have, but I understand that many people do have it. That requires low taxes, because otherwise these players take their talent abroad.

I come back to Professor Laffer, because his argument is one that is so obvious as to be self-evident: if the tax rate is zero, nothing will be raised and if it is 100%, no sane person will pay it either as there is no point in working or in earning. There is some point along that curve where the least legal avoidance takes place—I emphasise that avoidance is legal—the most amount of working is done and the highest amount of revenue is received. We have seen this. I know that some Conservative Members, myself included, think that there was a golden age when Baroness Thatcher was in charge—

[Ian Lavery]

rose—

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I give way to another supporter of the golden age.

[Ian Lavery]

I intervened just too early, because he mentioned Margaret Thatcher—another issue. Is there anywhere on this curve that the hon. Gentleman continues to mention where morality comes into play?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

This argument is not a moral one. We are not the House of Bishops. I am all in favour of the Lords Spiritual having a view on this, but I am not one of them. I did not go into the Church; I went into politics. Politics is about raising the revenue that is needed for the country to carry out its business, and it is not an issue of morality in terms of how we phrase the laws. That those laws are then obeyed is a matter of morality. I can probably quote paragraphs of the Catholic catechism on this, but you are looking fretful at that thought, Mr Deputy Speaker, so I shall move back to the golden age of the noble Baroness Thatcher, Lady of the Garter, Order of Merit.

In 1979, the top tax rate was 98%—83p in the pound on income tax and a 15p surcharge. [Interruption.] I hear Labour Members saying that that was excellent and a jolly good thing. It is rather splendid to know that I am not the only one with dinosaur-style views in this House; there are even greater dinosaurs on the Labour Benches. When those tax rates were reduced they came down first to 60% and then to 40%, to fury from hon. Members. I believe that the House was suspended when the noble Lord Lawson introduced the rate of 40p in the pound; I think the Scottish nationalists got up in a passion of anger, wishing for higher taxation to spread across the realm of the United Kingdom. What did that reduction do? It raised more money for Her Majesty’s Government, which meant that the Government could spend money on their priorities and pay down their debt. We had a golden economic scenario when the noble Lord Lawson was at the helm, because we believed in low tax rates and had the courage of our convictions.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I remember the noble Lord Lawson’s time as Chancellor and the real reason we boomed in that time was that he depreciated our currency by 35%.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Without going anything other than briefly through a history of sterling in the 1980s, I seem to remember that it bottomed in 1985 at $1.10 and then started rising again. So, that was not the case throughout the noble Lord’s period in office.

I shall come back to the subject of the Laffer curve, but I must first take an intervention from the hon. Member for Clwyd South (Susan Elan Jones).

[Susan Elan Jones (Clwyd South) (Lab)]

I must confess that I was rather enjoying the sporting analogies and wondering, if the rules were different, what rates of taxation would be required for England rugby players to be able to beat the Welsh—but let me move on. The hon. Gentleman says that there is no morality in tax, but how does he feel about indirect taxation? There were many concerns about the effect on petrol prices, for example, when VAT was raised. Does he think that that should be reduced, too?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are in danger of moving off the topic. We are discussing personal allowances and we need to get back to them. We have had a good lesson in the Jurassic history from those on both sides of the Chamber.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. One always feels ashamed not to answer a question directly, so I apologise to the hon. Lady for the fact that I shall have to give a later answer on that knotty point of value added tax.

I will stick with the Laffer curve and its history of increased revenue. We heard from the Opposition that when rates went down, the economy boomed and so, therefore, did the revenues raised. There are two answers to that. One reason that the economy boomed was that there was lower tax, so people had more of their own money in their pockets to spend on goods and services, leading to overall economic growth. Secondly, the amount paid by top taxpayers grew much faster than the rate of the economy overall. We are now in a situation where 27% of income tax is now paid by the top 1% of income tax payers—

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Not enough.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

In 1979, when the hon. Gentleman had a real socialist Government, that figure was about 8%. One can see that massive expansion in the burden of tax falling on the richest in society—the ones who can bear that burden—comes when the rate is lower. That is an excellent part of this Budget; perhaps the best part.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I thank my hon. Friend for being so generous in giving way. If one could possibly take the politics out of tax, surely one would want to hit the tax rate that brings in the most revenue, in order to pay for hospitals and everything else. If that tax rate was proved to be lower than the higher tax rate, one would like to think that common sense would prevail and that Ministers would choose the tax rate that would bring in the money.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I believe that there are studies that show that that rate would be 36p in the pound. I hope that the Minister is listening and that we can look forward in the next Budget to the rate being lower still.

We have heard discussion about the morality of tax rates, and I dispute that there is morality to tax rates, but there is a perniciousness about taxing for the sake of it and about taxing for the sake of envy, because people do not like the rich or because they wish to crush the income earners in society. That is not the type of envy that we have on these Benches. Even our Liberal Democrat friends do not suffer from that type of envy; they recovered from it after their experience in 1909.

We Conservative Members have never had that type of envy. We recognise that if the maximum amount of revenue is raised, it is better for everybody. We heard our Prime Minister giving an invitation to our friends in France, saying, “Come and join us. The weather here may be rainy, but the tax rate is only 45p in the pound, compared with the 75p that you may have to pay.”

[Ian Lavery]

Will the hon. Gentleman enlighten the House on what personal tax allowances he would put in place at different levels, if he were the Chancellor and had the power?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

It would be an impertinence for someone who entered the House in only the past two years to aspire, even hypothetically, to the height of Chancellor of the Exchequer. I leave that question to my hon. Friends on the Government Front Bench, who, having listened carefully to all that is said in this debate, will no doubt advise the Chancellor. They may consider the figure of 36p in the pound to be perfectly suitable—or they may go further and advocate a flat tax, which is a very attractive proposition. Perhaps people could have tabled an amendment to that effect, but sadly they did not. As I understand from my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills), who is no longer in his place—

[Gavin Williamson (South Staffordshire) (Con)]

He’s behind you.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Oh, he is behind me. My hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley said that the effect of the amendment from our Labour friends would be to bring the tax rate down to 40p. I am not sure that it was wise of him to say that, because those of us who were listening may be tempted to go into the same Lobby as the Opposition later, to help them achieve that objective.

I want to talk about the other great aspect of the Budget, and to give full credit to our Liberal Democrat friends for twisting Conservatives’ arms to get them to do something that they have always wanted to do anyway: get as many people out of taxation as possible by raising the thresholds. As the thresholds are raised, so the incentive to work becomes greater. The hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore) said that we wanted to make the out-of-work work harder by cutting their benefits, and the in-work work harder by cutting their taxes, and thought that was illogical. Of course it is not, because a person does not get unemployment benefit for working; if a person works, they lose their benefit, and if we encourage people to work, they have more money. Likewise, if we cut people’s taxes, they have more money, so they are likely to work harder.

When we raise the threshold, we find that many millions of people are able to work more easily. They will be taken out, to some degree, of the poverty trap, which is one of the most crushing and pernicious taxation and benefit traps that anyone has to face. The move, in stages, to a £10,000 threshold is a very bold thing to do in a time of economic difficulty, but it may have some of the greatest social benefits of any of the policies that the Government are following. It really is a noble approach to taxation—an objective that is fundamentally worthy.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman, but I am not sure that he realises that a large number of my constituents, and possibly his, who are in low-paid jobs claim council tax benefit, housing benefit and tax credits. However, all of those have been cut by the Government, and that counters the encouragement to work, in terms of the increase in the threshold.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am always grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s thoughtful interventions, but one of the greatest mistakes that Governments make is to have this merry-go-round of taxation and benefits, whereby we tax people and then pay them back their own money in benefits, with a cut taken for administration in between. It is much more sensible to take people out of tax altogether. I would like the threshold to be raised considerably higher, basically towards average earnings, so that the bulk of people do not pay tax at all on what they earn, but do, of course, pay in other ways, through other taxes—through indirect taxation. That takes away the major disincentive to go into employment, and lets people benefit from the fruits of their labour. That is an important proposal that has come forward, and it is popular throughout the country, though I would not say that there was literally cheering in the streets.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

My hon. Friend talked about the recycling of money through the system. In May 2010, nine out of 10 families were able to claim some sort of tax credit. Surely it is completely wrong if everybody —or 90% of people—is relying on the state to give them money back in some grandiose scheme. Surely taking people out of tax is the right way to get rid of that problem.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am in entire agreement with my hon. Friend. We want to get people out of the tax and benefits system as much as possible so that they can stand on their own two feet. That is what people want.

[Sheila Gilmore]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

It will be an honour to give way.

[Sheila Gilmore]

The problem with the hon. Gentleman’s argument is that, even if the tax threshold is raised towards the median income, as he suggested, unless the minimum wage is raised substantially, many people’s earnings will be so low that they will still live in great poverty. That was why benefits such as tax credits were created. The other route might be to raise the minimum wage.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Mr Deputy Speaker, you will rule me out of order if I argue that raising the minimum wage would be extremely unwise, so I would not dare to say it. However, on the point of benefits for the worst off, I am all in favour of those. It is a thoroughly good thing to help people who are just in the earning bracket, but not to give benefits to people earning £70,000 a year, paid for out of their extraordinarily high taxes.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Surely the biggest disincentive to less well-off people earning or trying to get work—many are trying to get work that is not available because there is mass unemployment—is the fact that all the benefits are means-tested. If we reduced the level of means-testing and had many more universal benefits paid for out of a much more progressive form of taxation, we would avoid that problem.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

There are enormously exciting benefit changes coming through and I look forward to speaking on those with enthusiasm, because I think they will make a substantial change to the welfare of the people of this country. But that is for another day. We must make sure that the tax system encourages work, gets people off benefits and helps them to be prosperous. Universal benefits have the grave disadvantage of wasting money on people who do not need it.

In the limited time that remains to me, I wish to deal with the issue that has caused most controversy: the freezing of the age-related allowance. This was a bold decision for the Government to take, but undoubtedly the right one. The ordinary threshold has been so raised that the age-related allowance, which used to be almost double the ordinary allowance, is now only marginally higher. The change is being made in the most sensible and calm way, by freezing the allowance so that nobody loses in cash terms. There will not be a cash loss to any existing pensioner. Over time the basic threshold will be raised so that everybody is better off.

It is a policy that has of course been momentarily unpopular. It has received a little publicity that is adverse, but as somebody once said, to govern is to choose. Government are at their best when they make tough choices and stick to them. We know that the economic situation of this country is deeply unsatisfactory. We know that we have a deficit that is out of control and a level of debt unseen out of wartime. In getting it right, the Government cannot throw money about like confetti. They must take the tough and bold decisions and yes, there may be consequences in the newspapers, but—

[Kelvin Hopkins]

The hon. Gentleman talks about the deficit. Things are getting worse, rather than better, because of the squeeze on the economy. If we made serious efforts to reduce the tax gap, which is estimated at £120 billion a year, we could solve that problem overnight. It is just a question of changing the law to make sure that people pay the taxes that they should pay.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

We have already discussed this. By and large people pay the taxes that they are supposed to pay, as Parliament has laid down. If they evade tax, the full force and might of the law can and should come down upon them.

I conclude on the crucial point of defending the Government on a decision that, though it has not been immediately well received, will be welcomed by the electorate, because the electorate admire Governments who govern effectively through the tough times. They do not admire Governments who are loose and lazy with their money. They admire ones who are willing to take the tough decisions. We should oppose all the amendments in the group and stick with the Budget as it was—a very fine and good Budget, in which the right decisions were made.

[The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury (Mr David Gauke)]

We have had an interesting debate that has addressed what are perhaps two of the most controversial issues in the Budget: the change to age-related allowances and the reduction in the 50p rate of income tax. The debate has lasted three hours, but at one stage I thought we might finish early, until we heard the tour de force from my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg). I hope that I will have time to respond to the various comments that have been made. We heard the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Cathy Jamieson) quote Groucho Marx, which I suppose is an improvement on other Marxes who might have been quoted, although I was reminded of the other Groucho Marx line:

“I’ve had a perfectly wonderful evening, but this wasn’t it”,

at least until I heard the speech from my hon. Friend.

The changes the Government have made to the rates and thresholds of income tax will provide a competitive platform for our tax system while also ensuring fairness. The measures in the Bill will reduce the additional rate of income tax in 2013-14 to 45p, increase the personal allowance to £8,105 and simplify the working of age-related allowances. I will discuss each of the amendments in turn, but it is important first to set out why the Government have taken this approach.

The fact is that the 50p rate of income tax has not raised the revenue it was intended to raise. It is currently the highest statutory income tax rate in the G20. When we came to power we inherited an economy that the previous Government had driven into a parlous state, with regard to not only the state of the public finances but our overall competitiveness. The fact is that the 50p rate came in only at the fag end of the Labour Government, who for 13 years had kept the 40p rate, and when they brought in the 50p rate they declared that it was temporary. There was a reason for that: they recognised that the 50p rate would damage our competitiveness. The hard evidence backs up that claim. The report by HMRC sets out that the 50p rate is distortive, damaging to international competitiveness and an economically inefficient way of raising revenue.

In short, the 50p rate is a failed policy. We were told that it would raise over £2 billion and, given the crippling deficit we were left, that was not something we could just wave away as if it did not matter. However, higher taxes are worth while only if they raise more revenue, and the analysis by HMRC shows that at best the yield would be £1 billion, and at worst it may raise nothing at all. That is because the behavioural response has been substantially larger than expected.

Financial Services (Market Abuse)

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I refer Members to my declaration of interests, as I am still actively involved in financial markets—though I am glad to say not in market abuse—and particularly in emerging markets, which has become more relevant in Europe. When I started in emerging markets, Greece and Portugal were such, and I have a feeling that they may soon be classified as emerging markets again.

I support the Government on not opting into the current criminal sanctions proposed by the European Commission. It is classic European Commission stuff. The Commission thinks harmonisation would be very useful because it is concerned about regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory arbitrage ignores the strength of the British position—that people want to trade in London. They are not particularly interested in trading in a Bulgarian bucket shop. Therefore we should remember the strength of our position and not be cowed by feeling that everything across Europe must be the same.

When we look at the wonderful documentation, we are reminded that the great joy of anything to do with Europe is that it provides thousands of pages to read and inwardly digest, almost always written in a form that is as impenetrable as possible, which is part of the problem with the European Union, as the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) so wisely pointed out. There is such confusion in how laws are developed that very few people manage to get to grips with them.

I wish to quote a short excerpt about why the Commission wants the criminal sanction to be brought together. It is so that member states

“can contribute to ensuring the effectiveness of this Union policy by demonstrating social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared to administrative sanctions or compensation mechanisms under civil law.”

That is fine, except that we are already doing it. The Government have already said that all the criminal offences that the European Union wants to bring together are covered by our own law, so it is hard to see why they then argue that it is essential that there should be harmonisation.

It is important to remember, with this opt-in at this stage, that if we opt in we cannot opt out again. This is not going to be part of the block opt-out of opt-ins that we can get by 2014. Anything that we opt into at this stage is permanent, so we would have a permanent criminal sanction agreed at the European Union level, which may not be suitable for what we want in this country.

The real problem is that Europe is the wrong area of focus for this country when it comes to financial markets. I know that we have a large market share in a whole range of financial products, that about 80% of hedge funds in the European Union are based in London and that we do more than a third of all global foreign exchange transactions. However, I thought that it would be interesting to look up where we rank across the whole range of financial services. There is an index, “The Global Financial Centres Index”, which ranks countries and capitals by a variety of measures to show how successful they are in financial services. It includes the people they have and their skills, and the depth and breadth of their markets. When we look at it, we see that London comes first, which should not surprise us. New York comes a fairly close second, followed by Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo, Zurich, Chicago, Shanghai, Seoul, Toronto, Boston, San Francisco and then Frankfurt. Germany, at 13th, is the first European Union country with a financial centre on the list.

We should not be worrying about co-ordination with Europe. To do so is to look at the past, at an outdated and outmoded form of competition. We need to look to the broader world, to the people with whom we really compete: Hong Kong, Shanghai and, of course, New York. Therefore, the Government must show some backbone by not giving in to more Europeanisation, because that is what has been done previously, that is what the EU is used to, and that is the comfort zone of the bureaucracy. We need to look at how our arrangements and regulations compete with the further world, not with what might be called the near abroad. If we do that, we will find that we want our own regulation and we want less European regulation, and we can negotiate from a position of strength, because the financial markets in the United Kingdom are overwhelmingly larger than those in continental Europe.

Therefore, I support the Government in not opting in, but I do not support them in qualifying it by saying “at this stage.” There is no need for any further transfer of powers to the European Union. That is part of the coalition agreement and we should never opt in to anything further in future.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I thoroughly endorse almost everything my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) has said, but I would go somewhat further, because I have a complete aversion to the whole concept of the transfer of our jurisdiction over matters affecting the City of London. I have said that for many years now. In fact, when the de Larosière report was published I wrote in the Financial Times that I saw it as a ticking time bomb, or words to that effect, and that if matters were allowed to continue we would find ourselves mopped up by European jurisdiction.

Following the statement my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary made to the House only last week, I asked a simple question: in the light of the vast amount of commitment and time that has been spent transferring jurisdiction over matters affecting the City to the European Union, how on earth will we be able to protect the City, the related single market aspects, including financial services, and matters of the kind now before the House in the market abuse directive when they are governed by qualified majority vote? Those are the realities.

The truth is that we have made the most massive strategic mistake in relation to matters of this kind, which are governed by qualified majority vote, under directives such as the MAD directive otherwise known as the market abuse directive, which was bitterly opposed by the City of London in the early part of this century. I have to say that events then turned for the worse and those proposals have now been overtaken.

Before I turn to the specifics of the matter before us, I ought to mention that the veto on the fiscal compact, which the European Scrutiny Committee said was effectively unlawful on the evidence we received, has not been followed up. The Government and the Attorney-General are clearly of the view that the agreement on the fiscal compact between the 25 was unlawful, but in reality nothing has been done. We have just had a reply from the Government to our report on the question, and on which we held an inquiry, but in no way do they continue to do anything to put to the test the illegality that lies at the heart of the fiscal compact. We are therefore still in the position whereby the Government regard the fiscal compact of the 25 as being a matter of irregularity, but they do not do anything about it.

That is a dangerous situation, and it has gone beyond that—to the fiscal union itself being promoted and advocated by the Government. That will make things even worse, with an even deeper black hole, as I said on television yesterday. The banking union proposals, which are also now being pressed upon us, will come to fruition around the time of the summit on 28 June, and I fear that we are being taken down an extremely dangerous route.

The market abuse directive before us is one example of that tendency to legislate continuously on financial services matters, and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset is quite right that we could legislate for ourselves on them. Bad markets, as I have said in articles I have written in the past, are bad business, and we have at our disposal in this Parliament every means to pass legislation on our own account, without necessarily or by any means having to leave it to the European Union. I would be going beyond the remit of this debate if I went into that in any further detail, but I repudiate the idea that we cannot legislate for ourselves on such matters.

I am by no means convinced that the Government intend to make it entirely clear whether or not we will opt in, and that is the problem with the opt-in. I think my hon. Friend is of the opinion that the Government have decided that we will not. I am not sure, but I thought he said that.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. No, that is not what I think. I think that the Government have not opted in, technically, at the moment, but hope to do so in future, and I think that will be a great mistake.

[Mr Cash]

In that case we are, as so often, ad idem and in agreement, and I am glad to hear that confirmation from my hon. Friend.

This whole business has one way or another been developing over the past 12 years—and before. It has been before the European Scrutiny Committee, and we have recommended it for debate, but it has been overtaken by further developments, particularly since the financial crash, which we are now in. I am extremely doubtful about whether market abuse in itself—important as the subject matter is, and something that needs to be dealt with—is in any way a contributor to the financial mess that the European Union is in.

We are in an economic crisis, we are in a black hole, and we should have a convention at which all those matters, including directives of this kind, are put before the member states with their cards on the table. We should say unequivocally that we want a different kind of Europe and put it to them, and the negotiating position that we adopt, those red lines, should then be put to the British people. We should have a referendum on those matters to make it absolutely clear that the direction of this over-legislated, over-burdensome European jurisdiction is doing no good whatsoever to the free markets—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

Well, to put it simply, the Committee is concerned that the Government might opt into the draft criminal sanctions directive once it is adopted. There would be a debate on that matter if they decided to do so. I do not think that we should opt in. That matter is part of the broader landscape and specific issues that are before the House.

The question of what the draft directive means by the word “intentionally” in relation to market abuse raises some very important legal issues. Then there is the question of whether the draft directive would apply automatically if there were proof of intent or whether there would be discretion to apply an administrative penalty rather than a criminal one. Those are all matters on which we could legislate on our own account if we wished to do so. I make no apology for repeating that point.

A further point concerns the practical application of the proposed new definition of “inside information”, which involves the whole issue of insider dealing. The trouble is—I say this with respect to Madam Deputy Speaker—that definitions in relation to European legislation raise the question of how this matter will be adjudicated on by the European Court of Justice. We have our own means and opportunities to pass legislation in this House that will define these questions.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My hon. Friend has come to the absolute crux of the matter. Once we opt into something, it is then justiciable by the European Justice of Justice. That brings the ECJ into a role regarding our criminal law, and that is a very substantial step for the Government to be taking.

[Mr Cash]

I am deeply grateful for the support of my hon. Friend, who is also a member of the European Scrutiny Committee and who has very considerable expertise in his own right. He has developed an acute sense of British and United Kingdom interests in relation to matters of great importance to the City of London.

A further point is that there is no useful recital in the directive, as there normally would be, to indicate the parameters of the draft regulations. We are deeply concerned about that. There is no certainty that we will opt in, but that does not alter the fact that there is grave concern that we will eventually end up being told that we will do so. If that is what happens, I, for one, will undoubtedly vote against it.

The directive aims to prevent insider dealing and the misuse of financially sensitive market information in the financial markets. That cannot be separated from the broader landscape of the manner in which the European Union is interfering in matters in the United Kingdom that affect the City of London. The City of London represents some 20% of our gross domestic product. I entirely take on board the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset that we are at the top of the league in global financial market activity. I believe that a serious attempt is being made by other members of the European Union—with Frankfurt at No. 13—to move further up the positions. That will be done partly through regulatory collusion and the use of qualified majority voting, as Professor Roland Vaubel has indicated in his general concerns about the manner in which qualified majority voting and directives are dealt with.

The intervention of the financial crisis in 2007 delayed the implementation of the original provisions and prompted a rethink. Whether that rethink is beneficial is another issue. The new EU regulation that will replace the original directive, which is proposed alongside the new directive, provides for minimum harmonised standards of enforcement and sanction throughout the community. Although the UK Government are broadly supportive of the measures, there are procedural uncertainties, notably in the problem of aligning the three interlocking legislative measures at the same time. That has led the Government to conclude that the UK should not yet opt into the directive. I am interested to hear whether the Minister has a view on the words “not yet”. I do not think that he will commit himself at this stage, but there will be considerable difficulty and trouble for the City of London if we do opt in.

I do not believe that the directives are in the interests of the United Kingdom. We can legislate on these matters ourselves. There is much talk of fiscal union, banking union, supervisory authorities and the wholesale transfer of our jurisdiction over the City of London, which means so much to our gross domestic product and to our ability to compete internationally. That is being undermined by proposals of this kind, whether or not they are brought into effect.

[Mr Hoban]

I will respond briefly to the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) and to my hon. Friends the Members for Stone (Mr Cash) and for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg).

The challenge that we face is that there are three interlocking legislative initiatives: the markets in financial instruments directive, which provides the scope of markets; the market abuse regulation, which looks at broadening the scope and is intimately linked with MiFID; and the criminal sanctions directive. Because the UK has a world-leading regime on market abuse, has historically taken a tough line and has a range of sanctions in place that few countries in the European Union can match, we are shaping the debate in this area and playing a major role in getting it right. We are trying to ensure that we maintain the high standards that the Financial Services Authority has in its investigatory powers and its sanctions.

The progress on these matters is not as quick as we would like, but that is partly because there are three interlocking initiatives. It is not quite the case that one moves at the speed of the slowest ship in the convoy on these things, but there is a challenge. The hon. Member for Nottingham East said that the matter is being passed across to the Cypriot presidency. A whole raft of things are being passed across to the Cypriot presidency. There is nothing new in stuff passing from one presidency to another. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Nottingham East asks from a sedentary position when we will get some movement. Discussions on MiFID are proceeding and it is one of the priorities of the Cypriot presidency. That will perhaps form the keystone and get the rest of it happening.

We are reserving our position on the opt-in. It is vital to London’s continued success as the world’s leading financial centre that we have the right measures in place on market abuse. That is why we have not opted in.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Hoban]

Very briefly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am extremely grateful to the Minister. I have just one question. What advantage is there to opting in if the rest of Europe is going to do it anyway and we already have something better in place?

[Mr Hoban]

We have an interest in ensuring that criminal sanctions are applied across Europe if we think the directive is appropriate, because shares and instruments that are traded within our borders can be affected by market manipulation outside our borders. It is therefore important that we have a proper regime in place, but let us leave the decision whether to opt in until the three interlocking pieces that I mentioned come closer together. Then I am sure the European Scrutiny Committee will bring us back to the topic once again.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House takes note of European Union Documents No. 16010/11 and Addenda 1 and 2, relating to a Draft Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), No. 16000/11 and Addenda 1 and 2, relating to the Draft Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, and No. 8253/12, relating to the European Central Bank Opinion on market abuse legislation; recognises that an efficient financial market that aids economic growth requires market integrity and public confidence; welcomes the UK’s leading role in combating market abuse; and supports the Government’s decision not to opt-in to the Criminal Sanctions Directive until it is clear that related provisions within the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive Review and the Market Abuse Regulation are further progressed in order to enable the Government to evaluate the implications for the UK, and ensure high standards in tackling market abuse are maintained.

Changes to the Budget

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Accommodating the interests of colleagues will require brevity, to be exemplified by Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that the real things that must not be changed are a tight fiscal policy and a loose money policy? There is no alternative.

[Mr Gauke]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: this Government, in contrast to the Labour party, remain committed to getting the public finances under control.

Section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993

Jacob Rees-Mogg Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I hope we do too. As for the repercussions, will we be taken to the European Court of Justice? I suppose that is what happens; however, I think the European Union has other things on its mind rather than punishing us for not sending the Red Book across to Brussels. It has more problems than it can deal with at the moment, and it will not be taking us to court simply for refusing to send across our Budget book, which it can buy in the shops anyway.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I apologise for not being here for the whole of the debate, but I was in the Finance Public Bill Committee. Does my honourable friend in European matters not agree that the Government have behaved much, much better this year, by allowing the debate in Parliament to take place before the book is sent to Brussels, and that we should encourage the Government in this reformed behaviour?

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Indeed. I think we ought to debate many more of these things on the Floor of the House. I would like to think that many more colleagues, from all parties, would take part in these debates and appreciate some of the things that some of us, on both sides, have been saying about the nonsense of the European Union at the moment.

I have been speaking for rather too long, so I ought to stop. There are two extremely good reasons for not sending the Budget report to Brussels. I hope that many Members will agree with that and vote against the motion this evening.