Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Sackman]

We do think that jury trials are a cornerstone of British justice. It is not inconsistent to say that the most serious cases—all cases in which the likely sentence is above three years—should be heard at a jury trial. If we turn the hon. Gentleman’s argument on its head, everybody should get a jury trial, because otherwise they are not getting a fair trial. We do not think that.

As a society, we have for centuries made a threshold choice about who can access a jury trial. We are having a debate now about where that threshold should be drawn. Our proposals strike the right balance between the rights of the different participants in the system. We think they secure fairness because of the other safeguards in the system—the giving of reasons by a judge in the Crown court bench division and the transparency measures we are bringing in—but we also think they are proportionate use of court resources. The hon. Members for Reigate and for Bexhill and Battle both made the point that somebody getting a criminal conviction in the magistrates court, which may attract a six-month custodial sentence or less, is a pretty serious thing in itself. For some people, that may mean, reputationally, that they can no longer pursue their career. These things are serious.

I do not think any of us is saying that the status quo, whereby magistrates and district judges hear those cases, is not inherently fair. It is fair. What is not fair is the status quo whereby the scale of the delays is detrimental to the quality of justice we are able to provide to the public, whether in jury trials, judge-only trials or magistrates trials. The delays are such that they are undermining law enforcement, the quality and recency of the evidence, and people’s memories. It is undermining the calibre of the justice that the system is able to mete out. Dealing with the delays is not just an efficiency question; it is inherent to the question of fairness itself.

We keep repeating the old adage that justice delayed is justice denied. It is a powerful one because there is truth in it: the older the vintage of the cases, the less fair they become. That is not fair on anybody. It is not fair on the defendant on remand or fair on the complainant. It is not fair on the witness, who may have just had the misfortune of passing by a criminal incident, and is being asked to recall what happened a year or two years ago, when they would like to move on with their lives. When it comes to fairness, timeliness is critical.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sarah Sackman]

I have to make a little progress.

Let me turn to the detail of clause 1. Part of its function is to ensure consistency across the statute book. To ensure consistency in that way, the clause makes a series of consequential amendments to remove references to a defendant electing for a Crown court trial. That includes amendments to the uncommenced written plea and allocations provision inserted by the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. Those uncommenced written procedures would allow defendants to indicate a plea without attending court. Their inclusion does not signify that the Government are intending to commence them. The clause ensures that if those provisions were brought into force in future, they would operate consistently with the removal of the defendant’s ability to choose the mode of trial. Defendants will still be able to indicate a plea in writing, and both parties may still make representations on venue. That decision on mode of trial would rest with the court.

The clause also updates the remittal power in section 46ZA of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Currently, where a case is already in the court, a judge may remit to the magistrates court only with a defendant’s consent. Clause 1 removes the requirement to obtain that consent, ensuring that remittal decisions, like allocation decisions, are made on the basis of the court’s assessment of suitability.

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Moreover, according to a recent assessment from the Institute for Government, there will be only a 2% difference. Abolishing a historical right in order to make a 2% difference is far too hard for me to comprehend. I will not repeat everything I have said before, but I really think that we should reconsider the abolition of jury trials for either-way offences—sorry, I will use the word “restriction”; that is probably the correct terminology to use. I would like clarification on clause 2.

[Joe Robertson]

I am not sure to what extent it is relevant, but I should probably declare that I used to be a practising solicitor, regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered with the Law Society.

The Committee dealt with similar issues on the implications for the right of election at some length during the debate on clause 1. Of course, proper time should be devoted to relevant issues in clause 2, but there is a significant overlap. If clause 1 is the constitutional sword that strikes down the right to choose a jury, clause 2 is the mechanism, or at least part of the mechanism, that replaces it. It is the mechanism, its operation in practice and its real-world consequences that I want to examine in some detail.

Clause 2 establishes an allocation framework where there is a written indication of a guilty plea. Under it, courts—acting alone and without the defendant’s consent—decide on a venue. That is made obvious by the substitution of wording, with “objecting” replaced by “make representations”. I have some distinct arguments against clause 2. I will take them in order, and I make no apology for the time that may require. The Committee is being asked to make a decision of constitutional significance without, I will argue, adequate evidence, safeguards, honesty or straightforwardness about its consequences and the extent to which it has been properly examined. That deserves serious scrutiny.

The gateway itself is poorly designed. Let me begin with the mechanism itself; before one can assess the consequences, it is necessary to understand the structure. Under the current law, albeit not yet implemented, the allocation works in two stages: there is a role for the court, a role for the prosecution and a role for the defendants. However, under clause 2, the role for defendants disappears, or perhaps it is more properly described as being watered down until it is no longer a right. The magistrate or the court decide, and that decision is final.

The criteria applied may, and will, take into consideration any representations made by the defendant, but that is not the same as the defendant’s being able to object. The assessment is made on the papers available at the outset; while it is probably not fair to call it an educated guess about how a case will unfold or, in the case of clause 2, how a guilty plea may be pleaded, every experienced practitioner knows that the true seriousness of a case or sentencing becomes apparent as it develops. How a matter looks on the papers can become very different when oral representations are made.

Indeed, the Criminal Bar Association has noted—particularly in reference to clause 1, but it applies to the combined effect of clauses 1 and 2—that the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that cases heard in the magistrates courts under extended sentencing powers will average just four hours, for cases where the likely sentences are approaching 18 months. That is not a serious assumption. Critically, there is also no right of appeal against the allocation decision. Of course, the Government have chosen not to provide one—unfairly, but in my view understandably—because an appeal route would undermine what they are trying to achieve.

We are treating a symptom as though it were the disease itself. Before I turn to the specific failings of the approach in clause 2, I want to spend a moment on context. I think the Government have framed this debate—maybe not deliberately—in a way that obscures the actual problem. The Lord Chancellor has repeatedly said that the Crown court is in a state of emergency, and he is certainly right that it is under very significant pressure; the backlog stood at just under 80,000 cases at the end of September 2025. He has also repeatedly said that a jury trial is a major driver of that emergency. However, at the same time, he has said that, if the backlog is brought under control and reduced, he will not restore the right to elect a jury trial that is being abolished, and the same goes for the complementary provisions in clause 2. Plainly, whether he is right or wrong, he is inconsistent, and it makes no sense.

[Alex McIntyre]

As a former solicitor, I appreciate the hon. Member’s commitment to being paid at an hourly rate, given the speed of his contribution his afternoon.

One of the points the Secretary of State made in support of this measure at the Dispatch Box was that the changing nature of our criminal justice system and the added demand that will flow through the system in the future, added to the increasing complexity of cases, mean that jury trials are taking longer through the very nature of the additional evidence that is being gathered. That means that even if the immediate backlog is brought under control, there will still be a need for system reform in the long term, because otherwise we will not be able to keep it under control in perpetuity. Why does the hon. Member disagree with that?

[Joe Robertson]

I should clarify that I no longer get paid on an hourly rate—I am paid by the taxpayer, as the hon. Gentleman is, on the same terms.

I do not reject the argument about reform. I accept that. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that the complexity of cases, including cases heard in the Crown court by a jury, has increased over the years, but he also said that he does not blame jury trials for the backlog. That is the difference between us. I do not see that the only option available to the Government is to end the election opportunity or the powers and rights of a defendant to select trial by jury or by magistrate.

[Dr Mullan]

The point was made very powerfully in the evidence sessions that we have this idea that we have to take a lot of time to explain all this complex stuff to a jury, and that we can just skip through it in a rapid way with a judge.

I visited courts and spoke to judges when I was on the Justice Committee. They themselves admit that they are not exactly whizz-kids when it comes to things like artificial intelligence or IT and the sort of things that might be over-complicating cases now. They are not going to be able to just whizz through stuff. They are going to need the same level of detail, explanation and time that a jury would need. Do we think defendants will be satisfied with a prosecution case that does not go through the same level of detail with a judge that it would have to go through with a jury?

We will end up with a whole new world of criminal appeals based on the idea that the judge did not adequately hear the evidence and that his summing up did not adequately address the reasons for his decisions. That could end up taking more time for judges. I am open to the idea that, potentially, we may possibly get some savings, but the case is so flimsy and weak that we cannot be expected to move forward on that basis when there are other things we could do.

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with my hon. Friend. There is a slightly strange implication that while jury trials have become more complex over time, due to technology and techniques for examining evidence—obviously a good thing—that somehow does not apply if the trial is in the magistrates court. That is the alarm bell, is it not? Magistrates courts are more capable of dealing with things in summary and they will not examine a case in as much detail and may miss things. That is not a criticism of magistrates and of the magistrates court—that is the system we have designed. When the consequences are less serious and the crime is less serious, the examination and process may be naturally less thorough.

That is not a reason to bring cases that today would be heard in the Crown court into the magistrates court without the defendant’s having the right to choose. My hon. Friend articulates that point exactly and represents the concerns that most people have.

In the evidence session, we heard that the current court backlog is the result of many things, including lack of investment—the Minister talked today about the lack of investment, and the issues with recruitment and retention, and criticised the previous Government for caps on sitting days—and the effect of the covid pandemic. The Minister and I might disagree on the extent to which that is true, but none of those things should be cured by abolishing jury trials.

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[Sarah Sackman]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the 1% to 2% refers to the time savings achieved by the Crown court bench division? The IFG recognised that the totality of the package achieved a 10% saving. The Ministry of Justice’s modelling—externally verified—shows a 20% saving, which is highly material.

[Joe Robertson]

I accept the Minister’s statement to the extent that it is a statement of fact of people’s evidence. To address the issue of taking cases out of one court to give to another, however: that is a small minority of cases. Indeed, that is the argument that the Government make, certainly to their own Back Benchers when they are worried about the Back-Bench view of their proposals: “Don’t worry. Most cases are heard in the magistrates court anyway, and only a tiny percentage are being taken out of the Crown court.” The Government cannot have the argument both ways: when speaking to their own Back Benchers, “Don’t worry, this is not going to be meaningful,” and when speaking to the rest of the world about tackling backlogs, saying that that in itself is a meaningful change.

[Dr Mullan]

What does not bear up to much scrutiny is for the Minister to say, “Actually, the package as a whole will deliver these major reforms,” because we do not object to the whole package. We can say, “Go ahead and do the things that we do not object to, and we will have violent agreement at later stages in the Bill.” The Government cannot hold over us the fact that we agree with some of the package, because that is not a reason for us to go along with the things that we do not like. That is part of the whole process of parliamentary scrutiny of a Bill—the bits that we do or do not like. We are not removed from commenting positively about the good stuff because we disagree with other things.

[Joe Robertson]

Once again, I agree with the shadow Minister. If the Government genuinely want to address the backlog, the answer lies in the other 179 recommendations that Sir Brian Leveson made: increasing sitting days, which the Government have now done in a modest way; improving case management; removing unnecessary adjournments; rebuilding or restructuring the legal profession; sustainable legal aid; and a whole list of recommendations. None of that requires the—in my view—brutal axe taken against the right of election to jury trial. In fact, it is more than a brutal axe; jury trial is just being denied for an either-way offence That is being restricted to the magistrates court.

I now turn to what I consider the most serious argument against the clause, which is an uncomfortable one. It has been referred to already in debate on clause 1, but it is relevant to clause 2 as well. The venue to which all relevant cases we are discussing will be diverted is the magistrates court, which produces—measurably, consistently and substantially—worse outcomes for defendants from ethnic minority backgrounds than the Crown court does. That is not a theoretical proposition or a position of advocacy; it is the statistical evidence and the documented finding of researchers, legal practitioners and analysis drawing on Government data. Magistrates courts convict people from ethnic minority backgrounds at rates up to 40% higher than non-ethnic minority defendants. That is not a small or debatable margin; it is a significant consideration.

Albeit to make a slightly different point, the hon. Member for Chichester mentioned that if someone has a clean record they would be tried in the magistrates court, but if they had a list of previous offences they may be tried on the same facts in the Crown court, where conviction rates are lower. Having previous convictions therefore puts someone into a venue with lower conviction rates. I am not suggesting that the Government have designed the measure in that way, but it is plainly nonsense and unacceptable for that to come about. The Government need to look at that and amend it.

Charities have responded to Sir Brian’s proposals and have provided further granular data. In Crown court jury trials, people of colour are convicted at broadly similar rates to their white counterparts. It is not hard to see why: the principle—the whole idea—behind a decision being made by someone’s peers is that juries reflect the country in which we live. Magistrates and professional judges are predominantly whiter, more educated and more male than the population at large. It is interesting to note, but is not a criticism, that this Committee itself is evidently less diverse not only than juries, but than the population at large. A defendant from an ethnic minority background charged with an either-way offence this week has a right to elect. They can look at the data—thank goodness we have that data—take advice from their legal representatives and make a considered choice about the venue in which they believe they are most likely to receive fair treatment. I would suggest, without quoting evidence, that a number of them elect the Crown court because they believe they will get a fairer trial—because they are more likely to have their fate at least partly decided by someone who shares something of their own background and lived experience.

Let me address the Government’s response to this evidence, which has been inadequate. The Lord Chancellor—who, as he has reminded this House, knows the experience of racial disparity personally and profoundly, and has long spoken about it throughout and before his time in this place—has argued that progress is being made. He has cited the figure that 21% of judges now come from an ethnic minority background. I welcome the progress that has been made, particularly in the judicial system, but that still does not compare to the fairness and legal principle of trial by jury.

I want to put the constitutional point more plainly. Parliament is being asked to pass a provision that it knows, on the basis of evidence submitted to its own Committee, will produce racially differentiated outcomes. The Government have seen that evidence. Ministers have been questioned on it at length, and the Bill has not been amended to address it, but it must be. If a different Government Department proposed a policy that its own evidence showed would increase adverse outcomes for ethnic minority applicants by, in this case, up to 40%, what would we say? We would say it is discriminatory and grossly unacceptable. We would demand it be withdrawn pending a full equality impact assessment. We would not pass it on a Government Whip. This is the standard I invite the Committee to apply here. The fact that the discrimination operates through an allocation mechanism in the criminal courts, or in some cases through an administrative form, does not change its nature or its effect. The test is the outcome, not the intention. No one is suggesting the Government intend this, but it is the outcome and the outcome is documented.

The racial disparity in outcomes does not exist in a vacuum. It is connected causally, not merely coincidentally, to a documented and persistent deficit in judicial diversity. In 2019, 12% of magistrates were from a BME background, which compares to an 18% share of the general population. The magistrates do not reflect the country that they are being asked to judge in the same way as a jury do.

I turn to the argument that the legal aid threshold will leave defendants unrepresented when making their plea in sentencing. That is a further systemic consequence of clause 2. The means test for legal aid differs, of course, between the two tiers of court, as we have heard. In the Crown court the threshold is more generous. Defendants in a wider income range qualify for representation at public expense. In the magistrates court the threshold is lower and less generous. Many defendants who would qualify for legal aid in the Crown court may not qualify for it in the magistrates court. Under clause 2, a significant cohort of defendants who previously had a right to elect, and with it the more generous legal aid provision, will find themselves in the magistrates court facing charges and sentencing that could result in a sentence of 18 months, or ultimately 24 months, without adequate legal representation. The Institute for Government has flagged this explicitly. Because of the low-income threshold to qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, many more defendants are likely to go unrepresented or under-represented, and an unrepresented defendant in serious criminal proceedings is not a defendant receiving fair justice.

There is a cruel irony in the Government’s framing of the issue. Ministers argue that one problem with the current system is that defendants elect a Crown court to delay proceedings and therefore game the system. But why would a defendant in a serious case choose the Crown court? Often precisely because they know that in the Crown court they are more likely to have or to be able to afford a lawyer, and in the magistrates court they may not. The election is not a game. It is part of a system that has stood for a very long time. It is a rational response, in this case, to a legal aid system that is itself under severe pressure.

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[Alex McIntyre]

The hon. Member is giving a rather elongated speech this afternoon, which we are all enjoying. On the subject of the Criminal Bar Association, I seem to recall it rallying against the removal of the ancient right of double jeopardy, which it said would deny people a fair trial and ruin our criminal justice system. I am pretty sure his party was in favour of that removal back in the noughties. Those predictions have not transpired; it actually led to justice, for example, for Stephen Lawrence. Does he agree that the CBA may be wrong in some of its views?

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the hon. Member for paying attention to my speech and staying with me on this. Fairly obviously, I do not think that the Criminal Bar Association is always right, but I do in this case.

The Institute for Government published “Beyond reasonable doubt?” on the day of Second Reading. Its conclusions were stark: the reforms risk prioritising speed over fair justice; the projected savings remain highly uncertain; a 10% to 15% increase in demand on the magistrates court will be difficult to manage in practice; and the structural reforms are likely to impede attempts to improve productivity and could make the situation worse in the short to medium term. That is not the view of lawyers protecting their professional interests; it is the view of independent public governance researchers.

The Law Society has raised concerns about the retrospective application of the provisions, the fundamental unfairness of removing trial rights from defendants who have already elected under existing rules, and the prospects for those with cases already listed. It has also raised concerns about the legal aid means test misalignment, proportionality and cases involving children, as well as the potential unworkability of fraud provisions.

I submit that the burden of proof in this debate does not lie with those opposing the Bill, when the entire criminal law profession, leading independent think-tanks, retired judges and KCs have come out so united in their strength of opposition. Indeed, when the Government are looking to tear up centuries-old principles, whether in whole or in part—depending on how we analyse the crimes that will no longer be allowed to proceed to the Crown court—the burden of proof must surely be on the Government to explain why they are all wrong. That explanation, in my view, has not been provided.

[John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that previous Governments of all political colours have changed the threshold for jury trials, including those of Jim Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher? It is not entirely accurate to say, in the way that he did, that it is the tearing up of centuries-old rights; Governments periodically look at the threshold for access to jury trial.

[Joe Robertson]

Of course, the Minister made that point—in her view, this is about thresholds. Whether we want to call it an argument about thresholds, and whichever part of history we want to look at, the Opposition’s fundamental point remains. There is a distinct lack of evidence for this Government’s plans today, set against the range of other provisions that could be, and in some cases have been, introduced. In our view, they have not been given the time to bed in and potentially deliver the savings that the Government want. I accept the hon. Member for Rugby does not accept that, but I think that is the point of contention here.

[Dr Mullan]

I covered all the statistics on the reforms that the hon. Member for Rugby mentioned this morning. The scale of these changes, compared with the scale of those changes, is absolutely unprecedented. There has never been a reduction in jury trials of the scale before us today. In support of the point being made by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East, the burden of proof must become higher and higher as the change being made gets bigger and bigger. This change is unprecedented, so let us have an unprecedented level of evidence to support it before asking us to consider it.

[Joe Robertson]

I agree with the shadow Minister, and I really have nothing to add—his words stand for themselves.

[John Slinger]

The shadow Minister states that the reforms proposed by this Government are unprecedented. Actually, the reforms of the Callaghan Government removed jury trials for theft, burglary, actual bodily harm and certain drug offences in 1977, and the Thatcher Government did the same in 1988 for criminal damage. Those are quite substantial changes, so I object to what I believe is hyperbolic language that some Opposition Members have used not only in Committee today but more widely. It undermines public confidence in the judicial system.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point.

[Dr Mullan]

rose—

[Joe Robertson]

In an attempt to resolve a debate that is not immediately mine, I will give way to the shadow Minister.

[Dr Mullan]

It would assist the Committee to know why we are making these comparisons. I have figures on the effect of the reclassification of criminal offences in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which is one of the examples that the hon. Member for Rugby used in order to say that we are unfairly comparing the categorisations.

Let us bear in mind that the changes before us today will result in a 50% reduction in jury trials. According to the Home Office statistics bulletin, which provides a summary of the effect of those changes for comparison, that legislation resulted in a 5% decline. The Government are asking us to support something that will lead to a 50% decline, yet the hon. Gentleman says that we are being hyperbolic in comparing the two and saying that one is insignificant and the other is significant. I think the difference between 5% and 50% is pretty significant.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the shadow Minister. I am probably not in a position to arbitrate between the two arguments; the hon. Member for Rugby will have to forgive me, as I come from the starting position that I back the shadow Minister, not least because he was wielding a particularly substantial file when he just spoke.

I want to address a provision that is not the immediate subject of this grouping, but which fundamentally determines the significance of clause 2—the reform of appeal rights from the magistrates court contained in clause 7. Currently, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court. That right is exercised in approximately—

[Linsey Farnsworth]

On a point of order, Ms Butler. I seek guidance on how we get back to clause 2, because we have veered off significantly from it. Clause 2 relates to provisions that have not yet come into force but could well come into force in the future, specifically in relation to how cases could proceed from the magistrates court to the Crown court by way of written submissions. The idea behind that provision was to avoid the need for a court hearing if everybody agreed. How can we get back on to clause 2, because I fear we are veering significantly away from what it is trying to do?

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[The Chair]

I take the shadow Minister’s point. I call Joe Robertson.

[Joe Robertson]

Thank you, Ms Butler, and I will of course stick to clause 2. I welcome any challenge that a specific point that I have made does not relate to clause 2. There is possibly a slight lack of clarity across the whole Committee, and I do not profess to be the only expert in the room; indeed, I am not an expert. However, I echo the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate that there seems to be a distinct lack of clarity about what clause 2 does. I am not suggesting that the Minister does not know, and I welcome an intervention if she feels that I need to be brought back into scope in this part of the debate.

Clause 2 specifically replaces automatic rights with a permission stage. When clauses 2 and 7 are combined, a defendant who believes they have been wrongly convicted must first persuade a Crown court judge that their appeal has sufficient merit before it is even heard. The Government argue that the 41% success rate shows that meritorious appeals will get through, but in my view, that misses the point.

The Law Society has identified precisely why the current simple route matters. A significant proportion of defendants in the magistrates court do not have a lawyer. As I have argued, under clause 2 more of them are likely to be unrepresented. Owing to the misalignment of legal aid means testing, an unrepresented defendant who has been wrongly convicted will surely be less likely to know how to draft grounds of appeal. They will not be able to identify legal errors that may appear in magistrates’ reasoning or decisions in the same way. As I understand it, they will also not be able to commission a transcript of proceedings in the same way and construct a submission that meets the permissions test. The permission stage is, in practice, a barrier that falls disproportionately on those least equipped to overcome it.

The opposition to the clause is broad and has not been answered. In some cases, the opposition is expert; in others, it comes through lived experience. I will briefly look at the range and weight of expert opposition to the provisions, some of which I have referred to already, because the Committee should understand— I am sure it does—what it is seeking to perhaps have regard to but set aside if it passes clause 2.

As we have heard, the Criminal Bar Association represents more than 4,000 practising criminal barristers. In answer to an earlier intervention, I do not say that the Criminal Bar Association’s word must be final, but it is clearly heavily persuasive, especially on this issue, which has already faced much scrutiny and disagreement from people with particular expertise in the field of criminal justice. As we have heard, its snap survey—so that is individual members, rather than the association—found that around 90% of members are against the proposals.

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[Sarah Sackman]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Joe Robertson]

I will give way to the Minister.

[Sarah Sackman]

I do not want to interrupt the hon. Gentleman because he is making important points, but the point was well made a moment ago that in line-by-line scrutiny the intent is to go line by line. Clause 2 deals with making what were uncommenced online procedures consistent with the changes made in clause 1 to the current ability of a defendant to choose venue. The hon. Gentleman is making a wide-ranging speech on whether one can appeal the mode of trial decision, and the permission to appeal. That will come later when we get to clause 7. I venture that these are all valid points that we will want to debate, but that might be the appropriate place to discuss those matters, because right now we are looking at clause 2. I am happy to reclarify the points I made in relation to clause 2, but if we range on to clause 7 in the scope of clause 2, we are not going to get the line-by-line scrutiny that we all want to achieve.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the Minister for rather politely encouraging me to come towards the end of my speech. I will finish by addressing the idea that somehow, because something does not happen in Scotland, it must be okay not to happen in England. That plainly has nothing to do with politics or even football—not that I am suggesting the Minister thought it did. I am happy to say, as a proud citizen of the United Kingdom, that I think the English and Welsh legal system is the best in the world. The common-law system is the foundation, it has been adopted all around the world, and is by far the most widely-used legal system. It is possibly our greatest export, along with the English language.

[Sarah Sackman]

While I am very proud of our legal system, I do not necessarily take the view that ours is best and we cannot learn from other systems. Indeed, some of the places that we have exported to, such as Canada, are the places that we are looking to learn from when seeking to ameliorate our own system. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, with its strong foundations, one of the strengths of our system is our fiercely independent judiciary? Much has been said about the judiciary, but does he agree that it is a fundamental pillar of our outstanding legal system and we should seek to defend it—and when judges are called enemies of the people, we should call it out?

[Joe Robertson]

I am very happy to say that I agree with all the things the Minister said. I also agree with learning from other systems. Plainly, the English legal system, like the English language, has been successful in its ability to adapt and evolve. Without going back to the beginning of my speech, started just a few minutes ago, for the reasons I have set out, I believe that this is an evolution—or arguably a revolution. [Interruption.] Was that another intervention? I think these measures are a stage too far.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I would like to briefly refer the Committee to some remarks that Sir Brian Leveson made during the evidence session we had before the recess. He said:

“We need people to confront what they have done. I do not want anybody to plead guilty who is not guilty and has seen the evidence. I am not asking to change the guilty plea rate, but in the early days, you pleaded guilty on the first or the second occasion you appeared at the Crown court—now there are many examples of that happening on the fifth or the sixth occasion you are in the Crown court. Each one of those takes a considerable amount of time. That is what is sucking up part of the time.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 8, Q9.]

Sir Brian tried to explain that a lot of people look at the evidence and say, “Yes, I will plead guilty, but I will do so after Christmas”—that was his example. He said that now, because of the Crown court backlogs, people know that their case will not be heard until 2028.

The point that Sir Brian was trying to make is that we need to incentivise those who look at the evidence of their case, and recognise that a guilty verdict is probably going to be arrived at, to put in a guilty plea. Does clause 2 not risk having the reverse effect? People will see that if they put in a guilty plea, the one opportunity they have to argue whether the case should be heard in a magistrates court or a Crown court—although I imagine the majority of them would argue that it should be heard in the magistrates court in this specific example—is taken away from them. Are we not then disincentivising people to put in a guilty plea at an early stage, when we want to see the Crown court backlog come down?