Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

The Opposition supports clause 19 and will not oppose it. As I have just said, we will resist amendment 61. We should be clear that provisions that make the boldest promises about drafting, with key terms left undefined, are problematic. We will seek to press amendments 104 and 105 to a vote. We will not press amendment 106 today if the Minister can help define the word “serious”.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Dr Murrison. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire has dealt with this point eloquently, but I wish to speak briefly on clause 19 and the Opposition amendments.

Obviously, I support what the Government are trying to achieve here, but I think they could go a little further in the drafting. When we talk about public interest, that goes to the heart of the whole issue and problem we have in this country of trying to tackle immigration—in particular, legal immigration and asylum claims. What is in the public interest? The problem is that the system we have has strayed so far from the public interest. Although the clause gives a legal definition, it is also a meaningful way of translating and understanding a political, social, economic and public problem. It is in the public interest that we do all we can to tackle the current volume of asylum and immigration claims. It is not a unanimous position, but very few in Parliament, and very few in the public at large, would disagree with the fundamental point that we need to bring down the level of immigration, asylum claims and illegal boat crossings.

On the public interest consideration, the topic of the right to family life picks up from the Committee’s discussion last week. The right to family life stems from the European convention on human rights and is a qualified right, meaning that it does not stand towering above all other considerations. It is my view, and a commonly held view—in fact, a view that was given by the Minister—that the right has strayed too far. Over many years, jurisprudence has allowed an expansive interpretation that has taken the family life core protection to cover a far wider set of circumstances. It is now used as a routine tool by those who wish to remain in the UK when the threat to or infringement of their family life, as a fundamental human right, is not really an issue. Clause 19 is part of the framework that seeks to attack that use.

We are where we are partly because of a set of legislation—with a convention at its core—made by Parliament over the years, including the Human Rights Act 1998 and other Acts, that has sought to define and in some cases limit, in others not, what we mean by the right to family life and the public interest. Those laws have been unsuccessful in doing that. The intention was there, but the drafting was insufficiently certain—though to some extent that is inherent in all legislating in this place—to ensure that the courts interpret the legislation as narrowly as Parliament intended. The Government have gone some way to try to be restrictive, as they think they have been in this clause, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire points out, some changes to the wording can be made. His amendments 105 and 106 seek to deliver those. The clause states:

“No weight should be given”;

but stating that no weight must be given would get rid of a door that is ajar to the courts to interpret the clause more expansively. The amendment slams that door by inserting the word “must”, so that there is no leeway for a clever legal argument that “should” gives sufficient leeway for a court effectively to make a decision that runs against what the legislation is trying to deliver.

I do not take the view that judges or indeed lawyers—on the whole, as a profession, broadly speaking—should be demonised for making decisions that use loopholes in the law. If this place fails to make the law certain and fails to close those loopholes, the fault comes back to Parliament and the Government who brought the legislation through Parliament. Here is the opportunity to tighten it up—that is the purpose of a Bill Committee: to tighten up wording through the fair scrutiny process.

The Opposition’s amendment 106 relates to a measure where the Government were perhaps not trying to completely close the door. It may be something that they deliberately left open. Amendment 106 would change proposed new section 117B(4)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in clause 19(4) of the Bill. I will quote proposed new paragraph 117B(4)(b) for Hansard, though it may appear out of context:

“they are in serious breach of a condition attached to their leave to enter or remain.”

The Opposition amendment seeks to leave out the word “serious” so that the provision applies to someone simply in breach of a condition.

My suspicion is that the Government want to leave a set of breaches of a condition that would not affect someone’s leave to remain. The Opposition’s position is that, if someone has breached a condition, that should mean the fundamental failure of any claim to remain that cites a right to family life. To me, the amendment would provide the certainty needed and deliver on what the public expect of us to tackle a significant problem in this country—the large number of claims that go beyond the original intention behind the right to family life.

The problem with leaving the word “serious” in the legislation is that it will be open to the court to make a decision about whether a breach is serious enough. Without any specific guidance or checklist in the legislation, the court will consider seriousness as a relative word or concept in an appellant’s case to not be returned to another country. A case could be made based on circumstance that family life is fundamentally important to someone and that sending them home would split up a family. They may paint a picture of the environment at home that could be very alien to us as a free and democratic society. Suddenly, that “serious breach” question might lead a court to conclude that a serious breach in the abstract becomes quite a minimal one when compared with an applicant’s story of hardship.

My concern is that the word “serious” will become a flexible term to be interpreted by the court. It will always be measured against the relative hardship of the claimant, who will of course state their case at its strongest in order to leverage the flexibility of the word “serious”. I struggle to see why the Government would not want to add in certainty, unless they particularly want to create an avenue where people can still make the right to family life claim. It would be extraordinary if they did, given all the rationale they have provided for bringing forward this set of provisions and the Bill in the first place. The Minister should be very clear about whether she sees this as a disagreement around drafting, or whether she is seeking—I am sure that she would have a reason for it, though I would disagree with it—to have an avenue of flexibility in the Bill, and why.

There is provision in the clause, and rightfully so, for particular circumstances in relation to children. Children are in a very special category because of their dependency and vulnerability. There are a number of situations laid out, but subsection (6) in particular deals with situations where there would be

“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child.”

We do not want to see people deported or removed when that would have a significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child. There are protections are built in here. Others may say that this is a particularly draconian provision, but I see some protections there and in paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new subsection (7) that are widely accepted and uncontroversial, and I wanted to draw attention to them.

--- Later in debate ---

On amendments 105 and 106, I agree with the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire that compliance with immigration conditions is important and that serious non-compliance should have clear consequences in the article 8 assessment. On amendment 105 specifically, although the wording of the clause provides decision makers with the flexibility to undertake an individualised assessment based on the facts of the case, as required in an article 8 assessment, it also makes it clear that “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s family or private life established at a time when they are in the UK without permission, are in breach of their permission or obtained that permission by deception. The amendment would therefore have no material effect. The addition of “must” in this part of the public interest test would not change the nature of courts and tribunals’ obligations to have regard to the statutory public interest considerations. “No weight” is the starting point.

[Joe Robertson]

Surely the Minister understands that while “no weight” may be the starting point, the end point is the decision, and that is the issue. A decision maker can have a starting point of “no weight”, but attach weight, and suddenly the decision is not where I think even she might intend in many cases.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but it is important for cases to be considered on a case-by-case basis. We can be as specific as possible, but the reality is that courts and tribunals have to maintain the flexibility to determine cases based on the individual facts and circumstances before them. It is important that our drafting enables that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I am asking the Minister these questions, so it would be marvellous if we could wait to see how she answers them.

Thirdly, does that approach not allow the Home Secretary to unilaterally stack the deck against an appellant in an appeal, on an arbitrary basis? Does that take away from the objective seriousness of the offence that they have committed? Does the approach therefore impermissibly limit the ability of the appellate body to decide an article 8 ECHR claim on its merits, as is required under the Human Rights Act 1998?

[Joe Robertson]

Clause 20 deals with cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation. The issues I have with the clause are broadly twofold. One issue is around the drafting, which has a number of serious deficiencies. That is not about whether the Government are getting it wrong or right on what they are trying to achieve, but about having certainty on what the legislation will do when it comes to people having to make decisions. My second issue is disagreement with what the Government are trying to achieve.

Under proposed new section 117C, which I will try to deal with as precisely as I can,

“(1) Where a person is liable to deportation, the public interest, and in particular the interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime, requires their deportation unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”

That deals with the public interest and its definition. Let us put aside the “unless”, which clearly opens an avenue for the court to examine whether the effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate, and deal with that public interest element. Proposed new subsection (1) says that “the public interest...requires” the deportation of those liable to it, which directs the court to define “public interest” as one thing. However, the Bill tries to define what that public interest is in proposed new subsection (2). It sets out “more serious” factors that point towards a greater public interest in a person’s deportation. It does not matter what those factors are, but they are in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c).

Why on earth does the court need direction in assessing the extent of the public interest when it is being directed to consider that public interest simply “requires their deportation”? It seems entirely meaningless to start directing the court as to what public interest might mean in terms of giving weighting to the factors in proposed new subsection (2)(a) to (c) when the court is being told to simply deport under the public interest. I fail to see how it has any relevance whatsoever, and it is potentially distracting from what the Government are trying to achieve.

I will now deal with the “unless” element, because that is entirely separate. Proposed new section 117C says that deportation is required

“unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.”

The court decision makers are given some help on what “disproportionate” would mean, which is entirely sensible. I disagree with some of the elements that the court should consider, but it is sensible to give the decision makers some direction.

I will stick to the drafting of paragraphs (a) to (c) of proposed new section 117C(4). Paragraph (a) says that exceptional circumstances apply where a person

“has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life”.

Given that provisions in relation to children, not just in this Bill but generally in the way we do law in this country, are different from provisions in relation to adults, that provision needs to be clear about whether it means a person has been resident in the United Kingdom for most of their adult life or their entire life from birth. Although it may suggest entire life from birth, I can see a court assuming it means adult life because we deal with children separately. It would therefore be much easier for someone who is, say, aged 24 and has been in the country for only three or four years to say that they have been a resident for most of their life, because provisions for children are separate. That is an avenue that could be exploited through a lack of drafting, unless the Government mean adult life. I think they should mean entire life, and they should be specific about what they mean.

Secondly, paragraph (b) says that exceptional circumstances apply where

“the person is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom”.

How on earth is a decision maker or a court supposed to determine whether someone is or is not socially and culturally integrated into the UK? We could have an entire PhD thesis on the extent of somebody’s social and cultural integration. We may all have views on what it means to be socially and culturally integrated. There may be some common themes around our views, but there will be much disagreement about the specifics when trying to make a decision about an individual case.

Of course, the decision makers are not there to do some highly resourced, detailed investigative study into someone’s circumstances. They will basically be relying on assertions. Surely it is open to someone saying, “I’ve lived here for a number of years. I speak English to a degree and I can go about normal daily life without endlessly causing friction or hardship, and I am therefore sufficiently socially and culturally integrated into the UK.” Or is the court supposed to examine the way they dress or eat, who they mix with and how often, the cultural background of the people they mix with or their religious traditions? Not only is it opening a can of worms, but it is quite offensive to have the state investigating someone’s social and cultural integration in order to make a yes or no decision.

According to this provision, a court—the decision maker—is not to make a decision about someone being reasonably well integrated or showing signs of cultural integration; someone is either socially and culturally integrated, or they are not. I just cannot see how the Government can possibly expect a decision maker to open up such an investigation. And that would be only one part of the integration inquiry.

Proposed new subsection (4)(c) then talks about

“very significant obstacles to the person’s integration in the country to which they are proposed to be deported.”

Having run the analysis and come up with a view about an individual’s cultural and social integration into the UK, the decision maker has to run a similar test on their ability to integrate into the country to which they are supposed to be deported—a theoretical test, because it might be somewhere they have not been for some time—where it is even harder to make some sort of value judgment, because it is a country that the decision maker could have absolutely zero experience of living in, and so they will, again, be reliant on assertions.

The test in that case is not even the same as in proposed new subsection 4(b), where the person must be “socially and culturally integrated”; at subsection 4(c), it is the person’s “integration”—there is no qualification of cultural and social integration. In this country, they could be socially and culturally integrated, but not integrated in a wide range of other ways; yet in the country that they are proposed to go to, any integration issues, not just social and cultural ones, could be a “significant” obstacle to integration. I do not understand why the definition is narrower on the question of a person’s integration—albeit far too broad for a court to tackle—for assessing the situation in this country and much wider for the situation elsewhere.

There are serious drafting issues here. We cannot merely just see where it all comes out in the wash, saying Home Office officials are very capable and all that sort of stuff. We have seen the problem with the number of appeals. Some of these provisions will genuinely need the court to tackle the interpretation issues, in the normal way that we do common law in this country, through test cases. These provisions will require an unusual set of test cases, through to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, to get judicial interpretation and assistance for the courts to apply thereafter, but, as we have seen in test cases, it is rarely one case that sets a new environment for the lower courts and decision makers to adhere to, but a series of them.

This is not only going to require an extraordinary amount of time to understand terms that the Government just need to deal with at this stage through the legislation process, but it will take years; any individual case that goes all the way up to the Supreme Court on how the court interpreted “socially and culturally integrated” will take a long time in and of itself—months into years. Where we may have challenging cases that seek to overturn what, for example, the Court of Appeal has said, by using the Supreme Court, we are talking years on years.

The Government are creating massive scope for backlog and uncertainty, and a huge opportunity for the legal profession to run a high volume of case law—it would be genuinely interesting, but would completely undermine the Government’s intention, which is to tackle backlogs, speed up the system and stop the endless need for judicial interpretation. That is what has led us to where we are, which is broader and broader interpretation.