Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley]

Q I would like to focus on the measures in the Bill—you made some reference to the ones on modern slavery. Could you expand on how those provisions might make it harder for individuals who have fictitious claims to stop themselves being removed?

Tony Smith: The Bill is really about the asylum process, rather than law enforcement. I think the Bill last year was more about the law enforcement; this is about the asylum process. There are some good things in here. As I say, I applaud the article 8 reforms, because article 8 is often used as a lever quite late in the process. After someone has been here for quite a while and has been through the process, you suddenly get an article 8 claim because they have developed a connection in the UK. So I think that that reform is right and will help to reduce the pull factor.

I like the idea of the tighter protection arrangements—the 30 months at a time. My only counsel against that is that the Home Office, in my experience, tends to automatically grant and grant and grant, because it is a lot easier than refusing, and that might just become an automatic turnover of grants for however long you allow people to stay.

I think you ought to look at who is going home. If people go back to their own country on holiday when they have a claim for refugee status, we can establish that. We have the passenger information and can cross-match that to their asylum records. If people go back to their own country once they have been given some kind of protection status here, they should not be allowed back in, because they are clearly not in fear of persecution.

The faster appeals process is absolutely essential. The problem with the appeals process is that it went over to the Ministry of Justice years ago, when the Home Office and MOJ were split up. The MOJ does not seem to have been really bothered about it—it has other things on its plate. The backlog is over a year now, so you have to try and get a grip of that. I do not know how you get that in the Home Office and how you persuade them, but I think it is a good idea. You really have to get that end-to-end process going right.

I like the idea of recouping public funds from people, a bit like in the student loan scheme. If people have come here and been a draw on public funds, and they then get into the workplace, why would you not claw back some of that money into the public purse?

I think that all those things might reduce pull factors. They are really good reforms. I am not saying they are not good measures; what I am saying is that, in my opinion, they are not good enough to stop the boats.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Q As we have just heard, you were director general of Border Force. You talk about the importance of stopping people coming in the first place. But Border Force has only five ocean-going cutters and six coastal patrol vessels. Is there a fundamental issue here of not having the assets for agencies of the state to do their job? Is that something that is not addressed in the Bill, but that would make a meaningful difference?

Tony Smith: The Border Force will enact whatever its operational instructions are, and its operational instructions are drawn from legislation, powers and authorities, so it does not matter how many boats you have out there in the channel. Currently, if someone comes within the 12-mile zone, under the law of the sea you are obliged—quite rightly, because saving lives is paramount—to bring them on board your vessel. The problem is that once they are within the jurisdiction, they accrue all of these rights to asylum applications, ECHR and modern slavery applications. I do not think it is a question of resource. I am a bit worried about resources, given what we saw in Portsmouth last week, because I do not think we have the bandwidth to cover the entire coastline any more. We have been focusing what resources we have on the short straits. Clearly, the smugglers are moving along the coast, so we need to be adaptable to be able to deal with that.

They would always take more resources if they were on offer, but for me it is more about how you get the people coming off the boats properly screened, not cleared within 24 or 48 hours—that is not long enough. Whatever your views on immigration, you have to properly and thoroughly screen people. A passport tells a story—it will tell you all sorts of things. We do not know their dates of birth or their nationalities; the biometric checks are pretty useless. All I am saying is that I think we need to be detaining people for at least longer than 24 hours at Manston if we are going to reduce the risk in any case.

[The Chair]

I remind Members to stay within the scope of the Bill. The resources of Border Force are not really within the scope of the Bill.

[Joe Robertson]

Thank you, Ms Jardine. I have taken the opportunity while the ex-director general of Border Force is in front of us. The wider point made by the Government is that the Bill has a deterrent effect, but there have been crossings without any Border Force personnel or boats being in the vicinity. A lifesaving charity, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, is being relied on to provide a quasi-policing collection service. How does the Bill help with any of that?

[The Chair]

Order. That is outwith the scope of the Bill, I am afraid.

[Joe Robertson]

I am just asking whether the Bill could help with any of that, given that the witness in front of us notes on his CV, in the formal papers, that he used to be in charge of Border Force.

[The Chair]

I appreciate that, but could you please keep your questions within the scope of the Bill, rather than asking about the resources of Border Force?

[Joe Robertson]

My wider critique is that the Bill does not do enough.

[The Chair]

That is not a question. Could you phrase that as a question, please?

[Joe Robertson]

Q Does the witness agree with me that the Bill does not do enough to tackle the fundamental issues of illegal migration and processing and deportation?

Tony Smith: Yes, I agree with you.

[Joe Robertson]

Thank you.

[The Chair]

Order. If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witness for his evidence, and we will move on to the next panel.

Examination of Witness

Guy Dampier gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

Q My point was, would it not be better to go to an intermediate tier, rather than take up the time of the courts? That is where we are seeing the backlog—the delay—because of the lack of available judges we have—

Jacqui McKenzie: We have that; we have a review mechanism. The Home Office is meant to review; once you load something up on the tribunal portal, the Home Office is meant to review the decision. That is why we are getting costs in these cases, which is almost unheard of. I have been doing this work as a lawyer for 18 years—it is two years for training—and I have never seen anything like it. We are getting costs in these cases because of the poor decision making at the Home Office, even when there is a built-in review mechanism. A formal part of the process is that things go back to the Home Office for it to review.

Professor Singer: I would add that if the problem this new mechanism is seeking to address is the lack of sufficient capacity among decision makers, the way that that could be most expediently addressed is simply by expanding the eligibility criteria for the existing tribunal system, to increase the pool of decision makers, rather than by having to staff an entirely new body, which the impact assessment itself says would be incredibly challenging.

[Joe Robertson]

Q I will address my question to Professor Singer. We heard in previous evidence about some of the novel or unusual drafting and wording in the Bill. For example clause 19(4) says:

“No weight should be given to a private or family life”,

rather than that those issues should be “disregarded”, which I think is the normal phrase you would find in law, rather than “no weight”—it is hard to understand what “no weight” means. Also, the ouster provision in clause 1(8) seeking to try to oust the jurisdiction of the court in certain circumstances is drafted in a very loose way, when we know from case law that courts want very specific ousters if they are going to accept them. Does that not run the risk that this entire Bill is actually going to increase litigation just so that the courts can try to define and understand what some of this novel and peculiar wording actually means?

Professor Singer: I have to say that I have questions about the drafting of the Bill in its entirety. I do not think that the Committee can appropriately scrutinise the Bill, because there is a significant lack of detail in so many of the provisions, in addition to very odd drafting. With due respect, a lot of it is back-of-the-envelope-type stuff, which has clearly been rushed through the legislative drafting process.

For example, in the previous panel, I heard the Committee questioning the clause on the introduction of a core protection status. The clause does not actually set out the eligibility or content, in terms of what a core protection status is; it gives the Secretary of State significant powers to make regulations in respect of what eligibility for a protection status would be and what the content of that status would be.

Similarly, in the provision on asylum support, we do not have any details about the actual operation or functioning of that system. The provision gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations in respect of this scheme. In relation to the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, we do not have the rules of procedure to scrutinise, to be able to ascertain whether there will be due process, which will be appropriately followed, and fairness.

I agree with you that there are strange inconsistencies in the drafting, but, additionally, I think the whole content of the Bill is quite lacking in many respects.

[Mr Foster]

Q You have both been heavily and quite vocally critical of the Home Office—more than any of the other witnesses today. One issue we have is that there is a lot of political pressure, and the country is not happy with the current system and with what is happening, particularly with legal migration—some would say that the lawyers are perhaps partly responsible for that, but that is a separate debate. You have also acknowledged that there is a huge backlog in the appeals process and that, a lot of the time, that is the Home Office’s fault. The Government are trying to propose an alternative process for that, which you are also criticising. We cannot continue with the status quo, so what would you both advise doing to speed up the process for both the United Kingdom Government and the individuals seeking asylum?

Professor Singer: There are a lot of much more financially effective ways to address the backlog. As was already intimated, a lot of the current tribunal backlog is caused by the fact that initial decision making was paused for a significant amount of time when the Rwanda scheme was being pursued. Once that was opened, there was a huge investment in making a large number of initial decisions on a very quick basis. That was roundly criticised on a number of counts as leading to speed over quality. A number of very poor-quality decisions then went through to the appeal system, leading to the backlog at the initial tribunal system.

That can be addressed by not having inconsistencies in the rate of initial decision making in the first place; improving the quality of initial decision making within the Home Office, hopefully leading to fewer appeals; making sure that there is legal aid provision for those who are entitled to it, so that they are not wasting time in the tribunal system; and ensuring that the Home Office uses its review mechanism appropriately. I am sure my colleague can speak to this at much more length than I can, but at the moment initial rejection decisions tend to include a large number of copy-and-paste grounds for refusal. When it gets to tribunal, the decision maker has to go through every single one of those grounds, which is incredibly lengthy. If a Home Office official reviewed that in advance and conceded the grounds that were not arguable, it would speed up the decision-making process within the tribunal system.

As I have already intimated, if there really is concern that there are not enough sitting judges in the first-tier tribunal, there is provision to expand the eligibility criteria within the initial system. Surely that would be a much more effective and speedy way to address the backlog than creating a whole new body and system, with its own mechanisms and staffing requirements. Although the stated intention of creating this new body is to address the asylum backlog, in reality, as we can see from the terms of the Bill, the true intention is to give the Home Secretary much more control over the operation of the tribunal system than she currently has.

Jacqui McKenzie: I will just add, in defence of lawyers, that we see stories every now and again of a dodgy practitioner here and there, but the vast majority of lawyers are helping. I have a small team of immigration and asylum lawyers. We do about 20 appeals a year, and 18 or 19 are won in the tribunal. None of them should have been anywhere near the tribunal. We work to a very high standard of putting in the evidence—the subjective evidence, the objective evidence, expert evidence, all that sort of thing. We do not take cases where we do not think there is a case. We are not bucking the system in any way. It is so frustrating to see those cases get refused by the Home Office, when they ought not to be. There is then the period of scrutiny called the review, and they get rejected there again. Then people spend another year or two in the asylum system before their appeals are ultimately allowed.

Lawyers are actually helping. They are trying to work with the Home Office. There is the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, which works with the Home Office. There are Windrush groups that work with the Home Office. I have been part of it. I worked with former Home Secretaries Sajid Javid and Priti Patel on trying to get things right. It is wrong to blame lawyers. We are doing our job, a job we train for many years to do, and we are trying to help the system. But it is a fact that poor decision making and structural problems around legal aid, which mean that we do not have enough practitioners, or enough high-quality practitioners, are causing a backlog.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Ahmed]

Q Minister, you heard me earlier mentioning my home city of Glasgow and my constituency of Glasgow South West, which has the highest number of asylum seekers. There is real pressure on local infrastructure and housing, compounded by some ill-advised housing policies from the Scottish Government. Can you provide some reflection on why the measures in the Bill are necessary, and what impact it will have, not only on restoring trust and public confidence in the immigration and asylum system, but on social cohesion more widely?

Anna Turley: I think you are absolutely right. This is such an important issue to all of our constituents across the country; it is one of the biggest things that comes up on the doorsteps in all the conversations we have. Everything is seen through the prism of fairness in this country, and rightly so. That is what the Bill is aiming for, through a number of measures, such as repayment of support and so on.

This is about fairness; if people come here, we want them to integrate and to settle. If they have a genuine right to be here, we will always provide that, but we also have to be conscious that, in a country where our resources are not infinite, we have to have a managed system, where we remove those who have no right to be here and ensure that we support people in a way that is compliant with our international obligations, but does not go over and above them, which perhaps in the past we have done too much.

In 2024-25, for example, the entire cost of asylum was £4 billion. At a time when our public purse is under strain, that is a challenge. We are working hard to do everything we can, all the way up to the source, to prevent the illegal movement of people across this country—the people trafficking that we have seen—and to disrupt the industrial network of gangs that exploit desperate people who wish to come to this country. We are doing that through doubling our investment in the National Crime Agency, working with the French to reduce the number of boat crossings, and processing and removing people.

The key part of the Bill is the speeding up of appeals. That is one of the most important ways that we can accelerate the process. Nobody should have to wait 72 weeks for an asylum appeal. No one should be able draw things out and exploit the system through last-minute loopholes, using provisions that are designed genuinely to protect people but that are being exploited to draw out cases.

This is a matter of fairness and due process, and of making a system that is fair and well managed so that it is fair both on the taxpayer and on those who are here genuinely fleeing persecution.

[Joe Robertson]

Q Minister, I am sure you want to tackle the immigration issues and asylum problem that we have. However, are you concerned that the provisions in the Bill, to the extent that they are beneficial at all, could be quite limited, as balanced against the potential upheaval of institutional changes in the way that asylum applications are dealt with, or that they have the potential to create all sorts of unintended consequences and issues due to the way the Bill is drafted? Given the evidence you have heard in this session, does any of that cause you concern?

Anna Turley: I think my biggest cause of concern is that things cannot go on the way that they are. We want to make sure that we introduce legislation that deals with that. Of course there will be things that we will, with the due process of Parliament, continue to work on as the Bill progresses. But the reality, particularly when it comes to the appeals process, is that the system as it stands is falling over and not serving anyone.

It is important that we build a new structure, which I believe is more flexible and swift, and which has all the right safeguards. We have not had a chance to discuss some of those safeguards. Some of the witnesses were critical of the process, but we are talking about building into the system a high degree of training and legal support, high professional standards, numerous levels of oversight, and the opportunity to go on to a tribunal appeal. We have great civil servants, who are not legally trained, but who manage the process. We want to build a body, and do it carefully and do it right, in a way that means that we no longer rely on the judicial capacity, which is falling over. We can then make those decisions swiftly, but with a properly, professionally trained body. That will enable us to make good, swift decisions on those appeals and then refer to tribunals as and when that is needed.

[Joe Robertson]

Q I get that the system we have is not good enough, but that does not mean that what you are proposing is. We have heard lots of evidence in this session that the problems lie not necessarily with the law, but with the way the Home Office deals with applications. Are you absolutely sure that this is the best Bill you can introduce? I think we can agree that the public are tired of Governments saying, “A system is not good enough; let’s have a trial and experiment with this idea.”

Anna Turley: I take the challenge about the quality of decision making in the Home Office, but I think 95% of decisions are appealed. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool flagged earlier, we are in a situation where people know that by appealing they can lengthen their stay and draw out the process. Of course, we are always looking to improve the quality of initial decision making—we will look to do that—but we are in a world where we are going from the decision making to a hugely bureaucratic, expensive, slow, burdensome system that is just not working. Introducing the appeals tier is about getting a better quality of decision making at a swifter rate, although it is always incumbent on us to improve the quality of decision making at the Home Office.

We have invested a lot in the judicial capacity. We have increased the amount that we spend by 21%. The number of sitting days is up 19%. We have done a lot to try to tackle that, but the number of appeals is still going up. The outcome of appeals has stayed constant, but the number of appeals is going up. That says to me that people are recognising that this is a way to thwart and draw out the system.

Dan Hobbs: As the Minister said, we are tackling a number of issues. Some of this is groundbreaking, in terms of asylum cost recovery. We are defining article 8 and bringing it back much closer to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, in terms of qualifying family members and setting out clear stipulations for both decision makers and the courts as regards the definition around family life. Again, that is a big area of attrition. As the Minister set out, 77% of people using article 8 had either arrived illegally or overstayed. A large number of foreign national offenders use article 8 as a means to either delay or avoid removal from the country. The Bill seeks to ensure that that is interpreted in line with how ECHR article 8 is due to be interpreted.

With the appeals authority, it is about having all the safeguards—the regulatory training, the procedural training and the professional ability to deal with these cases, backed by senior adjudicators who have legal training. It is also about having a fair and efficient system, because part of the challenge we see at appeal now is that there is a long gap between someone’s initial decision by the Home Office and when that comes before a judge. During that time, a whole series of events can happen, which means the case before a judge is often different from the one the Home Office made its initial decision on.

[Joe Robertson]

Q It is right, is it not, that the Home Office has a pretty poor record of success? When its initial decisions are tested on appeal, it loses at an incredibly high rate, suggesting there is something wrong with the original decision making at the Home Office. That has nothing to do with replacing the judicial system in the Bill.

Dan Hobbs: I think the overturn rate is actually declining, so the Home Office is getting more successful overall with those decisions that go before a judge. But, to my point earlier, what the judge decides can often be very different on the facts, compared with what was presented to the Home Office at the beginning, because of the passage of time. The Minister talked about upwards of 68 weeks between someone’s appeal being lodged and concluded, which means that a whole different series of facts come before the judge. So the evidence can change in that time, but our overturn rate is broadly coming down.

[Joe Robertson]

Q From a pretty bad place. That is factually the case, isn’t it?

Dan Hobbs: Broadly, about 50% of the refusals are then overturned. That is coming down, but equally the refusal rate has gone up. As the Minister said, we are refusing more cases, but the overturn rate is broadly similar.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)]

Q Would you reject the view that the referral system is exploited?

Eleanor Lyons: I would say that, from the evidence that we have seen—this has been looked at across the years by different Select Committees and academics—there is no evidence of widespread misuse of the system. Of the flights that did not go ahead in 2025 after 3 pm, that is less than 1% of the number of potential victims of modern slavery whom we identified in the UK last year. As I mentioned, if you make these sweeping changes in the legislation, you will also have a negative impact on all victims of modern slavery, in particular cases where we have taken too long to identify them. For example, the survivors of al-Fayed have reached out to me, and they have serious concerns, because we failed them; we did not identify them when we should have done. The Bill would have a negative impact on them, too.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Q If I understand this correctly, the central point that you are making, Eleanor Lyons and Will Prescott, is that the issues that the Bill seeks to address are with not, in your view, so much the law as it stands, but the administration of that law—training, interpretation and the exercise of functions by all sorts of officials. If there are any issues, that is where they lie, rather than the substance of the law as it stands. Is that a fair summary of what you are saying?

Dr Prescott: We have talked about this in our report. You have to be very careful about the sequence in which you do this. At the moment, there are all sorts of gaps in identifying modern slavery victims. A lot of people in first responder organisations—as Eleanor mentioned, you cannot refer yourself into the NRM—are not aware of their responsibilities. There is no dedicated modern slavery lead and, because there is no dedicated lead, everyone is responsible, which in practice means that no one is responsible.

A lot of victims also do not necessarily realise that they are a victim of modern slavery. They obviously do not understand what their rights are. In particular, if they are in an unfamiliar environment and speaking to unfamiliar officials, they will not necessarily be comfortable discussing certain practices that have happened to them. If you are going to tighten the criteria, you really need to fix the gaps in the existing system first, before you look to a much tougher approach.

[Joe Robertson]

Q Does the Bill address the gaps you have just identified?

Dr Prescott: It does not really. There are some bits of the Bill that are quite welcome, such as requiring firms to outline the steps they need to take to reduce modern slavery in their supply chains. That is helpful to an extent, but it does not really address the issue of the lack of dedicated first responders in organisations, for example, and it does not deal with fixing the identification problem within the system that we were quite concerned about. I do not think it is quite there yet.

Eleanor Lyons: I do not think the Bill addresses the fundamental issues, because I do not think you need legislation for that. There is a challenge at the moment with the process, because we do not have that training consistently across first responder organisations. I do not think we have the substantial evidence we need to underpin a lot of the changes that the Bill is proposing. It undercuts a lot of work that has been done over the years to recognise that victims of all crime groups and of exploitation take a long time to feel comfortable speaking, and they may be scared to come forward. We are creating exceptional rules for victims of modern slavery that I think are fundamentally unfair.

I would say that the issue with tackling modern slavery in this country is that we do not have dedicated funding for police teams any more, and we have a modern slavery strategy that is over 10 years out of date. If we really want to tackle the issue, we need to look at those big picture things. The Bill is making it harder for victims to come forward, and it does not address the problem of the perpetrators of the crime. Actually, a lot of those things were introduced under previous bits of legislation, and there is already a struggle to enact them at the moment.

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

Q Good morning, everyone. I have a direct question for Vicky, following on from the previous question. In your submission, you welcomed the Government’s objective of creating a fairer and more efficient asylum system, but you raised concerns about several specific provisions in the Bill. Can you explain to us which aspects of the Bill present the greatest risk to refugee protection?

Vicky Tennant: Thank you very much, and thanks for referring to the observations we shared with the Home Secretary a few weeks ago. What we essentially said is that we are very supportive of the overall objective to improve the asylum system by making it fairer, more efficient and more sustainable, and we think there are elements of the Bill that move in that direction. The spirit of our observations was very much along the lines of highlighting where we felt it could be strengthened to better achieve those objectives.

Of course, as the UN refugee agency we are very focused on what the Bill means for protections and solutions for asylum seekers and refugees. We also very much recognise the importance of public confidence in a well-functioning system—and that means not just a fair and efficient process for refugees, but the ability to return people who are found not to be in need of international protection. It means safe, regular routes for people, so that they are not forced into these dangerous journeys that we are all so conscious of. It is also about facilitating co-operation with international partners to address the challenges. We are very much coming from the perspective of recognising the challenges, and we want to work with the Government to address those. We have approached our engagement with the Bill very much with that in mind.

The observations speak to a number of areas, three of which I would highlight in particular. First, there are the very extensive provisions that deal with the appeals system and the establishment of the new appeals body. From our perspective that is not, in itself, inherently problematic, but what is essential that the body will only be able to achieve the objectives of helping contribute to that fairer and more sustainable asylum system if it has the relevant expertise firmly embedded in both the profile of the adjudicators and the role that legal expertise will play in the adjudication process.

It is clearly important that the body both is, and is seen to be, independent of the initial decision-making process, and is transparent in terms of being open to public scrutiny, including on the quality of the adjudication process. Then there are the procedural safeguards, such as access to legal advice and support, and the possibility for those with protection claims to have an oral hearing. Those are all key safeguards, and they are really essential. What you want is accurate, high-quality decisions so that appellants are not then in a position of lodging more appeals to the first-tier tribunal. We are very happy, by the way, that the possibility of further recourse to the first-tier tribunal is there, but we do not want to see it overused either; we want to see high-quality decisions at the appeal stage and, even better, at the first instance stage. That whole area of appeals is one where we feel that more information and more elements could be provided to facilitate the consideration of the Bill.

The second area—I am going to mention three—is the provision that would allow recovery of the asylum support provided to asylum seekers while their claims are looked into. First, I would highlight that asylum seekers do not have the right to work, so in many cases they are forced to rely on that support. Secondly, they have no control over the length of the process, so they have no control over how long it will take to get a decision. A high proportion of asylum seekers are subsequently recognised as refugees, and essentially saddling them with the prospect of an obligation to repay what could be a really very large sum of money is not going to help to facilitate the integration process at the moment when they should be getting back on their feet. That is not in the interests of refugees, and it is also not in the interests of communities. We also believe that there is an issue of compatibility with the refugee convention. It is quite a technical issue, and we have set it out in detail in the observations. I can say more about that if you would like, but that is an area where we would urge another look.

The third area is in relation to article 8 of the European convention on human rights. In the observations, we have not gone into detail on all the aspects of the changes to article 8—the interpretation of article 8 that is embedded in the Bill. We would just highlight how it could potentially impact refugee family reunion. We should bear in mind that, because of their displacement, refugees have often been separated from families in very chaotic and difficult circumstances. One element of the Bill speaks to the presumption that one would normally have expected cohabitation with the family member being sponsored, but that is difficult in the refugee context—it is a difficult threshold to make. Particularly in view of the suspension of refugee family reunion—that bespoke route—we feel that that could have quite a harmful impact.

Those are the three areas. Clearly, the legislation is only one part of the overall answer, so it also has to be looked at in the context of the wider policy reforms that are being pursued. As UNHCR, we have been very pleased with the level of engagement we have had with the Home Office as these reforms are seen through.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

indicated assent.

Helen Rance: No, I do not have those figures.

[Joe Robertson]

Q The Bill claims that it will have a deterrent effect on people coming to the UK illegally, but no matter how robust it might be, can it really have a deterrent effect when it seems so easy to set people off in boats from the north of France?

Helen Rance: Its deterrent effect would be the toughening up of the environment. The specifics of this Bill and the launching of boats from France are not specifically linked. This is the deterrent effect of making the UK less attractive in general. From this Bill alone, I cannot comment on the launching of boats.

[Joe Robertson]

Q Do you see it having any effect on where migrants might enter the UK and be received and intercepted by law enforcement? I ask because we see boat crossings now stretching as far down as Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. From your position, does anything in the Bill address the expanded geography of where organisations such as yours have to operate?

Helen Rance: There is nothing in this Bill that addresses the geography of where crossings leave from or arrive to.

[Tom Gordon]

Q I want to follow up on line of questioning of my colleague Siân Berry. When previous Governments removed safe routes from overseas, did the NCA see an impact on illegal activity by those exploiting vulnerable people? Do you feel confident that the Bill will reverse that?

Helen Rance: I understand the question, but I do not have the statistical figures over the last—

Dover and Portsmouth: Protests

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Monday 7th September 2026 Commons Chamber

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

May I pay tribute to the brave lifeboat volunteers from Bembridge, on the Isle of Wight, who responded to the migrant crossing yesterday?

The Isle of Wight is more than just a little bit west of Kent. This is a really concerning development, a potential failure to contain the geography of small boat crossings. The Minister likes to talk about the reduction in numbers, but what assessment has she made of this potential new development in where people smugglers are willing to operate from? In this case, they travelled across 80 miles of open water. What is she doing to ensure that resources are targeted properly not only in France, but on the south coast, so that local communities like those on the Isle of Wight and in Hampshire can respond to this, which is something that they have not seen at scale before?

[Sarah Jones]

We are keeping all these things under review. There is no intelligence to suggest that people who leave France from further west want to land anywhere other than where they normally do, but we keep all these things under control. Today I have spoken to multiple people at the National Police Co-ordination Centre and in Border Force, and to the police more widely, and these things are kept under review. There is no evidence of what the hon. Gentleman suggests, but the criminals are being disrupted over here, and we know that they will try to change tactics. However, there is no evidence at the moment about where they are trying to land.

Asylum Policy

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Monday 17th November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Shabana Mahmood]

I thank my hon. Friend for her question. We will pursue the consultation on measures that require it as quickly as possible, and there will be legislation in the coming months—certainly in the second Session—which we will obviously seek, subject to the agreement of the House, to pass as quickly as possible.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

The Home Secretary’s asylum plans still have a gaping hole in the middle of them in that she does not know what to do with failed asylum seekers who cannot be returned home. Her statement says that she is exploring possibilities with third countries. Can I suggest that she swallows her pride, and speaks to a third country that we know is willing: Rwanda?

[Shabana Mahmood]

I say to Conservative Members that they are going to have to ditch their addiction to Rwanda. The scheme did not work, and nobody in the country supported it. As the hon. Member and Opposition Members well know, when we are negotiating with other countries about possible agreements, the one thing we do not do is publicise them before an agreement is reached.

Oral Answers to Questions

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Monday 15th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend is right to raise this. New and emerging artificial intelligence technology has the potential to amplify threats to democracy, including through hyper-realistic bots, which are used to spread disinformation and misinformation at speed. The Government are absolutely committed to addressing the threats, including by ensuring that social media platforms have the right systems in place to identify and tackle harmful material that breaches their terms of service.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

T4. The Attorney General has claimed that we need the European convention on human rights and the European Court to solve the illegal migration crisis—an extraordinary claim. Will the Minister please explain, therefore, how Australia managed to tackle its migration problems and how the US is managing to implement our Rwanda plan, all outside the European convention that the Attorney General says we need?

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Alex Norris)]

The hon. Gentleman heard the Home Secretary’s point on the convention, but it is clear that gimmicks such as Rwanda do not work—£700 million for merely four volunteers to go. What works is effective processing, quick decisions and quick removals. That is what we will get under this Government, and it is what we do not get from those who carp from the Opposition Benches.

Oral Answers to Questions

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Charlie Dewhirst (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)]

7. What steps her Department is taking to reduce the use of asylum accommodation.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

15. What steps her Department is taking to reduce the use of asylum accommodation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Home Office is not buying hotels. As for the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, there are currently 61 service users housed in his area, which is less than 15% of the quota, and there are zero hotels.

[Joe Robertson]

The Government may not be buying hotels, but it is filling them up with asylum seekers. The number has gone up in the past year, not down, yet the Government say that they will reduce them to zero by the end of this Parliament. Will the Minister confirm whether the commitment to end the use of asylum hotels by the end of this Parliament is a guaranteed pledge on which we can judge their success or failure—yes or no?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

By March this year, 15% fewer people were in hotel accommodation than at the end of 2024. We are saving money on the chaos that we inherited from the Conservatives, and we have announced that we will end the use of hotels by the end of this Parliament.

Crime and Policing Bill

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I rise to support my amendment 19, which seeks to amend clause 94, which brings in a new law to make spiking or administering a harmful substance an offence. I am grateful for the cross-party support I have received for this amendment from Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Green and Independent MPs. The intended law around spiking is a sound one, and it generally has cross-party support—indeed, it was a measure in the previous version of this Bill, brought in under the previous Government. My concern is that it has a defect and that there is a loophole. My amendment seeks to close that by ensuring that spiking by a reckless act is also an offence.

Spiking is a hideous, heinous activity that destroys lives. It destroys people’s physical and mental health, and at worst, it kills people. The majority of victims of spiking—74%—are women, and the average age of those being spiked is just 26, but there is no typical spiking incident. The majority involve putting something in a drink, but needle spiking is also on the rise. The most likely place for spiking to happen is in a bar, pub or a club, but it can happen anywhere, including in a supermarket or on the street.

Spiking is most commonly thought among members of the public to be motivated by sexual intent or to facilitate a theft, but in Committee we heard from Colin Mackie from Spike Aware UK about a very different type of spiking, which is what I think the new law fails to address. It is the rise in spiking that seems to have no particular intent behind it. It is sometimes referred to as prank spiking—spiking for, to quote the Government’s own guidance, seemingly “a bit of fun”. We heard from Colin Mackie about how his son Greg died through suspected spiking of that kind.

The Bill criminalises spiking or administering a harmful substance with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy. I do not accept that every case of spiking fits into that definition. I will give an example of a scenario where recklessness would cover a case of spiking—by the way, I should say that recklessness is a well-trodden principle in criminal law, dating back over 200 years. It is an alternative to intent, so that if the prosecution fails to establish that someone meant to do something, it can alternatively establish that their actions were so reckless that they should be convicted.

An example is assault causing actual bodily harm. The prosecution must establish the harm, but it can establish either that someone intended that harm or that they did an act so reckless that harm was bound to follow. It does not matter which it establishes to a jury; it will secure a conviction. It is the same with manslaughter: the prosecution can run a case that although somebody did not intend for someone else to die, their actions were so reckless that they should have known that someone might die, and it can secure a conviction.

By the way, in the absence of law on spiking, those two offences are often used, but they are often defective, which is why the Government are bringing in their own spiking law. However, they have failed to replicate the principle of recklessness within it.

I will give a hypothetical example. A group of friends go into a bar. Two of them have been taking illegal drugs—they have done it before—and they are enjoying themselves. They say to each other, “That friend in our circle—he needs to loosen up some more. He needs to stop his ridiculous opposition to having a bit of fun by taking these pills. I tell you what: we’ll do him a favour. Let’s not tell him, but let’s slip one of these pills we’ve been taking in his drink so he can loosen up and enjoy the evening like we are.” They go ahead and do that, and of course their friend, very likely, is harmed. He may not have done that drug before, or he may have been taking prescription drugs and the mixture is a cocktail.

I am sure the House would intend that those two people had committed a crime, but when they are taken to trial I can see a scenario where their defence will say, “Members of the jury, my clients were foolish. They were silly. They shouldn’t have done it. But they didn’t intend to annoy their friend. They didn’t intend to injure their friend. What they intended to do was have a bit of fun and help him have a bit of fun. It was stupid, but they did not intend it.” How is a jury supposed to convict beyond reasonable doubt on that?

Instead, if the prosecution could point to recklessness, it would be able to say, “Members of the jury, we do not care whether what these two people intended would be fun for that friend. It was so obviously reckless to any reasonable person that it must be a crime, and you must convict.” Clause 94 needs that much more wide-ranging, all-encompassing, tried and tested legal principle in it. My amendment would do just that.

I thank Colin Mackie from Spike Aware UK for bringing that evidence to the Bill Committee, and Stamp Out Spiking, which has also done a huge amount, as well as Members no longer in this place who have been doing a lot of work behind the scenes.

[Simon Hoare]

I am not a lawyer, but my hon. Friend has deployed a clear and compelling argument. At the beginning of his remarks, he referenced how amendment 19, to which I am a signatory, commands cross-party support. In advance of anything the Minister may say, is my hon. Friend able to indicate, from conversations he has had with the Home Office and individual Ministers, the Government’s response? He seems to be making such a compelling case; it would be helpful if the Government accepted it.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank my hon. Friend. I was on the Bill Committee, where a similar amendment was tabled, so I can reference the Minister’s response at that time. I have also had a brief word with the Minister outside this place. The Government’s position seems to be that the type of activity I am describing is covered in the intent to annoy, but I hope that I have made it perfectly clear that all reckless acts are plainly not covered by an intention to annoy.

I do not for one minute suggest that the Government wilfully do not want the law to work and to cover all scenarios, but I am left with the impression that they have not sufficiently addressed their mind to the gaping loophole that is staring them in the face. If they do not like my amendment, I urge them to draft an amendment of their own to deal with the issue. If just one person walks free following this law because they were able to convince a jury that their actions were not annoying—but they would have been deemed reckless—that will be a terrible failure of what the Government are trying to do in the Bill. I urge the Minister to think again, and I urge all across the House to vote for the amendment to force the Government’s hand.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Ind)]

I tabled amendment 161 on public order issues and the policing of demonstrations. Before I get to that, I welcome the proposals in the Bill on fly-tipping, and I look forward to the guidance that will be issued to the various authorities to deal with it. I am attracted by the Opposition’s amendments on what is included in that guidance, largely because, like other Members, my constituency is plagued with fly-tipping. I seem to be followed by a mattress throughout my constituency in virtually every area I visit.

I come to public order and my amendment, which I tabled to try to get on the record the reality of what is happening with the public order issue and demonstrations. In the explanatory notes, the Government have set out this argument:

“The regular protests following the events in Israel and Gaza on 7 October 2023 highlighted gaps in public order legislation, principally the Public Order Acts 1986 and 2023.”

They have therefore brought forward proposals in response to the policing challenges of such protests.

Since 7 October, I have been on virtually every national demonstration in central London organised by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and other groups. I understand the pressure on the police service; in fact, I have police constituents who have had their leave cancelled and all the rest because of the frequency of the protests, but that has largely been a response to the depth of concern about what is happening in Gaza. People have wanted to express their view, and one of the ways of doing that through our democratic system is to demonstrate and march and protest. All the demonstrations I have been on have been peaceful, good natured and—up until a few recent incidents—extremely well policed.

In the explanatory notes, the Government set out that legislation is being brought forward in relation to three things, which I think we can all agree on. There is:

“A new criminal offence of climbing on war memorials.”

Secondly, there is

“possession of a pyrotechnic article at a protest”,

which is dangerous, anyway. The other is about concealing identity, although issues with that are referred to in other amendments, because that might well have an impact on the exercise of religious freedoms, particularly with regard to the veil and being able to dress.

The Government do not cite in the explanatory notes the issue in clause 114 of restriction on protests at places of worship. In all the national demonstrations in London that have taken place, there has never been an incident outside a place of worship. Concerns have been expressed by some groups, but largely, I think, they have been by groups who have motivations other than concerns about public order.

In the negotiations with the Metropolitan police on each demonstration that has taken place, there has been a long discussion in which the route is identified, and usually there is overall agreement to avoid any areas that could be seen as contentious and could provoke a reaction. Even when a place of worship, such as a synagogue, has been some distance from the demonstration, the organisers have tried to ensure not just proper stewarding, so that the demonstration does not go anywhere near it—usually, it has to be 10 or 15 minutes’ walking distance away—but that the times of services are avoided as well.

Interestingly, until recently there had never been a problem, but the police seem to have hardened their attitude, I think as a result of coming under pressure from organisations that might simply not want the protest to go ahead in any form because they take a different attitude to what is happening in Gaza and Pakistan. [Interruption.] If the water the hon. Member for Selby (Keir Mather) is carrying is for me, I thank him.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alistair Strathern]

A lot of us have been inspired by my hon. Friend’s campaigning before she arrived in this place, and her intervention is a powerful example of why. It is exactly that moment—that lack of belief—that far too many victims of spiking are encountering when they go to the authorities at the moment, and it is that lack of belief that we are looking to completely undercut in legislating to make this a specific offence today.

Sarah reached out to me because, excited as she is about the Bill, she rightly wants to ensure that we are delivering it as fully as possible. I know that it is the same motivation that made the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East table his amendment. I thank the Minister for taking the time to speak to me about this amendment on Friday. I know from the conversations she has had with officials that they are confident that, as drafted, the Bill would capture the fullness of possible offences related to spiking.

[Joe Robertson]

I am grateful to the hon. Member, particularly for setting out the case of his constituent, who was here in Westminster yesterday; indeed, I also met her. Does he accept that it is those of us elected in this Chamber who make decisions, and that assurances from officials that cannot be articulated in this House—I am looking for that articulation—are not a good reason not to back my amendment?

[Alistair Strathern]

I thank the hon. Member for all the work he has done on this important issue through tabling the amendment, not just now but in Committee. I do not want to put words into the Minister’s mouth, but I am pretty sure she will be able to articulate some of those officials’ views back to him when summing up. However, I want to ask the Minister, as I am sure the hon. Member and other colleagues would want to, that, as we go through this process—and given that she cares so passionately about this issue—she continues to test that understanding with officials. We owe it to Sarah and the many other victims of spiking to ensure that we get this right. I know the Minister is as determined as I am to ensure that happens, and I really hope that as a result we can fully test officials’ understanding and that view before we finally get the Bill into law, to ensure that we are taking the fullness of action needed to tackle spiking.

That fullness of action is important, because the issues that Sarah encountered and the challenges that far too many people face from spiking right across the country are not ones that we can solve with legislation alone. That is an important part of why we are acting by bringing forward a new clause today, and why we are discussing amendment 19.

If the Bill is finally passed and finally brings forward that specific offence that so many of us have been looking for, I hope that it will not be the end of the story. I hope the Minister will be able to bring forward further action, working closely with police chiefs and commissioners, to ensure that this is drilled into their strategic visions as part of our national strategy to reduce violence against women and girls.

We need to make sure that forces appropriately prioritise spiking cases, that officers are appropriately trained to encounter them and take them seriously, ensuring that deadlines around collecting CCTV are not missed before crucial evidence is deleted. We need to ensure that right across the country, there is not a single force that is not taking this issue with the seriousness that it deserves. I will certainly be reaching out to both my police and crime commissioners to urge them to do exactly that, and I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts about how this Government can make sure that we use all the powers and tools at our disposal to ensure that police forces are doing so too.

If we are to deter possible perpetrators of this crime, it is important that the severity of this new legislation and the new penalties are well understood, too. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how we can ensure that we are disseminating the action we are underlining today, and hopefully bringing into law in due course, to ensure that right across the country no one is under any illusions that spiking is not a deeply serious offence. It will be treated as such by this Government and by the police, who will go after them with the full force of the law.

For far too long, victims like Sarah and far too many people—typically women—right across the country have been left exposed to spiking. They have been left feeling like they are victims and left to go through their experiences alone. Fantastic organisations like Spike Aware UK have done all they can to champion their cause, to bring them together, to mobilise and to reinforce the need for change, but it is only through action nationally and delivering through our police forces right across the country that we can finally do justice to the severity of this issue and to the passionate campaigning of constituents like Sarah, who for far too long have felt that they have been suffering alone. I am glad to see this legislation coming forward and to see this specific spiking offence included. I look forward to working with the Minister to ensure that we can deliver it in as ambitious a way as possible.

Crime and Policing Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for setting out in detail the provisions for where crossbows are sold and the seller is not in the presence of the buyer. On providing identity documents and photographic evidence, is she concerned that the wording that she used is vague and that there is scope for providing false documents? Perhaps she could reassure me that, in some cases, copies would certified by a solicitor or someone of sufficient standing in the community—whatever the wording might be. I am concerned that false documents could be provided, but perhaps there is provision to stop that.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point, and it is of concern to me as the Minister. We are introducing this new procedure because we think that the current legislation around buying and delivering is not strong enough. I take his point and I will reflect on it. It may be—I do need to think about it—that it would be onerous to have certified copies. We want to get this right, however, and ensure that accurate legal documents are used, so I will come back to that point.

I will return to the new clauses, so that the Committee is clear about what they will do. New clause 70 also provides for a new offence on the part of the courier or the person delivering on their behalf, equivalent to the new offence that I have described for the delivery of a knife. The courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier must provide the crossbow or parts of crossbows only into the hands of the actual buyer, and only at the address that the buyer provided at the outset. If the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier fails to do that, they will commit a summary offence attracting a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine.

It will be a defence, however, for the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier to show that they have checked an official identity document, and that the ID has the name of the person indicated by the seller, that it shows that the holder is over 18, and that as far as they can tell, the picture in the identity document is of the person at the doorstep. Where businesses hire out or let crossbows for corporate events or entertainment—something that I did not know happened, but apparently does—and do so online, the age-verification measures will apply to the hire and delivery of the crossbows where the hirer is an individual. New clause 71 also provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance on the new offence under the Crossbows Act 1987.

Turning to the reportable sale of knives, new clause 68 introduces a requirement to report all sales of knives where they are made remotely, including online sales. That will help the police to tackle what is called the grey market—the resale of knives on social media. The police tell us that grey market sellers act irresponsibly. For example, they promote knives as weapons, which is unlawful, and they do not conduct age-verification checks. The new clause will give the police information that will enable them to act. Sellers who do not comply will be liable to a fine.

Sales are reportable where six knives or more, or two or more qualifying sets of knives such as a block of knives, or one or more qualifying set together with five or more knives, are sold remotely in one sale and are to be delivered to the same residential address in England or Wales. The reporting requirement is also triggered when multiple sales meeting those limits are made to the same person or the same residential address in England or Wales within a 30-day period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Thank you, Mr Pritchard. I wanted to make it clear that the documents that are being talked about in relation to proving identity are passports and driving licences. I take the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised with me in his intervention, but those are the two documents that will be looked at and provided. We will want to make sure that this works, and in the future, other documents may well need to be added to that list. However, just to be clear, it is those two documents.

As I have also said, we would expect that a person who is delivering would look at those documents. I do not really want to get into how those documents can be forged, because that is obviously an issue that is on the hon. Gentleman’s mind, but at the moment those are the two documents, and we would expect them to be examined by a delivery driver or courier when the items are delivered.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the Minister; that is helpful. Those documents are obviously very hard to forge, so I was not suggesting that they might be forged. My question was about was the possibility—I may simply be wrong here—of someone else presenting those documents. They are not forgeries; they are simply not the passport or driving licence of the buyer. Clearly, if the buyer has to be present when they present those documents to the person making the delivery, there is plainly not an issue, so I welcome that.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is clear. As we have said, photographic identity has to be provided at the beginning of the process—at the point of sale—as well as the identity document, to ensure it matches up.

With that, I commend these measures to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 66 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 67

Delivery of knives etc

“(1) The Offensive Weapons Act 2019 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 39 insert—

‘39A Defences to offence under section 38: England and Wales

(1) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of delivering a bladed product to residential premises to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(2) It is a defence for a person (“the seller”) charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of arranging for the delivery of a bladed product to residential premises to show that—

(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the bladed product unless the delivery conditions were met, and

(b) the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the product would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid commission of the offence.

(4) The delivery conditions are that—

(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the bladed product was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and

(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—

(i) that P was over 18, and

(ii) if the buyer was an individual, that P was the buyer.

(5) In subsection (4) “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38.’

(3) After section 40 insert—

‘40A Delivery of bladed products sold by UK seller to residential premises: England and Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed product to another person (“the buyer”),

(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is within the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed products for the seller,

(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed products, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed product to residential premises in England or Wales.

(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(3) A person finally delivering the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed product.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(8) Section 39(2) to (5) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) and (e) as it applies for the purposes of section 39(1)(b) and (e).

(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.’

(4) After section 42 insert—

‘42A Delivery of bladed articles sold by non-UK seller to premises: England and Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed article to another person (“the buyer”),

(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is outside the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed articles for the seller,

(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed articles, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed article to premises in England or Wales.

(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(3) A person finally delivering the bladed article on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed article.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(8) Section 42(2) and (3) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) as it applies for the purposes of section 42(1)(b).

(9) In this section—

“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales);

“delivery conditions” has the meaning given by section 39A(4), but reading the reference in that section to a bladed product as a reference to a bladed article.’

(5) In section 38(10) (offences) for “section” substitute “sections 39A and”.

(6) In section 39 (delivery of bladed products to persons under 18)—

(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1)(e) after “premises” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (7) omit paragraph (a).

(7) In section 40 (defences to delivery offences under sections 38 and 39)—

(a) in the heading, after “39” insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (2) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(d) in subsection (3) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(e) in subsection (4) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(f) in subsection (5) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(g) in subsection (6) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(h) in subsection (7), omit “England and Wales or”;

(i) in subsection (14), in the definition of “appropriate national authority” omit paragraph (a).

(8) In section 41 (meaning of “bladed product” in sections 38 to 40)—

(a) in the heading, for “40” substitute “40A”;

(b) in subsection (1) for “40” substitute “40A”;

(c) in subsection (2) for “40” substitute “40A”.

(9) In section 42 (delivery of knives etc pursuant to arrangement with seller outside UK)—

(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1)(e), after “article” insert “to premises in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (5) omit “England and Wales or”;

(d) omit subsection (10)(a);

(e) omit subsection (11)(a).

(10) In section 66(1)(j) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) for “42” substitute “42A”.

(11) In section 68 (regulations and orders)—

(a) in subsection (2) after “State” insert, “, except for regulations under section 39A(5)(d),”;

(b) after subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 39A(5)(d) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the offences and defences relating to delivery of knives to premises in England and Wales following a remote sale.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 68

Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales

“(1) In the Criminal Justice Act 1988, after section 141C insert—

‘141D Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales

(1) A person (“the seller”) must, in accordance with requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument, report to the person specified in the regulations any reportable sales the seller makes of bladed articles.

(2) A reportable sale of bladed articles occurs where the seller, in any of the ways set out in subsection (4), sells—

(a) six or more bladed articles, none of which form a qualifying set of bladed articles;

(b) two or more qualifying sets of bladed articles;

(c) one or more qualifying sets of bladed articles and five or more bladed articles that do not form a qualifying set.

(3) “Qualifying set of bladed articles” means three or more bladed articles packaged together for sale as a single item, where each bladed article is a different size or shape from the others.

(4) The ways are—

(a) in a single remote sale where the bladed articles are to be delivered to an address in England and Wales, or

(b) in two or more remote sales in any period of 30 days—

(i) to one person, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to one or more addresses in England and Wales, or

(ii) to two or more persons, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to the same residential premises in England and Wales.

(5) A sale of bladed articles is “remote” if the seller and the person to whom the bladed article is sold are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) a person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—

(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;

(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.

(7) A sale is not reportable if the person to whom the articles are sold (“the buyer”)—

(a) informs the seller that the buyer is carrying on a business, and

(b) is—

(i) registered for value added tax under the Value Added Tax Act 1994, or

(ii) registered as a company under the Companies Act 2006.

(8) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) commits an offence.

(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (8) to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.

(10) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (8) is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(12) In this section—

“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales), other than a knife which does not have a sharp point and is designed for eating food;

“residential premises” means premises used for residential purposes (whether or not also used for other purposes).

(13) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) may in particular include requirements about—

(a) how reports are to be made,

(b) when reports to be made, and

(c) the information reports must include.

(14) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(15) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend—

(a) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(a);

(b) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(b);

(c) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(c);

(d) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(c);

(e) the period specified in subsection (4)(b).

(16) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (15) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’

(2) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, in section 66(1) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) after paragraph (g) insert—

‘(ga) section 141D of that Act (duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales),’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause imposes a requirement on sellers of bladed articles to report bulk sales to a person specified in regulations.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 69

Remote sale and letting of crossbows

“(1) The Crossbows Act 1987 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 1 omit ‘unless he believes him to be eighteen years or older and has reasonable grounds for the belief’.

(3) After section 1A insert—

‘1B Defences to offence under section 1: England and Wales

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1 to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.

(2) Subsection (3) applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) is charged with an offence under section 1, and

(b) A was not in the presence of the person (“B”) to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire at the time of the sale or letting on hire.

(3) A is not to be regarded as having shown that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence unless, as a minimum, A shows that the following conditions are met.

(4) Condition 1 is that, before the sale or letting on hire—

(a) A obtained from B—

(i) a copy of an identity document issued to B, and

(ii) a photograph of B, and

(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that B was aged 18 or over.

(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(6) Condition 2 is that when the package containing the crossbow or part of the crossbow was dispatched by A, it was clearly marked to indicate—

(a) that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow, and

(b) that, when finally delivered, it should only be delivered into the hands of B.

(7) Condition 3 is that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that, when finally delivered, the package would be delivered into the hands of B.

(8) Condition 4 is that A did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.

(9) Where the crossbow or part of a crossbow was dispatched by A to a place from which it was to be collected by B, references in subsections (6) and (7) to its final delivery are to be read as its supply to B from that place.

(10) In subsection (8) “locker” means a lockable container to which the package is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells crossbows etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 1 of the Crossbows Act 1987, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 70

Delivery of crossbows

“In the Crossbows Act 1987, after section 1B (inserted by section (Remote sale and letting of crossbows)) insert—

‘1C Offence of seller delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England or Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”), and

(b) A and B are not in each other's presence at the time of the sale.

(2) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—

(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, or

(b) arranges for its delivery to residential premises in England or Wales.

(3) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—

(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a locker in England or Wales, or

(b) arranges for its delivery to a locker in England or Wales.

(4) In subsection (3) “locker” means a lockable container to which the crossbow or part of a crossbow is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).

(6) The “maximum term for summary offences”, in relation to an offence, means—

(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;

(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.

1D Defences to offences under section 1C

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(a) to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(b) to show that—

(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow unless the delivery conditions were met, and

(b) the person charged with the offence took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the crossbow or part of a crossbow would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.

(4) For the purposes of this section the delivery conditions are that—

(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the crossbow or part of a crossbow was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and

(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—

(i) that P was over 18, and

(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire was an individual, that P was that individual.

(5) “Identity document” has the same meaning as in section 1B(5).

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under section 1C.

1E Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of UK seller

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),

(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,

(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is within the United Kingdom at any time if the person carries on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.

(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(4) A person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.

(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.

(8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

1F Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to premises in England and Wales on behalf of non-UK seller

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),

(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is outside the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,

(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England and Wales.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is outside the United Kingdom at any time if the person does not carry on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.

(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(4) Any person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.

(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause creates offences relating to delivery of crossbows to premises following a remote sale equivalent to the offences relating to knives in sections 38 to 42 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 71

Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision

“(1) After section 1F of the Crossbows Act 1987 (inserted by section (Delivery of crossbows)) insert—

‘1G Interpretation of sections 1B to 1F

(1) This section applies for the interpretation of sections 1B to 1F.

(2) A person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—

(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;

(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.

(3) “Residential premises” means premises used solely for residential purposes.

(4) The circumstances where premises are not residential premises include, in particular, where a person carries on a business from the premises.

(5) A person charged with an offence is taken to have shown a matter if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.’

(2) After section 6 of the Crossbows Act 1987 insert—

‘6A Regulations

(1) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act are to be made by statutory instrument.

(2) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (alone or with other provision) regulations under section 1D(6) or 1E(7) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(3) Any other statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(3) In section 66(1) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc), after paragraph (ga) (inserted by section (Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales) insert—

“(gb) any of sections 1 to 3 of the Crossbows Act 1987 (sale etc of crossbows) as they have effect in relation to England and Wales,”.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision about the interpretation of the new sections added to the Crossbows Act 1987 by NC69 and NC70 and extends the guidance-making power in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 to cover offences under the Crossbows Act 1987.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 72

“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”

“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter—

(a) a ‘relevant search service’ is a search service other than an exempt service;

(b) a ‘relevant user-to-user service’ is a user-to-user service other than an exempt service.

(2) In subsection (1), ‘search service’ and ‘user-to-user service’ have the same meanings as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (the ‘2023 Act’) (see, in particular, section 3 of that Act).

(3) The following are exempt services for the purposes of subsection (1)—

(a) a service of a kind that is described in any of the following paragraphs of Schedule 1 to the 2023 Act (certain services exempt from regulation under that Act)—

(i) paragraph 1 or 2 (email, SMS and MMS services);

(ii) paragraph 3 (services offering one-to-one live aural communications);

(iii) paragraph 4 (limited functionality services);

(iv) paragraph 5 (services which enable combinations of user-generated content);

(v) paragraph 7 or 8 (internal business services);

(vi) paragraph 9 (services provided by public bodies);

(vii) paragraph 10 (services provided by persons providing education or childcare), or

(b) a service of a kind that is described in Schedule 2 to the 2023 Act (services that include regulated provider pornographic content).

(4) This Chapter does not apply in relation to a part of a relevant search service, or a part of a relevant user-to-user service, if the 2023 Act does not apply to that part of the service by virtue of section 5(1) or (2) of that Act.

(5) In this Chapter, ‘service provider’ means a provider of a relevant user-to-user service or a provider of a relevant search service.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause, which together with NC73, NC74, NC75, NC76, NC77, NC78, NC79, NC80, NC81, NC82, NC83, NC84, NC85, NC86 and NS1 are expected to form a new Chapter of Part 2 of the Bill, defines key terms used in the new Chapter.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 73

Coordinating officer

“(1) The Secretary of State must designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the coordinating officer for the purposes of this Chapter.

(2) The coordinating officer may delegate any of the officer’s functions under this Chapter (to such extent as the officer may determine) to another member of a relevant police force or National Crime Agency officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to designate a “coordinating officer” to perform the functions conferred on that officer under the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 74

Notice requiring appointment of content manager

“(1) The coordinating officer may give a service provider a notice (an ‘appointment notice’) requiring the provider—

(a) either to—

(i) appoint an individual who meets the conditions in subsection (2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, or

(ii) if there is no such individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer, and

(b) to provide the coordinating officer with the required information.

(2) The conditions are that the individual—

(a) plays a significant role in—

(i) the making of decisions about how a whole or substantial part of the service provider’s activities are to be managed or organised, or

(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities, and

(b) is habitually resident in the United Kingdom.

(3) ‘Required information’ means—

(a) the contact details of any content manager appointed;

(b) an email address, or details of another means of contacting the service provider rapidly which is readily available, that may be used for the purpose of giving the provider a notice under this Chapter;

(c) information identifying the relevant user-to-user services, or (as the case may be) the relevant search services, provided by the provider.

(4) An appointment notice must—

(a) specify the period before the end of which the service provider must comply with the notice, and

(b) explain the potential consequences of the service provider failing to do so (see section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty)).

(5) The period specified under subsection (4)(a) must be at least seven days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to require a service provider to appoint a senior executive as their “content manager” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72 or to confirm that there is no-one who meets the appointment conditions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 75

Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice,

(b) the provider has confirmed to the officer (in accordance with the appointment notice or under section (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b)), that there is no individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), and

(c) at any time within the period of two years beginning with the day on which that confirmation was given, there is an individual who meets those conditions.

(2) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the first day on which there is an individual who meets those conditions—

(a) appoint such an individual as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and

(b) provide the coordinating officer with the content manager’s contact details.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires a service provider that at any time could not appoint a senior executive as its content manager when required to do so (because there was no-one who met the appointment conditions) to make an appointment if, following a change in circumstances within 2 years, there is someone who meets the conditions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 76

Replacement of content manager

“(1) This section applies where a service provider has appointed an individual as the provider’s content manager (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or this section).

(2) The service provider may replace the provider’s content manager by appointing another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s new content manager for the purposes of this Chapter.

(3) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment is made under subsection (2), provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details.

(4) If the individual appointed as a service provider’s content manager ceases to meet any of the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), the appointment ceases to have effect.

(5) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment ceases to have effect under subsection (4)—

(a) either—

(i) appoint another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and

(ii) provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details, or

(b) if there is no longer such an individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision for the appointment by a service provider of a replacement content manager, including in a case where the original content manager ceases to meet the appointment conditions (and so that appointment ceases to have effect).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 77

Duty to notify changes in required information

“(1) This section applies where a service provider has, in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(a)(ii)provided the coordinating officer with required information.

(2) The service provider must give notice to the coordinating officer of any change in the required information.

(3) The notice must specify the date on which the change occurred.

(4) The notice must be given before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which the change occurred.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires a service provider that has given the coordinating officer required information (as defined in NC74) to inform the officer of any changes in that information.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 78

Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty

“(1) This section applies if the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice and—

(a) the period specified in the notice as mentioned in (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(4)(a) has expired without the provider having complied with the notice,

(b) the provider has failed to comply with a requirement under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information),

(c) the provider, in purported compliance with a requirement to provide, or give notice of a change in, required information (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information)(2)) makes a statement that is false in a material particular, or

(d) the provider makes a statement that is false in giving the confirmation mentioned in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1)(a)(ii) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b).

(2) The coordinating officer may give the service provider a notice (a ‘penalty notice’) requiring the provider to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding £60,000.

(3) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for the sum for the time being specified in subsection (2).

(4) Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) makes further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this Chapter.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider that fails to comply with various requirements imposed by an appointment notice or under NC75, NC76 and NC77.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 79

Unlawful weapons content

“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in England and Wales if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence under section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc a dangerous weapon),

(b) an offence under section 1 or 2 of the Knives Act 1997 (marketing of knives as suitable for combat etc and related publications), or

(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of England and Wales (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc an offensive weapon).

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Scotland if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence within subsection (1)(a) or (b), or

(b) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Scotland.

(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Northern Ireland if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence under Article 53 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160) (N.I. 24) (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc certain knives),

(b) an offence within subsection (1)(b), or

(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Northern Ireland.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause defines “unlawful weapons content” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 80

Content removal notices

“(1) This section applies where an authorised officer is satisfied that content—

(a) present on a relevant user-to-user service, or

(b) which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service;

is unlawful weapons content in a relevant part of the United Kingdom.

(2) The authorised officer may give a content removal notice to—

(a) the provider of the relevant user-to-user service, or

(b) the provider of the relevant search service.

(3) If the authorised officer gives a content removal notice to a service provider in a case where the coordinating officer has the contact details of the provider’s content manager, the authorised officer may also give the notice to that manager.

(4) A content removal notice is a notice requiring the service provider and (if applicable) the provider’s content manager (each a ‘recipient’) to secure that—

(a) the content to which it relates is removed (see section (Interpretation of Chapter)(2)), and

(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(5) A content removal notice must—

(a) identify the content to which it relates;

(b) explain the authorised officer’s reasons for considering that the content is unlawful weapons content in the relevant part (or parts) of the United Kingdom;

(c) explain that the notice must be complied with before the end of the period of 48 hours beginning with the time the notice is given;

(d) explain that each recipient has the right to request a review of the decision to give the notice and how a request is to be made (see section (Content removal notices: review));

(e) set out the potential consequences of failure to comply with the notice;

(f) contain the authorised officer’s contact details;

(g) be in such form, and contain such further information, as the Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe.

(6) The authorised officer may withdraw a content removal notice from a recipient by notifying the recipient to that effect (but withdrawal of a notice does not prevent a further content removal notice from being given under this section, whether or not in relation to the same content as the withdrawn notice).

(7) In this section—

‘authorised officer’ means—

(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the chief officer of the force, or

(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the Director General of the National Crime Agency;

‘relevant part of the United Kingdom’ means—

(a) where the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force in England and Wales, England and Wales;

(b) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Scotland, Scotland;

(c) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland;

(d) where the authorised officer is a member of the Ministry of Defence Police or a National Crime Agency officer, any part of the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers power on the police or an officer of the National Crime Agency to give a service provider and (if there is one) the provider’s content manager a notice requiring them to remove unlawful weapons content from the services they provide.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 81

Content removal notices: review

“(1) A person who is given a content removal notice (a ‘recipient’) may, before the end of the initial 48-hour period, request a review of the decision to give the notice.

(2) A request under subsection (1) is to be made by the recipient giving—

(a) a notice (a ‘review notice’) to the authorised officer, and

(b) a copy of the review notice to the other recipient (if applicable).

(3) The grounds on which a recipient may request a review include, in particular, that—

(a) content to which the notice relates is not unlawful weapons content;

(b) content to which the notice relates is insufficiently identified for the recipient to be able to take the action required by the notice;

(c) the provider that received the notice is not, in fact, the provider of the relevant user-to-user service or relevant search service to which the notice relates;

(d) the individual who received the notice as the service provider’s content manager is not, in fact, that provider’s content manager;

(e) the notice was otherwise not given in accordance with this Chapter.

(4) On receipt of a review notice, a review of the decision to give the content removal notice must be carried out—

(a) if the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force, by another member of that force who is of a higher rank;

(b) if the authorised officer is a National Crime Agency officer, by another officer who holds a more senior position in the Agency.

The individual carrying out the review is referred to in this section as ‘the reviewing officer’.

(6) On completing the review or (in a case where two review notices are given) both reviews the reviewing officer must, in respect of each recipient, either—

(a) confirm in full the decision to give the content removal notice,

(b) confirm the decision to give the notice, but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, or

(c) withdraw the notice.

(7) The reviewing officer must give each recipient a notice (a ‘decision notice’)—

(a) setting out the outcome of the review or reviews, and

(b) giving reasons.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision for the police or the NCA to review the decision to give a service provider or their content manager a content removal notice under NC80 where the recipient of the notice requests a review.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 82

Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content

“(1) This section applies where the reviewing officer—

(a) has carried out a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review), and

(b) confirms the decision to give the content removal notice to the service provider, the provider’s content manager or both of them (in each case whether as mentioned in subsection (6)(a) or (b) of that section).

(2) If the reviewing officer confirms in full the decision to give the content removal notice, the decision notice must require its recipient to secure that—

(a) the content to which the content removal notice relates is removed, and

(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(3) If the officer confirms the decision to give the content removal notice but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, the decision notice must—

(a) identify the content to which the confirmation relates (the ‘confirmed content’), and

(b) require its recipient to secure that—

(i) the confirmed content is removed, and

(ii) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(4) A decision notice within subsection (2) or (3) must specify the period before the end of which the notice must be complied with, and that period must be whichever of the following is the longest—

(a) the period of 24 hours beginning with the time the decision notice is given;

(b) the period—

(i) beginning with the time the review notice or, if there was more than one, the first review notice, was given under section (Content removal notices: review), and

(ii) ending with the end of the initial 48-hour period.

(5) In this section, ‘reviewing officer’ has the same meaning as in section (Content removal notices: review).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause provides for the police or NCA, following a review under NC81 which confirms (in full or in part) the decision to give a content removal notice, to give the service provider or content manager a decision notice requiring the removal of the unlawful weapons content concerned.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 83

Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties

“(1) Subsection (2) applies where—

(a) a content removal notice has been given to a service provider, or to both a service provider and the provider’s content manager, in accordance with section (Content removal notices), and

(b) the initial 48-hour period has expired without the notice having been complied with or a review notice having been given.

(2) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—

(a) to the service provider, or

(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the content removal notice, to the content manager or to both of them.

(3) Subsection (4) applies where, following a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review)—

(a) a decision notice has been given to the service provider or to both the provider and the provider’s content manager in accordance with section (Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content)(2) or (3) confirming the decision to give the content removal notice, and

(b) the period specified in the decision notice under subsection (4) of that section has expired without that notice having been complied with.

(4) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—

(a) to the service provider, or

(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the decision notice, to the content manager or to both of them.

(5) In this section a ‘penalty notice’ means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty—

(a) where the recipient is a service provider, of an amount not exceeding £60,000;

(b) where the recipient is a service provider’s content manager, of an amount not exceeding £10,000.

(6) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for a sum for the time being specified in subsection (5).

(7) See Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) for further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this section.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the police or NCA to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider or up to £10,000 on a content manager if they have failed to comply with a content removal notice or a decision notice.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 84

Guidance

“(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to the persons mentioned in subsection (2) about the exercise of their functions under this Chapter.

(2) The persons are—

(a) the chief officer, and any other member, of a relevant police force;

(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency and any other officer of the Agency.

(3) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.

(4) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance or revisions issued under this section.

(5) A person mentioned in subsection (2) must have regard to any guidance issued under this section when exercising a function under this Chapter.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers power on the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police and the National Crime Agency about the exercise of their functions under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 85

Notices

“(1) This section applies in relation to any notice that must or may be given to a person under this Chapter.

(2) A notice may be given to a person by—

(a) delivering it by hand to the person,

(b) leaving it at the person’s proper address,

(c) sending it by post to the person at that address, or

(d) sending it by email to the person’s email address.

(3) A notice to a body corporate may be given to any officer of that body.

(4) A notice to a partnership may be given to any partner or to a person who has the control or management of the partnership business.

(5) A notice sent by first class post to an address in the United Kingdom, is treated as given at noon on the second working day after the day of posting, unless the contrary is proved.

(6) A notice sent by email is treated as given at the time it is sent unless the contrary is proved.

(7) In this section—

‘director’ includes any person occupying the position of a director, by whatever name called;

‘email address’, in relation to a person, means—

(a) an email address provided by that person for the purposes of this Chapter, or

(b) any email address published for the time being by that person as an address for contacting that person;

‘officer’, in relation to an entity, includes a director, a manager, a partner, the secretary or, where the affairs of the entity are managed by its members, a member;

‘proper address’ means—

(a) in the case of an entity, the address of the entity’s registered office or principal office;

(b) in any other case, the person’s last known address;

‘working day’ means any day other than—

(a) a Saturday or Sunday, or

(b) a day that is a bank holiday in any part of the United Kingdom under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971.

(8) In the case of an entity registered or carrying on business outside the United Kingdom, or with offices outside the United Kingdom, the reference in subsection (7), in the definition of ‘proper address’, to the entity’s principal office includes—

(a) its principal office in the United Kingdom, or

(b) if the entity has no office in the United Kingdom, any place in the United Kingdom at which the person giving the notice believes, on reasonable grounds, that the notice will come to the attention of any director or other officer of that entity.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision about the ways in which a notice can be given, and the time at which a notice is to be treated as given, under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 86

Interpretation of Chapter

“(1) In this Chapter—

‘appointment notice’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1);

‘authorised officer’ in relation to a content removal notice, means the member of a relevant police force, or officer of the National Crime Agency, who gave the notice;

‘chief officer’—

(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, means the chief officer of police of the force;

(b) in relation to any other relevant police force, means the chief constable of that force;

‘contact details’, in relation to an individual, means the individual’s—

(a) full name;

(b) telephone number;

(c) email address;

(d) residential address, or other service address, in the United Kingdom;

‘content’ has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘content manager’, in relation to a service provider, means the individual for the time being appointed as the content manager of the provider (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or (Replacement of content manager));

‘content removal notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices)(4);

‘coordinating officer’ means the individual designated as such under section (Coordinating officer)(1);

‘decision notice’ means a notice given under section (Content removal notices: review)(7);

‘encounter’, in relation to content, has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘entity’ has the same meaning as in that Act (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘initial 48-hour period’, in relation to a content removal notice, means the 48-hour period specified in the notice as mentioned in section (Content removal notices)(5)(c);

‘issuing force’—

(a) in relation to a content removal notice given by a member of a relevant police force, means that force;

(b) in relation to a content removal notice given by a National Crime Agency officer, means the National Crime Agency;

‘relevant police force’—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, means—

(i) a police force in England and Wales, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

(b) in relation to Scotland, means—

(i) the Police Service of Scotland, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, means—

(i) the Police Service of Northern Ireland, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

‘relevant search service’ and

‘relevant user-to-user service’ have the meanings given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’);

‘required information’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(3);

‘review notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices: review)(2)(a);

‘search content’ and ‘search results’ have the meanings given by section 57 of the Online Safety Act 2023;

‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to a relevant police force, means—

(a) the chief officer of the relevant police force, or

(b) a member of the relevant police force of at least the rank of inspector authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the chief officer;

‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to the National Crime Agency, means—

(a) the Director General of the National Crime Agency, or

(b) an officer of the Agency who—

(i) holds a position in the Agency the seniority of which is at least equivalent to that of the rank of inspector in a relevant police force, and

(ii) is authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the Director General;

‘service address’ has the same meaning as in the Companies Acts (see section 1141 of the Companies Act 2006);

‘service provider’ has the meaning given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’).

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, a reference to ‘removing’ content—

(a) in relation to content present on a relevant user-to-user service, is a reference to any action that results in the content being removed from the service, or being permanently hidden, so users of the service in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content cannot encounter it;

(b) in relation to content which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service, is a reference to taking measures designed to secure, so far as possible, that the content is no longer included in the search content of the service that is available in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content;

and related expressions are to be read accordingly.

(3) The following provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 apply for the purposes of this Chapter as they apply for the purposes of that Act—

(a) section 226 (determining who is the provider of a particular user-to-user service or search service);

(b) section 236(5) and (6) (references to content being present).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause contains definitions of terms used in the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 87

Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (6).

(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—

‘27A Causing death by dangerous cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section “serious injury” means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’

(3) In section 28—

(a) in subsection (1) for ‘on a road dangerously’ substitute ‘dangerously on a road or other public place’;

(b) omit subsections (2) and (3).

(4) After section 28 insert—

‘28A Meaning of “dangerous cycling”

(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 27A, 27B and 28.

(2) A person is to be regarded as riding dangerously if (and only if) the condition in subsection (3) or (4) is met.

(3) The condition in this subsection is met if—

(a) the way that the person rides falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist, and

(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding in that way would be dangerous.

(4) The condition in this subsection is met if it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding the cycle in its current state would be dangerous.

(5) In determining the state of a cycle for the purposes of subsection (4), regard may be had (among other things) to—

(a) whether the cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations under section 81 (regulation of brakes, bells etc, on pedal cycles);

(b) anything attached to or carried on the cycle and the manner in which it is attached or carried.

(6) In determining what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—

(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and

(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.

(7) References in this section to something being “dangerous” are references to it resulting in danger of—

(a) injury to any person, or

(b) serious damage to property.

28B Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.

28C Causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section ‘serious injury’ means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’

(5) In section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling)—

(a) after ‘a road’ insert ‘or other public place’;

(b) after ‘the road’ insert ‘or place’.

(6) After section 29 insert—

‘29A Meaning of careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 28B, 28C and 29.

(2) A person is to be regarded as cycling without due care and attention if (and only if) the way the person cycles falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist.

(3) In determining what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—

(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and

(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.

(4) A person (A) is to be regarded as cycling without reasonable consideration for other persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by A’s cycling.’

(7) The table in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences) is amended as follows.

(8) After the entry relating to ‘RTA section 27’ insert in columns 1 to 4—

Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

A SIM farm is a system used to manage and operate a large number of SIM cards simultaneously, often using multiple mobile devices or modems controlled by central software. Farms can contain hundreds or even thousands of SIM cards, and they are typically used to send or receive a high volume of messages, calls or mobile data across networks.

While there can be legitimate uses for SIM farms, such as in telecoms testing or large-scale communication platforms, they are commonly associated with illicit and fraudulent activities. One of their most concerning uses is in the spread of spam and phishing texts, where mass messages with links to scams or malware are sent to unsuspecting individuals. They are also frequently used to bypass verification systems by creating large numbers of fake accounts on social media, messaging apps or online services. In other cases, SIM farms are employed in SIM box fraud, a scheme in which international calls are rerouted and disguised as local calls, depriving telecom providers and Governments of revenue and making the original caller harder to trace.

According to research carried out by Ofcom in August 2022, the scale of nuisance and potentially fraudulent communications across UK mobile networks remains alarmingly high. An overwhelming 75% of mobile users reported receiving suspicious texts or calls in just a three-month period, highlighting the widespread nature of the issue. These figures demonstrate the persistent and pervasive threat posed by scam communications, underlining the urgent need for more robust protections and enforcement mechanisms to safeguard the public.

SIM farms pose serious risks to national security and digital infrastructure. Their use can lead to network congestion, overwhelming mobile networks and disrupting legitimate communications. More critically, they are often exploited by organised crime networks to co-ordinate illegal activity as they are cheap, disposable and difficult to trace. That makes it significantly harder for law enforcement to monitor communications or link messages to specific individuals. The previous Conservative Government committed to banning SIM farms as part of their fraud strategy announced in May 2023. They subsequently launched a consultation on how best to implement the ban, although, interestingly, there were only 50 responses, many from businesses or individuals identifying as legitimate SIM farm users who opposed a ban.

In response to the 2023 Home Office consultation on SIM farms, Mobile UK, the trade body representing the UK’s four major mobile network operators, raised concerns that the proposed ban risked being ineffective due to evolving fraud tactics and technological advancements, including the fact that single-SIM devices, rather than SIM farms, are now the most common tools used to send spam SMS messages, according to data from one mobile operator. Mobile UK further warned that the proposed measures would not eliminate large-scale spam or scam messaging, and urged the Government to broaden the definition of SIM farm to include software-based or e-SIM-enabled methods used to achieve the same fraudulent outcomes.

In the Criminal Justice Bill in the 2023-24 Session, the previous Government included provisions to criminalise the possession or supply of devices capable of holding five or more SIM cards, targeting the infrastructure used in large-scale scams. I welcome the Government’s carrying forward the provisions in the Criminal Justice Bill to amend the definition of SIM farm and prohibit other electronic devices used to commit fraud via secondary legislation.

Clause 80 introduces the new criminal offence of possessing a SIM farm, reflecting growing concerns about their misuse in fraudulent and criminal activity. The clause makes it an offence for an individual to possess such a system unless they can demonstrate that they have a lawful authority or good reason for doing so. That shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the legitimacy of their possession, aiming to deter misuse while protecting legitimate operations.

The clause also provides examples of what may constitute a good reason, including the use of SIM farms for broadcasting services, public transport operations, communications network maintenance or freight tracking. Those carve-outs are designed to safeguard industries with genuine operational needs for such technology, while still targeting the widespread abuse seen in mass-messaging scams, SIM box fraud and illegitimate telecommunications activity. The clause is a key part of the broader effort to close regulatory gaps and strengthen the legal tools available to tackle modern digital fraud.

Clause 81 makes it a criminal offence to supply a SIM farm to another person. Clause 82 offers a meaningful definition of what constitutes a SIM farm for the purposes of clauses 80 and 81, and provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the definition by regulation. Schedule 10 provides for powers of entry and other investigatory powers relating to offences involving SIM farms. Clauses 83 to 85 create the offence of possessing a “specified article”; criminalise the supply of such articles, with appropriate exemptions; set out the sanctions; and allow for the Secretary of State to amend the definition of a specific article via amendment to keep the legislation in line with technology and changing criminal behaviours.

Will there be a formal review mechanism to assess the effectiveness and proportionality of these offences, particularly regarding the number of prosecutions under clauses 80 to 85? Given Mobile UK’s concerns that fraudsters are increasingly using single-SIM devices, e-SIMs and apps such as WhatsApp to bypass traditional SMS channels, is the Minister confident that the measures in the Bill and the Government’s current definition of SIM farm are sufficiently future-proof to tackle emerging forms of fraud?

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I support the clauses, which outlaw the use of SIM farms and the supply of SIM farms to others.

It is a defence for a person to show that they have “good reason” to use a SIM farm. Examples are given in the Bill, including providing broadcasting services, operating or maintaining a public transport service and tracking freight. I do not suggest that amendments are necessary, but I wonder whether the Minister can help us understand the provisions. What are examples of legitimate use in broadcasting services or tracking freight? These are areas of legitimate commercial activity that lay people are not particularly familiar with. I would be interested to know why a company would want to use multiple SIMs and phone numbers to track freight, for example. It is not meant to be a complex question.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am glad that there is cross-party support for these measures. The clauses were, on the whole, included in the Criminal Justice Bill introduced by the previous Government.

Fighting fraud is a top priority for this Government and tackling it is really important not only for our safer streets mission but for our growth agenda. We want to address the full range of fraud threats that occur. We want to close the systemic enablers that criminals are able to exploit to operate at scale and without detection, such as SIM farms.

The hon. Member for Stockton West is right that such a provision was included in the Criminal Justice Bill, but we have updated the definition of SIM farm to reflect newly emerging use cases. In response to feedback from stakeholders, we are creating an additional offence for the possession and supply of additional technologies, to be specified in the future, with appropriate exceptions to avoid unnecessary restrictions on legitimate businesses and professionals. I hope that goes some way to reassuring the hon. Member about why we are trying to future-proof these clauses. On the issue of review, the provisions will be reviewed two years after commencement.

On the point about legitimate activity, as I said, the list in the Bill is not exhaustive; it gives some indication of legitimate reasons why a business or organisation might have a SIM farm in its possession. Whether a reason is reasonable and stands up to scrutiny will obviously be a matter for the court to decide. The list is not exhaustive, in order to provide flexibility; as I said, this area is changing rapidly. In the coming weeks, months and years there may be new legitimate reasons for businesses to possess a SIM farm to assist them in providing a service or selling something. The clauses are constructed as they are in order to allow that flexibility.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 81 and 82 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10 agreed to.

Clauses 83 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 86

Offence of concealing identity at protests

Crime and Policing Bill (Tenth sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Luke Taylor]

I was not going to speak, but reflecting on the Conservative amendments, particularly amendment 44, took me back to our evidence session. There was a particularly helpful contribution from Colin Mackie of Spike Aware UK, who talked about his campaign on spiking having picked up on revenge and pranking. He was asked a particularly good question by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East about the words used in the Bill, particularly “annoy”. The ideas of pranking and revenge came out of his evidence, so will the Minister consider accepting amendment 44?

I also want to pick up the wider point about the need to work with all those involved, such as by working with not only nightclubs but bouncers, so that their qualifications require them to reflect on whether someone is out of control and drunk or has actually been spiked. We also need training at A&Es so that evidence can be taken and preserved if spiking is found to be the cause, rather than somebody just having had too much to drink. The clause is a good measure—it reflects the campaigning from Colin Mackie and groups like Spike Aware UK—but we should reflect on the wording and whether it is sensible to include amendment 44.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak to Opposition amendments 44 and 45 and to address directly what I consider to be a major loophole in this proposed law, which has really good intent behind it. There are two elements to the spiking loophole. I can envisage a defendant getting away with administering a harmful substance by saying that he or she did not intend to injure, aggrieve or annoy. Furthermore, they may claim that it was intended merely as a prank, but the act was so obviously reckless and stupid that they should nevertheless be captured by the provision.

As the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam just mentioned, we heard really good evidence on this issue. I pose the rhetorical question: what is the point of evidence sessions if we do not take on powerful and direct testimony from somebody whose family were affected in the most tragic way? “Pranking” was the word used in that session, and we heard that it is on the rise. Spiking can be done with the worst intent—to cause serious harm—but clearly any law should cover someone who intends a prank with a harmful substance.

The idea behind broadening the offence beyond merely intent—we are no longer necessarily talking about pranking, but about the intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy—to recklessness has plenty of foundation and precedent in law. In fact, we have just debated that point with clause 57, relating to exposure. Under the new law relating to exposure, someone commits an offence if they expose their genitals for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification. There are two reasons why clause 57 will capture someone under criminal law: if the person intends to be seen, or if they are reckless as to whether anyone sees them. When it comes to spiking, the idea should be the same: that a person who administers a harmful substance does so either with intent to injure, aggrieve, annoy or prank, or is reckless as to that being the effect of administering the substance.

Let us be clear: under clause 73, administering a harmful substance on its own is not a criminal offence. It requires something in the mind of a person—currently, only intent. I urge the Government to include reckless behaviour in respect of which, to a reasonable person, it should be obvious that injury, grievance or annoyance would result, even if that was not the intention.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to the debate, which has been a good one, getting to the heart of the important issue of spiking, which needs to be tackled. I am particularly grateful to the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling amendments 44 and 45, which enable me to give a fuller answer to the question he raised at the end of the Committee’s evidence session and to explain the rationale for clause 73.

Clause 73 fulfils our manifesto commitment to crack down on spiking and bring perpetrators to justice. I reassure the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and my hon. Friends that the new offence is just one part of a package of measures designed to tackle this crime. Alongside the Safeguarding Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley, I co-chair the cross-Government violence against women and girls strategy, which we will publish shortly. We will of course work with all the many agencies in this field—across the night-time economy, transport, the Department of Health and Social Care, the police and education sectors—to try to prevent this abhorrent crime and to support the victims who have sadly suffered.

The new offence is just one step in the Government’s commitment to halving violence against women and girls in a decade, and to making our streets safer. I should also say that although the majority of spiking victims are women, we should not forget—as Colin Mackie reminded us in evidence to the Committee—that men are victims too. Colin’s son, Greg, died after his drink was spiked with ecstasy. I pay tribute to Colin and Mandy Mackie from Spike Aware, and to the formidable Dawn Dines from Stamp Out Spiking for all her incredible campaigning over the years to get us to the point where we are clarifying this offence. I thank the many other organisations—my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham told us about the brilliant ones in Gravesend—for their work in this area to protect victims and stop these crimes happening.

--- Later in debate ---

Nor is it the case that a person can simply claim they had spiked someone intending it to be only a joke or a prank. That is not a defence under the current offence. It is a matter for a court or jury to decide, when considering the wider context of the incident that has occurred, whether the person intended to injure, aggrieve or annoy a person. Therefore, although I understand why the hon. Member for Stockton West tabled the amendments, the Government remain of the view that they are unnecessary and, potentially, unhelpful.

[Joe Robertson]

I have a modicum of sympathy for how the Minister is addressing the words “prank” and “revenge”, although I do not necessarily agree with her. Will she address the issue of intent and recklessness, because that has a clear precedent in law, and indeed in the Bill itself?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will happily do so. On being reckless, it would be for the court to decide and determine the case on the facts in terms of its interpretation of aggrieve, annoy and intent. It is also important to deal with amendment 45, which could cause a problem, and address the hon. Gentleman’s comments head on. The amendment would introduce the requirement that the person must act “knowingly or recklessly” before the offence of administering harmful substances is committed. That risks introducing confusion, rather than bringing clarity. For the offence to be made out, a person has to act with the specific intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy the other person. To additionally require a defendant to knowingly or recklessly act is logically inconsistent with the requirement that they act with a specific intention to injure, aggrieve or annoy the victim.

Having explained why it is not helpful to amend the clause in the way suggested, I will return to the details of the clause, which will help to provide clarity. Proposed new section 24(2) defines “harmful substance” as

“any poison or other destructive or noxious thing”.

By incorporating the language of the existing sections 23 and 24 offences, we aim to capture the broad range of substances that can, as established by existing case law, be illegal to administer.

Proposed new section 24 also modernises the law in other ways. It will become an offence triable either way, rather than an indictable only offence: this allows for less serious cases to be dealt with quickly in the magistrates court, allowing for justice to be served quicker. The penalty for the new offence will be 10 years, reflecting the seriousness with which the Government take this behaviour. That penalty is the same as for the existing section 23 offence, and an increase in the maximum penalty for the more commonly prosecuted section 24 offence. The new offence will extend to England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Finally, Government amendments 16 and 19 add the new offence, as with the other offences in the Bill, to the list of serious offences that exclude a person from claiming as a defence that they committed the offence as the result of being subject to modern slavery.

In conclusion, the Government believe that the new offence to capture spiking will simplify the current legal landscape and be more readily understood by both the public and the police. It is part of our wider programme to increase public awareness of the illegality of spiking, encourage reporting and help the police to better respond to this abhorrent crime. I commend clause 73 to the Committee.