Armed Forces Personnel

John Glen Excerpts

Thursday 10th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

I begin by acknowledging, as many others have, the welcome and historic breakthrough of enshrining the armed forces covenant in law. However, as the Prime Minister himself has said, the challenge is to make the Government live up to the obligations in it in reality. It is critical that we bring the aspirations that we all have for the covenant together with the realities that we are faced with in trying to deliver it.

The awful reality is that members of the armed forces and their families may have to face death or injury while they are serving. If the worst happens, it is extremely important to ensure that the right processes are in place and to make certain that the wishes of those who have been killed or wounded are carried out. I wish to focus my few remarks on that.

All armed forces personnel are advised in pre-deployment briefings to make a will. A form, MOD 106, is provided for the purpose. Unfortunately, no advice is given on making the will, nor is there any compulsion to do so. Little information is given to those serving on the risk of mental incapacity following a tour of duty, or on the fact that if there are such complications, the management of financial affairs will not be sufficiently dealt with by a will. In reality, members of the armed forces would need to have a legal power of attorney document to be used in those circumstances, but it must be registered before the mental incapacity happens to make it valid for use when an injury occurs.

Many complicating factors conspire to mean that in many cases, our service personnel may not be properly legally protected in such situations. First, there is a cultural battle. Many young men and women who want to serve are less likely to make a will, because they feel invincible before a tour of duty after undergoing sustained training, or sometimes because they do not want to tempt fate. Secondly, a will speaks only from death. Many personnel are under the misconception that a will covers all eventualities, including mental injury, but it will not. That means that there is a real need to deal with the legal power of attorney option properly.

The consequence of not having a legal power of attorney document can be far-reaching and cause enormous problems for those left behind. I have been made aware of the case of a young man who tragically lost his life. He had made a will, but did not have legal power of attorney in place in the right way, which caused some difficulties. The will was also out of date, which meant that the benefits did not go the people he intended them to. Similarly, another person was in the middle of an acrimonious divorce, and his will did not work as he wished. The outcome was that it did not accurately reflect his updated wishes, which caused major complications for his family.

As we know, more people who serve in the armed forces are surviving terrible injuries that they would not have survived 10 years ago. Some are unable to manage their affairs when they have recovered from physical injuries, which means that someone must do so on their behalf. An LPA would solve a lot of problems in such cases. It is true that an LPA pack can be downloaded from the Office of the Public Guardian, but it costs £130 to register the LPA when all the forms are completed. That will seem like a lot of money to service personnel, many of whom are young people who might believe that nothing will happen to them—an LPA is probably the last thing they want to spend their money on. Defence instructions mention that document, but I am given to understand that they lack detail and contain errors.

If no LPA is in place, a deputyship must be applied for on behalf of the injured service person, which can be extremely expensive, as can the ongoing maintenance costs of a professional deputyship. I am aware of one case of a deputyship costing about £60,000 per annum to service. Solicitors who manage compensation claims will choose to instruct a professional deputy when a lay deputy is perfectly viable, which drives up the costs that take away from compensation schemes—they will have to borne by the MOD.

I see this as a specific covenant issue: if we are prepared to send young people off to fight and possibly die or be gravely injured for their country, and if we invest so heavily in the correct equipment and training for them while they are on operations, we must also have a duty of care to ensure that their affairs are in the order that they would wish them to be in if they are injured or killed. We have concentrated on equally important matters until now, but this issue needs to be looked at again in more detail as part of the pastoral care package that is offered to service personnel.

I am not seeking to embarrass the MOD or the Minister—this is a constructive suggestion on which I have worked with hon. Members on both sides of the House—but the Mental Capacity Act 2005 made this issue real, which is why it needs further examination. What should be done? I would like all those on deployment, and ideally all service personnel, to have an up-to-date will and LPA in place. It would be best to have a will pre-enrolment, but personnel should certainly have one pre-deployment.

I have also had meetings with a group who have a proposal for an organisation called the services trust—I met the group earlier this week. They would like to assist the MOD and serving personnel with information on some of the gaps to which I have drawn the House’s attention. The group could also help with processing LPAs and could act as deputies if necessary.

It would be useful to train admin officers to give relevant information on the consequences of not writing a will or of having no LPA. In fact, the Office of the Public Guardian held a consultation on what groups of people should be exempted from the £130 LPA fee, but it did not include the MOD. That unnecessary oversight needs to be corrected.

It should be feasible to spread the cost of an LPA over a number of months and to take it from the wage packets of personnel at source. That is done for a variety of costs, and it would be a simple matter to add it to the joint personnel administration system. Payments could even be taken out with payments for the armed forces insurance scheme.

To return to where I began, the Government have made a commitment to the welfare of the armed forces by enshrining the covenant in law. It is essential that that commitment is extended to ensure that not only their financial and operational needs are met, but their legal needs. I respectfully ask the Minister to give an indication of whether he is prepared to meet me and other hon. Members, and representatives behind the services trust proposal, to establish what can be done to address that proven need in our armed forces.

Defence Transformation

John Glen Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I confirm that we intend to utilise HMS Caledonia as a unit for the MRB. We aim for the moving in to start in 2015-16. Of course, this will be a cross-departmental subject when it comes to looking at the wider costs.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend confirm that the additional funding announced for defence equipment budgets will not be a sufficient uplift post-2014 to achieve the full aspirations of the Future Force 2020?

[Dr Fox]

We have to look at the defence budget as a whole, not simply the equipment budget, and see where there is leeway. I set out the equipment programmes that we are willing to start spending money on today. I am simply not willing to start to spend on other projects where I can see no budgetary line in the future. After all the pain we have gone through to rebalance the Ministry of Defence budget, we are not going to go back to the bad old habits and recreate the black hole that we inherited.

Defence Reform

John Glen Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I was keen to discuss at length with Lord Levene how to create a structure within defence that could offer careers to those who might be attracted to the intellectual, if you like, side of defence—electronic warfare and so on—but who might not want to become commandos. We need to create a pillar inside defence that can grow as the nature of conflict changes. We want to create that expertise and attract those young minds who have a different view of what the electronic and cyberspaces look like and who are interested in a defence career. It is essential that we change how defence does business in order to reflect the genuine threats out there. As we develop that expertise, so we will have a greater ability to deter the sorts of attacks to which the hon. Gentleman referred.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

One of the issues that needs clarification is the practice of individuals being appointed to sensitive roles in large procurement processes for just two years. Will that be reviewed, so that the period of the role suits the project, rather than an arbitrary career path?

[Dr Fox]

The specific work on that is currently being done by Bernard Gray but, as I said in the statement, it is now important that we increase the length of tenure of many such posts, otherwise we are wasting talent. If the MOD were a private company, it would be number three in the FTSE. The idea of having the most senior people in the private sector stay for 18 months or two years, and then rotating them round because it is “good for their career experience” would not hold water in the private sector, and it no longer holds water in the MOD.

Armed Forces Covenant

John Glen Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

In so far as they have the same rights as anyone else to access public facilities, yes, it will. For some there are complex issues relating to nationality, but as I said, we are setting out today a cross-governmental arrangement. I want to consider some of the complex issues relating to those from Commonwealth countries. In particular, I want to ensure that we fully recognise that those who make the sacrifices share in the benefits.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement. Will he indicate his willingness to examine how compensation is paid to members of the armed forces who are injured? Currently, many of those who are badly injured and rightly receive many hundreds of thousands of pounds are at great risk of exploitation when inadequate or no financial advice is available on how to invest that money so that it is available in the years ahead. What relevance has today’s announcement for that?

[Dr Fox]

My hon. Friend makes a very interesting point. I will undertake to have some work begun in the Department to see where we are on that subject. It is obviously crucial for the long-term welfare of those who receive such payments that money is invested in a wise way that can maximise return over the longest period. He raises a crucial point and I will ensure that further work is done. I will report back to the House on that on a future occasion.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Glen Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

I am reluctant to turn this into a diary session for my diary secretary, but I think it would be very helpful to discuss this important issue with my hon. Friend. Departmental good practice guidance on maintaining project histories allows scope for project team leaders to interpret it and decide what best meets the needs of their project depending on its size, complexity and nature. The format and content are not mandated and, frankly, the problems with the Nimrod MRA4 project are about the most well-documented of any major procurement programme we have.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

12. What recent assessment he has made of the security situation in Afghanistan; and if he will make a statement.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox)]

Based on what I saw on my recent visit to Afghanistan, including my conversations with commanders and politicians, I assess that important security gains are being made. They are not irreversible and we can expect a high tempo over the winter and throughout the year. Although there are many challenges, there is cause for cautious optimism in the growth of the Afghan national security forces. We have the right strategy, numbers and equipment in place and now a little strategic patience is required to ensure that we are successful. Both 2011 and 2012 will be key years in that regard.

[John Glen]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. Does he agree that the best way forward for Britain’s long-term strategic security interests is to form long-term relationships between the international security assistance force military leaders and the Afghan police and military commanders? What observations would he make on the level of co-operation between UK forces and Afghan security leaders?

[Dr Fox]

That is an ongoing and progressing relationship. I point my hon. Friend to one particularly successful project—the police training taking place in Helmand. Those involved in that project throughout the country would recognise that what the British armed forces are doing is very possibly and very probably the leading project of that kind. If we can not only continue with what we are doing but export it as best practice to others, we will be making a doubly important contribution.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Andrew Robathan)]

We certainly support the scheme, which I understand is largely run by the Royal British Legion, although I do not have the details at my fingertips. It is an excellent scheme. We support the national lottery, the Royal British Legion and the whole programme.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

T7. Given the Government’s desire to improve armed forces accommodation and obtain greater value for money for the taxpayer, does the Minister accept that useful lessons can be learned from the Canadian Government’s example of outsourcing the management of armed forces housing, a policy that produced savings and improvements to accommodation facilities?

[Mr Robathan]

My hon. Friend is right. We are looking at every option as to how we can make housing for our troops more efficient. We shall certainly look at what my hon. Friend has mentioned as well; if he wants to make a submission, he is very welcome so to do.

The Army and RAF Lyneham

John Glen Excerpts

Wednesday 26th January 2011 Westminster Hall

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

First, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) for securing this debate. As someone who grew up in north Wiltshire and who is aware of the footprint that RAF Lyneham has in the local area and in the county more widely, I also pay tribute to the work that my hon. Friend has done during the past seven years in campaigning to keep the RAF at Lyneham and to the work that he is now doing, as he reflects the reality of the decisions that have been made, looks to the future and seeks a constructive way forward.

I speak as both a Wiltshire MP and as a member of the Select Committee on Defence. It seems to me that there are three significant reasons why this case for having the Army come to RAF Lyneham needs to be carefully examined.

The first reason is that it is quite clear that there is huge symbolic significance to RAF Lyneham and its relationship with Wootton Bassett. It is impossible for the Government to pay great tribute, with one voice, to the people of Wootton Bassett, which is just a few miles down the road from RAF Lyneham, for all that they have done to recognise the huge contribution of all those who have fallen in battle, and at the same time, with another voice as it were, not to go out of their way to recognise the impact that this decision, if it does not go the right way, would have on the local community. Effectively, RAF Lyneham is the gateway between the UK and Afghanistan, and over many years the people of the surrounding area have made a massive contribution to the well-being of service personnel’s families.

The motto of RAF Lyneham is “Support, Save and Supply”. As my hon. Friend has set out fully this morning, the opportunities for RAF Lyneham to continue to serve the armed forces—in this case, the Army—are significant. The infrastructure is in place, and I do not need to point to the long history over the past 50 years of the people of Lyneham and Wootton Basset’s service to the nation, but the decision has clearly been made to move the RAF to Brize Norton. We have to acknowledge, however, that we cannot make such decisions wholly without emotion and without respect for the wider issues at play in the vicinity.

The second reason is the economic value of RAF Lyneham. The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty) knows that the Defence Committee, of which I, too, am a member, looks at the strategic issues, but the economic arguments are massive. There are about 2,500 civilian and military personnel at Lyneham, and several thousand acres of land are connected with the base. The impact on the local economy has been estimated at about £90 million a year, so if Lyneham were to no longer have a significant military footprint, a considerable gap would be left which, as the chairman of Wootton Bassett chamber of commerce has pointed out, would be unsustainable. If the decision does not go the right way, there will be a direct adverse impact on the economy of Wootton Bassett.

Thirdly and finally, the strategic defence and security review has reached some uncomfortable conclusions, and it has made some difficult assessments of what needs to happen over the next 10 years, driven by the acknowledged financial mess that the Government have inherited. With 10,000 to 15,000 troops returning to the UK, we need to find the right situation for them to locate to, and it is absolutely clear that in Wiltshire the Army has a very welcoming home. In my constituency and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Claire Perry), there are so many strategic reasons why it would make sense for the Army to locate to Lyneham. It has been suggested that the Royal Logistics Corps could move from South Cerney and Hullavington to the Lyneham base, but a number of other options are available.

I ask the Minister for a timely decision, because considerable ongoing debate would leave the local economy open to lots of uncertainty. If that is not possible, we must ensure that we put in place a clear plan for the economic regeneration of the area, and allow the options to be fully explored and quickly executed. If there is a problem with the transfer of assets from the RAF to the Army, it needs to be worked out and dealt with quickly and sensibly, rather than allowing internal wrangling in the Ministry of Defence to stop progress.

The case seems very clear: Lyneham is a symbolic home of the armed forces and should continue to be so, whether for the RAF or the Army. There is an absolutely sound economic case for that, and it also presents an effective, practical solution to a problem that will need to be dealt with over the next 10 years. An Army base at Lyneham makes sense, but we must ensure that it happens quickly, so that the people there can have some reassurance after their massive contribution over the past 10 years.

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[Nick Harvey]

The key point is that when we are considering value for money, we have to balance the scale of the investment to build the facility against the savings that we will make from having everything at one location. I was not party to that decision, but clearly when those numbers were ground through the computers at the time, the judgment was arrived at that the Project Belvedere option did not represent value for money.

Since then, it has seemed unlikely that another defence use will be found for RAF Lyneham. I listened to my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) talking about the need for an economic plan, and I could not agree with him more. I am just mildly mystified as to why, 14 months before the base closes, the local civil population is talking about the need for a plan when the announcement that the base would cease its current role came eight years ago. The point that I am making is simply this: if there is to be a civilian use for RAF Lyneham in the future, rather than a military one—I am not saying for one moment that that will be the case—it will be for the local civil community to decide what that future will be.

The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway asked about transitional assistance. There is no precedent for that coming from defence funds in the cases of other base closures. It would certainly be something that other Departments and local authorities, particularly under the new localism agenda, would need to pick up. My hon. Friends are absolutely right, and the tone that has been struck—

[John Glen]

Will the Minister give way?

[Nick Harvey]

In a moment. The tone that has been struck by my hon. Friends thinking constructively and positively about what the alternative uses might be is exactly the right way forward from where we are now.

I have been asked about the timetable for a decision. I can only repeat that it is more important to get things right than to do them at breakneck speed. A detailed study is taking place of the entire defence estate and the ramifications of bringing nearly 20,000 personnel back from Germany. I reassure the Opposition spokesman that that is a comprehensive piece of work and that it will not be piecemeal. That work is going on at the moment, and it will take a few more months. In any event, we anticipate that decisions and announcements will be made before the summer recess, which is the approximate time frame for the decision. To that extent, my point about those in the local community knowing where they are will be resolved in the next few months, but it is wise for them to make contingency plans.

[John Glen]

The point that needs to be made is that local communities are being prevented from establishing a viable economic plan. They have done considerable work with Wiltshire council to establish an embryonic plan, but an MOD decision is required before that option can be fully explored. One cannot do the local plan before the MOD decision is known.

[Nick Harvey]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention, but, with respect, this bone of comfort—that the Army might come back from Germany—has been thrown only in the past couple of months, and I am still mystified why planning for a civilian future did not start long ago.

Defence Spending (Wales)

John Glen Excerpts

Wednesday 8th December 2010 Westminster Hall

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the debate, Mr Gray, and it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. As a member of the Defence Committee, although not a Welsh MP, I take a keen interest in these matters. As the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) will acknowledge, the Committee’s report pulled no punches when it came to reviewing the Government’s attitude to the strategic defence and security review, and in reporting its conclusions.

I agree with the concept of a defence training college. One of the critical challenges facing the armed forces is the need to avoid duplication and streamline training processes. When the Defence College of Electro-Mechanical Engineering—DCEME—was formed in April 2004, it brought together a number of separate service training organisations, all of which delivered different forms of engineering. The aim was to exploit synergies, improve training delivery and increase efficiency and effectiveness.

The notion of a defence training college is sound. There is a lot of training duplication across the three services, and anecdotally, there are many common factors to basic engineering training programmes, although that is not always acknowledged by the different services. It is clear that St Athan should play a key role in delivering a harmonised service.

In theory, a further rationalisation to one site could reduce costs and save money. That should bring areas of expertise and excellence together and lead to greater co-operation between the services. However, it is not clear whether the work has been done by the three services to align their training requirements. There are always good reasons to compromise, and different services have different needs. Such matters need to be ironed out, and we must be clear what we are aiming for in this investment.

[Huw Irranca-Davies]

I appreciate the fact that the hon. Gentleman is taking part in the debate. It is important to have members of the Defence Committee in the Chamber, because this discussion is not only about Wales but about what is best for the armed forces. I appreciate his train of logic, which steers us towards the rationale of having tri-service training on one site—we hope that it will be in Wales, but please let it be somewhere—for the good of the armed forces. However, the hon. Gentleman is approaching a compromise.

I do not want to digress from the subject of the debate, but when the decision was taken on Sheffield Forgemasters, there was an undertaking that discussions would continue. However, nothing has happened. We hear that the hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) is delighted that discussions are continuing on this matter, but yet we have heard nothing. Will the hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen), or perhaps the Minister, illuminate us on what exactly the future holds for the tri-services and St Athan?

[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I am confident that my hon. Friend the Minister will deal with that point; obviously, I am not in a position to verify it. However, I will point out that the defence academy at Shrivenham is a good example of successfully bringing together different service needs in delivering training. That defence academy has proved a resounding success. The majority of training there is postgraduate, with accredited civilian qualifications the result for many people.

[Geraint Davies]

The question was asked: where is the hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns)? Given that this issue is so strategically important for his constituency and that he is the new MP for the constituency, and if he is saying things about discussions, why is he not here? Where is he?

[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I understand from colleagues that my hon. Friend is working in the Vale of Glamorgan today. Obviously, I cannot account for the movements of other hon. Members.

The concept of St Athan was good, but it was decided that the project was undeliverable by the Metrix consortium. It is clear that a huge number of courses across the services need harmonising.

[Alun Michael]

I am a little puzzled about the decision. What the hon. Gentleman refers to was clearly decided—he is right about that—but it does not seem to have been decided on the facts, which demonstrated savings for the armed services as well as efficiencies from the proposals, which were assessed very carefully before the decision to go ahead was made. So why was the decision made to change that? It had all-party support. There was careful examination of the benefits to the services. Where did the decision come from?

[John Glen]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. No doubt the Minister will want to deal with the point about the logic of the Government when they made the decision.

What is confusing to me, as someone who has taken an interest in defence matters, is the extent of the investment at St Athan. Let us say that three services are coming together and, for example, work is being done on ship engines. How reasonable and cost-effective will it be to get engines from Portsmouth to St Athan? Is that the right option? To what extent will all that work be cost-effective? Presumably it would be helpful to have a driving range for tanks if people wanted to test the tanks on whose engineering they had been working.

How does the Minister reconcile the fact that, as the hon. Member for Swansea East (Mrs James) said, Wales receives the second lowest “investment” from the MOD with the arguably bigger imperative to achieve value for money for the MOD as a whole and for UK defence as a whole? Looking to the future, I am clear that defence training needs to be harmonised. That issue needs to be considered on two levels. Where would be the best place to site such a college from a UK defence perspective? In addition, such a decision should not be wholly based on relative under-investment in one region of the country or another.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[John Glen]

No, I shall make a little more progress and come back to the hon. Gentleman in a minute.

If the best place is St Athan, there is a need to bring certainty to the decision and clarity on the time scale and scope of the project. However, I do not believe that money should be spent in Wales just because it needs the investment. That is just one part of the decision. It is critical to ensure that any consolidated training college addresses the broadest possible needs.

[Mrs Moon]

I am extremely pleased to see my colleague from the Select Committee on Defence here today and I pay tribute to the work that he does as a Member for whom I have a great deal of respect. However, what he is suggesting today is that the Ministry of Defence has failed over the past three years rigorously to examine the proposal for St Athan. He is suggesting that civil servants and Ministers have neglected to consider all the issues that he has raised. That is just not true.

[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. I have a great deal of respect for her and her knowledge of this subject, but it was her party that was in government for several years and had an opportunity to bring this matter to a conclusion before the election. I wonder why it did not do so.

For me, the challenge remains the need to rationalise defence training and spending across the three services to the broadest possible extent. Let us consider leadership and management training. There are a huge number of locations throughout the UK. There are separate leadership schools and centres of excellence. There are vast numbers of adventure training establishments and music schools. I am frustrated that there is not enough clarity about taking the process that I have described to the furthest extent and perhaps giving greater scope for initiatives such as those that I am discussing.

[Huw Irranca-Davies]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[John Glen]

Yes, but this will be the last time; I have nearly finished my speech.

[Huw Irranca-Davies]

I worry that what we have here is a softening up. The hon. Gentleman serves on the Defence Committee. Surely he has the ear of the Minister and speaks to him in the corridors, as we try to do as well. Our suspicion is that discussions will continue about St Athan till the cows come home on the pastures of St Athan and that we are being softened up for the tri-service academy not going ahead in any shape or form that we recognise. It will be dispersed somewhere else in the UK or to various other sites in the UK. That is what the hon. Gentleman is hinting at.

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[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. Obviously, not being the Minister, I do not have the ability to make those decisions. I am just flagging up the wider defence interests that are at play. A serious examination is needed of what is right for UK defence interests as a whole and the efficient delivery of tri-service support. I am making the case for that to be as broad as possible and for the right decision to be made for the UK.

[Mr James Gray (in the Chair)]

I call Mr Jonathan Edwards.

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[Albert Owen (Ynys Môn) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I want to distance myself slightly from something that the hon. Member for Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire (Simon Hart) said. This is a serious debate, and Labour Members do not see it as fun. Wales is strategically important for defence training and the security of the whole United Kingdom, and Labour Members are proud of the investment that has gone into enhancing that capability over the past 10 years. The best pilots in the world are trained in Anglesey, and they are there because of the strategic importance of its RAF base. Those facts do not bear out any of the hon. Gentleman’s points.

I pay tribute to the Welsh personnel who serve in the armed forces and who serve overseas. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East (Mrs James), whom I congratulate on securing the debate, I think it is important also to mention those behind the scenes who are involved in setting up operations. Similarly, it is important to mention the Territorial Army, and that is one thing on which I agree with the previous speaker; Wales makes one of the greatest contributions of volunteers, and I pay tribute to them. I am sure that the Minister will join me in that.

Defence spending in Wales is vital to defence training in the whole United Kingdom and to the important role that that plays in NATO. The United Kingdom is part of NATO, and plays an important defence role in that context. However, we need commitment and sustainability for the future, and that is what the debate is about.

I am concerned that the strategic defence and security review was conducted in a hurry. It was done just before a comprehensive spending review and was, frankly, caught up in it. I would rather that decisions had been made in the cold light of day, based on strategic defence requirements, than in the heat of a comprehensive spending review. The strategic defence and security review must be bolder and look at broader issues. It must look at least a quarter of a century ahead. I welcome the Government’s five-year review, which is important, because things change. The threats to the United Kingdom change considerably, and we do not know where they will come from in the next three to four years, let alone the next 25 years. I therefore agree with the idea of a five-year review.

It is important that the Minister tells us what impact the departure, in my constituency, of 5,000 air personnel from the RAF would have on defence spending and defence personnel in Wales.

[John Glen]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Albert Owen]

I will give way briefly, but I am aware of the time constraints.

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[John Glen]

If the hon. Gentleman is so supportive of a regular review of defence spending now, will he tell us why there was not one between 1997 and 2010?

[Albert Owen]

Actually, I have lobbied on these issues. If the hon. Gentleman knows me, he will know that there is no difference between my criticisms of the Labour Government and of the current Government when I think that they are wrong. I think the current Government are wrong to have carried out the review so quickly. There is a window of opportunity to review things in five years, but that might be too late—that is the risk. We should have taken about 18 months to have a proper defence review. Whichever party was in office, the comprehensive spending review would have had to be done, and there would have had to be cuts, but we could have seen things in the cold light of day and had those strategic defence reviews in the future. That is my point.

I am conscious of the time, and had wanted to speak a bit longer than I will now be able to, because the subject is very important to Wales and my constituency. As the Minister knows, RAF Valley is in my constituency and is a centre of excellence for fast jet training with Hawks. There has been huge investment there in the past 10 years. Only last week a new building was opened, which will house the new Mk 2 jets. They are fantastic equipment and I am proud that they are British and will be part of our defence training.

The search and rescue headquarters is also based at RAF Valley. I was not 100% keen on the decision of the previous Government about part-privatisation, but I did understand the need to harmonise Navy and RAF helicopters, and, indeed, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency search and rescue, and bring them together. That decision—with billions of pounds of private investment coming into it—has been put on hold, and that will have a considerable impact on defence expenditure in Wales and my constituency. I am concerned about it and would like the Minister to clear up the matter of whether we shall continue with a part-privatisation, or whether there will be full privatisation. The uncertainty is affecting the morale of people employed in my constituency, who include a very famous member of the royal family, Flight Lieutenant Wales; that has got some attention.

The base is strategically important for search and rescue. If the part-privatisation had gone ahead, RAF Valley would have been the first base for such training in the whole United Kingdom. That would have been massively important to the local economy of north-west Wales, and the rest of Wales. I want some answers from the Minister about that, if possible. It is hugely important, and the base is there not because of job opportunities but because of Anglesey’s strategic importance to the United Kingdom. The base has an excellent record.

As to the strategic defence review itself, the impact that the loss of 5,000 personnel from the RAF alone will have on Wales is important. I do not believe everything that I read in the newspapers, but I was very concerned—I want the Minister to deal with this if he has the opportunity—to read an article in The Sunday Times of 28 November with the headline “Cuts leave RAF with fewer jets than Sweden”. I do not know much about Swedish defence, but I know that Britain trains and provides the best fighter jet pilots in the world, and I want that to remain the case. The article continues to say that many of the smaller NATO countries—and on the graph we are one of the smallest NATO countries with military fighter attack—would use a NATO base in Texas. I am happy to acknowledge the contribution of the Americans, but I do not think that their pilots are as good as ours. We need European and British involvement in NATO, and I cannot see why we cannot enhance our bases here, and get more Americans and Canadians. Canadians, Indians and Saudis come to RAF Valley now to train.

Billions of pounds have been invested in strategic defence. Hundreds of millions have been invested in the past 10 years in RAF Valley. I want that to continue. There are 1,500 personnel there, both civilian and military. It is top quality. It is a centre of excellence, not just in this country, but in the world. The search and rescue headquarters has people coming from all over the world, including Hong Kong, to see what we do, because we do it best. I am concerned that the strategic defence and security review, coupled with the comprehensive spending review, could undermine that and have a huge impact on strategic defence, and on local economies in Wales.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Moon]

The hon. Gentleman is trying to turn the whole debate. I am frightened by the debate, because the Government seem not understand that our defence capability relies on the defence industry being able to provide the equipment, and on our having the skills and the sovereign capability to provide our troops with the ability to defend this country.

[John Glen]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Mrs Moon]

No, I am not giving way again; our time is severely limited and I want to make progress.

I have made contact both with SMEs that form part of the supply chain of equipment to the MOD and with the large companies that I mentioned earlier. In my constituency, I have TB Davies, AMSS Ltd, Spectrum Technologies and TES Aviation, all of which are not only vital to the economy of Wales and of my constituency but provide the skills base that allows the MOD to provide the platforms needed by our armed forces.

It would be irresponsible not to consider the implications that the loss of the skills of the SMEs based in Wales would have for our prime contractors; we should remember that 70% of the work of those main contractors is allocated to SMEs. If we do not protect those SMEs, if we do not consider that skills base, if we do not consider our sovereign capabilities, we will put the defence of this country at severe risk.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Brown]

My hon. Friend is an extremely knowledgeable member of the Select Committee, and is exactly right; indeed, the hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen) indicated the same thing at the start of his speech. It basically made sense, and the Select Committee gave it full backing.

[John Glen]

I said that the Defence Committee’s report was pretty clear about the SDSR being undertaken in the wrong circumstances. I did not mention the report on St Athan.

[Mr Brown]

I clearly picked up from the start of the hon. Gentleman’s contribution that St Athan, and what was previously proposed on a cross-party basis, made sense. However, Hansard will show what was said.

We see uncertainty in the questions that are being tabled, whether on departmental redundancies, rescue services or the level of savings. This morning, in contributions from both sides of the Chamber, we have heard that that uncertainty still exists. We need to be clear about where we are going with St Athan. I am not convinced that the Minister will be able to tell us today, but indications are that we might hear in the spring. For all concerned, I sincerely hope that we will have a clearer idea by then.

A question was asked about what that uncertainty does for communities. The debate is about defence spending. It is about investment. It is about the future of our armed forces, and what we are best able to do to serve those who serve the nation in difficult circumstances. They do not need uncertainty. My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) made the valid point that small and medium-sized enterprises in many communities play a vital role. Uncertainty about where we are going can destroy SMEs, a point made also by my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn (Chris Evans). Delays lead to economic uncertainty.

The figure of £38 billion was mentioned once again. I wish to make it abundantly clear that that sum was never to be found in any document. The figure that was spoken of came from page 22 of the MOD major projects report of 2009, which mentioned £6 billion over 10 years. The only way that that £6 billion could become £38 billion was to assume that there would be no increase in Britain’s defence budget until 2021. That was never going to be the case under a Labour Government, and I sincerely hope that it was never going to be the case under any coalition Government. In fact, there was a 10% rise in defence spending between 1997 and 2010. In this country, defence spending consistently formed 2.5% of GDP—one of the highest levels in the world, so it is not that we scrimped at all.

I appreciate that I need to allow time for the Minister to speak. I am only sorry that I cannot give him more time. Members on the Opposition Benches have been clear this morning: they want more certainty on the matter. Let me finish with something that was said by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile)—he and I sat together at a dinner a couple of weeks ago. There was almost an admission from him that this rushed strategic defence and security review was financially driven; it was not in the best interests of our country, our defences or those who serve in foreign lands.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

John Glen Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

As a new member of the Defence Committee and, indeed, a relatively new Member of this House, I do not approach these matters as an expert. However, having listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), I contribute with some trepidation as a former strategy consultant. He seemed to say that, essentially, there is a lack of strategic thinking throughout government. I suspect that the real problem is the interaction with strategic thinkers and politicians. That is what has bedevilled the process.

I shall make four observations and then some brief concluding comments. Overall, the conclusions of the strategic defence and security review were the best that could have been achieved in the time available and in the circumstances that existed. Legacy issues were the first instrumental factor in defining the outcome of the SDSR, and I make that point broadly, without any intention of launching into a partisan attack. It is absolutely clear that over the period from 1997 to 2007, spending on defence stayed at broadly the same level—2.5% of GDP. However, the number of commitments grew massively, and in that context it was going to be difficult not to delay some decisions or over-spend. The right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), the former Defence Secretary, this afternoon disputed the idea of over-spend, but in reality, with that commitment and with the unintended expenditure that emerged, there was bound to be a problem.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I am interested that the hon. Gentleman should be using 1997 as his starting point. Does he agree that some of the cost pressures on the procurement budget were down to the incompetence of previous Conservative Governments? I am thinking particularly of how Nimrod was procured and of programmes such as HMS Astute, to name but one other.

[John Glen]

Quite possibly, but we can make cheap points or look at the fundamental problems that go back more than 20 years.

The hon. Member for Rutherglen and Hamilton West (Tom Greatrex) was looking at the respective contexts for the reviews—the one in 1997-98 and the one this year. The fundamental difference is the economic context. As the chief economic adviser to former Prime Minister Tony Blair said, the Government had a golden economic legacy. That was not the case this time, and that is a reality. We talk about strategic reviews, but they are within the context of the reality of the spending environment. There was no way in which the spending review could have been completed at a time scale different from that of the SDSR. That is just the reality, it seems to me.

There seems to be a legacy, going back to ’97 and beyond, in which decisions were delayed. The decision last year to slow the rate of the QE class carriers was absolutely the right thing to have done in the context of the bigger pressures to release money for Afghanistan, but that will mean that £600 million in extra spending will be required later. The top 15 equipment programmes are £8.8 billion over budget, with a 32-year cumulative delay. These are real challenges.

As a layperson, I look at the situation of Nimrod. I look at how the number of aircraft ordered was reduced from 21 to nine and the cost per aircraft was increased by 200%. When I also consider that it was eight years late, I see that there are fundamental problems in the whole system of government.

The second factor is making Afghanistan the No. 1 priority in the review. We can say with some confidence that the decisions made in the SDSR were completely necessary and absolutely right in respect of our commitments—more than 9,000 troops in the theatre of war. That costs a lot of money. The problem of all defence reviews is that they seek to address the long-term strategic issues. That, however, can never be done in isolation; it has to deal with current realities.

There will be some positive consequences. Those listening to the debate who have family members in Afghanistan can be assured that the full range of training and equipment is now available. Support for families is as it should be and the previous Government took good steps in that direction during their last year in power. The doubling of the operational allowance is also to be welcomed.

I am trying to be as quick as I can. The third issue that I would like to touch on is procurement. Procurement issues are systemic; there is no clear balance of power—or the balance is not right—between the MOD and the defence industry. The relationship is probably flawed. I hope that, as we see the defence industrial strategy emerge—after the SDSR, unhelpfully—we will have a serious examination of what is going on and what is required. I fear that sometimes the political pressures that obviously influence the MOD’s decision making have led it to prop up industry ahead of making the best decisions in defence terms.

I acknowledge the contribution made by the hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Mr Davidson); of course there needs to be an understanding of what long-term capabilities we need to invest in, but that must not always be as a substitute for making the right defence decisions for our country’s long-term interests. Often, we do not have the same person managing the procurement process. There is a change of scope and a lack of ownership. The MOD suffers and the taxpayer suffers, too. That is a critical issue that needs to be addressed.

My fourth point is about the capacity to change, which does not exist across the services in sufficient quantity. One commentator over the summer referred to the SDSR debate—or discussion, or negotiations—as a knife fight in a phone box, which is a pretty horrible analogy but one borne out by an assessment in the immediate aftermath of the SDSR announcements of which services won. I do not think that that is helpful in edifying the consequences and impact on the defence of this nation.

Let us consider some of the specifics. We have heard a lot this afternoon about the decision on the Harriers, but my concern would be about the extent of that gap in capability and how long it will take us to get the capability in place to fill that gap. Will the Tornadoes be viable for the length of time that they will potentially need to fill the gap and how much money will be required to fill some of the gaps? There is a great deal of supposition about how some of these things might work out. That might be from necessity—it is absolutely right to say that the financial pressures have been dominant in the entire decision making process—but some real concerns about capabilities that might be lacking in the near term need to be addressed.

As my hon. Friend the Member for South Thanet (Laura Sandys) said, by 2020 more than a third of our energy will be delivered by water-borne means, particularly liquefied gas. We have seen the emergence of piracy on our seas. Such things might proliferate and it is difficult to determine the risk that will face our country. I am concerned that there will be a delay in the readiness of capabilities.

It is absolutely clear that there needs to be greater capacity among the services to harmonise—for example, to harmonise the frequency of deployment, particularly as the Navy and the RAF will be working more closely together. As significant reforms of allowances will need to take place, it is important that that is done with care and fairness. I was talking to a constituent just a few weeks ago who has moved with his family nine times in the past 11 years. I hope that when decisions are made about the continuation of the CEA—the continuity of education allowance—they will be made fairly so that people can have continuity in their education. That seems to me an appropriate need, not a perk.

The SDSR could never have achieved all that it set out to achieve, because of the legacy, the challenges of procurement and the real issues to do with managing a budget that was pretty restricted. It was always going to be difficult, but I think there are grounds for optimism. I commend the Secretary of State for fighting hard and doing the best he could in extremely difficult circumstances.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

John Glen Excerpts

Thursday 16th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

At the core of the debate are three interlocking factors. I want to examine them and draw some conclusions from them. First, there has been a massive reduction in the defence budget since the war. It is now clear that, in the past decade, funding for defence has fallen too low. During our recent two foreign wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the sheer number of urgent operational requirements is evidence of the lack of investment in defence. We do not have the equipment in place for the engagements that we have chosen to pursue. Resources are scrambled at the last minute—at times, that leads to concerns about the adequacy of provision for our armed forces in theatre.

Secondly, we need to recognise that the debate cannot occur in the abstract. As we have just heard, it concerns men and women who are prepared to lay down their lives on our nation’s behalf. We must remember the very real needs of the 9,500 men and women who are currently serving in theatre in Afghanistan. Any outcomes of the continuing review must give them the highest priority in investment and spending.

Thirdly, the conclusions of the debate on the SDSR hinge on our assessment of the threats that we may face in future. Some see Afghanistan as the template for future operations, and want our armed forces configured on that basis, whereas other intelligence suggests that additional threats from different sources—such as interstate conflict, threats from failed states and cyber warfare—should be given greater consideration. The tension between those three factors must be resolved to reach the right conclusions on the future shape of our armed forces.

In short, while the Afghan commitment dictates our current priorities, it must not be allowed to dictate Britain’s future capabilities and defence posture. There is much discussion about the nature of the future threats. Some failed states show no signs of compromise, and history demonstrates the dangers of cutting defence spending in the belief that interstate war is over.

In future, an attack is as likely to come from disruption to our computer and IT networks as it is from a conventional military force. The debate is about the design of our defence capability and the extent to which it should be shaped on current or contingent operations, or on the threats we may be expected to counter in 10 or 15 years. Although we must ensure that our forces are armed properly and can fight and win in any combat operation with which the Government may task them, we must also make sure that we are a leader in countering cyber warfare. We must invest in Britain’s intelligence capacity as a priority, both in the armed forces and in other Government agencies. Whatever the challenge may be—terrorist attack, invasion of a dependent territory or NATO article 5 commitment—it will probably come when we least expect it. The capture of the Falklands, 9/11 and the gas shortages a few years ago have all demonstrated that, whatever the nature of the threat, it frequently comes from out of the blue.

Our front-line forces need strength, flexibility and the capability to fight all foes. It is clear that there is an irreducible minimum for each service if they are to remain viable, credible and capable of dealing with the threats that we ask them to counter. Whatever short-term economic pressures exist and however they weigh in this debate, they should not shape the strategy of our defence spending. As a member of the Defence Committee, I endorse the comments made by several Members, especially my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot). I remain concerned that a budgetary straitjacket, imposed by the Treasury, will dictate some of the SDSR outcomes, despite the best efforts of the ministerial team and the Secretary of State.

The UK’s decisions on defence need to be made in conjunction with the obligations and alliances that we have in NATO, as well as our commitments to the UN and in the EU. These are foreign policy areas and perhaps outside the scope of this debate, but the hard facts mean that defence comes at a cost—either we pay for it or we reshape the role and expectations of influence that we have.

I wish to offer a few observations about where savings can be made, such as in training. Rightly, the armed forces invest heavily in training, but in many areas that training overlaps among the three services, necessitating many initial training establishments with all the associated duplication of costs. There is scope for areas of joint training between the services, which will further reduce costs. This kind of cut will always generate a rearguard action from the services but we need to be bold. It is not a case of abandoning one service or another, but the question needs to be asked whether distinct establishments are needed when they have significant elements of training in common. However, it must be acknowledged that people, and by that I mean service personnel, are still required in significant numbers—for servicing equipment; for maintaining aircraft; for fire fighting and damage control on board ship; and for dominating an area on land.

These are tough times. The Treasury, as one would expect, has a tight grip on the spending review process—perhaps too tight for some of us—but this should not lead the SDSR to make decisions today that will cost more tomorrow. The capabilities to be deployed at times of critical but undefined threats in the future should not be sacrificed to deal with imminent budgetary threats. Anything we cut for good today will not be easily recovered tomorrow. I hope that the SDSR will make wise decisions that put our serving forces first. I hope that it will take tough decisions based on rational analysis rather than tradition, while acknowledging that if we do not look beyond the spending review to the risks and threats the nation will face in 10 or 15 years—and invest in research into new capabilities—this review will have failed.

UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan

John Glen Excerpts

Thursday 9th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

There are considerable military interests in my constituency, so I feel compelled to offer my perspective in this crucial debate. However, I have no military experience—many hon. Members who have spoken have such experience—so it is with some humility that I offer my opinions on the decisions that impact on so many brave men and women who are deployed in Afghanistan. I pay tribute to my constituent, Major Josh Bowman, who was shot in his bed in Afghanistan just before the recess, and to the other 133 soldiers who have given their lives in the service of their country in Afghanistan. We owe them so much.

I do not want to offer a critique of the history of Government decision making over the past nine years—the current Government must deal with the inherited legacy of the British deployment in Afghanistan—but during that time, the situation on the ground in provinces such as Helmand has evolved, with fighting of such intensity that we have been forced, as a nation, to take stock on several occasions.

The debate is another opportunity for the House to reflect on what, as a nation, we seek to achieve in Afghanistan. By what measure will we gauge our success? What will success look like? Does it mean free and democratic elections and the removal of corruption? How do we measure the extent to which we have succeeded? Perhaps success means a well-trained and effective army and police force, new roads, more schools and improved women’s rights. Where does the list end, and what is realistic?

For me, the critical issue is how realistic our list of objectives for the next five years is. I am concerned that the objectives are, at the moment, too vague, sometimes too ambitious, and difficult to stick to given the moving political context and uncertainties on the ground. Furthermore, the timetable for the removal of combat troops by 2015 might be the Government’s fixed policy position, but the critical question is what we can achieve by then. I am greatly concerned that indicating that date so clearly and unambiguously—admittedly, the date is a response to the increasing sense that installing full democracy in Afghanistan in a generation is unrealistic—may be taken by the Taliban as a lack of our commitment, intent or political will.

When John Reid, the former Defence Secretary, said that he hoped that no shot would be fired, few understood the full implications of committing ourselves to engagement in Afghanistan. Others in the House have described Afghanistan as a “broken 13th-century country”. I will not comment on the accuracy of that description, but it is clear that its culture, values and political maturity are different to any other theatre to which our troops could be deployed.

The solution that we offer must be comprehensive. We must take not only a strategic, joined-up approach, but one that views the challenges as international. Our approach will require unity of effort across the coalition, and across borders and myriad Government Departments and agencies, and we must consider everything from financial investment from the International Monetary Fund at one end of the scale, to providing teacher training at the other. To be most effective, the solution requires diplomats and generals, economists and policemen, engineers and teachers, as well as trainers. Defeating the Taliban in the conventional sense—on the battlefield—may satisfy our desire for a measure of success, but it does not secure the defeat of terror per se, especially not in the long term, unless accompanied by a more complex engagement with and investment in Afghan society. We would be wise to remember that for many in Afghanistan NATO forces were not invited, and therefore the kind of war that we think we are fighting is not the same as that seen by the Taliban or many people on the ground in Afghanistan. While we fight against those who harbour terrorists, they consider themselves to be engaged in a war against uninvited foreigners. We fight to defeat al-Qaeda: they fight for local tribal pre-eminence. NATO fights to eradicate the Taliban: they fight for independence. While that may be inconvenient to our world view, unless we acknowledge the different perceptions that exist and engage with them—and change the emphasis of our objectives—we will not achieve what we set out to achieve.

Our mission has to be one that focuses as much on smart, soft power as it does on military effect. What that means in reality is that our focus has to be on coaching, mentoring, training and building up capacity, not only in the military but in all aspects of government in Afghanistan. In recognising that our armed forces are operating within a country whose culture, values and faith system are so different to our own, we need to state explicitly what our objectives are, how we propose to achieve them and on what basis we will grade our progress. We have a job—even a moral duty—to leave the country in a better position than we found it. That will not be easy, and we need to be clear and honest about the success that we can realistically achieve.

While I agree that some form of timetable is useful, our strategic plans for Afghanistan must not be driven by an artificial political timetable. They must be driven by a rational and honest view of what we wish to achieve, recognising that our deployment will be more focused on state building than success in combat. Just because we are now realising the immense implications of playing the role of a catalyst for the rapid maturing of the democratic infrastructure, we cannot throw our hands up in the air and say that all troops must come home now. What would that say to the Afghan people? It would say, “We did our best by military force to deal with the forces of terror, but because of the time it would take to help you develop a stable country, we will leave you with a vacuum and you will have to deal with the consequences of stirred-up ethnic and tribal tensions and the prevailing insecurity that that brings.” That is not credible, honourable or right. Consequently, there is a requirement for our armed forces to remain in Afghanistan to deliver a realistic prospect of a reasonably secure Afghan state, but we need a pragmatic path to that end point.