Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Jon Pearce Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)]

I am a member of RamsTrust.

[Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)]

I am a season ticket holder in the Premier League.

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to benefit. I urge the Government to consider wording that refers specifically to not compromising the opportunities of future generations. The amendment also refers to increasing TV viewership and overall match attendance. That goes back to what my hon. Friend the shadow Minister said about not merely accepting the status quo continuing but seeking to improve and enhance the beautiful game, to which the amendment alludes by referring to increasing TV viewership and overall match attendance.

[Jon Pearce]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. Does the hon. Member agree that there is a tension between increasing TV viewership and increasing match attendance? Many fans around the country will say that the frustration of moving kick-off times from 3 o’clock on a Saturday to 4 o’clock on a Sunday, or to a Monday, Thursday or Friday evening, has a massive impact on the regular UK fan. Does the hon. Member see any tension between the aims of amendment 96?

[Joe Robertson]

I would not like to sweep aside any suggestion of tension. There will always be tension among people who watch sport—in this case football—in different ways, but I do not accept that there is an overall tension. It is perfectly possible to grow both match attendance and TV audiences. I do not accept that there is a structural tension between those two things. In my view, the success of football is infinitely growable.

Amendment 96 also refers to the unique heritage of football clubs. The shadow Minister talked about football being older than the Labour party, which shows how woven into the fabric of this country—indeed, of the whole United Kingdom—football is. The amendment also mentions the

“effects on the income of local businesses, cultural enrichment or the reputation of the local area.”

All Members know that football and football clubs have a positive effect on those things. It is right to that the Bill’s purpose reflects all those things and the breadth and importance of football in this country.

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[Mr French]

Thank you, Sir Jeremy; I appreciate your steer. My point is about definitions, but I appreciate that we will talk later about the scope of the Bill and the suitability of owners. The point that the official Opposition are trying to make is that the definitions should be more prescriptive about the multi-club ownership model. I hope you will allow me to carry on in that vein. I am sure I will make similar comments when we come to suitability.

If one of the clubs in a multi-club ownership runs into financial difficulty, it will surely draw resources away from the other clubs and put their financial stability at risk. As the Bill stands, the descriptions give no regard to that; rather, they seem to encourage that sort of behaviour as an obvious way to operate outside the scope of most of the regulator’s powers.

The City Football Group, which owns Manchester City, has stakes in clubs in Spain, France and Italy, and as far afield as Australia and Uruguay. Although that group is often held up as a successful example of the model, it raises legitimate questions, which we are seeking to ask today, about competitive fairness. In its own rules, UEFA has already sought to restrict clubs from competing in the same European competitions.

Not including multi-club ownership in this part of the Bill negates the Government’s claim that the Bill will promote competition. If anything, it seems that it will provide an open goal for the richest clubs.

As a football fan first, I know that supporters are frustrated by the tactics that the wealthiest clubs already use to avoid the financial fair play rules, and I am afraid the Bill will likely make that worse. We have seen UEFA act to ensure clubs such as RB Leipzig and FC Red Bull Salzburg restructure their ownerships to avoid breaching rules on clubs with shared control competing in the Champions League. UEFA recognises the risk to competitiveness, and the Government should too. The Minister must accept that UEFA is protecting competition across Europe, but she and the Government are actively putting competition at risk by not including accommodations for multi-club ownership in this part of the Bill.

I appreciate that giving the regulator complete carte blanche over the multi-club ownership model would likely violate UEFA’s rules. We know that UEFA has written to the Secretary of State about the Bill—she will not publish that correspondence—so why are the Government picking which bits they agree with UEFA on and which bits they do not? To be clear, we are not seeking to increase the regulator’s scope; instead, we want to apply consistent conditions to all owners, whether they own a newly promoted League Two club or some of the biggest clubs across multiple countries.

I am sure we will see more and more discrepancies between what the Government say and what the Bill will actually do as we continue through this Committee, but the fact that we have got only as far as schedule 1 in our first sitting and have found a glaring omission is proof that the Government need to look very carefully at how the Bill will operate.

[Jon Pearce]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I declare my interest as a member and the former chair of the RamsTrust. Given that my hon. Friend the Member for Derby South is also here, this is probably not the last time that we will get to talk about Derby County.

I welcome these definitions, which are hugely important as a balance against some of the tests of ownership. They will help to solve some of the problems that Derby County have faced. In October 2003, three individuals bought Derby County for £1 each. The three amigos, as they became infamously known by the fans, had no money of their own and initially refused to disclose who the actual owners of the club were. It turned out that the money the trio had used to support their takeover was a loan costing 10% interest a year from a company, the ABC Corporation, registered in Panama.

It was at that point that I joined the RamsTrust—the supporters’ group that campaigns for a stronger voice for supporters in the decision-making processes at Derby County. Obviously, such trusts play vital roles at other clubs across the country. The tireless efforts of the fans in scrutinising the activities of the management of the club led to four individuals being convicted for fraud and receiving substantial prison sentences. The definitions will certainly help; although those individuals would have passed any fit and proper person test because they had no previous convictions or previous evidence of fraud. That is why I welcome the provisions in the Bill.

[Joe Robertson]

In looking at the definitions, I am concerned about what is intended to be meant by “ultimate owner”, not least from a drafting point of view. Schedule 1 deals with an owner in significant detail, although it is actually quite convoluted and I worry that there may be loopholes in there that may be exploited in the future. By setting out such a high level of detail around trying to close loopholes, loopholes might accidentally be opened or created.

However, it is not the definition of “owner” that I want to look at, but the definition of “ultimate owner”, which must be something different or else it would not be separately defined. It is contained in clause 3(2), which says:

“For the purposes of this Act, a club’s “ultimate owner” is—(a) where the club has only one owner, that owner;”.

That makes sense; if a club is owned by one person then they are the ultimate owner—that is easy. It goes on to say:

“(b) where the club has more than one owner and one owner exercises a higher degree of influence or control over the activities of the club than any other owner,”.

That seems very vague wording for lawmaking. There could be two highly influential owners, but one has some power at their disposal that makes them technically able to exercise a higher degree of influence; that does not mean that the other owner is not also very influential. I do not understand why “ultimate owner” dismisses the possibility of there being two club owners exercising a significant degree of control, albeit where one has a marginally higher degree of control than the other.

Normally the wording in company law—but not just company law—talks about an owner, director or officer exercising significant influence and control, and there is a lot of case law that sets out what that means. That wording is used in the Bill, in schedule 1(15), which is entitled

“Significant influence or control over the activities of a club, trust or other body”.

But because clause 3(2) does not use that wording, “ultimate owner” must mean something different than exercising a significant degree of control, and I do not understand what it is getting at.

There is a third definition of “ultimate owner”. We have dealt with where there is only one owner—that is easy. We have dealt with where there is more than one owner, and one owner exercises a “higher degree” of influence, whatever that means. The third definition is

“in any other case, each owner of the club who exercises a degree of influence or control over the activities of the club”.

That seems to be sweeping up anyone with any influence, so potentially every owner. But it goes on to say

“where there are other owners, is a higher degree of influence or control than any other owner.”

That suggests that the only owner in a multi-owned club who is not caught by the definition of “ultimate owner” is the one owner who ranks the lowest in terms of the amount of control that they exercise over the club. The provision is badly drafted. It is very unclear what it is trying to achieve, and alternative wording is available to the Government and the draughters of the Bill. If the aim of describing the ultimate owner is to avoid applying this to very small shareholders, such as community shareholders and fans who have some ownership of the club but no meaningful say over what happens to it, the Bill could simply state that an ultimate owner is any owner other than those who exercise a negligible or trivial degree of control. That would exclude those who have no influence but who own shares and would avoid the convoluted, inclusive set of provisions that amount to nonsense in the minds of most people.

If an ultimate owner is not defined in the Bill, the Government open themselves up to all sorts of problems. An ultimate owner, who may be very wealthy, could deploy his well-paid legal team to take the Bill apart in court, and we know what courts will do: if the wording is unclear, they can find in favour of the person who is trying to be bang to rights with a badly drafted Bill. I would urge the Government to rectify that. I do not expect the Minister necessarily to be able to respond to all that detail on the hoof now. If she cannot, I ask her to go away and seek clarification on that, because I worry that that is a major drafting defect. If we cannot define an ultimate owner in the Bill, we have a problem.