UK Armed Forces in Middle East

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Monday 29th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Leo Docherty]

We always make the point to our Israeli colleagues that the protection of civilian life is imperative. We acknowledge that Israel has an absolute right to self-defence, and we hope that Hamas will recognise that the path to peace lies in laying down their arms and releasing the hostages.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

My understanding is that the British Government do not support the ground offensive by the Israeli military in Rafah. Will they therefore use all the leverage at their disposal, including withdrawing arms export licences, if the Israeli Government act against British policy?

[Leo Docherty]

We have one of the world’s toughest arms export regimes, of which we should be very proud.

Ukraine: Military Equipment

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge]

My right hon. Friend, who speaks with great passion, is right to talk about the need to hold Russia to account. We have said that repeatedly. We have said that in reference both to the war itself and to specific actions, such as those involving Alexei Navalny and so on. We are under no illusion about the nature of that regime and what would happen if it were to succeed. We have had that view right from the beginning, and it is brilliant that so many countries have joined us in that effort. I strongly believe that without our efforts Ukraine would not still be in the fight. How do we keep the Ukrainians there? We must keep providing the munitions that we have described, keep training the personnel in Interflex, and keep ensuring that our allies join us in all of those efforts.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

The US State Department has reportedly calculated that North Korea has delivered 10,000 containers of munitions to Russia for deployment in Ukraine. What can be done to disrupt the supply chain?

[James Cartlidge]

That is not a straightforward question to answer. As I said right at the beginning about the things that ultimately come from military intelligence, these are sensitive matters, but the hon. Gentleman can rest assured that these are priorities that we look at very closely with our international partners.

AUKUS Defence Partnership

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Tuesday 14th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I call Jonathan Edwards.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

Diolch, Mr Deputy Speaker. Is it not the case that major defence announcements such as this one should not be considered in isolation? By far the biggest foreign policy challenge that we face is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Western strategies are largely dependent on economic sanctions against Russia, but those sanctions have been blunted by the fact that Russia has been able to find other markets with which to trade. What assessment has the Minister made of whether the AUKUS security pact will help or hinder our strategies to bring Russia’s war to an end?

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: we have to ensure that our defence nuclear programme progresses in the way that I have indicated, but not to the exclusion of what we are properly doing on the continent of Europe. I am proud, and I think this whole House can be proud, that after the United States there is no nation on the planet that has done more than ours to provide military equipment to the Ukrainians: more than 100,000 artillery shells, 200 armoured fighting vehicles, night vision goggles, more than 10,000 anti-tank weapons, winter clothing and so on. We do all this and more because we believe that we need to send a message from this country that might is not always right and that our country can be counted on to stand up to bullies.

Ukraine

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Wednesday 25th May 2022 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

The hon. Gentleman asked his question very sincerely, and I know that his experience is shared by many Members. As a constituency MP, I have encountered such cases myself.

We are all keen to see these visas processed as soon as possible. As the hon. Gentleman will know, a significant number have been provided—I think it is more than 107,000 now—but I appreciate that that makes no difference to those who are sitting outside Ukraine with diminishing amounts of money, wanting to come to this country and to a home that is desperate to have them and embrace them. I know that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department—my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), who is sitting beside me—recognises that there are issues relating to children in particular; the Home Office is working assiduously to try to get on top of all these issues. In my personal experience, the system seems to be getting faster and better, but we are not there yet, and that work continues to be done by my friends in the Home Office.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

Before the Minister moves on to the subject of NATO commitments, may I raise the subject of direct support for Ukraine? As he knows, it has historical debt problems, and the invasion will obviously have a huge economic impact; the statistics are clear to us all. Can the Minister say something about the co-ordination of direct international financial support for Ukraine, and how we can keep the country solvent during a time when that is a very pressing matter for it?

[Jeremy Quin]

We have supplied significant funds directly to Ukraine to help it through this incredibly difficult period. I cannot lay my hands on the exact amount, but the House may be blessed with the figure later in my remarks. We are also working with the G7 and others. Clearly, Ukraine is suffering from extraordinary problems at present, and the international community recognises that. It also recognises that Ukraine is standing up for a cause that means so much to us all, so the hon. Gentleman’s point is well made.

If I may, I will move on to our economic response. We are escalating our sanctions regime still further to stymie the Russian war machine and isolate Putin. The UK has now sanctioned more than 1,000 individuals and 100 entities, including oligarchs with a net worth of more than £100 billion. In recent days we have focused on his inner circle and the shady financial network surrounding him. This is alongside the asset freezes, trade bans and tariffs that we and other G7 nations have imposed in recent months. Over time, this economic contraction and the restriction of access to complex components will have an ever-deepening impact on the Russian war machine. As time goes on, despite their daily dose of propaganda, it will be harder and harder for the Russian people to ignore the evidence that their leaders are betraying them and their interests.

--- Later in debate ---

[Luke Pollard]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I want to see reform of our procurement system to ensure that it is sufficient and agile, and, dare I say it, more cost-effective than it has been to date. That is why I am arguing for a medium-term strategy. The steps that we have taken so far have been important, but, rather than just considering the immediacy of the situation, we need a longer-term look at what we need to do.

[Jonathan Edwards]

Following on from what the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) said, I, too, believe that it will be a long-term conflict. Does the shadow Minister agree that, on top of the containment strategy that we will have to have in place for Russia, we will also need a strategy that offers Russia an alternative path for the post-Putin era, whenever that comes, so that it can resume normal international relations if it respects its neighbours?

[Luke Pollard]

It will be a very hard way back for Russia if President Putin remains in power. The off-ramp option that was spoken about in the early days of the war is now very difficult for President Putin to consider, but in discussing future options for how the war can end, we need to make it very clear that the war will end only when Russia leaves Ukraine in its entirety and returns Ukraine to a peaceful situation in which its people can make their own decisions.

I realise that time is passing, so I will briefly raise the Homes for Ukraine issue. There has been enormous support from the British people in opening up their homes to people fleeing Ukraine. My boyfriend and I have signed up to the Homes for Ukraine scheme, but without a matching service, it is difficult to ensure that we can fill our spare room. There are tens of thousands of people in a similar situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

It is a real pleasure to participate in this important debate. I begin by commending the Ministers on the Treasury Bench for the regular drumbeat with which they bring this subject to the House to allow us to understand what is happening, to take stock and to comment on the clearly very difficult situation in Ukraine.

If invading Ukraine was an effort to rekindle Russian superpower status, it has been a complete flop. There was no clear initial strategy, no effective command and control, no logistical support and absolutely no appreciation of the Ukrainian people’s fearless desire to stay and fight. For Russia, this has been a dismal campaign. The body bags returning to Russia have piled up in their thousands, and dozens of wrecked Russian T-72 tanks now litter Ukrainian roadsides after a failed attempt to take the capital. With international sanctions starting to bite and countries such as Britain replenishing the arsenal of the brave Ukrainian forces with NLAWs and the like, surely Putin knows he cannot win. But sadly, this is far from over. With little care for the accepted rules of war or even for the loss of Russian life, Russian forces have now regrouped in the south-west of the country and have begun bombing entire towns and cities from afar, carrying out barbaric war crimes to gain territory, specifically in the Donbas region, and exploiting the west’s timidity about getting directly involved.

As NATO leaders head to the Madrid summit in June, there are lessons for the west to learn. Step back from events in Ukraine and we begin to realise that this is not just about Ukraine; it is another turning point in our history—indeed, in European security. We have had it quite easy over the last 30 years, since the end of the cold war, but the next few decades will be extremely bumpy indeed. State-on-state aggression is clearly back. If we do not help to put this fire out in Ukraine, it will spread to other parts of Europe, yet today it seems we are doing only enough to ensure that Ukraine does not lose, and not enough to guarantee that Ukraine can win. Putin may have misjudged Ukraine’s resolve to hold ground and fight, but he was spot-on in believing that NATO would have no appetite for getting directly involved.

Putin’s invasion did not come out of the blue. His vice-like grip on his own media has, over decades, convinced the majority of Russians that the west—specifically NATO—is a threat and must be confronted. He has publicly expressed a desire to regain control of those countries that were once governed by Stalin. And now, he is sidling ever closer to China, which shares Russia’s disdain for western standards and values.

This is indeed a dangerous turning point in our history, and the threat picture is certainly beginning to change fast. I put it to the House that how we conduct ourselves over the next few months—how we regroup and how we choose to stand up to this growing authoritarianism across the world—could have major implications for how things play out over the next decade. I recall speaking when Parliament was recalled after we decided to withdraw from Afghanistan. I made the statement that our departure could well be the high-tide mark of western liberalism since the second world war. I fear that if we do not get Ukraine right, I might be right in that analysis.

If we are to do things correctly, we face three big tasks, which I put to the Minister today. First, on Ukraine itself, we must agree on what exactly victory looks like. Even in the debate so far this afternoon, there has not been disagreement, but there have been different views on what success actually is. For me, it is the flushing out of all Russian forces from mainland Ukraine—I park Crimea, because it is a more complex issue to be revisited at a later date. Ultimately, I encourage President Zelensky and the Ukrainian armed forces to clarify that that is what they want to do, because that then makes clear how we can fully support them.

There must be clarity of that mission, because there seems to be a little disagreement taking place across our European allies. France and Germany are suggesting that a chunk of the Donbas could remain in Russian hands. We need to agree what that mission is, because that then helps to define operations, tactics and the equipment that is required. Eastern Ukraine, for those not familiar with it, is open, flat, tank terrain. It is perfect for that form of mobility and firepower. That indicates the sort of equipment we need to give.

The second task—slightly bigger, and stepping back from Ukraine—is to rekindle those cold war statecraft skills and the ability to react robustly to events without assuming that we will lose control of the escalatory ladder and trigger a nuclear war when dealing with Russia. NATO, let us not forget, remains the most formidable military alliance in the world. It is no wonder Sweden and Finland both want in. Yet future generations may ask why NATO formally sat on its hands while a democracy on its doorstep was partially destroyed. Let us remember what happened in 1938 when we hesitated. Too often, we have been spooked by Putin’s rhetoric. We should be shaping events, not reacting to them.

In fairness to the west and in particular to Britain, we have come a long way since our initial hesitance to answer President Zelensky’s pleas for help. Thankfully, NATO allies are catching up with the scale of Britain’s military support for Ukraine, which actually began way back in 2014. However, NATO refuses to formally get involved. It is consensus-driven, and it is clear that some countries do not want to lean forward. It is time therefore to form a coalition of like-minded nations, working together to better co-ordinate military support for Ukraine, increasing the quality and quantity of equipment and assisting with supply chains and training, all united by a mission to see Ukraine push Russian forces entirely out of its mainland.

We must be proactive in limiting the economic harm that Russia is causing. We should establish a humanitarian corridor around the key port of Odesa, so that the grain that much of the world depends on can continue to reach international markets. That is in our interests, because it will help directly tackle the cost of living crisis affecting us here, too.

Our final task is to form a strategy to handle an ever-assertive Russia-China axis that is attempting to exploit our fragile world order. Putin would not have invaded Ukraine if President Xi had not given his backing and support. Both countries share a common goal of building an illiberal alternative world order where authoritarian states can flourish, and Ukraine is just the start of that new axis of autocracy flexing its muscles. We must recognise that the last 30 years have been a walk in the park compared with what lies ahead. All NATO countries must increase defence spending to a minimum of 3% and the recent cuts to our troop numbers, fighter jets and ship numbers must be reversed.

[Jonathan Edwards]

The right hon. Gentleman speaks with great authority and knowledge. Given the emergence of the axis between China and Russia, how concerned is he about reports of a joint military exercise in the last few days over the Sea of Japan?

[Mr Ellwood]

I look forward to the hon. Gentleman’s contribution. I will focus on what happens in the European theatre of operations, but he raises an important question about the tilt to the Pacific, which was mentioned earlier, and what is happening in Ukraine. If we now recognise that Russia and China are working together, we must also appreciate that what Russia is doing in Ukraine is in China’s interest, because it has kept us, Europe and the United States busy and distracted so we have not kept an eye on what is going on in other parts of the world. We need to recognise that we must lean into what is happening in the South China sea. I would like to see a development of the Quad—Japan, India, United States and Australia—with Britain and France being invited into that strategic partnership to look after and take a greater interest in the security of that part of the world. I hope that the Government will look forward to that in the discussions at NATO.

Ukraine Update

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Monday 25th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

I talked earlier about the joint expeditionary force. Irrespective of whether those countries joined NATO, it would be incomprehensible to me if Britain did not, for example, go the aid of Sweden should it be attacked or invaded. It is a fellow European country with huge links to our country, the same values and so on. One of the reasons why the JEF—Finland and Sweden, plus eight NATO countries—is such an important grouping of nations is that we totally share the same values, and have the same professionalism in our armed forces and the same capabilities. Britain signed a memorandum of understanding with Sweden—originally, I think, in 2014—to further our defensive co-operation, and we are working to see what more we can do in the near future.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

Ukraine is facing a financial crisis, with the Financial Times reporting that revenues are at around half of pre-war levels, and the fiscal gap for this month alone is projected to be $7 billion. The International Monetary Fund has approved an administered account for countries to make donations through a secure vehicle. Has the UK made a contribution to the account? What efforts are being made, together with partners, to provide Ukraine with hard cash?

[Mr Wallace]

We have given, I think, more than £100 million in aid, but I will write to the hon. Gentleman with details about the IMF fund. He is right that we need to focus on that as much as on military aid. The United States announced a significant amount of funding for Ukraine only over the weekend.

Migrant Crossings: Role of the Military

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

I would argue that that is exactly what our policy does. We are engaged around the world through our aid and military efforts to provide security and stabilisation in the countries from which most people are fleeing. I think that the work of our armed forces and of the brilliant people in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office who do international development is succeeding to an extent, but there is much more to be done. Criminal gangs are exploiting the most vulnerable, and it is right that we and our partners around the world get after those gangs to stop their work, because it is deeply insidious and malign.

It is also our responsibility to the people of this country to ensure that our borders are secure, for two reasons. First, it acts as a deterrent for those who are in France and are considering making an illegal crossing that will cost them their life savings and risk putting them to sea in a boat that is woefully ill-equipped for the sea state. Secondly, the people of the United Kingdom want control over their borders and over migration, and this Government are committed to delivering it.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

Diolch, Mr Speaker. It is disappointing that the Minister has not ruled out pushback in his answers today, because it poses an obvious danger to life. In response to the announcement this week, navy sources have said that they deem pushback to be unethical. If Border Force implemented that policy and a small boat capsized, what would be the policy for Border Force staff?

[James Heappey]

I have been clear that the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines will not use the tactic, principally because they simply do not have the platforms that are appropriate for doing so. Arguably, the Border Force does; it has been doing trials with it, so it remains an option. But let us be clear: there are parts of the channel in which it definitely cannot be done, and there is a small part of the channel in which it might possibly be done. That is for the Navy commander to consider in due course.

Having a robust response that starts with the guarantee that we will intercept all boats either at sea or as they land, and then bringing people into a system that itself acts as a deterrent, is the right way to go. The people want the Government to get control of our borders—it is one of the Prime Minister’s top priorities. The MOD has a part of that plan, which we are confident in our ability to deliver; the rest of the plan will be unveiled in due course.

Afghanistan

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Tuesday 20th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

That is exactly the sort of support that we envisage. The agreement is that there will be no military presence within Afghanistan, but that does not diminish in the slightest our ability to continue to have a strong relationship with the Afghan national security forces and to develop their capability either from the outside in or by bringing them to study and train in the United Kingdom.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind) [V]]

I congratulate the Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), on securing this question and on his excellent contribution, because whatever way the British Government try to present it, the unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan is a humiliation. No parliamentary vote was held to authorise the invasion 20 years ago, nor was democratic endorsement sought for the disastrous escalation of UK involvement in Helmand province. Is it not time that it was enshrined in law that major military engagements and significant escalations of conflict must be endorsed by this House and, I would argue, when Welsh troops are involved, by the Senedd as well?

[James Heappey]

That last point is clearly somewhat problematic. People from across the United Kingdom serve in our units and they serve as the UK’s armed forces. I suspect that the hon. Gentleman knows how impractical his suggestion is, but perhaps he is playing to an audience back home.

As for the hon. Gentleman’s earlier point, it would be impractical in the extreme for all operational decisions, some of which have to be taken with some haste, to be a matter for a vote in this House. The detail that underpins those decisions often cannot be fully shared at the Dispatch Box, for obvious reasons. The Government have, throughout, made every effort to be transparent about the way the Afghanistan campaign has been progressing. I remember there being regular updates to the House on it and the opportunity for Ministers to be held to account, but I am not sure that military planning by parliamentary vote is necessarily the way to show the coherence of the military instrument to our adversaries overseas.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel And Veterans) Bill

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 23rd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)]

Notwithstanding the Secretary of State’s comments, he knows that some people who are very close to the military consider the Bill to be extremely controversial. Indeed, the Financial Times today leads with a quote that it is an “international embarrassment”. Does he agree with General Nick Parker, a former commander of UK land forces, who was quoted in the Financial Times today as saying:

“We shouldn’t be treating our people as if they have special protection from prosecution…What we need to do is to investigate properly so that the ones who deserve to be prosecuted, are”?

[Mr Wallace]

First, that is what we are doing. I do not agree with the point about torture. I absolutely agree with the point by the former Attorney General for Northern Ireland on that subject.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Healey]

In his typical way, the hon. Member puts his finger on an important point. He understates his argument, as there is more than just some concern; there are, for instance, according to the Royal British Legion, very clear grounds for concern that the provision breaches the armed forces covenant, and I will come on to that point.

Let me deal with getting this problem, which does exist and must be fixed, in a proper perspective. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) was absolutely right about how hard it is to get hard, clear information out of the Government. Over recent months, I have had to prise figures out of the MOD. There is a deep resistance to releasing full, open information. The first important figures to give a broad perspective are these: over the past 15 years, there have been 25 cases brought by injured British troops against the MOD for every one case brought by alleged victims against our troops. You can see why, Madam Deputy Speaker, some of the veterans I have talked to about this Bill reckon it is more about protecting the MOD than it is about protecting troops. Britain deployed 140,000 troops to Iraq over six years. The Government cite—the Secretary of State did so today—1,000 civil claims, all against the MOD, not individual service personnel, as evidence for the Bill to end vexatious legal claims. One third of those cases—330—have had the MOD pay compensation. Clearly, they were not vexatious as the MOD rightly insists on only settling cases in which it accepts liability. [Interruption.] The Secretary of State says, “No, we don’t,” but if he looks at the annual report on the cases that the Department publishes and takes, he will see exactly that commitment and clarification. It does not have the power to settle claims where it judges that it would not be found liable in a court. However, one fifth of the cases—217—have been withdrawn or struck out. They may well have been vexatious cases—they were certainly baseless. They may have taken too long, but the system, even as it stands, has dealt with them.

Two fifths of the cases—414—are ongoing, according to the MOD, although that definition could mean that those cases are settled and the MOD has agreed to pay compensation, but there may still be outstanding arguments over legal costs. Those cases may again be long-running, but they are hardly vexatious if they have not been struck out by now.

On the criminal side, the Government cite 3,400 allegations. The Secretary of State referred to the Iraq Historic Allegations Team that looked into them. Despite deep flaws in that investigation, 70% were ruled out as there was no case to answer or no proportionate grounds for a criminal investigation. In other words, those allegations did not warrant a full investigation so got nowhere near the point of decision about prosecution. They would have been wholly unaffected by the Bill if the measure had been in place because, as the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, it does not deal with investigations—as it should—but only with prosecutorial decisions and process. By the way, just seven prosecutions have been brought against British soldiers from the remaining allegations and investigations, and all but one have now been dropped.

On Afghanistan and criminal cases, the Operation Northmoor investigation in 2014 examined 675 criminal allegations from 159 people. The investigation closed and no charges have followed. Indeed, the investigation concluded a year before the MOD confirmed in public in June that it had closed.

On judicial review, the Government have cited 1,400 JRs of civil and criminal Iraq and Afghanistan cases as justification for the Bill. I can only find evidence that two judicial reviews are continuing. The court gave the MOD permission to strike many of the others out three years ago. Yet in April, the Minister told me in answer to a written parliamentary question that the MOD had still only notified fewer than half—630—of the court’s decision not to take the investigations further.

To put the matter in perspective, certainly some vexatious claims have been lodged and the current system has taken too long to weed them out, but the bigger, more serious, more consistent problems lie in the system of investigations, which lacks speed, soundness, openness and a duty of care to alleged victims and to the forces personnel who may be in the frame. Those are the problems, which occur well before the point of decision about prosecution, which is the point at which the Bill starts to operate. They are what the Bill should and can deal with. Our aim during its passage through Parliament is to help ensure that it does.

To pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson), I must confess that when I first looked at the Bill, I thought that it was designed to draw a line under the cases still caught up in the problem of so-called lawfare. The first paragraph of the explanatory notes gives the same misleading impression. It says:

“This Bill aims to provide greater certainty for Service personnel and veterans in relation to vexatious claims and prosecution of historical events, that occurred in the uniquely complex environment of armed conflict overseas.”

But this legislation will have no impact on any past or any continuing cases, and clause 15 on commencement makes that clear, so it offers no hope and no help of faster resolution either for the troops or for the alleged victims, who may still be involved in long-running litigation or in repeat investigations. I want to make sure that no one in this House and, much more importantly, in the armed forces and the veterans community is misled by what they may have heard or may have understood before now.

Similarly, nothing in this Bill applies to Northern Ireland, despite the same commitment in the Conservative manifesto, similar concerns on the Government side about drawing a line for British troops who served in Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State’s letter to all MPs last week in which he confirmed his eagerness

“to ensure also the equivalent protections of our veterans who served in Northern Ireland.”

The Secretary of State’s speech looked back, but we now legislate for the future. The Bill is not a framework fit for the future point when Britain must again commit its forces to armed conflict overseas. The Government have got important parts of the Bill badly wrong, and I want to see Ministers work with all parties in both Houses and with groups beyond Parliament who have expertise to offer on this—from the British Legion to Liberty—to get this legislation right.

There are problems. The Bill is silent on the command responsibility and the role of commanders in some of these cases. There is a problem, I think, with the Attorney General’s consent, as it risks political factors coming into prosecutorial decisions. There is nothing on the disclosure rights, responsibilities and duties of the MOD. Let me summarise our biggest concerns about the Bill.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I agree with many of the points the shadow Secretary of State has made during his very valid contribution. Does he agree that one of the fundamental weaknesses with the Bill was put forward by the UK’s most senior military judge, who has argued that the consequence of the legislation is that UK military personnel are more likely to find themselves in front of the International Criminal Court?

[John Healey]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for conceding that I am making some valid points. His point is certainly valid, and it will be a point of central argument, probably in the debate today, but certainly as the Bill passes through both Houses.

Let me return to the biggest problems in the Bill. Part 1, as the Secretary of State said, introduces what the Government have called their so-called triple lock to make prosecutions for the most serious crimes harder. The presumption against prosecution for all crimes except sexual violence clearly creates the risk that the very gravest crimes, including torture and other war crimes, go unpunished if an incident does not come to light for five years or if the investigations are drawn out beyond that deadline.

Middle East: Security

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Tuesday 7th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend makes a really good suggestion, and I will take it up at the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting for him. He is right. We already have a number of international coalitions in the strait, such as on anti-piracy, which even involves China, and the International Maritime Security Construct, where we are working with the Americans on protecting our tankers. He is right; tanker wars, as they were called in the 1980s, have been around for a long time. The Iranians used to fire rocket-propelled grenades at tankers back then, deliberately to spike the oil price. He makes a good suggestion.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

Since the assassination, as part of its military build-up, the US has deployed long-range bombers to Diego Garcia, a territory that the British state illegally occupies. The Secretary of State talks about de-escalation, but is not the reality that the British Government’s actions are actually helping to escalate the crisis?

[Mr Wallace]

No. The United States has said that it has deployed many of its troops in response to the rhetoric coming out of Iran, to ensure that it protects its forces, and of course that is the right thing to do. We have sent a small team to ensure that our military planners are properly enabled, and we have changed the posture of our forces in Iraq to ensure that they are currently focusing on their force protection. That does not mean that we are preparing to do anything else, nor does it mean that the United States is.

Modernising Defence Programme

Jonathan Edwards Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. We now need extremely short, single-sentence questions and replies.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

With the splendid isolationism of Brexit and an obsession with nuclear weapons, is there not a danger that the British state will become the European version of North Korea?

[Gavin Williamson]

No chance at all.