Railways Bill (Third sitting)

Laurence Turner Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices off or to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings—but I hope you have plenty of water. We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate.

A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first; other Members are then free to indicate their wish to speak in that debate by bobbing. Please bob on each occasion on which you wish to speak during proceedings. At the end of the debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I shall call again the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press to a vote any other amendments in the group, which includes grouped new clauses, that will be at the Chair’s discretion.

My fellow Chairs and I shall use our discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses, following the debates on relevant amendments. I hope that that explanation is helpful, but you may seek advice when we are not sitting.

Clause 1

Great British Railways

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 257, in clause 1, page 1, line 8, at end insert—

“(2) A body corporate may be designated under this section only if—

(a) it is limited by shares, and

(b) it is wholly owned by the Crown.

(3) Regulations under subsection (1)—

(a) must specify the time from which the designation has effect, and

(b) must be published by the Secretary of State as soon as reasonably practicable.

(4) The designation of a body corporate terminates—

(a) if the body corporate ceases to be wholly owned by the Crown, or

(b) if the Secretary of State revokes the designation.

(5) Any notice of revocation under subsection (4)(b)—

(a) must specify the time from which the revocation has effect, and

(b) must be published by the Secretary of State as soon as reasonably practicable after the notice is given.

(6) For the purposes of this section a body corporate is wholly owned by the Crown if each share in the body corporate is held by—

(a) a Minister of the Crown,

(b) a company which is wholly owned by the Crown, or

(c) a nominee of a person falling within paragraph (a) or (b).

(7) Great British Railways is exempt from the requirements of the Companies Act 2006 relating to the use of ‘limited’ as part of its name.

(8) In this section—

‘company’ means a company registered under the Companies Act 2006;

‘Minister of the Crown’ has the same meaning as in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975 (see section 8(1) of that Act).”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 24—Great British Railways Board—

“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a Board to review decisions taken in respect of Great British Railways (‘the Board’).

(2) The Secretary of State must appoint to the Board persons who are employees of, or otherwise represent—

(a) Great British Railways,

(b) open access passenger operators,

(c) freight operators,

(d) The Office for Rail and Road,

(e) The Passengers’ Council, and

(f) an organisation or campaign group representing passengers with accessibility requirements.

(3) The Board must comprise at least six members and no more than half of its membership may be employed by, or otherwise represent, Great British Railways.

(4) Great British Railways must determine the frequency of board meetings in any year.

(5) Any—

(a) decision by the Secretary of State concerning, or

(b) direction given by the Secretary of State to,

Great British Railways must be notified to the Board prior to the making of the decision or issuing of the direction, and such decision or direction may only be made if a majority of the Board approves of it being made.

(6) The Board must publish any decision or direction it considers, and whether it has approved any such decision or direction.

(7) Where the Board has not approved a decision taken by, or direction given by, the Secretary of State to Great British Railways—

(a) the Board must notify the Secretary of State that it has not approved the decision or direction, and its reasons for not doing so;

(b) the Secretary of State may proceed to make any such direction or decision provided that, in their opinion, it is necessary to do so.

(8) Where subsection (7)(b) applies, the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out reasons for proceeding with the direction or decision.”

This new clause would require the creation of a GBR Board, constituted of relevant internal and external stakeholders and regulatory bodies, which the Secretary of State would have to consult on major decisions and changes.

New clause 38—Ministerial statements on functioning of Great British Railways—

“(1) Once every three months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must make a written ministerial statement in each House of Parliament summarising progress towards Great British Railways becoming fully operational.

(2) Should any day on which the Secretary of State must make a written statement be on a day when either House of Parliament is not sitting, the Secretary of State must publish a statement in similar terms.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament quarterly on progress in establishing Great British Railways.

[Laurence Turner]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. At the outset, I wish to declare that I am a member of Unite.

It is a privilege to speak at the start of these proceedings. I do so as a believer in public ownership of the railways not as an end, but as the best means of realising greater economies for taxpayers and improvements for all those who rely on the railways for livelihood and leisure. I am conscious that the Committee has much work ahead of it, so I will keep my explanation of the amendment brief.

Public ownership is the ballast of the Bill, but its clauses make only limited reference to ownership, although the drafting logic for that may be good—the Bill must, after all, be read alongside the previous enabling legislation passed by Parliament, the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 and the now much amended Railways Act 1993. In 2024, Parliament’s decision and intent were clear: passenger services are to come under public ownership as franchises expire. I must admit, however, that I start our proceedings under the shadow of a doubt. On my reading, there is a risk that the requirements of public ownership that sit outside this Bill may be time-bound, designed for the specific circumstances of transition, and dependent on definitions in statutory instruments that are themselves at risk of amendment or repeal without full parliamentary scrutiny.

I freely acknowledge that some members of the Committee may take a different view of the merits of the ownership question, and I am sure that we will have good and respectful debate on the Bill’s provisions in the weeks ahead, but surely we can all agree on one point: such an important decision as public or private ownership should be taken only through primary legislation. To put it another way, were a future Government to seek to return to a privatised model, they should be obliged to seek majority consent in the full House. That is what the amendment seeks to achieve.

The amendment would require Great British Railways to be a wholly and nationally owned public sector entity. Indeed, it would cease to be GBR if it were sold in whole or in part. The amendment would also, I think, prevent a future Secretary of State from taking the extremely perverse step of removing GBR’s designation as a public sector body and transferring it to a private or semi-private entity.

If the wording of the amendment seems familiar to hon. Members, it will be because they have been paying close attention to other legislation. Clause 1 of the Bill is effectively identical to section 1(1) of the Great British Energy Act 2025. The amendment is a near carbon copy—I am sorry to all members of the Committee, but we are only at the start of our descent; I cannot promise that the puns will improve as we go on—of the subsections that follow in section 1 of that Act. I note that in the equivalent Committee debate for that Act, the sponsoring Minister, the hon. Member for Rutherglen (Michael Shanks), said:

“The clause protects the principle of public ownership by making explicit that the company would terminate if it ceased to be wholly owned by the Crown.”––[Official Report, Great British Energy Public Bill Committee, 10 October 2024; c. 91.]

I accept that we are seeking to build on a complex body of legislation; the railways are the accumulation of two centuries of history, and so are the laws that govern them. If—I emphasise that word—a drafting issue has been identified, we also need to identify the right solution for this specific legislation. I am grateful to the Minister in the Commons and to the Minister of State, the noble Lord Hendy, for their thoughtful conversations on this matter. I am also grateful to the officials who have worked hard to prepare this commendable Bill. My motivation in tabling the amendment is to establish beyond doubt that the Bill will achieve its aim: that Great British Railways will be run by and for the nation. If we can assure ourselves of that, I believe that this legislation will set out a permanent way for reform. I will listen carefully when the Minister responds.

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)]

It is very nice to have you in the Chair, Mrs Hobhouse. I think this a conversation among Labour Members, and I do not want to get in the way of a private dispute. I might just sit down and listen to what the Minister has to say.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

Thank you.

We have this generational change in the organisation of the railways; the Government, with their majority, have taken a political decision to nationalise the sector. We know that nationalisation of the railways has been tried before. They were nationalised in 1950 or 1951—

[Laurence Turner]

It was 1948.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right. From 1950, we had the high point of post-war passenger numbers on the railways—about 1 billion passengers. From that period of nationalisation, the number of passengers choosing—I use that word advisedly—to use the railways started a long and seemingly unstoppable decline. It went from 1 billion in the early 1950s all the way down to about 735 million in the period of privatisation—1993. It seemed like that was due to the public changing the way in which they chose to live their lives. The Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Nottingham South, suggested from her seat on Second Reading that it was obvious that people did not want to use the train so much, even during a period of increasing population, because they were increasingly affluent and they bought more cars. That is a possible explanation.

But then something very odd happened. In 1993, the then Conservative Government legislated to privatise the railways. Now, we can debate—and I am sure we will multiple times over the coming days—whether that was a good or a bad thing in principle and whether the way the privatisation was done, through the Railways Act 1993, and subsequently amended was perfect or whether it could have been improved upon, but if we consider that the primary objective of a railway—leaving freight to one side for a moment—is to carry passengers, the data shows that the privatisation of the railways in the United Kingdom was an unqualified success. The seemingly inevitable decline in passenger numbers changed direction immediately. It was not just a slow bottoming out; that long-term decline immediately turned in the other direction, and then continued to grow until covid meant that all bets were off from 2019. Those numbers did not just grow to recover all the lost work of the previous 40 years—they did not go back up to 1 billion customers; they increased to 1.75 billion. That was a period of increased affluence, when the number of cars available to passengers increased enormously. The only explanation for the absolute reversal in passenger numbers is the decisions taken through privatisation—the profit motive and the incentive to focus on passengers rather than on the organisation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

May I draw the hon. Member’s attention to the fact that so far I have not made a single rail pun in the course of this debate—and I intend to keep it that way?

The hon. Member made a really important point about both parliamentary accountability and the general public being able to understand more about how GBR works and what it constitutes. Throughout the establishment of GBR, there are concurrent process that will allow the Secretary to State to outline more properly the long-term future of the railway and GBR’s role in it, including the long-term rail strategy, as well as work that we are already advancing on the accessibility road map and the rolling stock and infrastructure strategy.

Existing parliamentary structures in our Westminster democracy provide ample room for us to hold Government Ministers and the Secretary of State to account on the establishment of GBR. We have oral questions for Transport, as well as the ability to ask urgent questions on GBR’s establishment. Through both Lord Hendy in the other place and Ministers in this House, we have a real ambition to explain GBR’s provisions and ways of working to the general public, because we are confident in its ability to revolutionise how the railway runs on behalf of passengers, but I take the hon. Lady’s point.

Establishing GBR is the primary purpose of the Bill, and clause 1 provides the Secretary of State with the power, by regulations, to designate a body corporate as GBR. The clause enables wider provisions in the Bill relating to GBR to apply to a body corporate, such as the statutory functions and general duties set out in it. Following Royal Assent, a company will be designated as GBR, and it will consolidate Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd, DfT Operator, train operators and parts of the Rail Delivery Group into one organisation to ensure that GBR can be mobilised as quickly as is practicable.

The clause is essential for the Government to deliver our manifesto commitment to reform the railways by establishing GBR as the directing mind, bringing track and train together. I commend clause 1 to the Committee.

[Laurence Turner]

I must start by slightly disagreeing with the Minister on his approach to railway puns. The shadow Minister referred to the discussion on amendment 257 as a dispute; I reassure him that this is not a case of pistons at dawn—[Laughter.] It is going to get so much worse. Before I come to the Minister’s substantive response, I will briefly respond to a few other comments that have been made in the debate.

The shadow Minister spoke about changes in passenger numbers over the years, which is a good illustration of why it is important to look across a whole time series, and to bear in mind the old maxim that correlation is not causation. After all, passenger numbers were already falling by the time that we got to vesting day in 1948. The railways were exhausted after years of war—indeed, passenger numbers halved between 1920 and 1947. In fact, the actual nadir in passenger numbers was not in the early 1990s but in 1983. I thought that Opposition Members might have wanted to take pride in the successful sectorisation experiment under the Thatcher Government, perhaps aided by some benign neglect from that Administration, which was sadly not repeated by the subsequent Major Administration.

We have some good explanations for why exactly passenger numbers rose so dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s. For a long time, I think we could have all substituted our political explanations for why that happened. However, in 2018, a very good study, led by eminent modellers and academics, was published by the Independent Transport Commission on precisely that question. It found that passenger growth was overwhelmingly driven by changes in the job market—the types of roles being created and the areas of the country in which they were being created. It was also aided by changes to tax incentives for company cars in the early 2000s, which led to an additional increase in rail traffic.

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. For my constituents, in the period since the railways were privatised they have twice needed to be brought back under public ownership: once in 2003, when Connex failed, and again in 2021, when Southeastern failed. However, on both occasions, there was no impact on passenger numbers; rather, the factors that my hon. Friend is describing correlated and led to those passenger numbers. Does he agree that over the last 30 years, whether the service has been under national or private ownership has had no impact on the passenger numbers on trains in my constituency?

[Laurence Turner]

I absolutely agree, and we could point to other examples where franchises being taken in-house under previous Governments led to a service improvement. The Opposition’s problem has always been that public ownership works in practice but not in their theory.

I am heartened by what the Minister had to say on my amendment. This is not an issue of dispute; this is sensible scrutiny. I welcome the commitment the Minister made to take the issue away. I recognise that this Committee is probably not the place to resolve this detailed and technical consideration. I am encouraged by his comments and on the basis that we may return to this matter at a later stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Crown status etc

[Keir Mather]

I beg to move amendment 164, in clause 2, page 2, line 3, at end insert—

“(5A) This section is not to be read as preventing the exercise of functions by Great British Railways on behalf of the Secretary of State, the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers under arrangements made by the Secretary of State, the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers.”

This amendment clarifies that the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers may enter into agency agreements for the performance of functions on their behalf. For example, this may be required to assist with winding up of ongoing franchises, as they transition to GBR.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

In which case, I will speak first to amendment 2, as that is first in the grouping, and then proceed to the others.

Amendment 2 would make explicit the duty of Great British Railways to promote a thriving, competitive retail market, and align the Bill with the Government’s stated aim of delivering a system in which competition drives better outcomes for passengers. The retail market in the UK is currently one of thriving competition, as we can all recognise, and shows UK tech at its best. Trainline is—I think I am right in saying—a FTSE 250 company, and a tech growth story for the United Kingdom, being Europe’s leading train and coach app. The amendment is therefore key to ensuring that the landscape continues to thrive and that we do not drive Trainline and its competitors out of the country.

Members will remember that in written evidence to the Transport Committee, Trainline asked that Committee

“to recommend that the Bill be amended to require structural separation of GBR online retail from the rest of the GBR organisation and to publish information that enables the ORR, CMA and other regulators to assess compliance with competition law, subsidy control rules and non-discrimination duties. This should not be left to the Code of Practice alone”—

and, by the way, we have not seen the code of practice.

Trainline also said:

“We ask that the Committee recommend that the Bill include a statutory duty that all retail market participants—including GBR online retail—are treated fairly, equally and non-discriminatorily, and that GBR online retail be subject to the same Code of Practice as all other retailers…We ask the Committee to recommend that these economic parity safeguards, including structural separation of GBR’s online retail business, be written into the legislation and the forthcoming Code of Practice…We therefore ask that the Committee recommends…An explicit ORR power to impose binding orders or financial sanctions if GBR breaches its licence or the Code. ORR’s competition duty should explicitly apply in respect of these functions and GBR’s licence…Provision for an appeal body (for example the CMA or the Competition Appeal Tribunal) to hear merits of disputes…The Code development process must be led by ORR, independent of DfT and GBR. It must ensure full stakeholder consultation, clear timetable, transparent publication of decisions and mechanisms for future amendment.”

Members may say, “Well, they’ve got skin in the game, haven’t they? They’re a commercial organisation trying to compete with the future GBR, so it will be in their interest to try to fix the corporate structure in a way that gives them an unfair advantage.” But if we look at what Trainline is asking for, we see it is not seeking to gain an unfair advantage. It is merely asking GBR to create a level playing field. Trainline is not the only organisation making that argument; it is joined by others.

[Laurence Turner]

The hon. Gentleman said a few moments ago that Trainline and other online retailers are not seeking to make ill use of their market position, but the Advertising Standards Authority has ordered Trainline to amend its adverts, and the ORR ordered it to amend its practice of not showing booking fees at the start of the booking process. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Trainline accepted that its market share was significantly above the 25% test that the Competition and Markets Authority applies for a potential monopoly position. Does that concern the hon. Gentleman at all?

[Jerome Mayhew]

That demonstrates that the current system is working to hold Trainline to account, and that where there are abuses—if what the hon. Gentleman outlined amounted to abuses—effective systems are in position and they have been corrected.

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention did not speak to the overriding point: what do the Government want when they are applying this new structure to retail? Do they want a level playing field? Is that their intention, or do they want a systemically biased system in which GBR retail is given an unfair advantage over independent competition? Both answers are credible—it is possible for the Government to form one decision—but they should not pay lip service to a level playing field but, in design, achieve the opposite, which appears to be the case at the moment.

In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, the chief executive of the Campaign for Better Transport, essentially agreed with Trainline’s position. He said:

“We think that because the independent retail market has produced significant benefits for customers in the time that it has been in existence. It is heavily used by rail passengers. The critical question in relation to the Bill, and the other mechanisms that will be in place once the Bill has been passed, is how we ensure that there is genuine fair and open competition between GBR ticket retailing and the independent retailers currently or potentially in the market.”

This is a key point: the Government need to stop and think about what their intention is. If it is to have a fair market, the evidence, and all the feedback they are getting from the sector, is that they have not yet achieved that objective. They need to put their money where their mouth is and decide what their objective is. I hope the Minister will be clear in his response as to the Government’s thinking on that.

A second concern is that the sector is nervous about the apparent lack of hierarchy and detail in the functions. GBR is assigned multiple duties under the clause, but with no hierarchy, so it paves the way for potential confusion—or, worse, it gives GBR the ability to pick and choose which function it thinks is important in relation to any decision. It can quietly demote the importance of others so that it can serve itself and thereby reduce the power of the clause.

Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said in oral evidence to the Transport Committee:

“To lead from your further question: with the very broad powers for the Secretary of State and a certain lack of specificity on what will happen, what we are looking for is more key performance indicators, like in business. I realise it is a governmental entity, but the quantitative KPIs are not really there.”

I would go further than that: they are not there at all.

As well as amendment 2, which I have spoken to, we have also tabled new clause 3, which sets out GBR retail requirements. As I have said previously, this is a critical issue given the evidence that the Select Committee received, and the oral evidence that we heard on Tuesday, that the Government have built a structural conflict of interest into the Bill as currently drafted.

We also heard on Tuesday about international examples where a similar concern has been addressed in a different manner. SNCF is a state-owned railway in France that has unification of track and train. It also has a retail function, through which is competes with the wider market. SNCF, or, I presume, the French Government—I do not want to claim greater in-depth knowledge that I actually possess—have taken the decision to have a structural separation between SNCF retail and SNCF operations, the equivalent to GBR. The very obvious reason why they did that was for fairness and to have a level playing field. We are not talking about SNCF, but an improvement on the current position, which I fully accept is not perfect.