Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Bellamy Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very struck by the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, about light at the end of the tunnel. That is what this suite of amendments is about for a cohort of young people who, at the moment, will not be seeing a light at the end of that tunnel. I thank my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for speaking with such clarity about what these amendments are about, and other noble Lords who have described what this must feel like for a young person and pointed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, did, to some of the remedies that these three amendments offer to the Minister and the Government. I hope that they take them up and carry them through.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I again thank noble Lords for all the points made on this part of the Bill. I shall take it first in the general and then the particular. In the general, these amendments quite rightly put on the radar, the horizon and public consciousness the importance of dealing with prisoners who received their sentence when they were still under the age of 18. This is already a very important function that these amendments have performed. As for the question of the light at the end of the tunnel, I share the thoughts of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, that the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, were very pertinent as to what it feels like to be incarcerated in the dramatic circumstances that he related.

It is the Government’s view that these prisoners, among others, need to have light at the end of the tunnel. This is the whole purpose and thrust of the Government’s approach. In practical terms, as I understand it we have 32 prisoners in this position who have not been released, another 48 who have been recalled, and a hundred or so out in the community. These figures may not be exactly right; they are not quite the same as those given by the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, although they are approximately the same. For the recalled cohort and for those in the community, the reduction in the licence period from 10 years to three will be significant and very much benefit those serving this DPP sentence. Against this background, the Government are not quite persuaded that these amendments would achieve our joint objective of providing this light at the end of the tunnel.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, will he comment on the point I was making about the aim of having these reviews written into the statute? Subsection (2) in the new clause set out in Amendment 162 says that they are taking place

“with a view to ensuring that all possible steps are taken to enable their safe release at the earliest possible time”.

That flags up, at the outset, exactly what these reviews are dealing with. I do not know whether it is already in the action plan that the Minister has been referring to, but is there some way of getting that purpose clearly identified, and of course communicating that purpose to the DPP prisoners themselves who are subject to the system, so that they know that that is the purpose for which these reviews are being conducted?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for that point. It is certainly something I will take away when we come to consider the Government’s position.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

I apologise, because I know my noble and learned friend wants to complete his speech, but I ask this question simply because I failed to hear. The action plan has been spoken of a lot during the course of this evening. Is that an existing document, and is it published?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

Yes, and yes.

On the basis that I accept, on behalf of the Government, the importance of this topic, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords in the Committee. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, not least for giving us an opportunity to thank, once more, the Prison Reform Trust, and I would add the Howard League for Penal Reform and UNGRIPP, in particular, who are the family members of these desperate people in many cases. I thank her for pointing out this issue of the window of opportunity for rehabilitation and seeing another possible way of life.

Hope springs eternal, and therefore we are particularly lucky to have “hope” in the form of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who is so active in this Committee. Every point he made was quite hard, if I may say so, to resist. But my man of the match, I am afraid, was, none the less the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots, because I feel that one of the reasons that we have not had a serious penal reform campaign in this country, possibly since the Victorian period, is because we have lost empathy for the prisoner. We have locked them away—out of sight, out of mind. They do not vote, et cetera: all these things that will set the alarm bells ringing at the Daily Mail, if anybody is up there. We have lost empathy for these people. They are not human anymore; they are prisoners; but in this group of amendments at least, we are talking about people who were children when they were given this sentence, and the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots, had sufficient empathy to compare “criminals” with his late father’s friend and a war hero is the kind of empathy that I rarely hear about any demonised group in our society, whether it is convicted people, refugees and asylum seekers or anyone else who is, for the moment, in a demonised category. I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he said.

I am grateful, of course, to my noble friend Lady Thornton for the support of the Labour Front Bench. She of course was an Equality Minister in the not-too-distant past, and I hope that she will be one in the not-too-distant future, shortly, or in due course, or whatever these other phrases are that are occasionally—

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I do not wish her noble friend to place overreliance on the word “quite” in terms of statutory amendments. Statutory amendments are rather different from a proper approach in the action plan and putting that on a statutory basis.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful, but my hope is not dashed, not least because my noble friend is a force of nature, as he has demonstrated throughout his career with the integrity that others have referred to in the way that he has conducted himself over this particular issue in recent times. I need to put on the record for the Committee that he feels particularly strongly about the injustice faced by this cohort. I repeat: every argument we have aired earlier this evening becomes turbocharged in relation to these people, who were children when they were placed under this sentence. But for the moment, at least, I beg leave to withdraw.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I compliment the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, for the force and sincerity with which she put forward her views, as indeed have other noble Lords who have supported Amendment 167, which would go down the road of the resentencing exercise that we have been discussing.

In setting out the Government’s position, I find it hard to improve on the remarks that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, just made. This is a situation where we are dealing with the potential release of IPP offenders, who have committed mostly very serious sexual or violent offences. One would be overriding the decisions that the Parole Board has already taken, in most cases on multiple occasions, and would be putting the judge in the most difficult position.

Indeed, it is not a resentencing exercise in any normal sense of the word because, in most cases, the tariff has already expired. It is essentially a question of trying to do something different, dressed up as a resentencing exercise, to release persons who have already been held, on many occasions, to be unsafe to release. It is very difficult for the Government to go down that road. Again, there is a real risk, if one does go on that road, of wrongly raising the hopes of those who have put their faith in what is, in the Government’s view, not an appropriate way forward.

I want to add just one or two points. First, as the Committee is aware, I have on previous occasions—and I will do so on future occasions—emphasised the pressures we have at the moment on the prison population. The Government would be only too pleased to create further space in the prison population, or to relieve those pressures by releasing certain prisoners, but we have to consider the interests of public protection. It is not a question of being frightened of the media or of cowering in fear of the Daily Mail; it is a question of the protection of the public.

Any responsible Government would have to think very hard before a process that would allow the release, or that was envisaged to achieve the release—perhaps even unlicensed, without supervision—of large numbers of people in this position. I fully accept that the situation is regrettable. I accept the comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, that it is very regrettable that the whole thing arose in the first place. Terrible things may well have been happening back in 2005, but we are where we are. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord wants to intervene.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I have made my point; I will not reprise it again. The fallacy in both the Minister’s arguments is that he says they are dangerous, but actually the state has helped make them dangerous, if they are dangerous, by acting in the way in which it has. Normally, someone who has made a mistake accepts it and bears the consequences. I am not going to say any more because I will not persuade the Minister otherwise.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, from the point of view of the Government, I am not in a position to accept the premise advanced by the noble and learned Lord. I hear what he says. I do not accept, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, implied at one stage, that there is anything wrong with the Parole Board processes. I think I heard the word “dodgy” at one point, but I may have misheard. The Parole Board is a body that the Government have complete confidence in in this respect. This exercise should remain with the Parole Board.

I will say again: can we please distinguish between the problem of the released cohort and the problem of the never released cohort? We seem to drift from one to the other a lot of the time. Cases such as those of Matthew Price and, I think, the case of David Parker, which was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, are cases where people have been recalled after having been in the community for many years. That will no longer happen. The question of the recall is very largely dealt with, or very substantially improved, by the Government’s amendments in this Bill. What we are dealing with primarily is the never—not yet—released cohort.

I say again, in the light of my noble friend Lord Moylan’s remarks about the expected possible reaction of those who are still in prison and how to be particularly vigilant in supporting IPP prisoners in the light of these debates and related points, that the action plan is intended to give people hope. It is focused on their future to prepare them progressively with a sentence plan, the psychology services support, and a multidisciplinary progression panel towards eventual release. I think he would accept, even now, that the action plan has made a difference already; I see him nodding. We will take that forward and, as I say, it may well be the case the Government will be in a position to propose to your Lordships that the idea of an action plan should have a statutory basis, that the broad terms of its content should be set out and that the Secretary of State should report to Parliament so that—whatever Government comes into power—we can continue on the process that we have already started. The resentencing exercise is not, in the Government’s view, the way to go.

On that basis, the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Attlee would not arise because we are not going down that road. I do not think I need to say anything further about them, save to remark that what is being proposed would impose a very significant burden on our existing probation services. For that reason as well, one would have to reflect very seriously before going down that route. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment on this point.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, my amendment was a very fine amendment, but my noble and learned friend the Minister has addressed it. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment, and we will hear what the noble Baroness has to say.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with all the speakers so far. My concern is that Clauses 49 to 51 may be another way for the former Justice Secretary, Dominic Raab, to dilute the human rights framework through the back door.

Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires courts to interpret legislation compatibly with rights under the convention on human rights as far as is possible. The clauses would disapply Section 3 to prisoners as a group when it comes to legislation about their release. Several groups have rightly raised concerns about that.

I, too, cite the Prison Reform Trust, which said:

“The introduction of specific carve-outs from human rights for people given custodial sentences contradicts one of the fundamental principles underlying human rights—their universality and application to each and every person on the simple basis of their being human. Moreover, it is precisely in custodial institutions like prisons that human rights protections are most vital, because individuals are under the control of the state”.


In written evidence to the JSC, the Bar Council stated:

“There is no evidence of any systemic impairment due to the HRA of the Parole Board’s ability to make high-quality, safe, decisions about prisoners—no statistical analysis of recidivism/public safety concerns from prisoners released due to interpretation of legislation in line with Convention principles”.


In his speech at Second Reading in the other place, the chair of the Justice Committee, Sir Bob Neill, said:

“Whatever one’s view of the Human Rights Act, there is no evidence that this is a problem in such cases. In fact, the evidence we heard from practitioners, from both sides, is that it can be helpful to have to have regard to section 3 in these hearings. These clauses seem to be trying to solve a problem that does not exist, and I wonder whether we really need them. It is perfectly possible to have a robust system that still complies with section 3. This is a needless distraction that sends the wrong signal about a certain desire to pick unnecessary fights, which I know is not the current Secretary of State’s approach”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/5/23; col. 604.]


I really could not have put it any better, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, as your Lordships know, this group is a stand part challenge to Clauses 49 to 52 of the Bill, which, in essence, disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act to prisoner release legislation. The issue before us is, as much as anything, to do with the constitutional balance between Parliament and the courts. It is not about disapplying the Human Rights Act; it is about who does what. What do the courts do and what does Parliament do? That is the issue.

The provisions with which we are concerned include the new release test for releasing prisoners on licence—namely, the public protection test set out in Clauses 41 and 42, which make it abundantly clear that the protection of the public is the overriding factor. The Human Rights Act is also disapplied in relation to the referral mechanism, referring the most serious release decisions by the Parole Board to a court—currently the Upper Tribunal—and to other prison release decisions. As far as I am aware, no amendment has been tabled in this House objecting to the principle of the new public protection test, nor to the proposed referral mechanism—though there is an argument about which court it should go to—nor to the principle of our IPP reforms, except that it is argued that we should go further. Parliament has plainly indicated what it is trying to achieve.

Against this background, where exactly does Section 3 of the Human Rights Act fit in? Lest any misunderstanding persist—which it seems to do—my first point is that nothing in these clauses removes or limits any convention rights enjoyed by any prisoners, or anyone else for that matter, by virtue of Section 1 of the Human Rights Act or under the convention. A breach of human rights may still be pleaded before any domestic court or in Strasbourg in the usual way, whether it be the right to liberty, family life or any other right protected by the convention. Clauses 49 to 51 do not alter or detract from those rights in any way.

Even if—which I do not for one moment believe—anything in the legislation from which Section 3 has been disapplied were held by a higher court to be incompatible with the convention rights, in such a hypothetical case it would be for the court to make a declaration of incompatibility. Then, in accordance with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, it would be for Parliament to decide what to do—whether to amend the legislation and, if so, in what way. In other words, it is the job of Parliament to make challenged legislation compatible with the convention. It is Parliament’s legislation; it is for Parliament to fix it, and it is the constitutional responsibility of everyone in either House to find a legislative solution.

The problem with Section 3 is that it gives finding the legislative solution to somebody else altogether—namely the court. This is Parliament’s legislation and not the courts’. That was why I said at Second Reading that Section 3 of the HRA is, in essence, a procedural and interpretive provision that requires legislation to be given effect to in a way which is compatible with convention rights. Those words “given effect” have led, in certain circumstances, to the court reading in or reading down words into the legislation that Parliament has passed. In other words, the court is empowered under Section 3 to add to or subtract from what Parliament originally intended. This has been a difficult section to apply. It has required courts to depart from Parliament’s intention and, if I may say so, to stray into the legislative realm.

These amendments directly raise the proper balance between the courts and Parliament when it comes to legislative matters. That issue was highlighted in the 2021 Independent Human Rights Act Review. It was discussed over 80 pages, toing and froing on all sorts of points and suggesting numerous recommendations and amendments, with the majority of the panel finally recommending a series of reforms to Sections 2 and 3.

On the Government’s position that Section 3 is a most unusual power in this respect, I can do no better than refer your Lordships to the trenchant criticism of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act on constitutional grounds by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, King’s Counsel, present in this Chamber, in his evidence to that 2021 review. His basic point was that it is not the function of the courts to legislate; it is the function of Parliament. Against that background, in the present context, the Government’s position is that, on an issue of importance, such as public protection and prisoner release, it is for Parliament to determine what the test should be.

In the unlikely event of any of those provisions being disapplied, and a declaration being made under Section 4, again, it is for this House and the other place to put it right and not to delegate, abdicate or push away that responsibility on to the courts. That is the Government’s position and it is essentially a question of the constitutional balance between what we do and what somebody else does—in other words, the courts. That is essentially the background to these amendments.

Clause 52 sets out the approach a court should take if there is a challenge on human rights grounds regarding the release of a prisoner. I do not accept the characterisation by the noble Lord, Lord German, that the wording of Clause 52 is effectively saying that public protection is an exclusive requirement; it simply says that that is a requirement to which weight should be given. No doubt, the courts are perfectly capable of arriving at a sensible interpretation of the provision, but the Government’s view is that the importance of public protection is a matter that Parliament can rightly draw to the court’s attention as something to which weight should be given. I will just add that that requirement does not apply to the so-called non-derogable rights under the convention, which are: Article 2, the right to life; Article 3, the prohibition of torture; Article 4, the prohibition of slavery, and Article 7, no punishment without law.

The courts already consider risk to the public. The Bill simply ensures that weight is properly given to that consideration. The essential point is that on these matters, in this context, it is not for someone else to be reading in or reading down what your Lordships decide; it is for your Lordships and for Members of the other House to put matters right.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, having heard that explanation, on the first part I suspect that this will have to come back when we have an array of former judges of all sorts in this House to test the position the Government have placed on this matter. To a lay person, it seems to be on a trail of chipping away Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, in particular. Therefore, I think this can wait for another day to have that legal learning that I think we will all need to take it on board.

In respect of the Minister’s second point, about weight, it would not be so bad if it were simply “weight”; it would not be quite so bad if it were “great weight”; but it is “the greatest possible weight” and the greatest possible weight to me means virtually everything you can possibly put into it. I will take a simple Welsh analogy. You have a scrum. You put the weight of everybody into it with the objective of pushing the other side off the ball so that you can take it yourselves. That is where you would apply “the greatest possible weight”. There might be a bit of pulling of hair and ears, and whatever else goes on inside a scrum—but I am not going to talk about that any more.

If you think about it, though, the words “the greatest possible weight” are pretty conclusive that what you must do is virtually everything that is in sight. So, I take on board the Minister’s view that the word “weight” is important, but I do not take on board the words “the greatest possible weight”. However, on the basis of the future legal discussion we are likely to have in this House, I beg leave to withdraw my objection to Clause 49 standing part.