Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill

Lord Crisp Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. Amendment 204 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Lucas would narrow the scope of local authority powers to withhold consent to home education, in this case to exclude children in special schools. The driver of this—I looked at the Explanatory Notes but could not see anything that explains why special schools are all included—is that we seem to be treating parents of children with special needs in the same way as parents where there is an active investigation from children’s services and that feels disproportionate. There is also a risk of a conflict of interest where home education could be discouraged if the costs of providing therapeutic support to a child might be higher in that setting than in a special school, even if that was in the child’s best interests.

My Amendment 219 is a sort of common-sense amendment on an issue that I hope the Minister can clarify at the Dispatch Box. It seeks clarification that, if a local authority was to refuse consent to a parent to educate their child at home, it would need to provide the parents or carers with a statement explaining the reasons why, including the costs and benefits to the child. I assume that this would be good practice anyway, but if the noble Baroness can confirm that, that would be helpful.

I am sympathetic to the clarity that Amendment 210 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lucas would bring in terms of timings, but I think that Amendment 215A would be unduly onerous for local authorities. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, expressed concerns about the complexity of Clause 30. I am with him in that I think there is work to be done on Clause 30. He also focused on Clause 31 in his remarks, but I will cover those points in the next group.

[Lord Crisp (CB)]

My Lords, I am sorry; I missed my turn to jump up. I wanted to make two remarks. First, the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, has drawn the big picture of a range of issues that concern us all and I absolutely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, that we can hopefully work through those in meetings or in Committee in a bit of detail. There are many points to come back to on that.

The one that I want to pick up on is Amendment 221, from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and others, on the right of appeal. It goes back to a point that I made earlier: the relationship between local authorities and home-educating parents is the vital one in all of this. In the end, we are providing the legislative framework within which that will operate. At a time when there is clearly a lot of suspicion, confusion and so on, a right of appeal will help to deal with that situation. It seems common sense to have a right of appeal to a tribunal.

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In conclusion, these amendments are not an attack on oversight. They call for fairness and are rooted in law, supported by evidence and demanded by the lived experience of countless families who have chosen lawfully to educate their children outside school. They ensure that decisions are informed, protect against arbitrary power and provide avenues for justice when things go wrong. They do so not by weakening safeguarding but by strengthening it, by making it more trustworthy, more proportionate and more humane. I urge the Government to accept these amendments or to work with us to bring forward their own versions that reflect these principles. I urge noble Lords to support them.

[Lord Crisp (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 209 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, and others, in part for the reasons given so eloquently by the supporters of the amendment, but also because it provides the opportunity for the child concerned to be home-educated if that is the right thing for them. It is not just about ensuring that being home-educated is in the child’s best interest, but about providing the opportunity for that to happen. This is an important, and presumably relatively small, concession in terms of numbers, because here we are talking only about people who are in special schools, although I know there is another amendment later. I hope that the Minister will consider this amendment favourably.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I very much support what my noble friend said about young carers. We ought to be much better at collecting information on what is going on with young carers. The whole business of collecting information is getting easier with AI. The government AI team is a sight to be seen. I have not, in government, come across such an enthusiastic and effective team. I very much hope that the Department for Education will make contact and make use of the blockers. When you are faced with a difficult problem and need to find a way of collecting data that does not put a burden on the organisations that are having to do that data collection, and it is diverse and complicated, AI is a really good approach. I urge the Government to help look after young carers by taking that step.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morris of Bolton) (Con)]

My Lords, if Amendment 211 is agreed to, I will be unable to call Amendment 215 by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Crisp (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 211A, which is in my name. I very much agree with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. This is one of the biggest issues in the Bill. Why the words

“in the child’s best interests”

have appeared here and not elsewhere seems strange. They seem slightly out of place.

It may be that it is late in the evening, and I am going slightly brain-dead, but it seems that what is written in the Bill is internally contradictory. It says that the local authority

“must refuse consent if the local authority considers …that it would be in the child’s best interests to receive education by regular attendance at school, or”—

going back to my education, I assume this is the law of excluded middle—

“that no suitable arrangements have been made for the education of the child otherwise than at school”.

If it is alternatives, then presumably new Section 434A(6)(b)(i) means that there are cases when suitable arrangements have been made for the education of the child otherwise than in school, but it would be in the child’s best interests to receive education by regular attendance at school. Unless I have that completely wrong, it seems that this is something of a muddle anyway in the presentation of this account.

The bigger point, rather than simply that, is the one the noble Lord makes about who decides what is in the best interests and what we mean by it. I have suggested in my amendment to leave out

“that it would be in the child’s best interests to receive education by regular attendance at school”

and replace it with the actions mentioned further up the page in new subsection (4)(a) where the inquiries

“have led the local authority to conclude that the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm (within the meaning of section 31(9) and (10) of—”

the Children Act 1989.

In other words, keep this about abuse and about child protection, and do not introduce the wider consideration of

“in the child’s best interest”,

whatever that means, as well as, as I said, the logical inconsistency of the framing that is down on paper.

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[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friends and the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, have made a powerful case for the point of principle that underpins this group of amendments. I confess to agreeing with them only in part. The point of the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, that there may be a muddle in the drafting, may be a fair one because of the discussion we had earlier on my Amendment 204 about the automatic inclusion of children in special schools within the framework of local authority consent. So I am sympathetic to the points my noble friends and the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, make on children in special schools and the idea that the state knows what is best for them.

Where I am not sympathetic—I respect their opinion and I think they have a point—it is because, on balance, when a child is subject to a child protection plan or a child protection investigation, we have already established that it is either confirmed that the child is at risk of significant harm or there are serious concerns that the child could be at risk of serious harm. Whether the “best interest” is the best way of framing it, I do not know, but I think that at that point and for that group of children—

[Lord Crisp (CB)]

The amendment I have proposed uses almost the same words as those the noble Baroness has just used: rather than using the phrase “in the child’s best interest”, why not refer to being at risk, and abuse, as found by the tribunal? It seems much clearer to do it that way, and I wonder whether she would agree.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

The noble Lord is right and I am grateful to him for again drawing my attention and that of the Committee to his drafting. I guess one would then need to consider the group of children in special schools, because I would be surprised if the noble Lord’s drafting applied to so many of them.

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

At the heart of this group of amendments is the concern about the use and definition of the expression “best interest of the child”.

The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and others suggested that the use of the “best interests” ground in Clause 30 is a fundamental change to parents’ rights. I reiterate the quite narrow scope of the use of “best interests” in this clause. Remember that what we are dealing with here is not the fundamental decision about whether a parent has the right to remove their child from a school to educate them at home. They have that right, unless some very specific circumstances are met—when they may still have the right, but we introduce a process for the local authority to consent to whether it is appropriate for that to happen. I do not think I need to run through once again that narrow category of children and circumstances where, as we are proposing here, the local authority should be enabled at least to consider the issue of whether, in those circumstances, it is appropriate for the child to be removed from school.

I know that some noble Lords do not believe that there should be any need for consent and therefore do not believe that the criteria that the Government have chosen of Section 47 inquiries, child protection plans or special schools are appropriate. I accept that but, if you do have a consent system—and there is quite a lot of support for the idea that an additional stage is appropriate for children in these circumstances—you then need to decide the criteria for the local authority’s decision-making. New subsection (6)(b) makes it clear what those criteria should be in these very specific circumstances.

It does not feel unreasonable to me that those criteria should be what the local authority believes to be the best interests of the child. We can assume that the parents believe in the best interests of their child, but in these very specific circumstances, because of the nature of the children, we think the child’s rights might override the view of their parents.

So the first criterion is what is in the child’s best interests; the second is whether or not there are suitable arrangements made for the child to receive education, other than at school. I understand that some noble Lords do not believe that those are the right criteria, but I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, that this is somehow a fundamental change in the rights of parents. We recognise that most parents have their children’s best interests at heart and tirelessly advocate for them, often in difficult circumstances. That should be the basis on which parents are able to make decisions, in most circumstances, about whether or not their children are removed from school to be educated otherwise.

However, there are situations where a child could receive a suitable education at home but it is not in their best interests to do so—for example, if there are concerns that the child is being exposed to domestic abuse or extremism. In those cases, the school can act as a protective factor that enables issues to be escalated quickly.

I hope that my argument about the reason for the choice of those criteria also covers the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Crisp. He recommends that a local authority should automatically refuse consent for any child where the local authority has concluded that they are suffering or likely to suffer significant harm following a child protection inquiry, but child protection is complex and practitioners must gather a range of information and evidence from multiagency partners and others who work with the child and their family, and children can experience harm from both inside and outside the home. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to prohibit all such children from being removed from school for home education.

The consent measure rightly requires the local authority to consider the individual circumstances of each child. It is probably worth reminding ourselves that the consent measure is not preventing parents in these circumstances from home-educating; it is simply saying that the local authority should consider whether that is appropriate and use the two criteria that have been set out in the Bill.

Amendment 212, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wei—

[Lord Crisp (CB)]

I think I understand the Minister’s points, but could I just pick up the slightly pedantic point that I was making? If it is an “or”, it implies that suitable arrangements could be made for the education of the child otherwise than at school and that the local authority still considers that it would be in the child’s best interest to receive education by regular attendance at school. It is a slightly pedantic point and I am very happy to just register it rather than require an answer. As I say, I think it is the law of the excluded middle.

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

I understand the noble Lord’s point. If I am wrong on this then I will clarify afterwards, but you could envisage a situation where the problem was not the nature of the education being provided but whether, given the circumstances that the child found themselves in, it was in their best interests not to be in a school. The protective element of being in a school could be the most important point there.