Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 16th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to see the noble Baroness, Lady Griffin, in her place, and I wish her a very speedy recovery. I also congratulate her on her precision and the brevity of her remarks. I wish I was going to be as brief as she has been.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

So do we.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

So does my noble and learned friend; that is a free drink that he is not going to get.

Unusually for a modern criminal justice Bill, which was ably introduced by the Minister, this is, relatively speaking, a remarkably short one. It has only 18 clauses. It is rather spoiled, however, as there are 53 pages of schedules. I dream of the day when any Government decides to stop producing criminal justice Bills of voluminous length, but there we are.

I understand the political and moral basis for the provisions about defendants who refuse to appear in court to be sentenced. I listened with great care to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, on that. However, I agree with my noble friend Lord Sandhurst’s scepticism about whether they will work in practice. We will see how those arguments develop in Committee.

I do, however, welcome the proposals with regard to the ULS scheme. I had to operate it myself as a law officer when the Minister was at the Crown Prosecution Service. I think it is fair to say that we suffered together in that struggle. There will be more to say in Committee about the NDA provisions, which amend the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024.

This afternoon, I want to address a point about overseas victims not mentioned in the Bill. I spoke about this on 7 February 2024, on the fourth day in Committee on the then Victims and Prisoners Bill. I make no apology for doing so again, and I will table the same amendment to this Bill that I tabled to that Bill. In introducing these remarks, I refer to my interest as a barrister whose practice includes corporate crime cases.

Multinational companies have been fined more than £1.5 billion over the past 10 years or so after investigations by the Serious Fraud Office into corruption abroad. But only 1.4% of those fines—about £20 million—has been used to compensate victim countries or communities abroad. In my view, this needs to change.

Much of this corruption occurs in African countries that are already suffering terrible economic hardship, food and energy crises, and inflation. They are in dire need of economic support to repair the damage caused by corruption.

United Kingdom Governments have been vocal in their support for compensating foreign state victims of corruption. But the action actually taken to compensate foreign states tells a different story and leaves us open to charges of hypocrisy. Most corruption cases brought before the English courts involve foreign jurisdictions. We step in as the world’s policeman, investigating and prosecuting crimes that take place in other countries, but keep all the fines for ourselves. This is important because corruption causes insidious damage to the poor —and the not so poor—particularly in emerging markets. The United Nations says that it

“impedes international trade and investment; undermines sustainable development; threatens democracy and deprives citizens of vital public resources”.

The African Union estimated in 2015 that 25% of the continent’s gross domestic product was lost to corruption. Every company convicted of overseas corruption in this jurisdiction should be ordered to compensate the communities it has harmed. That would be both just and effective. Compensation should come through investment in programmes targeted at decreasing corruption and benefiting local communities; for example, by building and resourcing more schools and hospitals.

At first glance, English law encourages compensation. It is required to take precedence over all other financial sanctions—so far, so good. But, as with many noble ambitions, problems lurk in the detail. Compensation is ordered in criminal cases only where the loss is straightforward to assess, even though the trial judge is usually of High Court or senior Crown Court level and will deal with complex issues every day.

For example, in 2022, in a case in which I appeared for a victim state, Glencore pleaded guilty to widespread corruption in the oil markets of several African states. Although it was ordered to pay £281 million, not a single penny has gone back to the communities where the corruption happened, largely because it was held that the compensation would be too complicated to quantify. The Airbus deferred prosecution agreement tells a similar story. The company was required to pay €991 million to the United Kingdom in fines, but compensation to the numerous Asian countries where the corruption took place formed no part of the agreement.

The process for compensating overseas state victims—and particularly overseas state victims—needs simplification so that real money can be returned to them. An answer perhaps lies in incentivising the corporations that commit the crimes to pay compensation voluntarily on the understanding that it would not increase the total amount, including penalties and costs, that they would have to pay. The company could be given further incentive by receiving a discount on the fine it would still be required to pay to the United Kingdom Treasury, or an increase in the fine if it refuses or fails to make redress.

The required changes are, I suggest, straightforward and would cost the taxpayer nothing. It could create a standard measure of compensation, which would ensure consistency and transparency, as well as avoiding the difficulty of calculating a specific amount of loss or damage in each case. The compensation figure could equal whichever is the higher of the profit made by the company from its corrupt conduct or the amount of the bribes it paid to obtain the profits. This already happens when companies are sentenced, save that all the money goes to the Treasury. The defendant company would pay nothing more, but at least some of the money would benefit the victim state or the communities harmed within it.

Of course, it would be naive to think that compensation paid to a foreign state could never lead to further corruption. That is clearly a risk. To address this, defendant companies would be encouraged or required to enter into an agreement with the relevant state, which would include obligations to comply with United Nations guidance on the treatment of compensation funds and to identify projects for which the funds would be used, possibly with the involvement of a local non-governmental organisation.

To encourage states to enter into these types of agreements, corporations would be permitted to donate the compensation funds, for example, to the World Bank or International Monetary Fund for projects in the region instead, or to pay down a country’s debt, if an agreement cannot otherwise be reached.

The benefit of this approach is that, unlike at present, where there is no disadvantage in doing nothing, it puts the onus on the defendant companies to take restorative action—something that will appeal to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It also addresses the difficulties in quantifying losses by creating a simple approach that gives companies early sight of the amount that they will have to pay.

The Bill is, I am sure, full of wonderful provisions, but it does lack this wonderful diamond which needs to be added to the ring around the Minister’s finger— I do not know how far I can go with that one. But let us do this. We can then hold our heads high and enhance our national reputation in the fight against international corruption. This is not a matter of party politics. It is a matter of simple justice.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, victims demand effective and speedy justice, and we should deliver effective and speedy legislation.

We welcome many measures in the Bill which build on the previous Government’s efforts in the Criminal Justice Bill and in the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. Clearly, this Bill is intended to put victims first when addressing issues of justice and to enhance their voice in the criminal justice process. It is vital that victims are heard and that the justice system is transparent and accessible to victims. That includes, in particular, how offenders are sentenced and how victims can access the information given by the court on that issue.

We are grateful for many of the provisions in the Bill and for the fact that the Government have been open to constructive suggestions during its passage, resulting in new clauses and clarifications that have now been added to it. Indeed, we are supportive of the steps taken by the Government to strengthen the Bill’s approach to parental responsibility so that restrictions apply to offenders who have committed offences against any child rather than just their own.

There are, however, certain areas where we believe that there is further scope still for the Bill’s provisions to be improved, and there are several important points upon which the Bill is silent. In particular, that touches upon the issue of justice delayed being justice denied—a point made by a number of noble Lords.

There is also the parallel development of legislation going through this House that was touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: in particular, the Sentencing Bill. It is important to be clear that, although this Bill puts victims at the centre of justice, there is concern that the Sentencing Bill currently passing through this House tends to do the opposite. Under the suspended sentence presumption in the Sentencing Bill, many offenders who would previously have gone to prison will now remain in the community. For victims, this often means living alongside the offenders, seeing them in the street, in local shops and in shared public spaces. This is not an abstract policy choice but in fact a daily reality for the victims of crime. Can a system that leaves victims to live with the consequences of offending in this way really claim to put victims first? This is perhaps a tension between the Government’s victims Bill and their proposed sentencing provisions.

Turning to the clauses of the Bill itself, we are broadly supportive of Clause 1 on sentencing. Sentencing is not a purely administrative act but a moment of public accountability. For victims, the sentencing hearing is often the first and only opportunity to see an offender confronted with the true consequences of their actions, and their physical presence in court matters to victims. Indeed, the absence of an offender at sentencing, particularly where it is deliberate, can no doubt exacerbate the victim’s trauma arising out of the original offence.

With regard to the specific provisions, there is a reference to reasonable force being employed to bring an individual into court. That raises question marks of onus. Will it be for the police officer to prove that only reasonable force was employed? It might be more appropriate to approach this on the basis that such force as is necessary will be employed, provided that it is not disproportionate. That would be a safety net for police officers, who might very often be accused of using unnecessary force in the situation that they are faced with. There is also a need to ensure that police and prison officers, who are already under significant pressure, are provided with the appropriate instruction, training and means to carry out this task. That will need to be addressed in due course.

Turning to Clauses 3 to 5 on the restriction of parental responsibility, we generally support the Government’s steps in this area, as I indicated earlier. It is, as the Government consider it, an important child protection measure. But there is a question mark as to the four-year threshold provision, touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Meston. Are we otherwise to throw the onus back on the family court to address this issue? Equally, are interim measures to be left to the family court to determine and deal with? We hope these issues will be addressed going forward in discussion with the Minister. I look forward to that opportunity.

On Clauses 6 and 7 on victims’ rights, again we are broadly supportive of these measures. It is essential that we extend these measures in order that victims can be confident that their interests and concerns are being properly dealt with.

Some criticism was made of the length of Schedule 2. It is only fair to observe that Schedule 2 is of such length because of the attendant number of existing statutory measures that are required to be amended, which maybe does not reflect very well on our existing statutory provision but is the necessary consequence of having so many diverse provisions that touch on this very issue. There are one or two issues that we want to raise with the Minister in due course. For example, Schedule 2 requires certain parties to take such steps as they “consider appropriate”, which seems rather open- ended. We hope that in time the Minister will have an opportunity to address that sort of issue in Schedule 2 so that we can be reassured as to the effectiveness of these measures going forward.

On Clauses 8 to 10, with respect to the position of the Victims’ Commissioner, we are broadly supportive of all these measures and acknowledge the very considerable contribution that was made in this regard by the late Baroness Newlove. We look forward to her replacement with the experience that she has had as Victims’ Commissioner for London.

Clause 11 deals with the extension of the right to prosecute to those other than qualified solicitors or barristers. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that by extending this to those with CILEX qualifications we will increase diversity. That is to be welcomed. The noble Lord, Lord Gove, is also undoubtedly correct that the provision will dilute qualification. The question is whether it will dilute the quality of prosecution. That will have to be monitored with very conspicuous care going forward. I look forward to the Minister explaining to us how the Government will seek to monitor that. It is important that we have Crown prosecutors available, but equally they should be of a quality and standard to ensure fair and effective prosecution. That is a matter for the interests of victims and for society as a whole.

I turn briefly to Clause 12, which deals with the introduction of regulations to set rates of remuneration in the case of private prosecutions. Let it be noted that private prosecutions are a very significant and important aspect of overall prosecutions within our courts. Such matters as shoplifting, for example, which are a scourge upon society and the high street, are generally taken up as prosecutions privately by major institutions. Indeed, in the case of fraud, again private prosecutions play a very important part, not just in respect of minor fraud but very often in the case of major fraud, which is extremely expensive to prosecute.

The Minister said that what would be introduced would be fairer, with safeguards and so on. I wonder if she is being a little economical when she describes the matter in that way. I take as my guide the Explanatory Notes, which

“have been prepared by Ministry of Justice in order to assist the reader”—

in this case, myself. If we look at the Explanatory Notes, we are reminded that, in the case of a private prosecution, it is provided by the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 that there will be “reasonably sufficient” compensation to the prosecutor as required. The Legal Aid Agency monitors this matter, and it employs the Senior Courts Cost Office guidelines for solicitors in respect of such costs. Those particular costs have been the subject of review by the Master of the Rolls, pursuant to a recommendation from the Civil Justice Council, so that in 2021 those rates were increased for the first time in 11 years. There is now a provision for them to be reviewed annually in line with the services producer price index.

Consequently, those reasonable rates of remuneration are now about five times higher than the criminal legal aid rates. That has nothing to do with the reasonableness of remuneration for those undertaking private prosecution; it has everything to do with the poverty of the criminal legal aid rates that are in place at the present time. You do not encourage the very formidable burden of private prosecution by trying to bring down a reasonable level of remuneration to what is, frankly, a poverty level of remuneration that has had, and continues to have, a very significant impact on the prosecution of criminal offences in our courts. It is not just physical buildings; you have to invest in people as well as property. We have failed singularly to invest in people, and that has to be improved. I would rather see a victims provision that said we are going to pay a reasonable rate to those undertaking criminal prosecution, so that we can get adequate prosecutors and so that we can get adequate defence counsel, than to say that, in order to try to remove this embarrassing disparity, we will try to impoverish those who take up the burden of private prosecution.

Of course, the Minister said this will have no chilling effect on private prosecutions. I merely raise the question: where is the impact assessment? Perhaps we will hear in due course.

I move on to Clauses 13 and 14, which deal with sentencing reviews. With regard to unduly lenient sentencing, a number of noble Lords have observed that there is a need for transcripts to be available to victims in order that they can understand how a sentence was arrived at and, if necessary, make a request to the law officers that a ULS review should be carried out. In that context, I have no difficulty with the suggestion that the Attorney-General should have 14 days from the time of the request in order to deal with that matter. But, while I accept that the unduly lenient sentence mechanism is not an appeal mechanism for victims, it is a means by which victims can make a request of the law officers, and they have to be given a reasonable period of time to do that. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that, for that to be effective, there has to be a more realistic time limit available.

I turn briefly to matters which we say should properly be in the Bill but are not yet there, although I look forward to their introduction in due course, possibly at the instigation of the Minister herself.

First, there are no provisions to address the courts backlog. Let us be clear that, without any doubt, that is the greatest barrier to victims achieving justice, disposal and closure. We know that there are many Crown courtrooms that are not sitting on a single day, indicating that there is at least the property capacity to deal with it. I equally acknowledge the need for not just property but personnel. It would be good to see that fundamental problem addressed in the Bill as well. I also note that, where offers of additional court sitting days have been made by the Lady Chief Justice, they have not been fully taken up by the Government. It would be helpful to know why not, given the enormous backlog that we face at the present time.

Secondly, there is no real provision for increased transparency. Again, we come back to the issue of court transcripts. It appears to us that there is at least perhaps a halfway house: I appreciate that, very often, the Government will come up with the cost implications of transcripts as well as the time implications, but surely there is scope for a mechanism whereby, if victims request a transcript of sentencing remarks, the court should be able to request that transcript as soon as the request is made. It would not be in every case, by any means, and it would curtail both costs and delay.

The third area, touched on in the other place, is data on who actually commits crimes. The Bill contains no provision that mandates the collection and publication of data on offenders’ visa status, asylum status or related immigration information. That is important from the point of view of public perception and victims’ perception. To what extent is crime going to be committed by those who have come into this country unlawfully, for example? You have to satisfy public concern on that issue, and the appropriate way to do that is by collecting the appropriate data.

There is then the question of the need to recoup outstanding fines. I understand that at the present time there is something in the region of £1 billion in outstanding fines, and recovering that could only help the Ministry of Justice in its improvement of courts services and of legal aid rates, surely. But the scale of unpaid fines is “truly astounding”. Those are not my words: I am quoting the London Victims’ Commissioner. Surely some further steps need to be taken in that regard.

That question of fines then comes to the issue of overseas corruption, which was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I listened with interest to the point he made, and has previously made, about the need to ensure compensation for the countries that are the victims of corruption. I look forward to considering the amendments which he has made it clear he intends to bring forward in that regard.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, mentioned the possible concern that the issue of jury trials would be dropped into the Committee’s amendments. My understanding is that, as a matter of precedent, that never, ever happens, and what happens is that, if someone wishes to see an amendment, they indicate that they will bring it back on Report. In any event, I do not anticipate that the premature and perhaps ill-thought-out proposals that have emanated from the Ministry of Justice on the limitations to jury trial will come before the House any time soon—but, if they do, I have no doubt they will meet with the most robust response.

Before closing, I thank the Minister for the clarity with which she presented the Bill. I look forward to further engagement with her on its terms.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I have tried very hard to keep this non-partisan, but I have to say very gently to the noble Lord that it is a bit rich to hear from a member of the party opposite about what has happened to the criminal Bar, when pretty much everybody who was working there at the time—that includes me—knows it was the considerable cuts made to legal aid under the previous Administration that put the criminal Bar into the parlous state it is now in. But I say no more about that contentious subject, because this is not an opportunity for us to fall out. The noble Lord and I can debate the respective merits of barristers, solicitors and CILEX lawyers in due course.

I agree with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti about the importance of private prosecutions and entirely understand her concerns. I hope she is aware that the Government intend to look at some of the issues, for example, that surround disclosure in private prosecutions. We all know the cases to which I refer. She said she has reservations about corporate private prosecutions. I was about to say something, then the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, rather made the point for me that some very important commercial organisations have brought private prosecutions in relation to quite big frauds—sometimes very big frauds indeed. Economic crime is one of the scourges of our society. The investigation and prosecution of those crimes consumes a huge amount of public resource. The Government are certainly of the view that there is a place for private prosecution to help to ensure that economic crime is prosecuted successfully.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, drew my attention to the Explanatory Notes—again—as did the noble Lord, Lord Meston. If we have got them wrong, we will correct them by Report.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I was not suggesting for a moment that the Explanatory Notes are wrong; they just happen to contradict the Minister.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I would, of course, always say that I am right, would I not? In that sense, they are wrong.

The noble and learned Lord made the point about needing to invest in people. I will give another gentle reminder about who was in power for the past 14 years.

Turning to the question of the unduly lenient scheme, I entirely agree with noble Lords that there is no point in having a right that nobody knows they have, and we plainly are not getting this right in terms of information. It needs to be more broadly known about. The question of whether 28 days is the appropriate period is one to which the Government are giving urgent consideration. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, said that it should be made the same as for defendants. It is: they have 28 days. That is where the period came from: there is parity between the two. But that does not necessarily mean it must remain.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 10, leave out “by the Crown Court”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the rationale behind restricting the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing to only the Crown Courts.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments in my name relates to Clauses 1 and 2. I start by observing that we on these Benches are broadly supportive of most of the provisions in the Bill. Many of the amendments tabled in my name, save one or two exceptions, have the aim of strengthening the Bill’s existing provisions rather than removing them. The use of reasonable force to compel attendance at sentencing hearings was a measure first proposed by the previous Conservative Government in the Criminal Justice Bill, which fell at the Dissolution of Parliament. It is, therefore, a policy that we on these Benches strongly support.

As the Government have consistently said, victims and their families deserve to see justice done. They deserve to hear directly those remarks which explain the court’s reasons for the sentences that are being imposed, and they deserve the chance to face their offenders and have their own voices heard in open court. In that spirit, many of the amendments in my name probe details of Clauses 1 and 2, and question how they would operate in practice. These clauses set out the statutory powers for judges to order an offender to attend court for their sentencing hearing, by reasonable force if necessary. As we have heard previously, offenders who refuse to attend their sentencing hearing thereby insult their victims. Offenders should not be able to undermine the final moment of justice in such a way. The amendments in this group ask the important question of why the Government are not taking this opportunity to expand the applicability of Clauses 1 and 2, given their upcoming and substantial court reforms.

I understand that the application only to the Crown Court in these clauses is the same as the approach taken in our Criminal Justice Bill, but I point out a crucial difference between the positions of the last Government and this Government. When this clause was originally proposed, there were no plans to alter the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ courts. However, this Government are now proposing to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to three years, thereby shifting a large number of cases away from the Crown Court towards magistrates. As such, magistrates will hear a much greater proportion of increasingly serious cases, which surely throws into question the application and scope of Clauses 1 and 2.

In fact, this is a different contextual background from not only that of the previous Government but that of this Government. The Bill was introduced in the other place before the Government announced their court reforms. So, as published, Clauses 1 and 2 would have permitted the compulsory attendance of an offender for sentences between one year and three years. Now, however, if the Bill is unamended, and the Government’s court reforms go ahead, a person convicted in a magistrates’ court for an offence that would have previously been heard only before a Crown Court will not be required to attend their sentencing hearing.

If it was previously the Government’s view that offenders facing between one and three years’ imprisonment should be subject to compulsory attendance at their sentencing hearing, why have they not made the necessary amendments to the Bill? Perhaps that is because they have changed their mind, in which case the Minister should be clear about that. If it is the Government’s position that the scope of offenders who should be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing should remain the same as when the Bill was introduced, they must surely accept these amendments. The question that then arises is: why stop at the Crown Court, when extending these powers to other courts could make a meaningful and positive difference to the victims of other crimes?

We should not dismiss the experience of victims of, for example, burglary. Requiring an offender to attend their sentencing hearing may give those victims just as much closure. Conversely, an offender refusing to attend could cause just as much insult, if this series of amendments is not accepted. If anything, by reserving these powers for the Crown Court only, we risk playing down the significance of other crimes by signalling that offenders do not have to face their victims. Extending these powers to other courts would not only provide greater consistency but show that no crime is more permissible than another, or that one victim’s experience is not more or less important than another’s. If the rationale is one of practicality or resource, the Government should make that case. If, however, there is no compelling reason, whether it be legal, procedural or financial, the Bill presents an ideal opportunity to address a gap, rather than requiring further primary legislation later on down the line after court reform has been implemented.

If the Government’s intention is to strengthen victims’ confidence in the criminal justice system, surely consistency must be at the heart of that ambition. Victims do not experience crime through the lens of jurisdictional boundaries. They experience the indignity of being wronged and they rightly expect the justice system to deal with offenders in a manner that recognises that harm each time, regardless of which court is sentencing. It is for these reasons that I believe the Government should revisit the decision to confine these powers solely to the Crown Court; otherwise, the Bill risks creating a two-tier system, where the victims of some crimes are afforded the closure of seeing justice done in person, while others are denied it for reasons that are administrative rather than principled.

I would be grateful if the Minister could also clarify what consideration has been given to victims’ expectations and their confidence in the justice process when limiting these powers to the Crown Court. I hope that the Minister will reflect on these points and consider whether there is scope for a more ambitious and comprehensive approach. I look forward to her response and to working to strengthen this legislation for the benefit of all victims. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make a brief observation about the amendment. The exercise of this power by a judge is never going to be easy, and we should be very cautious about the way this is introduced. Let us first see how it works with people who have the experience of handling what, in the circumstances, will be a very difficult position before we move on to doing it in all courts. This power must be confined to those cases where it is really necessary, because I think that a number of us who have had experience of this would be very worried indeed if this power came to be routinely deployed.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, explores the reasons for limiting this power to the Crown Court.

Before I begin, I am sure that the whole Committee will wish to join me in paying tribute to the families of Jan Mustafa, Henriett Szucs, Sabina Nessa, Zara Aleena, and Olivia Pratt-Korbel—whose mother and aunt sit below the Bar today. Their tireless campaigning has brought about this change. They have persuaded the Government that when a cowardly offender refuses to attend court, it causes anger and upset, which can feel like a final insult to victims and their families, who have sat through the trial waiting for the moment when they can tell the world—and, importantly, the offender—about the impact their crimes have had. Many of them want the opportunity to look the offender in the eye as he or she hears about the effects of what they have done.

Offenders are expected to attend court for sentence, and the overwhelming majority do so. Because magistrates’ courts hear less serious cases, offenders are more likely to be on bail, and where an offender is on bail, the courts have powers to compel attendance by issuing a warrant. When a warrant is issued, the defendant is brought before the court in custody for the warrant to be executed, and the judge can add an additional sentence for the offence of failing to surrender to bail, which will appear on their record in future.

However, in the Crown Court, which deals only with the top level of serious crime, offenders are much more often remanded in custody, and so court powers to get them physically into court are more restricted. That is why the Government have acted by bringing forward this legislation which gives three powers that can be used in relation to recalcitrant—that is the right word, as used by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—offenders: first, authorising the use of reasonable force, except in the case of children, because we are a civilised country, and this Government do not believe in using force on children; secondly, for offenders who still refuse to attend, or for those who are disruptive once they are there, the power to add an additional sentence; and, thirdly, the power to impose the same kinds of prison sanctions as a prison governor can impose.

However, getting an unwilling and often disruptive offender to court is by no means straightforward, and it inevitably causes a delay to the sentencing hearing for the following reasons. At the outset, the judge will have to hear submissions from prosecution and defence counsel, as well as possibly from the prison and escort staff, as to whether the offender has a reasonable excuse for non-attendance and, if not, whether to exercise these new statutory powers. Then the judge will need to give a ruling, giving reasons as to why, in the circumstances of that particular case, it would be necessary, reasonable and proportionate to use reasonable force to get the offender to court.

Then the prison and transport staff will have to go and get the prisoner from the place, whether it is a prison or a court cell, which they are refusing to leave. The prison and transport staff will then have to use their judgment as to how best to execute the judge’s ruling, including what degree of force to use. Finally, if the offender is forced into court and is then disruptive, this is likely to cause more delay while the judge decides what to do next.

There is probably one thing we can all agree on: the criminal courts do not need any additional delays. Judges will need to weigh up carefully whether and when to use their new powers. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the question of the inherent powers that courts already have. Both the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts have inherent powers to deal with a non-attendance as a contempt of court, but these are used sparingly because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out very powerfully, it is far from straightforward.

For these reasons, the Government’s view is that this new legislation is appropriately restricted to Crown Court sentencing. It represents a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem, because it is the Crown Court where these powers are needed. Operational arrangements are already in place for producing the most serious and violent offenders at the Crown Court, managing the risks that that involves and, where necessary, using proportionate force. So, for these reasons, we consider that expanding the power to magistrates’ courts might create legal and operational uncertainty and unnecessary delay to court proceedings. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to the debate, and indeed the observations with regard to the timing of any extension of these powers.

I would observe, with respect to the submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that if these provisions help victims in the Crown Court, it is not clear why they would not help victims in magistrates’ courts.

The Minister talked at length of the difficulty of implementation with regard to these provisions, but that would apply equally in the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts. Indeed, the appearance of serious offenders in the magistrates’ courts will of course be an immediate development with the changes under the Sentencing Act, which extend the sentencing powers of magistrates to three years.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

5: Clause 1, page 1, line 19, leave out “18” and insert “16”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes why the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing applies to offenders aged 18 and above.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst propose that the provisions in Clauses 1 and 2 apply to offenders from the age of 16, rather than only to those aged 18 and over. As drafted, Clauses 1 and 2 are explicitly limited in their application to those aged 18 or over. That is a departure from the original Conservative proposal for this power, which would have required the court to consult the relevant youth offending team if the offender in question was under 18. We therefore believe that the blanket threshold of 18 should be examined.

The age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is, of course, 10 years of age. Even if it is believed that the age of criminal responsibility might reasonably be set higher than 10—a subject of recent debate in this Chamber—there is widespread cross-party consensus that it should be significantly lower than 18. Indeed, Scotland, after extensive consultation and careful consideration, chose to set the age of criminal responsibility at 14, reflecting evidence of developmental science and, indeed, public expectations in the field of criminal law.

A 16 year-old who has been convicted of a serious offence will be expected to go before a Crown Court judge to receive their sentence, yet will face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing under these provisions. That appears inconsistent with the intent of these provisions.

We have seen both in recent cases and in parliamentary proceedings on this Bill how deeply distressing and unfortunate it can be for victims and families when an offender refuses to face the court at sentencing, an act described by Ministers as a “final insult” to those already traumatised. It is difficult to articulate why someone aged 16 who has been found guilty of a serious offence should be exempt from measures designed to ensure that they confront the consequences of their own criminal actions.

We should also reflect upon the wider tapestry of civic responsibility that has developed, and which this Government would also confer upon 16 year-olds. The Government have proposed to lower the voting age to 16. Someone aged 16 can marry; they can pay tax and join the Armed Forces. They assume a suite of responsibilities in civil society. They are treated as autonomous agents in a host of legal and social contexts, and to exempt them uniquely in this narrow but important sphere from the requirement to attend their own sentencing hearing when convicted of a crime appears inconsistent with those wider developments.

We owe it to victims and to the public to ensure that the measures we put on statute reflect a coherent and principled approach. These amendments ensure that they align with the realities of criminal responsibility and the Government’s wider policy. Someone who commits a serious crime at 16, such as murder or serious violence, should not be placed beyond the reach of these important attendant provisions. That is the inconsistency which appears to us in the present form of Clauses 1 and 2.

Accountability cannot be robust at conviction and sentencing in substance but simply optional at the point of sentencing in practice. We have seen very recent examples of relatively young people aged 15 and 16 committing the most heinous offences, in some instances murder. There can be no doubt, of course, that the existing framework for youth justice should be maintained and remain separate and distinct from these provisions. Nevertheless, when it comes to those of 16 years and older, their personal conduct does take them before the Crown Court. They appear there for sentencing and there is no principled justification for differentiating on the basis of age alone between 16 and 18 when culpability and legal responsibility have already been established. With that in mind, I respectfully commend these amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, briefly, these amendments would treat offenders over the age of 16 in the same way as offenders over the age of 18 in relation to three aspects of the compulsory attendance regime. The first aspect is the requirement that the court consult a youth offending team before making an order; the second is the use of force against young offenders, and the third is the use of prison sanctions in the case of service offenders.

The Member’s Explanatory Statement explains that these amendments probe why these provisions apply only to offenders over the age of 18. The position that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has taken is that they should apply to everyone over the age of 16. I suggest that the answer to the question is that, modest as they are, these provisions make different arrangements for offenders under 18 because they are designed to protect 16 and 17 year-old offenders, who are children and not yet adults. I submit, and we on these Benches believe, that it is right that contemporary criminal justice attempts to treat offenders under 18 in a way that acknowledges the particular vulnerabilities of 16 and 17 year-olds.

In the first group of amendments today, the noble Baroness said that the Government broadly agree with that position. The amendments seek to remove the distinction between 16 and 17 year-olds on the one hand and adults, albeit young adults, on the other. We say that this would be a retrograde step and that it should be opposed. I would add that of the measures that are proposed in the amendments, those sanctioning the use of force against 16 year-olds—to bring them to sentencing hearings against their will—would be particularly egregious and potentially very damaging.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by reassuring your Lordships’ House that an attendance order can be made in respect of all offenders, including children. Most children are not tried in the Crown Court; they are tried in the youth court, even for serious offences. It is very rare for children of this age to appear in the Crown Court. If they do, an attendance order for their sentencing hearing can be made. The only difference is that force will not be used to get those children to court. The reason is that current operational policy, informed by the Taylor review of 2020, restricts the use of force on children. Domestic policy is also informed by the UK Government’s signatory status to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We have committed to complying with its duties under the convention. During the debate a week ago in your Lordships’ House on the age of criminal responsibility, I said that this Government recognise that children in the youth justice system can be some of our most vulnerable citizens. Many of them are themselves victims of neglect and abuse, at the very least, and there is a disproportionate occurrence of special educational needs and neurodivergence in this cohort.

While we acknowledge that some children have committed very serious crimes for which they must be punished, this Government do not treat them merely as small adults. We have devised a separate but related regime for them. Where a child fails to attend court, or is disruptive once there, that may be treated as a contempt of court, but the maximum penalty is a fine, with the court taking into account limited means and making relevant arrangements for younger children. Lowering the threshold from 18 to 16 would cut across that safeguarding architecture. The Government’s view is that the strongest coercive path should be reserved for adults, where the legal, operational and ethical framework properly supports their use. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their measured observations on these proposed amendments. There is broad agreement across the House that attendance at sentencing is about accountability, about dignity for victims and about respect for the court. Refusal to attend sentencing has rightly been described by Ministers as a final insult to victims and families. The question before the House, then, is not whether the principle is right but to whom it should be applied.

These provisions are about ensuring that offenders confront the consequences of their actions, allowing victims to see justice done and hear sentencing remarks. They also uphold the authority and integrity of the court.

We are dealing with a situation in which 16 and 17 year-olds find themselves prosecuted in the Crown Court for serious offences, including murder, in respect of which they receive long custodial sentences. A 16 year-old can be convicted of murder or serious violence; that same 16 year-old would face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing. Accountability cannot logically begin at conviction, however, and then disappear at sentencing. From a victim’s perspective, the same harm emerges regardless of whether an offender is 16, 17 or 18 years of age. The distress caused when an offender refuses to attend sentencing does not diminish by virtue of their age.

There is also the wider policy context that I mentioned before, which is that we now treat 16 year-olds, in essence, as adults in respect both of the proposal that they should be able to vote and of the fact that they can marry and can join the Armed Forces, and in respect of their wider social and political autonomy.

These amendments do not impact on the youth justice system. They do not remove judicial discretion. The courts will always retain discretion and take account of the welfare, capacity and safeguarding of 16 year-olds. In these circumstances, it respectfully appears to us that this proposal does not undermine Clauses 1 and 2, but rather seeks to strengthen them for the benefit of victims: someone whose conduct is serious enough to warrant Crown Court sentencing should not be shielded from accountability at the point of sentencing. But, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions that have been made. I shall begin with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, in his amendments, which seek to clarify what is meant by, for example, the “relevant local authority” in this Bill, as well as to put extra provisions in place concerning parental responsibility. We support the aim behind Amendment 17 that others with parental responsibility for the child in question are properly and, indeed, promptly informed if a prohibited steps order is made against an offender. These are clearly well-intentioned amendments that highlight that certain aspects of the Bill need to be thought through a little more carefully and clarified. I hope that the Minister will provide assurances about how that can be achieved.

I also thank my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for bringing forward his amendments, which would allow the Crime Court to take into account not only the interests of justice but the best interests of the child when deciding whether to make a prohibited steps order. On these amendments, we are not at this stage able to adopt a settled position. That is not because the underlying principle is unsound, but because further clarification is required from the Minister. As drafted, one of the exemptions to the making of a prohibited steps order is where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so, but that, as has been observed, is a broad and somewhat opaque formulation. We would be grateful if the Minister could explain what circumstances the Government envisage falling within that exemption. In particular, can the Minister offer examples of cases in which it would genuinely be in the interests of justice for a child to remain under the parental responsibility of an individual convicted of a serious sexual offence and sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment?

These amendments would add an explicit reference to the best interests of the child. That is a familiar concept in family law, but its interaction with the existing exemption is not at all clear. I invite the Minister to clarify whether the Government consider that the child’s best interests are already subsumed within the interests of justice, or whether this amendment would materially alter the test applied by the court.

Amendments 18, 20, 24, 30, 31 and 32 in my name reflect our concerns about the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. As drafted, both clauses state that a prohibited steps order against an offender that restricts their parental responsibility will not immediately cease to have effect if an offender is acquitted on appeal. Instead, both clauses include sections that set out a review process whereby the relevant local authority must make an application to the court for the acquitted offender. That is hardly consistent with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to as a short, speedy and summary order in circumstances where there is a successful appeal.

The clauses as drafted unnecessarily complicate and confuse the issue. The law should be clear that an acquittal brings the prohibited steps order to an end. People who are found to be not guilty of an offence should not have their parental responsibility, or indeed any other rights, restricted, even on a temporary basis. That principle is straightforward and our amendments seek only to ensure that the legislation reflects that clarity. I hope that will have the support of the House, and I urge the Minister to reconsider and simplify the drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. There is no compelling reason why these review orders should be left in place for innocent citizens and then be the subject of applications by a local authority on their behalf to another division of the court.

Amendment 18 is tabled to affirm our support for the provision of Clause 3 that, where an offender only has their sentence reduced, a prohibited steps order should continue to apply. We on these Benches already have reservations over why an offender’s length of imprisonment or detention must be four years or more for parental responsibility to be restricted. I note that the amendment made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, refers to a period of six months rather than four years. Clearly, there is scope for consideration as to where the line might be drawn as a matter of policy. If a sentence of four years is reduced on appeal, we do not believe that this should result in a prohibited steps order ceasing to have effect. It is quite unlike the situation where there is an acquittal on appeal. Such an outcome could create significant uncertainty for the child for whom the offender previously had parental responsibility. Crucially, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the offender remains guilty of a serious sexual offence against the child regardless of any adjustment in the sentence. An increased risk to the child’s safety or well-being could well emerge from such a situation.

There is also the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, about what happens in circumstances where a sentence is increased under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme. I invite the Government to address that point because clearly it has not been considered in the context of the present drafting of Clauses 3 and 4. For these reasons, I hope the Government will take all these amendments very seriously and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by repeating what I said in the debate about an earlier group. A prohibited steps order is not intended to be an additional punishment; rather, it is a tool devised to protect children. The aim of keeping the child safe and doing what is best for them is the central factor in every case. As I have already said, these powers are not intended to replicate, far less replace, the powers of the family court. Crown Court judges are simply not trained to make decisions about children, and they do not have the time to do so. The point has been made most powerfully by both the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. To ask the Crown Court to replicate the procedures of the family court could lead only to more time being needed to consider every case. As I have now said on at least three occasions today, the one thing the Crown Courts do not need is for cases to take longer.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

36: Clause 6, page 12, line 20, at end insert—
“(d) the National Crime Agency.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds the National Crime Agency to the list of relevant bodies.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this group which concern the operation of Clauses 6 and 7 and the scope and operation of the victim contact scheme. I turn first to Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I recognise the intention behind this amendment and the principle that underpins it: that victims whose close family members have been murdered, killed unlawfully or subjected to infanticide abroad should not find themselves falling between the cracks of the victims’ code simply because the offence occurred outside the United Kingdom. There is a strong case for ensuring that any victim should receive clear information and appropriate support on how to engage with the criminal justice system. The amendment seeks to give effect to that principle by requiring an appendix to the victims’ code setting out how it applies in such circumstances.

That said, it is also right to acknowledge that this amendment raises practical and operational questions that would need careful consideration. These include questions about jurisdiction, the extent to which criminal justice processes are engaged domestically, and how responsibilities would be allocated between domestic agencies and those overseas. I therefore look to the Minister to address how the Government would envisage this operating in practice while recognising and engaging with the important principle that the amendment seeks to advance.

Amendments 47A and 47B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, extend the definition of “victim” to include those who have experienced persistent antisocial behaviour meeting the statutory threshold for an antisocial behaviour case review. They also create a victim identifier linked to compliance with the victims’ code across criminal justice agencies. Both proposals are ideas that I am sure will instigate interesting debate; I look forward to hearing the noble Lord expand on them, and the Government’s response.

Amendments 56 and 57 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby—which may or may not be spoken to—concern transparency and accountability in decisions taken by hospital managers not to disclose information requested under Sections 44F or 44K. Clearly, if hospital managers are to be entrusted with the discretion to withhold information in cases that may directly affect victim safety, it is entirely reasonable that there should be clear written reasons for such decisions and a meaningful route to appeal. Transparency in decision-making is essential, not only for victims but for other parties, such as the Probation Service, which are tasked with managing risks.

I turn to Amendments 36 and 37 in my name. Amendment 36 is a technical amendment that adds the National Crime Agency to the list of relevant bodies to which Clause 6 does not apply. Given the National Crime Agency’s distinct operational role and intelligence-handling functions, it may be appropriate that it be expressly included in that provision. I hope the Government will see this amendment as a sensible clarification rather than as a point of contention.

Amendment 37 would require the Secretary of State to extend the victim contact scheme to certain categories of victim who are currently excluded from it—victims of offenders sentenced to less than 12 months for violent and sexual offences; victims of coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking or harassment; and bereaved families in cases of manslaughter or death by dangerous driving. It would also require information to be communicated in a timely manner and for annual data to be published on the scheme’s uptake and accessibility.

The importance of this amendment has only been heightened by recent legislative developments. The Sentencing Bill, which has now passed, represented a marked shift in sentencing policy, particularly through the automatic and blanket presumption against short custodial sentences, regardless of offence type. During the passage of that legislation, particularly in debate in this House, a number of noble Lords repeatedly raised the consequences for victims. Although the Government may respond by saying that in exceptional circumstances this presumption may be overturned, the reality is rather clearer. An increasing number of offenders convicted of violent and sexual offences will now serve their sentences in the community, rather than in custody.

From the victim’s perspective, that is not an abstract policy choice. It has immediate and practical consequences for their perception of justice being served, for their sense of safety, for their ability to plan their lives and for their need to receive appropriate information. Under the current framework, many of these victims are excluded from the victim contact scheme because the custodial threshold is not met. That is now, I suggest, a glaring inconsistency in the light of the Government’s Sentencing Act. If anything, victims whose offenders are serving sentences in the community have a greater need for timely, accurate and trauma-informed information, not a lesser one. Further, without timeliness the scheme risks becoming meaningless. Information provided late is often information too late to be of use, and, without transparencies, such as through the publication of annual data on uptake and accessibility, there can be no meaningful accountability for offenders or for the Government.

We now live in a sentencing landscape that places a far greater reliance on community supervision. The Government have said that they expect to more or less double the number of people being tagged rather than incarcerated. The need for transparency and accurate data has never been more pressing. Amendment 37 insists that, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it must accept the corresponding responsibility to support and protect victims properly. In the absence of custody, robust victim engagement is really not an option; it is essential. I therefore urge the Government to engage seriously with this amendment and, if they are minded to resist it, explain how victims are to be adequately protected in a system that is going to leave an increasing number of offenders in the community. I beg to move.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 42, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay; to the two amendments in my name, Amendments 47A and 47B—I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for adding her name to them; and to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, on which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, may speak to us by some supernatural means. I am not quite sure, but the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I will try to cover it.

I point out that what all these amendments have in common is that they have been laid with the active engagement and support of the Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman. The Minister mentioned that she knows and has a high regard for her. Rather than going on at great length about each amendment, although I am sure that your Lordships are dying to hear about them, I suspect that it would be better to have follow-up meetings involving Claire Waxman to go into the detail as to why she feels, and we feel, that these amendments are important enough to raise in Committee.

On bereaved victims of murder abroad, as in Amendment 42, we covered this ground in previous legislation when we attempted to get it into a Bill. My noble friend Lady Finlay will be able to go into much more detail about this but, in essence, we are dealing with a slight anomaly in the way that victims are treated. On average per annum, between 80 and 90 individuals who are UK citizens are murdered while they are abroad. At the moment, the experience of their families when those unfortunate incidents happen ranges from quite good to absolutely appalling. That is because there is no consistency in the way they are treated.

The Government have made attempts to get their house in order on what happens within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction. Where we seem to have an issue is in getting the FCDO to apply a form of guidance, and above all training, across its key consulates in the areas where these incidents take place to ensure that those consulates are properly equipped, if and when such a tragedy appears, to deal with it effectively and consistently. The experience from the victims whose loved ones have been murdered abroad is that, in some cases, the consulates are absolutely brilliant and go out of their way to be helpful, while in other instances the victim truly is left entirely on their own. In particular, if this has happened when the partner of the person who has been murdered is abroad, they may find no help whatever and not be familiar with the language of that country. You can imagine the complexity and agony of trying to deal with all of that, on top of the shock of having had somebody very close to you murdered. However, my noble friend will go into that in more detail.

What Amendments 47A and 47B have in common is that for certain victims of antisocial behaviour, when that behaviour really is persistent—it often conforms to an escalating pattern—and has a deep effect on the victim, there is not consistency at the moment in the way that is dealt with. Amendment 47A tries to ensure that the authorities are more effective in identifying that pattern of behaviour and are able to join the dots, put them together and recognise that the behaviour has triggered a threshold at which proper support and access to victim services should be allowed.

Again, Amendment 47B is about joining up the dots. The way in which antisocial behaviour is dealt with is that it might come to the attention of the police, or it might come to the attention of a local authority or a housing association. There is no consistent way of that information, first, being recorded in a consistent and helpful manner, and, secondly, being communicated across those different boundaries in a way that enables whichever of those three jurisdictions is looking at the pattern of behaviour to pull the evidence together that it needs to understand exactly what has been going on. This is a request for a unique identifier for each victim which would, I hope, be the start of a process to enable that information to be channelled in a more consistent and co-ordinated manner. That would obviously be helpful to the victims, but also extremely helpful to whichever authority is trying to identify just how severe that pattern of antisocial behaviour is, and whether the effect it is having on the subject—the victim—is sufficient for it to trigger comprehensive wraparound support.

Lastly, I will deal with the three amendments that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will deal with in more detail. They concern where somebody in one’s family has been murdered by an individual who is identified as mentally disordered and who is then detained because of their mental disorder. The ability of the victims to get access to the sort of information which they can get from the Prison Service and the courts is completely different from what is able to be accessed from the hospital system. Again, some hospitals and hospital managers go out of their way to be understanding and helpful, and try to give the victims whatever succour and information they can. Others refuse point blank. They say that a variety of laws and processes prevent them doing that and that they are not at liberty to do it. All that we and the Victims’ Commissioner are asking is to look at this closely.

Julian Hendy, the founder of an organisation called Hundred Families, is very involved in this; he can give chapter, book and verse. First, we need to establish just how much of a problem this is, perhaps through meetings. Secondly, what are the different ways in which we might do something about it? Thirdly, how complicated is that: does it need to be in primary legislation, or are there other ways of doing it?

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

This Government have not been in power over the whole of the last of the decade, and we are doing our best to look at it. I will certainly look at it and discuss it with her. We are simply saying that, at this stage, we do not think primary legislation is the right way of dealing with it.

Finally, I turn to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, in the names of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who is not in his place, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. Before I do, let me say that I recently had the privilege of meeting with Emma Webber and with Julian Hendy of Hundred Families. They explained very clearly to me the issues as they see them, and it was a very moving experience. I pay tribute to their strength and honour the memories of those they have lost. Their experiences, along with the experiences of all victims of crime, must continue to guide us.

Part of the rationale for providing information to victims is to help them to feel safe and so they can plan for an offender’s eventual release or discharge. That is why the legislation requires that hospital managers provide victims with specified information where appropriate, regardless of any assessment by a hospital manager of the victim’s safety and well-being, because we acknowledge that the hospital manager’s assessment could well be different from the victim’s own assessment.

Where hospital managers receive a request for information from an eligible victim outwith the specified list within the Bill, they will consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to provid it, and this assessment can of course include considering the risk to the victim. Where there are specific concerns about a victim’s safety, there are other, more appropriate processes to be followed. It is important to note that this is not the primary purpose of the victim contact scheme.

Where a decision is made that it is not appropriate to provide some information, reasons can and should be provided wherever possible. However, these should reflect the victim’s communication preferences, and considerations about this would, in our view, be most appropriately set out in operational guidance, which would also provide the necessary flexibility to adjust requirements as we monitor practice.

We agree that victims should have a route for some recourse where information is not provided. There are existing complaint routes for all cohorts, and the Government consider that a more effective way of going about this would be to make sure hospital managers understand and fulfil their obligations to victims at the outset, rather than introducing additional bureaucracy. My officials are working closely with the Department of Health and Social Care to consider routes by which to support hospital managers, including whether a joint departmental protocol, or via planned updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice—statutory guidance under the Mental Health Act 1983—might provide an appropriate vehicle.

In relation to all the amendments in this group and many of the others, we are listening and we want to get it right. We will continue to work with your Lordships and with victims’ groups, but for now I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this wide-ranging and thoughtful debate on the operation of the victim contact scheme and the wider support network for victims. The debate has demonstrated broad consensus on the principle that victims’ rights and access to information must keep pace with changes in sentencing policy and criminal justice practice. The question is not whether victim engagement matters but whether our current structures are fit for purpose in the systems we now operate.

Several amendments in the group had common concerns: gaps in coverage within the victims’ code and the victim contact scheme; lack of transparency, consistency and accountability in how information is provided; the risk that victims fall through the cracks; and the technical thresholds or institutional boundaries that exist. Taken together, these amendments seek to ensure that victim support is timely, trauma-informed, consistent and capable of scrutiny. The amendments also recognise that, among others, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it assumes a greater, not a lesser, responsibility to support victims. Victim engagement must be strengthened not weakened in a non-custodial sentencing landscape. I therefore urge the Government to consider carefully how victims are to be protected and informed under current policy. In the meantime, I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 36 withdrawn.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

39: After Clause 7, insert the following new Clause—
“Victim personal statements(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue revised guidance on the content of victim personal statements.(2) The revised guidance issued under subsection (1) must stipulate that when making a victim personal statement, a victim must be able to say anything they wish about the defendant, provided it is not contrary to any statutory limitations on free speech, makes allegations of untried criminal conduct or is disorderly language.(3) The court must disregard any prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review how to make victim personal statements less restrictive and clarify what can be included.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 39 in my name would require the Secretary of State to issue revised guidance on victim personal statements, clarifying what victims may include and ensuring that the courts appropriately disregard prejudicial material.

Victim personal statements are a valuable and important part of our criminal justice process. They allow victims to articulate in their own words the impact that a crime has had on them and on their families. This personal element is often deeply cathartic and can provide a sense of agency in a system that victims have described as otherwise procedural and somewhat distant. However, as this Bill was scrutinised in the other place, it became clear that many victims and practitioners find the current approach to personal statements unclear and, in some cases, unnecessarily restrictive.

Members spoke of victims feeling that they were sometimes advised to omit heartfelt and deeply personal material from their statements. These omissions were not for any legal reason, but appeared to be due to an overly cautious interpretation of the guidance. There is also a concern that victims do not always understand what is and is not permissible, and that this lack of clarity can undermine their confidence in the entire process.

One recurring theme from previous debates is that victims should not be left uncertain about what they can and cannot say, nor should they feel that their legitimate expressions of harm are being suppressed for procedural reasons. At the same time, the amendment acknowledges the equally important principle that personal statements must not be vehicles for

“allegations of untried criminal conduct”,

or material that is contrary to

“statutory limitations on free speech”

or due process. It is designed precisely to strike the appropriate balance. It would not remove any existing safeguards. It simply asks the Secretary of State to revisit and clarify the guidance governing the content of personal statements in a way that gives victims clarity and a genuine sense of voice.

The amendment would require revised guidance to be issued within six months of the Bill passing. The revised guidance must stipulate that, when making a victim personal statement, the victim should be able to say

“anything they wish about the defendant”,

so long as it does not go beyond lawful free speech, make untested allegations of new criminal conduct, or contain “disorderly language”. These are sensible and well-established legal boundaries.

The amendment also states that the court must disregard any

“prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement”.

In practice, this would simply enshrine what is already understood by judges: that victims may express themselves freely, while judges continue to confine themselves to factors that are legally relevant and admissible. Placing this in the Bill would reassure victims that greater freedom of expression in their statements will not be misconstrued as diminishing the fairness of proceedings, or indeed as providing a basis for an appeal. This would not mean that victims would be able to litigate matters that fall outside the scope of the case before the court, nor would it mean that victim personal statements would supplant other evidence or judicial reasoning. It would mean that victims would know where they stand, and that they would not be discouraged from expressing the full impact of their experience simply because the existing guidance is interpreted excessively cautiously.

The importance of clarity in this area cannot be overstated. Victims and their families often report that they do not know what is expected of them when making a personal statement, or that they are told they must temper their comments in ways that feel artificial or perhaps insensitive. That undermines public confidence in the system and risks denying victims a meaningful voice at a critical moment in the justice process. This amendment offers a proportionate way forward. It respects judicial integrity and would preserve the lawful limits on personal statements. At the same time, it would provide victims with the clarity and the dignity that they deserve. It would ensure that they can say what they need to say without fear that well-meaning but over cautious guidance may curtail their voice.

I present the amendment in a constructive spirit. I look forward to the Minister outlining how the Government believe that the current guidance is operating—whether it achieves its objectives, and whether there is an appetite for revision that reflects victims’ legitimate expectations—and speaking to the points raised by Members on both sides of the House and in the other place. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My brief observations draw on my experience of what happened about 20 years ago when the statements were being developed. For more serious cases, such as murder and manslaughter, there was an attempt to give the victim’s family an advocate. It had transpired that drafting these statements was not easy, and so this was trialled for a few years. It proved to be an extremely expensive way forward, and the scheme came to an end with the financial crisis of 2008.

That left us with the problem, in all these cases, of how you formulate what was then called a victim impact statement and is now called a personal statement? They are extraordinarily difficult to formulate. Those with experience of civil cases will know that, if you ask a witness to produce something in his own words, or you ask the claimant in a case to do the same, you get something you could never put before the court, because it would never really convey what had to be put forward. Therefore, the way in which progress was made was along the cautious lines of developing guidance. I think such guidance always needs to be kept under review. You need consultation with the Crown Court judges, who see this all the time. Clarity in the guidance is essential, but I greatly caution against allowing a victim to do more than explain to the court the way in which the crime has affected the victim, his family and the community. Going beyond that seems to raise all sorts of problems, and the last thing one wants to do is to revictimise a victim by saying, “You shouldn’t say that in court”. Clarity is essential, but I say, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, that his formulation goes too wide of the mark.

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For these reasons, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment, but I ask him to work with me, through the recently launched victims’ code consultation and beyond, better to understand victims’ experiences of the VPS process and how any issues might be addressed, while ensuring that the criminal justice system operates safely and fairly for all.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, clearly, we have to achieve a balance between preserving due process in the justice system and empowering victims. We have to be able to reassure victims but, at the same time, protect the judicial process. We must reduce the risk of misunderstanding, or indeed even of appeal, in the context of these statements.

However, there does seem to be a widely held concern that these guidance provisions are not working as they should at the present time. There seems to be an understanding that further work is needed to clarify how victim guidance is construed and applied. I suggest that it is not simply a matter for the criminal practice directions, but one that we should consider, whether in the form of a review or further directions or guidance from the House.

In the circumstances, I seek to withdraw the amendment, but I do so on the basis that the Government understand the need to revisit this issue and why the guidance is not working, and will come to a view as to how it can be improved going forward.

Amendment 39 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches, the Liberal Democrats have been concerned for a long time about the victim’s right to access court transcripts. We have tabled amendments to a number of Bills, including, most recently, the now Victim and Prisoners Act 2024, and I have Amendment 41 to this Bill. I thank open justice campaigners for the contact that we have had with them during the Victims and Prisoners Act and since then.

During the Victims and Prisoners Bill, the then Minister finally agreed to a trial in certain locations that would ensure that victims could have access to sentencing remarks but to nothing else. Ministers of both this and the last Government have said that it would just cost too much to extend the scheme but, as we have said, the process that is used is extraordinarily expensive, and technology should be our friend these days. To give the Committee a feel of some of the figures that we have been made aware of, we have seen people quoted £30 for a copy of sentencing remarks to over £300 for an original transcript, and where victims requested a transcript of the entire court case we have seen figures of £7,500 and even £22,000.

Victims and their families are in principle able to access remarks at no cost. I am not just talking about since the pilot; I am talking about some of the other things, and I will come on to the detail later on. They can sometimes get access at no cost, but the problem is that the paperwork that some courts have required families to fill out is burdensome and intrusive, requiring families to declare salaries, debts, bank balances and more. That really should not be the case when they are getting to the end of a trial, with all the burdens that that has brought them.

Amendment 41 would go beyond sentencing remarks but not as far as our amendments to the Victims and Prisoners Bill. It would include transcripts of judicial summings-up, bail decisions and conditions that are relevant to their case. It would also set a time limit for the Secretary of State to ensure that the transcripts were provided within 14 days.

We thank the Government for confirming that access to the judge’s sentencing remarks is being rolled out across the country, but we remain concerned that some victims need access to more. This is because for far too long, as we discussed in an earlier group, victims have been advised by the police and prosecutors either not to attend a trial or to frame their own remarks carefully.

I have three brief quotes on that. The first is:

“I wanted to go and watch the trial after I had given my evidence but was told by the prosecution barrister that it would not look good with the jury. The police said the same. I didn’t really question it. I was so scared to do anything that *might* have a detrimental effect on the outcome”.


Another victim said:

“We were advised not to attend because it may make us look bitter”.


And another said:

“I was told I couldn’t watch the court case after giving evidence as I’d look like I wasn’t scared of the perpetrator and it could harm the jury’s decision”.


Open justice campaigners say:

“This advice from professionals is in direct contrast to Judges we meet, who very much want the victims to attend hearings”.


So there is a gap there.

The reason why we propose including judicial summings-up and bail decisions is that there is often more detail in things like bail decisions and conditions that affect the victim directly. I have recently been involved in advising a family where there was a bail condition that required the alleged perpetrator not to go within two miles of the victim. That was changed without the victim’s knowledge, and suddenly she found the perpetrator nearby and could not understand why. A victim in that sort of instance should be able to ask for the details of those. It was clear that she was completely unaware that the bail conditions had been changed after the perpetrator’s solicitor had asked for a hearing. For judicial summing up, there is often more detail in there that can help the victim to come to terms with the entire process. That is one reason why we are pushing for that.

We would still like occasionally for some victims in really traumatic cases, particularly where a therapist advises this—this is not in the amendment, and there is a reason for that—to be able to access the entire court transcript, but we recognise that that is unlikely until technology can provide it at virtually no cost to the court. I think we are nearly there, but at the moment the structure of the way in which people can apply for help and the way that transcripts are made is overly expensive, given the world that we are living in in 2026. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 41, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and Amendment 73 in my name. Both these amendments are designed to strengthen victims’ engagement with the justice system by enhancing access to, and the availability of, transcripts of important court decisions.

We give full and unequivocal support to Amendment 41. This is a broader right than the one we were able to secure during the passage of the Sentencing Bill, where our amendments sought to ensure victims’ access to transcripts of sentencing remarks. Initially, that amendment was opposed by the Government, who argued that embedding a statutory duty for universal access and universal publication would create significant operational and resource pressures and risk increasing judicial workload.

The importance of these amendments has been further underscored by the report—released, I believe, today—that the Ministry of Justice has instructed the deletion of a substantial archive of court records held by Courtsdesk: data analysis that supports journalists and civil society in scrutinising the justice system. That archive has long been relied on to track sentencing outcomes and judicial decisions. Its removal has understandably raised concerns about the future accessibility of court information and the practical operation of open justice.

In that context, the case for clear, structured and victim-centred access to sentencing information becomes even more compelling. If independent archives and informal routes to transparency are diminishing, it is all the more important that Parliament ensures that formal mechanisms exist to guarantee access to core judicial material, particularly for victims whose lives are directly affected by these decisions.

In previous debates, Ministers made it clear that they supported the principle of transparency and of victim access to sentencing remarks. Sentencing remarks can already be published in high-profile cases but the Government maintained that expanding those limited provisions into a broad statutory requirement, as initially tabled, was not necessary to achieve the objective of openness and could impose burdens that the current system was not equipped to bear. We therefore tabled a more diluted version of our amendment to extend free provision of Crown Court sentencing transcripts to victims who request them.

The importance of this measure cannot, in my view, be overstated. Sentencing remarks explain the judge’s reasoning as well as the factors taken into account when outlining legal judgment behind a sentence. For victims and their families, this explanation is essential to understanding why justice has been administered in the way it has and becomes particularly important in the context of, for example, unduly lenient sentence appeals.

Amendment 73 complements the amendment passed in the Sentencing Bill, now the Sentencing Act, by addressing the publication of sentencing remarks online. It would require that, when a request is made for sentencing remarks delivered in the Crown Court, those remarks are made available publicly online within 14 days, subject to an important safeguard. The court must first inform the applicant of their right to request that the remarks not be published and, if such a request is made, the remarks must not be published.

This opt-out mechanism is a proportionate and indeed pragmatic response to government concerns that prevented broad publication being adopted previously. Ministers explained that, while they supported the principle of transparency, they could not accept a universal statutory obligation to publish all sentencing remarks, citing the risk of significant workload increases and resource pressures on an already stretched judiciary and courts system. By allowing individuals to choose not to have their own remarks published, this amendment preserves transparency for the public while safeguarding privacy and individual choice and reducing operational risk.

We stand in favour of open justice: the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. When victims and the wider public can access the reasoning behind sentencing decisions, confidence in the rule of law and in the integrity of judicial decision-making is strengthened. A criminal justice system that is opaque risks undermining the very legitimacy that it seeks to uphold. If victims cannot see the reasoning behind the rulings that affect their lives, they and the public will struggle to have confidence that justice has actually been done. When sentences are handed down with discretion and complexity, the need for transparency is greater, not less. For these reasons, we support Amendment 41 and look forward to the Minister’s response to Amendment 73.