Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 16th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I say at the outset that, as far as the speakers in the gap are concerned, the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, need not fear to intervene in the gap, as he has done on other occasions before my speaking. He is always very welcome. It was very good to hear the noble Lord, Lord Gove, speaking in the gap, with his experience and showing above all that this is very much a non-party-political debate. We are all worried about the concerns he expressed.

From these Benches, as my noble friends Lady Brinton and Lady Hamwee in particular have said, we broadly welcome the Bill. Just by way of introduction, for too long, victims in our criminal courts were largely ignored and unprotected by the system and were, frankly, shamefully treated as bit-part players in the business of criminal justice as no more than witnesses. When offenders pleaded guilty, they were often not even informed about the date and place of trial. Certainly, they were not given an opportunity to make any meaningful contribution to the procedure of the case.

Recent years, however, have seen a great deal of welcome change. The introduction of victim impact statements and the attention that is now paid to them; the establishment of the office of the Victims’ Commissioner, given statutory authority in 2004; and the formal introduction of the victims’ code and its statutory strengthening by the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 have all been important milestones along the way. Now we genuinely have a system that seeks to put victims of crime at its heart, but in many ways this important ambition is not achieved in practice. It is hoped that the measures in the Bill will close some of the gaps, but certainly not all of them.

I join everyone else in paying a warm tribute to Baroness Newlove, with whom I worked on a number of important measures to improve our system. She had such an important influence on the criminal justice system and on public awareness of the importance of victims and of looking after them in society as a whole. I welcome the appointment of Claire Waxman to the post; she has done a wonderful job as Victims’ Commissioner for London, and I believe that she will do a wonderful job as Victims’ Commissioner.

The Bill takes forward the Government’s intention to strengthen the position of victims, and it fits particularly with their ambition to halve violence against women and girls. Among the most important and welcome provisions of the Bill are those in Clauses 3 to 5, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out, and Schedules 1 and 2 that go with them; they include restricting parental responsibility for convicted sex offenders committing offences against children and requiring the court to make a prohibited steps order. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Meston, about the good sense and the likely utility of these measures. We welcome them and the general valuable protection of vulnerable children who are at risk of violence or abuse from convicted offenders.

I am bound to add one note of caution, however: on these Benches we would prefer to see greater discretion in the courts about the making of prohibited steps orders. Sometimes we resort too quickly to mandatory requirements where those may not be necessary or appropriate in every case.

I turn to non-disclosure agreements and the measures in Clause 6 for avoiding unacceptable provisions in such agreements. It is clear that NDAs have often been misused—often, but not always, in the context of employment—and used to prevent victims and direct witnesses from reporting behaviour that is patently criminal. Kinds of behaviour that should be reported but where NDAs can be used to silence victims are abuse, including sexual abuse, bullying, and racial, religious or sex discrimination. Some protection of victims has been offered by the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, but Clause 6 will strengthen the protection for victims and direct witnesses, and it is welcome.

It is a major step forward that the victim contact scheme is to be strengthened. This will make it easier for victims to be kept informed about the release of perpetrators; in particular, it will introduce a dedicated helpline for victims. Victims of stalkers, for example, shamefully have been ignored too often in the past. They have had good reason to complain about the lack of information they have been entitled to receive. I note the important contribution of my noble friend Lady Brinton in the past.

It is right that the definition of victims should be widened, as it will be by Schedule 2, to include bereaved family members and children who have witnessed domestic abuse. We would like to see a reporting obligation on the working of the victim contact scheme to include reports on its accessibility to victims and on its uptake. We would like to see proposals for improvement of the scheme made public on a regular basis.

Strengthening the powers of the Victims’ Commissioner to give the commissioner the power to act in the general public interest where particular cases or circumstances or the plight of particular victims raise questions of general importance will broaden the commissioner’s office to enable her to work more effectively in the public interest.

I have not so far mentioned as particularly important the powers in Clauses 1 and 2 to compel the attendance of defendants at their sentencing hearings. Of course I agree with the Government that defendants should be obliged to attend sentencing hearings, and I recognise the importance to victims of obliging offenders to look them in the eye, as the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, mentioned in opening. Victim impact needs to be understood by the public and by defendants, as the noble Lord, Lord Meston, said. So of course the court should have the power to order defendants to attend such hearings, and it is right that they should do so and right that those who fail to do so should be penalised.

But is there any real point in including a power, as the Bill does, for a prison or custody officer to use reasonable force to compel such attendance? What force is reasonable for that purpose? We have read press stories of offenders being likely to be bound and gagged to bring them to court. Indeed, these were fuelled and reinforced by amendments the Conservatives introduced in the Commons to sanction such treatment—a concept that may have been supported today by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, although I am not sure he meant to go as far as perhaps he did.

I question whether we wish to risk giving offenders the chance of appearing publicly as martyrs and making the criminal justice system into a public spectacle of what could be seen or portrayed as oppression, whether fairly or unfairly. Far better, I suggest, to make the order to treat non-compliance as contempt, as the Bill suggests; to allow judicial discretion, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, suggested; and to sanction it with reasonable but not excessive extra time in custody or financial penalties as appropriate, just as we would for other contempts of court. Unusually, in this case I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Meston, that extra sentences would not act as a deterrent to defendants thinking of avoiding their sentencing hearings. I suspect I share the doubt of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, about the use of force.

I turn to a number of amendments to the Bill that we wish to see and propose to introduce. First, we need to be sure that victim support services will be improved by these measures and adequately funded. My noble friend Lady Hamwee made some important points on victim support services and the degree to which provision needs to be made, increased and properly resourced. We would want to see not just national government but local authorities required to produce victim support strategies for meeting the needs of victims of offences relating to domestic or family-related abuse, sexual offences or child criminal exploitation in their areas. My noble friend Lady Benjamin talked of trauma-informed support for victims, particularly child victims. We want to see reports on support services for victims as they are developed, especially for child victims. But such reports should also include the carers for victims, whether they be for children or for elderly or disabled victims of crime.

We will also introduce an amendment seeking a commitment to make transcripts of sentencing remarks and summings up available to victims. I agree with those who suggested that a solution based on new technology and AI may make it easier, but the availability of transcripts is very important and should not be put off by a supposed lack of resources. I welcome the agreement of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, both on the importance of transcripts and on the lack of validity of the excuse that the cost is a justifiable reason for failing to address this issue.

No one who heard the sentencing today of Paul Doyle by Judge Menary, to more than 21 years’ imprisonment for the dreadful road rage attack on the Liverpool Football Club victory parade, could fail to realise the need for public awareness of sentencing and its justification. While public awareness is vital, victim understanding is just as important—even more so. The provision of transcripts and of sentencing hearings is therefore a crucial service.

I look forward to considering the important amendments to be moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, on improving our provisions for compensation in a corporate context. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, put that in the frame of restorative justice. I agree with him that that is an interesting and sensible way of introducing this topic and of taking the approach that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, suggests.

We also support the amendment proposed in the House of Commons by Joshua Reynolds MP to amend the victims’ code to ensure that it will apply to assisting relatives of victims of murder or manslaughter committed abroad.

On the unduly lenient sentence scheme, my noble friend Lady Brinton outlined the degree to which we do not believe that the short extra time to be given to the Attorney-General to introduce an application goes far enough. There is, I suggest, no reason in principle why the unduly lenient sentence scheme should not ensure that questioning the leniency of sentences is as available as appeals against excessive sentences are available to offenders.

Before closing, I say this: for all the merits of this Bill, as my noble friend Lady Brinton and others have highlighted, it exposes a glaring failure in the Government’s approach to the criminal justice system: the failure to take sufficient measures to address the delays in the criminal justice system which have led to the current appalling court backlogs. As the last speaker in the gap, the noble Lord, Lord Gove, said that the most important thing for victims is speedy and effective justice, and he emphasised the importance of the qualified criminal Bar in providing that.

The delay in court hearings has been the starkest denial of victims’ rights to justice that we can imagine, as the depressing prevalence of abandoned cases in the face of delay attests, and that is particularly so in the case of sexual offences. For every victim in a case that is abandoned because it is not brought to trial in a reasonable time, that is a denial of justice. It is a betrayal by society of that victim, who justifiably loses any confidence that the system or the state is on the victim’s side.

The noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch, in what was an important speech, said that no one expects to be a victim of crime. She highlighted the lack of political attention that crime therefore attracts. That also means that she highlighted the lack of resources allocated by government to criminal justice as a result.

I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, said about the importance of not just cutting but ending these disastrous delays. Like him, I do not accept that the only way of cutting delays is by restricting jury trials, which I regard as extremely important. It is a question of resources, of efficiency, and of being more adventurous in the ways we deal with this. It is a question of more court sitting days and more hours; of better repair and refurbishment of disused and decrepit buildings; of ensuring that we do not have courts standing empty; and of ensuring that we have more barristers, solicitors, judges, all properly remunerated and attracted to continue the work they do in their professional lives.

On efficiency, we need to improve prison delivery services and all those wasteful things that cause endless adjournments. Prosecutors need to avoid overcharging when that will make no difference to ultimate disposal or sentence. We need to make more use of new technology for listing, for pre-trial hearings and for evidence preparation and presentation, making cases more economic. We need to have an overall inventive approach. If we do that and cut the delays, we will be doing more for victims than what we do in the Bill. Meanwhile, what we do in the Bill is of course extremely important, and that is why, generally, we welcome it and will seek to improve it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I would, of course, always say that I am right, would I not? In that sense, they are wrong.

The noble and learned Lord made the point about needing to invest in people. I will give another gentle reminder about who was in power for the past 14 years.

Turning to the question of the unduly lenient scheme, I entirely agree with noble Lords that there is no point in having a right that nobody knows they have, and we plainly are not getting this right in terms of information. It needs to be more broadly known about. The question of whether 28 days is the appropriate period is one to which the Government are giving urgent consideration. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, said that it should be made the same as for defendants. It is: they have 28 days. That is where the period came from: there is parity between the two. But that does not necessarily mean it must remain.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

As the noble Baroness knows, the period for appeal is extendable in certain circumstances. That is quite an important provision.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

That is very rare. If you appeal out of time, you have pretty much had it. You need to have a really good reason to do so. I now turn to—

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord is probing at this stage and I am with him in wanting to see procedures from the point of view of victims, but I simply do not know whether magistrates have the same powers as Crown Court judges. When we debated this issue before, we were told about the powers that judges have now, without the need for an extension.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, came quite close to my question. Magistrates come from a very different background. Do they currently have the same powers as the judges who will be covered by this legislation, quite apart from the powers that are given by the Bill, in dealing with recalcitrant—if that is the right word—defendants?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the way in which he has explained these amendments. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for injecting a note of caution and to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for injecting a note of questioning about the proposed amendments.

In their explanatory statement, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, state that the amendments in this group probe

“the rationale behind restricting the power to order offenders to attend a sentencing hearing to only the Crown Courts”.

The noble and learned Lord explained why he suggests that there is no difference, for the purpose of this power, between the Crown Courts and the magistrates’ courts.

I should make it clear that we on these Benches start from the position that defendants should be obliged to attend court for their sentencing hearings. But the fact that they are obliged to attend court does not lead to the conclusion that the courts ought to have the power to get them to court however much they wish to resist.

It is, of course, important from the victims’ point of view—this is a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made—that the defendants who have committed offences against them are in court for the occasion when they are brought to justice. It is appropriate, therefore, that in the right cases, the court should have the power to order them to do so.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out what a serious power this is. It is particularly a serious power, as I will come to say, because the use of force is sanctioned to get defendants to court. We have heard tell, in the press and in the House of Commons, from some of the wilder speeches—if I may put it that way—of, in effect, the court having the power to order that offenders be brought to court by considerable force and in chains. I am quite clear that that is not the way the Bill puts it; it puts it in terms of the use of force being reasonable, proportionate and appropriate. Nevertheless, it is a very serious power.

It is also important from the offenders’ point of view that they should come to court, first, to hear what the court says about their offences as well as what their counsel and the prosecution say about their offences. It is also important because their attending court and listening, hopefully with some care, to what goes on at their sentencing hearing may be taken as a sign of their understanding of the import of the hearing. If an order is made, the breach of such an order to attend court for a sentencing hearing is a sign of a lack of remorse on the part of the defendant. A lack of remorse will usually involve a court treating a defendant more severely than it might treat a defendant who does show remorse for the offences that they have committed and an understanding of the impact of those offences on the victims.

The scheme of this Bill is to bring in a very strong regime of compulsion with a specific incorporation of provisions about contempt of court and significantly, as I adumbrated, about the right to use force to bring defendants to court who are unwilling and refuse to attend their sentencing hearings. The conditions for the new regime, as set out in the Bill, are that the defendant has been convicted and is in custody awaiting sentencing by the Crown Court. That brings into play the kind of reservation that the noble and learned Lord spoke about. This new regime is designed to deal with serious offences. A third condition is that the offender has refused or is likely to refuse to attend the sentencing hearing.

It follows that the code for punishment for contempt should be confined to adult offenders. The amendments seek to make this procedure and all its features applicable to a wider group of offenders, and to magistrates’ courts as well as Crown Courts. I ask the Minister and the noble and learned Lord when they close how far a change to include magistrates’ courts will help victims. One can see how it is justified and might help victims in serious cases, but I question how far the use of force will ever be in the public interest. One must question the purpose of the use of force. It could be twofold. It could be to force offenders to face up to their offences and help them to avoid reoffending. It could be to help the victims by letting them see that those who have committed offences against them are being brought to justice. There may be force in that.

However, there is also a risk, which may be important, of forced attendance becoming a means for defendants to get publicity for themselves, their offences and their resistance to justice: to portray themselves as public martyrs and, in some cases, to make political gestures that could be thoroughly undesirable. If these orders became the norm, those dangers would be real. If it is to have a positive effect, this power is likely to be much more effective for serious cases in the Crown Court than it is for cases in the magistrates’ court. Of course we take the point that the scope of hearings in magistrates’ courts has been increased over what it was before the distinction was changed. Nevertheless, I will be very interested to hear the Minister’s response on the distinction. Our position at the moment is that the distinction is plainly justified.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, explores the reasons for limiting this power to the Crown Court.

Before I begin, I am sure that the whole Committee will wish to join me in paying tribute to the families of Jan Mustafa, Henriett Szucs, Sabina Nessa, Zara Aleena, and Olivia Pratt-Korbel—whose mother and aunt sit below the Bar today. Their tireless campaigning has brought about this change. They have persuaded the Government that when a cowardly offender refuses to attend court, it causes anger and upset, which can feel like a final insult to victims and their families, who have sat through the trial waiting for the moment when they can tell the world—and, importantly, the offender—about the impact their crimes have had. Many of them want the opportunity to look the offender in the eye as he or she hears about the effects of what they have done.

Offenders are expected to attend court for sentence, and the overwhelming majority do so. Because magistrates’ courts hear less serious cases, offenders are more likely to be on bail, and where an offender is on bail, the courts have powers to compel attendance by issuing a warrant. When a warrant is issued, the defendant is brought before the court in custody for the warrant to be executed, and the judge can add an additional sentence for the offence of failing to surrender to bail, which will appear on their record in future.

However, in the Crown Court, which deals only with the top level of serious crime, offenders are much more often remanded in custody, and so court powers to get them physically into court are more restricted. That is why the Government have acted by bringing forward this legislation which gives three powers that can be used in relation to recalcitrant—that is the right word, as used by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—offenders: first, authorising the use of reasonable force, except in the case of children, because we are a civilised country, and this Government do not believe in using force on children; secondly, for offenders who still refuse to attend, or for those who are disruptive once they are there, the power to add an additional sentence; and, thirdly, the power to impose the same kinds of prison sanctions as a prison governor can impose.

However, getting an unwilling and often disruptive offender to court is by no means straightforward, and it inevitably causes a delay to the sentencing hearing for the following reasons. At the outset, the judge will have to hear submissions from prosecution and defence counsel, as well as possibly from the prison and escort staff, as to whether the offender has a reasonable excuse for non-attendance and, if not, whether to exercise these new statutory powers. Then the judge will need to give a ruling, giving reasons as to why, in the circumstances of that particular case, it would be necessary, reasonable and proportionate to use reasonable force to get the offender to court.

Then the prison and transport staff will have to go and get the prisoner from the place, whether it is a prison or a court cell, which they are refusing to leave. The prison and transport staff will then have to use their judgment as to how best to execute the judge’s ruling, including what degree of force to use. Finally, if the offender is forced into court and is then disruptive, this is likely to cause more delay while the judge decides what to do next.

There is probably one thing we can all agree on: the criminal courts do not need any additional delays. Judges will need to weigh up carefully whether and when to use their new powers. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the question of the inherent powers that courts already have. Both the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts have inherent powers to deal with a non-attendance as a contempt of court, but these are used sparingly because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out very powerfully, it is far from straightforward.

For these reasons, the Government’s view is that this new legislation is appropriately restricted to Crown Court sentencing. It represents a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem, because it is the Crown Court where these powers are needed. Operational arrangements are already in place for producing the most serious and violent offenders at the Crown Court, managing the risks that that involves and, where necessary, using proportionate force. So, for these reasons, we consider that expanding the power to magistrates’ courts might create legal and operational uncertainty and unnecessary delay to court proceedings. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I shall make two observations. The first relates to the remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in relation to how judges will exercise these powers and whether guidance will be given. No doubt the Lady Chief Justice will consider whether to give guidance, or such guidance might be given by practice direction or be the subject of discussion at the Judicial College, but the handling of this is entirely for the judiciary. It is difficult enough, and it certainly would not be in any way appropriate for the Ministry of Justice to give guidance. It seems to me that the exercise of this judicial power must be for the judicial branch of the state and it alone—unless, of course, Parliament in its infinite wisdom decides that it wants to set down the criteria. I strongly urge Members not to do that.

The second relates to a more practical point, and that is the ability of the victim to intervene in the decision and to be able to make a request. It is sometimes forgotten that a transformation occurred during the 2000s and the next decade in the way in which the Crown Prosecution Service dealt with victims. There was a time when the victim was regarded as peripheral to the way in which the courts operated and to matters that had to be taken into account. That position changed remarkably and for the better. I think it is appreciated that the judicial power to have someone brought into court has to be exercised with the greatest degree of thought. If the Crown Prosecution Service were to request this to happen, I would be astounded if it had not consulted the victim. In my experience, that is what often happens in these difficult circumstances. There is a discussion as to the best way of proceeding and it is very important that this is approached in that sort of way.

If the victim was to be allowed to make the request directly, this raises the question as to how. Is this to be done in open court with the discussion of the various issues? Is it not best left to the wisdom of the Crown prosecutor and the judge’s ability to ask questions as to the victim’s views? It seems to me this is a much more efficacious way of dealing with the matter rather than bringing the victim in personally—because there is no suggestion of a victim’s advocate for this—to what will be, if this power is to be exercised, an occasion of great difficulty. The last thing anyone wants to happen is to provide secondary victimisation by an awful scene in court. I urge the Government to exercise very considerable caution in considering this amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, once again I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for his note of caution about Amendment 3—and Amendment 8 in the case of service personnel—which would allow victims to request that an order be made. I completely agree with him that it is a matter for the judiciary to exercise its discretion as to whether orders are made. I am not entirely sure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, took into account quite how difficult it is going to be to make these orders. I suggest that the caution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, about bringing the victim in as effectively a party to such an application is a point well made. But I accept that it is right that the victim’s voice should be heard. I also agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, that the victim’s voice in court now is heard in a way that it certainly was not decades and even years ago. But a formal position whereby the victim was entitled to make a request is probably undesirable, though it is quite clear that the victim’s voice should be heard and that guidance to and from the judiciary should reflect that.

Amendments 4 and 9 are effectively seeking a very serious conflict:

“If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim, or, where the victim is deceased or is unable to be consulted … a family member or other appropriate representative”.


That would put the victim in a wholly invidious position of effectively making the victim compulsorily a party to the application for an order. That is likely to stoke up hostility between the victim and the offender, which we are trying to avoid or at least reduce, and even possibly between the victim and the court, which would be a thoroughly undesirable position. Far better, I suggest, to leave it to the judge to decide how the victim’s views should be sought and taken into account, without imposing any duty on the court to consult the victim at any stage. It would be much better for the Bill to remain silent on how the victim’s views should be sought, but the expectation will be that they will be sought, and I have no doubt that that is how the judiciary would approach this exercise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst propose that the provisions in Clauses 1 and 2 apply to offenders from the age of 16, rather than only to those aged 18 and over. As drafted, Clauses 1 and 2 are explicitly limited in their application to those aged 18 or over. That is a departure from the original Conservative proposal for this power, which would have required the court to consult the relevant youth offending team if the offender in question was under 18. We therefore believe that the blanket threshold of 18 should be examined.

The age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is, of course, 10 years of age. Even if it is believed that the age of criminal responsibility might reasonably be set higher than 10—a subject of recent debate in this Chamber—there is widespread cross-party consensus that it should be significantly lower than 18. Indeed, Scotland, after extensive consultation and careful consideration, chose to set the age of criminal responsibility at 14, reflecting evidence of developmental science and, indeed, public expectations in the field of criminal law.

A 16 year-old who has been convicted of a serious offence will be expected to go before a Crown Court judge to receive their sentence, yet will face no statutory obligation to attend their own sentencing hearing under these provisions. That appears inconsistent with the intent of these provisions.

We have seen both in recent cases and in parliamentary proceedings on this Bill how deeply distressing and unfortunate it can be for victims and families when an offender refuses to face the court at sentencing, an act described by Ministers as a “final insult” to those already traumatised. It is difficult to articulate why someone aged 16 who has been found guilty of a serious offence should be exempt from measures designed to ensure that they confront the consequences of their own criminal actions.

We should also reflect upon the wider tapestry of civic responsibility that has developed, and which this Government would also confer upon 16 year-olds. The Government have proposed to lower the voting age to 16. Someone aged 16 can marry; they can pay tax and join the Armed Forces. They assume a suite of responsibilities in civil society. They are treated as autonomous agents in a host of legal and social contexts, and to exempt them uniquely in this narrow but important sphere from the requirement to attend their own sentencing hearing when convicted of a crime appears inconsistent with those wider developments.

We owe it to victims and to the public to ensure that the measures we put on statute reflect a coherent and principled approach. These amendments ensure that they align with the realities of criminal responsibility and the Government’s wider policy. Someone who commits a serious crime at 16, such as murder or serious violence, should not be placed beyond the reach of these important attendant provisions. That is the inconsistency which appears to us in the present form of Clauses 1 and 2.

Accountability cannot be robust at conviction and sentencing in substance but simply optional at the point of sentencing in practice. We have seen very recent examples of relatively young people aged 15 and 16 committing the most heinous offences, in some instances murder. There can be no doubt, of course, that the existing framework for youth justice should be maintained and remain separate and distinct from these provisions. Nevertheless, when it comes to those of 16 years and older, their personal conduct does take them before the Crown Court. They appear there for sentencing and there is no principled justification for differentiating on the basis of age alone between 16 and 18 when culpability and legal responsibility have already been established. With that in mind, I respectfully commend these amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, briefly, these amendments would treat offenders over the age of 16 in the same way as offenders over the age of 18 in relation to three aspects of the compulsory attendance regime. The first aspect is the requirement that the court consult a youth offending team before making an order; the second is the use of force against young offenders, and the third is the use of prison sanctions in the case of service offenders.

The Member’s Explanatory Statement explains that these amendments probe why these provisions apply only to offenders over the age of 18. The position that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has taken is that they should apply to everyone over the age of 16. I suggest that the answer to the question is that, modest as they are, these provisions make different arrangements for offenders under 18 because they are designed to protect 16 and 17 year-old offenders, who are children and not yet adults. I submit, and we on these Benches believe, that it is right that contemporary criminal justice attempts to treat offenders under 18 in a way that acknowledges the particular vulnerabilities of 16 and 17 year-olds.

In the first group of amendments today, the noble Baroness said that the Government broadly agree with that position. The amendments seek to remove the distinction between 16 and 17 year-olds on the one hand and adults, albeit young adults, on the other. We say that this would be a retrograde step and that it should be opposed. I would add that of the measures that are proposed in the amendments, those sanctioning the use of force against 16 year-olds—to bring them to sentencing hearings against their will—would be particularly egregious and potentially very damaging.

Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do apologise.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Not at all. I apologise. I waited for the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, to introduce his amendment before I spoke.

I will speak briefly to Amendment 40, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and then to Amendment 67, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. I will say nothing on Amendments 46 and 47 on child sexual abuse, except that I fully support them, for the reasons that have been given.

Amendment 40 is on fraud, bribery and money laundering. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, rightly says that it is not the first time that he has brought this issue before the House or before Parliament. Indeed, he has been a formidable campaigner on the issue for a number of years. On these Benches, we think he is right about it. It is a very difficult area on which to propose legislation in precise or specific terms. With this amendment, he seeks to require a review of the whole area of fraud, bribery and money laundering within the UK and abroad.

The background is the inevitable inadequacy of existing civil proceedings, in this jurisdiction or elsewhere, not only from a jurisdictional point of view but because of the inevitable cost of civil proceedings, the difficulty of valuation and the difficulties of enforcement for the victims of substantial economic crime. They cannot be properly compensated by the existing regime of compensation orders. A review is needed to consider how compensation might be ordered and to consider the principles that are brought into play by complex economic crime for criminal activity here and abroad, and not always just in one jurisdiction but often across countries and in multiple jurisdictions.

The noble and learned Lord highlights our poor record as a country—though rightly he says that we are better than many—in providing compensation for victims of economic offences. He highlights that there may not be just individual or corporate losers; there can also be organisations or states which deserve compensation but for which, presently, our law and the law elsewhere makes no proper provision.

These are difficult issues and there are very difficult issues concerning quantification. The inadequacy of how we fail the victims of overseas corruption and other economic crime amounts, in effect, to our holding our hands up and admitting defeat in the face of those issues. The review for which the noble and learned Lord calls needs to be illuminated and energised by some extremely innovative and imaginative thinking which holds out the prospect of real improvement of the position and accepts that we may not be precise in any award of compensation. A real attempt to provide adequate compensation can be made and should be made.

I am bound to say that I also agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that grasping this issue could enhance the business reputation of London as a centre of economic and business excellence where others have failed in this area.

Amendment 67, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks a review of sentencing guidelines to insist on compensation which is commensurate, they say, with the value of stolen items, although I appreciate that the way the amendment was opened goes wider than cases of theft.